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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42611 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
JEREMIAH A. QUANE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL 
DAVID Z. NEVIN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
3/16/2012 NGOC MCBIEHKJ New Case Filed - Other Claims Deborah Bail 
COMP MCBIEHKJ Complaint Filed Deborah Bail 
SMFI MCBIEHKJ Summons Filed (2) Deborah Bail 
MOTN. MCBIEHKJ Motion for Limited Admission of P Gregory Deborah Bail 
Haddad 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion for Limited Admission of James B Perrine Deborah Bail 
3/19/2012 AFOS CCWRIGRM (2) Affidavit Of Service (03/16/12) Deborah Bail 
3/22/2012 ORDR CCTHERTL Order Granting Motions for Limited Admission Deborah Bail 
4/2/2012 NOAP CCVIDASL Notice Of Appearance (Quane for Brian Calder Deborah Bail 
Kerr and Silk Touch Laser LLP) 
NOTS CCVIDASL Notice Of Service of Discovery Deborah Bail 
' 4/16/2012 ANSW TCORTEJN Answer (Quane for Brian Kerr MD, Silk Laser Deborah Bail 
Touch) 
4/18/2012 HRSC DCDOUGLI Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Deborah Bail 
05/09/2012 03:30 PM) 
DCDOUGLI Notice of Status Conference Deborah Bail 
5/2/2012 NOTS CCKHAMSA Notice Of Service Of Discovery Deborah Bail 
5/4/2012 STIP CCHOLMEE Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Deborah Bail 
5/7/2012 CONV CCTHERTL Hearing r,esult for Status Conference scheduled Deborah Bail 
on 05/09/2012 03:30 PM: Conference Vacated 
5/16/2012 HRSC DCDOUGLI Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/24/2013 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) 10 days 
DCDOUGLI Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Deborah Bail 
Further Proceedings 
5/17/2012 MOTN. CCWRIGRM Motion for First (Automatic Disqualification of Deborah Bail 
Alternate Judge) 
5/18/2012 ORDR CCTHERTL Order for First (Automatic) Disqualification of Deborah Bail 
Alternate Judge (Williamson) 
6/6/2012 NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs First Set of Deborah Bail 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production and 
Requests for Admissions to Defendants 
6/26/2012 NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
6/29/2012 NSDR CCSWEECE Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Deborah Bail 
8/24/2012 MOTN CCHEATJL Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendant's Answers Deborah Bail 
To Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories 
AFCO · CCHEATJL Affidavit Of Counsel Deborah Bail 
MEMO CCHEATJL Plaintiff's Memorandum Of Law In Suuport Of Deborah Bail 
Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Defendant's Answers 
To Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories 
8/27/2012 NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (09/12/2012@ 2:30 pm) Deborah Bail 
HRSC CCMEYEAR Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Deborah Bail 
09/12/2012 02:30 PM) 
000003
Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
9/5/2012 AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit for the Certification per Rule 32 a 2 Deborah Bail 
[file stamped 09/06/2012] 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Opposition to Compel Deborah Bail 
[file stamped 09/06/2012] 
9/12/2012 DCHH CCTHERTL Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Deborah Bail 
on 09/12/2012 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
9/14/2012 AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit of Counsel Deborah Bail 
9/19/2012 OBJE MCBIEHKJ Objection to Proposed Order on Motion to Deborah Bail 
Compel 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Jeremiah A Quane for Objections Deborah Bail 
9/20/2012 RESP CCDEREDL Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants Deborah Bail 
Objeciton to Plaintiffs Proposed Order and Claim 
for Fees and Expenses Related to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel Defendants Answers to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories 
9/24/2012 NOTS CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
9/27/2012 NOTC CCKHAMSA Notice Of Change Of Address Deborah Bail 
10/11/2012 ORDR CCTHERTL Order {Granting Motion to Compel) Deborah Bail 
1/4/2013 NOTO CCWRIGRM Notice to Take Video Deposition Deborah Bail 
NOTO CCWRIGRM (4) Notice Of Taking Deposition Deborah Bail 
1/11/2013 NOTO CCWATSCL Notice Duces Tecum Of Taking the Video Deborah Bail 
Deposition of Charles Ballard 
2/1/2013 RSPN CCPINKCN Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants' Notice Deborah Bail 
Duces Tecum of Taking the Video Deposition of 
Charles Ballard 
2/11/2013 NOTS CCMEYEAR (2) Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
3/14/2013 NOTO CCSWEECE Notice Of Taking Videotaped Deposition Deborah Bail 
3/22/2013 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
3/26/2013 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
MISC MCBIEHKJ Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure Deborah Bail 
5/14/2013 NOTO MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Taking Deposition of Charles Ballard Deborah Bail 
NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
5/16/2013 SUBC MCBIEHKJ Substitution Of Counsel {New Firm) Deborah Bail 
5/28/2013 DEWI CCWATSCL Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witness List Deborah Bail 
6/3/2013 NOTC CCHOLMEE Notice to .Take Deposition Deborah Bail 
6/4/2013 NOTS CCPINKCN Notice Of Service of Discovery Deborah Bail 




Time: 03:55 PM 
Page 3 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
6/21/2013 NOTC CCREIDMA Notice Of Service of Plaintiff's Third Set of Deborah Bail 
Discovery Requests to Defendants 
6/26/2013 MOTN CCSWEECE Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Deborah Bail 
Witnesses 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit of Scott McKay Deborah Bail 
MEMO CCSWEECE Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Deborah Bail 
Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses 
NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing Deborah Bail 
HRSC CCSVVEECE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/10/2013 03:30 Deborah Bail 
PM) Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert 
Witnesses 
7/2/2013 AFFD CCKINGAJ Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiff's Deborah Bail 
Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses 
MEMO CCKINGAJ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Deborah Bail 
Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses 
7/3/2013 NOTD CCHOLMEE Notice Of Taking Deposition of Dr Geoffrey Stiller Deborah Bail 
7/8/2013 RPLY CCPINKCN Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition Deborah Bail 
to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert 
Witnesses 
7/9/2013 MEMO CCHOLMEE Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Deborah Bail 
Motion in Limine Experts 
7/10/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Deborah Bail 
07/10/2013 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 -Motion to Exclude Cumulative 
Expert Witnesses 
7/23/2013 NOTS CCSWEECE Notice Of Service of Discovery Deborah Bail 
7/24/2013 ORDR CCVILLTL Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Deborah Bail 
Cumulative Expert Witness 
7/25/2013 NOTC CCMARTJD Notice of Intent to Serve Subpoena Deborah Bail 
7/29/2013 AMEN CCPINKCN Amended Notice of Take Video Deposition of Dr. Deborah Bail 
John P lundeby MD 
7/31/2013 NOTD CCHOLMEE Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Dr Deborah Bail 
Dean Sorensen 
8/12/2013 AMEN CCSWEECE Amended Notice to Take Video Deposition of Dr Deborah Bail 
Thomas Coffman MD 
NOTD CCMARTJD Notice Of Taking Deposition Deborah Bail 
8/13/2013 NOTS CCMARTJD Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
8/14/2013 NOTS· CCMEYEAR Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
8/26/2013 NOTC CCHOLMEE Notice of Change of Address Deborah Bail 
8/30/2013 NOTC CCKHAMSA Plaintiff's Notice Of Intent To Offer Testimony Of Deborah Bail 
Medical Expert By Video Teleconference And 
Request For Leave To Permit Same 
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Date: 3/2/2015 
Time: 03:55 PM 
Page 4 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 


















































Notice Of Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 




Notice Of.Taking Deposition Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Deborah Bail 
on 09/04/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Deborah Bail 
09/24/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 10 days 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/05/2013 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) 10 days 
CCOSBODK . Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 


















AMENDED Notice of Trial Setting and Order 
Governing Further Proceedings (10 days) 
Amended Notice to Take Video Conference 
Deposition of Dr Gregory Laurence 
Notice Of Taking Deposition 
Notice Of Intent To Serve Subpoena Duces 
Tecum 
Motion For (Automatic) Disqualification of 
Alternative Judge Per the Court Order of 
September 9, 2013 
Notice Of Service 
Notice Of Taking Deposition 
Affidavit Of Service 9.23.13 
Second Amended Notice to Take Video 
conference Deposition of Dr Gregory Laurence 
Notice Of Taking Video Conference Deposition 
Duces Tecum of Susan Kerr 
Notice Of Service 
Notice Of Service of Discovery 













Notice of Reconvened Videotaped and Video Deborah Bail 
Conference Deposition of Charles Garrison MD 
Amended Notice of Reconvened Videotaped and Deborah Bail 
Video Conference Deposition of Charles Garrison 
MD 
Notice of Hearing 11/05/13 @ 9:30 pm 
Notice Of Service 





Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
10/21/2013 AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit of Counsel In Support Of Defs Motion in Deborah Bail 
Limine 
MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum In Support Of Defs Motion in Deborah Bail 
Limine 
NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing 11/05/13@ 9:30am Deborah Bail 
10/22/2013 MISC MCBIEHKJ Defendants Proposed Jury Instructions and Deborah Bail 
SPecial Verdict Form 
MOTN CCOSBODK Plaintiffs Consolidated Motions In Limine Deborah Bail . 
AFFD CCOSBODK Affidavit Of Counsel Deborah Bail 
MISC CCOSBODK Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions And Special Deborah Bail 
Verdict Form 
10/29/2013 MISC CCREIDMA Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant's Motions In Deborah Bail 
Limine 
MISC CCREIDMA Plaintiffs Pretrial Exchange of Information Deborah Bail 
Certification 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Plaintiffs Deborah Bail 
Responses to Defendant's Motions In Limine 
MISC TCLAFFSD Certification Of Defense Counsel Per The Deborah Bail 
Amended Notice Of Trial Setting And Order 
Governing Further Proceedings Dated September 
9,2013 
MEMO TCLAFFSD Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motions Deborah Bail 
In Limine 
AFFD TCLAFFSD Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Memorandum Deborah Bail 
In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
10/30/2013 RSPN CCHEATJL Plaintiffs Response To Defense Counsel's Deborah Bail 
Misrepresentation To The Court RE Mediation 
10/31/2013 NOTC, CCHOLMEE Notice of Filing Deborah Bail 
EXHI CCOSBODK Plaintiffs Exhibit List Deborah Bail 
11/1/2013 REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Deborah Bail 
Limine 
11/5/2013 DCHH · CCVILLTL Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Deborah Bail 
11/05/2013 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 1 
JTST CCVILLTL Jury Trial Started Deborah Bail 
11/6/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 2 
11/7/2013 DCHH; CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Kristi Valcich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 3 
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Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
11/8/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Roxanne Patchell/Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 4 
11/12/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 5 
MEMO CCVILLTL Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiff Recovering Deborah Bail 
for Krystal Bllard's Medical Costs and Burial 
Benefits and Expenses 
11/13/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 6 
11/14/2013 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 - Jury Trial Day 7 
12/6/2013 MOTN TCLAFFSD Plaintiffs Motion For Sanctions, For Full Deborah Bail 
Enforcement Of Sanctions Previously Imposed, 
And For Enforcement Of Existing Discovery And 
Disclosure Deadlines 
DECL TCLAFFSD Declaration of P Gregory Haddad In Support Of Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Motion For Sanctions, For Full 
Enforcement Of Sanctions Previously Imposed, 
And For Enforcement Of Existing Discovery And 
Disclosure Deadlines 
MEMO TCLAFFSD Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Plaintiffs Deborah Bail 
Motion For Sanctions, For Full Enforcement Of 
Sanctions Previously Imposed, And For 
Enforcement Of Existing Discovery And 
Disclosure Deadlines 
12/23/2013 OBJC CCKHAMSA Objection To Plaintiffs Motion For Sanctions, For Deborah Bail 
Full Enforcement Of Sanctions Previously 
Imposed, And For Enforcement Of Existing 
Discovery And Disclosure Deadlines 
12/24/2013 NOHG CCSCOTDL Notice Of Hearing (2-12-14 @2PM) Deborah Bail 
12/27/2013 HRSC CCSCOTDL Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/12/2014 02:00 Deborah Bail 
PM) Sanctions 
1/30/2014 NOHG TCHEISLA Notice Of Hearing Deborah Bail 
[entered in error] 
STAT TCHEISLA STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk actior Deborah Bail 
[entered in error] 
2/5/2014 MOTN CCSCOTDL Defendants Motion for Leave to File Over Length Deborah Bail 
Brief in response to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
AFFD · CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Deborah Bail 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
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Date: 3/2/2015 
Time: 03:55 PM 
Page 7 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
2/5/2014 AFFD CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Terrence S Jones in Opposition to Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions 
AFFD CCSCOTDL Affidavit of Dr Geoffrey D Stiller Deborah Bail 
MEMO CCSCOTDL Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Deborah Bail 
for Sanctions 
2/7/2014 MEMO CCHEATJL Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion Deborah Bail 
For Sanctions 
2/10/2014 MOTN CCHEATJL Plaintiffs Motion To Strike Defendants' Second . Deborah Bail 
Overlength Memorandum 
DECL CCHEATJL Declaration Of P Gregory Haddad In Support Of Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In SUpport Of 
Motion For Sanctions 
MEMO CCVILLTL Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Deborah Bail 
Motion for Sanctions 
2/11/2014 EXHI CCNELSRF Exhibit "A" to Plfs Motion To Strike Defendants' Deborah Bail 
Second Overlength Memorandum 
2/12/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Deborah Bail 
02/12/2014 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
2/18/2014 MEMO TCLAFFSD Plaintiffs Memorandum Of Attorney Fees & Costs Deborah Bail 
DECL TCLAFFSD Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad In Support of Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Memorandum Of Attorney Fees And 
Costs 
2/20/2014 HRSC CCVILLTL Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/08/2014 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) 3weeks 
2/21/2014 DCDOUGLI Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Deborah Bail 
Further Proceedings 
2/24/2014 OBJE CCHOLMEE Objections to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Attorney Deborah Bail 
Fees and Costs 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit of Jeremiah A Quane For Objections to Deborah Bail 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
NOHG. CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing 3.12.14@200PM Deborah Bail 
HRSC CCHOLMEE Hearing Scheduled (Objection to Attorney Fees Deborah Bail 
and Costs 03/12/2014 02:00 PM) 
2/27/2014 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion for First Disqualification of the Honorable Deborah Bail 
Deborah Bail 
2/28/2014 ORDR CCVILLTL Order (Denying Motion for First Disqualification of Deborah Bail 
the Honorable Deborah Bail) 
3/12/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL Hearing result for Objection to Attorney Fees and Deborah Bail 
Costs scheduled on 03/12/2014 02:00 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
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Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 8 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
3/20/2014 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
NOTA CCTHIEBJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Deborah Bail 
3/25/2014 NOTC. CCREIDMA Plaintiff's Notice of Reliance on Previously Filed Deborah Bail 
Consolidated Motions In Limine and 
Supplemental Motions in Limine 
AFFD CCREIDMA Affidavit of Counsel Deborah Bail 
NOTC CCREIDMA · Plaintiff's Notice of Reliance on Previously Filed Deborah Bail 
Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
3/26/2014 MOTN CCVIDASL Defendants Motion in Limine Deborah Bail 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion in Deborah Bail 
Limine 
MISC CCVIDASL Defendants Proposed Jury lnstuctions and Deborah Bail 
Special Verdict Form 
3/27/2014 HRSC CCVILLTL Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Deborah Bail 
04/02/2014 02:30 PM) 
3/28/2014 MOTN CCHOLMEE Defendants Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial of Deborah Bail 
April 8, 2014 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit of Dr Britani Hill Deborah Bail 
MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion to Shorten Time Deborah Bail 
4/1/2014 MISC CCHEATJL Certification Of Defense Counsel Per The Deborah Bail 
Amended Notice Of Trial Setting And ORder 
Governing Further Proceedings Dated February 
21 2014 
RSPN CCWEEKKG Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Emergency Deborah Bail 
Motion to Vacate Trial 
MISC CCWEEKKG Plaintiff's Pretrial Exchange of Information Deborah Bail 
Certificate 
RSPN CCWEEKKG Plaintiff's Oppostition and Response to Deborah Bail 
Defendatns' Motion in Limine 
AFFD CCWEEKKG Affidavit of Counsel Deborah Bail 
4/2/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL Hearing result for Status by Phone scheduled on Deborah Bail 
04/02/2014 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
HRVC. CCVILLTL Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Deborah Bail 
04/08/2014 09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 
weeks 
4/8/2014 HRSC CCVILLTL Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/16/2014 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) three weeks 
NOTC CCVILLTL Notice of Re-setting Trial (9/16/14@ 9:30 am) Deborah Bail 
7/7/2014 REMT. CCTHIEBJ Remittitur-Dismissed Supreme Court Docket No. Deborah Bail 
41971 
8/6/2014 NOTC CCMURPST Notice of Change of Address Deborah Bail 
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Date: 3/2/2015 
Time: 03:55 PM 
Page 9 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
9/11/2014 BREF CCMARTJD Brief on Use of Depositions at Trial Deborah Bail 
NOTC CCMARTJD Notice of Filing Deborah Bail 
9/16/2014 DCHH· CCVILLTL Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Deborah Bail 
09/16/2014 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: more than 500 
JTST CCVILLTL Jury Trial Started Deborah Bail 
9/17/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 2 --- more than 500 
9/18/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 3 --- more than 500 
9/19/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 4 --- more than 500 
9/23/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 5 --- more than 500 
BREF CCVILLTL Plaintiffs Bench Brief Re: Taxes Deborah Bail 
9/24/2014 BREF CCVILLTL Plaintiffs Bench Brief Re: Admissibility of Medical Deborah Bail 
Bills 
DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 6 --- more than 500 
9/25/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 7 --- more than 500 
MEMO CCVILLTL Defendant's Bench Memo Re: The Introduction of Deborah Bail 
Air Force Medical Records of Krystal Ballard for 
Impeachment Purposes 
9/26/2014 MISC CCVILLTL Plaintiffs Request for Curative Jury Instructions to Deborah Bail 
Address Defendants' Violation of Pretrial Ruling 
DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 8 --- more than 500 
9/30/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 9 --- more than 500 
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Date: 3/2/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:55 PM ROA Report 
Page 10 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
9/30/2014 ORDR· CCVILLTL Revised Order Re: Unauthorized Deborah Bail 
Recording/Transcribing and Use of Unofficial 
Tanscripts 
10/1/2014 MISC CCVILLTL Plaintiffs Request for Supplemental Jury Deborah Bail 
Instructions Re: Death Certificate and the 
Element of Proximate Cause 
AFFD CCVILLTL Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Deborah Bail 
Offer of Proof Re: Records of Dr. Kerr's 
Experience Performing Liposuction 
DCHH· CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 10 --- more than 500 
AFFD CCVILLTL Affidavit of Terrence S. Jones in Response to the Deborah Bail 
Court's Order Re: Unauthorized Recording and 
Use of Unofficial Transcripts 
10/2/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 11 --- more than 500 
BREF CCTHIEKJ Trial Brief Deborah Bail 
10/3/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL District Court Hearing Held Deborah Bail 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Jury Trial Day 12 --- more than 500 
JRYI CCVILLTL Jury Instructions Deborah Bail 
VERD CCVILLTL Special Verdict Form Deborah Bail 
10/15/2014 JDMT DCKORSJP Judgment Deborah Bail 
CDIS DCKORSJP Civil Disposition entered for: Kerr, Brian Calder, Deborah Bail 
Defendant; Silk Touch Laser,, Defendant; Ballard, 
Charles, Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/15/2014 
STAT DCKORSJP STATUS CHANGED: Closed Deborah Bail 
10/16/2014 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
NOTA CCTHIEBJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Deborah Bail 
10/28/2014 MEMO TCMEREKV Plaiintiffs Verified Memorandum Of Costs As A Deborah Bail 
Matter Of Right, Discretionary Costs And 
Adjusted Previous Award Of Sanctions 
10/30/2014 HRSC TCHEISLA Notice of Hearing, Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Deborah Bail 
Scheduled 11/17/2014 03:00 PM) Stay of 
Execution 
APPL· TCHEISLA Application for Stay of Execution or Enforcement Deborah Bail 
of the Judgment Entered October 15, 2014 
11/4/2014 NOTC CCRADTER Notice of Plaintiff Non-Opposition to Stay of Deborah Bail 
Execution or Enforcement of Judgment 
000012
Date: 3/2/2015 
Time: 04:31 PM 
Page 11 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2012-04792 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, etal. 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, Silk Touch Laser 
Date Code User Judge 
11/5/2014 ORDR CCVILLTL Order on Defendants' Application for Stay or Deborah Bail 
Enforcement of Judgment Entered October 15, 
2014 
11/6/2014 HRSC CCVILLTL Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/03/2014 02:30 Deborah Bail 
PM) for Fees and Costs 
11/7/2014 NOTH TCWEGEKE Notice Of Hearing Deborah Bail 
11/10/2014 MOTN CCSCOTDL Defendants Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs Deborah Bail 
Memorandum of Costs 
11/26/2014 OPPO· CCMARTJD Opposition to Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Deborah Bail 
Costs 
12/3/2014 DCHH CCVILLTL Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Deborah Bail 
12/03/2014 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
2/3/2015 ORDR CCVILLTL Order Re: Costs and Fees Deborah Bail 
2/12/2015 OBJT CCHEATJL Objection To Plaintiffs Proposed Supplemental Deborah Bail 
Judgment 
2/13/2015 JDMT CCVILLTL Supplemental Judgment (Re: Costs and Fees) Deborah Bail 
3/2/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE (3) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
No. 42611 
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BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
OR\G\NAL 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, through his attorneys, and for causes of action against the 
above-named Defendants, states and alleges as follows: 
I. PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Charles Ballard is a former resident of Idaho and a current resident of Florida as an 
active-duty member of the United States Air Force. He is the surviving spouse of Krystal 
Melissa Ballard, deceased, who up until the time of her death was also an active-duty member of 
the United States Air Force. 
2. Defendant Brian Calder Kei;r, M.D. ("Defendant Kerr") is a licensed medical doctor 
who resides in Idaho and who practiced medicine in the City of Eagle, County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, at all relevant times in the Complaint, including on and after July 21, 2010. 
3. Defendant Kerr was and is a partner in Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP at all 
relevant times in the Complaint. 
4. Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership with its 
registered address as 252 W. Meadows Ridge Lane, Eagle, Idaho 83616, in the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho. 
5. At all relevant times in the Complaint, Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP, has operated 
an outpatient clinic where it provides cosmetic and plastic surgery services at 3210 E. Chinden 
Blvd., Suite 113, Boise, Idaho 83616 ("the Silk Touch clinic"). This Defendant has operated its 
business under its own name and under the trade names, or doing-business-as names, of Silk 
Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and 
. . 
Lipo of Boise. All of these Defendants, trade names, and doing-business-as names, are 
collectively referred to herein as the "Silk Touch Defendants." 
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6. At all material times herein, Defendant Kerr was an employee of the Silk Touch 
Defendants acting within the course and scope of his employment. 
7. Plaintiff has complied with Idaho Code § 6-1001, et seq, by filing an application for a 
Prelitigation Screening Panel with the Idaho State Board of Medicine which has returned its 
Report and Recommendation. 
8. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, thereby meeting _the minimum 
jurisdictional limits for filing with this Court. 
II. FACTS 
9. Plaintiff Charles Ballard is a Staff Sergeant in the United States Air Force and is now 
stationed in Florida .. He was a Staff Sergeant at all times relevant to this Complaint. Prior to 
being stationed in Florida, Plaintiff was stationed and resi~ed in Idaho with his wife, Krystal 
Ballard, up until the time of her death. 
10. At the time of her death, Krystal Ballard was also a Staff Sergeant in the United 
States Air Force. 
11. At the tirrie of Krystal's death, Charles and Krystal Ballard were married and living 
together in Mountain Home, Idaho, While both were stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force 
Base in Mountain Home, Idaho. 
12. Leading up to, and on July 21, 2010, Krystal Ballard was 27 years old and in good 
health. 
13. At all times material herein, Defendant Kerr and the Silk Touch Defendants held 
. themselves_ out to the public as individually and collectively competent providers of cosmetic and 
· plastic surgery services. 




14. Prior to the time he began providing cosmetic and plastic surgery services, Defendant 
Kerr was primarily engaged in providing anesthesiology services to the public. 
15 .. On July 21, 2010, Defendants Kerr and the Silk Touch Defendants, and upon 
information and belief, other agents, employees, and servants of these Defendants; performed 
cosmetic surgery on Krystal Ballard at the Silk Touch clinic. 
16. The medical care provided by, including but not limited to the sterilization 
procedures and techniques implemented, used, and performed by, Defendant Kerr and the Silk 
Touch Defendants, and upon information and belief, other agents, employees, and servants of 
these Defendants, while providing cosmetic surgery services to Krystal Ballard, fell below the 
standards of care owed to the patient by physicians and facilities providing cosmetic and plastic 
surgery services. 
' 
17. As a direct and proximate result of this care by these Defendants, including 
sterilization procedures and techniques falling below applicable standards of care, Krystal 
Ballard suffered during surgery, and/or developed and continued to suffer from afterward, a 
life-threatening infection and/or condition, and died. 
18. The surgery and post-surgery care and monitoring procedure~ an~ techniques 
implemented, used, and performed by Defendant Kerr and the Silk Touch Defendants, and upon 
information and belief, other agents, employees, and servants of these Defendants, while 
providing cosmetic surgery.services to Krystal Ballard and monitoring and/or caring for her 
afterward, fell below the applicable standards of care owed to the patient by physicians and 
facilities providing surgery and post-surgery cosmetic and plastic surgery services. 
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19. As a direct and proximate result of these surgery and post-surgery procedures and 
techniques falling below the applicable standards of care, Krystal Ballard suffered during surgery, 
and/or developed and continued to suffer from afterward, a life-threatening infection and/or 
condition, and died. 
20. In the early morning hours of July 26, 2010, Krystal Ballard died at St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho, as a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or 
omissions of Defendant Kerr and the Silk Touch Defendants, and upon information and belief, 
other agents, employees, and servants of these Defendants, in providing cosmetic surgery services, 
surgical monitoring services, and/or post-surgical monitoring services. 
III. MEDICAL CAUSATION 
21. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent paragraphs 
of this Complaint. 
22. The negligence and other wrongful conduct of the Defendants as alleged in this 
Complaint were a direct arid proximate cause of Krystal Ballard's death. 
23. The damages Plaintiff suffered and will suffer are a direct and proximate result of 
each of the Defendants' negligence and other wrongful conduct. 
IV. CLAIMS 
24. Plaintiff reallege.s the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent paragraphs 
of this Complaint. 
25 .. Each of the Defendants were negligent in the manner in which they treated Krystal 
Ballard. To a reasonable medical certainty, the care rendered by the Defendants fell below the 
applicable standard of care in the community in which it was provided. 
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. . 
26. Each of the Defendants were negligent in providing Kryst~l Ballard medical and 
cosmetic surgery care and services, surgical care and monitoring services, and/or post-surgical 
care and monitoring services (including up to the time of her death) that fell below the applicable 
standard of care in the community in which it was provided. 
27. These acts of negligence were a direct and proximate cause of.the special and general 
damages sustained by Plaintiff, which damages are described in the "Damages" section below. 
. 28. Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP is responsible under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for the acts and omissions of its employees, including Defendant Kerr and its nursing 
staff and/or others for whom it may be legally liaqle and for the acts and omissions of the same 
performed under the trade names, or doing-business-as names, of Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk 
Touch Med Spa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipo of Boise. 
29. The Defendants' misconduct was willful or reckless pursuant to Idaho Code § 
6-1603(4)(a). 
V. DAMAGES 
30. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent paragraphs 
of this Complaint. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has sustained . 
both economic and non-economic losses, which include but are not limited to, damages in the 
form of: 
(a) The decedent's funeral expenses; 
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•. 
(b) Loss of wages and other benefits of employment which would have been earned by 
Krystal Ballard and shared with her husband, Plaintiff, during the course of her normal 
work life expectancy; 
( c) The reasonable value attributable to the ,loss of service, care, comfort and society of 
Krystal Ballard; and 
(d) As a result of Defendants' negligence and other wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has 
been forced to employ attorneys for the prosecution of this action and Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121, and Rule 
54( d)( 1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
1. For the recovery of all special and general compensatory damages sustained as a direct 
and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants, all in a precise amount to be proven at 
the time and place of trial of this action, but which in any event exceed the jurisdictional limits of 
$10,000; 
2. For the recovery of all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho law; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
7 • COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
000020
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues in accordanc~ with Rule 38(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
rt-
DATED this the /(ft day ofM~ch, 20~2. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LJ;,P 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
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Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. 
) 
vs. ) CV DC 1204792 
) 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) SUMMONS 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
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and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND · · ) 
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NOTICE: YOU HA VE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE 
· COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
' 
TO: Silk Touch Laser, LLP, c/o Registered Agent Susan Kerr, 252 W. Meadow Ridge 
Lane, Eagle, ID 83616 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this 
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as 
demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice of 
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in titne and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10( a)( 1) and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or denials 
of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3 . .Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing 
address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorneys, as 
designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of 
the above-named court. · 
D~TED this /6 day of Marchi tA16·, CHRISTOPHER De R!CH ,,, ,,, ' 
,,, -'O:l O.\'r' \' ,,, v, ,, '<. (\ . / ,, 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 313-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
.. 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite· 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) SUMMONS 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER; LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, ) 
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NOTICE: YOU HA VE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE 
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., 3210 E. Chinden Boulevard, Suite 113, Eagle, ID 83616 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this 
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as 
demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice of 
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
I. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admi_ssions or denials 
of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing 
address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorneys, as 
designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of 
the above-named court. 
/~- ,,,, ........ , 
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2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
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CASE NO. 
MOTION FOR 
LIMITED ADMISSION OF 




The undersigned local counsel petitions the court for admission of the undersigned 
j 
applying counsel, pursuant to Idaho Bar Commissic:m Rule 222, for the purpose of the: above-
captioned matters. 
Applying counsel certifies that he is an-active member, in good standing, of the bar of 
West Virginia, that he maintains the regular practice of law at Bailey & Glasser's West Virginia 
; 
I 
office noted above, and that he is not a resident of the State ofldaho or licensed to practice in 
' 
Idaho. 
Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other 
I 
parties ·to this matter and that a copy of the motion accompanied by the $200 fee, has been 
provided. to the Idaho State Bar. 
Local counsel certifies that the above information is true to the best of his knowledge, . ' 
after reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that the attendance of an attorney 
' ' 
from his firm shall be required at all court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless 
•. ' 
specifically excused by the trial judge. 
: DATEDthis/~March,2012. 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
W14aAM 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
~~ 
Scott M~Kay '. .. 
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THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
Certificate of Good Standing 
Philip G. Haddad - WVSB 10#5834 
This is to certify that, according to the records of the West Virginia State Bar, Philip G. 
Haddad, of Morgantown, WV, was admitted to practice law by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals on October 02, 1991, and was registered as an active member of The 
West Virginia State Bar in October, 1991. 
It is further certified that the said Philip G. Haddad, according to our membership records, 
is currently an active member in good standing with The West Virginia State Bar. 
Given over my hand and seal of The West Virginia State Bar this day, November 15, 2011. 
c!/~Jf ~ 
Cheryl L. Wright 
Membership Coordinator 
The West Virginia State Bar 
' 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
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LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability . ) 
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The undersigned local counsel petitions the court for admission of the undersigned 
applying counsel, pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222, for the purpose of the 
above-captioned matters. 
Applying counsel certifies that he is an active member, in good standing, of the bars of 
Alabama, West Virginia and District of Columbia, that he maintains the regular practice of law at 
Bailey & Glasser' s Alabama office noted above, and that he is not a resident of the State of Idaho 
or licensed to practice in Idaho. 
Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other 
parties to this matter and that a copy of the motion accompanied by the $200 fee, has been 
provided to the Idaho State Bar. 
Local counsel certifies that the above information is true to the best of his knowledge, after 
reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that the attendance of an attorney from 
his firm shall be required at all court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless 
specifically excused by the trial judge. 
~ 
DATED thi{l_ day of March, 2012. 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & ~ARTLETT LLP 
f/~#~ 1ps B. Perrine s~~ 
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THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
Certificate of Good Standing 
James B. Perrine - WVSB 10#7215 
This is to certify that, according to the records of the West Virginia State Bar, James B. 
Perrine, of Montgomery, AL, was admitted to practice law by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals on September 30, 1996, and was registered as an active member of 
The West Virginia State Bar in September, 1996. 
It is further certified that the said James B. Perrine, according to our membership records, 
is currently an active member in good standing with The West Virginia State Bar. 
Given over my hand and seal of The West Virginia State Bar this day, March 13, 2012. 
vJ/1, c{)f1 l{hL~./--, 
~ L Wright '_) 
Membership Coordinator 
The West Virginia State Bar 
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NO. ___ mtr-,1-n"""""-
1.M. ___ ..F~~~ YID : 
MAR f 9 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Charles Ballard 
vs. 
Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. et al. 
For: 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, ID 83702 
STATE OF IDAHO 




AF.FIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Defendant(s): 
Case Number: CV OC 1204792 
Received by TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC on March 16, 2012 to be served on SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP. 
I, Antonio Roque, who being duly s»'orn, depose and say that on Friday, March 16, 2012, at 4:25 PM, I: 
SERVED the within named Silk Touch Laser, LLP by delivering a true copy of the Summons; 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; Motion for Limited Admission of P. Gregory Haddad; Motion 
for Limited Admission of James 8. Perrine to Susan Kerr, Registered Agent, a person authorized to 
accept service on behalf of Silk Touch Laser, LLP. Said service was effected at 3210 E. Chinden Blvd., 
Ste.113, Eagle, ID 83616. 
I h~reby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over 
th~ age o~ Eighteen years and not a party to the action. 
Our Reference Number: 116646 
Client Reference: David Z. Nevin 
Subscribed and sworn before me today 
Monday, March 19, 2012 
000032
NO·---~'iiiF"'t"'6~=---
A.M. __ -_,,t:~ -·-:: 
MAR 1·9 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cl rk 
. By JAMIE RANDALL ' 8 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT cfrUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Charles Ballard 
vs. 
Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. et al. 
For: 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, ID 83702 
STATE OF IDAHO 





AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Defendant(s): 
Case Number: CV OC 1204792 
Received by TRI-COUNTY PROCE;SS SERVING LLC on March 16, 2012 to be served on BRIAN 
CALDER KERR, M.D. 
I, Antonio Roque, who being duly sworn, depose and say that on Friday, March 16, 2012, at 4:28 PM, I: 
SERVED the within named person(s) by delivering to and leaving with BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D. a: 
true copy of the Summons; Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; Motion for Limited Admission of 
P. Gregory Haddad; Motion for Limited Admission of James B. Perrine. Said service was effected 
at 3210 E. Chinden Blvd., Ste. 113, Eagle, ID 83616. 
I 
I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over 
thT age of Eighteen years and not a party to the action. 
Our Reference Number: 116647 
Client Reference: David Z. Nevin 
~OR I G\ NAL 
Subscribed and sworn before me today 
Monday, March 19, 201'2 
000033
NO,------~~-
FILE~.M. 2'' 2 t- . A.M ____ . - -
MAR 2 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA THERRIEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 










Pursuant to Motions for Limited Admission, and good cause appearing, 
P. Gregory Haddad and James B. Perrine are hereby admitted pursuant to Idaho Bar 
Commission Rule 222 ite above captioned matter. 
DATED thi/( -day of March, 2012. 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
APR O 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the 
I 
undersigned hereby appears as counsel of record for Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
000035
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of April, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Montgomery Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
000036
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO----~:;.;;,r--,-f--,..,1.A,._ 
A.M. ____ ~Ll~~.?-l: L/9= 
APR O 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 2nd day of April, 2012, I served a copy 
of DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF, together with a 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
000037
copy of this NOTICE, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the method indicated 
below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Montgomery Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
· Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2012. 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
: .... ~:::::::=F-IL=~~fbl:5~1-J,--
APR 1 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JOANNA ORTEGA 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
ANSWER 
COME NOW the above-entitled Defendants and answer the Complaint as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 





Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein 
specifically and expressly admitted. 
11. 
Defendants admit that Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. is a licensed physician in the 
State of Idaho, resident of the State of Idaho, employee of the other Defendants, the 
existence and status of the Defendants, that Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. provided 
anesthesiology services, that Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. rendered services to Krystal Ballard 
before July 21, 2010, on July 21, 2010 and thereafter, the demise of Krystal Ballard and 
paragraphs 2, 6, 7 and 11· of the Complaint. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff and Krystal Ballard were guilty of negligent and careless misconduct 
at the time of and in connection with the manners and damages alleged, which proximately 
caused and contributed to said events and resultant damages, if any. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The Complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a)(1)(2) and 8(e)(1), Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedures. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest as respects any claim for medical 
expense, contrary to Rule 17, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks the capacity to recover the Decedent's funeral expenses. 
ANSWER-2 
000040
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff takes nothing in this action, that 
the Complaint be dismissed and Defendants be awarded their costs of suit and such other 
and further relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED this 161h day of April, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
ANSWER-3 
000041
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 161h day of April, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Montgomery Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ANSWER-4 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
. [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
. Quane 
000042
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED 
SP A LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-OC-2012-04792 
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE 
UNDER I.R.C.P. 16(a) & 16(b) 
Upon review, the Court has determined that this matter is appropriate for a scheduling 
order under I.R.C.P. 16(b). 
You are hereby notified that the aforementioned case is set for Status Conference ..... . 
Wednesday, May 09, 2012 @ 03:30 PM in the chambers of this Court at the Ada County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho. A scheduling order under I.R.C.P. 16(b) may issue following this 
conference. 
All parties must appear at this time in person or by counsel. Counsel must be the 
handling attorney, or be fully familiar with the case, and have authority to bind his/her client and 
law firm on all matters set forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b). 
In lieu of this status conference, if all parties agree on all matters set forth on the attached 
stipulation for scheduling and planning, the stipulation may be completed, signed and filed 
before the date set for the status conference. 
Dated Wednesday, April 18, 2012. 
th])/ NOTICE 9F ST ATVS CONFERENCE 
v u: P" ;b-0 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
000043
David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSERLLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B.Perrine,jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO..~~~--;:-:;-::::-~.....,,,.,..---~ FILEDS? ~ _A.M. ____ P.M_,, ____ -'--· 
MAY O 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 




Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories, together with a copy of this Notice of Service of Discovery, has been served 
upon counsel indicated on the certificate of service below. 
DATED, this 2"ct day of May, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~--By~~~~~~~~~~~~~--=-..2:-~-~~~ 
David Z. Nevin Z 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2-NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
000045
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 2, 2012, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Service of Discovery was served upon the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
3 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
Scott McKay 
000046
CAREr PERKINS LLP 12083458660 » 
; 
208 345 8274 P 3/4 
:. ____ F_,L~M. eta! 
MAYO 4 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE f-OURTH .IUDJC!AL DISTRICT OF DEPUTY 




BRIAN C/\LDER. KERR. M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho llmitcd 
liability partnership: and SlJ..K TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, 011 Idaho limited liability 
pnrtncrsllip. dba SILK. TOUCH MHD SPA 
and/ol' SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CEN'l.'~R. and/or SJLK TOUCH MED 
SPA LASER AND UPO OF BOISE, 
D~fcndant. 
CASE NO. ,CV-OC-2012-04794 
STIPULATION FOR SCHEDULING /\ND 
PLANNIN(r 
The: parLies hereby stipulat~ to the following scheduling deadlines: 
I. The last day to file written discovery (Interrogatories a1,d rcqllcst for prodl1ction of 
documents) shall be no later than 90 days prior to trial. 
2. The plaintiff sh:ill disclose all cxpc:1t witnesses to be used at tria I 110 later than 180 days 
prior to trial. · 
3. The defi:ndants shall disclose all expert wi11,csscs to be used at trial no l11tcr clwn __ 120 ___ _ 
days prior lo trial. 
4. The las! dny for the wking of any cliscovt:ry deposirions shnll be 110 later than -·· 60 __ .. dilys 
pl'ior to tri:11. 
S. Thr.: Jao;l day lo lil~ amendmc1lls lo join ,u,y ndditionnl p'111ies shall be no la11.:r than _:1_!~----
days prior lo 11fal. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS MUST BE FILED NO LA1'ER TI-IAN <JO DAYS PRIOR 
TO TRIAL. NO HEARJNG ON ANY $_VM.MARY JUDGMENT WILL BF. t~RM11"1'1::Q..lli 
TI-IE' 75-r>A Y PERIOn J>RlOR TO TRlAL. IT IS ADVISABLI~ TO SCHlmllLI~ YOUR 
MOTION AS SOON AS FEASIBLF.. 
"' Parties t:stimate the case will take _!Q_ days to 11')', Cnse is 10 be t.l'icd as :i: 
L__J Court Trial lL) l 2 Person Jury Tl'lal ( __ _) G Person JL11·y ·rrial 
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFF.:RF.NC~ 2 
ORIGINAL 
000047
• 2,012·05-04 12:57 CAREY PERKINS LLP 12083458660 » 208 345 8274 P 4/4 
"' Pwiics' preference for trial dates: (Please confer nnd complete. Do not ~rr:1ch 
"unavailable dates".) 
NOTE: Trial ~ettings will be 12-14 months from the date of your status 
• I 





Week ofTucsday, September 10 . 20.!_~ 
Weck of Tuesday. September 17 . 2013 --............ .,__._ .. ,.______ -
Week of Tuesday. September 24 . 20 .:1!1 
Court's clerk will con film dotes with counsel if preferences con not be met. 
The parties reserve the right to :imend this stipulation by agreement of al I pa11ies. su~jcct to 
Court approval; each party reserves the: right to seek amendmcnl h~reof by Court orc.kr. a11d to 
requesl· fu1ther status conferences for such purpose, in accordance with J.R.C.P. 16(a and I 6(b). 
&I?P-~~~/l~i;. 
~~ 
D 'd Z N . DATED this av, ... cvin 
Scott S. McKay 
Attorneys at Low 
Post Otlice Box 2772 
Bois ID 83701-2772 
(L--.. 
l./ day of /21 Ct ( 
DATED this_!:£_ day of ~ 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, LASER 
AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-04792 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING 
AND ORDER GOVERNING 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
This case is set for Jury Trial to commence on the Tuesday, September 24, 2013 at 09:30 AM and 
continue for ten (10) days. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED: 
1. All pretrial motions, with the exception of Motions in Limine, shall be heard and completed at 
least twenty-eight (28) days before the trial date. A Judge's copy of all motions and memoranda in support 
tltereof slwuld be filed directly witlt cltambers. *Motions in Limine slta/1 be lteard on tile morning of trial. 
a. The last day to file written discovery (Interrogatories and request for production of 
documents) shall be no later than ninety (90) days prior to trial. / 
b. The plaintiff shall disclose all expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one hundred 
eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
c. The defendants shall disclose all expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one 
hundred twenty (120) days prior to trial. 




d. The last day for the taking of any discovery depositions shall be no later than sixty ( 60) days 
prior to trial. 
e. The last day to file amendments to join any additional parties shall be no later than one 
hundred eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
f. **MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHALL BE FILED NO LATER THAN 
NINETY (90} DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
**NO HEARING ON ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT WILL BE PERMITTED IN 
THE SEVENTY-FIVE (75} DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO TRIAL, REGARDLESS OF 
WHEN THE MOTION IS FILED. 
**IT IS ADVISABLE TO SCHEDULE YOUR MOTION FOR HEARING AS SOON 
AS FEASIBLE. 
* ALL WITNESSES ARE TO BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME AND ADDRESS 
2. Not later than fourteen (14) days before the trial date, counsel for all parties to the action shall 
hold a conference for exchange of information and discussion of matters specified by I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 
l 6(b). 
3. Not later than seven (7) days before trial: (a) each attorney shall certify to the Court in writing 
. 
that such Exchange of Information Conference has taken place and furnish with such certification a list of the 
names of persons disclosed as possible witnesses pursuant to Rule 16(a)(4), and a descriptive list of all 
exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence, reciting which exhibits counsel have agreed may be received in 
evidence without objection and those to which no objection will be made on grounds other than irrelevancy 
or immateriality; or (b) in lieu thereof, all counsel may join in submitting a written stipulation in 
conformance with Rule 16(b ). 
4. Any objection to the date of this trial must be made by any paiiy within fifteen (15) days from 
the date of this notice. 
5. All exhibit lists must be submitted to the Court five (5) days prior to trial. 
6. All requested jury instructions must be submitted to the Court, both hard copy and e-mailed lo 
lsimsdouglas@adaweb.net fourteen (14) days prior to trial. 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS/ JT 2/4 
000050
7. This Order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified for good cause 
shown to prevent manifest injustice. 
8. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of this order, which may include 
assignment of the trial date to another case. 
9. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an 
alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case if the assigned judge is unavailable. The 
following is a list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G. D. Carey 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr. 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Peter McDermott 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Daniel Meehl 
Hon. George R. Reinhart, III 
Justice Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Justice Linda Copple Trout 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Hon. Barry Wood 
Hon. W. H. Woodland 
All Sitting Fourth District Judges 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 
40(d)(l), each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for disqualification without cause as to any 
alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after service of this notice. 
DATED Wednesday, May 16, 2012, 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS/ JT 3/4 
000051
.i, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on Wednesday, May 16, 2012, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott S. McKay 
Attorneys at Law 
Post Office Box 2772 
Boise ID 83701-2772 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 519 
Boise ID 83701-0519 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS/ JT 4/4 
000052
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
:~.=======,it:11.gn_t--l4.r-J'!-,.,t{~; 1:i....: 
MAY 1 7 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV QC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) 
DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ALTERNATE JUDGE 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Carey 
Perkins LLP, and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(1), respectfully moves 
this Court to grant an automatic disqualification of the Honorable Darla Williamson from 
presiding over the above-entitled matter as an alternate judge. 
MOTION FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE - 1 
000053
DATED this 17th day of May, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Jer ia A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Atto neys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of May, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION 
OF AL TERNA TE JUDGE by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
V je,-;~_Quane 
MOTION FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE-2 
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Ht:vt:IVt:D 
MAY 1 ·,- 2012 
Ada Count\/ Clerk 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
NO.----::::-::---:=----
FILE~.M.:3 : DO 
A.M----· 
MAY 1 8 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA THERRIEN 
DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, dba SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA and/or SILK TOUCH MED 
SPA AND LASER CENTER, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF 
BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
ORDER FOR FIRST 
(AUTOMATIC) 
DISQUALIFICATION OF 
AL TERNA TE JUDGE 
Based upon the foregoing Motion and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 40(d)(1), the Honorable Darla Williamson is ordered disqualified from presiding 
in the above-entitled matter. ~ 
DATED this~ day of ~ , 2012. 
D.lSTRICT JUDGE 
l/l,1m.111 !ff:...:./ 
Honorable Deborah A. Bail · 
ORDER FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE - 1 
000055
r 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBYCERTIFYthatonthis Zlsl-dayof m~ , 2012, 
I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER F FIRST (AUTOMATIC) 
DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1)4 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
IX] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
~] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
['x]] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8600 
ORDER FOR FIRST (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE- 2 
000056
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B.Perrinejbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO·---~~-n~~-
AM. FIL~t. Jf: $3 
JUNO 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN .CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
AND REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
ORIGINAL 
000057
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 6th day of June, 2012, the Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions to Defendants 
Brian Calder Kerr, M.D.; Silk Touch Laser, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership; 
and Silk Touch Laser, LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, d/b/a Silk Touch Med 
Spa, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and 
Lipo of Boise, along with a true and correct copy of this Notice of Service, were served upon 
counsel for the Defendants as follows: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
D U.S. Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Overnight Mail 




2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
000058
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/1,-
I hereby certify that on June f_ , 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Service of Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production and 
Requests for Admission to Defendants by delivering the same to the following via: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
D U.S. Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Overnight Mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
3 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
000059
David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
~oise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
N0 .. ___ .....,,,,..=:,---7.q..._~~:;z__ F'ILEDD, ~ A.M .. ____ P.M. .,. 
JUN 2 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 
MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
1 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA 
CASE NO. CVOC12-04792 





Pursuant to Rule 45(b )(2) of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, through his 
attorneys, gives notice to the Defendants that he will cause a Subpoena Duces Tecum iii the form 
attached as Exhibit A, to be served on Sprint Nextel Corporate Security after July 3, 2012. 
DATED this 261h day of June, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA 
000061
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2012, I served a true and concct copy of the foregoing to 
Plaintiff by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage ptep~id: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
3 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA 
000062
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD 
Plaintiff, 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D. SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A and/or 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO 
OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
The State of Idaho to: 
Sprint Nextel Corporate Security 
Subpoena Compliance 
6485 Sprint Parkway 
Overland Park, Kansas 66251 
Facsimile 816-600-3111 
YOU ARE COMMANDED 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SUBPOENA 
[ ] to appear in the Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify in the above case. 
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a deposition in the above case. 
[ ] to permit inspection of the following premises at the date and time specified below. 
[X) to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects, including electronically stored information, at the place, date and time 
specified below. 
To produce a complete set of all phone records, including but not limited to, toll records, the content, date, and time of all SMS and text 
messages, email records, for Krystal Ballard, fka Krystal Ashton, from July 1-July 31, 2010, for phone/account number 917-549-6924 
PLACE DATE AND TIME 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Facsimile 208-345-8274 
July 31, 2012 
You arc further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or to produce or 
permit copying or inspection as specified above the you may be held in contempt of court and that the 
000063
aggrieved party may recover :from you the sum of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by 
your failure to comply with this subpoena. 
Dated this day of 2012 --- -----
By order of the court. 
Clerk 
Deputy 
( court seal) 
000064
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO-----..,,,.._ 
AM. ______ F,te.LJr 
-~ ... ~£:' 
JUN 2 9 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D 




Case No. CV QC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability. partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 29th day of June, 2012, I served a copy 
of: 
1) DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES; 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
000065
2) DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS; and 
3) DEFl=NDANTS' RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
together with a copy of this NOTICE, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the 
method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Montgomery Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2012. 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Deliver~d 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
J re 1ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
20 I Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 




ALJ6 2 4 2012 
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
559123 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DEFENDANTS' 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to Rule 
37(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and moves this Court to compel Defendants' 
answers to Plaintiffs first set of interrogatories. This Motion is supported by a memorandum of 
law and an affidavit of counsel, both of which have been contemporaneously filed herewith. 
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff served twenty-three interrogatories, among other discovery 
requests, upon Defendants. Defendants asserted an objection to Plaintiffs interrogatories and 
refused to answer any of them on the grounds that the number of interrogatories exceed forty --
the number allowed under Rule 33(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff made 
numerous· good faith attempts to resolve this discovery dispute and avoid the Court's 
involvement, but to no avail. Despite Plaintiffs best efforts to reach an amicable resolution, 
Defendants continue to refuse to answer any of Plaintiffs interrogatories. 
Plaintiff now has no alternative but to respectfully move the Court to compel Defendants 
to answer Plaintiffs interrogatories. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 




Dated this-;)'{ day of August, 2012. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
000068
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
; fl,,.. 
I hereby certify that on the ~ t{ day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories by hand delivering the same to the following: 
559123 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN; BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrinc@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO·-----,ffl'F.l'-~--jr,tf5 26 
A.M·----P.M._.._"-f"',-..--
ALJG 2 ~ 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
559406 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
,- ' 
I ' •, ) I 
• I ,.- I r 
i . -, 




AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GREGORY HADDAD 
ST A TE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA, TO WIT: 
I, Philip Gregory Haddad, as the attorney for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, subscribed hereto 
by authority duly given, after being duly sworn, upon his oath, state and allege the following. 
I. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff in this litigation. 
2. On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff served on Defendants' counsel his First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for AdmissJon, a true &nd. accurate copy of 
which is attached hereto at Exhibit A. 
3. On June 29, 2012, Defendants served their objection in response to Plaintiff's 
interrogatories, a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto at Exhibit B. 
4. On July 6, 2012, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter via facsimile to Defendants' counsel, a 
true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto at E~bibit C. 
5. Plaintiff's counsel sent another letter by facsimile to Defendants' counsel on July 25, 
20.12, a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto at E~hibiiD. 
6. On July 26, 2012, Defendants' counseJ faxed a letter to Plaintiff's e.ounsel, a true and 
accurate copy of which is attached hereto at Exhibit E. 
7. Plaintiff's counsel faxed a letter to Defendants' counsel on August 6, 2012, a true and 
accurate copy of which is attached hereto at Exhibit F. 
8. On August 9, 2012, Defendants' counsel faxed a response letter to Plaintiffs counsel (a 
true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto at Exhibit G. 





I 0. Plaintiff has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the Defendants in an 
effort to secure Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's interrogatories without court action. 
And further affiant saith not. 
STATE OF , 
COUNTY OF , to;.;wit: 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/1-. 
I hereby certify that on the ;} lf day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of Counsel by hand delivering the same to the following: 
559123 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Scott McKay 
000073
David Nevin (lSB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Sqqt~,J'J'cKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NBVfNJ3ENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LtP 
30:3 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 0594.,,9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Mcmroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (,334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Alt6rneys1or PlainJiff 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURTFORTIIBFO , l(:;:IAL DlSTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Cas.e No, CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S FlRST S,tT' O;F 
lNTERROGATORIES, RE~llfr.STS 
Fon; f:ROI)OCTl(>N ANP, 
REQUESTS FOJt ADl\illSSJONSTO 
DEFENDANTS JJRIAN C~DER 
KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH LASER, 
LLP, AN IDAHO LIMITED 
LIAJ}ILJTY P ARTNERSl:lIP; AND 
SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, AN 
lDAHO tIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a SILK TOUCH 
MEDSPA, and/or SILK TOUCH 
Mli:.D SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or S.ILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, AND LIPO OF BOISE 
I - PLAINTIFF'S FJRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 




PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; 
SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, AND SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED 
SPA, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED 
SPA, LASER, AND LIPO OF BOISE 
DEFINITIONS 
A. "Document" means originals or any exact copies of written, recorded, transcribed, 
punched, filmed, taped, or graphic matter, however and by whomever prepared, produced, 
reproduced, disseminated or made, including. but not lfmited to, any memoranda, intraoffice or 
interoffice communications, letters, studies, reports, summaries, articles, releases, notes, records of 
conversation, minutes, statements, eo'mments, spe.eches, testimony, notebooks, drafts, data sheets, 
work sheets, records, stati.stics:, charts~ c.ontracts, diaries. bills. accounts, graphics or oral records, 
presentations of any kind (including~ without limitatlons. photographs, plats,. charts, graphs, 
microfiche, microfilm, videotape recording and rrtotion pictures), tapes, data processing s.heets or 
cards, computer or word processing disks, or other written, printed, typed, aural, or recorded 
material in the possession, custody or control of you or your counsel. The term "document" also 
means all copies or reproductions . of all the foregoing items upon which notation in writing, print, 
or otherwise has been made that do not appear as originals. T0, the extent the data processing cards, 
magnetic tapes, or other computer-related materials are produced, produce all programs, 
instructions, and other similarly related information necessary to read., comprehend and otherwise 
utilize said data processing cards, magnetic tapes, or other computer-related materials. 
B. "Individual" or "person" means any natural person, including, without limitations, 
an officer, director, employee, agent, representative, distributor, supplier, independent contractor, 
license or franchise, and it includes any corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, 
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group, government agency and agent, firm or other business enterprise or legal entity, which is not 
a natural person, and means both singular and plural. 
C. "Oral," when used in conjunction with a term connecting information refers to any 
spoken expression, exchange, or transmission of thoughts, messages, information, or the like, at 
any time or place, and under any circumstances whatsoever. 
D. "Define," whe.n used with the reference to a phrase or term, means (a,) state t~ 
meaning of the' phrase or term; and (b) identify each person known by you to have personal 
knowledge regarding the meaning of such phrase or tenn upon whose testimony you presently 
intend to rely at trial. 
E.. "Describe" means to explain fully by reference to underlying, facts rather than 
cqn~lttiml oHact or law. 
F. "Identify,'' when used with reference to a natural person, means to slate his or her 
{a) foll name; (b) present business and/or residence address and telephone numbers; (c) present 
business• affiliation, address, title or position; (d) if different from ( c ), the group, origination or 
business the person was representing at any time relevant to the answer to a specific interrogatory; 
and (e) home address. If this information is not known, furnish such information. as was last 
known. 
G. "Identify," when used with reference to a business entity, means to state its (a) full 
name; (b) form of organization (e.g., corporation, partnership); (c) place of incorporation; and (d) 
address of its principle place of business . If this information is not known, furnish such 
infotmation as was last known. 
H. "Identify," when used with reference to an act, action, activity, omission or event, 
means to state (a) the identity of each person who participated in such act, action, activity, 
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omission, or event; (b) the date and place of such act, action, activity, omission, or event in detail; 
and (c) the identity of each person having knowledge or the act, action, activity, omission, or 
event. 
I. "Identify," when used in reference to a document, means to state (a) the type of 
document or some other means of identifying it (e.g., letter, memorandum, report, etc.); (b) its 
subject matter; ( c) the identity 0f its author; ( d) the identity of each addressee or recipient; (e) the 
identhy of ea,ch person to whom copies were sent and-each person by whom copies were received; 
(f) its title and date; and (g) its present location and the identity of its custodian (if any such 
document was, but is no longer in the possession of or subje.ct to the control of you or your 
counsel, state what and when disposition was made of it. 
J. "Identify," when used with referet1ce to a conversation, oraJ corrimunicaticm, 
diseussion, oral statement or interview, means; (a) state-tlie date upon which it took place; (b) 
identify each person who participated in it, witnessed, it and/or overheard it; (c) state whut was said 
by each-person, including the issues and matters discusses; and (d) identify each document which 
describes or relates to it. 
K. "Communicati'Qns(s)" and/or "communicate" shall mean all occ:a,s-i-ons on which 
information was conveyed from one person or entity to another, either: (a) through a 
document; or (b) verbally, either in person or by telephone (including phone messages or 
alerts); or (c) by means of any other mechanical or electronic device. 
L. "Complaint" refers to any communication from anyone expressing negative views 
or suggestions for improvements, irrespective of whether the concern raised in the communication 
was investigated or verified (by you) or at your direction . 
M. "RELEY ANT TIME PERIOD" means July 13 , 20 IO to present. 
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N. In construing or interpreting these interrogatQries, all words in the plural may be 
read in the singular, and vice versa whichever reading which results in the provision of the larger 
amount of information or documents being the. correct reading. 
0. In constrqing or interpreting these interrogatories, all words of a conjunctive 
meaning (e.g., ''and") may be read in the disjunctive meaning (e.g. "or''), and vice versa, or both, 
whichever reading. whi(;fore$:tJ1ts2in the provision of the larger amount of information or documents 
being the correct reading. 
P. ''Documen,t$ and Tnihgs t0' be l>roduced'', means original documents and things if 
they exist anclcaH rmn~identica1 copies. If su~lr·origfnaJ;s do not exist or are not in the possession or 
eontroi of the Defend:ant, if means· any addifi<¥ria'I cqpy>fi;E said origlnals and alJ non-identical 
copres thereof'. 
Q. •1You.'' and/or ''yours" means Dt. Bi'lan C~der !<.err, M.D., Silk Touch Laser, LLP, 
and Silk Touch Laser, J;IJ> d/h/fu Silk 'J;ouch,.Med ~pa, and/or 6i1k Touch Med Spa amt Laser 
OENER:A.B PROVISIONS 
,.; 
Pursuant to Rule oftbe ldano Rules of Cjvil Procedure, the interrogatorres .set forth 
below are to be answered wttbinthitt)' (30) days of service, fully and separately in writing, tinder 
oath, and in accordam;e with the· above cited r11le. Answers to these interrogatories must include 
not only information in your personal knowledge and possession, but also any and all information 
available to you, including information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys or 
employees. If a claim of privilege is made as lo any such information, you must specify the basis 
for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged. 
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lf 'Qny document identified in an answer to an Interro~tory was, but is no longer in your 
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in ex.istence, describe what 
disposi,tion was made of it or what became of it Your answer must be based not only on 
documents in your personal possession, but also on any documents available to you, including 
documents in the posse_ssion of your agents, attorneys, accountants or employee.s. No document 
requested to be identi:r'iedo.rprQdµced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue ofa record 
retention program or for RAY other reason. 
These interrogaJotfes. are continuing and your responses to them must be s.uppleme.ntec:I to 
the maximum extent authorized by law and the applicable rules. 
INT'.ltRllOG:A TORTES 
. :> 
P1ec\Se lgt;p;Jif>1 tb.e person(s) responding to these 
AllS\"'e.r: 
Please provide the employment history for tile last ten 
years of Or; Brian Calder, Ke'tr a!lld any agent, servant, or employee who had any interaction or 
communi,cation with Krysta:1Ballard. Please include with this answer the employer name, the job 
title and duties; the dates of such employment; the reason for leaving employment; and the salary 
or wages foreach employment. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name and addresses of each person whom 
you intend to call as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which each expert is expected 
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to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions of eacfu expert, a summary of the grounds for 
each opinion of each expert, and a summary of each expert's qualifications. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please state in detail the legal and factual basis for 
any claim or defense by you that someone other than you are liable for the death of K.t,ystal BaJlard 
and the Plaintiffs damages stemming from the same. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please identrfY th:e, man11facturer, model, and serial 
niTJ'l'.t~~r of all equipment or machinery used in KJ·ysta1'B1aEi:a:icli''$. pro-eedure. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state with specificity the education, training 
and experience which qualified Dr. Brian Calder Kerr to perform the cosmetic procedure at issue 
and produce a copy of an traf:ning material, certificates or licenses documenttng his experience 
performing cosmetic procedures such as the one performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please identify all hospitals or Joint Commission 
accredited facilities at which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr has privileges to perform the cosmetic 
procedures performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please iclenfrfy any individual employed by or acting 
on behaJf of you who currently has authority and/or access to perform any type of cosmetic 
procedure using the Cynosure Smartlipo Machine; any individual who had this authority/access 
from Jauuary I, 2005 through July 21, 2010 to perform such procedures and produce all 
documents to support this answer. 
Answer: 
INTERR_()GATORY :NO. 9: Does Silk Touch Laser, LLP have any policies 
procedures, bylaws o,r sta.Qdards to assess and, credential agents, servants or employees to perform 
com;puier cosmetic prod.edures, If yes, please describe each one and produce all documents 
regarding the same. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATOR\1/i}NQ. 10: PJ'ease state the date of the first cosmetic procedure 
perfo1med by Dr. Brian CalderJ{err, and specifically the first Smart Lipo procedure and first fat 
transfer procedure; the location each procedure was performed and all education and training Dr. 
Brian Calder Kerr had received to perform the procedures. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: For the equipment identified in response to 
Interrogatory No. 5, did the manufacturer of the equipment provide any training, seminars, 
workshops, in services, etc. (collectively, "training") which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr or agents , 
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servants or employees of Silk Touch Laser, LLP attended. For each training, please list the date of 
each training, the individuals who attended each training, the person and/or entity which provided 
the training, and a description of the matters discussed during the training. 
Answer: 
IN'FERROGA'I:ORY N0. 12: Please identify all faoilU:ies. at which yotJ, curre:ntly 
hold privifeges to ...  pntctice1:nedi4ine. 
Answer: 
IN't'.ERR0GA:J;,O,Rl''NO. 13: Please provide the name and address(s) of an.y third 
p:arty entjty or .organit:atioti th.at p~rforrns any kind of inspection, evaluation, or screening of Silk 
XNTE.RRC'>GATQRY NO. 14: Please provide the name and address€es) of any third 
party entity or org~nit,atlop'; th~li.n$'pects the sterilization practices and procedure.s at Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, includjng, but not limited to the equipment and instrnments used in the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify the manufacturer, model number and 
serial number of all equipment used to sterilize the equipment used in Krystal Ballard's procedure, 
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including but not limited to the hand piece, cannulas and the fiber, and produce the sterilization 
Jogs, as well as a copy of any services or xepairs on the equipment. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please Me,ntify any and all communication between 
Dr. Brian Calder Kerr and Krystal and/or Charles BalJard whjeh occurred after fhe. procedures 
were performed on Krystal Ballard. For each communication,.please identify the type or nature of 
the communication (e.g., phone call, emai11 text message), pr,ovicle the phone number and/or email 
address of the phone and/or email account that was use·d to· make the communication, provide the 
substance of each communication as verbatim as you c:an, jdentify each recording, message or 
memorialization of each communication. and pro~tce all recordings, messages, and 
memoriali:z.ation' s of each communication. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17; Please lis.t ~U persons i:1:i. the room with Dr. Brian 
Calder Kerr and Krystal Ballard while procedures were being performed on Krystal BaUard and 
each individual who made contact with and/or inserted any instrument or equipment into Krystal 
Ballard during the procedures. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please state whether Dr. Brian C. Kerr or Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, has ever been cited, sanctioned or fined by any governmental, regulatory, or licensing 
agency. 
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Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: List any and all inspections and/or inves1igations 
conducted by a federal, state of local agency, or any other independent organizati'on in which Dr. 
Brian C. Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, and/or any employee, agent or independent contractor wa.s 
found to be in violation of any federal, state or local statute or regulation from 2005 to present. If 
the inspect,ion or the investigation was conducted by an independent organization, state the 
organizational standard that was: alleged to violated, ftoin 2005 to present. For each, state the name 
of the agency conducting the Inspedion and /or investigation; the date of the inspection and /or 
investigation; the findings of the irtspections and/or investigations; all actions taken by you to 
rectify any alleged d'efidencies and the. qJtima.t~ d,ispositJ:onofthe matter . 
.Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify each witness known to you to have 
information and relevant mat~cials to the claims presented in this action or to any defense asserted 
thereto, and for each person ple~se give a brief summary of each such witness's expected trial 
testimony. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: State the liability coverage, policy number, insurance 
company, maximum amount of liability coverage for each policy including the amount per person, 
the amount of all persons and the content of any insurance agreement you have available to satisfy 
J l - PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQlffSTS FOR PRODUCTION 
AND REQ UESTS FOR /\DMlSSlONS TO DEFENDANTS 
000084
part or all of any judgment which may be entered in this action. or to indemnify or reimburse for 
payments made to satisfy a judgment 
Answer: 
lNTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please. identify and describe each procedure, policy, 
and/o.r protoGol for sterilization.of each individual and/or piece of equipment which participated in 
or was used during the procedure on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
~NTi~ROGAl:ORY NO. 23: Please describe any traiojng, seminars; workshops, in 
se~ces; etc. ·(~ollectivefy, "training'') which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr or agents, servants or 
empldyees of SHk Toucij, Las:er, LLP attended for each procedure, policy, and/or protocol for 
sterilization identified and d.escribed in Interrogatory No. 22. For each training, please list the date 
of each training, ~he individµtds who attended each training, the person and/or entity which 
provideddhe training? and a description of the matters discussed during the training. 
Answer: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Requests for Admissions 
set forth below are to be answered within thirty (30) days of service, fully and separately in 
writing, under oath, and in accordance with the above cited rule. 
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I. Admit that you performed a liposuction procedure on Krystal Ballard with a 
Cynosure Smartlipo Machine. 
RESPONSE: 
2. Admit that Krystal Ballarq's procedure wa.s performed by Dr. Brian Calder Kerr. 
RESPONSE: 
3. Admit that Krystal Ballard's death resulte·d from bacteria which entered into her 
body during the. procedure) perfonned by Dt. Brian Calder Kerr. 
RESPONSE: 
4. Admit that Krystal BaJford's death was caused by the negligence Qf Dr. Brian 
C.nlder Kerr and /or other agents, servants, and employees of Silk Touch Laser, LLP. 
RESPONSE: 
5. Admit that Dr. Brian Calder Kerr has no professional training and/or certification 
qualifying him to perform the procedures performed on Krystal Ballard . 
RESPONSE: 
6. Admit that prior to the purchase of the Cynosure Smartlipo Machine that Dr. Brian 
Calder Kerr, had no previous experience with performing liposuction procedures . 
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RESPONSE: 
7. Admit that each document produced pursuant to these discovery requests,is 
authentic under Idaho Rule oft"Vidence. 
RESPONSE; 
REQlJESTS,FORPRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rukt3:4'and ptherapplicable provisions of the Idaho Rules of CivirProctlrlure, 
you are requested to prodiice ang, s~rve upon counsel for the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, within 
thirty (30) days of ~ervice hfiithJa teqt1est·tlie following: 
REQUEST NO. 1 •• • AJJ cfQeuments ide,ntified or refexred to in answering any of 
Response: 
2: Each docitment about which Dr. Brian. Calder Kerr has in his 
possession, custody; and ooiltrol pertaining to the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedures. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 3: The curriculum vitae or resume of each expert you intend to 
call as an expert witness at trial. 
Response: 
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REQUEST NO. 4: All reports provided to you by any witness (expert or lay) 
that you have received in relation to this case. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 5: All warnings or other disclosure informa.tioti given to any 
patients considering a liposuction or fat transfer. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 6: All pnotographs or videotapes raken of Krystal Ballard 
~(Ore" during and after the Smartlipo procedure on July 2f.r2010. 
Respopse: 
REQUEST NO. 7: All invoices, purchase orders, and rec~ipts regarding any 
and all repairs and manufacturing of the equipment used during Krystal Ballard~s proceclure. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 8: Produce each and every document or tangible thing which you 
intend to utilize as an exhibit and/or demonstrative aid at the trial of this matter. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 9: Any and all medical and billing records of Krystal Ballard. 
Response: 
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REQUEST NO. 10: Produce a copy of any and all citations issued to or against 
you or any of your employees or agents, by any governmental or regulatory agency. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 11: Prodvce all maintenance, ownership. operation and other 
records in your possession relating to, in any way, the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedure. 
a:EQUEST.NO. 12: All manua.ls, i1,c;lq~in.; clinical and service manuals, 
regarding the e.gujpment usijcr on Kti:y'.$tal Ballar.:d's surgery. 
Respqnset 
REQUEST NO. 13: Any and aU wrhUen · agr~ements made between you and 
Krystal Ballard. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 14: A copy of Dr. Brian Calder Kert's curricul.um vitae. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 15: A complete copy of every liability, excess and/or umbrella 
insurance policy that could provide coverage for the claims asserted in the Complaint. 
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Response: 
REQUEST NO. 16: All proposals, memoranda, communications or any other 
documents concerning any review or inspection of Silk Touch Laser, LLP, conducted by federal, 
state or local agency, or any quasi-governmental organization, non-for-profit organization during 
the past ten years. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 17: All documents' including, but not limited to, any written 
material, film, video, reGording,. book, or policy and prncedure that was provided to any employee 
for purpos~s. of tra:ining,, d.em-OJlstrating,. describing or irtsfi:ucting employees on the proper use, 
maintenance, .functionality, and sterilization of the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedure. 
Response: 
DATED this 61h day ofJtlne,, 2012. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
~/(_--
By _ ___________ _ 
David Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
/\ ttorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June (;, , 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
P[aintfff's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admission to Defendants, Brian Calder Kerr, M.D; Silk Touch Laser, LLP an ltlaho limited 
liability part11ership; am/ Silk Touclt Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, ,Vb/a 
Silk Touch Med Spa, amllor Silk You.cit Med Spa and Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med 
Spa, Laser,. am/ Lipo of Boise by delivering the same to the following via: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
16111 Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
D U.S. Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Overnight Mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN;)McK.A Y & BARTLETI, LLP 
<~~6 By __ -=-(5--_ -------- ---r--...--
Scott McKay 
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Jeremiah A. Qu~ne, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor,. U.S. Ban~ Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 3•1'5-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
©@~W 
,_/ ,. :·+. ' ' ---~ . "$ ~ - '. '-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOl!JRTH JUDfCIAl rngrmcT 
OF THE STAT5 . . . HO, IN AND 
FOR THJ! G .· 0~ ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case: N'i1. f;V oc 1io4792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER, KERR~ frM.O., 
TOUCH ·SS~t .. liitl.:P, an lcfaho· Ji . 
liability .. ership; and SILK TOU < 
LASER, ULP, an .Idaho lirDiJed liatliJjfi' 
partnership, dba SILK TOUGF-tMED SPA 
and/or Slt;..K TOUCH MED SPA ANO 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA. LASER AND UPO OFBOISE, 
Defendants. 
s: ©11~,~QTJONS TC) 
IRSTSET OF 
. TORIES 
Defendants object to the Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories on the grounds 
that the number of interrogatories, including sub-parts of interrogatories exceed the number 
of interrogatories allowed by RuJe 33(a)(3), I.R.C.P. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES -1 
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t./\" -
i ! <'. .. :Of\T~Jrythis 29th day of June, 2012. 
} ! 
~ l ;r ·' CAREY PERKINS LLP 
i".} 
1~1 
By ___________ _ 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29111 day of June, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
Oft lf';!;Jl;.RROGA TORIE.S by delivering the same to e1:lch,of the foJlowing·, by the method 
indicitl~!;;t galow. addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN , McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, !<;taho 83701 
Telephone (206) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
8All.EY & GLASSER LL~ 
2855 Cranberry Sqyare 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street. Suite 2170 
Montgom~ry. Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[XJ: U.S, Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
( ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ) Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[XJ U.S. Mail , postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334} 262-0657 
/ s / 
Jeremiah A. Quane 




Ptiono (304} 594.(JQ87 Fu ()04} 594-9709 BAILEY &GLASSERLLP 
Mr. Jeremiah,~; Cluane 
P.O. Box.51!l 
BQise, 10 83.?G,1-0519 
Facs1rnile: (2(18) 34&-8660 
VIA.Flf(~ltllMSS MAIL ANO FACSIMILE 
July 6, 2012 
Re: Charfss,Batfard v. Brian Kerr, M.D., et al~ Case, No, CV OC 1'!8'49'92 
Dea~ ~ tr auane. 
Qf, cou~. no objecttcm ,to Plaintiff's . fnterrogatoJies ~~seq oo ex ·. 
could have mefit. "[S]ubpa~s directed at eliciting detail~ conceming a corn. 




sho~ld be ®psldered a sing I~ question." e ~- Wright, ~t ~Ii . ederal P 
Procedure,, § 2168, 1 {3d oo. 2002). See kham ' nnt Cdr • PCS. 225 
F.R.IJLiij9'S:1e~4 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding that parts,r common theme were 
not sepa~te interrogatories). Each of Plaintiffs lnterrog · ..... , ..... ..•.. pertain~ to ~ ••. common 
therne and counts as ~ s gle interrogatory. Further. '"recipients of Int~ atones are 
not entJUed to object Q~ ' on a selective count of the various clauses ln the 
reqµest~... Richardson v~ State of Montana, 130 P.3d 634, 644 (Mont. 2006) 
(concluding that the State's objection to interrogatories on excessiveness grounds "was 
without merit"); 27 C.J.S. Discovery§ 83 (citing Richardson). Accordingly, Defendant 
cannot object to Plaintiffs Interrogatories because an interrogatory may have more than 
one clause. See Richardson, 130 P.3d at 644 ("common sense dictates that one 
sentence containing three clauses does not constitute three separate Interrogatories"). 
Rule 33 Is given a "liberal interpretation. D Smith v. Big Lost River Irrigation 
District, 83 Idaho 374, 383 (Idaho 1961 ). Plaintiff has made a good faith attempt to 
S49250 
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comply with the pennlssible number of 'interrogatories under Rule 33 .and Is confident 
that the Cou.rt will compel Oefen~aot to answer Plaintiffs lnterrogator:ies. 
Prior to seeking the Coijn's involvement. we ask that yov meet and confer with 
us about your objection to Plaintiffs Interrogatories. Prior to Qur discussing this. matter, 
we ask that within seven (7) days of this letter. you provide a detailed basis for its 
excessiveness objection and a date and ti.me in the next two weeks that you are 
available to discuss Def~odant!s obj~ctlon. If we do not hear from you Within se~en (7) 
days, then Plaintfff will have· ~~ alt~mafive. but to move tb compel Defendant's response 
to Plaintiff's lnterrogat<,>pes.. l'QU can r~acll me at the number above: or CQo1act my law 
partner, J.B. Perrine, at (.33'4)~pif.6465. 
Sincerely, 
P. Gregory Haddad 
PGH/bb 
cc: Scott McKay (via eint,l{I) 
549250 
000095
07/06/2012 FRI 16:19 FAX 


















__________________ ,i,r ._,.. 
F~C~JMIT.,E TB..ANSMITTA.L SHBET 
COMPAN)', 
oA?8: .. 3 'f 5· 'it.t<LIJ 
TOTAL No: OF P .1!.GES l>ld.UDWG Covmt, 










Mr. Jeren,i~h A. Q.uane 
P .0. -Bo~ 5t9 
Boi$e, l;Q 8:!101,-0 9 
F aosimile: (20~} - 0 
Lawym 
ln~met www.bo1ileygl.mer.¢om 
Phone {304) $94-0087 l'u (l04) S94-97Q9 
2&5S Cran~ Square 
Morgamown. WV 2650& 
July 25, 201'2 
Re_: €harJ'es, 9allard v. Brian Kerr, M.0., et al, Case Nd. CV OG 1204:792 
Dear Mr. Quan~., 
By l~tter dated July-~;-2n 1.2 we requested }!OU provide, u~. -~ wolien re'~,a~ose as 
to the legaf baSiS' f9r xour OQjeC,tiOfJ~ tq our first set of discovery ba~ecf Q;{l the ·alleged 
excessjve umber df:·interrc,,g~tqrl~~; We have yet to ceceive a ·w,iijep '~Ei$pQ0Se, 
a,lthf.?U9t\ a g~c,q:ur qffi~ dldcEill mine-abou1 aettJl'l~r\JP a D t9 <f .. .· .. . l was 
in. triaJ the .··· ,- ..... ' J - · · · tgl -·-'g went on· a vac;atiot':J' t e~~'·(;) . ..... 16Jh. I 
und~fotahd !!J1fma~ . he office a.s weJJ,: bul rio ... f:i~t~~.dipg, fffi~t fact', 
we hiivenoH~ ,J:I . sf! as requested irtQLirleTte.1t lfiisle ou.ld 
pre4ed~ an~; tel e>,h 'lry an at,t~i;r,pt to resolY~ ,thi~J:1 . I 
am, m~,fi~t; [i~,~imi$ resqJ~e. the di:sput~ short of QQ· u.t 
al . li~e · h , abJe · the, court our efforts p,1£lt' to' to 
I i i-ze ... . . .. ·. . . . . . ~libse litigatioh . strategy !'$ lq . tf)e 
disc ry<p throuwn meritl~ss objections. Having. not liflgated any. with 
you previous • I am wfUing to give everyone tl1e benefit of tne dciuot; b · 
objections Without legal foundation. 
Given the fact qver two weeks has passed since our letter of July 6, I am r~uestiog yet 
again written response setting forth the legal basis for your calculation that our 
interrogatories .exceed those permitted. I will need the response by Friday, July 27 to 
avold our having to file a motion to compel. If we do not receive the response by close 
of business on Friday, I will assume you stand by your objection as stated in your 
discovery responses and we wilt proceed on that basis. If you wish to reconsider your 
objection and respond to the discovery requests as propounded, then we will be happy 
to give you an additional two weeks to file responses. 
Be assured that I always prefer to litigate cases amicably. However. having an 
obligation to my client, I will aggressively deal with any attempt to derail what should be 




'P. (jregory J{aatfac[ 
P. Gregory Haddad 
PGH/bb 
cc: Scott McKay (via email) 
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Re: BfJllprd v. Kerr 
ourPile· ~fo.1107/Q~-~~:~ 
Dear Mr. Hadoad; 
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OFFICES IN 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAJ:!0 &3405-1388 
980 PIER VIEW DRIVE, SUifa 8 
r. O. B0X~IJ88 
TeU?i'HONe (208) S29•0000 
f ACSlMIU! (208) S29-0005 
WITJl A'Tl'Olu!ll!t$ AOMmllD 
TO rl!AcnCl! 1.A w IN ~Ul'OltMA. 
10/,){0, Ol(ll<JON, llTAII, 
WAillllNG!ON Alli) wYOMlNO 
• A.Df,l!TJ'IID TO PkA(:'l1CI! IW 
IDAllOANDWYOMIHG 
This is th¢ 
to my commitments in 
office July 16 and informed; 
until today or yesterday. 
l.n<L\'e h~d to respond to your lefter of Ju.ly 6 due 
rn .. Idaho, altno.ugh my assistant telepnoned your 
soniwh<;> answered the phone that I was unavaiiable 
I would li~.! >tR qff~r YsOll O"lY comn,ents regarding your letter of July 6. 
understand the positio~' you have taker'l:in re~ard to my objections tome interrogatories 
on the grounds that they exceed the number allowed by our rule of clvH,procedure. My 
objection to the interrogatorie,s stated the>gro.und:s and this is all that is required for such 
an objection. In your letter, you .state that I have not even made ~ nalf--hearted attempt to 
formulate a meritorious objection. Since you.r letter states yo.µr position on the number of 
interrogatories, your statement in the letter has no beari11g upon the issue and it makes no 
difference what you assume I did Of did not do in formulating the objections. In fact, your 
statement is false and you had no basis to even make suet, a statement. I consider this 
to be an irrelevant comment that is meant to be derogatory of me. 
In your letter, you arbitrarily and unilaterally give me seven days to provide 
a detailed basis for my objections and if I do not respond within seven days, you will file a 
motion to compel. This deadline does not take into consideration my availability to respond 
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have stated thsUhey would like to have my response as soon as I am avajJable to give a 
response. Since this Is ~pparently your policy, there will be in, all likelihood, situations in 
this case where I wiU be forced to :adhere to your policy, such as the scheduling of matters 
and court ~ppearances. 
I h,a>1e an9tH~ii!fa~cjfio instance where you and your loc~f'c::ouns~l~F~itrarHy 
selected July 31 for tlte datij for the subpoena of records of Sprint Nextel Corporate 
Security. The. subpoena I r~ceived specifies July J1, office of your local cotmser1 but a 
time is not listed, even though the form of the subpoena calfs fora place, date and time. 
No one contacted me-to see.i,fl was available and I am not, which isnotthewaythings are 
done in 6oise. Because, thrS,tseems to be the way you and local counsel practice, t WIii 
take the liberty of scheduling matters1 fnclOding the deposition of your client on a date\ time 
and plac~ I choose, without obtaining your availability. 
Your letter of July 2S also demands my r .otion. !n that letter, you state th~t 
ate ~ttorqeys whose liti9ation strategy is tt;> · d .. the litigation process through 
~ss objections, althougf) you say yotJ. are WIJliri g:i'Oe everybne the benefit of the 
cldUbt. This statement has no bearing whatsoever on the objections I have assertect and 
your position orrthe objections, I, fail to understand why you included this statement unless 
it was meant to disparage me. 
lnyourTettst ofjufy 2S you also arbitrarily set a deadline of July 27. l will not 
be in my office July 27 b.ec~use I must travel to another city on business. It i~ not the 
custom in Boise to impose sach unllateral and arbitrary deadlines, wnich give no difference 
to the opposing attorney's aYc,1ilabi1ity. 
I would also lik~ to state that threats from an attorney serve no purpose: or 
worthwhile function. You have stated your position on the number of interrogatories1 which 
is fine, but the threats you assert are irrelevant and do not serve as a means of reaching 
an agreement on answering the interrogatories. In fact, they have the opposite effect. 
Rule 33(a)(3), I.R.C.P. reads in relevant part: 
''No party shall serve upon any other single party 
to an action more than forty (40) interrogatories. 
in which sub-parts of interrogatories shall count 
as separate interrogatories ... ". 
The key to the interpretation of this Rule is whether the other parts of the 
interrogatory, in addition to the primary interrogatory require answers on specific issues 
that are designated. Looking at Interrogatory No. 1, it asks for the identity of the person 
or persons responding to these Interrogatories and Requests. This is one Interrogatory if 
only Dr. Kerr is identified. The other parts of the Interrogatory specify two distinct and 
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and addresses for the past five years. These two parts require answers for each that are 
different from each other and are not embodied in the identity of Dr. Kerr. As respects Dr. 
Kerr, this constitutes three interrogatories. If more than Dr. Kerr is identified in responding 
to the interrogatories, such as one perso,n, this is three more interrogatories, or a total of 
six. If there are three pe.opJe who responded to the Interrogatory in addition to Dr. Kerr, 
this is nine more interrog?tories. 
The same ana)ysis of Interrogatory No, 2 appJies, although No. 2 is far more 
extensive than No. 1. The Interrogatory asks for the employmeothistory for the last ten 
years of Or. Kerr and any agent, servant, or ,er:nployee who had any interaction or 
communication with Krystal Ballard. In addition to this, there are six specific questions to 
answer, ~ach of which require separate answers that are different and distinct for one 
another. They are: 1) employer name: 2) job title; 3) job duties, ·4) elates of employment; 
5) reason fe>r leaving employment; and 6) salary orwages for each,employment. This Is 
9, tal of six separate interrogatories for Dr. Kerr. A o t~is-·other ag_e·nts and·employee,s 
! , Kerr who had any interaction or communlcatf .ifh:J<rystal.Ballarcl~ and the number 
<if interrogatories is increased dramatically by· a mu (cation of six for each employee or 
agent. 
lnterrog2:jtory No. 3 contains five separ1:1te s.ubjects that require answers and 
each of them is dlstim::t and separate: from the oth~rs. 
Interrogatory No. 8 is actua11y two separate interrogatories, despite the fact 
that they are designated as Interrogatory No. 8. 
lnterrogat9ry No. 10 contains three separate subjects or cate.gories to 
answer, each of which are distinct and different from one another. 
Interrogatory No. 11 refers to Dr. Kerr a nd the agents, servants and 
employees of Silk Touch Laser. It then has four separate subjects that require answers 
by Dr. Kerr and the employees of Silk Touch Laser. 
Interrogatory No. 16specifies four specific subjects or categories that require 
answers, each of which are different from the others, despite the fact that the Interrogatory 
is directed to Dr. Kerr and Krystal Ballard and Charles Ballard. 
Interrogatory No. 19 applies to Dr. Kerr, Silk Touch Laser and/or any 
employee of either which involves separate answers for each. In addition to this, the 
Interrogatory specifies six subjects that require answers by each person and entity to whom 
the Interrogatory is directed. Each subject is different from the others. 
Interrogatory No. 20 is actually two separate interrogatories, even though 
they are listed as one interrogatory. The Interrogatory asks the identity of each witness 
and for each witness a brief summary of their expected trial testimony. 
000103
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Interrogatory No. 23 is directed to Dr. Kerr, and agents, servants and 
employees of S.ilk To.uoh La~er:. It therJ; qe::1ignates four sepa.rate categories that require 
answers, each ofwhlch are dlstjnctand 'different from the others. 
Several qf t~Js J!jteEtgg~J ' s reqJ.JeSt the production of documents, ~ata and 
tangible items. Rule 3'3' iijr,,i~te'rr:ogat .does not require or pertain to the production of 
such material. 
When I · tto.n:s to the interrogatories, l conctt,Jct~ an 
analysis of eacn .oneii . . Y1. have setforth in this letter. l did not, as you 
put it, even mage a ha -heart, .. . t to . fqrmt.ifate a me p9t;1s objection. In my 
opinion; my eht:1nces of.prevailing dn mr objections are atthe equal to your chances 
of pr~vaifjng on yo.or posjtion. Even sq, t triink we m1Jst make every effort to reach .an 
accord. 
> . According to ~Ur Rt.ties., if)'v 
,that ~ou nave tried t~ :resolve, 01;1.r 
' es that ~OU are right a:nd l' 
, .. > gat9rfes. For ai stai:tiOS' ~. 
suggest t you s~bmit a tev:ised s~t 
R4le:on 40 intertog~to·ne$,wh'ich r can, 
iHtiey. slightly ex.c~t;}t!~ 0 narnJ:i~t. J 
some respect Clr r~.qo,· 
agreement.. Yow· po 
requirement and practi 
· t9tm;i.eJ answers, you must 
. . ctfon. Your letter of July 6 
4rt will compel answers 
,r:fofle our differences, I 
. . , hz~~e, close to meeting the 
~.P$id~t and Mpefully·agree to answer, even 
~tm1,r BuJ1;:s and practice$, requ:ireyou (ogive 
·· . well as yot,1rs,. and in an: ~~9rt.t9 re5'ch an 
,and you are rigl'.lt is not compatible with this 

















August 6·, 2012 
VIA US MAIL AND FACSIMIU: 
Mr. Jeremiah A Ouane 
P.O. Box-519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
La~rs 
Internet www.bail~a~r.com 
Phonc(304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cranba'.ry Square 
M OIJ!311\0wn, WV 26S08 
ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
Re: Chades Ballard v. Brian Kerr, M.D., et al, Case No. CVOC 1204792 
DearMr, Quane. 
\ t!~!t?t . gt ¥o~r letter faxro to me July 29:;. 2Qt2 ~"'pJithank yoU, for your ~sponse. 
Wn naoo6teqly, given the tenor of you.(' ~tter "fl8 will,b;e: at loggerheads with respect 
to reaching a resolution concerning the objections mat:te oased on wtiat you perceive to 
be an excessive number of interrogatories, ·· t nonetheless think it best to try ta resolve 
these Issues short of court Intervention. If not, then l want to be able to represent to the 
CourtJhat e\lery effort naa b~ made to resolYe>this dispute. 
First, Rule 33 of the Ida . Jes of CMI Prcioedure indicate that .. no 0party sha,JI serve 
upon any other s·o a· st0:11ny action, mbre than forty (40) interrogatories; io which 
subparts of interrogaJorr · 1 count as separate interrog·atories.,." As you ,~a.a see 
from the interrogatories., ere directed both to Silk Touch as well as CJt'. Kerr 
individually. Because YQtJf "math" and mine may differ, I wiU identify, which 
interrogatories are d!rectedatDr. Kerr andwhich at Silk Touch so I can pfaceyour mlhd 
at ease with respect to the number of interrogatories we served on your respective 
clients. I will also withdraw ce.rtain interrogatories as indicated below. This is being 
done solely to avoid the need to waste the Court1s time on a discovery dispute. not that I 
believe your objection is valid. Further, while we disagree as to how you have 
calculated the· number of interrogatories, we are calculating the number based on your 
math only as a means of resolving this dispute without court Intervention. 
Interrogatory No. 1 
We would request that you provide an answer as to the person or persons responding 
to these interrogatories and requests. You need not provide dates of birth or addresses 
for these individuals. This would account for arguably no more than 1 interrogatory to 
each of your clients based on your "math." 
553996 
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Interrogatory No 2 
Interrogatory No. 2 is directed to both Dr. Kerr individu.aUy a, well as Silk Touch. We 
withdrc!w the reason for leaving employment and salary/wage informatiE>rt This would 
amount to three interrogatories directed at Dr. Kerr and three interrogaf i>i'ies directed at 
Silk Touch Spa based upon your •math." 
lbtertogatory No. 3 
This interrogatory would be directed at each of your clients. Assuming. your math is 
correct, this:would involve six Interrogatories. 
tnterrogat,c,ryNo. 4 
lntetrogatocy No. 4 is directed to both of your c.flents ~nd tt ·is a slngle interrog~tE>ry to 
each. 
Interrogatory No. 5 
o atory is gir~ed to Silk J . 
Qroducin.g lnfoOJ'latlon r 
amte'iriferrogatories is atist.1 . 
Interrogatory. No; 6 
· is both an in · rrogatory and; r 
can speak . s education; tt . an 
t . e never hid. it suggested that educa 
separate and distinct as th<>Se terms are 
reflected in a CV'. 
Interrogatory No. 7 
This is. a single interrogatory directed at Dr. Kerr. 
Interrogatory No. 8 
Withdraw the interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 9 
This is a single interrogatory directed at Silk Touch. 
Interrogatory No. 10 
i~teriogt:1t,ory. A~mt,ting. to 
model· a11clr seri'aJ number 
o. As fQr th~t l .~Fr09titbr)\ ...  or. 
and it is:·a interrogijtory. 
arid . . are tht~ 
and ace typieal.ly 
.According to your math, this would be four interrogatories directed at Or. Kerr. 
553996 
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Interrogatory No. 11 
This interrogatory would be five interrogatories directed at each of your clients, 
according to your math. 
Interrogatory No. 12 
This is a single interrogatory directed at Or. Kerr. 
Interrogatory No. 13 
This would be arguably, pursl,.1ant to }'Olir math, two interrogatories directed at Silk 
Touch since it requests name'Sand addresses. 
Interrogatory No. 14 
We will withdraw Interrogatory No. 14 as if would be encompassed by Interrogatory No . 
13. 
Interrogatory No. 15 
This encompasses both ~n in,terrogato!Y and request for production. As to the 
interrogatory, it is a singre interrogatory dir~ted at Silk Touch. 
Interrogatory No. 16 
I thin!< you would be hard-pJ~~ed to ar!;JU~,th.rt trying to, account for aH fQJnmunieations 
would be more than a ~ingJe lnterrogatci\y even thougl1 you have to identify fhe manner 
in which you communicated. "This Is directed at Dr. Kerr. 
lnterrog·atory No. 17 
This would be two interrogat-0ri~s direeted at both Dr. Kerr and Sill< Touch based on 
your math. One asking who was in (f\e room and the second who made contact or 
inserted any instruments during the procedure. 
lnterro,gatory No. 18 
Interrogatory No. 18 is directed exclusively to Silk Touch and .ls a single interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 19 
This would be exclusively directed at Silk Touch and it has five subparts basically 
asking for information concerning inspections. According to your math, this would be 
five interrogatories directed at Silk Touch. 
553996 
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Interrogatory No. 20 
rnterrogatory No. 20 is directed to both Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch, and your math would 
have it at two interrogatories. 
Interrogatory No. 21 
Interrogatory No . . 21 is ~ssentially asktng for what is on a Dec sheet and would be 
dire(;ted'atb9th of your clients. f:qot even for sake of argument would I considet..thatto 
be separate. interrdg~fories, t:,tit rather one toward each. 
rnterrggatory h!G: 22. 
fnterrogatOrY· Np • .. 22·. ii ~Ire 
interrog·atori~'S'. tit . ea'ehi brie 
sterilized equipm~J'Jfi 
1n·terrogatory No. 23 
d at Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr and wo:ul.~. ~ .. two 
ttiey sterilized themselves and second, how they 
!his. int~rrvgatpJ;Y WoqJ~i" b,~< dir8Gted to both your clients and it would be five 
mterrogatorfes ac(;()rdfog to .. yovr ma.th. 
· i l 'tf:.CQPtlt· for 39· interrogatories directed at Silk. Tq 
· f · ,, ' · , ~bpefully,, we can ag,:ee to move,thi' . 
res~~ridt to whether you wm agreet lp'r 
odiflc~Uons ~n<;t.clarffiaa:tions set· folUI i 





Thank you,Jor yctUJ ~ttt}tition t~ this mattt:;r, If we do not he~r from Y9V, we wlU a~,9me 
you continue to ·take lssue ·atla stand by your objections. We will then file a motion to 
compel. 
P. Gregory Haddad 
PGH/tjl 
cc: Scott McKay (via emam 
553996 
000108
08/06/2012 MOK 15: 43 FAX 

























CharJes Ballard v,. 8'$fn.K~n:. M:ll. 1; 





CAREY PERKINS LLP 12083458660 » 
FACSIMIL .E TRANS 'Nl:>tSSION 
. ·CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor 
U.S. Bank Plaza 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
fax (208} 345-8660 
AugJ.Jst 9., 2012 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAlt.EY & GLASSER LLP 
Mo.rsantown1 Wast Virginia 
Fax No. 304-594--9709 
Phone No. 304-594-0087 
P 1/3 
FROM: Jeremiah A. Quane 
Re: Ca$e Name Ballard v. Kerr 
Our Fi.le No. 1107 /25-938 
Comments: Please see the art.ached letter of -today's date. 
Including the cover sheet, this facsimile contains 3 pages. 
Confldontl:illty Notlr::o: This rnes:s.ige is inlcmdod for tho V$O of tho individu.il or onuty to which il is addrossod and m.iy conlain 
Information th:lt ls privileged, confidential and exempt 110m dlsclo:suro undor .ippllc.iblo law. If tho roador of this moss3go 1$ nQI tho 
lntondod recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for deUvelin9 the massage to tho intendod recipient, you aro hereby notified 
that any dlssomlnetloii, distribution or copyin9 of this eommunlcalion is strictly prohibited. II you have rec:eivea lhis communic:ition in 
error, please notify us immodlatcly by tolephono. 
If you havo rocoivod this communication in orror, ploasc notify us lmmodlataly by telephone. 
000110
201a-os-_09 11:09 CAREY PERKINS LLP 12083458660 » 
13. B, SM:IT.H (16~-1975) 
J~EMY D, BROWN 
U;S,UE s. BROWN 
DONALD F. CARBY• 
MARISA S, CRECE1JUS 
KJMN A. GRIFFJTJIS 
TeRRENCS S. JONES 
OAVIP W. KNQTTS 
AUBR6Y:O. LYON 
81\UCE R. McAWSTeR 
-MATTHEW F, McCOLL 
HANS A. MITCHEIL 
DA\'ID S. PERKINS 
CAR$TI!N A. P.ETERSON 
W[I.UAM o. rope 
JEREMlhH A. QUANE 
PINA 1- SALi.AK 
RICW.R.D I.. STUBBS 
6RJCAJ;W!-1ITB 
TR.MY. 1...:wRiom 
At.4Y q; ZAVJOOW 
VIA f8CS1M1l:.E Ot,ILY 
. P: Gregory Ha.d.~~d: 
, .GL;A$S~R [J::P 




IOI S.C BOULEVARD 
I'. X$19 
BOISS:, I 8'37Q 1-0519 




August 9, 2012 
'nberry Square 
own, We$t Virginia 2650S 
Re: y~Kerr 
le·No. 1107/25-938 





TBLE~QNH (20$) 519-0000 
FACSIMILE at)B) n!4l005 
I . 
\1/J'!'.U . hllMITTlll>, 
TO l>AA ... _ . W'fN ~lltl!A, 
lDAllO, . iON. UTAII. I 
WA.UIINGTON JIN!> WYl)MINO 
0 ADMl1Tlll) ffl NIACTICD I 
QMIJO All!> \YVoMJNC 
Your interrog~torles .are ~ddp ~p.~rately to0 feair··Oefenda.nl§ beip_g Dr 
Kerr, Silk Tou~h Laser, LLP; $ilk Touch ~ eind Laser ~~m~er, and $ilk ~uctt 
Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo qf ~ and each _ enci.fJnt is reqveste'() to arl~W~ftlJ.~'ftifll se{ 
of the lnterr ories. The rmat, style and de:$cliption ,of t ~tor:lesdoes not 
sepa_rateorid __ ify which ~f the·interro~atorles ati~pne, D~len .4JaStet;J to answ~rj 
S,.ect1on a. pag~/5, of the interrogatories state~ ''y(:)U.ane,t{Qr"y:pur,s means Or. Kerr, Silk 
'Touch Laser, LLP, Silk Touch MeqSpa and Laser r, and SIik 'fo!!lch MedSpa, Laser! 
and Lipa of Boise. I fall to understand your logic a on1ention 1n y<;>t,ir letter of August 6 
that some of the interrogatories are dir~ct~cl qnly to a partjcular Defendant, such as your 
reference to numbers 5, 7, 9, 12, 13. 15, 18 and 19. You then go 9n to s.tate that yoJ 
account for 39 interrqgatories directed at SiJk Touch Laser, LLP and 36' interrogatories 
directed at Dr. Kerr. Your statements are simply not in conformity with the style, 
description and format of the interrogatories. 
It is impossible to figure out which oHhe interrogatories are directed to whom, 
despite the explanation in your letter. There is no reason not to send separate sets of 
interrogatories directed to a particular Defendant. If we end up in Court over this, we 
should and must have a clear and concise record for the Judge to assess and your letter 
of August 6 does not fulfill this need. I need interrogatories directed to a particular 
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Defendant instead of the method you have employed. As a solution, I strongly recommend 
you do this and we can then go forward and hopefully agree. 
You again,.inyourletter6fAu9vst61 tmpose an arbitrary, unilateral qeadline 
of Aug_ust 10 for me Jo(~.~@ d;w~h.ou_t kn~wi~g if I am alive or in China~ rhisjsnotthe 
waythrngs are donemB · · Jf.YPll do ,t this way tn West Virginia. You al~q1tbi:~aten 
to move the Court to co onses.Jf' I rJo·not respond by August 10. Again,. you qo 
not take Into account rpy . . tty to: re$pond by August 1 O, but neverthEtless, I am 
re.sponding before August 10; Threats get you nothing. 
You have a~ked,for dates for the deposition of Dr. Kerr within the next two 
weeks of your le,tterwith the suggestion that the.deposition may not occur until late Augus1 
or early September. I take it from thh;; that you want dates in this time frame. Here again, 
yqµ unjlaterally impose a time frame for th~ deposition which is very narrow-In.scope. I 
wit! te.1~ you that my business makes it impossi,bte: p:,e d~position in August and 
e · · tember, much less the availabil~ otJi1:i. this in mind. I will get you 
d . . ... or our availability, but lam puttin9:yo.u on. . . t they will not be in the time 
f~m~ you demand. At the. best, I am looking af O .r hecause I am booked solid in 
most of September, 'especially the l~ter n.alf. 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 . 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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C5)MES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to Rule 
37(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides this Memorandum of Law in 
. 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories. A motion and affidavit of counsel has been contemporaneously filed herewith. 
I. Factual Background 
On March 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed the Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, 
inter alia, that Defendants negligently performed cosmetic surgery upon, and negligently 
provided post-operative care to, Krystal Ballard, causing her death on July 26, 2010. (Compl. ~~ 
18-20.) 
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff served on Defendants' counsel his First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admission (attached to Affidavit of 
Counsel at Exhibit A). 
On June 29, 2012, Defendants responded to Plaintiffs interrogatories with a single 
sentence objection: "Defendants object to the Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories on the 
grounds that the number of interrogatories, including sub-parts of interrogatories[,] exceed the 
number of interrogatories allowed by [Rule 33(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure]." 
(Defs.' Obj. to Pl.'s First Set of Interrogs. 1 (attached to Affidavit of Counsel at Exhibit B).) 
Defendants provided no explanation for, nor asked to speak to Plaintiffs counsel about, their 
objection. 
on' July 6, 2012, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter via facsimile to Defendants' counsel 
(attached to Affidavit of Counsel at Exhibit C), and requested a written explanation as to why 




limit. In an attempt to avoid the Court's involvement, Plaintiffs counsel also requested a phone 
call with Defendants' counsel to follow Defendants' written response. 
On July 16, 2012, an assistant from Defendants' counsel's office telephoned Plaintiffs 
counsel to advise that Defendants' counsel would be unavailable until the latter part of the 
month. On July 25, 2012, having received no written, legal basis for Defendants' objection, 
Plaintiffs counsel sent another letter by facsimile (attached to Affidavit of Counsel at Exhibit 
D), which again requested a written justification for Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs 
interrogatories. The next day, Defendants' counsel faxed a letter (attached to Affidavit of 
Counsel at Exhibit E), which sets forth an extraordinarily narrow reading of Rule 33(a)(3) with 
respect to counting interrogatories. For example, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs 
Interrogatory No. 1, which seeks the identity of the person providing answers, including that 
person's date of birth and addresses for the past five years, must be counted as three 
interrogatories. Likewise, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 6, which calls 
upon Defendant Kerr to state with specificity the education, training, and experience that 
qualified him to perform the cosmetic procedure at issue, must be counted as three 
interrogatories. Defendants further assert that the total of all subparts to a particular 
interrogatory must be multiplied by the number of individuals called upon to respond to same. 
Defendants apply this reasoning to Plaintiffs Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, and 
23. 
By letter dated, and sent by facsimile to Defendants' counsel, on August 6, 2012 
(attached to Affidavit of Counsel at Exhibit F), Plaintiffs counsel, having applied Defendants' 
method of computation to each and every one of Plaintiffs interrogatories, limited the scope of 




and withdrew some interrogatories entirely. Using Defendants' narrow (and incorrect) 
construction of Rule 33, Plaintiff propounded thirty-six interrogatories upon Defendant Kerr and 
thirty-nine interrogatories upon the Silk Touch Defendants. 
Three days later, on August 9, 2012, Defendants' counsel faxed a response letter 
(attached to Affidayit of Counsel at Exhibit G) to Plaintiff's counsel. By this letter, 
Defendants' counsel expressed incredulity regarding Plaintiff's counsel's application of 
Defendants' counsel's methodology to address Defendants' objection and resolve the discovery 
dispute. 
Defendants have not answered any of Plaintiff's interrogatories. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
now has no alternative but to ask the Court to compel full, good-faith responses to Plaintiff's 
interrogatories. 
II. Argument 
Rule 33(a)(3) provides as follows: 
No party shall serve upon any other single party to an action more than forty ( 40) 
interrogatories, in which subparts of interrogatories shall count as separate 
interrogatories, without first obtaining a stipulation of such party to additional 
interrogatories or obtaining an order of the court upon a showing of good cause 
granting leave to serve a specific number of additional interrogatories. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 33(a)(3). Though the Court has much discretion in addressing the scope of 
interrogatories in the face of objections, it is well-established that "[Rule 33] should be accorded 
a liberal interpretation" in effectuating its purpose: "to afford parties information regarding facts 
involved in the issues in suit to enable the proposing party to prepare for trial and to reduce the 
possibility of surprise in the trial." Smith v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 374, 383, 364 




And while liberal interpretation of discovery rules is certainly justified, this in no way 
precludes application of common sense. While addressing a similar discovery dispute, the 
Montana Supreme Court found that "[w]hile [Rule 33(a) of the Montana Rules of Civil 
Procedure] does not define the term 'subpart,' common sense dictates that one sentence 
containing three clauses does not constitute three separate interrogatories." Richardson v. 
Montana, 331 Mont. 231, 243, 130 P.3d 634, 644 (2006). This is especially true when subparts 
are drafted to elicit information pertaining to a common theme. Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2168.1 (3d ed. 2002) ("Subparts directed at eliciting details concerning 
a common theme should be considered a single question."); Swackhammer v. Sprint Corp. PCS, 
225 F.R.D. 658, 664-665 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding that subparts relating to a common theme are 
not separate interrogatories). For this reason, "recipients of interrogatories are not entitled to 
object based on a selective count of the various clauses contained in the requests." Richardson, 
331 Mont. at 233-234, 130 P.3d at 644. 
Plaintiff filed this action in March. He propounded discovery requests upon Defendants 
on June 6, 2012. On August 6, 2012, Plaintiff, in great deference to Defendants' interpretation 
of Rule 33, made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute and to preclude the Court's 
involvement. Plaintiffs efforts have been met only with recalcitrance. Therefore, in an effort to 
move this case more efficiently toward disposition, Plaintiff asks the Court to compel Defendants 
to fully and completely answer his interrogatories. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff also seeks reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, 






Dated this -;;{{ day of August, 2012. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~ev~ 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
fl-
I hereby certify that on the ~l.t day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories by hand delivering the same to 
the following: 
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Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Scott McKay 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 . 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff· 
NO. FILED !7'.~ I -
AM-. ___ ..,.P.M,-f-~/ 
AUG 2 7 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
· CHARLES BALLARD, ) 
) 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 
MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
1 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
ORIGl~JAL 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff gives notice to the Defendants 
that he will call for hearing his Motion to Compel on September 12, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. before the 
Honorable Deborah A. Bail. ,,,_ 
DATED this ':>1 day of August, 2012. 
2 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
Respectfully submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ft-.. 
I hereby certify that on August 'J 7, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Hearing by hand delivering the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 




~ U\\~~~,'ll Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
NO. ___ FILFnl/::;..~:':T---
A.M, ____ F,~~~ = 
SEP O 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ByLARAAMES 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEPUTY 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND 
CERTIFICATION PER RULE 
37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 
37(a)(2); I.R.C.P. - 1 
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1. I am the attorney of record for Defendants in the above-captioned 
action, and the following statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true 
and correct. 
2. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of a 
letter from counsel for the Plaintiff dated August 6, 2012. 
3. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of a 
letter from counsel for the Defendants dated August 9, 2012. 
4. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit C, is a true and correct copy of a 
letter from counsel for the Defendants dated August 29, 2012. 
5. Attached hereto, marked Exhibit D, is a true and correct copy of a 
letter from counsel for the Defendants dated July 26, 2012. 
6. Exhibits D, Band C were sent to counsel for the Plaintiff via facsimile 
on the respective dates of each letter. 
7. Counsel for the Plaintiff has never responded to Exhibits Band C by 
any means or in any form. 
8. Notwithstanding Exhibits B and C, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the 
Motion to Compel Defendants' answers to Plaintiffs first set of interrogatories. 
9. Although not required by Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P, counsel for the 
Defendants has in good faith conferred and attempted to confer with Plaintiffs counsel in 
an effort to resolve the issues regarding answers to Plaintiffs interrogatories without court 
action, as set forth in Exhibits Band C. 
10. The failure of Plaintiffs counsel to respond to Exhibits B and C, but 
instead filing the motion to compel answers to interrogatories, does not constitute a good-
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 
37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. - 2 
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faith attempt to resolve or arrive at a mutually agreeable means of providing answers to 
interrogatories so as to avoid court action. 
11. Taking into account Exhibits A, B, D and C in combination, it is 
Affiant's opinion and position that the discovery dispute between the parties can and 
should be resolved without court intervention on Plaintiff's motion to compel answers to 
interrogatories. 
12. Although the affidavit of Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Haddad, in paragraph 
10 states that Plaintiff has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
Defendants in an effort to secure Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's interrogatories without 
court action, this statement is not supported by the content of Exhibits A, Band C and in 
particular the fact that Mr. Haddad has never responded to Exhibits B and C, which are an 
effort on the part of defense counsel to resolve the dispute and avoid court action. 
13. It is the position of defense counsel that the affidavit of Mr. Haddad 
is not a valid certification under Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P., which provides that the motion to 
compel answers to interrogatories must include a certification. 
14. It is the position of defense counsel that without a valid certification by 
Mr. Haddad, the Plaintiff's motion to compel answers to the interrogatories is not subject 
to adjudication by the Court. 
15. It is the position and opinion of defense counsel that Plaintiff's 
interrogatories, addressed separately to each of the four Defendants in the case, exceed 
the number of interrogatories allowed by Rule 33(a)(3), I.R.C.P. and that Plaintiff's counsel 
did not obtain a stipulation from defense counsel or an order of the Court to serve a 
specific number of additional interrogatories. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 
37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. - 3 
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught. 
JeremiG1, V.ouane 
r:..+0-. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _._J_ aay of Septem 
1,,,, ....... ,,,,, 
!>,,• ~ B AfRl) ,,,,,. 
~# "'(J .......... -~~ ~~..- .. ~. 
14< I 0~,-.RY •,- \ : I~ I : = • ~ •""' • : • • , v • • 
i \ ' Zo! 
\ ••• PU~\, l:r:I 
\ •••• • ••• ~ $ ~,, .r,. ...... ....<;) ,,' 
,,,, :,4 TE 0~ ,,,, ,,,, .......... ,, 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS 
AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS AND CERTIFICATION PER RULE 





August 6, 2012 
VIA US MAIL AND FACSIMILE 
Mr. Jeremiah A. Quane 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Lawyers 
Internet www.bailcyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-008? Fax (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cranberry Squurc 
Morgunto11 n, WV 26508 
. ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
Re: Charles Ballard v. Brian Kerr, M.D., et al, Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Dear Mr. Quane, 
I am in receipt of your letter faxed to me July 26, 2012 and thank you for your response. 
While undoubtedly given the tenor of your letter we will be at loggerheads with respect 
to reaching a resolution concerning the objections made based on what you perceive to 
be an excessive number of interrogatories, I nonetheless think it best to try to resolve 
these issues short of court intervention. If not, then I want to be able to represent to the 
Court that every effort has been made to resolve this dispute. 
First, Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that "no party shall serve 
upon any other single party to any action, more than forty (40) interrogatories, in which 
subparts of interrogatories shall count as separate interrogatories ... " As you can see 
from the interrogatories, they were directed both to Silk Touch as well as Dr. Kerr 
individually. Because your "math" and mine may differ, I will identify which 
interrogatories are directed at Dr. Kerr and which at Silk Touch so I can place your mind 
at ease with respect to the number of interrogatories we served on your respective 
clients. I will also withdraw certain interrogatories as indicated below. This is being 
done solely to avoid the need to waste the Court's time on a discovery dispute, not that I 
believe your objection is valid. Further, while we disagree as to how you have 
calculated the number of interrogatories, we are calculating the number based on your 
math only as a means of resolving this dispute without court intervention. 
Interrogatory No. 1 
We would request that you provide an answer as to the person or persons responding 
to these interrogatories and requests. You need not provide dates of birth or addresses 
for these individuals. This would account for arguably no more than 1 interrogatory to 
each of your clients based on your "math." 
553996 
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Interrogatory No 2 
Interrogatory No. 2 is directed to both Dr. Kerr individually as well as Silk Touch. We 
withdraw the reason for leaving employment and salary/wage information. This would 
amount to three interrogatories directed at Dr. Kerr and three interrogatories directed at 
Silk Touch Spa based upon your "math." 
Interrogatory No. 3 
This interrogatory would be directed at each of your clients. Assuming your math is 
correct, this would involve six interrogatories. 
Interrogatory No. 4 
Interrogatory No. 4 is directed to both of your clients and it is a single interrogatory to 
each. 
Interrogatory No. 5 
This interrogatory is directed to Silk Touch and is a single interrogatory. Attempting to 
suggest that producing information regarding manufacturer, model and serial number 
would be separate interrogatories is. absurd. 
Interrogatory No. 6 
This is both an interrogatory and request for production. As for the interrogatory, Dr. 
Kerr can speak to his education, training and experience and it is a single interrogatory. 
I have never had it suggested that education, training and experience are three 
separate and distinct as those terms are used interchangeably, and are typically 
reflected in a CV. 
Interrogatory No. 7 
This is a single interrogatory directed at Dr. Kerr. 
Interrogatory No. 8 
Withdraw the interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 9 
This is a single interrogatory directed at Silk Touch. 
Interrogatory No. 10 
According to your math, this would be four interrogatories directed at Dr. Kerr. 
553996 
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Interrogatory No. 11 
This interrogatory would be five interrogatories directed at each of your clients, 
according to your math. 
Interrogatory No. 12 
This is a single interrogatory directed at Dr. Kerr. 
Interrogatory No. 13 
This would be arguably, pursuant to your math, two interrogatories directed at Silk 
Touch since it requests names and addresses. 
Interrogatory No. 14 
We will withdraw Interrogatory No. 14 as it would be encompassed by Interrogatory No. 
13. 
Interrogatory No. 15 
This encompasses both an interrogatory and request for production. As to the 
interrogatory, it is a single interrogatory directed at Silk Touch. 
Interrogatory No. 16 
I think you would be hard-pressed to argue that trying to account for all communications 
would be more than a single interrogatory even though you have to identify the manner 
in which you communicated. This is directed at Dr. Kerr. 
Interrogatory No. 17 
This would be two interrogatories directed at both Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch based on 
your math. One asking who was in the room and the second who made contact or 
inserted any instruments during the procedure. 
Interrogatory No. 18 
Interrogatory No. 18 is directed exclusively to Silk Touch and is a single interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 19 
This would be exclusively directed at Silk Touch and it has five subparts basically 
asking for information concerning inspections. According to your math, this ~ould be 
five interrogatories directed at Silk Touch. 
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Interrogatory No. 20 
Interrogatory No. 20 is directed to both Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch, and your math would 
have it at two interrogatories. 
Interrogatory No. 21 
Interrogatory No. 21 is essentially asking for what is on a Dec sheet and would be 
directed at both of your clients. Not even for sake of argument would I consider that to 
be separate interrogatories, but rather one toward each. 
Interrogatory No. 22 
Interrogatory No. 22 is directed at Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr and would be two 
interrogatories to each, one how they sterilized themselves and second, how they 
sterilized equipment. 
Interrogatory No. 23 
This interrogatory would be directed to both your clients and it would be five 
interrogatories according to your math. 
Having totaled this out, I account for 39 interrogatories directed at Silk Touch and 36 
interrogatories directed at Dr. Kerr. Hopefully, we can agree to move this along rather 
than delaying discovery. Please respond to whether you will agree to respond to the 
discovery requests based on the modifications and clarifications set forth in this letter by 
Friday, August 10, 2012. Otherwise, we will move the court to compel responses. 
In any event. irrespective of our ability to work out our differences as to these discovery 
requests, we would request dates on which Dr. Kerr can be deposed. While the 
deposition may not occur until late August or early September, I would like to have 
some dates within the next two weeks to consider. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. If we do not hear from you, we will assume 
you continue to take issue and stand by your objections. We will then file a motion to 
compel. 
P. Gregory Haddad 
PGH/tjl 
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Your interrogatories are addressed separately to four Defendants being Dr. 
Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, Silk Touch MedSpa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch 
Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise and each Defendant is requested to answer the full set 
of the interrogatories. The format, style and description of the interrogatories does not 
separate or identify which of the interrogatories any one Defendant is requested to answer. 
Section Q, page 5, of the interrogatories states "you and/or "yours" means Dr. Kerr, Silk 
Touch Laser, LLP, Silk Touch MedSpa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch MedSpa, Laser, 
and Lipo of Boise. I fail to understand your logic and contention in your letter of August 6 
that some of the interrogatories are directed only to a particular Defendant, such as your 
reference to numbers 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18 and 19. You then go on to state that you 
account for 39 interrogatories directed at Silk Touch Laser, LLP and 36 interrogatories 
directed at Dr. Kerr. Your statements are simply not in conformity with the style, 
description and format of the interrogatories. 
It is impossible to figure out which of the interrogatories are directed to whom, 
despite the explanation in your letter. There is no reason not to send separate sets of 
interrogatories directed to a particular Defendant. If we end up in Court over this, we 
should and must have a clear and concise record for the Judge to assess and your letter 
of August 6 does not fulfill this need. I need interrogatories directed _to a particular 
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Defendant instead of the method you have employed. As a solution, I strongly recommend 
you do this and we can then go forward and hopefully agree. 
You again, in your letter of August 6, impose an arbitrary, unilateral deadline 
of August 10 for me to respond, without knowing if I am alive or in China. This is not the 
way things are done in Boise, even if you do it ~his way in West Virginia. You also threaten 
to move the Court to compel responses if I do not respond by August 10. Again, you do 
not take into account my availability to respond by August 10, but nevertheless, I am 
responding before August 10. Threats get you nothing. 
You have asked for dates for the deposition of Dr. Kerr within the next two 
weeks of your letter with the suggestion that the deposition may not occur until late August 
or early September. I take it from this that you want dates in this time frame. Here again, 
you unilaterally impose a time frame for the deposition, which is very narrow in scope. I 
will tell you that my business makes it impossible to have the deposition in August and 
early September, much less the availability of Dr. Kerr. With this in mind, I will get you 
dates for our availability, but I am putting you on notice that they will not be in the time 
frame you demand. At the best, I am looking at October because I am booked solid in 
most of _September, especially the later half. 
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I am disappointed that you did not respond to my letter of August 9 (Exhibit 
G to your affidavit), but instead filed your motion to compel answers to your interrogatories 
and scheduled the hearing on the motion September 12. Before I go on in this letter, I 
want you to know that I have a deposition scheduled September 12 that makes it 
· impossible for me to attend the hearing on September 12, and this deposition has been 
scheduled for over one month of my client in an Ada County case. I was not contacted to 
see if I was available on the 121h and if this date remains, I will not be able to attend the 
hearing. I leave this to you. 
I do not believe we have exhausted our negotiations toward a resolution of 
our differences, based on your letter of August 6 and my letter of August 9, which I think 
we are obligated to do, in lieu of your motion to compel. To reiterate, your First Set of 
Interrogatories are directed, in their entirety to each Defendant in the case (four) and 
according to the style and format of the interrogatories, each Defendant is required to 
answer the full set of the interrogatories. I addressed this point in my letter of August 9, 
in which I stated that the interrogatories do not separate or identify which of the 
interrogatories any one Defendant is requested to answer. Your letter of August 6 contains 
several matters that appear to be conducive of the possible resolution of our respective 
positions, as does my letter of August 9. In your letter of August 6, you withdrew some of 
the interrogatories and specify that Interrogatory Nos. 5, 9, 13, 15, 18 and 19 are directed 
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only to Silk Touch and that by my math, there are 39 interrogatories directed at Silk Touch 
and 36 directed at Dr. Kerr. You then go on to say that you would like my response and 
agreement to answer the interrogatories based on the modifications and clarifications set 
forth in your letter of August 6. In my letter to you of August 9, in response to your letter 
of August 6, I proposed what I believe to be a suitable and reasonable way to resolve our 
differences, so as to conform to to the points you set forth in your letter of August 6, by 
suggesting that you submit separate sets of interrogatories to a particular Defendant. If 
you would do this, along the lines described in your letter of August 6, it is likely that we can 
agree and avoid court intervention, which is not too late to do. From my perspective, the 
problem is that your interrogatories are still the interrogatories in dispute, despite your letter 
of August 6. Your letter of August 6 does not change the existing interrogatories, such as 
the withdrawal of some and the specification of those that are directed to Dr. Kerr and Silk 
Touch. To me, this would be an easy and uncomplicated task on your part and it would 
rectify and resolve our differences. You would by this means, simply incorporate the points 
set forth in your letter of August 6 in the form of substitute interrogatories addressed to Dr. 
Kerr and Silk Touch, with the deletion of the interrogatories you withdraw in your letter of 
August 6. I assume your motion to compel is a flat rejection of this proposal on my part 
and the reason why I am disappointed by your not responding to my letter of August 9. My 
proposal is not to be considered a retreat from my objection to your interrogatories, but 
made in the spirit of compromise and to avoid a court hearing, which I am sure the Judge 
would like to avoid. 
Dr. Kerr is available to be deposed in my office at 1 :30 p.m. on October 10 
' through 12 and October 23 through 26. Would you please select one of these dates, if any 
of them are available to you,. as soon as possible in order for Dr. Kerr to make his 
arrangements? 
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This is the first opportunity I have had to respond to your letter of July 6 due 
to my commitments in cases in eastern Idaho, although my assistant telephoned your 
office July 16 and informed the person who answered the phone that I was unavailable 
until today or yesterday. 
I would like to offer you my comments regarding your letter of July 6. 
understand the position you have taken in regard to my objections to the interrogatories 
on the grounds that they exceed the number allowed by our rule of civil procedure. My 
objection to the interrogatories stated the grounds and this is all that is required for such 
an objection. In your letter, you state that I have not even made a half-hearted attempt to 
formulate a meritorious objection. Since your letter states your position on the number of 
interrogatories, your statement in the letter has no bearing upon the issue and it makes no 
difference what you assume I did or did not do in formulating the objections. In fact, your 
statement is false and you had no basis to even make such a statement. I consider this 
to be an irrelevant comment that is meant to be derogatory of me. 
In your letter, you arbitrarily and unilaterally give me seven days to provide 
a detailed basis for my objections and if I do not respond within seven days, you will file a 
motion to compel. This deadline does not take into consideration my availability to respond 
and, of course, it is made irrespective of my availability. Most experienced lawyers would 
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have stated that they would like to have my response as soon as I am available to give a 
response. Since this is apparently your policy, there will be in, all likelihood, situations in 
this case where I will be forced to adhere to your policy, such as the scheduling of matters 
and court appearances. 
I have another specific instance where you and your local counsel arbitrarily 
selected July 31 for the date for.the subpoena of records of Sprint Nextel Corporate 
Security. The subpoena I received specifies July 31, office of your local counsel, but a 
time is not listed, even though the form of the subpoena calls for a place, date and time. 
No one contacted me to see if I was available and I am not, which is not the way things are 
done in Boise. Because this seems to be the way you and local counsel practice, I will 
take the liberty of scheduling matters, including the deposition of your client on a date, time 
and place I choose, without obtaining your availability. 
Your letter of July 25 also demands my reaction. In that letter, you state that 
there are attorneys whose litigation strategy is to delay the litigation process through 
meritless objections, although you say you are willing to give everyone the benefit of the 
doubt. This statement has no bearing whatsoever on the objections I have asserted and 
your position on the objections. I fail to understand why you included this statement unless 
it was meant to disparage me. 
In your letter of July 25 you also arbitrarily set a deadline of July 27. I will not 
be in my office July 27 because I must travel to another city on business. It is not the 
custom in Boise to impose such unilateral and arbitrary deadlines, which give no difference 
to the opposing attorney's availability. 
I would also like to state that threats from an attorney serve no purpose or 
worthwhile function. You have stated your position on the number of interrogatories, which 
is fine, but the threats you assert are irrelevant and do not serve as a means of reaching 
an agreement on answering the interrogatories. In fact, they have the opposite effect. 
Rule 33(a)(3), I.R.C.P. reads in relevant part: 
"No party shall serve upon any other single party 
to an action more than forty (40) interrogatories, 
in which sub-parts of interrogatories shall count 
as separate interrogatories ... ". 
The key to the interpretation of this Rule is whether the other parts of the 
interrogatory, in addition to the primary interrogatory require answers on specific issues 
that are designated. Looking at Interrogatory No. 1, it asks for the identity of the person 
or persons responding to these Interrogatories and Requests. This is one Interrogatory if 
only Dr. Kerr is identified. The other parts of the Interrogatory specify two distinct and 
separate subjects that are in addition to the identity of Dr. Kerr, namely their date(s) of birth 
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and addresses for the past five years. These two parts require answers for each that are 
different from each other and are not embodied in the identity of Dr. Kerr. As respects Dr. 
Kerr, this constitutes three interrogatories. If more than Dr. Kerr is identified in responding 
to the interrogatories, such as one person, this is three more interrogatories, or a total of 
six. If there are three people who responded to the Interrogatory in addition to Dr. Kerr, 
this is nine more interrogatories. 
The same analysis of Interrogatory No. 2 applies, although No. 2 is far more 
extensive than No. 1. The Interrogatory asks for the employment history for the last ten 
years of Dr. Kerr and any agent, servant, or employee who had any interaction or 
communication with Krystal Ballard. In addition to this, there are six specific questions to 
answer, each of which require separate answers that are different and distinct for one 
another. They are: 1) employer name; 2) job title; 3) job duties, 4) dates of employment; 
5) reason for leaving employment; and 6) salary or wages for each employment. This is 
a total of six separate interrogatories for Dr. Kerr .. Add to this other agents and employees 
of Dr. Kerr who had any interaction or communication with Krystal Ballard, and the number 
of interrogatories is increased dramatically by a multiplication of six for each employee or 
agent. 
Interrogatory No. 3 contains five separate subjects that require answers and 
each of them is distinct and separate from the others. 
Interrogatory No. 8 is actually two separate interrogatories, despite the fact 
that they are designated as Interrogatory No. 8. 
Interrogatory No. 10 contains three separate subjects or categories to 
answer, each of which are distinct and different from one another. 
Interrogatory No. 11 refers to Dr. Kerr a nd the agents, servants and 
employees of Silk Touch Laser. It then has four separate subjects that require answers 
by Dr. Kerr and the employees of Silk Touch Laser. 
Interrogatory No. 16 specifies four specific subjects or categories that require 
answers, each of which are different from the others, despite the fact that the Interrogatory 
is directed to Dr. Kerr and Krystal Ballard and Charles Ballard. 
Interrogatory No. 19 applies to Dr. Kerr, Silk Touch Laser and/or any 
employee of either which involves separate answers for each. In addition to this, the 
Interrogatory specifies six subjects that require answers by each person and entity to whom 
the Interrogatory is directed. Each subject is different from the others. 
Interrogatory No. 20 is actually two separate interrogatories, even though 
they are listed as one interrogatory. The Interrogatory asks the identity of each witness 
and for each witness a brief summary of their expected trial testimony. 
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Interrogatory No. 23 is directed to Dr. Kerr, and agents, servants and 
employees of Silk Touch Laser. It then designates four separate categories that require 
answers, each of which are distinct and different from the others. 
Several of the interrogatories request the production of documents, data and 
tangible items. Rule 33 for interrogatories does not require or pertain to the production of 
such material. 
When I prepared the objections to the interrogatories, I conducted an 
analysis of each one in the fashion and way I have set forth in this letter. I did not, as you 
put it, even made a half-hearted attempt to formulate a meritorious objection. In my 
opinion, my chances of prevailing on my objections are at the least equal to your chances 
of prevailing on your position. Even so, I think we must make every effort to reach an 
accord. 
According to our Rules, if you file a motion to compel answers, you must 
certify that you have tried to resolve our dispute without court action. Your letter of July 6 
simply provides that you are right and I am wrong and that the court will compel answers 
to the interrogatories. For a starting point on our efforts to reconcile our differences,, I 
suggest that you submit a revised set of interrogatories that come close to meeting the 
Rule on 40 interrogatories, which I can then consider and hopefully agree to answer, even 
if they slightly exceed 40 in number. I think that our Rules and practices require you to give 
some respect or recognition to my position as well as yours, and in an effort to reach an 
agreement. Your position that I am wrong and you are right is not compatible with this 
requirement and practice. 
Very truly yours, 
JAQ/kb 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS' LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
PROPOSAL 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants' 
Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, supported by Plaintiff's memorandum of 
law and the affidavit, with exhibits, of Plaintiff's counsel Philip Haddad and opposed by this 
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Legal Memorandum and Proposal and the Affidavit of Counsel for the Defendants, 
Jeremiah A. Quane, with exhibits. Defendants' position is threefold: 
1. The Interrogatories exceed the number allowed by Rule 33(a)(3), 
I.R.C.P. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion does not include a valid certification as required by 
Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P., and is therefor not subject to an adjudication by the court. 
3. The refusal or failure of counsel for the Plaintiff to continue 
negotiations that are reflected in Exhibits A, B, and C to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, 
which in all likelihood, would resolve the issues regarding Answers to Interrogatories and 
render Plaintiffs Motion moot. 
I. 
PROPOSAL 
The Plaintiffs Interrogatories are directed separately in their entirety to Dr. 
Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, L.L.P., and two other entity Defendants, and each Defendant is 
requested to answer the full set of the Interrogatories. The style, format and description 
of the Interrogatories do not separate or identify which of the Interrogatories any one 
Defendant is asked to answer, i.e., every Interrogatory must be answered in full by each 
Defendant, irrespective of the answers provided by any other Defendant. This point was 
discussed in Exhibits B and C to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane sets forth the Plaintiffs' response to Exhibit D of the 
Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, and contains several modifications and changes to 
Plaintiffs Interrogatories, as follows: 
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1. Complete withdrawal of Interrogatory numbers 8 and 14. 
2. Withdrawal of portions of Interrogatory numbers 1 and 2. 
3. The designation of Interrogatories to both Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch, 
being numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 17, 20, 21, 22, and 23. 
4. The designation of Interrogatories to only Dr. Kerr, being numbers 6, 
7, 10, 12, and 16. 
5. The designation of Interrogatories to only Silk Touch, being numbers 
5, 9, 13, 15, 18, and 19. 
Exhibits Band C to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane set forth solutions and 
approaches to the dispute that embrace and incorporate the foregoing matters as 
expressed in Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. The solutions and 
approaches simply ask that the Plaintiff serve substitute separate sets of Interrogatories 
to a particular Defendant that conform to the matters outlined in Exhibit A to the Affidavit 
of Jeremiah A. Quane. If this was to be done, the discovery dispute would be resolved 
without the need for a Court hearing on the Motion to Compel and doing so by Plaintiff's 
counsel would be an easy and uncomplicated undertaking. It is the position and request 
of defense counsel that the Court enter an Order for the Plaintiffs submission of substitute 
Interrogatories as set forth above as a means of facilitating the resolution of this discovery 
dispute. If the Court will do this, there will be no reason for the Court to decide the issue 
on the number of Interrogatories, and the issue on the adequacy of the certification of 
Plaintiffs counsel required by Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. This proposal by defense counsel 
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is made in the spirit of compromise and to avoid a Court hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel. 
11. 
CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF INTERROGATORIES PER 
RULE 33(A)(3), I.R.C.P. 
The Rule provides in part that "no party shall serve upon any other single 
party to an action more than forty (40) interrogatories, in which sub-parts of interrogatories 
shall count as separate interrogatories." There must be a reason why the Rule mandates 
that sub-parts of interrogatories shall count as separate interrogatories. The Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories do not specify sub-parts specifically, but not doing so does not exclude the 
existence of sub-parts. The Plaintiff's Legal Memorandum is replete with references to a 
common theme and therefor sub-parts concerning a common theme are considered a 
single question or interrogatory. If this is the case, the limitation on the number of 
interrogatories per Rule 33(a)(3) could and would be rendered nugatory and inapplicable. 
A simple and analogous scenario could be devised for an interrogatory that in effect would 
nullify the limitation of Rule 33(a)(3), such as an interrogatory that specifies the common 
theme "did you witness the motor vehicle accident between A and B, and if you did, set 
forth and describe facts and events that are specifically specified in the interrogatory." By 
this means, an unlimited number of parts associated with the common theme could be 
used in the interrogatory and void the limitations of Rule 33(a)(3). In looking at Plaintiff's 
Interrogatory No. 11, this situation is exemplified. This Interrogatory contains four parts 
consisting of a list of date and each training, the individuals who attended each training, 
the person and/or entity which provided the training, and a description of the matters 
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.. 
discussed during the training. These are sub-parts that require different and separate 
answers by Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Laser. 
A sub-part by definition must relate to some other aspect or provision of an 
interrogatory, otherwise that term would not have been used in Rule 33(a)(3). A key to the 
interpretation of Rule 33(a)(3), in which sub-parts of interrogatories shall count as separate 
interrogatories, is whether the other parts of the interrogatory, in addition to the primary or 
initial part of the interrogatory, require answers on specific issues or matters that are 
designated and Plaintiff's Interrogatory numbers 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 
and 23 do just this. Interrogatory number 8 is actually two separate Interrogatories that are 
denoted as one Interrogatory. To the best of undersigned counsel's knowledge, there are 
no Idaho Supreme Court decisions that define sub-part or the meaning of sub-parts as that 
term is used in Rule 33(a)(3). The same is true as respects Idaho Court of Appeals 
decisions. 
Plaintiff cites to the Idaho case, Smith v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 
374, 383, 364 P.2d 146, 151 (1961 ). Smith, it should be noted, was a case which 
preceded the current rule, 33 (a)(3). The Smith Court makes no mention of how the 
number of interrogatories, or sub-parts, is to be calculated. In fact, Smith, relies in part on 
a federal case in which the trial court was sustained on its ruling that a party was not 
obligated to answer certain interrogatives. See Newall v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 
F.2d 338, 1944 U.S. App LEXIS 4268 *8. There, the Plaintiffs had served 352 discovery 
requests. The 101h Circuit Affirmed the trial court's decision to sustain the objections to the 
requests, which the Court found onerous and cumulative. 
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It was these very abuses of the discovery process that led the federal courts to limit the 
number of interrogatories in 1993. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted 
"Experience in over half of the district courts has confirmed that limitations on the number 
of interrogatories are useful and manageable." Charles A Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure, p.213. 
When making its rule change, though, the federal rule, as well as the 
Montana state rule (see below), were changed to read that the number of interrogatives 
which may be served should include "discrete sub-parts," only, in the count. See F.R.C.P. 
33(a)(1) and Mont.R.Civ.P 33. 
The following cases are pertinent on the subject of counting sub-parts. 
Valdez v. Ford Motor Co., 134 F.R.D. 296, 298 (D. Nev. 1991) (holding that local rule 
limiting interrogatories to "40 including subparts" "requires that every part of an 
interrogatory be counted and subject to the limitation of 40 ... even when a subpart relates 
to the main interrogatory."). In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 
170 F.R.D. 454,454 (E.D. Wis 1997), the court rejected the contention that subparts need 
not be counted if they are a logical extension of or directly related to a basic interrogatory. 
The use of the word "discrete" gets at the heart of the distinction in the cases cited by 
Plaintiff and to the heart of the matter at bar. Idaho's rule, pointedly, unlike the federal rule 
does not use the term "discrete subparts." Montana's rule does. Thus, when Plaintiff cites 
to a Montana Supreme Court case for support, the support is misplaced. See Richardson 
v. Montana, 130 P.3d 243 (Mont. 2006). There, the Court distinguish the various 
"clauses" contained within the questions posed by the State from "sub-parts" Id., 130 P .3d 
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at 244. Idaho's ~ules' drafters have made a clear choice of the approach set out in Aetna 
and Valdez. Subparts, not discrete subparts, are to be counted as individual 
interrogatories. To find otherwise would make the Idaho rule meaningless. Plaintiffs could, 
as they have done here, pick a theme, and then ask numerous questions relating to that 
theme, and call it one interrogatory. 
Ill. 
CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY RULE 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. 
The Plaintiffs Motion to Compel must include a certification that the Plaintiff 
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with defense counsel in an effort to 
secure the resolution of the discovery dispute without court action. Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. 
In the absence of a valid and accurate certification, the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is not 
ripe for a decision of the Court. 
The Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane sets forth the facts and events that 
support the conclusion that there is not an adequate certification as required by Rule 
37(a)(2), primarily because Plaintiffs' counsel has not seen fit to respond to Exhibits Band 
C, which constitute, in effect, a departure from good faith efforts to resolve the dispute. 
Since Plaintiffs counsel has not provided a reason or explanation in regard to the 
proposals contained in Exhibits Band C, it is clear that he no longer wants to continue with 
negotiation or efforts to reach an agreement, despite his comments in Exhibit A that read 
"Having totaled this out, I account for 39 Interrogatories directed at Silk Touch and 36 
Interrogatories directed at Dr. Kerr. Hopefully, we can agree to move this along rather than 
delaying discovery. Please respond to whether you will agree to respond to the discovery 
requests based on the modifications and clarifications set forth in this letter by Friday, 
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August 10, 2012. Otherwise we will move the Court to compel responses." Exhibit B, dated 
August 9, 2012 and Exhibit C, dated August 29, 2012 are defense counsel's responses. 
They essentially specify agreement to Exhibit A, subject to the condition that separate sets 
of Interrogatories be submitted to Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch that delete the Interrogatories 
withdrawn in Exhibit A. Exhibits B and C also describe the reasons for the proposal of 
separate Interrogatories to Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch. It is indeed puzzling and difficult to 
understand why Plaintiff's counsel has not responded to the proposals in Exhibits B and 
C which fact is not conducive of reaching a solution of the parties' differences. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants respectfully urge the Court to enter an Order for the 
Plaintiffs submission of substitute Interrogatories, an Order denying the Plaintiff's Motion 
to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, and an award of costs and attorney fees to the 
Defendants for opposing Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
DEFENDANTS' LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND PROPOSAL - 8 
000151
~· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND PROPOSAL by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
V Yeremiafl A. Quane 
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Judge Bail 091212 Tara The.. n Susan Gambee Courtroom508 
Time Speaker Note 
01 :28:35 PM I jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Motion to Compel 
01 :28:52 PM I Scott McKay I on behalf of the Plaintiff 
.. 0.1. :.28: 56 ... PM.l.be~=~~ah ............................. 1 on .behalf .. of .. the ... Defendant ................................................................................................ -................................... .. 
02:32:15 PMjJudge jCalls case 
.. 02:'32:42 ... PM·i·s· ..... McKay··---·-............ 'f Arg.ues .. Motion ... to .. Com.pel·-.. stfff'has .. not .. received answers .. to .. 
............................................................ ! ...................... _ ...._ ................................... interrogatories ....................................................................................................................... _ .............. -........................................ . 
02:37:01 PM IJ. Quane !Argues in opposition of Motion to Compel 
02:57:24 PM j S. McKay I Responds ...... 
03:00:55 PM I Judge 'I Grants the Motion to Compel. Permits the Defense to 
I , answer separately for Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Med Spa 
I i 
03:02:10 PM I I Response must be made within 14 days. M~ McKay will 
........................................... _ .. _ .. 1 .................. -............................................. 1.submit .. an ... appropriate .. order ..............................................................................................................................  







David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304). 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser:com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Aflorneys.for Plaint(.f! 
~~- //fat ,t ___ _ 
· SEP.. 1 If 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF P. GREGORY HADDAD 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA, TO WIT: 
l, P. Gregory Haddad, as the attorney for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, subscribed hereto by 
authority duly given, after being duly sworn, upon his oath, state and allege the following. 
1. . I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff in this litigation. 
2. Plaintiff's attorneys fees and expenses associated with procuring Defendants' 
Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories total $7,151.36. 
3. Plaintiffs attorneys fees related to Bailey & Glasser's efforts to procure 
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories are $5,244.00. 
4. A true and accurate itemization of Bailey & Gla.~ser's fees is attached hereto at 
Exhibit A. 
5. Plaintiff's attorneys fees related to the efforts of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett to procure Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories are $1,858.00. 
6. A true and accurate itemization of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett's fees is 
attached hereto at Exhibit B. 
7. Plaintiff's legal expenses related to the procurement of Defendants' Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories are $49.36. 
8. A true and accurate itemization of the aforementioned expenses is attached hereto 




9. Plaintiff provides these itemizations without waiving his attorney-client privilege 
or the protections afforded pursuant to the work product doctrine. 
10. Plaintiff, through his COlU)Sel, endeavored to keep the aforementioned fees and 
expenses reasonable by·engaging paralegals to perform work, by filing no reply, and by engaging 
local counsel to argue the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to 'Ph1intiffs Rirst 
Set oflnterrogatories. 
And farther affia11t saith not. 
S'l'A TE OF "\,Qw_ t -p .. U\ ~ ; a 
COUNTY OF '-t::)ltD1,:-vvv =r , to-wit: 
Taken, subscribed and sworn to before.me this \4) h day of Septemqer, 2012:. 





NOTARY PU81.IC sme OF WEST VIRGINUi 
. 2GO WWldY L-





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of September, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Affidavit of Counsel by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
5591106 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 




Date Employee Hours Rate Amount Description 
Ballard, Charles BALL001 
Estate of Krvstal 000001003362 
07/03/2012 Perrine, J. B. 0.10 325.00 $32.50 Review Responses to discovery reauests bv-Defendants. 
07/05/2012 Perrine, J. 8. 2.10 325.00 $682.50 Prepare letter to Defendant's counsel re: meet and confer about Defendant's objection on 
excessiveness qrounds to Plaintiffs interroqatories. Monitor email traffic re: same. -
07/06/2012 Bombard, Rebecca D. 0.50 95.00 $47.50 Finalizina Letter to Mr. Quane Regardina Obiections to Discoverv Reauests. 
07/09/2012 Bombard, Rebecca D. 0.10 95.00 $9.50 Receipt Phone Call From Jerry Quane's Office In Resoonse to Letter From PGH. 
07/25/2012 Perrine, J. 8. 0.10 325.00 $32.50 Review letter to Quane re: responses to Plaintiffs lnterroaatories. 
07/25/2012 Perrine, J. B. 0.10 325.00 $32.50 Review letter to Quane re: responses to Plaintiffs lnterroQatories. 
07/25/2012 Bombard, Rebecca D. 0.30 95.00 $28.50 Draft Letter to Mr. Quane. 
07/26/2012 Bombard, Rebecca D. 0.20 95.00 $19.00 Draft Letter to David Nevine Enclosina Letter That Was Sent to Mr. Quane. 
07/26/2012 Bombard, Rebecca D. 0.10 95.00 $9.50 Receipt and Review of Letter From Jerimiah Quane In Response to Objections to 
Interrogatories. 
07/31/2012 Haddad, Philio Grea 0.40 325.00 $130.00 Draft letter to defense counsel re discoverv resoonses. 
08/20/2012 Perrine, J. B. 0.10 325.00 $32.50 Oraanize Motion to Comee! re: IROGS. 
08/21/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 1.90 225.00 $427.50 Reviewed case documents in preparation for drafting of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' 
Answers to Interrogatories 
08/21/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.10 225.00 $22.50 Communicated with PGH re: Motion to Compel Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatories 
08/21/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 1.20 225.00 $270.00 
Legal research & brief writing - Drafted Plaintiffs Motion to Co:npel Defendants' Answer~_to 
Plaintiffs lnterroQatories 
08/21/2012 McAllister, Brian .J. 0.80 225.00 $180.00 Legal research & brief writing - Researched Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in preparation for 
draftinq Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to lnterroaatories 
08/22/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.20 225.00 $45.00 
Communicate (in firm) - Emailed PGH, JBP, and MF re: Motion to Compel and supporting 
Memorandum of Law 
08/22/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.10 225.00 $22.50 
Communicate (outside counsel) - Communicated with local counsel's office in re: Affidavit in 
support of Motion to Compel 
08/22/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 5.00 225.00 $1,125.00 
Legal research & brief writing - Drafted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and supporting 
Memorandum of Law 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 3.20 225.00 $720.00 
Legal research & brief writing - Revised and edited Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to 
Compel 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.20 225.00 $45.00 Drafted Affidavit of Counsel in support of Motion to Comoel Leaal research & brief writinq 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.30 225.00 $67.50 Lea al research & brief writing - Revised and edited Motion to Comoel 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 1.20 225.00 $270.00 
Legal research & brief writing - Legat Research related to Rule 33 of Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.30 225.00 $67.50 
Communicate (in firm) - Conferred by email with JBP re: revisions to Motion to Compel, 
Memorandum of Law 
08/23/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.20 225.00 $45.00 
Communicate (outside counsel)- Conferred with local counsel's office by phone and email re: 
Motion to Compel and supporting documents 
08/23/2012 Perrine, J. B. 0.70 325.00 $227.50 Review and revise Motion to Comoel and Memo of Law. 
08/24/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 2.00 225.00 $450.00 Legal research & brief writing - Finalized Motion to Compel and Memorandum of Law for filing 
08/24/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.50 225.00 $112.50 Legal research & brief writing - Drafted Affidavit of Counsel 
08/24/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.10 225.00 $22.50 Communicate (in firm) - Conferred with PGH re: Affidavit of Counsel 
08/24/2012 McAllister, Brian J. 0.10 225.00 $22.50 
Communicate (outside counsel) - Communicated with local counsel re: final revisions to Motion 
to Compel, Memorandum of Law, and Affidavit of Counsel 
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09/10/2012jMcAllister, Brian J. 0.20! 225.00! $45.00 !Conferred with PGH re: Motion to Compel Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories 
$5,244.00 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles j 1126 
Mr. Charles Ballard 
Phone 2 
Phone 4 
By billing value on each slip 
By billing value on each slip 
Exempt 
9/13/2012 




• Rate Hours Amount 1 
ID Mar!5up % DNB Time DNB Amt 
--- --26,....5-.o·o 1. -4"C""0----,37..,.,1~.o-o- -~liable--8/24/2012 SM --
59755 preparation 
Review and preparation of case email (various); conferences with legal 
assistant regarding tasks and filing; telephone conversation with 
co-counsel; review pleadings and coordinate filing regarding motion to 
compel 
8/24/2012 DP ·-' :· ~ · 65.00 2.7Q 
60018 legal assist. 
Proofread, format and finalize motion, memo and affidavit in support of 
motion to compel including exhibits; telephone conversation with court 
staff regarding hearing date; coordinate filing, service and copies to 
co-counsel 
8/27/2012 DP 65.00 0.20 
60019 legal assist. 
Telephone conversation with Judge's clerk; prepare notice of hearing on 
motion to compel · 
9/6/2012 SM 265.00 0.40 
59936 preparation 
Review defendants' opposition to motion to compel 
9/10/2012 SM 265.00 0.70 
59995 preparation 
Review IRCP regarding briefing; prepare email to co-counsel regarding 
same; telephone conversation with attorney Greg Haddad regarding 
hearing on motion to compel; review issues regarding hearing 
9/12/2012 SM 265.00 3.20 
60015 preparation : ,. · . 
Prepare for 11eann9 011 motion 10 compel c:liscov0ry inch1tlinrJ review ol 
pleadillgs and casEis cilecl therein, rHview of cJiscovi1ry rnquests ancl prior 
correspon<Jence, furthc}r rm,earch nod outlin1~ of argument; ~11lencl hearing 
and ar~JW:? motion: prepare~ email update to co-counsel: revinw e1nail 
regarding name: conl'eronco witll D,wicl Nevin rE!fJarding stalus; ,~rnail to 
assistant regarding order 
9/13/2012 SM 265.00 0.60 
60016 preparation 










NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles:Mr. Charles Ballard (continued) 
Page 3 
Date Professional Rate Hours Amount 1 
_ID ___ -,.- Task ___ ,_ Markup·% ____ .. DNB Time __ D_N_B_A_m_t -----·-----· 
order and supporting documentation; telephone conversation with same; 
prepare order and letter to Court · 
TOTAL Billable Fees 
Total of billable expense slips 
---·--· ..... -... ----·---- .. :., . -----· ---





Fees Bill Arrangement: Slips 
By billing value on each slip. 
Total of billable time slips 
Total of Fees (Time Charges) 
Total of Costs (Expense Charges) 
Total new charges 
New Balance 
Current 








-------··----------·-· .. ---~·---··-... ····--··-···-----· .. -·-····-·-------------------
Professional Summary 
----·---·-·---·""""'·-·---------· .. ··---·---------........ - .... -.... ·----............ -......... ____ , .... -----------
ProfessionaJ _ Rate Hours ____ C_h_a.,..,..rges __ ., ................ Slip_y: 
DP 65.00 2.90 $188.50 $188.50 0.00 
SM 265.00 6.30 $1,669.50 $1,669.50 0.00 
:,, 
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ExpCode UnitMult DateDa1 Units Amount Description 
BALL001 Ballard, Charles 
000001003362 Estate of Krysta! Ballard ~ 
07/25/2012 E108 1.00 1.00 $0.45 Postage. 
08/06/2012 E108 1.00 1.00 $0.45 Postage. 
08/24/2012 E101 53.00 0.25 $13.25 Photocopies ( 53 x.25) • 
09/07/2012 C124 0.00 1.00 $12.42 Legal Research for August 2012. 





Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
H0~:7'i"'ri:i~---=== 
A.M., g/3 ~it __ _ 
SEP 19 2012 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY BIEHL 
~ 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR 
EXPENSES AND ATIORNEY FEES 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED ORDER 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was based entirely and exclusively on the 
Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's Interrogatories on the grounds that the number of 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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Interrogatories, including sub-parts, exceed the number of Interrogatories allowed by Rule 
33(a)(3), I.R.C.P. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Compel was directed at 
the Defendant's objection that the number of Interrogatories exceed the number allowed 
by Rule 33(a)(3). The Defendants' Opposing Legal Memorandum section on calculation 
of the number of interrogatories per Rule 33(a)(3) addressed the same issue. The other 
two sections of Defendants' Legal Memorandum comprised a proposal and the certification 
of Plaintiff's counsel per Rule 37(a)(2), I.R.C.P. 
Oral argument on the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was basically directed at 
the issue framed by the Plaintiff's Motion and the Defendants' objection. Plaintiff's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum, and Defendants' Legal Memorandum in Opposition did not 
pertain to or involve any issue regarding Defendants' right to assert objections to specific 
interrogatories in the event the Court should grant the Plaintiffs' Motion and overrule the 
Defendant's objection. Plaintiff's proposed Order contains the provision that Defendants 
are ordered to answer the Interrogatories without objection. The without objection part of 
the Order was not present to the Court for adjudication, if this part means the right of the 
Defendants to assert objections to specific interrogatories when the Defendants provide 
answers to the interrogatories. When the Defendants provide their answers to the 
interrogatories and if objections are asserted to any specific interrogatory, the validity or 
invalidity of any objection will be ripe for adjudication by the Court at that time. 
The proposed Order also contains the provision that the Defendants answer 
the Interrogatories within 14 days of the hearing. At the hearing, the Court said that the 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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Defendants will answer the Interrogatories within 14 days, but the Court did not say when 
the 14 day period would start to run. Absent this, the Order should state when the 14 day 
period begins, taking into account Rule 6(a), I.R.C.P. that provides in part: "In computing 
any period of time prescribed or allowed by ... order of court ... the day of the act, event 
... after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included." The 
Plaintiff's proposed Order is not in compliance with Rule 6(a). 
At the hearing, the Court said that the Defendants, when answering the 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories, can designate which of the Interrogatories apply to any particular 
Defendant and provide answers accordingly. The proposed Order does not contain this 
provision. The first full paragraph of the proposed Order is in conformity with the sole issue 
framed by the arguments of counsel, Plaintiff's Motion, and Defendants' opposition. 
Defendants propose that the second paragraph or sentence of the Order be deleted 
entirely and the date for answering the Interrogatories be incorporated, which the 
Defendants believe should be the date that an Order is entered by the Court, as opposed 
to the date of the hearing. The last part of the proposed Order and the Defendants 
objection is addressed below. 
II. 
CLAIM FOR EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Shortly after the Court announced its ruling on the Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel, counsel for the Plaintiff informed the Court that a claim for expenses and attorney 
fees had been asserted and the Court immediately replied that a claim would be granted. 
No hearing was conducted on this claim and there were no briefs or documents filed by 
either parties on this subject, except for the fact that a claim was asserted in the Motion to 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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Compel that reads: "Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiff also seeks reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the Order, including 
attorney's fees." 
Rule 37(a)(4) reads in pertinent part: 
"Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party 
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that 
the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." 
With no disrespect intended, the Court did not provide opportunity for hearing 
or make a finding on whether the opposition to the Motion was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Just because a claim is asserted 
by the prevailing party does not automatically mean that an award is proper or warranted. 
The Rule also provides that expenses and attorney's fees be reasonable. 
It is the Defendants' position that their objection to the Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories was substantially justified and that the circumstances were such that an 
award of expenses is unjust. The following points, arguments and authorities are outlined 
and discussed for consideration by the Court in regard to the Defendants' position. 
1. Rule 33(a)(3) itself provides for counting sub-parts of interrogatories 
as separate interrogatories and there are no Idaho Appellate Court decisions that have 
holdings that invalidate or make Defendants' objections invalid. Likewise, there are no 
Idaho Appellate Court decisions that define the meaning of Rule 33(a)(3) or the meaning 
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of sub-parts and their application and interpretation. Thus, the Defendants' position on the 
number of interrogatories, including sub-parts, was not contrary to ahy Idaho Appellate 
Court decisions. 
2. Defense counsel's letter of July 26, 2012 to Plaintiffs attorney, Exhibit 
D to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, sets forth in detail the basis and means by which 
defense counsel arrived at his count of the numbers of Interrogatories. This count was 
made and arrived at in a careful and considered manner and was not made to impede or 
restrict discovery or frivolous in nature. It was an honest attempt by defense counsel to 
inform Plaintiffs attorney of the bassi for the objection and methodology of gauging the 
number of Interrogatories. In the letter of Plaintiffs attorney to defense counsel dated 
August 6, 2012, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, he identified which 
Interrogatories are directed to Dr. Kerr and which to Silk Touch, although he disagreed with 
defense counsel's count. There was also disagreement on whether the entirety of the 
Interrogatories were directed to each Defendant to answer, even though the Interrogatories 
were addressed to each Defendant and that Rule 33 provides that no party shall serve 
upon any other single party more than 40 interrogatories. In the same letter, Plaintiffs 
attorney also stated that by defense counsel's count, 39 Interrogatories are directed to Silk 
Touch and 36 Interrogatories directed to Dr. Kerr, for a total of 75 Interrogatories. The total 
count of 75 is based on the position that both Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr must each answer 
the full set of the Interrogatories, which was a reasonable conclusion by defense counsel, 
taking into account Rule 33 and the manner in which the Interrogatories were stated and 
formulated for each Defendant. 
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3. In Defense counsel's Legal Memorandum, two Federal cases are cited 
that fully support the position of defense counsel and they are on point and relevant. None 
of the cases cited in Plaintiff's Memorandum are relevant or do they constitute precedent 
for the Plaintiff's position and Motion. In fact, the decision in the case of Swackhammer 
v. Sprint Corp. cited in Plaintiff's Memorandum contains a holding that supports the 
Defendants' position. Therefor, the Court has not been provided with legal authority or 
precedent in the briefing that was filed that supports the Plaintiff's position, whereas the 
Defendants provided authority and precedent that supports their position. The Plaintiff did 
not file a reply memorandum to the Legal Memorandum filed by the Defendants. At oral 
argument, Plaintiff's attorney referred to a Nevada decision of a Federal Magistrate and 
told the Court that it invalidated or overruled the case of Valdez v. Ford Motor Co., cited 
in Defendants' Legal Memorandum. Since this case, believed to be Ginn v. Gemini (137 
F.R.D. 320, 1991), was not cited in advance of the hearing by Plaintiff's attorney in any 
manner or by a memorandum, defense counsel had no way to respond to it or challenge 
the interpretation of the case by Plaintiff's attorney. 
After the hearing, defense counsel read the full decision of the case and 
represents to the Court that it did not overrule the Valdez case or invalidate the holding of 
the Valdez case. It simply disagreed with the decision in Valdez and therefor in the 
Federal Court of Nevada, according to two Federal magistrates, there is a difference of 
opinion on the calculation of sub-parts of Interrogatories. When the Defendants' position 
is supported by relevant on point court decisions and precedent, albeit from other 
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jurisdictions in the absence of controlling Idaho court appellate decisions, it is difficult to 
understand or believe that the Defendants' objection was not substantially justified. 
4. As mentioned above, at the hearing the Court stated that_ the 
Defendants, when answering the Plaintiff's Interrogatories, can designate which of the 
Interrogatories apply to any particular Defendant and provide answers accordingly. In 
Plaintiff attorney's letter of August 6, 2012, Exhibit A, the Interrogatories for Dr. Kerr and 
Silk Touch are specified by number and defense counsel is asked to respond based on the 
modifications and clarifications in the letter. In defense counsel's letters of August 9, 2012 
(Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane) and August 29, 2012 (Exhibit C to the 
Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane) defense counsel agreed to answer the Interrogatories for 
Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch as specified in the letter of Plaintiff's attorney dated August 6, 2012 
(Exhibit A), except for a request that substitute separate Interrogatories be served on Silk 
Touch and Dr. Kerr, which would essentially resolve the dispute. The remark of the Court 
at the hearing, described in this paragraph, is basically tantamount to the method for the 
Defendants to answer the Interrogatories as proposed in the letters of Plaintiff's attorney 
and defense counsel, with the one exception that the Plaintiff need not serve substitute 
. ~ 
separate Interrogatories to Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch. In effect, the Court fashioned a 
procedure by virtue of which the Defendants could specify the Interrogatories to answer 
for each Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch without requiring separate substitute Interrogatories. The 
Defendants agreed in advance of the hearing to answer the Plaintiff's Interrogatories if they 
were separately diercted to Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch, advocated by Plaintiff's attorney in his 
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letter of August 6, 2012, when combined with the subject statement of the Court at the 
hearing, constitute circumstances that make an award unjust. 
5. The Defendants duly considered and relied upon the case of Valdez 
v. Ford Motor Company, 134 F.R.D. 296, Nevada 1991 when the objection to the 
plaintiffs interrogatories was asserted, in addition to other court decisions. In the Valdez 
case, the court stated: 
Local Rule 190-1 (c) provides in relevant part that "the total 
number of interrogatories propounded to each party by any 
other party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 shall be limited to 40 
including suparts." The plain meaning of the language in the 
rule is clear and unambiguous. Local Rule 190-1 ( c) requires 
that every part of an interrogatory be counted and subject to 
the limitation of 40. 
The court in Valdez also stated: 
The procedure for interpreting a local rule should parallel the 
process used in the construction of statutes. "In construing a 
statute, this court first looks to the plan meaning of the 
language in question." Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dept. 
of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1990). "The plain 
meaning governs .... unless such plain meaning would lead 
to absurd results." Oyer v. U.S., 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
In addition to these statements the court in Valdez went on to say: 
2. All propounded interrogatories and subparts should be 
counted by the parties. If the parties disagree on the count, 
they should use the count that produces the greatest number 
of interrogatories. This interpretation will avoid litigation over 
the routine tabulation of interrogatories and subparts in a 
propounded set of interrogatories. 
Valdez has not been overruled and it has been cited with approval in other cases, albeit 
there are cases that do not follow Valdez. Counsel for the Defendants shepardized the 
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Valdez decision and found nothing that would invalidate his reliance on Valdez or establish 
a reason not to object to the Plaintiff's Interrogatories. This research helped convince 
defense counsel that the objection to Plaintiff's Interrogatories was substantially justified. 
The fact that this Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel does not prove or establish 
that the Defendants' objection was without substantial justification such as to allow an 
award of expenses and attorney fees. 
6. Defense counsel tried to continue with efforts to reach an agreement 
with Plaintiff's attorney and avoid a Court appearance. His letter to Plaintiff's attorney 
dated August 9, 2012 (Exhibit B to Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane) was unanswered and 
obviously ignored by Plaintiff's attorney. Again by letter dated August 29, 2012 (Exhibit 
C), further attempt was made and this letter was also ignored by Plaintiff's attorney. The 
letter of August 29, 2012 contained the following statement: "I do not believe we have 
exhausted our negotiations toward a resolution of our differences, based on your letter of 
August 6 and my letter of August 9, which I think we are obligated to do, in lieu of your 
motion to compel." Had Plaintiff's attorney responded to these letters, instead of ignoring 
them, it is very likely an agreement would have been reached and the Motion to Compel 
would have become moot and unnecessary. The conduct of Plaintiff's attorney was not 
the exercise of good faith on his part whereas defense counsel diligently tried to reach an 
agreement in the exercise of good faith. 
Rule 37(a)(4), is confined to reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred 
in obtaining the Order on the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. This provision of the Rule 
covers Plaitniff's preparation of the Motion to Compel, preparation of the supporting 
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documentation for the Motion, and the Court appearance for the hearing on the Motion. 
The supporting documentation in this case consists of the Memorandum and the Affidavit, 
with Exhibits, of Plaintiff's counsel. The proposed Order of Plaintiff's attorney provides for 
an award of reasonable expenses and attorney fees in obtaining the Order as specifically 
stated in Rule 37(a)(4). 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel contains the same language and is a one page 
document, excluding the caption of the first page. The body of the motion is confined to 
one and only one issue - Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's Interrogatories on the grounds 
that the number of Interrogatories exceed forty, the number allowed under Rule 33(a)(3), 
I.R.C.P. The Motion and the legal issue it embodies is uncomplicated, straightforward and 
clearly defined and does not involve complex, sophisticated, and multiple legal concepts. 
No depositions have been taken in the case. The Affidavit of Plaintiff's attorney that 
accompanied the motion merely referred to and incorporated the Interrogatories to the 
Defendants, Defendants' objection, five letters exchanged between Plaintiff's attorney, and 
defense counsel that were prepared and sent before the Mmotion was filed and the 
sentences that the Plaintiff has yet to receive answers to the Interrogatories and that 
Plaintiff has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the Defendants in an effort 
to secure Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories without court action. The 
Plaintiff's supporting Memorandum for the Motion consists of four pages, excluding the first 
caption page, the signature page, and the certificate of service. The Memorandum cites 
to Rule 33(a)(3), three cases and Federal Practice and Procedure which are identical to 
the citations and references in Plaintiff attorney's letter to defense counsel dated July 6, 
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2012 (Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Plaintiffs counsel P. Gregory Haddad). The citations in 
the letter of July 6, 2012 were obviously identified and researched sometime before or on 
July 6, 2012, which was at least 50 days before the Motion to Compel was filed on August 
24, 2012. The Memorandum of Plaintiff also contains discussions of each letter 
exchanged between defense counsel and Plaintiffs attorney, referred to in the Affidavit of 
Plaintiffs attorney as Exhibits C, D, E, F and G, and a reference to a telephone call from 
defense counsel's office to Plaintiffs attorney, all of which predated the filing of the Motion 
to Compel. In essence, everything that was done by Plaintiffs attorney had been done 
before the Motion to Compel was filed. It is the position of the Defendants that the 
activities and legal work performed by counsel for the Plaintiff before the Motion to Compel 
was filed was undertaken and devoted to the attempted resolution of the Defendants' 
objection to the Interrogatories and the reconciliation of the differences between Plaintiffs 
attorney and defense counsel so as to avoid the necessity of filing the Motion to Compel. 
In fact, several of the letters of Plaintiffs attorney state this very thing. Rule 37(a)(4), 
speaks to reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in obtaining the Order and 
nothing other than that. Although Plaintiffs Motion, Affidavit and Memorandum borrow 
from and incorporate the legal work performed before the Motion to Compel was filed, this 
activity and legal work was performed for reasons other than expenses and fees incurred 
in obtaining the Order on the Motion to Compel. 
The proposed Order of Plaintiffs attorney states that Plaintiff be awarded 
reasonable expenses in obtaining the Order including attorney fees and a reference to the 
Affidavit of Plaintiffs attorney that sets forth the expenses and attorney fees. The Affidavit 
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of Plaintiff's attorney, P. Gregory Haddad, states that Plaintiff's attorney fees and expenses 
associated with procuring Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories is 
$5,244.00 for his law firm and attorney fees related to the efforts of Nevin, Benjamin, 
McKay, and Bartlett to procure Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories is $1,858.00, for a total combination of $7,151.36 that includes expenses 
of $49.36. In combination the two Plaintiff's law firms had four attorneys working on the 
case starting on July 3, 2012 according to the billing records attached to the Affidavit of P. 
Gregory Haddad, one paralegal and one legal assistant. The four attorneys, per the billing 
records, are P. Gregory Haddad, James Perrine, Brian McAllister and Scott McKay. The 
paralegal is Rebecca Bombard and the legal assistant is identified with the initials D.P. 
The hourly rates for Mr. Haddad and Mr. Perrine is $325.00. The hourly rate 
for Mr. McAllister is $225.00. The hourly rate for Mr. McKay is $265.00. The hourly rate 
for Mr. McKay's legal assistant D.P. is $65.00. The hourly rate for paralegal Rebecca 
Bombard is $95.00. The total time for Mr. McAllister that pertains to the Motion to Compel, 
researQh, and the supporting documents for the Motion is 18.3 hours. Mr. Haddad had no 
time for the Motion except for a letter to defense counsel dated July 31, 2012 in the billing 
record. Defendants provided answers to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions and 
Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents and the entry of Mr. Perrine 
of July 3, 2012 refers to his review of them. The billing record of Mr. Haddad1s firm for the 
period July 5, 2012 through July 26, 2012 for Mr. Perrine and Rebecca Bombard pertains 
to the letters that were generated and a phone call from defense counsel. Mr. Perrine had 
one entry of August 20, 2012 of 0.10 time that related to the Motion to Compel. Several 
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entries in the billing of Mr. Haddad's firm related to conferences and communications 
among and between several different individuals. The billing record of Mr. McKay of 
August 24, 2012, 1.40 in time, relates to conferences with his legal assistant, telephone 
conversation with co-counsel, preparation of case email and coordinate filing for Motion 
to Compel. The time of Mr. McKay's legal assistant D.P. totals 2.9 hours in connection with 
the Motion to Compel. Mr. McKay's time that is reflected for the Motion to Compel is 4.30 
hours. His time on September 13, 2012, 0.60 hours, relates to a letter from Mr. McAllister, 
and a telephone conversation with him and preparation of the Order on the Motion to 
Compel and letter to the Court. The billing of Mr. McKay reflects several conversations and 
communications between and among various individuals just like the billing of Mr. 
Haddad's firm does. Between Mr. McKay, Mr. Perrine, Mr. McAllister, and legal assistant 
D.P., a total of 25.6 hours is recorded for the Motion to Compel, Court appearance, and 
the documentation and research for the Motion. 
There is considerable time that involves unnecessary and wasted duplication 
of work among attorneys and D.P. The research for and citations in the Plaintiffs 
Memorandum for the Motion was actually performed on or before July 6, 2012 (see Exhibit 
C to the Affidavit of Mr. Haddad) in connection with the efforts and negotiations of counsel 
to try and reach an agreement for the Answers to the Interrogatories and avoid court 
intervention which is required by Rule 37(a)(2), certification. 
The Court hearing on the Motion lasted about % hour, give or take a few 
minutes either way. Mr. McKay's billing record for September 10, 2012 and September 12, 
2012 show total time of 3.90 hours to prepare for the hearing and attendance at the 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
I 
COMPEL DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY FEES -13 
000178
hearing, that includes a telephone conversation with Mr. Haddad in regard to the hearing 
and a confernce with David Nevin. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff can spend all the time they want, charge whatever 
hourly rate they choose and have as many attorneys and paralegals work on the case as 
they want, but this is not the standard or basis for the issue at hand, which is the amount, 
if any, to be assessed against the Defendants. Rule 37(a)(4) calls for reasonable 
expenses and attorney fees, not what Plaintiff's counsel accumulates or charges. The 
customary and standard fees and legal work required on a project is that which prevails in 
the District Court of Ada County and other surrounding district courts. Hourly rates and the 
time devoted to a particular legal topic or issue that prevails in West Virginia (locale of Mr. 
Haddad and Mr. McAllister) is not applicable. Furthermore, the hourly rates of Mr. Haddad, 
Mr. McAllister, and Mr. Perrine are not in line with the customary, usual and standard 
hourly rates that prevail in Ada County for the type and nature of the motion to compel and 
legal work done in tort cases of any type. The same is true of Mr. McKay. Their hourly 
rates are substantially higher than the accepted, customary and usual rates that prevail in 
Ada County and the Court should approve the hourly rates established in Ada County, if 
the Court does enter an award against the Defendants. The same is true as respects the 
time reasonably required and necessitated for the Motion to Compel. Frankly, in the 
opinion of defense counsel, the amount claimed for attorney fees is unbelievable, 
preposterous and totally out of line. In the opinion of defense counsel, the reasonable time 
required to prepare the Motion to Compel, supporting Memorandum and Affidavit of 
Plaintiff's counsel and attendance at Court for the hearing on the Motion should not exceed 
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four to five hours at the most, and the hourly rate to be applied should conform to the 
customary and established rates in Ada County, which is described and set forth in the 
Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. Defendants respectfully urge the Court to consider the 
factors and matters set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), I.R.C.P. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
The objection to the proposed Order of Plaintiff's attorney be granted and the 
Order modified by deleting the portions that follow the first paragraph and adding the 
provisions that the Defendants respond to the Plaintiff's Interrogatories, as allowed by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, within 14 days of the entry of an order in conformity with 
the time computation of Rule 6(a), I.R.C.P, and that the Plaintiff's request for expenses and 
attorney fees is denied. Alternatively, if the Court grants the Plaintiff's request for attorney 
fees and expenses, a reaso.nable amount be awarded for the actual expenses and attorney 
fees incurred in obtaining the order as opposed to the amount set forth in the Affidavit of 
P. Gregory Haddad and the billing records attached to the Affidavit. Defendants pray that 
the Court not enter the proposed order of Plaintiff's attorney until the issues raised in these 
objections have been decided by the Court and that the time period for the Defendants to 
answer the interrogatories be set, as a preliminary order, within 14 days after the Court 
enters its final order. A hearing is requested. 
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Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this 181h day of September, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
B~Oft 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 181h day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR EXPENSES AND 
A TIO RN EY FEES by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as_ follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
, _Attorneys for Plaintiff . 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP , 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
·101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SEP 19 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY BIEHL 
Depcq 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF.BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE 
FOR OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR EXPENSES 
AND ATIORNEY FEES 
I, Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
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1. I am the attorney of record for Defendants in the above-captioned 
action, and the following statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are 
true and correct. 
2. I have handled hundreds of civil tort cases that involved numerous and 
varying legal issues, including discovery issues, some of which involved disputes regarding 
answers to interrogatories. Of these civil tort cases, many were medical malpractice cases. 
I have handled and/or tried civil tort and medical malpractice cases in all but 8 of the 44 
counties in the State of Idaho and the Federal District Court of Idaho. Of these cases, a 
great number of them were in the District Court of Ada County. 
3. Based on my experience, I am familiar with and have knowledge of 
the attorney fee hourly rates customarily and usually charged by attorneys in civil tort and 
medical malpractice cases that include cases in the District Court of Ada County and its 
surrounding counties. I have acquired this knowledge by means of discussing hourly rates 
with attorneys, reviewing billing statements of attorneys and claims asserted by attorneys 
in connection with litigated cases and decisions of courts for the assessment of attorney 
fees. I have testified as an expert witness in the District Court of Ada County on the 
subject of reasonable and customary attorney fee hourly rates and observed other 
attorneys doing the same. In these cases, the presiding judge accepted me as a qualified 
expert witness. 
4. I am qualified to render the opinions stated in this Affidavit. 
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5. The customary, usual and accepted hourly rates for attorneys in the 
Fourth and other Judicial Districts of the State of Idaho in civil tort and malpractice cases 
is in the range of $150 to $190, and $190 is the outer or highest rate. 
6. In my opinion, these are the ranges for the assessment of attorney 
fees in connection with the Plaintiffs motion to compel answers to interrogatories. 
7. My experience and acquired knowledge set forth above, covers, 
applies and relates to the attorney time necessary and reasonably required to perform legal 
services for varying subjects and I believe that I am qualified to render an opinion on the 
time that was customarily reasonably necessary and required of Plaintiffs attorney to 
obtain the order on the Plaintiffs motion to compel answers to the interrogatories. 
8. To obtain the order on th~ Plaintiffs motion to compel, specified in 
Rule 37(a)(4), I.R.C.P., the reasonable attorney time and activity consisted of the 
preparation of the motion, supporting memorandum and affidavit of Plaintiffs attorney and 
attendance at Court for the hearing on the motion. The reasonable time required for this, 
in order to be consistent with the customary, usual standards that are applicable, is in the 
range of four to five hours, at the most. 
9. The Plaintiffs motion was uncomplicated, straight forward, involved 
a single issue that required minimal research and analysis and factual foundation, and 
limited time in Court for the hearing on the motion. These factors are consistent with and 
adequate for the time reasonably required to obtain the Court order on the motion. 
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 181h day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
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delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ! 
P. Gregory Haddad 
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Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR EXPENSES AND 




9 ·J.\- \;) 
'. 
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dbevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
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T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
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James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER,, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED ORDER AND CLAIM 
FOR FEES AND EXPENSES 
RELATED TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, and responds in 
opposition to Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs proposed order and claim for fees and expenses 
related to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories. To avoid belaboring these issues, many of which have already been decided by 
the Court, Plaintiffs response is brief and should not be interpreted as conceding· the various 
points Defendants now attempt to reargue. 
On the afternoon of September 12, 2012, the Court heard arguments related to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. After the 
presentation of arguments, the Court, quite properly, overruled Defendants' objection to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and granted Plaintiffs motion. The Court ordered 
Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories within 14 days, and granted 
Plaintiffs request for expenses, including attorney fees, as provided in Rule 37(a)(4) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On September 14, 2012, Plaintiffs counsel submitted a proposed order to the Court, as 
well as to Defendants. The proposed order was accompanied by an Affidavit of Counsel, by 
which Plaintiff set forth the expenses, including attorney fees, related to the procurement of 
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. On September 18, Defendants 
filed objections to Plaintiffs proposed order, as well as to Plaintiffs fees and expenses. 
The Plaintiffs proposed order reflects the Court's rulings of September 12, 2012. 
Defendants take issue with that Order because they now wish to assert additional objections 
which they failed to timely assert in response to the first set of interrogatories; that is not a valid 
basis for the Court to withhold entry of the Order. Defendants asserted only one objection to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories during the standard answer period. See Defs.' Objections 
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to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Counsel filed 
on August 24, 2012. Specifically, Defendants asserted that the number of interrogatories, 
including subparts, exceeded the number permitted by Rule 33(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No other objections were stated by Defendants either individually or collectively to 
these interrogatories. Accordingly, because Rule 33(a)(2) states that "[t]he party upon whom the 
interrogatories have been served shall serve the original of the answers, and the objections, if 
any, within 30 days after the service," (emphasis added), Defendants have waived any further 
objection to these interrogatories, and any objections they now raise would be untimely. 1 Given 
Defendants' approach to discovery to date, allowing such objections would invariably lead to 
delays and additional disputes. In any event, the Court was correct to overrule Defendants' sole 
objection to the interrogatories and should now order Defendants to answer Plaintiffs First Set 
oflnterrogatories without objection. 
Moreover, by their objection to Plaintiffs fees and expenses, Defendants claim that 
Plaintiffs pro hac vice and local attorneys charge rates well in excess of the prevailing rates in 
Ada Co11nty. As evidenced by the decision appended hereto, the Unites States District Court for 
the District of Idaho disagrees with Defendants' conclusion. Exhibit A, LaPeter v. Canada Life 
1 While the undersigned has not located any Idaho appellate cases discussing waiver for failure to 
timely st.ate objections, numerous other jurisdictions have so held. See, e.g. Drew v. Hagy, 134 
Ga. App. 852, 216 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1975) (failure to file timely objections to interrogatories is a 
waiver of the right to object); Leach v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 903, 169 Cal. Rptr. 
42, 43 (Ct. App. 1980) (same); Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2173 
(same): Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex. 1987) ("A failure to timely object to 
interrogatories waives any objection, unless an extension of time is granted or good cause is 
shown for the delay."); Garrity v. Kemper Motor Sales, 280 Minn. 202, 206, 159 N.W.2d 103, 
106-07 (1968) (holding that "because no objections to the interrogatories were mad~ within the 
time specified by the rules, all objections except those related to privilege, work product, and 
experts' conclusions were waived."); Golding v. Taylor, 19 N.C. App. 245, 248, 198 S.E.2d 478, 
480 (1973) (not finding a waiver because defendant asserted right against self-incrimination in 
not responding but noting "ordinarily, in the absence of an extension of time, failure to object to 
interrogatories within the time fixed by the rule is a waiver of any objection."). 
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Ins. Of Amer., No. 1:06-CV-00121-BLW, 2007 WL 4287489, at *1-2 (Dec. 4, 2007) (finding 
hourly rates consistent with those at issue here to be "within the Boise community standard").2 
Therefore, the hourly rates of Plaintiffs counsel are consistent with the Boise community 
standard and reasonable, as is the time expended by Plaintiffs counsel in obtaining this order 
compelling discovery. 3 
Defendants' objections are an attempt to reargue the issues presented by oral argument on 
September 12, 2012. Additionally, the filing of Defendants' objections is a transparent attempt 
to avoid their discovery obligations to Plaintiff. 
The Court's rulings of September 12, 2012, were proper: Defendants' Answers to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories are due, without objection, in fourteen days (thus, on 
September 26, 2012), and Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
which are properly set forth in the Affidavit of Counsel filed on September 14, 2012. 
Accordingly, Defendants' objections should be overruled. 
2 Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court take 
judicial notice of this decision. 
3 By virtue of the objections necessitating the instant response, Plaintiff has now expended 
additional time in seeking the order compelling discovery. Accordingly, it would be appropriate 
for the Court to enter the submitted Order, award expenses, including attorney fees, 'as reflected 
in Plaintiffs prior submission, and permit Plaintiff to augment his prior submission to include 




Dated this :J O day of September, 2012. 
' --
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By ~/v<o 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EXPENSES RELATED TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS' 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES by delivering the 
same to the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 





LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. of Amer" Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007) · 
2007 WL 4287489 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Alfred R. LaPETER and Sharon R. LaPeter, as 
Trustees of the LaPeter 1985 Living Trust, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CANADA LIFE INSURANCE 
OF AMERICA, Defendant. 
No. CV-06-121-S-BLW. Dec. 4, 2007. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
William A. Mon-ow, Jill S. Holinka, Kevin Eugene Dinius, 
White Peterson, Nampa, ID, for Plaintiffs. 
Robert A. Faucher, B. Newal Squyres, Kevin C. Braley, 
Holland & Hart LLP, Boise, ID, for Defendant. 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
*l The Court has before it Canada Life Insurance Company 
of America's ("Canada Life") Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs (Docket No. 94), Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Second 
Declaration of Robert A. Faucher (Docket No. 105), and 
Plaintiffs' Motio~ to Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Idaho law governs the award of attorney fees in this matter 
because federal courts follow state law as to attorney fee 
awards in diversity actions. See Inte1form Co. v. Mitchell, 
575 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th Cir.1978) (applying Idaho law). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the prevailing party 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees when a commercial 
transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. See Erickson v. 
Flynn, 64 P.3d 959 (Idaho Ct.App.2002). 
"The determination of whether a litigant is the prevailing 
party is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Sanders 
v. Lankford, l P.3d 823, 826 (Idaho Ct.App.2000); see also 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). In Idaho, governing legal standards on 
the prevailing party issue are provided by IRCP 54(d)(l) 
(B). "[T]here are three principal factors the trial court .must 
consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: 
(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the 
relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues 
between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the 
parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues." Id. 
There is no dispute that this case involved a commercial 
transaction for purposes of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
Moreover, based on the Court's final Judgment in this matter, 
Canada Life is clearly the prevailing party. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a 
money judgment is for a plaintiff. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, 
LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 133 
(Idaho 2005). Canada Life avoided liability in this matter 
when the Court granted summary judgment in its favor on all 
of Plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
A. Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs contend that Canada Life's requested attorney fees 
should be reduced because their hourly rates are too high and 
the time expended was excessive. 
1. Hourly Rates 
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly rate by 
considering the experience, skill and reputation of the 
attorneys requesting fees. See Schwarz V. Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir.1995). "A 
district court should calculate this reasonable hourly rate 
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant 
community, which typically is the community in which 
the district court sits." Id. (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). The relevant community in this case is Boise, Idaho, 
where this Court sits. 
Here, Plaintiffs specifically obj~ct to the rates charged by 
Newal Squyres and Bob Foucher, who charged $350.00 and 
$335.00/$355.00 respectively for their time. This Court is 
intimately familiar with the hourly rates charged in the Boise 
market because the Court deals with motions for attorney fees 
on a constant basis. Canada Life con-ectly points out that this 
Court recently awarded fees to a party based on typical hourly 
rates charged by Canada Life's attorneys at Holland & Hart. 
WestlawNexr© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. EXHIBIT f\ 
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Canada Life has also provided the Court with Mr. Faucher's 
declaration, which establishes the credentials and billing rates 
for the Holland & Hart professionals who worked on this 
matter. (See Faucher Declaration, pp. 2-3). It has also been 
this Court's experience that attorneys at regional firms, such 
as Holland & Hart, charge hourly rates at or near, but not 
above, the high end of acceptable rates for the Boise area. 
*2 Based on the Court's knowledge of typical attorney 
rates in the Boise area, coupled with Mr. Faucher's affidavit, 
the Court finds that the rates charged by Canada Life's 
professionals are within the Boise community standard, with 
the exception of Mr. Faucher's rate. Mr. Faucher's hourly 
rate is near, and even exceeds for some tasks, Mr. Squyres' 
hourly rate, even though Mr. Squyres has practiced for over 
30 years, but Mr. Faucher has practiced for less than 20 years. 
(See Faucher Declaration, pp. 2-3). Although Mr. Faucher 
indicates that he represents lending institutions throughout the 
country, he has not persuaded the Court that his rate should 
exceed that of his colleague who has p·racticed for over 30 
years. Accordingly, the Court will reduce Mr. Faucher's rate 
to $300.00 per hour. 1 
2. Number of Hours Charged 
Plaintiffs also contend that the number of hours claimed by 
Canada Life are excessive. Plaintiffs essentially contend that 
Canada Life's attorneys spent too much time researching, 
drafting, editing and finalizing briefs, and too much time 
preparing for oral argument. Plaintiffs contend that any fee 
award should be reduced by at least 30 perc~nt. 
The Court recalls that the briefs were well organized and well 
researched, and that counsel's oral argument was persuasive. 
It has been the Court's experience that the more concise briefs, 
and more persuasive arguments, require the most preparation. 
The high quality of the work, coupled with the Court's 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Canada Life, 
and against Plaintiffs, reveals that the significant effort spent 
on the briefs and preparation for oral argument in this case 
was warranted. A.dditionally, the high quality work done at 
the front end of this case saved the parties the additional 
expense of trying this matter. 
Moreover, Canada Life's attorneys sufficiently itemized 
their fees by describing the services performed. (Faucher 
Declaration, Ex. A). Accordingly, the Court does not find that 
the number of hours charged by Canada Life's attorneys were 
excessive. 
3. Declaration Related to Mr. LaPeter's Conviction 
Plaintiffs argue that Canada Life's attorney fees should 
be reduced as a sanction for Canada Life's filing of a 
declaration attaching documentation of Mr. LaPeter's felony 
convictions. Plaintiffs suggest that Canada Life introduced 
Mr. LaPeter's criminal convictions into the record as an 
attempt to intimidate Mr. LaPeter and blacken Mr. LaPeter's 
reputation in they eyes of the Court. Plaintiffs also ask the 
Court to strike that declaration. 
Based on the record, it is clear that Plaintiffs, not Canada Life, 
introduced Mr. LaPeter's criminal history into this litigation. 
Plaintiffs first disclosed Mr. LaPeter's criminal record to 
the Court in Mr. LaPeter's affidavit filed in December 2006 
in support of Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order. (See 
Docket nos. 21-22). Thus, it was not improper for Canada 
Life to address the issue or to file the records with the 
Court. Accordingly, there is no reason to sanction Canada 
Life. Likewise,· there is no reason to strike Mr. Faucher's 
declaration. 
4. Non-Taxable Costs 
*3 Canada Life requests its non-taxable costs pursuant 
to IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Plaintiffs do not dispute application 
of IRCP 54(d)(l)(D), but argue that Canada Life has not 
fulfilled the rule's requirement that the costs were necessary 
and exceptional. Rule 54(d)(l)(D) states that additional, non-
taxable, costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said costs 
were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
the adverse party." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Discretionary costs 
may include costs related to long distance telephone calls, 
photocopying, faxes, travel expenses, and expert witnesses. 
See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 109 P.3d 
161, 168 (Idaho 2005). The Court must make express findings 
as to why a party's discretionary costs should or should not 
be allowed. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Court 
need not evaluate the requested costs item by item. Instead, 
"express findings as to the general character of requested 
costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, 
exceptional, and in the interests of justice is sufficient to 
comply with this requirement." Puckett v. Verska, 158 P.3d 
937, 945-946 (Idaho 2007). 
Here, the Court finds that although Canada Life's 
discretionary costs were for the most part reasonable and 
necessary, they were not exceptional. The nature of this case, 
essentially a breach of contract case, was. not exceptional. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently construed the 
requirement that costs be "exceptional" under IRCP 54(d) 
WestlawNexr© 2012 Thomson Reuters:No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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(l)(D) "to inclu~e those costs incurred because the nature 
of the case was itself exceptional." The Idaho Supreme 
Court has also stated that "[c]ertain cases, such as personal 
injury cases generally involve copy, travel and expert witness 
fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather 
than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)." Id. (citing 
Inama v. Brewer, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (Idaho 1999). This case 
is more akin to the ordinary personal injury case. Canada 
Life's discretionary costs were "routine costs associated with 
modem litigation overhead" in commercial litigation: City of 
McCall v. Seubert, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126-27 (Idaho 2006). 
Accordingly, the Court will deny Canada Life's request for 
non-taxable costs. 
5. Idaho Code§§ 45-15-3 and 45-1512 
Idaho's anti-deficiency statute provides that in order to 
recover a deficiency from a grantor personally after 
foreclosure, the beneficiary must sue the grantor within three 
months after the trustee's sale. Additionally, the beneficiary 
can recover only the difference between the debt and the fair 
market value of the property at the date of sale or the sale 
amount, whichever is greater. LC. § 45-1512. Idaho's single 
action statute provides that a beneficiary under a deed of trust 
cannot sue the grantor on the debt except under certain limited 
circumstances. LC. § 45-1503. The statute's purpose is to 
compel a creditor who is secured by real property to recover 
from the grantor's pledged real estate before recovering from 
the grantor's other assets. Plaintiffs contend that these statutes 
prevent Canada Life from recovering its attorney fees and 
costs. 
*4 Plaintiffs' argument is based on a contention that Canada 
Life, for all intents and purposes, is the beneficiary of the 
deed of trust that secures the ParkCenter Mall. However, 
Canada Life is not the beneficiary of that deed of trust. 
Through assignment, Canada Life Assurance Company is 
the beneficiary of the deed of trust. (See Schwartz Aff., 1 
7-10, Exs. 1-3, Docket No. 57). Plaintiffs admit as much, but 
contend that because Canada Life and Canada Life Assurance 
Company are both subsidiaries of Great West Insurance, the 
Court should regard the two companies as the same entity. 
Plaintiffs cite no case law or rules explaining why the Court 
should not treat the separate entities as separate entities. 
Accordingly, the Court will not treat them as the same entity. 
The anti-deficiency and single action statutes do not ~pply 
to parties, like Canada Life, who are not beneficiaries of 
a deed of trust securing indebtedness owed by the grantor. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statutes do not preclude 
recovery of attorney fees and costs in this case. 
6. Total Fees and Costs 
Based on the above analysis, Canada Life is entitled to 
$437,742.50 in attorney fees. The Court reached this amount 
by reducing Mr. Faucher's hourly rate from $335.00/355.00 
to $300.00 per hour, which reduced Mr. Faucher's bill by 
$51,498.50. The Court then subtracted that amount from the 
total amount outlined and claimed in Canada Life's fee bill 
($491,310.00-$51,498.50 = $439,811.50). The Court then 
subtracted an additional $2,069.00 based on Canada Life's 
concession that it mistakenly included $2,069 .00 in fees for 
work pertaining to the receivership litigation (See Canada 
Life Reply Brief, p. 8, n. 18). The Court will not award any 
non-taxable costs. 
II. Motion to Consolidate 
Months ago, the Court suggested that, at least for purposes 
of appeal, the parties should consider whether it would be in 
the interest of judicial economy to consolidate this case with 
the other two related matters-Case Nos. 07-254 and 07-228. 
However, because Plaintiffs have already separately appealed 
all three cases, the Court finds no reason to consolidate them 
at this point. Based on the outcome of the appeals, the Court 
may revisit this issue. However, at this point, the Court will 
deny the Motion to Consolidate. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Canada Life's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Docket 
No. 94) shall be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED IN 
PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs shall pay Canada 
Life $437,742.50 in attorney fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Second Declaration of Robert A. Faucher (Docket No. 105) 
shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108) shall be, and the same 
is hereby, DENIED. 
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Footnotes 
1 Mr. Faucher's declaration lists the following attorneys, their experience level and billing rates: (1) Mr. Bithell-nearly 40 years-
$405.00 per hour; (2) Mr. Squyers-over 30 years-$350.00 per hour; (3) Mr. Braley-9 years-$235.00 per hour; (4) Mr. Goergen-5 
years-$185.00; (5) Mr. Fischenich-3 years-$185.00; and (6) Ms. Davis-2 years-$175.00. Considering the experience and billing rates 
of Mr. Faucher's colleagues, $300.00 per hour is the reasonable rate for Mr. Faucher in this matter. 
End of Document © 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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INTERROGATORIES together with a copy of this NOTICE, upon counsel in the above-
entitled matter by the method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
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DATED this 241h day of September, 2012. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SEP 2 7. 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT and THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED PARTIES, and their attorneys of record: 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 1 
000200
\ 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that effective October 1, 2012, Carey Perkins LLP's 
Boise office is moving and its new address Will be: 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 North 5th Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
The Boise office's post office box, firm telephone and facsimile numbers 
remain the same. Please amend your certificate of service and pleadings accordingly. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 2012. 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 2 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
BY~-,,....~~---,<.'---~~~~~~~ 
Jeremiah . Quane, Of the Firm 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 271h day of September, 2012, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 3 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
000202
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI~ OF IO'.L/5" FILE~.M., ___ _ 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA THERRIEN 
DEPUTY 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
ORDER 
On September 12, 2012, a hearing was held before this Court on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories filed August 24, 2012. 
The Court having considered this motion, Defendants' opposition thereto, the arguments of 
" 
counsel presented at this hearing and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered that said motion 
is GRANTED. The Court has reviewed the interrogatories at issue and finds the interrogatories 
do not exceed the number of interrogatories allowed by Rule 33(a)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure as argued by Defendants. 
Accordingly, Defendants are hereby ordered to answer said interrogatories without 
objection within 14 days of the foregoing hearing. 
It is further ordered that Plaintiff be awarded his "reasonable expenses in obtaining the 
order, including attorney fees" as provided in Rule 37(a)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
000203
Procedure and requested in Plaintiff's motion. The Court has reviewed the Affidavit of Counsel 
000204
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
20 I Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
No_ 
AM~~------_-:::}~i:ii:IL~~~;------t1""'-T'-4-~~ 
JAN O 4 2013 
CHR/STOPHi:A D 
By CHRISTINE s~f CH, Clerk 
Oc,"UTY vvEET 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF DR. BRIAN 
CALDER KERR, M.D. 
000205
To: Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Please take noti,ce that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, t~e the video 
depositio? of Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., on Wednesday, January 30, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. at 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, 303 W. Bannock, Boise, Idaho 83702, and continuing 
from time to time until completed, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take 
part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this _Qi_ day of January, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
000206
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the t>\{ day of January, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DR. BRIAN_ CALDER 
KERR, M.D., by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 




NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
000207
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
: .. ____ F_.IL~.~: :136: 
JAN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
O \~ \ G\ N~\L 
000208
To: Silk Touch Laser, LLP 
d/b/a Silk Touch Med Spa and/or 
Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser Center and/or 
Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, Charles 
Ballard, hereby gives notice to Silk Touch Laser, LLP, that on the 31st day of January, 2013, at 
9:00 a.m., the Plaintiff, by counsel, shall take the deposition of an agent or agents to be 
designated by Silk Touch Laser, LLP or any d/b/a thereof to be most knowledgeable as to the 
hereinafter specified matters, at the office of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, located 
at 303 W. Bannock, Boise, Idaho, upon oral examination pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
Topics 
Plaintiff hereby requests that Silk Touch Laser, LLP designate an individual or 
individuals to testify to the following: 
1) All aspects of consultation services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its 
agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
2) All aspects of medical examination services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, 
its agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
3) All aspects of pre-operative services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its 
agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
4) All aspects of post-operative services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its 
agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
2 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
000209
5), All aspects of surgical and/or cosmetic surgical services rendered by Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, its agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
6) All aspects of the medical equipment used in furtherance of services rendered by 
Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. 
7) All aspects of manufacturer instructions, whether presented in written, video 
graphic, or any other format, which pertain to proper and/or recommended usage of the medical 
equipment employed in furtherance of services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its agents, 
servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard. · 
8) All aspects of the medical techniques and procedures employed in furtherance of 
services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal 
Ballard. 
9) All aspects of the sterilization procedures employed by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its 
agents, servants, and/or employees in furtherance of rendering services to Krystal Ballard. 
10) All aspects of consultation services rendered by Silk Touch Laser, LLP, its 
agents, servants, and/or employees, to Krystal Ballard, including, but not necessarily limited to, 
consultation, examination, pre and post-operative or surgical care, equipment, sterilization 
procedures, and cosmetic surgical procedures. 
11) The entire file, including, but not necessarily limited to, billing and medical 
records, related to the treatment of, and/or services rendered to, Krystal Ballard. 
12) Dr. Brian Calder Kerr's employment and qualifications, including his training and 
experience in performing the procedures performed on Krystal Ballard. 
13) Briana Kerr's employment and qualifications. 
14) Susan Kerr's employment and qualifications. 
3 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
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15) Donna Berg's employment and qualifications. 
16) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols for the selection and procurement of 
equipment to be employed during surgical procedures. 
17) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols for the selection and/or engagement of 
personnel during surgical procedures. 
18) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols for the selection of surgical procedures to 
be offered to the public. 
19) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols pertaining to the certification, training, 
and/or education of personnel. 
20) Procedures, policies, protocols, and/or records pertaining to sterilization of 
equipment, personnel, and treatment site(s). 
21) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols pertaining to the documentation of services 
rendered .. 
22) Procedures, policies, and/or protocols pertaining to the documentation and/or 
memorialization of patient-provider communications. 
23) The employment or personnel files for · all agents, servants, and/or employees 
identified in· Silk Touch Laser, LLP's responses to Plaintiffs discovery, including, but not 
limited to Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, Briana Kerr, Susan Kerr, and Donna Berg. 
24) The search for, anci/or identification of, all electronically stored data or 
information responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests. 
25) Any and all surveys; investigations, and/or inspections conducted by any 
organization, whether voluntary or mandated, which pertain to the allegations contained within 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
4 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
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26) Logs and/or other records pertaining to spore counts or otherwise pertaining to 
sterilization of medical equipment. 
27) All aspects of Dr. Brian Calder Kerr's membership in professional organizations. 
28) All aspects of Silk Touch Laser, LLP's adherence to, or departure from, industry 
and trade recommendations pertaining to equipment usage, surgical and/or cosmetic surgical 
procedures, and patient care procedures. 
29) Liability coverage. 
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Defendant requests that you produce at said deposition all 
documents upon which you will rely in responding to these inquiries, including, but not limited 
to, notes, memoranda, letters, e-mails, handbooks, journals, brochures, and manuals. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. 
Dated this O"\ day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~:.----
B y __ +-t+-ff--#---------
~~ a . Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __Qj_ day of January, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF 30(b)(6) REPRESENTATIVE OF 
SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Court Reporter 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
6 
000213
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:, ____ fa~.. '.::tB9 : 
JAN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
000214
To: Briana Kerr 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 519 
B.oise, ID 83701-0519 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the deposition of 
Briana Kerr, on Thursday, January 31, 2013 at 1 :00 p.m. at Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett, LLP, 303 W. Bannock, Boise, Idaho 83702, upon oral examination pursuant to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. 
Dated this ___fli_ day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Respectfully Submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the O'-) day of January, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF BRIANA KERR by delivering the 
same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Court Reporter 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com . 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP . 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff~ 
\ ' NO FILED c; j (3 
A.M.----P,.M-~-----
JAN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
0 -f~ I G INJ\ L 
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To: Susie Kerr 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the deposition of 
Susie Kerr, on Thursday, January 31, 2013 at 11:00 a.m. at Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett, LLP, 303 W. Bannock, Boise, Idaho 83702, upon oral examination pursuant to the 
Rules of C~vil Procedure before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. 
Dated this _fil__ day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BE J IN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP m, __ 
By: ----+-H--Y--H--~'!t:Jf ________ _ 
]t\'l.~ 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
· James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the b"'\ day of January, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF SUSIE KERR by delivering the same 
to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Court Reporter 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 3~5-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JAN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
000220
To: Donna Berg 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701-0519 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the deposition of 
Donna Berg, on Thursday, January 31, 2013 at 3:00 p.m. at Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett, LLP, 303 W. Bannock, Boise, Idaho 83702, upon oral examination pursuant to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. 
Dated this C~ day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
8
~ DavM~vm lt=: 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <ll-\ day of January, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF DONNA BERG by delivering the same 
to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Court Reporter 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
fC<L"· Scott c 
3 
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-l Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
~ CAREY PERKINS LLP 
/ Capitol Park Plaza 
::= 300 North 5th Street, Suite 200 
(0 P.O. Box 519 
- Boise, Idaho 83701 
Cl::: Telephone (208) 345-8600 
0 Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO.----=-=-----
FILED 4: St) A.M. ____ P.M. __ ---.=---
JAN 11 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHARLOTTE WATSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE DUCES TECUM OF 
TAKING THE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
OF CHARLES BALLARD 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF and his counsel of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants will take testimony on 
oral examination of Charles Ballard before a court reporter, a videographer and notary 
. . 
public with the firm of M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc., commencing on Friday, the 1st 
NOTICE DUCES TECUM OF TAKING THE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF CHARLES 
BALLARD-1 
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day of February, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., and continuing thereafter from day to day until such 
time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the law offices of Nevin, 
Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, 303 West Bannock Street, Boise, Idaho, at which time 
and place you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may 
deem proper. 
The items and materials to be produced at the deposition by Charles Ballard 
consists of the following: 
1. · Krystal Ballard's Federal Income Tax Returns for the years 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
2. Charles Ballard's Federal Income Tax Returns for the years 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
3. Documents, $Uch as a Marriage Certificate, that reflect and pertain to 
th marriage of Charles Ballard to Krystal Ballard. 
4. If Charles Ballard is married at the time of his deposition on February 
1, 2013, documents, such as a marriage certificate, that reflect and pertain to his marriage 
~o the person he is married to. 
5. If Charles Ballard is not married at the time of his depositions on 
February 1, 2013, documents, that reflect and pertain to any marriages he has had since 
July 26, 2010, such as marriage certificates. 
6. Any and all documents, records, writings and physical things that 
pertain to and reflect in any way the following response of Charles Ballard in his Answer 
to Interrogatory No. 3 of the Defendants: 
NOTICE DUCES TECUM OF TAKING THE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF CHARLES 
BALLARD - 2 
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a. Loss of support to Charles Ballard from the death of Krystal 
Ballard. 
b. Depletion of community assets. 
c. Reduction of the community to earn income. 
d. Costs and expenses changeable against community property 
arising from the injuries to Krystal Ballard prior to her death. 
e. Funeral expenses. 
f. Loss of income from Krystal Ballard. 
g. Loss of pension and/or retirement benefits of Krystal Ballard. 
h. Loss of health insurance benefits from Krystal Ballard. 
7. Any and all documents, records, writings and physical things that 
support and are relied upon by Charles Ballard for his response to the Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 3. 
8. Any and all documents, records, writings and physical things that 
pertain to and support in any way the following allegations in the Complaint: 
a. Decedent's funeral expenses. 
b. Loss of wages and other benefits of employment which would 
have been earned by Krystal Ballard and shared with her 
husband, Plaintiff, during the course of her normal work life 
expectancy. 
c. The reasonable value attributable to the loss of service, care, 
comfort and society of Krystal Ballard. 
9. Bills, invoices, charges and documents that pertain to and reflect the 
amounts of the services, medical care and treatment provided for Krystal Ballard from the 
time of the surgery of Dr. Kerr until her death. 
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10. Bills, invoices, changes and documents that pertain to and reflect the 
amounts for funeral, burial and last rites having to do with Krystal Ballard. 
11. Any and all documents, records, writings and physical things that 
pertain to and reflect payment of all or any portion of the items described in paragraphs 9 
and 10 above. 
12. Records, files, documents and reports of all physicians, health care 
providers, hospitals, institutions and service providers of Krystal Ballard during the time 
frame of 2000 to the date of her death. 
13. Records of the United States Air Force for Krystal Ballard that relate 
to the time period 2005 until her death. 
14. A list of all physicians, health care providers and hospitals who 
provided services to Krystal Ballard from 2000 to her death. 
' 
15. Photographs of Krystal Ballard taken· during the last 5 years of her life. 
16. Photographs of the gravesite of Krystal Ballard including a headstone 
or marker that depicts wording or comments. 
17. Records, reports, files, documents, tangible things and objects of the 
Ada County Coroner and/or Ada County. 
18. Records, reports, files, documents, tangible things and objects, of the 
Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, Mountain Home Air Force Base 
or elsewhere. 
19. Records, reports, files, doc~ments, tangible things and objects of Dr. 
Glen Groben ~nd Ada County for the and in conjunction with the autopsy performed on 
Krystal Ballard. 
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20. Authorizations signed by Charles Ballard that will allow counsel for Dr. 
Kerr to obtain the material and items described in paragraphs 12, 13, 17, 18 and 19 
directly. 
21. Documents and records that pertain to and involve the Estate of 
Krystal Ballard, its administration, adjudication, wrapping up and closure. 
22. The last will and testament of Krystal Ballard and any codicils. 
23. Records, documents and writings that relate to or involve any 
inheritance for Charles Ballard due to the death of Krystal Ballard and life insurance 
benefits for Charles Ballard that are due Charles Ballard from life insurance on Krystal 
Ballard. 
24. Documents, records, writings and physical things that reflect and 
pertain to the current net worth of Charles Ballard. 
25. Documents and records that pertain to and reflect prescriptions for 
medications purchased or acquired by Krystal Ballard from the time of the operation by Dr. 
Kerr until her death. 
26. Drivers license of Krystal Ballard that was in effect on the date of her 
death. 
27. Documents, records and writings for applications of Krystal Ballard for 
any type of insurance that she initiated during the last 3 years before her death. 
28. Writings, diaries, notes and recordings of Krystal Ballard and Charles 
Ballard that pertain to and reflect events, facts, conversations with Dr. Kerr and his office 
staff/employees of Silk Touch Laser. 
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This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 11 1h day of January, 2013. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
B~.~ 
Jeie( iahA. Qu~f the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 1h day of January, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE DUCES TECUM OF TAKING THE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF CHARLES BALLARD by delivering the same to each of the following, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO,,---~Fl!::"1L=eo--:-~-+-:1;="""""'$-
AJJ, ___ -rP.M __ __..._ _ 
FEB O 1 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CH~LSIE PINKSTON 
DEPUTY 
·IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
559123 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE DUCES 
TECUM OF TAKING THE 




C,OMES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to Rules 
26(b)(l), 30(b)(5), and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby responds to 
Defendants' Notice Duces Tecum of Taking the Video Deposition of Charles Ballard. 
On January 11, 2013, Defendants, by facsimile, served upon Plaintiffs counsel a Notice 
Duces Tecum of Taking the Video Deposition of Charles Ballard. The Notice advised that Mr. 
Ballard's deposition would take place on February 1, 2013, and set forth twenty-eight requests 
for production of documents. 
Defendants have provided Plaintiff only twenty-one days notice of Mr. Ballard's 
deposition. Despite the shortened notice, Plaintiff has made a diligent and good faith effort to 
respond to Defendants' requests, and will supplement accordingly. 
General Statements and Objections 
I 
A. Representations of fact and law herein are made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These responses represent Plaintiffs best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-work product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it calls for information 
subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for critical self-
examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information arguably 
subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are not waived beyond 
the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in that no 




C. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those C(?mmonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does not exist. 
E. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent it may be overly broad, 
unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible and/or relevant evidence. 
No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is w_aived by the 
provision of any response herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 
Responses 
Requests No. 1 and 2 seek Plaintiffs federal tax returns for the years 2000 through 2012, 
and Krystal Ballard's federal tax returns for the years 2000 through 2010. Plaintiff objects to 
these requests to the extent they are overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible and/or relevant evidence. The tax 
returns of Charles' Ballard have no relevance to any issue in this case. The tax returns for Krystal 
Ballard for a decade are not relevant to any issue in this case. Without waiving or limiting these 
objections, Plaintiff is in the process of obtaining federal tax information for Krystal Ballard . . 
Request No. 3 seeks "[d]ocuments, such as a Marriage Certificate, that reflect and pertain 
to the marriage of Charles Ballard to Krystal Ballard." Plaintiff objects to this request to the 




overly broad. Without waiving or limiting these objections, Plaintiff hereby produces the . . . . 
requested marriage certificate (BALLARDOOOOO 1-BALLARD000002). 
Request No. 4 requests that "[i]f Charles Ballard is married at the time of his deposition 
on February 1, 2013, documents, such as a marriage certificate, that reflect and pertain to his 
marriage to the person he is married to." Mr. Ballard is not married presently. Plaintiff has no 
documents responsive to this request. · 
Request No. 5 requests that "[i]f Charles Ballard is not married at the time of his 
depositions on February 1, 2013, documents, that reflect and pertain to any marriages he has had 
since July 26, 2010, such as marriage certificates." Mr. Ballard has not been married since July 
26, 2010. Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request. 
Request No. 6 requests as follows: "Any and all documents, records, writings and 
physical things that pertain to and reflect in any way the following response of Charles Ballard in 
his Answer to Interrogatory No. 3 of the Defendants: 
a. Loss of support to Charles Ballard from the death of Krystal 
Ballard. 
b. Depletion of community assets. 
c. Reduction of the community to earn income. 
d. Costs and expenses changeable against community property arising from 
the injuries to Krystal Ballard prior to her death. 
e. Funeral expenses. 
f. Loss of income from Krystal Ballard. 
g. Loss of pension and/or retirement benefits of Krystal Ballard. 
h. Loss of health insurance benefits from Krystal Ballard." 
Plaintiff hereby produces an·invoice from Rost Funeral Home (000015BILL-000018BILL), an 
invoice from Tillman Funeral Home (BALLARD000132), an invoice from Artistic Flowers 
(BALLARD000133), receipts for items related to Krystal Ballard's funeral (BALLARD000134), 
a 2011 United States Air Force pay table (BALLARD000101), 2010 United States Air Force pay 




(BALLARDOOO 116-BALLARDOOO 131 ). Tax returns, pension and retirement benefit 
information for Krystal Ballard will be supplemented. Further, pursuant to the scheduling order 
deadlines, the Plaintiff will produce and economic report reflecting economic losse~ to Charles 
Ballard. 
Request No. 7 requests "[a]ny and all documents, records, writings and physical things 
that support and are relied upon by Charles Ballard for his response to the Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 3." In his response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff stated that he 
"claims as special damages all those damages entitled to be claimed under the laws of the State 
of Idaho . . . . " Plaintiff refers Defendants to the documents referenced in response to Request 
No.6. 
Request No. 8 requests "[a]ny and all documents, records, writings and physical things 
that pertain to and support in any way the following allegations in the Complaint: 
a. Decedent's funeral expenses, 
b. Loss of wages and other benefits of employment which would have been 
earned by Krystal Ballard and shared with her husband, Plaintiff, during 
the course of her normal work life expectancy. 
c. The reasonable value attributable to the loss of service, care, comfort and 
society of Krystal Ballard." 
Plaintiff hereby produces the documents referenced in response to Request No. 6. 
Request No. 9 requests "[b ]ills, invoices, charges and documents that pertain to and 
reflect the amounts of the services, medical care and treatment provided for Krystal Ballard from 
the time of the surgery of Dr. Kerr until her death." Plaintiff hereby produces medical records 
from St. Alphonsus Medical Center (SAMC000001-SDAMC000192), medical records from 
Elmore Medical Center (EMC000001-EMC000029), medical records from Silk Touch Med Spa 
(STMS000001-STMS00023), medical records from Elmore Ambulance Service (EAS000001-




records from Elmore Medical Center (000001BILL-000003BILL), billing records from St. 
Alphonus Medical Center (000004BILL-000013BILL), a billing record from Elmore Ambulance 
Service (000014BILL), and a billing record from Life Flight Network (000019BILL). 
Request No. 10 requests "[b ]ills, invoices, changes and documents that pertain to and 
reflect the amounts for funeral, burial and last rites having to do with Krystal Ballard." Plaintiff 
hereby produces an invoice from Rost Funeral Home (000015BILL-000018BILL), an invoice 
from Tillman Funeral Home (BALLARD000132), an invoice from Artistic Flowers 
(BALLARD000133), and receipts for items related to Krystal Ballard's funeral 
(BALLARD000134). 
Request No. 11 requests "[a]ny and all documents, records, writings and physical things 
that pertain to and reflect payment of all or any portion of the items described in paragraphs 9 
and 10 above." Plaintiff currently has no responsive documents in his possession. 
Request No. 12 requests "[r]ecords, files, documents and reports of all physicians, health 
care providers, hospitals, institutions and service providers of Krystal Ballard during the time 
frame of 2000 to the date of her death." Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it is overly 
broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible and/or relevant evidence. The medical records of Krystal Ballard for a decade are not 
relevant to any issue in this case. Without waiving or limiting these objections, Plaintiff 
produces Air Force medical records (USAF000001-USAF000044), a Patient Medical History 
Form (BALLARD000020), medical records from St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. (SAMC000001-
SAMC000192), medical records from Elmore Medical Center (EMC000001-EMC000029), 
medical records from Silk Touch Med Spa (STMS000001-STMS00023), medical records from 
-




(LFN000001-LFN000005), Elmore Medical Center billing records (000001BILL-000003BILL), 
billing records from St. Alphonus Medical Center (000004BILL-000013BILL), billing records 
from Elmore Ambulance Service (000014BILL), and billing records from Life Flight Network 
(000019BILL). 
Request No. 13 requests "[r]ecords of the United States Air Force for Krystal Ballard that 
relate to the time period 2005 until her death." Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds it 
is overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the · 
discovery of admissible and/or relevant evidence. Defendant's request for "records" is unduly 
broad. Certainly every United States Air Force record for Krystal Ballard is not relevant to the . . 
claims and defenses in this case. Without waiving or limiting these objections, Plaintiff he~eby 
produces USAF Interim Report of Casualty and Final Report of Casualty (BALL~OOOO 17-
BALLARD000018), Air Force Medical Records (USAF000001-USAF000044); Geneva 
Conventions Identification Card (BALLARD00002 l-BALLARD000022), Performance 
Feedback Worksheets (BALLARD000024-BALLARD000027), Reenlistment Eligibility Annex 
to DD Form 4 (BALLARD000028), Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD 
Pers~nnel (BALLARD000029-BALLARD000030), Joint Spouse Assignment Requests 
(~ALLARD000031-BALLARD000032), Transcript Request - Community College of the AF 
(BALL~000033-BALLARD000034), Mountain Home AFB Memorandum Re: Application 
for Join Spouse Assignment (BALLARD000035), Financial Management and Comptroller 
Craftsman Workbook (BALLARD000039-BALLARD000100), Change of Projected 
Assignment Data (BALLARD000038), Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Election and 
Certificate (BALLARD000019), United States Air Force Interim arid Final Reports of Casualty 




(BALLARD000036), Department of Air Force memorandum to Krystal Ballard Re: Extension of 
' Enlistment for PCS (BALLARD000037), 2011 United States Air Force pay table 
(BALLARD000101), 2010 United States Air Force pay tables (BALLARD000102-
BALLARD000115), and Air Force Benefit Fact Sheets (BALLARD000116-
BALLARDOOO 131 ). 
Request No. 14 requests "[a] list of all physicians, health care providers and hospitals 
who provided services to Krystal Ballard from 2000 to her death." Plaintiff objects to this 
request to the extent it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible and/or relevant evidence. The requested records 
of Krystal Ballard for a de~ade are not relevant to any issue in this case. Without. waiving or 
limiting these objections, Plaintiff produces the documents set forth in Request No. 12. 
Request No. 15 requests "[p]hotographs of Krystal Ballard taken during the last 5 years 
of her life." Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds it is overly broad, unduly 
burdensome, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
and/or relevant evidence. . Without waiving or limiting these objections, Plaintiff produces 
photographs contained within Krystal Ballard's funeral program (BALLARD000004-
BALLARD000008), a number of separate photographs (BALLARD000135-
BALLARD000149), as well as a video of Krystal Ballard's funeral. 
~equest No. 16 requests "[p]hotographs of the gravesite of Krystal Ballard.including a 
headstone or marker that depicts wording or comments." Plaintiff produces a photograph 
(BALLARDOOO 150). 
Request No. 17 requests "[r]ecords, reports, files, documents, tangible things and objects 




Informal Probate of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative 
(BALLARD000009-BALLARD000012) and the Ada County Coroner Investigative Report, 
Narrative Report, and Autopsy Report (ADAOOOOOl-ADAOOOOl l). 
R~quest No. 18 requests the production of "[r]ecords, reports, files, documents, tangible 
things and objects, of the Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, Mountain 
Home Air Force Base or elsewhere." Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds it is overly 
broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible and/or 
• 
relevant evidence. . Without waiving or limiting these objections, Plaintiff produces any and all 
such records in his possession, which relate to the matters alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, 
namely the United States Air Force Interim and Final Reports of Casualty (BALLARD000017-
BALLARD000018). Plaintiff will supplement his Response to this Request if he comes into 
possession of any additional responsive documents. 
Request No. 19 requests "[r]ecords, reports, files, documents, tangible things and objects 
of Dr. Glen Groben and Ada County for the and in conjunction with the autopsy performed on 
Krystal Ballard." Plaintiff hereby produces a Certificate of Death (BALLARD000003) and the 
Ada County Coroner Investigative Report, Narrative Report, and Autopsy Report (ADAOOOOOl-
ADAOOOOl l). 
Request No. 20 asks Plaintiff to provide "[a]uthorizations signed by Charles Ballard that 
will allow counsel for Dr. Kerr to obtain the material and items described in paragraphs 12, 13, 
17, 18 and 19 directly." Plaintiff incorporates herein each of his objections and responses made 
to Requests 12, 13, 17, 18, and 19 and refers Defendants to the documents produced in response 




Request No. 21 requests "[d]ocuments and records that pertain to and involve the Estate 
of Krystal Ballard, its administration, adjudication, wrapping up and closure." Plaintiff objects 
to this request on the grounds it is overly broad, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible and/or relevan~ evidence. Without waiving or limiting these 
objections, Plaintiff produces an Application for Informal Probate of Will and Informal 
-
Appointment of Personal Representative (BALLARD000009-BALLARD000012), Information 
to Heirs and Devisees / Notice of Appointment (BALLARD000013-BALLARD000014), and 
Letters Testamentary (BALLARDOOOO 15-BALLARDOOOO 16). 
Request No. 22 requests "[t]he last will and testament of Krystal Ballard and any 
codicils." Request No. 23 requests "[r]ecords, documents and writings that relate to or involve 
any inheritance for Charles Ballard due to the death of Krystal Ballard and life insurance benefits 
for Charles Ballard that are due Charles Ballard from life insurance on Krystal Ballard." Request 
No. 24 requests documents "that reflect and pertain to the current net worth of Charles Ballard." 
Plaintiff objects to each of these requests (Request Nos. 22, 23, 24) on the grounds they are 
overly broad, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
and/or relevant evidence. None of these Requests seek information which has any relevance to 
the issues in this case. 
Request No. 25 requests "[ d]ocuments and records that pertain to and reflect 
prescriptions for medications purchased or acquired by Krystal Ballard from the time of the 
operation by Dr. Kerr until her death." Plaintiff hereby produces the above-referenced medical 
records. 
Request No. 26 requests the "[ d]rivers license of Krystal Ballard that was in effect on the 




Request No. 27 requests "[ d]ocuments, records and writings for applications of Krystal 
Ballard for any type of insurance that she initiated during the last 3 years before her death." 
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds it is overly broad, irrelevant, and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible and/or relevant evidence. The Request seeks 
information which has no relevance to the issues in this case. 
Request No. 28 requests "[ w ]ritings, diaries, notes and recordings of Krystal Ballard and 
Charles Ballard that pertain to and reflect events, facts, conversations with Dr. Kerr and his 
office staff/employees of Silk Touch Laser." Plaintiff does not possess responsive documents 
beyond the applicable medical records referenced above. 
592109 
Dated this 1st day of February, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By~J 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of February, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Notice Duces Tecum of Taking Video 
Deposition of C!,arles Ballard by hand delivering the same to the following: 
592109 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
P. Gregory Haddad 
12 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B. Perrine, jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:_, __ __.Fl~~ 4-z:e: 
FEB 11 2013 
CHFIISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
BIJ ANNAMARIE MEYIA 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
595248 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
OF DISCOVERY 
000242
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
' 
Production of Documents to Defendant, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, together with a copy of this 
Notice of Service of Discovery, has been served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of 
service below. ,,_ 
DATED this_!.!__ day of February, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~----By _____ c) 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
595248 
000243
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February !l_, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Service of Discovery was served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
300 N. 61h Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
3 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B.Perrine,jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Ff8 i 1 2013 
CHRISTOPM!fl O. rtlCH, Olerk 
By ANNArAARIE MSVEFI 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
595238 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
OF DISCOVERY 
000245
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendant, Brian Calder Kerr, MD., together with a copy of this 
Notice of Service of Discovery, has been served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of 
service below. 
/'-
DATED this!!__ day of February, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~#~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
595238 
000246
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February .!i_, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Service of Discovery was served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
300 N. 6th Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 . 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 . 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO.------,;;.:-=_,.._ 
AM ____ 1:_,b,ei, ti?:!: 
P.M_. _ .:t.J_,,,~4SI~. 
MAR 1 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o RIO 
By CHRISTINE 'swe~ CIGJrlc 
Ol:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 




To: Jonelle Cadiz 
1500 Sheridan Drive 
Jacksonville, AR 72076 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the 
videotaped deposition of Jonelle Cadiz, on Tuesday, April 2, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. at Bushman 
Court Reporting, 620 W. Third Street, Suite 302, Little Rock, Arkansas 72201, and continuing 
from time to time until completed, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take 
part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before an appropriate officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
/l.f (1,-'-
Dated this __ day of March, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By:~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSERLLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION 
000249
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/1--
I hereby certify that on the /{{ day of March, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JONELLE CADIZ 
by deliveting the same io the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 North 61h Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Bushman Court Reporting 
620 W. Third Street, Suite 302 
Little Rock, AR 72201 
Court Reporter 
1t"" vi A x:: /GI · 
~~- :?yS"' - ·~{pC, 0 
3 






Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Capitol Par~ Plaza 
300 North 61h Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
il1------~r-.:--
P.},1_ ___ FIL'~~-14 L4 J 
MAR 2 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl.;rk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
:JEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 22nd day of March, 2013, I served 
ANSWER AND RESPONSES OF DEFENDANT SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
000251
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS and ANSWERS AND RESPONSES OF DEFENDANT 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D. TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, together with a copy of this 
Notice, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
000252
-
David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'::--~M.:J;ti:9,_: 
MAI< i 6 2013 
CHRfSTOPHER D. RICH, Cl~ 
6y KATHY BIEHL 
Oeputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 
MED SP A, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
1 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
CASE NO. CVOC12-04792 





Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff gives notice to the Court and the 
Defendants that he has served Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories by hand delivering on March 26, 2013, to the persons indicated on the certificate 
of service below. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT.LLP 
By~-~~~~~-~~~~~~-F-~~,c_~~­
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
000254
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 26, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
hand delivering the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
3 • NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
000255
David Nevin asB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
::_ 5t. r;?J 
MAR 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY BIEHL 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 




COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard ("Plaintiff'), by his counsel, and discloses 
the following expert witnesses who may be called upon to testify at the trial of this action: 
1. Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
Sorensen Cosmetic Surgery Center 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 120 
Boise, ID 83706 
2. George Nichols, M.D. 
73 9 Middle Way 
Louisville, KY 40206 
3. Keith Barclay Armitage, M.D. 
12600 Cedar Road 
Cleveland Heights, OH 44106 
4. Cornelius A. Hofman 
The GEC Group 
5555 N. Star Ridge Way 
Star, ID 83669 
5. The following individuals were involved in the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard 
beginning on July 25, 2010, until her death just after midnight on July 26, 2010: 
Elmore Ambulance Service, 895 N. 6th East, Mountain Home, Idaho 83647. 
Cody Murphy, EMT; and 
Wendy Vanderburgh, EMT - Paramedic. 
Elmore Medical Center, 895 N. 6th Street, Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Karl Olson, MD; 
Bertram Stemmler, MD; and 
Edward Kim, MD. 
2 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
000257
Life Flight Network, 2779 S Liberty St, Boise, Idaho 83709 
Beth Studebaker, RN; and 
Steve Mozingo, PM. 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 1055 North Curtis Road, Boise, Idaho 83706 
Matthew Campbell, MD - Emergency Department; 
Tisha Fujii, DO - Critical Care; 
Billy Mrogan, MD - Surgical Consult; 
Jeffrey Symmonds, MD - Vascular Examination; 
Michael Kenner, MD - Heart & Vascular Center; 
Howard Schaff, MD - Gem State Radiology; and 
Attending nursing and other staff to include David Atkinson, RN; Rob Hart, RN; Debra 
Servatius, RN; Kristin Prescott, RN: Tensie Tobenas, RN; Benjamin Gagnebin, RN; Shirley 
Phillips, DTR (diet/nutrition); Ann Schaffer, CRT; and Wynne Proctor, RN. 
The following individuals who participated in, or contributed to, the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard conducted by the Ada County Coroner's office, 5550 Morris Hill Road, Boise, Idaho 
83706: 
Erwin L. Sonnenberg, Coroner; 
Glen R. Groben, M.D., Forensic Pathologist; 
Robert Karinen, Forensic Lab Supervisor; 
Barton L. Kline, Forensic Lab Technician; and 
Kelly Cole, Coroner's Investigator. 
3 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
000258
6. Plaintiff may inquire of Defendant Brian Kerr, MD, whose address is known to 
Defendants' counsel, regarding opinions held by this Defendant. 
7. Plaintiff reserves the right to call rebuttal witnesses. 
8. Plaintiff reserves the right to call any and all persons identified by other parties to 
this action. 
9. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this disclosure as discovery proceeds. 
Dated this 26th day of March, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By:~~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
000259
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I :hereby certify that on the 26th day of March, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE delivering the same to the 
following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 519 








\ \\ ,• r· .... ~~ Jt 
2013/05/14 11 :11 :58 4 /6 
""' ORIGINAL ::u~ Z 5fM,-. --
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAY 14 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o. RlCH, Clerk 
91 l<A'fHV BIEHL 
l)opUtJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
OF CHARLES BALLARD BY 
AUDIO-VISUAL MEANS 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF and their attorneys of record: 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF CHARLES BALLARD BY AUDIO-VISUAL 
MEANS -1 
000261
2013/05/14 11 :11 :58 5 /6 
YOU WILL PELEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Defendants will take testimony 
on oral examination of Charles Ballard by audio-visual and teleconferencing means per 
Rule 30(b)(4), I.R.C.P., before a video operator and a court reporter and notary public 
' 
with the firm of Anchor Court Reporting, Pensacola, Florida, commencing on Thursday, 
the 23rd day of May, 2013, at 1 :30 p.m., Florida time, and continuing thereafter from day to 
day until such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at Anchor Court 
Reporting, 229 South Baylen Street, Pensacola, Florida 32502, at which time and place 
you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may deem proper. 
Counsel for the Defendants will participate in the deposition by teleconferencing from 
Boise, Idaho at REGUS - Downtown, 950 Bannock Street, Boise, Idaho 83702, starting 
at 12:30 p.m., Boise time. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 14h day of May, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 





2013/05/14 11 :11 :58 6 /6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of May, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF CHARLES 
BALLARD BY AUDIO-VISUAL MEANS by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ l U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
C\114v 
V JeremTu-tr-A. Quane 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF CHARLES BALLARD BY AUDIO-VISUAL 
MEANS- 3 
000263
David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B. Perrine, jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO:--~~--J-r. .......... -
AM. FIL~~ ViJ:: 
MAY 1 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET' 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
()R\G\NAL 
000264
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Notice of 
Duces Tecum . of Taking Video Deposition of Charles Ballard and Plaintiff's Second 
Supplemental Answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, together with a copy of this 
Notice of Service of Discovery, has been served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of 
service below. 
. ~ 
DATED this }'{ day of May, 2013. 
2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
000265
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ft.-, . 
I hereby certify that on May IL/ , 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Service of Discovery was served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 . 
3 - NOTICE OF SERVICE 
000266
2013/05/15 16:34:14 4 /6 
20-13·05· 14 17: 19 CAREY PERKINS LLP 
ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780·3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
12083458660 >> e Law 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURiH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
P 18/32 
MAY 15 2013 
CHRIS TOP HS A 
By t<Ar,;y~1:f H, Clerk 
Deputy 
vs. 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF 
COUNSEL 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LL~, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SllK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
TO: CLERK OF JHE ABOVE-ENTITLED COUF{T and ALL PARTIES 
AND COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL· 1 
000267
2013/05/15 16:34:14 5 /6 
20-13·05-14 17:20 CAREY PERKINS LLP 12083458660 >> e Law P 19/32 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 (b)(1 ), hereby substitute Jeremiah A. Quane of the firm of Quane Jones 
McColl, PLLC, as its attorneys of record in thls action in place of the firm Carey Perkins 
LLP, in the above-referenced action. All future correspondence, notes, pleadings and 
other documents relating to this action should henceforth be served upon: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone- (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile - (208) 780-3930 
jaq@quanelaw.com 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
~I --Jerem ah A. Quane 
DATED this~day of May, 2013. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By~ RichL.Stubbs 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL· 2 
000268
2013/05/15 16:34:14 6 /6 
'2013-05-14 17:20 CAREY PERKINS LLP 12083458660 >> e Law P 20/32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
lSW"" . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of Mayl 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by delivering 
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETr LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranber~ Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaint;rr 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL - 3 
[ J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ } U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J Hand Delivered 
[ I Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
I ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
I ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[XI Facsimile (334) 262·0657 
000269
- 2013/05/28 11 :22:30 4 /6 
QR\G\NA.L 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO·-----::::-:=----::----
A.M. ____ F_.1~ ,:::( ~'fO 
MAY 2 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER. LLP, an Idaho Hmited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE,' 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
The Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing further proceedings dated 
May 16, 2012, provides inter alia, that the Defendants shall disclose all expert witnesses 
to be used at trial by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to trial and jury trial 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 1 
000270
2013/05/28 11 :22:30 5 /6 
to commence on September 24, 2013. In compliance with this Order, the Defendants 
disclose the following expert witnesses to be used at trial: 
1. Dr. Thomas Coffman, Boise, Idaho. 
2. Dr. Alan Frankie, Boise, Idaho. 
3. Dr. Charles Garrison. Boise and Pocatello, Idaho. 
4. Dr. Brian Kerr, Boise, Idaho. 
5. Dr. Gregory Laurence, Germantown, Tennessee. 
6. Dr. John Lundeby, Spokane, Washington. 
7. Dr. Geoffrey Stiller, Moscow, Idaho. 
8. Dr. S. Angier Wills, Pocatello, Idaho. 
DATED this 281h day of May, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
~U~" Jer'fumiahA QuaRe, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS'· DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of May, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay · 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 3 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B.Perrinejbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
;;l) .• -- FILED--I-ttk ~~= 
,U.1. P.M~...:+~--
JUN O 3 2c:3 
Cl-lFHSTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
ORIGINAL 
000273
To: Briana Kerr 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane 
Quane, Jones, McColl 
U.S. Bank Plaza, Suite 1601 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the 
deposition of Briana Kerr, on Tuesday, June 25, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. at Quane, Jones, McColl, 
' 
PLLC, 101 S. Capitol, Suite 1601, Boise, Idaho 83701, upon oral examination pursuant to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 
The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. 
re.A 
Dated this~ day of June, 2013. 
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By:~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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· CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' ,,c/ 
I hereby certify that on the J__ day of June, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF BRIANA KERR by delivering the same to 
the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Quane, Jones, McColl 
U.S. Bank Plaza, Suite 1601 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83701 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Court Reporter 




JUN o 4 2013 
J~di1©61JAivlmtefk ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO.~--:-~~---
A.M. \n\..\ ~ ~IL~-~-----
JUN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 3rd day of June, 2013, I served 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
000276
.. . . 
INTERROGATORIES, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel in the 
above-entitled matter by the method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 




JUN 1 7 2013 
A.da county Clerk 
David Nevin (ISB. #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T:(304)594-0087;F:(304)594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 6l ?~ FILED A.M. P.M ___ _ 
JUN 172013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Cl'3rk 
By ELVSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
620745 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF DR. JOHN P. 
LUNDEBY,MD 
000278
To: Dr. John P. Lundeby, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
deposition of Dr. John P. Lundeby, M.D., on Friday, July 26, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. at law offices of 
Ramsden and Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814, at which place and 
time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 





10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedur~s, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
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000280
' . ' . 
EOFSERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the_,_ day of June, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DR. JOHN P. LUNDEBY, M.D., 
by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
P. Gregory Haddad 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com · 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. rl\!I' : U = 
. A.M.----P.M-.w ...!:,~--
JUN 2 1 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYS HA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, , 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 21 51 day of June, 2013, Plaintiff's Third Set 
of Discovery Requests to Defendants, along with a true and correct copy of this Notice of 
' 
Service, were served upon counsel for the Defendants by facsimile as follows: 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO .. 
A.M---"~1~~35) : 
JUN 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
625782 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Rule 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and moves this Court to strike cumulative experts. This 
motion is supported by a memorandum of law, as well as an Affidavit of Counsel, both filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
On June 3, 2013, Defendants served their First Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories, which identifies highly cumulative expert witness testimony. Because 
Defendants' disclosed expert witness testimony is so blatantly in violation of Rule 403, Defendants 
should not simply be precluded from introducing such cumulative evidence at trial, but Plaintiff 
should be spared the undue and unfair prejudice of incurring the expense of a discovery effort, 
including depositions, involving experts whose role in this case is necessarily limited to offering 
cumulative testimony. 
Though Plaintiff's counsel made an effort to address this issue in good faith with defense 
counsel, the parties reached no resolution. Therefore, the Court's involvement is now required. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff now moves this Court for an order limiting Defendants to two expert 
witnesses, including Defendant, Dr. Kerr, on any single topic. 
Dated this 26th day of June, 2013. 
625782 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By ~n~ 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
hand delivering the same to the following: 
625782 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519, 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
::::=. 
A.M.__-~ ___ F_,/LEO ~ ' 
.JI.~- ~::r 
JUN 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o 
By CHRISTINE sWf:· Clerk 
. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnersh~p, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT MCKAY 
OR\G\NAL 
000287
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) · 
Scott McKay, being first duly sworn, states and alleges the following: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff in this litigation. 
2. On June 3, 2013, Defendants served a supplemental answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory 
No. 3, which calls for expert witness information. This supplemental answer is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
3. On more than one occasion since that time, Plaintiffs counsel raised objection with 
defense counsel regarding Defendants' disclosure of multiple experts concerning the same 
subject matter, including by letter dated June 20, 2013. Letter from James B. Perrine to Terrence 
S. Jones, June 20, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. By letter dated June 21, 2013, Defendants' counsel maintained the propriety of 
Defendants' intended expert witness testimony. Letter from Terrence S. Jones to James B. 
Perrine, June 21, 2013, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
5. Plaintiff has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the Defendants in an 
effort to resolve this dispute without court action. 
STATE OF IDAHO 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
by hand delivering the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 





Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JUN O 4 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST . 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Defendants hereby submit their First Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's 
First Set_ of Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name and addresses of each person 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 1 
· EXHIBIT A 
000290
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which each 
expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions of each expert, a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion of each expert, and a summary of each expert's 
qualifications. 
SUPPLMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: 
1) Brian C. Kerr, M.D. 
Clo Quane Jones McColl PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. Suite 1601 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 780-3939 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance offacts and opinions held: Dr. Kerr is a physician licensed by the 
state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Kerr has engaged in the medical 
specialty of anesthesiology and cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Kerr 
will testify as a non-retained expert witness at the trial as to his compliance with the 
applicable standard of health care practice with respect to all of the medical services 
rendered to the patient/decedent Krystal Ballard. Dr. Kerr will testify that he has actual 
knowledge of the standard of health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that he met such 
standard taking into account his background, training, experience and field of medical 
specialization with respect to any and all medical services rendered to the patient. 
Part of the basis for Dr. Kerr's opinions include: his background, training, 
research, practice and experience in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed 
physician in Boise, Idaho, his prior involvement in the peer review process while working 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 2 
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as an anesthesiologist, his involvement as an anesthesiologist on thousands of surgeries, 
·his prior medical staff privileges, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures like 
liposuction are performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in performing a large volume of 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic 
liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting procedures are performed, 
his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments needed to perform the nature 
and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his knowledge of the scope of 
practice of cosmetic providers in Boise, Idaho and elsewhere, and his knowledge of the 
types of medical providers who perform cosmetic procedures like the ones at issue in this 
case and his knowledge of the manner and method by which surgical equipment and 
surgical procedure facilities are maintained in a sterile fashion. Dr. Kerr will explain his 
training and experience at the Mayo Clinic during his residency in anesthesiology 
1989-1992 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the anesthetic procedures he 
performed, was taught and observed. He will explain the same matters for his ~xperience 
as a staff anesthesiologist at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise from 
1992 to 2008. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for achieving sterile operating conditions and the 
disinfection of instruments and equipment and that the similar matters undertaken for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard were used and exceeded. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that the infection rates at Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center were and are for in excess of any infections he has encountered which 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES- 3 
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are essentially zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily 
treated successfully with no adverse consequences. 
By way of these and other professional experiences in Boise, Idaho, Dr. 
Kerr will testify that he has actual knowledge of community standards of health care 
practice applicable to him. During his professional career in Boise, Idaho, he has been 
acquainted with physicians who perform cosmetic procedures who are not plastic 
surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds including: 
family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and gynecology. 
Dr. Kerr has become acquainted with the nature and scope of the practice of these other 
cosmetic procedure providers and the procedures utilized by them in this specialty in 
B~ise, Idaho in 2010, including the procedures utilized for maintaining a sterile field and 
how to properly clean and maintain the surgical eqµipment and instruments utilized for 
cosmetic procedures including the procedures at issue in this case. Dr. Kerr will explain 
that the standard of health care practice for plastic surgeons is not the st~ndard of health. 
care practice for him or physicians who practice in the same medical specialty he does. 
Dr. Kerr will describe and offer testimony oh the training he received for the 
procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard and refer to the publications, data and 
documents that have been produced in discovery on this subject that are incorporated 
herein by this reference and explain the numerous similar procedures he performed 
before his treatment of Krystal Ballard, consisting of 199 liposuctions through July 20, 
2010 and 33 fat transfers through July 20, 2010. 
Dr. Kerr will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for his facility to be certified, inspected or approved by 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES-4 
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any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his clinic and the 
instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to ~onduct his 
medical practice and the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
During Dr. Kerr's professional career in Boise, Idaho, he has received 
specific training in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and 
ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will testify that he had adequate training and experience 
to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. He will 
testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these types of 
. procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was appropriate for the 
procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based 
setting without general anesthesia and that he had proper facilities, equipment and 
personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health 
care practice. As reflected in his deposition testimony and discovery responses which 
are hereby incorporated as if set forth in full, Dr. Kerr had performed these procedures on 
numerous other patients before and since the procedure at issue in this case. Dr. Kerr will 
testify that he possesses the professional knowledge and experience that allows him to 
express the opinions and testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that he has never had a patient experience a 
post-operative complication like the one alleged in this case nor has he ever had a patient 
experience a post-operative infection of this nature, nor a patient death. Based in part on 
his review of this case and in consultation with experienced and trained medical 
professionals in several other a~eas of medicine including infectious disease and 
pathology, he will testify that the patient's death was not due to any error or omission on 
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his part or the part of anyone associated with his practice. He will testify that he 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. Dr. Kerr will explain the 
procedures he performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal Ballard, 
starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same.sterile and 
disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and there were 
no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will explain the same 
matters in regard to the multitude of procedures her performed before the procedure he 
performed on Krystal Ballard. He will render the opinion that his liposuction and fat 
transfer procedures did not cause or result in the introduction of any bacteria to the 
patient. Dr. Kerr actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and that his 
opinions will be stated on a more probable than not basis or reasonable medical certainty. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that nothing he elected to do or not do with re?pect to the 
medica! services provided to Krystal Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the applicable local 
standard of health care practice which in turn caused or contributed to any damages or 
injuries .to the patient. Dr. Kerr will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was 
not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the standard of health care 
practice by him. He will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable to 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise is established 
by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way they typically 
practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, publication, 
foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. Dr. Kerr's testimony at 
trial will necessarily contain a mixed component of both factual and expert testimony. He 
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will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care typically provided under 
similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic 
surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will express and define the local standard 
of practice as it existed in Boise in 2010 with respect to the medical issues in this case 
consistent with his deposition testimony, prior discovery responses and the contents of 
this disclosure which are hereby incorporated. He will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
complia·nce is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. The standard of healthcare practice for physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and no perfect outcome was ever 
warranted or represented to the patient. The standard of practice applicable includes as 
a major element aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of science 
which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. Dr. Kerr. will be 
prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why his care in this 
case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all operative 
procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Kerr will ~xplain that 
post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized risk factor 
that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care practice by 
the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, infections may 
occur. Dr. Kerr will explain the advice and information given to Krystal Ballard in regard to 
the risk, benefits and options he provided to Krystal Ballard on two occasion·s before his 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in his medical records. Dr. Kerr will 
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explain the standard of health care practice that is applicable to him and that everything 
undertaken by him in his care and treatment of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of the 
standard of health care practice, based on the class of health care provider to which he 
belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Kerr will explain that the standard 
of health care practice provides that he is to be judged and evaluated in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, taking into account 
his training, experience and field of medical specialization. 
As part of his testimony and consistent with his specialty of anesthesiology 
and cosmetic surgery, Dr. Kerr is expected to testify concerning the totality of medical 
services provided to Krystal Ballard. As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss his 
training and the certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery. He will discuss his care and treatment of the 
patient as outlined in the patient's medical records as well as his conversations and 
interactions with the patient and her husband as discussed in the documents produced in 
discovery and/or attached as exhibits to Dr. Kerr's deposition. To the extent it is relevant 
to his opinions, he will also discuss his continuing education courses since transitioning 
from anesthesia to cosmetic procedures including his further knowledge of cosmetic 
surgery which includes both the Vaser procedure and fat injection procedures and how 
they are performed in different locations in this body. 
With respect to the fat injection, he will discuss how a person's own fat may 
be used to improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less 
needed (usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will 
explain how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site 
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being treated. Before the procedure, the areas from where the fat is being removed are 
injected with a fluid to minimize bruising and discomfort. The fat is removed from the body 
by a cannula through a small incision. He will discuss how the fat is prepared to be 
reinjected back into the patient's body and then placed into the desired area using either a 
smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He will explain how some of the 
fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume over time, which is often 
addressed by injecting more than is needed at the time to achieve the desired end result. 
Over a few weeks, the amount of transferred fat will decrease. He will explain how the 
fat transfer procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was consistent with 
the local standard of practice given the nature and extent of the procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss the entries in his records 
l 
including his first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she desired, 
the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic prqcedure, he 
. . 
will discuss the patient's health history form, the fact that she had previously had a 
liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this type, the general state of the 
patient's health, the operative report and a detailed explanation of how he did the 
. ' 
procedure on July 21, 2010, he will discuss the patient's vital signs and her clinical 
condition before during and after the surgery as well as at the post-operative visit with the 
patient, his pre-operative, intra operative and post-operative discussions, instructions and 
directions shared with the patient and then ultimately the discussions he had with 
patient's husband and aunt, he will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
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to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, he will 
explain the artistic nature of the procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the 
cannula back and forth to feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will explain the manner and method by 
which the adipose tissue harvested is then drained and prepared for reinjection, how the 
instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each procedure, he 
will discuss those pieces of equipment and/or attachments and medical goods which are 
new versus sterilized for reuse between patients and/or procedures, he will discuss the 
pre and post-operative antibiotics he administered to the patient and the reasons why 
they were appropriate, he will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
to him or even to be suffering from any signs or symptoms of any. infection beyond general 
localized pain in her buttocks which would be expected initially from this type of 
procedure. He will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did not 
have any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus or other signs of 
active drainage from the operative sites, there was no swelling or signs of a rash or 
change in condition of the skin surrounding the area. Dr. Kerr will explain how he . 
looked for and documented the absence of these signs and symptoms during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and her 
husband prior to her death. He will testify that at no point did the patient present to him 
as having an infection nor did the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to 
refer the patient, prescribe a different course of medical care or obtain any further 
diagnostic testing than was done. He will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods 
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and the fact that they do not exist on the skin nor would they be found on his instruments, 
but rather they are a class of bacteria which resides in the bladder, bowels and urinary 
tract of a patient. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss wh¥ the Vaser procedure is an appropriate method of 
removing unwanted adipose tissue in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will testify that he 
had adequate training and experience to perform the surgical procedures on the patient in 
. ' 
question and that he performed these procedures in conformity with the local standard of 
practice to which Dr. Kerr is held. He_will explain how the field of laser lipolysis with the 
use of tumescent anesthesia has expended in recent years. He will discuss how when 
considering different types of the body for lipolysis that each area has its own unique 
geography and involves a degree of physician judgment as to how much material to 
remove and/or reinject into each location. He will explain the positioning of the patient, 
incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, choice of instruments, his 
artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient expectations, and patient 
education and counseling from the informed consent phase through the postoperative 
follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical illustrations as well 
as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at issue including 
those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies produced to date. 
As part of his testimony, he will explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain· how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
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Small-diameter probes are then inserted into the body through small incisions. He will 
explain how by resonating at a high ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose 
fat cells·- while leaving blood vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The 
loose fat cells mix with the tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using 
gentle ~uction. After the surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote 
maximum skin retraction, smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to 
traditional liposuction. 
Dr. Kerr may also discuss his knowledge of the history ·of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. He will 
discuss his operativ~ report and how he creates his medical record document~tion, how 
and why he selected the antibiotics in question including the decision on July ,23 to place 
. 
the patient on 500 mg of Keflex and that this was an appropriate broad spectrum anti~iotic 
to provide the patient given her location in Mountain Home, he will explain how the 
affected area is expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the 
affected area, the instructions given to the patient, he will discuss the cardinal signs of an 
infection and how he specifically evaluated, questioned the patient and dpcumented 
regarding these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the 
' 
amount of time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that ~e took the 
approprfate amount of time to address this patient during her procedure on July 21, 2010. 
He will discuss his knowledge of the various cosmetic organizations to which he belongs 
and/or has knowledge of, what they offer their members and the opportunities to 
associate with colleagues and obtain continuing education in this emerging field. Dr. Kerr 
will explain the matter he undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal Ballard and 
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assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical sites, 
including abnormal odor, and thus there was no evidence or suggestion of infection of the 
sites. 
He will discuss how on July 26, 2010 he learned around 1 p.m. that Krystal 
Ballard had died. After the patient's death he sent a document setting forth his list of 
concerns to the coroner who he asked for a copy of the autopsy record. He will discuss 
the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in her urine 
and that this is consistent wi.th an infectious process in the patient's bladder. This is also 
an area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist. He will 
discuss how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC count of 14.7. He 
will disc.uss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery. He will comment 
upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address the patient's bladder or perform any 
microscopic examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in 
the positive UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. Dr. Kerr is 
expected to offer testimony on the autopsy report of Dr. Glen Graben and the matters he 
described in his deposition in regard to the report, including the fact that Dr. Graben did 
not perform a microscopic evaluation of the bladder and urinary tract with the exception of 
the kidneys. 
Dr. Kerr is also expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and 
how this can be signs of dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys 
were not functioning properly. He will address the vague and confusing nature of the 
autopsy report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of 
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acute inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, it is not clear which surgical 
sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the tissue 
sections where harvested from on the patient. Dr. Kerr will render the opinion, more 
likely than not, that the gram negative bacterial rods, if they existed, were introduced into 
the patient's surgical site sometime after the procedure rather than being introduced 
during the procedure. He has never had a patient experience such an infection in all his 
years. , Dr. Kerr will testify that few of his patients who have undergone. a lipolysis 
procedure have ever experienced any kind of post-operative infection and none of those 
patients died and all of them were diagnosed based on clinical observation. These were 
limited cellulitis based on clinical suspicion and not based on a culture result. Dr. Kerr will 
explain that if the opinions of Dr. Dean Sorensen are valid, there should have. been other 
infections of patients before and after the procedure on Krystal Ballard, and there were 
not. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that when he saw the patient on July 23, two days post 
operatively, he did not observe any evidence of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. 
He will discuss how the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband 
and the military and that she was noncompliant with what she had been told both in 
writing and verbally about how to care for herself. He will discuss how the patient 
erroneously reported that she had fallen and injured her back and claimed this was the 
source· of her pain rather than admit she had cosmetic surgery performed. He will 
discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking her medications because she did not 
want proof of them to show up in any drug screen she might take with the military. He will 
also discuss how the patient admitted to engaging in act!vities she was told to refrain from 
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in order to allow her body time to heal. He will discuss his concern that the patient was 
not properly changing her bandages and caring for herself as instructed and how during 
any of these times would have been an opportunity for the bacteria in question to be 
introduced into her system. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that he and his employees followed the appropriate 
sterile technique in regards to the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. He will 
explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do everything 
right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced into the 
surgical site. He will discuss the patient's admission that she was not taking the narcotic 
pain medication Norco and was instead taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not 
appear to be providing the patient with adequate pain control. He will explain how the 
patient was not following the instructions on how to care for herself, change her 
bandages, and get appropriate rest. He will discuss the patient's disclosure that she had 
a PT exam in the military scheduled for a day or two after the procedure and Was told that 
she should not engage in that activity. He will discuss how the patient agreed to tell her 
husband that she had the cosmetic procedure done so he could help care for her, but 
then she failed to do so on multiple occasions. He will explain that when the patient 
showed up on July 21 to have the procedure she did not have someone present to drive 
her home as she was instructed to do. Dr. Kerr will discuss how he did not use a 
sedating drug with the patient and then observed her for a period of time after the 
procedure before allowing her to drive home and even offered to have a taxi take the 
patient home. 
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The patient was placed on 500 mg of Keflex per day for 10 days as of the 
July 23 visit. He would have removed the bandages in order to personally observe the 
area of the wound to check for signs and symptoms of infection. He will testify that the 
amount of bruising and edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would 
expect to see at that point postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did 
not require him to obtain a complete blood count on the patient on _July 23 in order to 
determine what her white count was at that time. He will discuss his training in 
performing liposuction he received from both John Lundeby and at the Keller Medical 
· Institute. He will discuss his experiences with and the differences between Smart Lipo, 
Ultrasonic liposuction and traditional liposuction. He will discuss his background, 
training and experience in the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique. 
He will discuss how this is an office based procedure which is not required to be 
performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order to perform 
such a procedure. He was not required, nor does·the standard of practice require that 
his facility be certified or approved by any accreditati~n facility such as the_ MACH or 
AAAASF. 
He will discuss how his procedure room is prepared for surgery, how the 
patient, himself, his assistant and the patient are all prepared for surgery and the sterile 
technique utilized. He will discuss the autoclave he uses, how it operates and how it 
helps him maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will testify that he was not 
required to test for spores or mold and that these issues have nothing to do with the case. 
He will discuss the areas around the patient which are considered part of the sterile field 
depending on the nature and type of .procedure at issue. He will discuss the operation 
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and use of the Vaser ultrasonic lipolysis machine utilized for the procedure in this case. 
' 
He will explain how the tumescent lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the 
patient. He will explain how the Vaser procedure is done with the device in place under 
the skin without direct visualization. He will discuss how -he harvested 400 cc of fat from 
the patient's anterior abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of · 
fat from ·the patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this case 
was utilized for less than eleven minutes despite the fact the patient was in the procedure 
room for around four" hours. He will discuss the different cannulas used to aspirate the 
fat and the artistic technique required to accomplish the desired aesthetic outcome. 
He will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle 
and syringe and that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection 
phase of the procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for 
the same needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the 
patient. He will discuss his informed consent discussion with the patient including the . 
contents of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. He will 
discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis and fat 
injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with .the patient 
both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they fail to 
comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will develop 
complications. He wi~I discuss and interpret the entries in his medical recorqs. 
Dr. Kerr will render his opinions consistent with the requirements of Idaho 
Code §6-1012 and 6-1013. In this regard, he will challenge the foundation as well as 
rebut the opinions of the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of 
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consent, he will testify that he discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the 
' risks notmally attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by 
the patient was valid in all respects consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code 
§39-4506. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss his preoperative clinical 
examination in-eluding evaluation of the regions to be lipo-contoured including review for 
hernias,· scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, the quality of the skin and its 
elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location of fat deposits. He will 
rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that he improperly performed the lipolysis 
procedure, the fat injection procedure, that he improperly sterilized his equipment or that 
he did <:3nything to cause the patient's death. Depending on the testimony of Dr. Dean 
Sorensen at trial, Dr. Kerr may offer testimony on and descriptive of the fact that Dr. 
Sorensen is a competitor of his and advertises his belief that non-plastic surgeons should 
not do liposuction, such as his website that states "unfortunately, there are a number of 
procedures being performed by physicians who are not trained in plastic surgery. These 
non-plastic surgeons often utilize technologies that have catchy names and are 
expensive but in clinical trials have not shown any significant improvement over the 
standard tumescent liposuction techniques. Patients are advised to select a procedure 
that is safe and effective based on scientific results performed by a Board Certified plastic 
surgeon and to ignore the marketing hype so common today." Depending on the proof 
submitted at trial and the testimony of Dr. Sorensen and/or the tenor or implication of his 
testimony and opinions, Dr. Kerr may describe the lawsuit against Dr. Sorensen in Boise 
that resulted in the jury rendering a verdict of malpractice against him and assessing 
damages of a substantial amount against him. Dr. Kerr may testify that Dr. Sorensen has 
l 
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never observed or seen the operating procedures of his, including his sterile techniques, 
use of instruments, disinfectant matters and the way he performed the procedures on 
Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Kerr will testify 
that he had the best interests of the patient in mind and that he was committed to the 
rendition of his services in full compliance with the applicable local standard of health care 
practice and his experience and capability. He will testify that even in hindsight the patient 
did not present with any increased risk for infection that would have raised any concern 
about her undergoing the procedures on July 21, 2010. At the time of Dr. Kerr's 
procedure on July 21, 2010, there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal 
Ballard and Dr. Kerr will opine that Krystal Ballard was not suffering from a urinary tract 
infection on July 21, 2010. 
Data and other information considered and summary of 
qualifications: In forming his opinions, Dr. Kerr has relied upon his own unique training 
and experience as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of anesthesia 
and cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 in treating, diagnosing, managing and 
caring for patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of 
.other cosmetic surgeons and care providers, his knowledge that it is within his specialty 
and capability to perform the procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, 
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his interactions with cosmetic providers, and his membership and participation in various 
medical, associations, including those in the state of Idaho. The data upon which his 
opinions are based include his medical education, training, skill, experience, his 
experience practicing cosmetic surgery within Boise, his review of the care and treatment 
. . 
experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the course of his career in 
medicine in Boise. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss the ability, competence and proficiency of Brianna Kerr 
as a surgical assistant and the manner in which she maintains sterile conditions for 
surgeries, and the fact that she did nothing in the surgery of Krystal Ballard that would 
create or contribute to an infection. 
His opinions are also based upon the findings of various other health care 
providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies and other 
testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and recommendations 
for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and interactions before, 
during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all medical records, 
affidavits, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Kerr's professional 
background and qualifications were discussed in his deposition and are incorporated 
herein. As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, he 
has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including his own, his 
employees, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered his medical 
records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance Service; Life Flight, 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's Office and the 
Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure_. In the event further depositions or medical records 
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are produced, they will also be considered. Dr. Kerr will explain the weight changes of 
Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 25, 2010 at Elmore 
Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 she weighed 180 
pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these changes in weight. 
At Elmore Medical Center, July 25, 2010, the treating physician evaluated 
the butt~cks and abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no 
redness, warmth or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 
% hours after admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. 
Alphonsus on·July 25, 2010, central venous press1:1re was measured at 20 which is very 
high and proof of fluid overlaid. Dr. Kerr will explain these factors and their relative 
significance in terms of the possible reasons for the death of Krystal Ballard .. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center and 
the clinical findings are indicative of a developing urinary tract infection or abnormalities 
that developed after his procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact 
present at autopsy in certain locations, they came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard 
or her intestinal tract and were not introduced during his surgical procedure. Bacteria was 
found in the urinalysis at Elmore. 
It is expected that Dr. Kerr will explain pertinent anatomy, infectious 
processes, pathophysiology of infections, nidus for infections, gram negative rods, types 
of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were negative for growth, 
antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard regarding. what drugs 
would show up on drug test by the Air Force. He will also explain the post-surgery matters 
he undertook and his efforts to assist Krystal Ballard, including the importance of the 
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post-treatment instructions given to Krystal Ballard as denoted in his medical records and 
the evidence that is consistent with non-compliance by Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Kerr reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Kerr reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth in this 
disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded broadly in 
order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. Dr. Kerr has 
not testified in any matter in the last four years. He is not a retained expert. His 
curriculum vitae was previously produced and is incorporated by this reference. 
2) Gregory Laurence, M.D. 
Germantown Aesthetics 
7475 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, Tennessee 38138 
(901) 624-5605 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Laurence is a physician licensed 
in the state of Tennessee to practice medicine and surgery.· Dr. Laurence is board 
certified in both family practice and laser surgery and has engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Laurence will .testify as a 
retained expert witness at the trial. Dr. Laurence will testify that he has actual knowledge 
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of the standard of health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion D·r. Kerr met 
such standard taking into account Dr. Kerr's background, training, experience and field of 
medical specialization with respect to any and all medical services rendered to the 
patient., 
Dr. Laurence will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Laurence's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed physician, his experiences in the peer 
review process associated with his hospital staff privileges at Baptist Memorial Ho'spital 
and St. Francis Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, his experience of having performed 
hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures 
like liposuction and fat transfers were performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in 
pe.rforming a large volume of liposuction and fat transf~r procedures, his knowledge of 
how the Vaser ultrasonic liposuction procedure is performed, how fat tran~fers/grafting 
procedures are p·erformed, his· knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments 
needed to perform the nature and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his 
knowledge of the scope of practice of cosmetic providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, Idaho and 
elsewhere, his knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform cosmetic 
procedures like the ones at issue in this case and his knowledge of the manner and 
method by which surgical equipment and surgical procedure facilities are maintained in a 
sterile fashion. As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also explain his training and 
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experien.ce at the University of Tennessee during his residency in family practice in 
1992-95 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the procedures he performed, was 
taught and observed. He will explain the same matters for his experience in his own 
aesthetics surgical center which he operates in Germantown, Tennessee from 2003 to 
the present. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the standard of health care practice er:nployed at 
his own surgical facility in Tennessee for achieving sterile operating conditions and the 
disinfection of instruments and equipment and maintaining a sterile operative field and 
that the similar actions and efforts undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been described for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard in this case were used and exceeded in his opinion. Dr. 
Laurence will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his deposition and 
discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility an~ are essentially 
zero, wi~.h possibly one or two_ minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated.successfully 
with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how this is evidence that the 
sterility procedures employed by the Defendants in this case were appropriate and 
working properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that during his professional career he has been 
acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic procedures that are not 
plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds 
including: family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and . . 
gynecol"ogy. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic.surgery by 
various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. Dr. Laurence has become acquainted 
with the nature and scope of the practice of these other cosmetic procedure providers and 
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the procedures utilized by them in this specialty, including the procedures .utilized for 
maintaining a sterile field and how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment 
and instruments utilized for cosmetic procedures including the procedures at issue in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health care practice for plastic 
surgeons is not the standard of health care practice in the same medical specialty as his 
and Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had proper training and 
experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal Ballard. As part of his 
testimony, he is expected to refer to the publications, data and documents that have been 
produced in discovery on this subject and explain the numbers of similar procedures he 
has performed. Dr. Laurence will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard 
of health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected or 
approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. He will 
testify that he was not required to test for spores or mold and that these issues have 
nothing .to do with the case. 
During Dr. Laurence's professional career he has received specific training 
in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and ultrasonic assisted 
lipolysis. He will testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of training obtained 
by Dr. Kerr and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to 
perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. Dr. Laurence 
will testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these types of 
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procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was appropriate for the 
procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based 
setting without general anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, equipment and 
personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health 
care practice. Dr. Laurence will testify that he possesses the professional knowledge 
and experience that allows him to express the opinion and testimony described in this 
document. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the fact this patient experienced a 
post-operative complication like the one alleged in this case which resulted in a patient 
death does not establish that the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will 
testify that postoperative infections are not proof of a violation. He will render the opinion 
. 
that the patient's death was not due to any error or omission on Dr. Kerr's part or the part 
of anyone associated with his practice. He will discuss his own sterilization techniques, 
training and experience in this area which will help support his opinion that Dr. Kerr 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard; starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He .will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
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but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in 
regards to the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the 
surgical technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer 
procedures did not cause or result in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. 
Laurence actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and will express all 
opinions stated herein on a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the specific issues set forth in this 
disclosure, but he will also testify globally that nothing Dr. Kerr elected to do or not do with 
respect to the medical services provided to Krystal Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the 
applicable local standard of health care practice which in turn caused or contributed to 
any damages or injuries to the patient. Dr. Laurence will testify that the unfortunate death 
of Krystal Ballard was not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the standard of health care practic~ applicable 
to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Laurence will testify regarding his various publications, honors and university 
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~ppointments as set forth in his curriculum vitae which is hereby incorporated as if set 
forth in full. He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide him with 
opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field ~f cosmetic 
surgery including his affiliations with the American Institute of Ultrasound Medicine, the 
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the American Society of Cosmetic 
Breast Surgeons, and the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians. 
Dr. Laurence will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, 
Dr. Laurence will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 
2010 with respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and 
any deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if 
set forth in full. Dr. Laurence holds the opinion and will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the 
records and deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was 
ever warranted or represented to this patient. 
Dr. Laurence will explain how the standard of practice applicable includes, 
as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of 
science· which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. He will 
render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate post-operative instructions and 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 28 
000317
properly followed the patient and communicated with her and her family. Dr. Laurence 
will be prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why Dr. Kerr's 
care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all 
operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. La.urence will 
explain that post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized 
risk factor that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care 
practice by the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, 
infections can and do occur. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice 
and information to Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. Dr. 
Laurence will explain that everything undertaken by Dr. Kerr in his care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the standard of health care 
practice, based on the class of health care provider to which Dr. Kerr belonged and in 
which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health 
care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged and evaluated in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, taking i~to account 
his training, experience and field of medical specialization and not by a plastic surgeon 
which Plaintiff is unfairly trying to do in this case. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss his training and the 
certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. 
Kerr. He will discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's 
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medical records and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. 
Kerr's documented conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Laurence will 
discuss and explain to the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be 
used to improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less . 
needed (usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will 
explain how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site 
being treated. He will explain how before the removal procedure begins the areas from 
where the fat is being removed are injected with a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize 
bruising and discomfort to the pati_ent. He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or 
fat is freed and ultimately removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small 
incision in the patient's skin. 
· Dr. Laurence will discuss and describe how the adipose ·tissue is then 
prepared to be re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the 
' 
desired area using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He 
will render the opinion that the manner, method and volume by which Dr. Kerr re-injected 
the adipose tissue back into the patient was appropriate in all respects. He will explain 
how some of th~ fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume over time, which 
is often addressed by the physician having to re-inject more adipose tissue into a specific 
location to achieve the desired end aesthetic result. He will explain how the fat transfer 
procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was consistent with the local 
standard of practice given the nature and extent of the procedure. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the entries in Dr. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Laurence will also discus's Dr. Kerr's 
operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, the 
patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at the 
post-operative visit with the patient. He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's 
post-operative discussions, instructions and directions shared with the patient and then 
ultimately the discussions he had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Laurence will 
explain that Krystal Ballard appeared to be in good health and without a urinary tract 
infection before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and there is no evidence that she had a 
urinary tract infection and that the pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the technical aspects of the Vase~ liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, and 
the amount of traction applied to free the adipose tissue. From his unique perspective as 
a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Laurence will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction 
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procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the cannula back and forth in order to 
feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result which varies depen~ing on the 
location of the procedure and the body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. 
In the process of providing his opinions that the care by Dr. Kerr was 
appropriate, Dr. Laurence will also explain the manner and method by which the adipose 
tissue harveste.d was then drained and prepared for reinjection. He will also discuss how 
the instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each procedure, 
he will discuss these pieces of equipment as well as their various attachments as well as 
describing the medical equipment which is new versus that which must be re-sterilized for 
reuse between patients and/or procedures. Dr. Laurence will discuss the pre and 
post-operative antibiotics administered by Dr. Kerr to the patient and explain why they 
were appropriate medications to give to the patient as a prophylaxis against infection. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
per the medical records and deposition testimony. He will discuss the expected 
localized pain patients can expect to experience following a fat transfer procedure. To 
the extent it becomes relevant to aid in expressing his favorable opinions, Dr. Laurence 
may also discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did not have any fever 
or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus or other signs of active 
drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling or signs of a rash or change 
in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked 
for and then properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during 
his postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and 
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her family prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point 
did the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, nor did the standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a different course of 
medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, 
Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods and the fact that such 
organisms do not exist on or in the skin, nor would they be found on surgical instruments. 
Instead, they represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of 
a patient. He will testify that Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform 
the surgeries in question, that Dr. Kerr's medical records contain an adequate description 
of the care rendered and the discussions with the patient, that Dr. Kerr implemented 
appropriate sterility techniques and conditions for surgery and that he used correct 
solutions for cleaning and disinfecting instruments and assuring that operative conditions 
were adequately sterile to guard against the risk of infection. He will testify that 
postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions which are not the 
subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are impossible to 
prevent. 
To the extent the surgical selection is questioned or needs further 
explanation at trial, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to discuss why the Vaser procedure is 
an appropriate method of removing unwanted adipose tissue in a patient like Krystal 
Ballard. As part of his testimony and in order to expand upon his background and 
experience in cosmetic surgery, Dr. Laurence may offer testimony explaining how the 
field of laser lipolysis with the use of tumescent anesthesia has developed in recent years. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES- 33 
000322
This may include testimony addressing that when considering different types of the body 
for lipolysis that each area has its own unique geography and involves a degree of 
physician judgment as to how much material to remove and/or re-inject into each location. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to explain the positioning of the 
patient, incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, choice of 
instruments, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient expectations, 
and patient education and counseling from the informed consent phase through the 
postoperative follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical 
illustrations as well as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at 
issue including those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies 
produced to date. 
As part of his testimony, he will explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels.· This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
With the use of exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then 
inserted into the body through small incisions. He will explain how by way of using a 
resonating high ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while 
leaving blood vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix 
with the tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using gentle suction. After 
the surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin 
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retraction, smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to traditional 
liposuction. 
Dr. Laurence may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his e~planation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area, the 
instructions given to the patient, he ·will discuss the cardinal signs of an infection and how 
Dr. Kerr's records and deposition evidence that he specifically and appropriately 
evaluated and questioned the patient and then documented in his records regarding 
these is~ues on each enc6unter he had with the patient. He will discuss the amount of 
time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that there was nothing usual or out 
of character regarding the amount of time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. 
As outlined above, Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge of the various 
cosmetic organizations to which he belongs and/or' has knowledge of, what they offer 
their members and the opportunities to associate with colleagues and obtain continuing 
education in this emerging field. Dr. Laurence will explain the adequacy of the 
postoperative evaluation Dr. Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal 
Ballard and assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical 
sites, including absence of any abnormal odor or other evidence or suggestion of 
infection of any of the surgical sites. 
He will discuss his review and comments of the autopsy record and the 
patient's subsequent treatment records. By way of example, Dr. Laurence is expected to 




discuss the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus R~gional 
Medical Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in 
her urine. Based on his experience in family practice, he will render the opinion that this 
laboratory finding is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious 
process located within the patient's bladder. He will explain how the bladder is also an 
• 
area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist in the face of an 
,' ! 
infection.· 
Dr. Laurence will also comment upon the significance from his perspective 
regarding how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC count of 14.7. 
He will. discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery, stress and 
dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address the 
patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any microscopic 
examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in the positive 
UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. He is also expected to 
discuss.the patient's elevated creatinine and how this can be signs of dehydration as well 
as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were not functioning properly. 
Dr. Laurence will address the vague and confusing nature of the autopsy 
' 
report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of acute 
inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which 
surgical sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the 
tissue sections where harvested from on the p~tient. Dr. Laurence will render the 
opinion, more likely than not, that the gram negative bacterial rods were introduced into 
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the patient's surgical site sometime after Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure rather than being 
introduced during the procedure. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncom pliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging position the patient elected to place herself and her health 
care provider in by erroneously reporting to her husband that she had simply fallen and 
injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain rather than admit she 
had cosmetic surgery performed. 
In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she wa~ not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to ?isobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability to provide her with care _and 
to make decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportu_nity for the bacteria in question to ~e introduced into her system. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that Dr. Kerr and his employees followed the 
appropriate sterile technique in regards to the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
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He will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique a·nd that one can do 
everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced 
into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods claimed to have been 
identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. He will discuss the patient's 
admission that she was not taking the narcotic pain medication Norco and was instead 
taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not appear to be providing the patient with 
adequate pain control. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and 
edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would expect to see at that point 
postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to 
obtain a complete blood count on the patient on July 23 in order to determine what her 
white count was at that time. He will discuss his background, training and experience in 
' 
the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique in his practice in order to lay a 
foundation for his opinions as to the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's sterile technique. Dr. 
Laurence will discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which 
are not required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required 
in order to perform such procedures. Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr 
was not required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his 
facility be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the AAACH or 
AAAASF or any governmental agency. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's 
procedure room was properly prepared for surgery and to protect and P,reserve an 
appropriate sterile field. He will discuss the autoclave at issue, how it operates and how 
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it helps Dr. Kerr maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will discuss the areas 
around the patient which are considered part of the sterile field depending on the nature 
and type of procedure at issue. He will discuss the operation and use of the Vaser 
ultrasonic lipolysis machine utilized for the procedure in this case. He will explain how 
the tumescent lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain 
how the Vaser procedure is done with the device in place under the skin without direct 
visualization. He will discuss how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat 
from the patient's anterior abdomen, 200 cc offat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 
cc of fat from the patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this 
case was utilized for less than eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the 
nature of the procedure. 
As it relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiff's experts, Dr. Laurence 
will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and 
that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection phase of the 
procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for the same 
needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. He 
will discuss the adequacy of the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient 
including the content of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. 
He will discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis 
and fat injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the 
patient both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they 
fail to comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will 
develop complications. 
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Dr. Laurence will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of 
the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, he will testify 
that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the risks normally 
attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by the patient was 
valid in all respects. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. 
Kerr's preoperative clinical examination including evaluation of the regions to be 
lipo-contoured including review for hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, 
the quality of the skin and its elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location 
of fat deposits. He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr improperly 
sterilized his equipment or that Dr. Kerr did anything to cause the patient's death. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also address and explain the 
weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 
25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 
she weighed 180 pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these 
changes in weight. He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore 
Medical Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks 
and abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, 
warmth or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours 
after admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. Alphonsus 
on July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very high and 
proof offluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on causation, Dr. Laurence 
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will explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of the possible reasons 
for the death of Krystal Balfard. 
Dr. La!Jrence will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medi~al Center 
and the ·clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection the developed after his 
. . 
procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or her intestinal tract 
and were not introduced during his surgical procedure. As part of his testimony, it is 
expected that Dr. Laurence will explain pertinent anatomy, infectious processes, 
pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram negative rods, types of 
bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were negative for growth, 
antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard regarding that drugs 
would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Laurence will 
testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not present with any increased risk 
for infection that would have raised any concern about her undergoing the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's procedure on July 21, 2010, 
there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal .Ballard. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
•. 
forming his opinions, Dr. Laurence has relied upon his own unique training and 
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experience as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery 
in Tennessee in treating, diagnosing, managing and caring for patients like Krystal 
. -
Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of other cosmetic surgeons and care 
providers, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 
2010 and his knowledge that it is within Dr. Kerr's specialty and capability to perform the 
procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, and his membership and 
participation in various medical associations and organizations as set forth herein. The 
data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, training, skill, 
experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the care and 
treat~ent experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the course of his 
career in medicine. 
Dr. Laurence's opinions are also based upon the findings of various other 
health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
' . 
_interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr .. Laurence's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has: considered and reviewed the depositions takeri to date including Dr. Kerr's, 
employees of Silk Touch, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and co~sidered Dr. 
Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance 
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Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's 
Office and the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or 
. . 
medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Laurence reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Laurence reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial 
will depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of 
the Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. 
3) Charles Garrison, M.D. 
P.O. Box 4226 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
208.891.8505 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, causation, damages and the care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Garrison is a physician licensed 
by the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Garrison has engaged in the 
. 
medical specialty of forensic pathology at all times relevant herein which he practices in 
Pocatello and Boise, Idaho. Dr. Garrison will testify as a retained expert witness at the 
trial and his testimony will address the issue of the cause of the patient's death. Part of 
the basis for Dr. Garrison's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice 
and experience in performing forensic pathology and in determining disease processes 
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as well as the cause of death of patients like Krystal Ballard as part of his regular practice 
of medicine. 
Dr. Garrison will render opinions which refute and rebut the opinions, 
conclusions and methodology advanced by Plaintiff's experts including the opinions of 
George Nichols, M.D. and Keith Armitage, M.D. who claim that the· bacterial infection 
which the patient died from was a direct result of bacteria introduced during the July 21, 
2010 procedure and who further claim that the presence of gram negative rods are proof 
of a breach in sterility by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' experts contend that the toxic 
shock and multisystem organ failure which the patient suffered from occurred as a result 
of contaminated equipment of the Defendants. Dr. Garrison, who has viewed and 
analyzed the medical and autopsy records as well as the tissue pathology slides from the 
post mortem examination, will refute these opinions at trial. 
Dr. Garrison will render his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. Dr. Garrison's medical specialty, training, experience and knowledge enable 
him to render the opinions expressed in this document, which includes the :subjects of 
bacteria, bacterial infections, virus, gram negative rods, types of bacteria that embrace 
gram negative rods, the presence and location of gram negative rods, sepsis, toxic shock, 
cause of death of patients from sepsis and toxic shock and bacteria that inhabit the skin, 
urinary tract and bowel. He will testify that the presence of gram negative bacteria in the 
wounds of Krystal Ballard, are by no means proof to a reasonable medical certainty, that 
a breach in sterility occurred in the surgical procedure. He will explain that although the 
patient's death involved gram negative sepsis, to contend as Plaintiffs' experts do, that 
the etiology of her sepsis was a primary infection of the wound which occurred as a result 
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of a bre~ch in sterility, is to ignore the medical facts of the case, and wound infections in 
general. 
He will testify that for Plaintiffs' experts to state that there are no other 
reasons for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria introduced 
intraoperatively during the procedure as a result of contaminated equipment, is to ignore 
the process of postoperative wound infections, their etiology, the facts of this case, the 
patient's presenting symptoms and treatment course, how wounds are evaluated to 
determine the presence or absence of an infection and the routes by which they occur. 
In this regard, Dr. Garrison will explain post-operative wound infections and compare 
them to other infectious processes, including those associated with the patient's urinary 
track bacteria and abno'rmal urinalysis. 
He will testify regarding how infections become septic. He will render the 
opinion that the sepsis which led to the septic shock and multi-system organ failure was 
caused by the patient's primary infection which was the urinary track, not any wound 
infection as alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. In this regard, he may also discuss the fluid 
retention and weight gain of the patient in the days prior to her death associated with her 
organ failure, but yet there was never any overt signs of the patient having any wound 
infection at the locations of the fat transfer or liposuction. The presence of gram negative 
bacteria in the surgical wound(s) of Krystal Ballard is simply proof of their presence, but 
by no means is it proof that they arrived there by or through the surgical procedure of Dr. 
Kerr. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Garrison will explain the difference between a 
primary versus a secondary infection and how it relates to the onset of sepsis in a patient 
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like Krystal Ballard. He will render the opinion that the patient's sepsis and subsequent 
septic shock and death were not proximately caused by any bacteria introduced into the 
operative field during Dr. Kerr's July 21, 2010 liposuction and fat transfer procedure. He 
will testify that Dr. Nichols conclusions are not only medically flawed and inaccurate, but 
they fail to take into consideration any other diagnostic evaluation that might have been 
done to further define the etiology of the infection, and reach such a conclusion with 
proper and appropriate medical investigation. 
He will testify that the most that can be said about the presence of gram 
negative bacteria allegedly found in the wounds of Krystal Ballard at autopsy is simply 
that it is proof of their presence at that location - which location cannot be determined for 
certainty since the tissue samples were not labeled as to precise location. He will testify 
that such a bacterial finding at autopsy is by no means definitive proof to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that the gram negative organism, whatever it was, arrived 
there by or through the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr, nor does such a finding 
at autopsy establish that the patient's death was due to any breach in sterility or cleaning 
protocol of any of the equipment, instruments or facility within the Silk Touch Med Spa 
facility. 
Dr. Garrison will testify that he would expect to see gram positive organisms 
populate the site of the operative wound if in fact the sepsis was due to a skin infection 
caused by a breach in sterility as alleged. He will explain how in this case the presence 
of the gram negative organisms represented a secondary process to the patient's 
ongoing urinary tract infection. In this regard, he will explain the process by which a 
urinary tract infection can lead to sepsis in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will testify 
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that he has not seen a circumstance wherein a gram negative rod resulted in sepsis, 
septic shock followed by the death of the patient. 
He will testify that the autopsy. conducted in this case did not identify any 
specific organism. He will discuss how in most cases of a postoperative surgical wound 
infection, that he generally observes signs and symptoms of infection due to a breach in 
sterility within two to three days of surgery which did not occur in this case. He will 
discuss how the evidence in this case demonstrates that both Dr. Graben, Dr. Kerr, the 
patient's husband and the patient prior to her death all describe a patient and an operative 
site whi.ch is not grossly infected at any time, even at autopsy. He will testify that the 
absence of evidence of any gross infection at the surgical site is wholly inconsistent with it 
having caused the patient's death as Plaintiffs' experts contend. In. this regard, Dr. 
Garrison will discuss the cardinal signs of infection ·and how the patient presented without 
evidence of any fever and without evidence of any warmth, redness or drainage to the 
wound site. He will discuss and explain the significance of such a finding. 
He will testify that there is nothing from the autopsy, the depositions, the 
medica! records or the death of the patient which establish to any reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that' there was any breach of sterility in this case. He will discuss the 
• 
autopsy report including the fact that the tissue samples do not identify with any degree of 
specificity where they were taken from which further compounds the relevance of the 
finding ,of gram negative rods. He will testify that Plaintiffs' experts cannot state to any 
degree of medical certainty that the mere presence of gram negative organisms was in 
any way caused by, evidence of, or the result of a breach in sterility or cleaning protocol 
by any of the Defendants or their employees. In the opinion of Dr. Garrison, it is most 
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probable, which means to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the gram 
negative bacteria came from the bowel or urinary tract of Krystal Ballard where they 
reside and that their presence was not due to their being introduced during the procedure 
by Dr. Kerr. 
As further support for his opinions, he will discuss the significance of the fact 
that there were not any other postoperative infections reported or experienced by any 
patient who was seen at the Silk Touch Med Spa before or since this patient's procedure 
and how this is further evidence that the sterilization procedures at the facility were 
adequate to maintain a proper sterile field. As part of his testimony, he will discuss how 
the process of sterilization work~ and how bacteria are eliminated by various cleaning 
processes and how there is not just one approved way to maintain a sterile field. As part 
of his testimony, he may also discuss hoyv different types of bacteria are susceptible to 
different cleaning techniques, temperature and/or antibiotics. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Garrison will discuss different types ·of bacteria, 
how bacteria multiply, how they react to different parts of the human body, where they 
normally live in t~e human body, how they are identified _in various standard tests, how the 
body fights off and/or responds to and/or relies upon different types of bacteria, where 
various types of bacteria normally reside within and on the human body, how different 
kinds of gram negative bacteria organisms are known to reside within the human urinary 
tract and bowels as well as within fecal matter. 
For purpose~ of explaining his testimony he is expected to discuss general 
anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as 
the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. He may 
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discuss how antibiotics are able to travel throughout the body, how infection within certain 
types of tissue can be harder to treat depending on the vascularity of the area of the 
infection (such as treating localized infections in fatty tissue versus in muscle) and 
whether or not an infection is localized versus systemic. It is expected that Dr. Garrison 
will use during his testimony demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy and/or 
pictures of the patient and/or of the bacteria. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Garrison has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of forensic pathology, in 
evaluating laboratory results, tissue samples, autopsy records, consultations with other 
physicians and otherwise managing and identification of bacterial disease processes in 
patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits, customs and practice 
experiences of other forensic pathologists who address medical situations like those 
presented in this case, and his membership and participation in various medical 
associations, including those in the state of Idaho. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical, education, 
training,, skill, experience, his experience practicing forensic pathology, his review of the 
care and treatment of the patient by Dr. Kerr and others, and his review and consideration 
of the depositions and discovery responses taken and/or disclosed to date in this case. 
His opinions are also based upon the findings of various other health care providers for 
the patient, the results and values of various laboratory and infectious disease studies 
and other testing· and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
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interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Garrison's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae, 
which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
As part of his review, he has had available to review and consider the 
medical records of Silk Touch Med Spa, Dr. Brian Kerr, the records of Elmore Medical 
Center, Elmore Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
the Ada County Coroner's Office and portions of the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. 
In the event further depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be made 
available to this witness for consideration. 
Dr. Garrison reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Garrison reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with the law. The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend ,to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden 
has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to 
respond. 
4) Thomas Coffman, M.D. 
125 East Idaho, Suite 203 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, causation, damages and the care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
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Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Coffman is a physician licensed 
by the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Coffman is engaged in the 
medical specialty of infectious disease at all times relevant herein which he practices in 
Boise, Idaho. Dr. Coffman will testify as a retained expert witness at the trial and his 
testimony will address the issue of the cause of the patient's death and the fact that death 
did not ~esult from the events of the procedure of Dr. Kerr. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Coffman's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in infectious diseases and in determining disease and infectious processes as well as the 
cause of death of patients like Krystal Ballard as part of his regular practice of medicine. 
Dr. Coffman will render opinions which refute and rebut the opinions, 
conclusions and methodology advanced by Plaintiff's experts including the opinions of 
George Nichols, M.D. and Keith Armitage, M.D. who claim that the bacterial infection 
which the patient died from was a direct result of bacteria introduced during the July 21, 
2010 procedure and who further claim that the presence of gram negative rods are proof 
of a breach in sterility by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' experts contend that the toxic 
shock and multisystem organ failure which the patient suffered from occurred as a result 
of contaminated equipment of the Defendants. Dr. Coffman, who has viewed and 
analyzed the medical and autopsy records as well as the tissue pathology slides from the 
post mortem examination, will refute these opinions at trial. 
Counsel for the Defendants have requested access to blood samples, 
tissue samples and gram stained samples from the autopsy which are to be evaluated by 
Dr. Coffman and other defense experts, however, as of the writing of this disclosure, only 
the tissue sample slides have been produced by the Coroner's office. Arrangements are 
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still being made and the defense is still waiting to receive both the gram stained slides and 
the blood samples for further evaluation and testing. As a result, Dr. Coffman is unable 
to complete his work on this matter thus far. The opinions of Dr. Coffman which are 
known t.hus far are set forth herein and it is expected that additional opinions· will be 
. ' 
supplemented once the missing materials identified above have been made available for 
review. 
Dr. Coffman will render his opinions on a more probable than not basis 
which is to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Dr. Coffman's medical specialty, 
training, experience and knowledge enable him to render the opinions expressed in this 
document, which includes the subjects of bacteria, bacterial infections, virus, tissue 
types, gram negative versus gram positive rods, types of bacteria that embrace gram 
negative and gram positive rods, the presence and location of gram negative versus gram 
positive. rods and the methodologies for reviewing each, sepsis, toxic shock, cause of 
death of patients from sepsis and toxic shock and identification and type of bacteria that 
reside and inhabit the skin, urinary tract and bowel. 
He will testify that Dr. Kerr was not required to test for spores ~r mold and 
that these issues have nothing to do with the case. Dr. Coffman will discuss other 
disease processes which are known to cause a rapid patient death such as occurred in 
this case. He will discuss how infections lead to sepsis and toxic shock. He will testify 
that based on his view of the tissue slides that he sees evidence of white blood cells which 
can be evidence of the reparative process following surgery. He will testify as to why he 
believes the blood cultures were negative as well as what the various components of a 
complete blood count mean to him as an expert in infectious disease. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will discuss where gram negative 
versus gram positive bacteria are known to reside in the body. He will testify that gram 
negative bacteria do not reside on or in the skin, but instead reside within the urinary tract 
and bowel. He will testify that even if gram negative bacteria were observed in any of the 
tissue samples that this does not rule out that the patient may well have had an ongoing 
infection in another area of her body such as her urinary tract. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will testify that he has substantial 
experience in identifying bacteria and other cellular structures and organisms in tissue 
sample~ obtained from the human body. He will testify that he is regularly called upon in 
his specialty in infectious disease to make such determinations and that he is capable of 
identifying the differences between a gram negative versus a gram positive bacteria on 
' 
properly prepared slides as well as being able to further classify and define specific 
species of bacteria and other organisms and cellular structures within the human body. 
Dr. Coffman will render the opinion that based on his review of the materials 
to date that any sepsis, toxic shock or other infectious process suffered by the patient was 
not caused by or in any way due to a lack of sterility or failure to properly clean and 
maintain the equipment and/or sterile field by Dr. Kerr and/or his office staff. · 
He will rebut the Plaintiffs' experts wherein they opine that there are no 
other reasons for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria 
introduced intraoperatively during the procedure as a result of contaminated equipment. 
In this regard, he will discuss the process of postoperative wound infections, their 
etiology, the facts of this case, the patient's presenting symptoms and treatment course, 
how wounds are evaluated to determine the presence or absence of an infection and the 
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routes by which they occur. In this regard, Dr. Coffman will explain post-operative 
wound infections and compare them to other infectious processes to the extent not 
otherwise discussed by other defense experts. 
He will testify regarding how various infections can lead to the condition 
known as sepsis. He will render the opinion that the sepsis which allegedly led to the 
septic shock and multi-system organ failure was caused by the patient's primary infection 
which was not a wound infection as alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. As part of his 
testimony, Dr. Coffman will explain th~ difference between a primary versus a secondary 
infection and how it relates to the onset of sepsis in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will 
render the opinion that the patient's sepsis and subsequent septic shock and death 
cannot be blamed on Dr. Kerr's July 21, 2010 liposuction and fat transfer procedure. 
He will testify that Dr. Nichols conclusions are not only medically flawed and 
. . 
inaccurate, but they fail to take into consideration any other diagnostic evaluation that 
might have been done to further define the etiology of the infection, and reach such a 
conclusion with proper and appropriate medical investigation. Even assuming arguendo 
as to the findings by Dr. Graben, Dr. Coffman will testify that the most that can be said 
about the presence of gram negative bacteria allegedly found in the wounds of Krystal 
Ballard at autopsy is simply that it is proof of their presence at that location - which 
location cannot be determined for certainty since the tissue samples were not labeled as 
to precise location. 
Dr. Coffman will testify that such a bacterial finding at autopsy, is by no 
means definitive proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the gram negative 
organism arrived there by or through the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr, nor 
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does such a finding at autopsy establish that the patient's death was due to any breach in 
sterility or cleaning protocol of any of the equipment, instruments or facility within the Silk 
Touch Med Spa facility. 
Dr. Coffman will testify that he would expect to see gram positive organisms 
populate the site of the operative wound if in fact the patient's sepsis was due to a skin 
infection caused by a breach in sterility as alleged. Dr. Coffman will discuss and explain 
the process by which a urinary tract infection can lead to sepsis in a patient like Krystal 
Ballard. He will testify that he has not seen a circumstance wherein a gram negative rod 
resulted in sepsis, septic shock followed by the death of the patient. It is the opinion of Dr. 
Coffman that the infectious process of Krystal Ballard, as stated in the autopsy report, 
came from bacteria from her urinary tract or bowel that developed after the procedure of 
Dr. Kerr. 
He will testify that the autopsy conducted in this case failed to identify any 
specific org~nism. He will discuss how the evidence in this case demonstrates that both 
Dr. Graben, Dr. Kerr, the patient's husband and the patient prior to her death all describe 
a patient and an operative site which was not grossly infected at any time. He will testify 
that the absence of evidence of any gross infection at the surgical site is inconsistent with 
such an alleged infection as having caused the patient's death as Plaintiffs' experts 
contend. In this regard, Dr. Coffman will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how 
the patient presented without evidence of any fever and without evidence of any warmth, 
redness or drainage to the wound site. He will discuss and explain the significance of 
such a finding. 
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He will testify that there is nothing from the autopsy, the depositions, the 
medical records or the death of the patient which establish to any reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that there was any breach of sterility in this case and that the 
conclusions stated by the Plaintiff's experts on this topic are without a factual basis in the 
record. He will discuss the autopsy report, the photos, blood tests, tissue samples and 
gram staining. He will testify that Plaintiffs' experts cannot state to any degree of medical 
certainty that the mere presence of gram negative organisms were in any way the result 
of a bre~ch in sterility or cleaning protocol by any of the Defendants or their employees. 
As further support for his opinions, he will discuss the significance of the fact that there 
were not any other postoperative infections reported or experienced by any patient who 
was seen at the Silk Touch Med Spa before or since this patient's procedure and how this 
is further evidence that the sterilization procedures at the facility were adequate to 
maintain a proper sterile field. He will render the opinion that for the patient to have 
suffered from an infection due to a breach in sterility caused by any failure in the cleaning 
and sanitizing protocol of the defendants, that one would expect to see substantial 
evidence of other contaminated equipment related postoperative infections which there 
are none of in this case. 
From his unique perspective as an expert in infectious disease, as part of 
his testimony Dr. Coffman may also discuss the process of medical equipment 
sterilization and how bacteria are eliminated by various cleaning processes and how 
there is not just one approved way to maintain a sterile operative field. As part of his 
testimony, he may also discuss how different types of bacteria are susceptible to different 
cleaning techniques, temperature and/or antibiotics. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will be prepared to discuss different 
types of bacteria, how bacteria multiply, how they react to and survive in different parts of 
the human body, where they normally reside within the human body, how they are 
identified in various standard tests, how the body fights off, responds to and/or relies upon 
different types of bacteria, how different kinds of gram negative bacteria organisms are 
known to reside within the human urinary tract and bowels. 
For purposes of explaining his testimony he is expected to discuss general 
anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as 
the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. He may 
discuss how antibiotics are able to travel throughout the body, how infection within certain 
types of tissue can be harder to treat depending on the vascularity of the area of the 
infection (such as treating localized infections confined to fatty tissue versus infections 
which are able to make their way into muscle and the blood stream) and whether or not an 
infection is localized versus systemic. It is expected that Dr. Coffman will use during his 
testimony demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy and/or pictures of the patient 
and/or of the bacteria. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Coffman has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of infectious disease in 
evaluating laboratory results, tissue samples, blood tests, gram staining, operating 
laboratory equipment, autopsy records and otherwise managing and identification of 
bacterial disease processes in patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations o~the habits, 
customs and practice experiences of other infectious disease specialists who address 
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medical .situations like those presente? in this case, and his membership and participation 
in various medical associations, including those in the state of Idaho. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing medicine in the area of infectious 
disease; his review of the care and treatment of the patient by Dr. Kerr and others, and his 
review and consideration of the depositions and discovery responses taken and/or 
disclosed to date in this case. His opinions are also based upon the_ findings of various 
other health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory 
and infectious disease studies and other testing and observation, treatment plans, 
consultations, referrals and recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from 
such medical services and interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. 
Kerr as described in all medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. 
Dr. Coffman's professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae, which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
As part of his review, he has had available to review and consider the 
medical records of Silk Touch Med Spa, Dr. Brian Kerr, the records of Elmore Medical 
Center, Elmore Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphons_us Regional Medical Center, 
the Ada County Coroner's Office and portions of the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. 
In the event further depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be made 
available to this witness for consideration. 
Dr. Coffman reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Coffman reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
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in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with the law .. The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden 
has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to 
respond. 
5) Alan W. Frankie, Ph.D. 
1491 Lewis Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Subject Matter: Damages an~ economic analysis. 
Substance of Opinions and Expected Testimony: Dr. Frankie is an 
economist and retired professor from Boise State University. He has been an economist 
in Boise, Idaho, continuously from 1984 to the present. Dr. Frankie will respond to and 
rebut the opinions of the patient's economic expert, Cornelius Hofman. It is expected 
that Dr. Frankie will render opinions regarding discount rates and present value 
calculations regarding the patient's special damages claims. He may also testify 
regarding inflationary rates for annuities. 
The economic report of Plaintiff's expert, Cornelius Hofman, was not 
l 
produced until May 14 by means of the Plaintiff's second supplemental answers to the 
written interrogatories of the Defendants. By court order dated May 16, 2012, the 
Defendant's disclosure of experts shall be disclosed 60 days after the Plaintiff's 
disclosure of experts. It is impossible for Dr. Frankie to respond to and submit his 
opinions on the report of Mr. Hofman at this time and should the court allow Mr. Hofman to 
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render testimony and opinions at trial over the objection of the defendants, ,the expert 
opinions of Dr. Frankie should not have to be disclosed until 60 days after May 14, 2013. 
As a result, Defendants reserve the right to supplement the opinions of Dr. 
Frankie. As part of his opinions, however, he is expected to address the issue of 
consumption rates and how the Plaintiff has improperly calculated the decedent's rate of 
consumption in order to inflate claims for future lost wages. In this regard, he will address 
the permissible categories of damages eligible to the Plaintiff in this case, namely, the 
damages for wrongful death are measured by the support the Plaintiff as the surviving 
spouse would have received had the decedent lived. He will discuss the absence of any 
. . 
children in this case and that no support would have been provided by the decedent to 
support any children. 
Dr. Frankie will also discuss the improper assumptions in earnings and the 
failure to consider other income and expense offsets which exist by virtue of both the 
Plaintiff and the decedent being members of the military. By law in Idaho, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover any amounts for loss of inheritance, loss of income or loss of 
accumulation which are deemed speculative, particularly here where in the decedent was 
only 27 years of age, had been married for less than four years and had been in the 
military for such a short period of time. Dr. Frankie will discuss the speculative nature of 
said damages and how these categories relate to the improper opinions advanced by Mr. 
Hofman. 
Dr. Frankie is still in need of additional tax records for Charles Ballard and 
we currently have no tax records for Krystal Ballard despite the outstanding requests for 
these records. Dr. Frankie has further opinions he may render once being provided with 
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these missing tax records as well as being able to comment on the fact that Mr. Hofman 
did not request or utilize such records when generating his report purporting to forecast 
the current and future losses of the Plaintiff. 
Dr. Frankie will dispute the consumption rates relied upon by Mr. Hofman in 
the range of 24%. He will further testify Plaintiff has not produced a credible projection of 
earnings or anticipated promotions/advancements for either the Plaintiff or the decedent. 
For purposes of responding to the report of Mr. Hofman, Dr. Frankie has assumed a 
similar projection of earnings for both Charles and Krystal Ballard. He will discuss the 
absence of data and reports from the Air Force as to what track, if any, the decedent and 
Charles Ballard are/were on as respects aspirations for advancement, further 
promotions, raises in income, etc. Dr. Frankie will also comment upon the fact that Mr. 
Hofman has not produced item No. 39 relied upon as a basis for some of his opinions in 
his report. 
Regarding the issue of loss of household services, Dr. Frankie will comment 
' ' 
upon the lack of any documentation regarding what household services, if any, that the 
decedent provided in order to arrive at his conclusion. 
There are additional issues which have not been addressed by Mr. Hofman 
including the fact that often the decedent and the Plaintiff were not living together and if 
they were it was often only half time. Mr. Hofman's report fails to factor this key 
compon~nt of household services. 
Based on the limited information available, for the household services, one 
assumes each spouse spends 38% of the time on indivisible tasks, 31 % on tasks for 
themselves and 31 % on tasks for the other. Charles Ballard therefore only lost the 38% 
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for services that were concerned with indivisible tasks. The 31 % of tasks that the 
decedent did for the Plaintiff are therefore cancelled out because he is no longer having to 
do the 31 % for the decedent. Thus his only potential household services loss is for those 
indivisible tasks she performed which they shared equally. 
Underlying Facts and Data: Dr. Frankie will rely on his education, training 
and experience as an economist; the use and recognition of standard and accepted 
economic data, government reports, public~tions and authorities; his experience teaching 
economics and finance at Boise State University; his review of the economic loss report of 
the patient's experts and his assumptions and calculations for determining the annual 
costs for household services and lost wages associated with an individual like Krystal 
Ballard. 
Dr. Frankie reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
recognized economic literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure. 
Additional materials which Dr. Frankie may ultimately review and consider for forming his 
opinions is unknown and reserved based on the foregoing. The Defendants have not 
received the income tax returns or documents that reflect the earnings of the decedent 
over the past several years even though they were requested of the Plaintiff to be 
produced several months ago. As a consequence, Dr. Frankie does no.t have this 
material showing the decedent's actual earnings which Dr. Frankie will utilize to further 
criticize the invalidity of Mr. Hofman's opinions. In the· event Dr. Frankie is deposed his 
deposition testimony is hereby incorporated into this disclosure as if set forth in full. 
Dr. Frankie reserves the right not to offer any of the opinions set forth herein 
as this disclosure is prepared with the assistance of counsel and is worded broadly in 
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order to comply with the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be 
offered at trial will depend entirely on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the 
testimony of Plaintiffs and their experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and only after 
that burden has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be 
needed to respond. 
Dr. Frankie's Curriculum Vitae setting forth his qualifications and prior 
publications is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
6) John Lundeby, M.D., FAGS, FAACS 
Shape Cosmetic Surgery and Med Spa, PLLC 
524 W. 6th Ave 
Spokane, Washington 99204 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance offacts and opinions held: Dr. Lundeby is a physician licensed in 
the state of Idaho and Washington to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Lundeby is 
board certified by the °American Board of Surgery and the American Board of Cosmetic 
Surgery and has engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery at all times 
relevant herein. Dr. Lundeby will testify as a retained expert witness at the trial. Dr.· 
Lundeby will testify that he has actual knowledge of the standard of health care practice 
applicable to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, 
Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr met such standard taking into account Dr. 
Kerr's background, training, experience and field of medical specialization with respect to 
the medical treatment rendered to the patient. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
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of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the b?sis for Dr. 
Lundeby's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and ~xperience 
in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed physician, his experiences in the peer 
review process associated with his hospital staff privileges at Kootenai Medical Center 
and Northwest Specialty Hospital, both in Idaho, his experience of having performed 
hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures 
like liposuction and fat transfers were performed in Boise in 2010. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his experience in performing a large volume of 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic 
liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting procedures are p~rformed, 
his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments needed to perform the nature 
and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his knowledge of the scope of 
practice of cosmetic providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, Idaho and elsewhere, and his 
knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform cosmetic procedures like the 
ones at issue in this case. As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby may also explain his 
training and experience at the University of Washington and the San Joaquin General 
Hospital in 1991-96. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his 
deposition and discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are 
essentially zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated 
successfully with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how this is evidence 
that the sterility procedures employed by the Defendants in this case were adequate and 
working properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
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Dr. Lundeby will testify that during his professional career he has been 
acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic procedures that are not 
plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds 
' 
including: family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and 
gynecology. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic surgery by 
various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. Dr. Lundeby has become acquainted 
with the nature and scope of the practice of these other cosmetic procedure providers and 
the procedures utilized by them in this specialty. Dr. Lundeby will explain that the 
standard of health care practice for plastic surgeons is not the standard of health care 
practice in the same medical specialty as his and Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had proper training and -
experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal Ballard. He will testify 
that Dr. Kerr did not need any residency in general or other surgical field in order to 
competently perform the liposuction and fat grafting procedures at issue in this case. As 
part of his testimony, he is expected to discuss the fact that he provided training to Dr. 
' . 
Kerr at his office in Spokane and that Dr. Lundeby has trained many physicians in 
performing a variety of cosmetic procedures. 
He will testify that he has performed cosmetic surgery with Dr. Kerr and has 
witnessed his habits and customs in this regard in a surgical setting. Dr. Lundeby is 
expected to refer to the publications, data and documents referred to in his attached 
curriculum vitae. He is expected to discuss the numbers of similar procedures he has 
performed. Dr. Lundeby will explain that there _was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected or 
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approved by any organization or government agency, which in~luded his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
' ~ 
During Dr. Lundeby's professional career he has received and provided 
specific training in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and 
ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of 
' ' 
training obtained by Dr. Kerr and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and 
experience to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding th_e significant experience he has in performing these 
types of procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was 
appropriate for the procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in 
an office based setting without general anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, 
equipment and personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local 
standard of health care practice. Dr. Lundeby will testify that he possesses the 
professional knowledge and experience that allows him to express the opinion and 
testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the fact this patient died does not establish that 
the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will testify that postoperative 
infections, if that is what occurred in this case, are not proof of a violation in operative 
technique, patient selection or breach in sterility. He will render the opinion that based 
on the record in this case that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the patient's 
death was not due to any error or omission on the part of Dr. Kerr or his practice. 
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Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment ·in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Lundeby will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in 
regards to the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the ·procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that the surgical 
technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer procedures would 
not have caused or resulted in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. Lundeby 
actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and will express all opinions 
stated herein on a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. Dr. Lundeby will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was not 
and cannot be assumed or proven to be the result of violations of the stand~rd of -health 
care practice. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable 
to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
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publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding his various publications, honors, committee and 
university appointments as set forth in his curriculum vitae which is hereby incorporated 
as if set forth in full. He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide 
him with opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of 
cosmetic surgery including his affiliations with the American Society for Laser Medicine 
and Surgery, the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, the National Society of 
Cosmetic Physicians, the American College of Surgeons and both the Idaho and 
American Medical Associations. 
Dr. Lundeby will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, 
Dr. Lundeby will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 
2010 with respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and 
any deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if 
set forth in full. Dr. Lundeby holds the opinion and will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the 
records and deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was 
ever warranted or represented to this patient. 
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Dr. Lundeby will explain how the standard of practice applicable includes, 
as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of 
science which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. He will 
render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate post-operative instructions and 
properly followed the patient and communicated with her and her family. Dr. Lundeby 
will be prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why Dr. Kerr's 
care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all 
operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Lundeby will 
explain that post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized 
risk factor that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care 
practice by the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, 
infections can and do occur. 
To the extent he is asked to address the issue of informed consent, Dr. 
Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice and information to 
Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the procedure on July 21, 
2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. Dr. Lundeby will explain that 
the surgical care by Dr. Kerr of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the 
standard of health care practice, based on the class of health care provider to which Dr. 
Kerr belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Lundeby will explain that the 
standard of health care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged and evaluated in 
comparison with similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, 
taking into account his training, experience and field of m.edical specialization and not by 
a plastic surgeon which Plaintiff is unfairly trying to do in this case. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss his training and th~ 
certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. 
Kerr. He will discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's 
medical records and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. 
Kerr's documented conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. He 
will discuss the training classes he provides to physicians, like Dr. Kerr, regarding 
introduction to and advanced applications for liposuction procedures. 
With respec.t to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Lundeby will discuss 
and explain to the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be used to 
improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less needed 
(usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He. will explain 
how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site being 
treated. He will explain how before the removal procedure begins the areas from where 
the fat. is being removed are injected with a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize 
bruising and discomfort to the patient. He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or 
fat is freed and ultimately removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small 
incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's facility did not need to be 
certified in order to operate in Idaho. He will testify that there is no evidence that Dr. Kerr 
went too deep and entered the abdominal cavity or otherwise impacted the bowel in any 
way so as to contaminate the operative field during the liposuction procedure. He will 
. ' 
discuss the pain response a patient would be expected to give if the fascia were to have 
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been impacted, particularly where the patient did not have any sedatives on board for the 
procedure. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss and describe how the adipose tissue is prepared to 
be re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the desired area 
using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He will discuss 
how the fat is deposited above the muscle and in some instances within portions of the 
mu~cle.' He will discuss the skill in making injections with accompanies performing fat 
transfer procedures and that it takes a degree of artistic talent, but that it is not otherwise 
generally a technically challenging or physically taxing activity for a cosmetic surgeon to 
engage in. 
He will render the opinion that the manner, method and volume by which Dr. 
Kerr re-injected the adipose tissue back into the patient was appropriate in all respects. 
He will explain how some of the fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume 
over time, which is often addressed by the physician having to re-inject more adipose 
tissue into a specific location to achieve the desired end aesthetic result. He will explain 
how the fat transfer procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was 
consistent with the local standard of practice given the nature and extent of the 
procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss the entries in Dr .. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
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that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the preoperative preparation of the patient 
utilizing Hibiclens and alcohol. He will discuss how physicians and hospitals use 
Hibiclens to cleanse patients as well as their own hands and exposed parts of their bodies 
before surgery to prevent the spread of bacteria, infection, or disea_se to patients. It is also 
used to cleanse wounds to prevent the spread of bacteria and infection. Dr. Lundeby will 
render the opinion that the skin preparation and surgical sterile technique for the surgery 
in using Hibiclens and alcohol were appropriate and good agents to use for that purpose. 
To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Lundeby will also discuss Dr. 
Kerr'~. operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, 
the patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at 
the post-operative visit with the patient. He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's 
post-operative discussions, instructions and directions shared with the patient and then 
ultimately the discussions he had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Lundeby will 
explain that Krystal Ballard was in good health before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and 
there is no clinical evidence that she had a urinary tract infection and that the 
pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within the standard of health care practice. 
He may discuss the fact that sometimes patients will elect not to disclose 
health conditions to the physician which may impact the timing of an elective procedure. 
The re?son for this nondisclosure is generally because they are concerned that the 
physician will cancel or postpone the procedure which may be inconvenient to a patient 
due to the fact that the patient desires to achieve a recovery by a specific date. 
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Dr. Lundeby will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedu·re including how the local, anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the ·desired impact on the adipose tissue, and 
the amount of traction applied to free the adipose tissue. From his unique perspective as 
a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Lundeby will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction 
procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the cannula back and forth in order to 
feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the 
location of the procedure and the body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
per the medical records and deposition testimony while she was seen by or: Kerr. He 
will discuss the expected localized pain patients can expect to experience following a fat 
transfer procedure. To the extent it becomes relevant to aid in expressing his favorable 
opinions, Dr. Lundeby may also, discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the 
patient did not have any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus 
or other signs of active drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling or 
_ signs of a rash or change in condi~ion of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his experience in caring for postoperative wounds and infections 
based o.n his long history of performing all manner of both cosmetic and general surgery. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked for and then ... 
properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection . during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and her 
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family prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point did 
the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, nor did the standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a different course of 
medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. He will testify that 
Dr. Kerr was not required to obtain any diagnostic tests before electfng to perform surgery 
on July 21. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods and the fact that such 
organisms do not exist on the skin, nor would they be found on surgical instruments 
following an appropriate cleansing through an autoclave. Instead, he will discuss how 
they represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of a patient. 
He will testify that postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions 
which are not the subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are 
impossible to prevent. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will be prepared to explain the 
positioning of the patient, incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, 
choice of instruments, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient 
expectations, and patient education and counseling from the informed consent phase 
through the postoperative follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various 
anatomical illustrations as well as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the 
procedures at issue including those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and 
supplies produced to date. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES- 74 
000363
In connection with describing his opinions and the basis therefore, Dr. 
Lundeby may be called upon to explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally invasive 
technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will explain how 
the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as tumescent fluid which 
numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also temporarily expands 
the volu·me of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. With the use of 
exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then inserted into the 
body through small incisions. He will explain how by way of using a resonating high 
ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while leaving blood 
vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix with the 
tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using gentle suction. After the 
surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin retraction, 
smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to traditional liposuction. 
Dr. Lundeby may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area, the 
instructions given to the patient, he will discuss the cardinal signs of an infection and how 
Dr. Kerr's records and deposition evidence that he specifically and appropriately 
evaluated and questioned the patient and then documented in his records regarding 
these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the amount of 
time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that there was nothing usual or out 
of character regarding the amount of time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on 
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July 21, 2010. He will testify that the records and deposition testimony document that Dr. 
Kerr is a caring, hands on physician who goes to great lengths to monitor and be available 
for his patients. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain the adequacy of the postoperative evaluation Dr. 
Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal Ballard and assessing whether 
there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical sites, including absence of any 
abnormal odor or other evidence or suggestion of infection of any of the surgical sites. 
He will render the opinion that in order for Dr. Kerr to have infected the patient in some 
manner at the time the surgery was performed on July 21, that there would have to have 
been evidence of infection at the location of the surgery by the time of the autopsy or at 
Elmore Medical Center. He will testify that the abse_nce of any evidence of infection at 
the injection or liposuction sites is proof to Dr. Lundeby that the patient was not infected 
during the surgery and that her death is due to some other cause. 
He will discuss his review of the autopsy record and the patient's 
subsequent treatment records. By way of example, Dr. Lundeby is expected to discuss 
the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in her urine. 
Based on his experience in general surgery, he will render the opinion that this laboratory 
finding is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious process located 
within the patient's bladder or urinary tract. He will explain how the bladde~ is also an 
area wherein gram nem~tive rod bacteria are known to populate and exist in the face of an 
infection. He will discuss the concept of how infections, like a urinary tract infection, can 
be spread hematogenously or via the blood stream. 
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Dr. Lundeby will also comment upon the significance from his perspective 
regarding how the patient did not present to Elmore Medical Center with any fever, but 
had a WBC count of 14.7. He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including 
surgery, stress and dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to 
address the patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any 
microscopic examination of that o_rgan to address the nature of the bacteria identified in 
the positive UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. He is also 
expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how this can be signs of 
dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were not functioning 
properly. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss how the pa~ient presented to Elmore Medical 
Center with a blood gas pH of 6.99 and how this is dangerously low and provides strong 
evidence that the patient was extremely ill by that point and that she needlessly delayed 
seeking medical attention despite the urging and instruction of Dr. Kerr and his staff. He 
will testify that the patient's decision to delay returning for further care to either Dr. Kerr or 
the ER after July 23 is the reason she died and that if she had returned sooner that she 
more likely than not would have been saved. He will discuss how the cost of vanity and 
the patient's apparent unrelenting desire for secrecy resulted in her own tragic demise. 
He will discuss with the jury that it is not the physicians fault when the patient fails to do as 
they are instructed and return when their condition worsened as it clearly did long before 
this patient ultimately elected to seek medical help and was transported critically ill to 
Elmore Medical Center. 
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Dr. Lundeby will address the vague and confusing nature of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of acute 
inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which 
surgical sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the 
tissue sections where harvested from on the patient. In this regard, Dr. Lundeby will 
discuss how there are commonly a ~ariety of bacteria located near the surface normally of 
wound sites which is not evidence of an infection, but that the more important inquiry 
which would be more indicative of an infection is whether the gram negative rods were 
located within the deeper issues under the wound sites which cannot be determined from 
the autopsy documents in this case. 
He will discuss the normal wound biology is to see evidence of bacteria on 
the surface. Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion, more likely than not, that the gram 
negative bacterial rods were introduced into the patient's surgical site sometime after Dr. 
Kerr's surgical procedure rather than being introduced during the procedure. Dr. 
Lundeby will render the opinion that based on his experience that gram negative· rods do 
not result in the sudden and unexpected patient death such as occurred in this case. He 
will discuss the fact that the autopsy records eliminate embolism as a cause of death for 
} 
this patient. Despite this finding at autopsy, he will testify that it would be extremely 
uncomr,:ion (outside of necrotizing fasciitis which attacks the soft tissue and the fascia or 
tissue covering the muscle and can cause rapid death) for an alleged soft tissue infection 
to spread, become septic and kill a patient within the limited time frame at issue in this 
case. In this regard, he will discuss how sepsis is a presumptive clinical diagnosis which 
is compounded in. this case due to the absence of any positive blood cultures. Dr. 
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Lundeby is expected to offer testimony on several aspects of the autopsy report of Dr. 
Graben, starting with sepsis with probable toxic shock syndrome of unknown etiology and 
manner of death natural. His inspection of the incisions through the surgical sites reveal 
reparative changes, but no gross evidence of an infectious process. No pockets of pus or 
discolored fluid are seen. No evidence of erythema around the incisions sites. 
Subcutaneous fat and muscle of the abdominal wall, lower back and buttocks show no 
areas of necrosis or discoloration associated with reparative changes and no pockets of 
discolored fluid or pus. These autopsy findings are consistent with and ~;upport his 
opinion that bacteria were just introduced during the procedure ·of Dr. Kerr. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in nonc6mpliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging. position the patient elected to place herself and her health 
care provider in by erroneously reporting to her husband that she had simply fallen and 
. 
injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain rather than admit she 
had cosmetic surgery performed. 
In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
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essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability to provide her with care and 
to make decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique 
and that one can do everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria 
can become introduced into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods 
claimed to have been identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. He will 
discuss the patient's admission that she was not taking the narcotic pain medication 
Norco and was instead taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not appear to be 
providing the patient with adequate pain control. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and 
edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would expect to see at that point 
postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to 
obtain a urinalysis or complete blood count on the patient on July 23. Dr. Lundeby will 
discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which are not 
required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order 
to perform such procedures. Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr was not 
required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his facility 
be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the AAACH or AAAASF or 
any governmental agency. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will explain how the tumescent 
lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain how the Vaser 
procedure is done with the device in place under the skin without direct visualization. · He 
will discuss how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat from the patient's 
anterior abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of fat from the 
patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this case was utilized 
for less than eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the nature of the 
procedure. 
As it relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiff's experts, Dr. Lundeby 
will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and 
that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection phase of the 
procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for the same 
needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. He 
will disc~ss the adequacy of the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient 
including the content of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. 
He will discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis 
and fat injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the 
patient both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they 
fail to comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will 
develop complications. 
Dr. Lundeby will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of 
the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, he will testify 
that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the risks normally 
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attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by the patient was 
valid in all respects. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. 
Kerr's preoperative clinical examination including evaluation of the regions to be 
lipo-contoured including review for hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, 
the quality of the skin and its elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location 
of fat deposits. He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr. improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr did anything to 
cause the patient's death. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby may also address and explain the 
weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed· 135 pounds. On July 
25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 po'unds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 
she weighed 180 pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these 
changes in weight. He will discuss the concept of third spacing of fluid or leaking of fluid 
out of cellular structures due to the body's global inflammatory response. He will discuss 
this in connection with efforts which were made to maintain fluid volume for the patient 
once she presented at the hospital. He will testify that a weight gain of 50 po'unds due to 
efforts to maintain fluid volume in the faGe of the patient's condition would not be 
unexpected. 
He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore Medical 
Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks and 
abdomen of Krystal B_allard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, warmth 
or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 Yi hours after 
admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. Alphonsus on 
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July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very high and proof 
of f!uid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on causation, Dr. Lundeby will 
explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of the possible reasons for 
the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center 
and the' clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection that developed after the 
procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they were more likely to come from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or 
her intestinal tract and that they were not introduced during his surgical procedure. As 
part of his testimony, it is expected that Dr. Lundeby will explain pertinent anatomy, 
infectious. processes, pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram 
negative rods, types of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were 
negative for growth in this case, antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal 
Ballard regarding that drugs would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's . response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. : This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Lundeby will 
testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not present with any increased risk 
for infection that would have raised any concern about her undergoing the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. He will testify that at th~ time of Dr. Kerr's procedure on July 21, 2010,. 
there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal Ballard. 
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Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Lundeby has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic and general surgery 
in Spokane, Washington in treating, diagnosing, managing and caring for elective 
procedure patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of 
other cosmetic surgeons and care providers and the way they perform the procedures at 
issue in this case, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho standard of practice applicable to Dr. 
Kerr in 2010 and his knowledge that it is within Dr. Kerr's specialty and capability to 
perform the procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, and his 
membership and participation, in various medical associations and organizations as set 
forth he~ein. The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing cosmeUc surgery, his review of the 
care and treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the 
course of his career in medicine. 
Dr. Lundeby's opinions are also based upon the findings of various other 
health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Lundeby's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
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As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered and reviewed the depositions of Dr. Kerr. He has also reviewed and 
considered Dr. Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore 
Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County 
Coroner's Office and the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further 
depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Lundeby reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Lundeby reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial 
will depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of 
the Plaintiff and his experts. 
7) Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. 
Palouse Surgeons 
2400 West A. Street Suite 101 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1778 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, standards of health care practice; causation, 
and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts known and opinions held: Dr. Stiller is a physician 
licensed in the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Stiller is board 
certified in both general and cosmetic surgery and has engaged in the medical specialty 
of cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Stiller will testify as a retained expert 
witness at the trial. Dr. Stiller will testify that he has actual knowledge of the _standard of 
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health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of 
cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion, and based on his own 
unique background, that Dr. Kerr met such standard taking into account Dr. Kerr's 
background, training, experience and field of medical specialization with respect to any 
and all medical services rendered to the patient. Dr. Stiller actually holds the opinions 
expressed in this document and will express all opinions stated herein on a more 
probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
Dr. Stiller will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Stiller's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience in 
performing general and cosmetic surgical procedures as a licensed physician, his 
experiences in the peer review process associated with his hospital staff privileges in 
Idaho, his experience of having performed hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his 
knowledge of how cosmetic procedures like liposuction and fat transfers are'performed, 
including how they were performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in performing a large 
volume of liposuction and fat transfer procedures. 
Dr. Stiller will explain his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic liposuction 
. 
procedure is performed, his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments 
needed to perform the nature and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his 
knowledge of the scope of practice of cosmetic surgery providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, 
Idaho and elsewhere, his knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform 
cosmetic procedures like the ones at issue in this case and his knowledge of the manner 
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and method by which surgical equipment and surgical procedure facilities are maintained 
in a sterile fashion. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller may also explain his training and 
experience at the Graduate Hospital in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during his residency in 
general surgery 1997-2001 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the procedures 
he performed, was taught and observed, including his role as chief resident. He will 
explain the same matters for his experience in his own surgical facility which he currently 
operates at Palouse Surgeons in both Pullman, Washington and Moscow, Idaho. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at his 
own facility in Moscow, Idaho for achieving and maintaining sterile operating conditions 
and the. disinfection of instruments and equipment and maintaining a sterile operative 
field and that the similar actions and efforts undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been 
described for the procedure on Krystal Ballard in this case were used and exceeded in his 
opinion. Dr. Stiller will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his 
deposition and discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are 
essentially nil. 
He will comment upon how this is evidence that the sterility procedures 
employed by the Defendants in this case were appropriate and working properly at the 
time of the surgery at issue in this case. Dr. Stiller will testify that during his professional 
career he has been acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic 
procedures that are not plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number. of different 
medical backgrounds. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic · 
surgery by various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. 
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He may also discuss his various publications and presentations on 
cosmetic surgery including liposuction and fat transfers as set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae. Dr. Stiller will discuss how he has become acquainted with the nature 
and scope of practice he and other cosmetic surgical procedure providers utilize as well 
as the procedures utilized by them in this specialty, including the procedures utilized for 
maintaining a sterile field and how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment 
' 
and instruments utilized for cosmetic surgical procedures including the procedures at 
issue in this case. He will testify that there is more than one way to achieve proper 
sterilization. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that the standard of health care practice for a plastic 
surgeon is not the same standard of health care practice for someone in the same 
medical specialty as his and Dr. Kerr. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had 
proper training and experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal 
Ballard. As part of his testimony, he is expected to refer to the publications, data and 
documents that have been produced in discovery on this subject and explain the numbers 
of similar procedures he has performed. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected. or 
approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. During 
I 
Dr. Stiller's professional career he has received specific training· in various lipolysis 
procedures including traditional, laser assisted and ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will 
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testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of training obtained by Dr. Kerr and 
that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform· the 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. 
' . 
He will testify that it was appropriate for the procedures at issue to be 
performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based setting without general 
anesthe_sia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, equipment and personnel to do these 
procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health care practice. pr. 
Stiller will testify that he possesses the professional knowledge and experience that 
allows him to express the opinion and testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that the fact this patient experienced a post-operative 
complication like the one alleged in this case which resulted in a patient death does not 
establish that the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will testify that 
postoperative infections are not proof of a violation. He will render the opinion that the 
patient's death was not due to any error or omission on Dr. Kerr's part or the part of 
anyone associated with his practice. He will discuss his own sterilization techniques, 
training and experience in this area which will help support his opinion that Dr. Kerr 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. 
Dr. Stiller will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infec~ious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
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how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
' . 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Stiller will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in regards to 
the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures performed on 
Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that gram negative bacteria do not cause 
sepsis or toxic shock as alleged in this case. As part of his testimony, he will discuss the 
urinalysis obtained at Elmore Medical Center which revealed plus 3 bacteria, white and 
red blood cells, elevated white blood cell count with a left differential shift and ketones. As 
. ' 
part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that the surgical technique 
employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer procedures did not cause or 
result in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. Stiller will testify regarding the 
specific issues set forth in this disclosure, but he will also testify globally that nothing Dr. 
Kerr elected to do or not do with respect to the medical services provided to Krystal 
Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the applicable local standard of health care practice 
which in turn caused or contributed to any damages or injuries to the patient. 
Dr. Stiller will be rendering his testimony based on his own unique 
perspective as a general and cosmetic surgeon and the training and practice experience 
he has received. Dr. Stiller will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was 
not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the standard of health care 
practice. Dr.· Stiller will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable to 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
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established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
publicati.on, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Stiller will testify regarding his various publications, honors and university 
appointments at the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians and the University of 
Washington School of Medicine WWfa:.MI program as set forth in his curriculum vitae 
which is hereby incorporated as if set forth in full. 
He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide him 
with opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of cosmetic 
surgery including his affiliations with the American College of Surgeons, American 
Academy of Cosmetic Surgery and the Idaho Medical Association. He will discuss what 
these organizations offer their members and the opportunities to associate with 
colleagues and obtain continuing education in this emerging field. 
Dr. Stiller will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by physicians engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller 
will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 2010 with 
respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and any 
-
deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if set 
forth in full. Dr. Stiller holds the opinion that compliance with the standard of practice 
does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and compliance is intended to 
minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and unintended results. 
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He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for physicians 
engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the records and 
deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was ever 
warranted or represented to this patient. Dr. Stiller will explain how the standard of 
practice applicable includes, as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as 
opposed to the application of science which may vary depending on the patient and care 
circumstances. He will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate 
post-operative instructions and properly followed the patient and communicated with her 
and her family. Dr. Stiller will testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why 
Dr. Kerr's care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice to which he is 
held. 
As with all operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility 
and Dr. Stiller will discuss that post-operative infections, if they should develop, are an 
accepted and recognized risk factor that are usually not due to inappropriate care or 
violations of the standard of health care practice by the physician and that under the best 
of circumstances and medical care, infections can and do occur even under the best of 
care conditions. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice 
and information to Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that everything undertaken by Dr. Kerr with regard to 
his care and treatment of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the 
standard of health care practice typically provided, based on the class of health care 
provider to which Dr. Kerr belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Stiller 
' 
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will explain that the standard of health care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged 
and evaluat~d in comparison with similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same 
class as himself, taking into account his training, experience and field of medical 
specialization and not by a plastic surgeon. 
In order to support his opinions, Dr. Stiller is expected to discuss the training 
he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic 
surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. Kerr. He will 
discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's medical records 
and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. Kerr's documented 
conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Stiller will discuss and explain to 
the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be used to improve the 
appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less needed (usually the 
thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will discuss his research 
and publications '?n this topic. He will explain how typically, the transferred fat results in 
an incr~ase in volume of the body site being treated. He will explain how before the 
removal procedure begins the areas from where the fat is being removed are injected with 
a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize bruising and discomfort to the patient. 
He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or fat is freed and ultimately 
I 
removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss and describe how the adipose tissue is then prepared to be 
re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the desired area 
using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. With use of 
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demonstrative exhibits and various medical instruments, he will explain both the lipo and 
fat injection process to the jury. He will render the opinion that the manner, method and 
volume by which Dr. Kerr re-injected the adipose tissue back into the patient was 
appropriate in all respects. 
Dr. Stiller will explain how some of the fat that is transferred often does not 
maintain its volume over time, which is often addressed by the physician having to 
re-inject more adipose tissue into a specific location to achieve the desired end aesthetic 
result. He will explain how the fat transfer procedure v:vas done using a local anesthetic 
and that this was consistent with the local standard of practice given the nature and extent 
of the procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will discuss the entries in Dr. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what tre_a~ment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Stiller will also discuss Dr. Kerr's 
operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, the 
patient',s vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at the 
post-operative visit with the patient. 
' 
He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's post-operative discussions, 
instructions and directions shared with the patient and then ultimately the discussions he 
had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Stiller will explain that Krystal Ballard was in 
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good health before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and there is no clinical evidence that 
she had a urinary tract infection and that the pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr ·was within 
the standard of health care practice. He will render the opinion that the patient 
developed an infectious process in her.urinary tract after the procedures by Dr. Kerr which 
had nothing to do with the surgery or the sterilization procedures used by the Defendants 
in this case. In order to further illustrate his testimony to the jury, Dr. Stiller will discuss the 
technical aspects of th~ Vaser liposuction procedure including how the local anesthetic is 
given, how the tumescent anesthetic is prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose 
tissue, how the Vaser device operates to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the 
cannulas are placed, the amount of energy applied to the device to effectuate .the desired 
impact on the adipose tissue, and the amount of traction applied to free the adipose 
tissue. 
From his unique perspective as both a general and cosmetic surgeon, Dr. 
Stiller will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction procedure and the laborious aspect 
of moving the cannula back and forth in order to feather the tissue and achieve the 
desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the location of the procedure and the 
body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. In the process of providing his opinions 
that the care by Dr. Kerr was appropriate, Dr. Stiller will address the method by which the 
adipose tissue harvested was drained and prepared for re-injection. He will also discuss 
how the instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each 
procedure, he will discuss these pieces of equipment as well as their various attachments 
and describe that medical equipment which is new versus that which must be re-sterilized 
for reuse between patients and/or procedures. 
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Dr. Stiller will discuss the appropriate nature of the pre and post-operative 
antibiotics administered by Dr. Kerr to the patient and explain why they were given not for 
an infection, but rather as a prophylaxis against infection. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion 
. that the evidence in this case establishes that the patient never appeared infected or 
septic while being treated by Dr. Kerr. He will discuss the localized pain patients can 
\ 
expect to experience following a fat transfer procedure into the buttocks region. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did 
not demonstrate having any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of· 
pus or other signs of active-drainage from the operative sites., and there was no swelling 
or signs of a rash or change in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor 
when she was seen by Dr. Kerr and when she was seen at Elmore Medical Center the 
day before her death. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked for 
and then properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subse~uent discussions with the patient and her 
. husban~ prior to her death. He will testify th~t he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point 
did the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, toxic shock or sepsis, nor did the 
standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a 
different course of medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, Dr. Stiller will 
discuss his knowledge of various bacteria including gram negative rods and the fact that 
such organisms do not exist on or in the skin, nor would they be found on surgical 
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instruments in the event of a breach in sterility. Instead, he will discuss how they 
represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of a patient. 
He will testify that Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform 
the surgeries in question, that Dr. Kerr's medical records contain an adequate description 
of the care rendered and the discussions with the patient, that Dr. Kerr implemented 
appropriate sterility techniques and conditions for surgery and that he used correct 
solutions for cleaning and disinfecting instruments and assuring that operative conditions 
were adequately sterile to guard against the risk of infection. He will testify that 
postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions which are not the 
subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are impossible to 
prevent. 
As part of his testimony and in order to expand upon his background and 
experience in cosmetic surgery, Dr. Stiller will discuss how the field of laser lipolysis with 
the use of tumescent anesthesia has developed in recent years. This may include 
testimony addressing that when considering different types of the body to undergo 
lipolysis that each area has its own unique geography and involves a degree of physician 
judgment as to how much material to remove and/or re-inject into each location. As part 
of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will be prepared to explain the positioning of the patient, 
incision sites for various injections and instruments, patient selection,· choice of 
instrument sizes and positioning, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of 
patient expectations, and patient education and counseling from the informed consent 
phase through the postoperative follow up period. 
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He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical illustrations as well as 
various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at issue including those 
depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies produced to date. As part 
of his explanation of how the Vaser Lipo process works, he will describe it as a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
With the use of exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then 
inserted into the body through small incisions. 
He will explain how by way of using a resonating high ultrasonic frequency, 
the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while leaving blood vessels, nerves and 
connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix with the tumescent fluid, which is 
then removed from the body using gentle suction. After the surgery, patients are 
prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin retraction, smoother results 
with minimal recovery time compared to traditional liposuction which requires far greater 
traction and trauma to the surrounding anatomical structures. 
Dr. Stiller may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area and 
the instructions given to the patient. He will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's records 
and deposition testimony evidence that he appropriately evaluated and questioned the 
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patient and then documented in his records these issues on each encounter he had with 
the patient. 
He will discuss the amount of time it takes to perform the procedures in 
question and that there was nothing usual or out of character regarding the amount of 
time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on July 21, 2010. Dr. Stiller will explain the 
adequacy of the postoperative evaluation Dr. Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for 
evaluating Krystal Ballard and assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of 
infection of the surgical sites, including absence of any abnormal odor or other evidence 
or suggestion of infection of any of the surgical sites. He will discuss his review and 
comments of the autopsy record and the patient's subsequent treatment records. He will 
discuss the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center. 
He will render the opinion that the laboratory data at Elmore Medical Center 
is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious process located within 
the patient's bladder which occurred postoperatively and not located within the operative 
area of Dr. Kerr. He will explain how gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate 
and exist in the urinary tract. Dr. Stiller will also comment upon the significance from his 
perspective regarding how the patient did not present with any fever, but ~ad a WBC 
count of 14.7. He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery, 
stress and dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address 
the patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any microscopic 
examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in the positive 
UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. 
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He is also expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how 
this can be signs of dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were 
not functioning properly. Dr. Stiller will address the confusing aspect of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist referred to an increase in the amount of acute inflammatory 
cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which surgical sites he is 
referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the tissue sections 
where actually harvested from the patient. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that the gram 
negative rods were introduced into the patient's surgical site(s) sometime after Dr. Kerr's 
surgical procedure rather than being introduced during the procedure and that _their 
introduction had nothing to do with the cleanliness and/or sterility of Dr. Kerr's facility and 
equipment. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncompliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging position the patient placed herself in despite the advice and 
instruction of her health care provider by erroneously reporting to her husband that she 
had simply fallen and injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain 
rather than admit she had cosmetic surgery and needed help monitoring her care and 
condition. 
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In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability. to provide her with care and 
to make: decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that Dr. Kerr and his employees followed the 
appropriate sterile technique in regards to the procedure performed on Krystal Ballard. 
He will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do 
everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced 
' . .  
into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods claimed to have been 
identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. Dr. Stiller will render the 
opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and edema observed on July 23 was 
consistent with what he would expect to see at that point postoperatively. 
He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to obtain 
a complete blood count on the patient on July 23 in order to determine what her white 
count was at that time. Dr. Stiller will discuss his background, training and experience in 
the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique in his practice as further 
support for his opinions as to the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's sterile technique. Dr. Stiller will 
discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which are not 
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required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order 
to perform such procedures. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr was not 
required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his facility 
be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the MACH or AAAASF or 
any governmental agency. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's 
procedure room was properly prepared for surgery and to protect and preserve an 
appropriate sterile field and that he did not require additional rooms or locations to store 
and clean equipment. He will discuss the autoclave at issue, how it operates and how it 
helps Dr. Kerr maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will discuss how an 
autoclave operates, how it is loaded, what is done to maintain an autoclave, how it is 
tested and that Dr. Kerr was not required to do more with his autoclave that he has 
described in this case. 
Dr. Stiller will describe the areas around the patient which are considered 
part of the sterile field depending on the nature and type of procedure at issue. With 
respect to the lipo procedure in this case, he will explain how the tumescent lidocaine is 
mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain how the Vaser procedure is 
done with the device in place under the skin without direct visualization. He will discuss 
how DL Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat from the patient's anterior 
abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of fat from the patient's 
left lateral waist flank. He will testify that these were not excessive amounts and may 
comment upon the findings set forth at autopsy and in the autopsy photos demonstrating 
the areas of adipose tissue within the patient. 
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Dr. Stiller will discuss how the Vaser in this case was utilized for less than 
eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the nature of the procedure. As it 
relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiff's experts, he will explain how the fat was 
injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and that there were no incisions 
made into the patient during the injection phase of the procedure. He will testify that it 
was a proper and acceptable technique for the same needles to be used to inject the fat 
into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. Dr. Stiller will discuss the adequacy of 
the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient including the content of the 
informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. He will discuss the risk of 
infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis and fat injection procedure. 
As part of his testimony, and to the extent it is an issue at trial, Dr. Stiller will discuss how 
the consent form discusses with the patient both pre and post treatment instructions and 
how it warns the patient that if they fail to comply with these instructions may increase the 
possibility that the patient will develop complications. He may also discuss his 
experiences in discussing risks and benefits with patients and the fact that certain 
patients fail to follow the advice and instructions and end up with an unexpected and/or 
dissatisfactory result. 
Dr. Stiller will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of the 
expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, to the extent not 
covered by other witnesses, he will testify that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the 
nature and the extent of the risks normally attendant to the procedure in question such 
that the giving of consent by the patient was valid in all respects. As part of his 
testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's preoperative clinical 
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examination including evaluation of the regions to be lipo-contoured including review for 
hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, the quality of the skin and its 
elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location of fat deposits. 
He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr_ improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr improperly 
sterilized his equipment or that Dr. Kerr did anything to cause the patient's death. Based 
on his own unique surgical perspective, Dr. Stiller may also address and explain the 
significant documented weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 
135 pounds. On July 25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At 
autopsy on July 26, 2010 she weighed 180 pounds. He will discuss the medical reasons 
and significance of these changes in weight as it relates to the issues of fluid overload and 
organ failure. 
He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore Medical 
Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks and 
abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, warmth 
or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours after 
admission. He may also comment upon the findings at autopsy which documented no 
frank evidence of an infection as aptly depicted in the autopsy photos. He may further 
address and explain to the jury how at Elmore Medical Center the patient's cardiac 
ejectio~ fraction was noted to be only 17% which is poor. In addition, later at St. 
Alphonsus on July 25, 2010, the patient's central venous pressure was measured at 20 
which is very high and proof of fluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on 
causation, Dr. Stiller will explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of 




the causes for the death of Krystal Ballard all of which have nothing to· do with the care 
and treatment rendered by Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical ~enter and 
the clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection the developed after his 
procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they more likely than not came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or 
her intestinal tract and were not introduced during Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure. As part 
of his testimony, it is expected that Dr. Stiller will discuss and explain pertinent anatomy, 
infectious processes, pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram 
negative rods, types of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were 
negative for growth, antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard 
regarding that drugs would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
It should be noted that in response to the Plaintiff's counsel's concern about 
the defense experts, Dr. Stiller will testify such that he avoids the presentation of needless 
cumulative testimony by tailoring his responses such as to avoid excessive duplication of 
other defense experts. As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller may be called upon to discuss 
the patient's anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, 
organs as well as the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and 
antibiotics. This may include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits 
depicting general anatomy and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment 
itself. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not 
present with any increased risk for infection that would have raised any concern about her 
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undergoing the procedures on July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's 
procedure on July 21, 2010, there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal 
Ballard. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Stiller has relied upon his own unique training and experience as 
a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of general and cosmetic surgery in 
Moscow, Idaho in consenting, diagnosing, treating, operating, managing, caring for and 
following up with patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices 
of other cosmetic surgeons and care providers, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho 
standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 2010 and his knowledge that it is within Dr. 
Kerr's s·pecialty and capability to perform the procedures in question as part of his 
practice· of medicine (regardless of the fact that Dr. Kerr also happens to be board 
certified in· anesthesia), and his membership and participation in various medical 
associations and organizations as set forth herein. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the 
care and treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the 
course of his career in medicine. Dr. Stiller's opinions are also based upon the findings 
of various other health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various 
laboratory studies and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, 
referrals and recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical 
services and interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as 
' 
described in all medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. 
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Stiller's professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including Dr. Kerr's, 
employees of Silk Touch, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered Dr. 
Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance 
Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's 
Office and the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or 
medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Stiller reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
co.ntinues. He reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth in this 
disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded broadly in 
order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. 
DATED this 31 51 day of May, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Je'r ah . Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 107 
000396
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of June, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad . 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
. 2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered, w/ attachments 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[X] U.S. Mail, w/o attachments 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, w/o attachments 
[ · ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
. Quane. 
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BAILEY &GLASSERu.P Phone (334) 262-6485 Fu:,; (33~) 2(,:!-0657 ------------2-01 Mo;~~-;:- .. -
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY 208-780-3930 
Ter·ence S. Jones, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boi:;e, Idaho 83701 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Dear Mr. Jones: 
sui1c 2170 
Mnnigomery, AL 36104 
June 20, 2013 
In providing dates for experts, please provide dates within the deadlines set by 
the Court for completion of discovery. To the extent this proves impractical for any 
par:icular expert, we are willing to discuss conducting a deposition after the discovery 
deadline, provided that under no circumstances would such discovery effect the trial 
date. 
We have previously raised with you your disclosure of multiple experts 
concerning the same subject matter. Specifically, you have disclosed five experts, 
including Dr. Kerr, in the area of cosmetic and plastic surgery. We are quite certain the 
Court will not permit you to present red-undant expert testimony at trial. Accordingly, we 
ask that you identify no more than two experts in this field. In other words, tell us the 
· experts you actually intend to call as your trial witnesses so we can avoid unnecessary 
depositions. If you are not willing to do this. we will seek appropriate relief from the 
Court. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
JBP/flc 
cc: Scott McKay, Esq. (via facsimile only) . 
624183 
Sincerely, 
Isl James B. Perrine 
James B. Perrine, Esq. 
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Qu·ane Jones McColl. PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Terrence S. Jones tsj@quonelow.com 
June 21', 2013 
VIA FACSIMILE (334) 262-0657 . 
James B. Perrine 
. BAILE;Y & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alal;>ama 36104. 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
. Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Perrine: 
US Bonk Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suile 1601 · 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise; ID 83701 
(208) 700:3939 Telephone 
(208) ·780-3930 Facsimile 
www.quonelaw.com 
I am writing in response to your letter of June 20th. Regarding the 
depositions of Ors. Garrison ar:id Frankie, their availability in August is. based so1ely on 
their limited schedules. I provided you y,1ith earlier.dates for·Or. Frankie in June, but this 
was wisely deferred until you ·are able to produce the- requ~sted·fax·records.· · Piease . 
. understan<,:1 that w~ are not lookl11g to ·ctiang~ the _trial date by-having the:se depo~Jtions. 
after the di_scovery _deadline. we· take thEfposition that we-provided· you-with complete 
expert witness discloswes in· conf6rm.ity witli the- requirerrierits of discovery. and it is . 
your decision to take depositions th.at we believe wil_j simply prove duplicative of these 
disclosures. · 
Regardii:,g your claim that we have listed multiple experts on the same 
subject matter, we disagree with your characterization. Rule 403 speaks to the 
prohibition of presenting needlessly cumulative evidence. We are mindful of this rule 
and will not run afoul of it at trial. We have listed several experts from different 
specialties of medicine to testify on behalf of the Defendants. The fact that you elected 
to only list one expert does not mean that we should be so limited at trfal. The jury is· 
entitled to hear from different experts with different background who all agree that Dr. 
Kerr did not violate the applicable local standard of practice. 
In the spirit of cooperation, we will agree to withdraw Dr. Wills as one of 
our experts. This eliminates the need to take his deposition. We do, however, intend to 
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call all of. our remammg experts at trial anc;i _will vigorously oppose any efforts. to. 
· otherwise limit the number of _defense expert witnesse .We dp not have an excessive 
number and your decision to include Dr.. Kerr in . ur. numerical ~afculation .is improper. . 
You may consider this our effort to meet and onfer and informally resqlve this m~tter. 
TSJ/ms 
cc: · Scott McKay (via fax) 
P. Gregory Haddad (via fax) 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JUN 2 6 2013 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SP A, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Rule 403 · of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and files his Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses. Because Defendants intend to offer 
multiple expert witnesses to offer blatantly duplicative, redundant, and cumulative evidence as to 
each element of this professional negligence action, defense experts should be excluded. Plaintiff 
should not be saddled with the expense of deposing all of these expert witnesses when Defendants' 
discovery responses demonstrate an overtly obvious attempt to offer evidence in violation ofldaho 
Rule of Evidence 403. 
a. Factual Background 
On June 3, 2013, Defendants served a supplemental answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 
3, which calls for expert witness information. (See Dcfs.' First Supp. Ans. to PL 's First Set of 
Interrogs (Affidavit of Counsel Exhibit A).) By their 108-page disclosure (not including 
attachments),Fefendants explicitly identify four experts who they intend to offer as standard of 
care witnesses: the Defendant, Dr. Kerr; Gregory Laurence, M.D., John Lundeby, M.D., F ACS, 
FAACS; and Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. (Id.) It should be noted, however, that Dr. Thomas Coffman 
will offer a standard of care opinion to the degree he opines "that Dr. Kerr was not required to test 
for spore~ or mold .... " (Id. at 52.)1 
According to Defendants, Drs. Kerr, Laurence, Garrison, Coffman, and Lundeby will 
testify as to "facts of the case," causation, and damages. (Id. at 2, 22, 43, 63.) Defendants intend 
to offer Dr. Stiller's testimony to address "facts of the case" and causation. All of these expert 
witnesses are intended to offer testimony on "the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard." (Id. at 2, 
22, 43, 63, 85.) 
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Defendants' supplemental answer to Plaintiffs third interrogatory is replete with examples 
of cumulative evidence. With regard to the applicable standard of care, for example, Defendants 
intend for "Dr. Kerr [to] explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of health care 
practice or otherwise, for his facility to be certified, inspected, or approved by any organization or 
governmental agency .... " (Id. at 4-5.) Defendants intend for Dr. Lundeby to provide the exact 
same testimony. (Id. at 25.) 
Additionally, Drs. Kerr, Lundeby, Coffman, and Stiller will all testify that Defendants 
employed proper techniques to maintain sterility. (Id. at 15, 24, 53, 64, 87.) Relatedly, 
Defendants intend to offer Dr. Garrison to testify that there is no evidence to establish "that there 
was any breach of sterility in this case." (Id. at 4 7; see also id. at 48 ("[S]terilization procedures 
were adequate to maintain a proper sterile field.").) These are but some of the examples of 
cumulative expert testimony contained with the subject discovery response. 
In an attempt to resolve this dispute without Court involvement, counsel exchanged 
correspondence on this issue. (Letter from James B. Perrine to Terrence S. Jones, June 20, 2013 
(Affidavit of Counsel Exhibit B); Letter from Terrence S. Jones to James B. Perrine, June 21, 
2013 (Affidavit of Counsel Exhibit C).) It is Defendants' position that they will not run afoul of 
Rule 403 because their disclosed experts are "from different specialties of medicine." (Id. at 1.) 
Plaintiff maintains disagreement with Defendants' position, and the dispute remains unresolved. 
b. Defendants' intention to offer blatantly cumulative expert witness testimony in this 
matter justifies exclusion of expert witnesses. 
It is axiomatic that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Idaho R. Evid. 403; see also Burgess v. 
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Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995) (cumulative expert 
testimony properly excluded pursuant to Idaho R. Evid. 403). 
In this matter, the overtly cumulative nature of Defendants' anticipated expert witness 
testimony is unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff. Defendants' 108-page answer to Plaintiffs third 
interrogatory contains numerous examples of cumulative testimony as to multiple elements of 
Plaintiffs cause of action. Because Defendants' disclosed expert witness testimony is so blatantly 
in violation of Rule 403, Defendants should not simply be precluded from introducing such 
cumulative evidence at trial, but Plaintiff should be spared undue and unfair prejudice of incurring 
the expense of a discovery effort, including depositions, involving experts whose role in this case 
is necessarily limited to offering cumulative testimony. 
Defendants are simply wrong to suggest that they will not run afoul of Rule 403 on account 
of their expert witnesses' varied medical specialties. The fact remains that those experts have been 
retained to offer opinions as to a single cause of action. To some degree, all experts have different 
backgrounds, yet that does not justify duplication of testimony on the same subject matter. 
Plaintiff takes no issue with the fact that Defendants may elect to offer expert testimony to 
supplement that of Dr. Kerr on any particular element of Plaintiff's cause of action. However, the 
breadth, scope, and depth of cumulative testimony demonstrated within Defendant~' discovery 
response is wholly inappropriate, as it is clearly and unfairly prejudicial. 
c. Conclusion 
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Defendants should be 
limited to two expert witnesses, including Defendant, Dr. Kerr, on any single topic. 
625832 4 
000404
Dated this 261h day of June, 2013. 
625832 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 26, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
hand delivering the same to the following: 
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161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 




David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B.Perrinejbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO 
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JUN 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, ) 
) 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, . ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 




1 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
ORIGINAL 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff gives notice to the Defendants 
that he will call for hearing his Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses on July 10, 
2013 at 3:30 p.m. before the Honorable Deborah A. Bail. 
,-
DATED this ~~ day of June, 2013. 
2 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~~~~ By~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~--- ----
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER.VICE 
""'" I hereby certify that on June J~, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
- ' 
Notice of Hearing by hand delivering the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
: ____ F.,....,~~.~ 
JUL D l 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
liy ANNAMAR_IE MEYER 
DEPU,V. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
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MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES 
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. Terrence S. Jones, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, and the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's 
First Supplemental Responses to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's 
Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the 
professional credentials and curriculum vitae of Ors. Stiller, Laurence, Lundeby, Garrison 
and Coffman. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the 
McLean Decision. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the B.C. 
Sims Decision. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Kobos 
Decision. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the 
Johnson Decision. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the 
Frederick Decision. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES - 2 
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transcript from an oral ruling by the Honorable Joel D. Horton in the case of Yoonas v. 
Ediger, Ada County Case No. CV Pl 0000249D. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the 
transcript from an oral ruling by the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in the case of Strandbakke 
v. Moreno, Nez Perce County, No. CV 05-0002547. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nct day of July, 2013. 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES - 3 
000412
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed 
as follows: 
David Z. Nevin [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Scott McKay [ ] Hand Delivered 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2772 [ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
Boise, Idaho 83701 [X] Email 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
2855 Cranberry Square [ ] Overnight Mail 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 [ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 [X] Email 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 [ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 [X] Email 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Honorable Deborah A. Bail [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
District Court [X] Hand Delivered 
200 W Front St [ ] Overni Mail 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 [ ] Fae ile (334) 262-0657 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 59~-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff Charles Ballard ("Plaintiff'), in accordance with Rule 33 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits the following Supplemental Responses to 
Defendants' First Set oflnterrogatories. 
General Statements and Objections 
A. Representations of fact and law herein are made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These responses represent Plaintiffs best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-work product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it calls for information 
subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for critical self-
examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information arguably 
subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are not waived beyond 
the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in that no 
disclosure of anything which is actually privileged is intended. 
C. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those commonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does not exist. 
E. No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is waived by the 
provision of any response herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 
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RESPONSES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please set forth the name and address of each and every 
individual known to you or your counsel who has knowledge or who purports to have knowledge 
of any of the facts of this case. By this Interrogatory we seek the names and addresses of all 
:_..J: •. :.l .. ~1~ ••• t..~ t..~ •• ~ 1,-~ ... ln...ln-o n~ ,...,,..,...n.-f- i-n 1-,.,,,.,. lrnnn,lorlrTi:> nf' tl,,:, f'<>f'fc, nf' tl,ic, f'!:!C,P ,~1h1f'h 
111Ul V 1uua1~ VV J.lU 11a V V J.\...llV vv l\.lUE,V VJ. pu1. _lJVJ. L. 1.,V J..lU. v '-"' .l.'-.1..1.V vw .1.vu.ov VL \..1..1.- .&.-. ........ u _,,,_ ...... u ......... _...,_ ................... ... 
/' \ 
I I 
pertain to your claim for damages as well as matters pertaining to liability. 
/ I 
\ / 
/ SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: 
; New Address: Charles Ballard, 2590 Hidden Estates Circle, Navarre, FL 32566. 
I 
' I 
; Persons with knowledge of the marriage between Plaintiff and Krystal Ballard and 
Plaintiffs loss of comfort and support from the untimely death of Krystal Ballard and Krystal 
Ballard's service to the United States as an enlisted member of the United States Air Force and 
her career plans, include but are not limited to: 
Tearie Wilkins, 2275 Lexington Drive, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana 71110; and 
Jonelle Cadiz, 1500 Sheridan Drive, Jacksonville, Arkansas 72076. 
Persons with knowledge of Krystal Ballard's service to the United States and 
performance while an enlisted member of the United States Air Force include, but are not limited 
to: 
MSgt. Rachel L. Tower, United States Air Force (currently deployed); and 
Lt. Col. Michael R. Auel, United States Air Force. 
The following individuals were involved in the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard 
beginning on July 25, 2010, until her death just after midnight on July 26, 2010. The knowledge 
and information possessed by each of these individuals, including opinions held, are set forth in 
the previously produced records associated with these individuals and referenced again below. 
3 - PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS FIR.ST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
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Elmore Ambulance Service, 895 N. 6th East, Mountain Home, Idaho 83647. (See Bates 
EASOOOOOl - EAS000034, previously produced.) 
Cody Murphy, EMT; and 
Wendy Vanderburgh, EMT - Paramedic. 
Elmore Medical Center, 895 N. 6th Street, Mountain 
EMC000001-EMC000029, previously produced.) 
Karl Olson, MD - Emergency Department; 
Bertrem Stemmler, MD - Medical Imaging; and 




J.ua11v Q'lt::/1'7 U.JV"T I. 
Life Flight Network, 2779 S Liberty St, Boise, Idaho 83709 (See Bates LFNOOOOOl -
LFN000005, previously produced.) 
Beth Studebaker, RN; and 
Steve Mozingo, PM. 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 1055 North Curtis Road, Boise, Idaho 83706 (See 
Bates SAMCOOOOOl - SAMC000192, previously produced.) 
Matthew Campbell, MD - Emergency Department; 
Tisha Fujii, DO - Critical Care; 
Billy Mrogan, MD - Surgical Consult; 
Jeffrey Symmonds, MD - Vascular Examination; 
Michael Kenner, MD - Heart & Vascular Center; and 
Howard Schaff, MD - Gem State Radiology. 
See also records for attending nursing and other staff to include David Atkinson, RN; 
Rob Hart, RN; Debra Servatius, RN; Kristin Prescott, RN: Tensie Tobenas, RN; Benjamin 
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Gagnebin, RN; Shirley Phillips, DTR (diet/nutrition); Ann Schaffer, CRT; and Wynne Proctor, 
RN. 
The following individuals who participated or contributed to the autopsy and death 
investigation of Krystal Ballard conducted by the Ada County Coroner's office, 5550 Morris Hill 
n __ ..J n_;__ T..l .... 1- .... Q')r,f'\C 'T"l- .... 1 ... _ .............. 1 .... ..J,..,. .... ,,...._,l :-+--- ..... -,.~-- __ ,..,,,,,,...,.,,.....-1 t..... .... r ,.,.n,...h ,....+ +h,,.g= 
l\.Ui1U, DU1::.c;, 1Ui111U OJ /VU. 111c; .l\.HUVV.lc;U!:,C a.uu 1111uu11auu11 }'U.::,.::,1,,.::,.::,1,,u uy l,,C,.1,,U V.L Ull,,,;, 
individuals, including opinions held, are set forth in the previously produced records associated 
with these individuals and the Coroner's office. (See Bates ADAOOOOOl - ADAOOOOl l, 
previously produced.) 
Erwin L. Sonnenberg, Coroner; 
Glen R. Groben, M.D., Forensic Pathologist - in particular see Autopsy Report authored 
by Dr. Groben, dated September 24, 2010 (Bates ADA000004 - ADAOOOOll), previously 
produced); 
Robert Karinen, Forensic Lab Supervisor; 
Barton L. Kline, Forensic Lab Technician; and 
Kelly Cole, Coroner's Investigator - in particular see Investigative Report and 
Investigative/Narrative Report (Bates ADAOOOOOl -ADA000003, previously produced.) 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person 
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, and for each such person set forth a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data 
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used 
as a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years, the compensation to be paid for the testimony and a listing of any 
5 - PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
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J 
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: 
Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
Sorensen Cosmetic Surgery Center 
250 Bobwhite Comt, Suite 120 
Boise, ID 83706 
Dean Sorensen, M.D. is a physician who has practiced cosmetic medicine including 
plastic surgery in Ada County for over 20 years. He owns and operates the Sorensen Cosmetic 
Surgery Center of Idaho. Dr. Sorensen's facility serves the Boise and Eagle, Idaho areas. Dr. 
Sorensen also has staff privileges at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center in Boise. Dr. Sorensen 
is familiar with the standard of care applicable to defendants at the time Krystal Ballard was 
treated by Dr. Kerr at his clinic, Silk Touch MedSpa and Laser Center. He is f~iliar with the 
standard of care applicable to physicians such as Defendant Brian Kerr, M.D. practicing 
cosmetic medicine including cosmetic and aesthetic procedures and surgery in Ada County 
including Boise and Eagle at the time Krystal Ballard was treated by Dr. Kerr at his clinic in July 
2010. 
Dr. Sorensen's Curriculum Vitae is attached in supplemental response to Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 6. By way of background, he received his degree in medicine from Loyola 
University in Chicago. Upon completion of his medical school training, Dr. Sorensen underwent 
an internship followed by a residency in general surgery at Highland Hospital in Oakland, 
California and the U.S. Naval Hospital in Portsmouth, Virginia. Subsequently, he undertook a 
two-year fellowship in plastic surgery at the University of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake 
City. Following a facelift fellowship, Dr. Sorensen returned to Boise where his practice includes 
p~astic, aesthetic and reconstructive procedures and services. Dr. Sorensen is board-certified by 
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the American Board of Surgery and the American Board of Plastic Surgery. He is a Fellow of 
the American College of Surgeons, a member of the American Society of Plastic Surgeons and 
the Aesthetic Society. He is a member of the AMA and Idaho Medical Association. He is past 
President of the Ada County Medical Society. He has served on the Idaho State Board of 
AAAASF, which certifies ambulatory surgical facilities similar to that of the defendants for 
compliance with local and national standards of care, including the sterilization policies, 
procedures and protocols employed by such facilities. By virtue of his education, training and 
experience as described above, Dr. Sorensen is familiar with the standard of care for physicians 
and surgical facilities offering cosmetic and aesthetic services such as those performed by the 
defendants and which were performed on Krystal Ballard by the defendants, including the 
appropriate sterilization policies, procedure and protocols required by the standard of care in 
both the Boise, Eagle, Ada County and surrounding areas. Dr. Sorensen is familiar with the 
applicable standard of health care practice in the areas served by St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, to include Ada County, Idaho and the cities 
of Boise and Eagle, which existed at the time and place of the treatment of Krystal Ballard on or 
about July 21, 2010 in Eagle, Idaho, and which was applicable to the class of health care 
providers to which the defendants Dr. Kerr and his clinic, Silk Touch Med Spa & Laser Center, 
belong, and in which he and the clinic were functioning, and which applied to similarly trained 
and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account their 
training, experience, and fields of medical specialization (hereafter "the applicable standard of 
care"). 
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Dr. Sorensen has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, including the 
report of the post-mortem examination of Krystal Ballard. He has also reviewed the deposition 
transcripts of Dr. Kerr, Ms. Kerr and Donna Berg as part of his review in this case. As discovery 
proceeds, Dr. Sorensen will receive additional discovery materials as they become available and, 
therefore, his anticipated opinions are subject to modificatiorr ai-id supplementation. 
Sorensen's anticipated opinions will be to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
A 11 ~+ T"\-
I"l.11 VJ. .L.11. 
It is expected that Dr. Sorensen will testify that Krystal Ballard died as a direct and 
proximate result of conduct of the defendants that was not only negligent, but rose to the level of 
reckless misconduct, and which grossly violated the applicable standard of care. A review of the 
depositions reveal that Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff lacked adequate training in appropriate 
sterilization of a facility, its equipment and instruments. Further, Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff 
failed to properly avail themselves of information readily available to provide for appropriate 
sterility in carrying out their cosmetic and aesthetic practice. These standards are readily 
available from organizations that certify ambulatory and surgical facilities, the Center for 
Disease Control, the medical literature, and references within the user's manual of the machinery 
used during Krystal Ballard's surgery and medical treatment. 
Specifically, but without limitation, it is expected that Dr. Sorensen will testify as 
follows: 
1. Krystal Ballard died from septic shock as a result of bacteria which entered her body 
during the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010 at the defendants' facility. 
2. The infection was introduced into Ms. Ballard's buttocks during the procedure and 
was determined to be gram negative rods which are commonly found in stool. While a failure to 
appropriately prepare the patient for the fat transfer could have been the cause of the bacteria 
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being introduced into Krystal Ballard's body, most likely it occurred because the material 
obtained from the abdomen was contaminated because of the wholly inadequate, negligent, and 
reckless misconduct of the defendants in failing to sterilize the instruments and equipment used 
during the procedure. 
3. The procedure ioom used for the liposuction on :t'v1s. Ballard \~1as not a clean 
environment by any reasonable surgical standards. It was used for other, non-surgical 
procedures and as a storage area for supplies and contaminated instruments used during 
procedures. 
4. The instruments used in the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on Ms. Ballard 
were initially put in a basin in the procedure room and "washed" with Hibiclens and alcohol. 
Alcohol is not approved as a sterilization solution, nor is Hibiclens approved for sterilization of 
medical instruments, supplies or equipment. 
5. The dirty instruments were taken from the procedure room not to an area designated 
for dirty equipment, but rather to a room where the autoclave was kept for allegedly sterilizing 
the equipmen~. 
6. The defendants broke almost every rule of safe care of surgical instruments as 
measured by any reasonable standard in their treatment of Ms. Ballard. There were no protocols 
or procedures for cleaning of instruments, nor housekeeping and cleaning of the procedure room 
or the clean room. After the initial gross cleaning in the procedure room the instruments were 
placed in a Hibiclens/alcohol mixture not an approved proteolytic enzyme solution wash and 
were then transferred to the room where the autoclave was, which should have been but was not 
a clean room. 
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7. The autoclave used depends on the mechanical monitoring of sterilization. Gauges on 
the autoclave do not ensure sterilization. The defendants admit there was no maintenance and 
service checks of the autoclave, nor were any logs kept of any inspection of the autoclave. 
8. Allegedly chemical indicators were used, but Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff do not wrap 
documentation of internal as well as external use of chemical indicators because chemical 
indicators cannot be used as means of ensuring sterility. Biological indicators must be used 
(spore tests) but were not. The failure to use biological indicators and spore counts is egregious. 
9. The autoclave used by the defendants in their treatment of Ms. Ballard as an alleged 
means of sterilizing hollow chambers and cannulas must have both a negative or vacuum 
pressure as well as a gravity cycle. The former forces steam through the cannula for appropriate 
sterilization of the instruments. 
10. The employees handling the instruments used to treat Ms. Ballard and responsible for 
cleaning and sterilization do not have an adequate medical background, nor adequate training in 
the safe handling, cleaning and sterilization of equipment, nor were there any protocols in place 
to provide that guidance, and Dr. Kerr himself lacks fundamental knowledge of appropriate 
cleaning and sterilization to provide the training and guidance to other staff. 
Dr. Sorensen will testify that defendants including specifically Dr. Kerr violated the 
applicable standard of care by virtue of the above described treatment of Krystal Ballard. Dr. 
Kerr and defendants breached the applicable standard of care in the way in which they operated 
the facility at the time Ms. Ballard was treated, including through the complete neglect and 
failure to adhere to even the most basic standards required in the Boise, Eagle and Ada County 
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areas, and defendants' conduct was negligent, reckless and demonstrated a willful disregard for 
patient safety which lead directly to and proximately caused the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Sorensen charges $500.00 per hour in connection with his consultation and services 
as an expert witness in this matter. He has not authored any publications within the preceding 
ten years and has not testified as an. expert at trial or deposition within the preceding four years. 
George Nichols, M.D. 
73 9 Middle Way 
Louisville, KY 40206 
Dr. Nichols is a medical doctor who specializes in anatomical, clinical, and forensic 
pathology. A copy of Dr. Nichols' Curriculum Vitae, which outlines his education, training, and 
experience in his medical specialty is provided as part of Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses to 
Interrogatory No. 6. Dr. Nichols has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, 
including the autopsy report prepared in conjunction with the post-mortem examination, as well 
as recuts of the pathology slides from the post-mortem examination. As discovery proceeds, Dr. 
Nichols will receive additional discovery materials and, therefore, his anticipated opinions are 
subject to modification and supplementation. All of Dr. Nichols' opinions are expected to be to 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
It is expected that Dr. Nichols will testify that the bacterial infection from which Krystal 
Ballard died was a direct result of bacteria being introduced into her body during the procedure 
performed by Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010, and as a result of a breach in sterility, as gram negative 
rods are proof to a reasonable degree of certainty that a breach in sterility occurred. As a result 
of bacteria being introduced into her body, Krystal ·Ballard was exposed to an exotoxin, which 
causes an inflammatory response (toxic shock) and blood vessels to dilate. As a result of the 
sepsis, Krystal Ballard's organs were underperfused, ischemia to the organs ensued, a!1d Krystal 
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Ballard succumbed to multisystem organ failure. Dr. Nichols will testify that there is no other 
reason for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria introduced intra-
operatively during the procedure, most likely as a result of contaminated equipment. 
Dr. Nichols charges $400.00 per hour in connection with his consultation and services as 
where an out-of-state appearance necessitates his missing an entire day's work. 
A listing of any other cases in which Dr. Nichols has testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition within the. preceding four years is attached hereto1, bates numbered 
BALLARD000200 - BALLARD000207. 
Keith Barclay Armitage, M.D. 
12600 Cedar Road 
Cleveland Heights, OH 44106 
Dr. Armitage is a medical doctor, who specializes in infectious disease. A copy of Dr. 
Armitage's Curriculum Vitae, which outlines his education, training, and experience in that 
medical specialty, is provided as part of Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 6. Dr. Armitage has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, 
including the autopsy report prepared in conjunction with the post-mortem examination. As 
discovery proceeds, Dr. Armitage will receive additional discovery materials and, therefore his 
anticipated opinions are subject to modification and supplementation. All of Dr. Armitage's 
opinions are expected to be to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
It is expected that Dr. Armitage will testify that the bacterial infection from which 
Krystal Ballard died was a direct result of bacteria being introduced into her body during the 
procedure performed by Defendant Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010, which occurred as a result of a 
1 All documents referenced in this Supplemental Response are contained on a compact disc attached hereto. 
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breach m sterility. The gram negative rod bacteria discovered at autopsy are proof to a 
reasonable degree of certainty that they resulted from operative sterility issues from instruments 
used during the procedure and introduced intra-operatively. As a result of the bacteria being 
introduced into Krystal Ballard's body during the procedure performed by Defendant Dr. Kerr, 
A listing of all publications authored by Dr. Armitage within the preceding ten years is 
attached hereto, bates numbered BALLARD000254 - BALLARD000260. 
Dr. Armitage, in connection with his consultation and services as an expert witness in this 
matter, charges $300.00 per hour to review records, discuss the case, and prepare any reports, 
$400.00 per hour to attend any deposition, and $1,500.00 per half day to testify at trial. 
Cornelius A. Hofman 
The GEC Group 
5555 N. Star Ridge Way 
Star, ID 83669 
Cornelius A. Hofman is an economist. A copy of Mr. Hofman's Curriculum Vitae, 
which outlines his qualifications, professional experience, and background is provided as part of 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 6. Mr. Hofman will 
present testimony on his opinions of net present value of lost financial support and lost non-
financial support to Plaintiff, which is attributed to the untimely death of Krystal Ballard. Mr. 
Hofman has been provided information concerning the educational background, employment 
history, and wage earning and benefits history of Krystal Ballard, as well as the services Mrs. 
Ballard provided to her husband. Please refer to the materials attached hereto and bates 
numbered GECOOOOOl- GEC000347. 
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As discovery proceeds, Mr. Ho.fman will receive additional discovery materials, expected 
to include, but not be limited to, the tax return information for Mrs. Ballard and Plaintiff, 
economic and financial literature, college transcripts, and military benefits. Accordingly, his 
anticipated opinions are subject to modification and supplementation. 
~.1r. Hofman, in connection 'Nith his consultation and services as an expert witness in this 
matter, charges $3,900.00 for analysis and report preparation and $490.00 per hour to testify at 
any deposition or trial. 
A listing of any other cases in which Mr. Hofman has testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition within the preceding four years 1s attached hereto, bates numbered 
BALLARD000224 - BALLARD000231. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: For each and every person you have identified in 
answer to Interrogatory No. 5, set forth the qualifications, professional experience and 
background of the individual. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:2 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
are set forth at BALLARD000233 - BALLARD000235, attached hereto. 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of George Nichols, M.D. are 
set forth at BALLARD000190-BALLARD000199, attached hereto. 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of Keith Barclay Armitage, 
M.D. are set forth at BALLARD000236 - BALLARD000253, attached hereto. 
2 As previously noted, the documents referenced in this Supplemental Response are contained on a compact disc 
attached hereto 
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The qualifications, professional experience and background of Cornelius A. Hofman are 
set forth at BALLARD000208 - BALLARD000223, attached hereto. 
DA TED this 261h day of March, 2013. 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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• I 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard ("Plaintiff'), in accordance with Rule 33 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits the following Second Supplemental Answers to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories. 
General Statements and Objections 
A. Representations of fact and law herein arc made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These answers represent Plaintiffs best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-work product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogatory to the extent that it calls for 
information subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for 
critical self-examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information 
arguably subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are not waived 
beyond the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in 
that no disclosure of anything which is actually privileged is intended. 
C. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogatory to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those commonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does not exist. 
E. No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is waived by the 
provision of any answer herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 




INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person 
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, and for each such person set forth a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data 
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used 
as a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years, the compensation to be paid for the testimony and a listing of any 
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: 
Plaintiff previously disclosed Cornelius A. Hofman with the GEC Group in response to 
this interrogatory. Mr. Hofman is an economist. Plaintiff supplements his prior response to this 
interrogatory concerning Mr. Hofman and produces herewith Mr. Hofman's report dated May 8, 
2013, styled "Assessment of Economic Loss" prepared in connection with this case and the death 
of Krystal Melissa Ballard, bates numbered GEC000351-GEC000395. 
Additionally, we provided Mr. Hofman with Krystal's transcript from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University and her transcript from University of Maryland University College. 
Those documents are bates numbered GEC000348-GEC000349 and GEC000350, respectively, 
and are attached hereto. 
Plaintiff previously disclosed Keith Armitage, M.D., in response to this interrogatory. 
Dr. Armitage specializes in infectious disease medicine. In addition to the previously disclosed 
opinions of Dr. Armitage, which are incorporated by reference herein, it is expected that Dr. 
Armitage will testify concerning the lack of effect the antibiotic prescribed by Dr. Kerr would 
have on the gram negative bacteria cultured at autopsy. Dr. Armitage is expected to testify that 
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the antibiotic prescribed by Dr. Kerr in follow up to the procedure he performed on Krystal 
Ballard would not be effective in treating gram negative bacteria. Further, the prescribing of a 
Medrol Dosepak by Dr. Kerr would suppress the body's own immune system and have a 
deleterious effect on a patient with an infection. Further, Dr. Armitage will testify that the time 
interval between the cosmetic procedure and Krystal Ballard's death is such that the introduction 
of the fatal bacteria occurred intraoperatively. Had the infection occurred post-operatively, 
Krystal Ballard would not have exhibited signs of sepsis until much later. Additionally, the 
bacteria responsible for post-operative infections are gram positive bacteria, usually from skin 
flora, not gram negative bacteria. As such, the gram negative bacteria is not a typical post-
operative infection but rather one coming from peritoneal cavity flora which must have been 
transferred to the buttocks during the fat transfer. 
Further, Plaintiff saith not. 
DATED this 14111 day of May, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP e.~~v By: 0-v e,,r 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 





7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
(901) 752-4999 
Gregory N. Laur~nce, M.D. 
Professional Experience 
Medical Director, Complete Medical Care Germantown & Germantown Aesthetics Surgery Center 
Hospital Laparotomy privileges 
Qualified in laparoscopic procedures 
Obstetrical Family-centered care 
Capable abdominal and vascular ultrasound 
Training, experience, and proven ability in office cosmetic surgery, facial and body 
Diplomat 1995-2000 
Board American Academy of Family Fellow 2000-present 
Certification Physicians 
8880 Ward Parkway 
Kansas City, Missouri 64114-2797 
September 1995-present 
2009 - present 
American Board of.Laser Surgery 
Diplomat 
Medical Tennessee #25017-lssued 10/26/93 
Li censure State of Tennessee Division of Health 
Related Boards. Expires 6/30/2013 
Idaho, pending licensure 
Utah, pendinq licensure 
Fellow 
Medical May 2008 American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Education Surgery 
July 1995-June 1996 The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
Fellowship in Advanced Women's Health 
Director, Charles E. Couch, M.D., 
FACOG 
July 1992-June 1995 The University of Tenr:iessee, Memphis 
UT/Sai!lt Francis Family Practice 
Residencv Proaram, Memphis, TN 
August 1988-June 1992 University of Texas at Houston Medical 
School, Houston, Texas-M.D. Degree 
June 1992 
Previous January 1987-May 1.987 University of Houston, Houston, Texas 
Education Graduate Studies 
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September 1981-May 1986 Baylor University 
Waco, Texas 
B.S. DeQree in Bioloav 
American Institute of Ultrasound in I I 
Society Medicine (AIUM) 1994-present I I 
Memberships 
Association of American Physicians 
and Surgery 1999-present 
American Academy of Family 1 
Physicians (AAFP) 1992-present 
I 
American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Surgeons 2003-present 
National Society of Cosmetic · 
Physicians 2011-present 
American.Congress of Phlebology 
2009-present 
I 
Baptist Memorial Hospital - East, 
i 
Hospital I 
Appointments Department of Family Medicine 
Chairman October 1999 - 2000 I 
Baptist Memorial Hospital - East, 
Medical Executive Committee, 2000 
TeneUSt. Francis Hospital, 
Maternal/Fetal Well-Being Committee 
1998-2000 
Methodist Hospital, FP/OB Joint 
Practice Committee 1998 - 2000 
University The University of Tennessee, 
App_ointments Memphis 
Department of Family Medicine 
Clinical Instructor July 1, 1995-Jun~ 
30, 1996 
Associate Clinical Professor July 1, 
1996-oresent 
Hospital Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Appointments Saint Francis Hospital Methodist Hospital 
5959 Park Avenue 1265 Union Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38119 Memphis, TN 38104 
August 7, 1995-present December 1, 1996-2003 
Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Baptist Memorial Hospital Delta Medical Center 
899 Madison Avenue 3000 Getwell Road 
Memphis, TN 38146 Memphis, TN 38118 
October 1996-present September 12, 1996-present 
(901) 369-8517; fax 369-8503 






Private Practice (August 1996-1999) 
Peabody Healthcare 
6005 Park Avenue Suite 4248 
Memphis, TN 38119 
Private Practice (August 1999-2002) 
Laurence Family Practice & Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2002-2008) 
Germantown Family Practice & 
Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (2003-present) 
Germantown Aesthetics, LP 
7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2008-
present) 
Complete Medical Care Germantown 
7 485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2009-
present) 
The Vein Institute 
7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Laurence, Gregory; Orientale, 
Eugene, Jr., "Colorectal Cancer: 
Screening Diagnosis and 
Management," Manual of Family 
Practice; ed.: Robert B. Taylor, 
publisher: Little Brown. 1996. 
Laurence, Gregory, "Obstetrical 
Privileging in Memphis," Tennessee 
Family Physician; ed.: J. Lou Manning, 
pg 8-9, winter 1999. 
Laurence, Gregory, "MemoryGel TM 
Breast Implant Post-Approval Study," 
IRB Company, Inc; ed.: Clinical Study. 
5271 Mentor PAS 
June 30 - July 3, 2001 
July10-July 12, 2002 
June 2003 
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Subfascial Breast Augmentation 
Internal Mastopexy 
J. Dan Metcalf, MD (Oklahoma City, OK) 
i 




June 2004 Robert Shumway, MD (LaJolla, CA) 
June 2003 Biplanar Breast Augmentation 
June 2004 Chip Splinter, MD (San Diego, CA) 
June 2004 Transumbilical Breast Augmentation 
June 2005 Peter Cheski, MD (Beverley Hills, CA) 
Adam Baker, M.D. 
References 2120 Merchants Row Ste 2 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Ph: (901) 362-7170 
Susan Nelson, M.D. 
2032 Satinwood 
Memphis, TN 38119 
(901) 758-8287 
William Macmillan Rodney, M.D. 
Chairman University of Tennessee 
Department of Family Medicine, 1989-
1997 
6575 Black Thorn Cove 
Memphis, TN 38119 
(901) 753-0423 
Malpractice State Volunteer Mutual Insurance 
Insurance Company 
Carrier 
1 M/3M coverage 8/5/96 to present 
101 Westpark Drive, Suite 300, P.O. 
' Box 1065 
Brentwood, Tennessee 37024-1065 
(615) 377-1999 or (800) 342-2239; fax 
(615) 377-9192 
DEA Certificate BL3847083, exp 3/31/2014 
University of Tennessee Community 
Honors Physicians Award for teaching medical 
students 2003 
"Physician Champion" for Baptist 
Memorial Hospital Celebrate Nursing 
Germantown News Reader's Choice 
Award "Best Physician" - 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011 ' 
Plastic Surgery Practice 
Best of 2011 
Named 'One of the Top Cosmetic 
Surgeons in the Nation' 
The Aesthetic Awards 2011-2012 
Awarded 'Best Non-Surgical Facial I 
Reiuvenation' 
I 













Geoffrey D. Stiller, MD, FACS, FAACS 
Mining and Mechanical Institute, Freeland, PA 
Eastern College, St. Davids, PA 
Graduated Magna Cum Laude with a B.S. in Biology and minor in 
Chemistry 
University of Minnesota Medical School 
Graduate medical studies leading to an MD 
i 
Intern in General Surgery, Graduate Hospital, Philadelphia, PA 
Resident in General Surgery, Graduate Hospital, ·Philadelphia, PA 
I 
Administrative Chief Surgical Resident, Graduate Hospital, 
Philadelphia, PA 
Fellow in Cosmetic Surgery, Southcenter Cosmetic Surgery and 
Hair Restoration, Inc. Seattle, WA 
Aug 2001-June 2005 USAF, Mountain Home AFB, Mountain Home, ID 
Staff General Surgeon, Chief of Surgery, Officer in charge of 
I 
Surgery Clinic, Interim Chief of Medical Staff 
2002-2005 Department of Veterans Affairs, Boise, ID 
Associate Staff General Surgeon without compensation 
Jan 2005-July 2005 Palouse Surgeons, LLC, Pullman, WA 
General Surgeon Locum Tenem 
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Aug 2005-Aug 2008 Palouse Surgeons, LLC, Pullman, WA 
Owner, General/Vascular /Thoracic/Laparoscopic Surgeon 
Sept 2007-Aug 2008 Southcenter Cosmetic Surgery & Hair Resoration, Inc., 
Seattle, WA 
Cosmetic Surgery Fellow 
Sept 2008-Mar 2009 Genesis ENT and Plastic Surgery, Charlotte, NC 
Cosmetic Surgeon 
I 
Apr 2009-Mar 2010 Uplift Cosmetic Surgery, Laser and Skin Center, Charlotte, NC 
Owner 




Palouse S~rgeons, LLC, Pullman, WA 
Cosmetic and General Surgeon 
Aug 2005-Aug 2008 Affiliate Faculty University of Washington Medical School 
WWAMI program 
20010-present Faculty of the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Publications: 
Stiller, GD, et al: A Unique Method of Body Contouring after Massive Weight Loss. 
The American Journal of Cosmetic Surgery. 3:130 
Weese, JL, et al: Neoadjuvant chemotherapy, radical resection with intraoperative 
radiation therapy (IORT): Improved treatment for gastric adenocarcinoma. 
Surgery 128-4:566-71, 2000 
Centeno, RF, et al: An alternative approach: antegrade catheter-directed thrombolysis in a 




















Brazilian Butt Lift. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Awake lnframammary Breast Augmentation .• National Society of 
I 
Cosmetic Physicians 
Brazilian Butt Lift. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Liposuction of the Inner and Outer thigh, Banana roll, and Knees 
National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Abdominoplasty Complications. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Thighplasty. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Breast Augmentation Approaches. National/ Society of Cosmetic 
Physicians 
Facial Rejuvenation with Facelift and Fat Transfers. National Society 
Of Cosmetic Physicians 
Cosmetic Surgery on the Palouse. Gritman Medical Center 
Breast Cancer and Reconstruction. Moscow Breast Cancer Support Group 
Brazilian Butt Lift. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Breast Augmentation Techniques. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Facial Rejuvenation using Autologous Fat Transfer. National Society of 
Cosmetic Physicians 
Hand Rejuvenation using Autologous Fat Transfer. National Society of 
Cosmetic Physicians 
Mini-Facelift. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Lipo-Abdominoplasty. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
1998 Robert Lauks Award: chosen by faculty as the exemplary surgical 
resident in overall knowledge and care of the surgical patient (one award 
given per year for the entire residency) 
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2000 Robert Lauks Award: chosen by faculty as the exemplary surgical resident in 
overall knowledge and care of the surgical patient (one award given per year 








State of Idaho 
Paul Nemir Award: chosen by faculty and peers as the senior surgical resident 
with outstanding surgical skills and knowledge 
Customer Service Award Hero: Mountain Home AFB patient survey 
Customer Service Award Hero: Mountain Home AFB patient survey 
Customer Service Award Hero: Mountain Home AFB patient survey 
USAF Meritorious Service Medal 
Pullman Regional Hospital Patient Satisfaction Award, Runner-up 
State of Washington 
State of North Carolina expired, not renewed 
State of South Carolina expired, not renewed 
State of Pennsylvania expired, not renewed 
Board Certification: 
Board Certified by the American College of Surgery 2003, re-certified 2012 
Board Certified by the American Board of Cosmetic Surgery 2011 
Society Memberships: 
Fellow of the American College of Surgeons 
Fellow of the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery 
Idaho Medical Association 
000443
Washington Medical Association 
Hobbies: 




John P. Lundeby, MD, FACS, FAACS 
Curriculum Vita 
Shape Cosmetic Surgery and Med Spa, PLLC 
AAAHC Accredited Surgery Center 
524 W. 61h Avenue 
Spokane,WA 99204 
Birth Information: 
Cottonwood, Idaho USA 
Current Positions: 
Owner- Shape Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
Nov 2009-current 
Owner- North Idaho Surgery, PLLC 
Nov 2009-current 
Previous Positions: 
Co-Owner- The Laser & Vein Center, PLLC, dba Reflections Med Spas 
Jan 2005-Jan 2010 
Co-Owner- Lake City Surgeons, PLLC 
Jan 2005-current 
Senior Partner and Owner- Palouse Surgical Associates, PLLC 
Aug 1996-Dec 2007 
Education: 
University of Washington School of Medicine, MD 
Jun 1991 
University of Idaho, BS Zoology with Chemistry Minor 
May 1987 
North Idaho College, AAS Machine Shop 
May 1982 
000445
Postgraduate Medical Education: 
Chief Resident in General Surgery 
San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jul 1994-Jun 1996 
Resident in General Surgery 
San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jul 1992-Jun 1994 
Intern in General Surgery 
San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jun 1991-Jun 1992 
Professional Licensure/Certification: 
Board Certified, American Board of Cosmetic Surgery, 
Body, Breast & Extremity Surgery 
2012-current 
Board Eligible, American Board of Laser Surgery 
2010 
Board Certified, Recertified, American Board of Surgery 
2006-current 
Board Certified, American Board of Surgery 
1997-2006 
Idaho State Medical License 
1997-cu rrent 
Washington State Medical License 
1996-current 
California State Medical License 
1992, now inactive 
DEA Certificate Idaho 
1992-current 
DEA Certificate Washington 
000446
2008-current 
Idaho Board of Pharmacy Certificate 
1997-cu rrent 
Diplomat, National Board of Medical Examiners 
1992 
Advanced Cardiac Life Support Certified 
1989-current 
Advanced Trauma Life Support Certified 
Current 
Pediatric Life Support 
Previously Certified 
Professional Society Memberships: 
Fellow, American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery 
Faculty Member, National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Fellow, American College of surgeons 
Member, American College of Phlebology 
Member, American Society for Laser Medicine and Surgery 
Member, Idaho Medical Association 
Member, Kootenai Benewah Medical Society 
Member, Spokane County Medical Society 
Member, Washington State Medical Association 
Member, American Medical Association 
Committee Appointments/Offices Held: 
Chairman, Executive Committee and Medical Staff Committee, Shape Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
2009-present 
Chairman, Medical Quality Improvement Committee, Shape Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
2009-present 
President, Kootenai-Benewah Medical Society 
2007-2008 
000447
Trauma Director, Kootenai Medical Center 
2006-2007 
Secretary Treasurer/President Elect, Kootenai Benewah Medical Society 
2006-2007 
Chairman, Board of Directors, Palouse Surgery Center, LLC 
2002-2004 
Chief of Surgery, Gritman Medical Center 
Chief of Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Chief of Trauma, Gritman Medical Center 
Co-Director, Intensive Care Unit, Pullman Memorial Hospital 
Chief of Surgery, Pullman Memorial Hospital 
Vice President Medical Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Secretary Treasurer Medical Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Member, Medical Staff Executive Committee, San Joaquin General Hospital 
Editorial Board, Hospital Physician 
President, San Joaquin General Hospital Housestaff Association 
Honors/ Awards: 
Most Outstanding Surgical Trainee 
San Joaquin General Hospital 
1996 
Faculty/Teaching Positions: 
Clinical Faculty, NSOCP 
2009-present 
Clinical Lecturer, Cynosure Corporation 
2008-present 
Certified Trainer in Laser Medicine, Cutera 
2006-2008 
Clinical Instructor, Surgery 
Department of Surgery 
000448
University of Washington 
1997-2008 
Affiliate Faculty, Clinical Instructor 
WWAMI Program 
University of Idaho 
1997-2008 
Medical Staff Appointments: 
Kootenai Medical Center 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
2005-present, currently Community Associate Staff 
Northwest Specialty Hospital 
Post Falls, Idaho 
2005-2012 
Northern Idaho Advanced Care Hospital 
Post Falls, Idaho 
August 2006-2012 
Research/Presentations/ Articles: 
"Lasers in Clinical Medicine", Houston, TX 
Dec 2010 
"Arm Liposuction", NSOCP, Tucson, AZ 
Nov 2010 
"Pitfalls to Avoid in Liposuction", NSOCP, Tucson, AZ 
Nov 2010 
"Lasers in Clinical Medicine", Cynosure, Seattle, Las Vegas, Austin, 
Houston, New York City, Greenwich, Phoenix, Chicago 
2009-2010 
"Smartlipo: A Clinician's Perspective", Seattle, WA 
Aug 2008 
"Smartlipo for Practitioners", Seattle, WA 
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Jun 2008 
"Vein Therapy Using the Cutera 1064 nm Laser", Cutera Clinical Forum, Washington, DC 
May 2007 
"Thoracic Trauma", CE presentation to the ED Nurses, Kootenai Medical Center, 
Mar 2007 
"Chest Trauma", CE presentation to Coeur d'Alene Fire Department Paramedics 
Feb 2007 
"Vein Treatment Using the 1064 nm Cutera Laser", Corporate Webinar, Cutera International 
Jan 2007 
"Body contouring: Dr. Michelangel~?", North Idaho Business Journal 
Dec 2006 
"Varicose Vein Treatment", Risk Management presentation, NPIC, Portland, OR 
Nov 2006 
"Insurance and Varicose Veins", North Idaho Business Journal 
Sep 2006 
"Dare to be Bare", North Idaho Business Journal 
May 2006 
"Laparoscopic Nissen Fundoplication" CME presentation, Kootenai Medical Center 
Apr 2006 
"Embarrassing Rosacea Can Be Controlled", North Idaho Business Journal 
Feb 2006 
"Scar Treatment Starts with Prevention, Then Appropriate Care", North Idaho Business Journal 
Dec 2005 
"Consider Laser Safety", North Idaho Business Journal 
Nov 2005 
"Varicose Veins Now Very Treatable", North Idaho Business Journal 
Sep 2005 
'What to Look For in a Med Spa", North Idaho Business Journal 
2005 
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"Laparoscopic Nissen Fundoplication", CME presentation, Gritman Medical Center 
2001 
"Chest Tube Management", CME presentation, Pullman Memorial Hospital 
2000 
"Wound Healing", CME presentation, Gritman Medical Center 
1999 
"Post Traumatic Chylous Ascites in a child: Review of the Literature and Case Report", 
Stockton Surgical Society 
1994 
"Evaluation ofTriage Criteria for Trauma Victims Utilizing Aeromedical Transport", unpublished research 
1990 
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Charles 0. Garrison 
P.O. Box 4226 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
(208)287 -5556 
PERSONAL INFORMATION: 
• Date of Birth
• Birthplace: Nampa, Idaho 
• Military Service: Us Air Force, 1955-1959 
EDUCATION: 
• Maryknoll College, Glen Ellyn, Illinois (1953-1955), 
• Idaho State College, Pocatello, Idaho (1959-1962), BS 
• Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri (1962-
1966) MD 
INTERNSHIP: 
• Kansas University Medical Center, Kansas City, Kansas (1966-1967) 
o Mixed - Internal Medicine, 1 O months; Pathology, 2 months 
POSTGRADUATE: 
• Residency, Internal Medicine, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota (1967-
1968) 
• Residency, Anatomic and Clinical Pathology, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, 
Minnesota (1968-1972) 
• Forensic Pathology, Office of the Medical Investigator, University of New 
Mexico School of Medicine, Albuquerque, New Mexico (1978-1987) 
SCHOLASTIC: 
• High Honors, Idaho State College (1962) 
LICENSURE: 
• Missouri (1966) 
• Minnesota (1967) 
• Colorado (1972) 
• Idaho (1976) 
PROFESSIONAL & ACADEMIC: 
• Chief Resident Associate, Surgical Pathology, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, 
Minnesota (1972) 
• Associate Consultant, Surgical Pathology, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, 
Minnesota (1972) 
• Pathologist, Southwest Memorial Hospital, Cortez, Colorado (1973-1974) 
• Pathologist, Project HOPE, Washington, D.C. (1974-1975) 
1 
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• Chief Pathologist, Cornwall Regional Hospital, Montego Bay, Jamaica 
(1974) 
o With the institution, but also under the auspices of Project HOPE. 
• Senior Lecturer, University of lfe, lle-lfe, Nigeria (Pathology-1975) 
o With the institution, but also under the auspices of Project HOPE. 
• Co-Director, Bannock Regional Medical Center Pathology, Pocatello, 
Idaho 
• Co-Director, Pocatello Regional Medical Center Pathology, Pocatello, 
Idaho 
• Co-Director, Eastern Idaho Clinical Pathology Laboratory, Pocatello, Idaho 
• Co-Director, Western Pathology Associates, Pocatello, Idaho 
• Consultant, locum tenens, Southland Hospital, lnvercargill, New Zealand 
(November 2000-March 2001) 
• Consultant, locum tenens, IDX Pathology, Boise, Idaho (2001) 
• Consultant, locum tenens, Snake River Pathology, Burley, Idaho (2001-
2002) 
• Wound Care Specialist, Idaho Wound Care & Hyperbarics Center, 
Pocatello, Idaho (June 2003- October 2012) 
• Consultant in Wound Care, Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center, 
Pocatello, Idaho ( 201 O - to present) . 
• Director, LabCorp Laboratories, Pocatello, Idaho (approx. 2008 to present) 
• Forensic Pathologist, Ada County Coroner's Office, Ada County, Boise, 
Idaho (2007 - present, and as consultant 1978 - 2007) 
• Forensic Pathologist, General Pathologist both Anatomic and Clinical, 
Idaho Pathology Laboratories (October 2012 - to present) 
BOARDS: 
• American Board of Pathology: Anatomic and Clinical Pathology (May 1973) 
• American Board of Pathology: Forensic Pathology (May 1988) 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
• College of American Pathologists 
• American Society of clinical Pathologists 
• American Academy of .Forensic Sciences 
• National Association of Medical Examiners 
• Idaho Medical Society 
• Southeast Idaho District Medical Society 
• Bannock County Peace Officers Association 
• Idaho Peace Officers Association 
CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION: 
• Montelores County Medical Meeting 97 Postgraduate Seminars, Stoner, 
Colorado, January, 1973 





• Montelores County Medical Meeting 97 Postgraduate Seminars, Stoner, 
Colorado, January, 1974 
• American Society of Clinical Pathologists 97 Winter Meeting 97 
Postgraduate Seminars, February, 197 4 
• Medicolegal Investigation of Death: Idaho Peace Officers Training 
Academy, April, 1977 
• Investigation of Sex Crimes 97 Idaho Peace Officers Training Academy, 
June,1977 
• Tutorial on Neoplastic Hematopathology: The University of Chicago and 
the City of Hope National Medical Center, October, 1977 
• Tutorial on Immunology 97 San Antonio, Texas July, 1977, University of 
Texas Health Science Center 
• Current Concepts on the Classification and Morphology of Leukemia 97 
Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, April, 1978 
• Tutorial on Pathology: Idaho Pathology Society 97 February, 1978 
• Seminar on Medical Investigation of Death: Office of The Medical 
Investigator, School of Medicine, Albuquerque, New Mexico, August, 1978, 
and August, 1982 
• Tutorial on Pathology: Idaho Pathology Society, February 1978 and 1979 
• Idaho POST Academy (Peace Officer's Standards and Training), 
February, 1980, Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho 
• Office of Medical Investigator, University of New Mexico under James T. 
Weston, M.D. 
• Office of Medical Investigator, University of New Mexico under John 
Smialek M.D. and Patricia Mcfeeley, M.D. 
• Annual Cytology Case Study Program; Colorado Association for 
Continuing Medical Laboratory Education, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 
• CAP/LAP Inspector Training Program; Boise, Idaho, 1989 
• Evaluating Suspicious Child Death; Ada County Medical Education 
Consortium, 1989 
• Neoplasms and Diseases of the Head and Neck; College of American 
Pathologists 97 Arizona Society of Pathology, 1989 
• Myelodysplastic Syndromes; Mayo Foundation, 1990 
• Obstetrical Pathology; Placentas and Perinatal Disorders; College of 
American Pathology, Arizona Society of Pathology, 1990 
• Children's Hospital, San Diego, CA, Center for Child Protection. 
Evaluating the sexually abused child. July 1991 
• Webcast: New Technology to Address the Ever-Changing Wound 
Microenvironment. June, 2005 
• Webcast: Monochromatic Infrared Photo Energy Clinical Outcomes in the 
Treatment of Diabetic Neuropathy. July, 2005 
• SAWC 2005, San Diego California 




• HBO and Wound Care Symposium, Vail, Colorado, January, 2007 
• Great Eight Teleconference Pressure Ulcers: March, 2007 
• SAWC-WHS, San Diego, Ca., April, 2008 
• New England Seminar in Forensic Sciences; Colby College, Waterville, 
Maine; August 2012. 
AFFILIATIONS: 
• People to People Health Foundation, Inc., (Project HOPE): Pathologist, 
July 1974, December 1975. 
COMMITTEES: 
• Co-Chairman: Committee on Child Abuse, Bannock County, Idaho 
• Chairman: Infection Control Committee, Bannock Regional Medical Center 
and Pocatello Regional Medical Center, Pocatello, Idaho 
• Medical Investigator and Coordinator with Law Enforcement and Child 
Protection of Health and Welfare regarding Child Abuse 
• Medicolegal Investigator for Pocatello Police Department, Idaho State 
Police, Sheriff's Offices in Bannock, Bingham, Power, Bear Lake, Caribou, 
Cassia, Custer, Minidoka, Fremont, Blaine, Jerome and Twin Falls 
Counties and their respective City Police Departments 
• Consultant, National Governor's Conference, State of Idaho 1985 
• lnteragency Task Force on Child Abuse; Bannock County, Idaho 
PRESENTATIONS: 
• Seminar on Basic Hematology 97 Sponsored by Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare (one week) April, 1978 
• Seminar on Medical Aspects of Child Abuse to Juvenile Judges of Idaho, 
Idaho State Supreme Court, February, 1978 
• Seminar on Hematology and Hematologic Photomicroscopy for Zeiss 
Optics in Seattle, Washington, August, 1979 
• Instructor in Medicolegal Investigation of Death, Idaho Peace Officer's 
Training Academy 
• Seminar on Rape Investigation, Medical and Legal, to Law Enforcement 
Agencies throughout State of Idaho, Sponsored by Idaho POST Academy 
• Instructor in Medicolegal Investigation of Death and Investigation of Sex 
Crimes with F.B.I. Presentations annually in Idaho 
• Presentation on Child Abuse at Eastern Montana College for Western 
Canada, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Sponsored by F.B.I. and Eastern 
Montana College, June, 1985 
• Presentation on Child Abuse and Sex Crimes, Idaho State University, 
Pocatello, Idaho. Sponsored by F.B.I. and Idaho POST Academy, June, 
1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 
• Instructor, Accident Investigation, Idaho State Police 




• Instructor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Indian Affairs; 
Physical and Sexual Abuse of Children, Billings, Montana, 1988 
• Numerous presentations of Physical and Sexual Abuse of Children to 
CASA Trainees; Law Enforcement Agencies; Public School Teachers; 
High School Students (to include classroom presentations as well as 
junior Civitan) 
• Guest Lecturer - Idaho State University course on Sexual Abuse, 1991 
• Guest Lecturer - Medical Technology Conference, Queenstown, New 
Zealand, 2002 
• Guest Lecturer - Conference on Child Abuse - lnvercargill, Christ Church, 
and Nelson, New Zealand, 2003 
PUBLICATIONS: 
• Participant, CPA, American Journal of Medicine, 41:30097308, August, 
1966 
• Garrison, C.O., Dines, D.E., Harrison, E.G., Jr., Douglas, W.W., and 
Miller, W.E., The Alveolar Pattern of Pulmonary Lymphoma. Mayo Clinic 
Proc., 44:26097271, April, 1969 
• Garrison, C.O., Dines, D.E., Harrison, E.G., Jr., Douglas, W.W., and 
Miller, W.E., Unusual X-ray Findings in Pulmonary Lymphoma. (Clinifoto 
Department) Geriatrics, 25:889791, June, 1970 
• Ludwig, J., Garrison, C.O., and Baggenstoss, A.H., Latent Hepatic 
Cirrhosis: A Study of 92 Cases. Am. J. Digest Dis., 15: January, 1970 
• Rodarte, J.R., Garrison, C.O., Holley, K.E., and Fontana, R.S., Whipple's 
Disease Simulating Sarcoidosis. Arch. Intern. Med., 129: March, 1972 
!' Garrison, C.O., Kazier, F.J., Bowie, E.J.W., Owen, C.A., Jr., Protamine 
Sulfate and Ethanol Gel: A Laboratory and Clinical Evaluation for 
Determination of Disseminated lntravascular . Coagulation. (Study 
completed, Manuscript in preparation.) 
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THOMAS J. COFFMAN, MD 
WORK ADDRESS 




212 Jantoni Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: 208-866-1646 
EDUCATION 
1975-1979 University of California (Santa Cruz, CA) 
• B.A., Biology 
1979-1984 University of Iowa Medical School Iowa City IA 
• MD 
1984-1987 University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics Iowa City, IA 
• Resident in Internal Medicine 
1987-1989 University oflowa-Department of Medicine 
• Fellow in Infectious Disease 
BOARD CERTIFICATION 
• American Board of Internal Medicine-1987 
• American Board of Infectious Disease-1990 
• American Board of Infectious Disease-2001 
LICENSURE 
• Idaho-1990 M-5628 
April 14, 2010 
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE ______________ _ 
• 2009- 2011 Chief of Staff, St Lukes Regional Medical Center 
• Clinical Assistant Professor of Medicine, University of 
Washington School of Medicine 
• Chairman, Infection Control Committee, St Lukes Regional 
Medical Center 
• Chairman, Infection Control Committee, Elles Rehabilitation . 
Hospital 
• Co-Chairman Infections Control, St Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center 
• 1990-Present Private Practice, Infectious Disease 
• 2001-Present, HN Clinical Services (Ryan White Grant) Family 
Practice Residency ofldaho 
PUBLICATIONS 
ABSTRACTS 
April 14, 2010 
• Coffman, TJ, Cox CD, Edeker BL, Britigan BE. The 
pseudomonas siderophore can :function as a hydroxyl radical 
catalyst, J. Clin. Inves., V6 #4, pp 1030-37, Oct 1990 · 
• Schlecte JA, Coffman, TJ. Plasma free cortisol in depressive 
illness: A review of findings and clinical applications. J Psych. 
Med., 3:23-31, 1985 
• Adams HP, Dawson G, Coffman, TJ, Corry R. Stroke in renal 
transplant recipients, Arch. Neurol., 43:113-115, 1988 
• Britigan BE, Coffman, TJ, Adelberg DR, Cohen MS. 
Mononuclear Phagocytes have the potential for sustained hydroxyl 
production: Use of spin trapping techniques to investigate 
mononuclear phagocyte free radical production, J. Exp. Med., 
168:2367-2372, 1988 
• Britigan BE, Coffman TJ, Buettner GR. Spin trapping evidence 
for the lack of significant hydroxyl radical phagocytes using a spin 
adduct resistant to superoxide mediated destruction. J. Biol. Chem. 
• Britigan BE, Coffman, TJ, Adelberg DR, Cohen MS Monocytes 
and monocyte-derived macrophages lack the endogenous capacity 
to form hydroxyl radical as assessed by spinning trapping. Clin. 
Res. 36:452A, 1988 
• Coffman, TJ, Cohen Ms, Mcgowan SE, Adelberg DR, Britigan 
BE. Free radical production of human moncyte-derived and 
pulmonary alveolar macrophages and the impact ofy-interferon 
assessed by spin trapping. Proceedings of the 281h Interscience 




April 14, 2010 
• Kaiser DL, Bilar J, Coffman TJ, Adams TIP. Neurologic 
complications of prosthetic valve endocarditis. Am. Neural. Assoc 
• Coffman TJ, Buettner GR, Hamill DR, Britigan BE. The 
pseudomonas siderophore pyochelin can function as a hydroxyl 
radical catalyst Clin. Res., 37:426, 1989 
• Coffman TJ, Buettner GR, Hamill DR, Britigan BE. An improved 
spin trapping system for assessment ofNeutrophil hydroxyl radical 






62 A.3d 922 
430 NJ.Super. 156, 62 A.3d 922 
(Cite as: 430 N.J.Super. 156, 62 A.3d 922) 
H 
Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division. 
Lisa McLEAN, Administratrix ad Prosequendum of 
the Estate of Kevin McLean, and Lisa McLean, In-
dividually, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
LIBERTY HEALTH SYSTEM, Greenville Hospit-
al, and A. Khan, M.D., Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
Jersey City Medical Center, Manuel Aragones, 
M.D. and Surriaya Khanum, M.D., Defendants. 
No. A-1793-I IT4. 
Submitted Nov. 8, 2012. 
Decided March 28, 2013. 
Background: Mother of deceased patient brought 
medical malpractice action against hospital and 
emergency room physician, alleging that defendants 
had negligently failed to detect and treat an infec-
tion, causing patient to become paralyzed and die. 
After a jury trial, the Superior Court, Law Division, 
Hudson County, entered judgment on verdict in fa-
vor of defendants, and mother appealed. 
Holdings: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
Ashrafi, J.A.D., held that: 
(1) probative value of testimony of plaintiffs ex-
pert was not outweighed by risk of needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence, and 
(2) exclusion of testimony denied plaintiff fair trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Evidence 157 ~146 
157 Evidence 
1571V Admissibility in General 
1571V(D) Materiality 
157kl46 k. Tendency to mislead or con-
fuse. Most Cited Cases 
· Page 2 of 12 
Page 1 
Probative value of expert testimony of emer-
gency room physician, that defendant physician had 
violated standard of care in treating patient, was not 
outweighed by risk of needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence, and thus testimony was admiss-
ible in medical malpractice action arising when de-
fendant physician failed to detect or treat a serious 
infection in patient who came to emergency room 
twice in three days; even though plaintiff had 
presented expert. testimony of another emergency 
room physician that defendant had violated stand-
ard of care in both visits, value of second opinion 
on complicated medical issues was high. N.J.S.A. 
2A:84A, App. A, Rules ofEvid., N.J.R.E. 403. 
[2] Evidence 157 €=)146 
157 Evidence 
157IV Admissibility in General 
I 571V(D) Materiality 
157kl46 k. Tendency to mislead or con-
fuse. Most Cited Cases 
The burden lies with the party seeking exclu-
sion of evidence to show that the probative value of 
the evidence is substantially outweighed by one or 
more factors including risk of confusion of issues, 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A, 
App. A, Rules ofEvid., N.J.R.E. 403. 
[31 New Trial 275 €=)35 
275 New Trial 
275II Grounds 
275Il(C) Rulings and Instructions at Trial 
275k35 k. Reception of evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trial court error, excluding testimony of 
second expert on issue of whether defendant emer-
gency room physician breached standard of care, 
denied plaintiff a fair trial in medical malpractice 
action, warranting new trial; trial court unreason-
ably limited plaintiff to one witness on issue of li-
ability on grounds that second witness would be 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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62 A.3d 922 
430 NJ.Super. 156, 62 A.3d 922 
(Cite as: 430 N.J.Super. 156, 62 A.3d 922) 
duplicative, breach of standard of care was central 
disputed issue in the case, defendant specifically 
and falsely argued that plaintiff had only one expert 
testifying on issue of breach of standard of care, 
and trial court's evidentiary ruling prevented 
plaintiff from responding to defendant's improper 
argument. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A, App. A, Rules of 
Evid., N.J.R.E. 403. 
(4) Trial 388 €=>120(3) 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 13 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
388k120 Matters Not Sustained by Evid-
ence 
388k120(3) k. Evidence rejected or ex-
cluded. Most Cited Cases 
An attorney may not take advantage of a favor-
able evidentiary ruling and make opening state-
ments or closing arguments that are contrary to 
facts which the other party was precluded from ad-
ducing. 
(5) Health 198H ~826 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk824 Questions of Law or Fact and 
Directed Verdicts 
I 98Hk826 k. Proximate cause. Most 
Cited Cases 
Issue was for jury on whether patient's pre-
existing condition, a antibiotic-resistant infection, 
was the proximate cause of his paralysis and death, 
in medical malpractice action against emergency 
room physician who had failed to detect or treat the 
infection; defense expert testified that even if ·de-
fendant had detected the infection and treated it 
with antibiotics, the results would not have been 
any different. 
[6] Health 198H ~827 
Page 3 of 12 
Page2 
198H Health 
I 98HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk827 k. Instructions. Most Cited 
Evidence in medical malpractice action did not 
warrant jury instruction asking jury to apportion, on 
a percentage basis between patient's pre-existing in-
fection and defendant physician's alleged negli-
gence in failing to detect or treat the infection, 
proximate cause of patient's paralysis and death, but 
instead jury should have been asked only whether 
plaintiff proved that the increased risk of harm res-
ulting from defendant's negligence was a substan-
tial factor in causing patient's injuries and death; 
testimony of defendant's expert, that even if defend-
ant had detected the infection and treated it with an-
tibiotics the results would not have been any differ-
ent, was insufficient to satisfy defendant's burden 
of establishing that damages could have been reas-
onably apportioned and what those apportioned 
damages were. 
[7] Evidence 157 ~351 
157 Evidence 
157X Documentary Evidence 
157X(C) Private Writings and Publications 
157k351 k. Unofficial or business records 
in general. Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €=)55 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General · 
388k55 k. Exclusion of improper evid-
ence. Most Cited Cases 
Statements contained in patient's medical re-
cords, opinions as to when patient had cqntracted 
antibiotic-resistant infection and what had caused 
the infection, were required to be redacted from re-
cords before records were admitted in evidence, un-
der rule governing expert opinions contained in ad-
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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missible hearsay evidence, in medical malpractice 
action arising from emergency room physician's 
failure to detect or treat the infection; physicians 
expressing the opinions contained in the records 
were not called as witnesses in the action, and the 
opinions in the records conformed to opinions of 
patient's experts but were contradicted by defend-
ant's experts. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A, App. A, Rules of 
Evict., N.J.R.E. 808. 
**924 Drazin and Warshaw, P.C., attorneys for ap-
pellant (John R. Connelly, Jr., Redbank, on the brief). 
Wahrenberger & Pietro, L.L.P., attorneys for re-
spondents, Liberty Health System and Greenville 
Hospital (Judith A. Wahrenberger, of counsel; 
Lindsay B. Beaumont, on the brief). 
James B. Sharp & Associates, L.L.C., Parsippany, 
attorneys for respondent, A. Khan, M.D. (Mr. 
Sharp, of counsel and on the brief; Peter Espey, on 
the brief). 
Before Judges FUENTES, ASHRAF! and HAY-
DEN. 
The opm1on of the court was delivered by 
ASHRAF!, J.A.D. 
*159 An undetected infection left a sixteen-
year-old boy paralyzed and allegedly led to his 
death. Plaintiff, who is the boy's mother and the ad-
ministratrix of his estate, filed a medical malprac-
tice lawsuit claiming that an emergency medical 
doctor who treated her son twice within three days 
should have discovered the *160 infection. Defend-
ants contended that the patient's symptoms gave the 
doctor no reason to suspect an infection. The jury's 
verdict was that plaintiff did not prove medical 
malpractice. 
Plaintiff now appeals, asserting that several er-
rors at the trial tainted the jury's verdict, and also, 
that the verdict was against the weight of the evid-
ence. We reverse and order a new trial. The trial 
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court should not have prohibited plaintiff from 
presenting the testimony of a second expert witness 
on the subject of medical malpractice because his 
testimony would be duplicative. 
I. 
Kevin McLean was born in 1988. On Septem-
ber 24, 2005, when Kevin was sixteen-years-old, he 
and some friends were assaulted in Jersey City, and 
Kevin was stabbed in the thigh and in the arm. 
Plaintiff-mother, Lisa McLean, rushed to the scene, 
and Kevin was taken by ambulance to Jersey City 
Medical Center. His wounds were treated in the 
emergency department, and he was discharged with 
a prescription for an antibiotic. Kevin followed up 
on the care of his wounds with his primary care 
physician, pediatrician Reginald Coleman, and the 
wounds appeared to have healed within a few weeks. 
**925 About six weeks after the stabbing, on 
November 9, 2005, Kevin complained of low back 
pain, which was radiating into his left leg. Plaintiff 
took him to the emergency room at Greenville Hos-
pital that afternoon. Kevin and his mother did not 
draw a connection between the stabbing and the 
back pain, and they did not volunteer information 
about the stabbing injuries at the emergency depart-
ment in Greenville Hospital. About three hours 
after he arrived at the hospital, Kevin was examined 
by defendant, Dr. Anwar Khan. The doctor ordered 
urinalysis and an x-ray of the back, both of which 
were normal. The doctor diagnosed Kevin with a 
back sprain and administered pain medication. Kev-
in's pain improved quickly, and the doctor dis-
charged him from the hospital at about 10:00 that 
night. 
*161 Two days later, on November 11, Kevin's 
back pain had worsened and was now radiating into 
both legs. He was walking with a visible limp. 
Plaintiff took him again to the emergency depart-
ment at Greenville Hospital, and again Kevin was 
seen by Dr. Khan. This time, the doctor ordered 
two CT scans, both without intravenous contrast. 
FN1 The scans were unremarkable. The doctor dia-
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gnosed Kevin with sacroiliitis, a type of joint in-
flammation. He discharged Kevin with prescrip-
tions for a pain reliever and a muscle relaxant and 
instructed him to follow-up with his own doctor. 
FN I. CT, short for computed tomography, 
is an imaging procedure that uses a com-
puter to interpret data from x-rays and to 
produce an image of a selected area of the 
body. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1996 
(28th ed.2006). Intravenous contrast en-
hances the ability to see certain structures 
on the CT scan. 
Kevin's condition did not improve over the 
next several days. On November 15, he was seen by 
Dr. Coleman, who observed that Kevin did not 
"look right" and had him admitted at Jersey City 
Medical Center. Kevin's condition declined rapidly. 
After several tests, he was transferred to St. 
Joseph's Medical Center. There, he went into cardi-
ac arrest and became comatose. Kevin was eventu-
ally diagnosed with methicillin-resistant staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA), a type of staph infection 
that resists antibiotics. 
Despite the treatment that was administered at 
St. Joseph's hospital, Kevin's blood tests did not 
come back negative for infection until November 
22. In addition, doctors perfonned a CT-guided as-
piration of Kevin's upper thigh, from which they 
drained a half liter of pus. 
Kevin began to regain consciousness in 
December, but the damage was already done. The 
infection and cardiac arrest caused brain damage 
that paralyzed him from the neck down. He spent 
the rest of his life in either a hospital bed or a nurs-
ing home. Two years after his visits to Greenville 
Hospital, Kevin died on October 27, 2007, of com-
plications from his quadriplegia. 
*162 Plaintiff filed her medical malpractice 
complaint in August 2008, naming as defendants 
Greenville Hospital, Dr. Khan, and Liberty Health 
System, as well as Jersey City Medical Center and 
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other doctors. Defendants other than those associ-
ated with Greenville Hospital were dismissed from 
the case without finding that they had any liability 
for Kevin's injuries and death. The trial of the mal-
practice case against the Greenville Hospital de: 
fondants FN2 was conducted from September 19 
**926 to October 5, 2011. The trial focused on ex-
pert testimony to establish what caused Kevin's in-
fection and eventual death. The witnesses at trial 
were plaintiff-mother, Kevin's grandmother, de-
fendant-doctor, and a total of six expert witnesses, 
four called by plaintiff and two by defendant. Each 
side presented an expert on the standard of care in 
emergency medicine, as well as an expert in infec-
tious diseases. Plaintiff also presented expert testi-
mony from a radiologist and a forensic economist. 
As we will discuss, plaintiff had consulted with ad-
ditional experts and was prepared to present their 
testimony as well, but the court had infonnally 
granted a pretrial motion of defendant that restric-
ted each side to one expert witness on any subject 
or specialty relevant to the case. 
FN2. Plaintiffs claims against Greenville 
Hospital and the entity that owned it were 
based solely on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, legal responsibility for the al-
leged negligence of Dr. Khan as the emer-
gency room doctor. In the remainder of 
this opinion, we will refer to the Greenville 
Hospital defendants in the singular as 
"defendant." 
The jury returned a verdict that defendant was 
not negligent in his treatment of Kevin. The trial 
court denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial, and 
judgment was entered in favor of defendant. 
Plaintiff then filed this appeal. 
IL 
[l] We agree with plaintiff that the trial court 
erred in prohibiting plaintiff from presenting testi-
mony by a second malpractice liability expert and 
that the error entitles plaintiff to a new trial. 
*163 In preparation for the trial, plaintiff con-
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suited with and prepared to call at the trial five 
medical expert witnesses: James Bagnell, M.D., an 
emergency department physician; Alan Schechter, 
M.D., also an emergency department physician; 
William Matuozzi, M.D., a radiologist; Mark 
Cooper, M.D., another radiologist; and Arthur 
Klein, M.D., an infectious disease physician.FN3 
Our record on appeal does not document how the 
trial court's limitation on the number of experts 
came about. We do not have a record of a formal 
pretrial motion or an actual ruling on the record 
limiting each side to one expert in a specific field 
of medicine. It appears from counsel's comments 
during the trial and statements in the appellate 
briefs that defendant moved to limit the number of 
expert witnesses that could testify before the jury 
and that the trial court indicated informally its fa-
vorable inclination on the motion. 
FN3. Plaintiff also presented testimony at 
the trial from a non-medical expert wit-
ness, forensic economist Royal Bunin, 
M.B.A., on the subject of plaintiffs eco-
nomic loss for the wrongful death claim. 
Defendant's experts at the trial were Mi-
chael VanRooyen, M.D., an emergency de-
partment physician; and Chester Smialow-
icz, M.D., an infectious disease physician. 
On the morning of jury selection, the trial court 
and the attorneys discussed the list of anticipated 
witnesses who would testify. The court reminded 
plaintiffs attorney of its "understanding" that 
plaintiff would not call all of her expert witnesses 
to testify. Plaintiffs attorney referred to the trial 
court's "preliminary indication[ ] about a ruling that 
[plaintiff] should not use two E.R. doctors and two 
radiologists." Apparently accepting the court's rul-
ing at that time without making a formal objection, 
counsel named Dr. Bagnell as the emergency de-
partment expert who would testify for plaintiff. 
Dr. Bagnell was expected to testify, and did 
later testify before the jury, that defendant deviated 
from the accepted standard of medical care for an 
emergency department physician on both visits of 
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Kevin to Greenville Hospital, November 9th and 
November 11th. Dr. Bagnell's opinion was that de-
viation occurred when *164 defendant failed to eli-
cit from Kevin his recent history of stab wounds, 
failed to palpate the patient and independently dis-
cover**927 the wounds, and also failed to perform 
a CT scan with contrast, which would have re-
vealed the infection. 
Before Dr. Bagnell testified, during counsel's 
opening statements to the jury, Dr. Khan's attorney 
made a remark that prompted plaintiffs attorney to 
revisit the issue of the court's restriction on the 
number of expert witnesses. In his opening state-
ment, defense counsel remarked: 
[W]e will prove to you that no emergency room 
physician with a possible exception of Dr. Bag-
nell, plaintiffs expert who is going to testify 
here, would ever have thought for a scintilla of a 
moment that this is a patient with an infection. 
None. 
This statement was false. Dr. Schechter's expert 
report for plaintiff concluded that the accepted 
standard of care had been met by defendant's treat-
ment of Kevin on November 9th, but it also indic-
ated that on November 11th, when the back pain 
persisted and increased, "the standard of care re-
quired that an infectious or compressive cause for 
Mr. McLean's back pain be searched for." Dr. 
Schechter summarized his opinion as follows re-
garding November 11th: 
Mr. McLean presented for a second time to the 
emergency department at Greenville Hospital on 
November 11, 2005 with three to four days of 
back pain radiating to his legs. The workup that 
was done on that day did not meet the accepted 
standard of medical care. Needed blood tests 
were not done. A needed rectal temperature was 
not done. Needed appropriate imagings were not 
done. Mr. McLean was prematurely discharged 
from the Greenville Hospital emergency depart-
ment on November 11, 2005. 
After the opening statements, plaintiffs attor-
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ney moved for reconsideration of the limitation on 
expert witnesses. Counsel argued that he had com-
plied with the court's instruction to choose one 
emergency department expert to testify and that de-
fense counsel had now told the jury "that there's no 
other ER doctor in the world save the witness that 
we intend to put on the stand that shares the opinion 
that his client did anything wrong." Plaintiffs attor-
ney requested that the court either allow Dr. 
Schechter to testify or inform the jury that plaintiff 
had a second emergency department expert that 
contradicted defense counsel's remark. *165 De-
fense counsel responded that the opinions of 
plaintiffs two emergency department experts were 
not consistent and that plaintiff had to "take [her] 
pick." The court stated it would review the expert 
reports and then rule on plaintiff's application. 
At the conclusion of the trial day, the court 
denied plaintiffs request to allow Dr. Schechter to 
testify. The court described defense counsel's re-
mark as "just hyperbole ... [a] passionate attorney 
losing his cool for ... two seconds." The court could 
think of no reasonable way to correct defense coun-
sel's "one line that may have misrepresented a fact" 
and believed the jury would not be affected by the 
remark. Describing Dr. Schechter's testimony as 
"duplicative," the court ruled that plaintiff would 
not be permitted to "bring in another expert because 
he says basically the same thing that your current 
expert says." The court also commented that 
plaintiff probably would not want to call Dr. 
Schechter before the jury because he disagreed with 
part of Dr. Bagnell's opinions and the latter expert 
provided "more deviation testimony" in support of 
plaintiffs case. Having been rebuffed, plaintiff pro-
ceeded at trial with only Dr. Bagnell's testimony on 
the subject of defendant's alleged deviation from 
accepted standards of medical care and treatment. 
**928 We now hold that the trial court erred in 
limiting expert witnesses to only one per side for 
each relevant field of medicine, in particular, on the 
crucial issue of deviation from accepted standards 
of medical care. The court's pretrial ruling was a 
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mistaken exercise of its discretionary authority to 
control the presentation of evidence at the trial. See 
N.J.R.E. 61l(a) ( "court shall exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence"). Nothing in 
our rules of evidence, or other laws or rules, gives a 
trial court authority to balance the number of wit-
nesses presented by each side at the trial. Nor is the 
trial court authorized by N.J.R.E. 403 or any other 
rule or law to bar crucial evidence merely on the 
ground that it duplicates another witness's testi-
mony. 
*166 A trial court would likely abuse its discre-
tion if it imposed a limitation of only one witness 
for each side to testify on a factual matter that is vi-
tal to the resolution of a disputed issue. To illustrate 
the point with a hypothetical example, in a typical 
car accident case where the driver's negligence is 
disputed, the trial court would err if it barred testi-
mony on the ground of duplication by a second eye-
witness, who would testify essentially identically to 
another eyewitness, that the traffic light was red or 
that the driver was speeding or driving erratically. 
In the general charge to the jury, courts often in-
struct that the number of witnesses is not con-
trolling in deciding whether a party has met its bur-
den of proof. See Model Jury Charge (Civil), 1.121, 
"Preponderance of Evidence" (2012). But at the 
same time, the jury is not prohibited from consider-
ing whether more than one witness has attested un-
der oath to a fact that is important to deciding a 
contested issue. Corroboration of a fact by more 
than one witness can be very important in seeking 
the truth. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a); State v. 
Walker, 417 NJ.Super. 154, 165, 8 A.3d 844 
(App.Div.2010). 
We see no reason that expert testimony should 
be treated wholly differently from factual testimony 
with respect to vital opinions that go to the heart of 
the disputed issues in the case. Especially in a case 
such as this where the jury's truth-finding function 
required choosing between the opinions of experts, 
the parties should have been permitted to corrobor-
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ate the testimony of their experts with other experts 
who reached similar conclusions. 
Expert testimony may be more complex and 
time-consuming than factual testimony, such as the 
facts we referenced in our hypothetical example. 
The trial court has discretion to exclude expert 
testimony under NJ.R.E. 403 that may unduly 
delay or complicate the trial without sufficient pro-
bative value. Such a ruling, however, must be made 
formally, on the record, and in accordance with the 
rules of evidence. We disapprove of the procedure 
employed in this case by which the trial court in- ' 
formally*167 perhaps off-the-record during confer-
ence with the attorneys in chambers-restricted the 
witnesses that a party may call to testify _FN4 
FN4. To be fair, it is also the function of 
counsel to make a record of any pretrial 
ruling with which a party disagrees. 
[2] Under NJ.R.E. 403, the trial court may ex-
ercise its discretion to exclude evidence because 
"its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the risk of (a) ... confusion of issues ... (b) undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." See Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. 
Co., 160 N.J. 480, 495, 734 A.2d 1147 (1999). The 
burden lies with the **929 party seeking exclusion 
of the evidence to show that the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by one or more of the 
factors listed in Rule 403. State v. Morton, 155 NJ. 
383,453, 715 A.2d 228 (1998). 
A leading practice manual on the New Jersey 
Rules of Evidence states: "Although clause (b) of 
N.J.R.E. 403 cites 'undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence' as 
reasons for excluding evidence under the Rule, it is 
difficult to find reported decisions which rely on 
such reasons alone." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, 
Current NJ. Rules of Evidence, comment 4 on 
N.J.R.E. 403 (2012). Cases relying on this portion 
of the Rule often involve issues tangential to the 
central dispute in the case. See Showalter v. Bari-
lari, Inc., 312 NJ.Super. 494, 514, 712 A.2d 244 
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(App.Div.1998) (evidence of the plaintiffs blood 
alcohol content in a dram shop case, offered to 
prove that the defendant served him alcohol, was 
needlessly cumulative where other evidence estab-
lished the fact); State v. Taylor, 226 NJ.Super. 441, 
451, 544 A.2d 883 (App.Div.1988) (evidence of 
witness's character for truth and veracity was prop-
erly excluded, since admission would have required 
time for prosecution to locate rebuttal witnesses, 
and the collateral dispute about general credibility 
of the witness may have confused the jury). 
Here, the testimony that plaintiff wished to 
present went to the heart of her case: whether de-
fendant deviated from accepted *168 standards of 
care for an emergency department physician. Al-
though a second expert would have taken more time 
at the trial, it might have been time well-spent. In 
the field of medicine, second opinions are often 
sought to test the accuracy of a diagnosis or the be-
nefits and risks of proposed treatment. Surely it 
cannot be said that additional expert testimony in a 
case that involved complicated issues of emergency 
and diagnostic medicine had such low probative 
value as to be substantially outweighed by its par-
tially repetitive nature. 
We note that Rule 403 does not refer to 
"duplicative evidence" but to " needless ... cumu-
lative evidence" that might cause undue delay in 
the trial and a waste of time. By our holding today, 
we do not preclude a trial judge from excluding ex-
pert evidence when its cumulative nature substan-
tially outweighs its probative value. We hold, 
however, that two expert witnesses on the central 
issue of liability in a medical malpractice case do 
not per se reach the level of needless cumulative 
evidence that substantially outweighs its probative 
value. The trial court mistakenly exercised its dis-
cretion in granting defendant's pretrial motion to 
limit expert witnesses to one on each side on a cent-
ral disputed issue in the case. 
[3][4] In addition, whatever discretionary au-
thority the trial court theoretically may have had to 
limit each side to a single emergency department 
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expert, that authority dissipated once defense coun-
sel misused the court's pretrial ruling and falsely 
told the jury that no emergency medicine expert 
save one would have considered an infection as the 
cause of Kevin's symptoms. An attorney may not 
take advantage of a favorable evidentiary ruling and 
make statements that are "contrary to facts which 
[the other party] was precluded from adducing." 
State v. McGuire, 419 NJ.Super. 88, 144, 16 A.3d 
411 (App.Div.) (quoting State v. Ross, 249 
NJ.Super. 246, 250, 592 A.2d 291 (App.Div.), cer-
tif. denied, 126 NJ. 389 (1991)), certif. denied, 208 
NJ. 335, 27 A.3d 948 (2011). Having successfully 
moved before trial to exclude one of plaintiff's two 
emergency department experts, defense counsel 
*169 made an inaccurate statement to the jury that 
plaintiff **930 was powerless to disprove because 
of the court's ruling. 
The trial court recognized the impropriety of 
the remark, but it concluded that it was "not critic-
al" to the plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's case was that a 
doctor performing up to the accepted standard of 
care would have considered an infection as a poten-
tial cause of Kevin's otherwise undiagnosed back 
and leg pain, and the doctor would have ordered ad-
ditional tests to confirm or exclude that potential 
cause. Defense counsel's false assertion succinctly 
summarized the defense position that such a dia-
gnosis was not warranted. The remark struck at the 
core of the dispute. It required a response, which 
plaintiff was prepared to give before the trial began. 
The court should have reconsidered the limitation it 
placed on expert testimony and allowed plaintiff to 
present Dr. Schechter as an expert witness. His 
testimony would not have been a waste of time and 
would not have unduly delayed the trial. 
Any concern about the divergence in the opin-
ions of plaintiff's liability experts was for plaintiff 
and her attorney to weigh in deciding whether to 
call Dr. Schechter before the jury. Plaintiff's attor-
ney might have argued in summation that the dif-
ferences in the opinions of plaintiff's experts 
showed that they performed their evaluations inde-
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pendently and, in fact, bolstered their credibility. A 
trial judge must avoid infringing on the parties' 
right to present their proofs through their chosen 
witnesses, which is "an essential element in the 
conduct of a trial." Cardell, Inc. v. Piscatelli, 277 
NJ.Super. 149, 155, 649 A.2d 107 (App.Div.1994) 
(internal quotation mark omitted); accord Peterson 
v. Peterson, 374 NJ.Super. 116, 125, 863 A.2d 
I 059 (App.Div.2005). 
Because the excluded testimony of Dr. 
Schechter was crucial to plaintiff's allegations of 
malpractice and might have affected the jury's ver-
dict, it was reversible error to exclude it. Plaintiff is 
entitled to a new trial. 
III. 
[5][6] Plaintiff also contends that the trial court 
erred in denying her motion at the end of all evid-
ence for a directed verdict on *170 apportioning of 
damages between defendant's alleged negligence 
and the pre-existing infection. Defendant responds 
that it presented evidence from which the jury 
could conclude that Kevin's injuries and death 
would have occurred even if defendant had ordered 
additional diagnostic tests. Furthermore, defendant 
contends that the jury never reached issues of prox-
imate cause and its apportioning between Kevin's 
pre-existing condition and defendant's alleged neg-
ligence. The jury's deliberations ended upon its 
finding that defendant was not negligent. Addition-
ally, plaintiff did not object to the jury instructions 
the court gave on a pre-existing condition and prox-
imate cause. 
The issue is moot because the jury did not 
reach any question on the verdict form on proxim-
ate causation and its apportioning. We nevertheless 
comment upon the issue because it may again be 
presented on a retrial. We conclude that the trial 
court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for a 
directed verdict, as it was presented. But the court 
should not have asked the jury on this trial record to 
apportion proximate causation in terms of percent-
ages between the pre-existing condition and de-
fendant's alleged negligence. 
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ln Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 574 A.2d 398 
(1990), the Court addressed causation and damage 
questions in cases in which a plaintiff suffered from 
a pre-existing condition that combined with the de-
fendant's medical malpractice to cause **931 harm. 
ln such situations, practical realities require that the 
standard for proximate causation be modified. To 
succeed in such a case, the plaintiff must show that: 
(1) the defendant deviated from the applicable 
standard of care; (2) the deviation increased the risk 
of harm to the plaintiff from a pre-existing condi-
tion; and (3) the increased risk was a substantial 
factor in producing the ultimate result. Id at 108, 
574 A.2d 398. The defendant should only be held 
responsible for the portion of the harm attributable 
to his or her conduct, but the defendant bears the 
burden of proving that the plaintiff's damages can 
be apportioned between the defendant *171 and the 
pre-existing condition. Id at 110, 574 A.2d 398; ac-
cord Fosgate v. Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 272-73, 330 
A.2d 355 (1974). 
Here, plaintiff alleged that Kevin was suffering 
from a pre-existing MRSA infection when defend-
ant examined him on November 9th and 11th. 
Plaintiff had the burden of proving that negligent 
diagnosis and treatment by defendant on one or 
both dates increased the risk of the injuries and 
death caused by the infection, but defendant had the 
burden of proving an appropriate apportionment of 
proximate causation in terms of percentages. See 
Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. I, 24, 843 A.2d 1042 
(2004); Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 282, 
798 A.2d 67 (2002); Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at I 08, 
574 A.2d 398. 
Although Dr. Smialowicz testified for the de-
fense that the infection was not present on or before 
November 11th, he also testified that defendant's al-
leged deviation from the standard of care would 
have made no difference in Kevin's condition. On 
cross-examination, plaintiff's attorney asked Dr. 
Smialowicz to assume that blood had been taken on 
November 11th, that the MRSA infection was dis-
covered, and that antibiotics were started immedi-
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ately. Dr. Smialowicz stated that starting antibiotics 
at that point "would not have changed anything." 
Similarly, on re-direct examination, defense coun-
sel asked Dr. Smialowicz if the outcome would 
have been different had antibiotics been started 
promptly after November 11th. Dr. Smialowicz said 
no. This testimony amounts to the defense's denial 
that the alleged negligence of defendant increased 
the risk of harm to Kevin. Dr. Smialowicz's testi-
mony permitted the jury to conclude that the al-
leged negligence of defendant was not a substantial 
factor in bringing about Kevin's injuries and death 
and that the pre-existing infection was the sole 
proximate cause. The trial court appropriately 
viewed the defense case as contending that the jury 
should allocate 100% proximate causation to the 
pre-existing condition and zero to defendant's al-
leged negligence. Consequently, the court correctly 
denied plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict *172 
on whether the pre-existing condition was the prox-
imate cause of Kevin's injuries and death. 
Defendant presented no evidence, however, to 
satisfy the defense burden of proof on apportion-
ment of proximate cause in any different percent-
ages. In Verdicchio, supra, 179 N.J. at 37-38, 843 
A.2d 1042, the Court held that the defense expert's 
testimony that the "ultimate outcome" would have 
been the same if cancer had been diagnosed and 
treated earlier was insufficient to carry the defend-
ant's burden of proving apportionment between the 
pre-existing condition and the misdiagnosis. 
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that a question 
asking the jury to determine percentages of proxim-
ate causation was not warranted in this case based 
on the evidence presented. Instead, the jury should 
only have been asked whether plaintiff proved that 
the increased risk of harm **932 resulting from de-
fendant's negligence was a substantial factor in 
causing Kevin's injuries and death. See Reynolds, 
supra, 172 N.J. at 285-86, 798 A.2d 67; Scafidi, 
supra, 119 N.J. at 108-09, 574 A.2d 398. ln the 
context of that question, the court would also in-
struct the jury that defendant asserted the infection 
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was the sole proximate cause and defendant's al-
leged deviation was not a substantial factor in caus-
ing the injuries and death. 
On retrial, the court should consider again the 
issue of an appropriate jury charge and tailor the 
charge to the proofs as presented. 
IV. 
For purposes of completeness in the event of 
further appeal, or as further guidance for a retrial, 
we add the following brief comments to address 
other issues plaintiff has raised. 
We reject plaintiffs argument that the jury's 
verdict was against the weight of evidence. The de-
fense experts testified that Kevin's symptoms were 
inconsistent with an infection and that defendant 
had no reason to conduct tests to determine whether 
an *173 infection was causing Kevin's back pain. 
Dr. Smialowicz testified that the virulent infection 
that paralyzed Kevin did not occur until after Kev-
in's second visit to Greenville Hospital on Novem-
ber 11th. The jury could credit the testimony of de-
fendant's experts and conclude that defendant did 
not deviate from accepted standards of care. 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the jury's verdict was not the 
product of improper influence, such as undue sym-
pathy for defendant, or on impatience in seeking to 
reach a verdict. Those arguments of plaintiff do not 
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 
2:l l-3(e)(l)(E). 
[7] We also conclude that the trial court cor-
rectly granted defendant's application for redaction 
of small parts of the medical records admitted in 
evidence. Plaintiff offered in evidence records from 
St. Joseph's Medical Center and the convalescent 
hospitals to which Kevin was later admitted. The 
records contained statements that attributed the 
MRSA infection to the September 2005 stabbing 
injuries, conclusions that conformed to the opinion 
of plaintiffs infectious disease expert, Dr. Klein, 
and were contradicted by defendant's expert in the 
Page 11 of 12 
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same field, Dr. Smialowicz. Although the bulk of 
the medical records were admissible pursuant to 
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (business records) and N.J.R.E. 
803(c)(4) (statements made for the purpose of med-
ical diagnosis or treatment), disputed opinions 
about Kevin's diagnosis, the cause of his infection, 
and the length of time that the infection existed 
were properly excluded from the records in accord-
ance with N.J.R.E. 808. See Nowacki v. Cmty. Med. 
Cntr., 279 NJ.Super. 276, 652 A.2d 758 (App.Div.) 
, certif. denied, 141 N.J. 95, 660 A.2d 1194 (1995); 
see also Agha v. Feiner, 198 NJ. 50, 63, 965 A.2d 
141 (2009) (while experts may refer to a medical 
report from a non-testifying expert to apprise the· 
jury of the basis of an opinion, N.J.R.E. 703 "was 
not intended as a conduit through which the jury 
may be provided the results of contested out-
of-court expert reports"). 
*174 Next, plaintiff argues that defendant's 
emergency department expert, Dr. VanRooyen, was 
permitted to change his testimony at trial without 
adequate notice to plaintiff, contrary to McKenney 
v. Jersey City Medical Center, 167 N.J. 359, 771 A. 
2d 1153 (2001). Dr. VanRooyen had stated in his 
deposition that defendant had ordered a blood test 
on November 9th. Shortly before the trial began, he 
corrected that mistake and eventually testified 
**933 that he meant defendant had ordered a ur-
inalysis, not a blood test. Plaintiffs attorney sought 
to cross-examine Dr. VanRooyen as to whether a 
blood test should have been ordered. The trial court 
sustained defendant's objection and ruled that no 
expert for plaintiff had testified that a blood test 
should have been ordered, and so, that alleged form 
of negligence was not a relevant issue before the jury. 
On retrial, Dr. Schechter will presumably testi-
fy consistently with his report that a blood test 
should have been ordered on November 11th. The 
factual predicate for the trial court's ruling will no 
longer be present, but a ruling on whether Dr. Van-
Rooyen may be asked about the need for a blood 
test must await the circumstances presented at the 
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retrial. The tardy correction of Dr. VanRooyen's de-
position error is now moot as an issue of fair notice 
to plaintiff. Presumably, Dr. VanRooyen can be 
cross-examined again at the retrial regarding his er-
ror as relevant to his credibility as an expert wit-
ness. 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
NJ.Super.A.D.,2013. 
McLean v. Liberty Health System 
430 NJ.Super. 156, 62 A.3d 922 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Patient filed medical malpractice action against 
surgeons, nurses and pharmacists following colon 
surgery for injuries resulting from intestinal leak. 
The 94th District Court, Nueces County, Jack 
Hunter, J., entered verdict in favor of defendants. 
Patient appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dorsey, J., 
held that: (1) bench conference was sufficient to 
preserve error; (2) exclusion of expert medical wit-
ness' testimony as to cause of patient's postsurgery 
intestinal leak as merely cumulative was improper; 
(3) exclusion of nurse as expert witness was im-
proper; (4) failure to make timely offer of proof as 
to what nurse, as excluded expert witness, would 
have testified resulted in failure to preserve error on 
appeal; and (5) exclusion of expert medical witness' 
testimony as to cause of patient's postsurgery intest-
inal leak was harmful error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
(lj Trial 388 ~43 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k43 k. Admission of Evidence in Gen-
eral. Most Cited Cases 
When trial court makes decision to admit or ex-
clude evidence in which it weighs competing legit-
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imate factors in reaching decision, court exercises 
discretion. 
L2] Appeal and Error 30 ~970(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k970 Reception of Evidence 
30k970(2) k. Rulings on Admissibility 
of Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases 
Reviewing court will not disturb trial court's 
decision to exclude or admit evidence unless trial 
court abuses its discretion to choose among legitim-
ate and legal alternatives. 
(3] Appeal and Error 30 €=>181 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30kl81 k. Necessity of Objections in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 ~1026 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)l In General 
30kl 025 Prejudice to Rights of Party 
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30kl026 k: In General. Most Cited 
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In reviewing claim of trial court error, Court of 
Appeals first determines whether claimed error was 
preserved for review, whether trial court committed 
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388 Trial 
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388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k44 Offer ofproof 
388k45 In General; Necessity and Suf-
ficiency 
388k45(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Bench conference, held outside hearing of jury 
that apprised trial court of nature of expert evidence 
and was recorded by court reporter, was informal 
offer of proof as to excluded expert's testimony and 
was sufficient to preserve error. Rules App.Proc., 
Rule 52(b). 
[5] Trial 388 ~56 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k56 k. Cumulative Evidence in Gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
In medical malpractice action, exclusion of ex-
pert medical witness' testimony as to cause of pa-
tient's postsurgery intestinal leak as merely cumu-
lative was improper; although patient had already 
called a first medical expert who had testified as to 
same issue, first expert's credibility had been di-
minished due to fact that first expert was personal 
friend of patient and was not board certified in spe-
cialty, while second expert did not know patient 
personally and possessed different credentials, in-
cluding board certification in specialty. Rules of 
Civ.Evid., Rules 403, 611. 
[6] Trial 388 €;;;;>56 
388 Trial 
, 388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k56 k. Cumulative Evidence in Gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
In deciding whether to exclude witness' testi-
mony as cumulative, test is not merely whether 
evidence to be adduced from two witnesses is sim-
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ilar, but also whether excluded testimony would 
have added substantial weight to offering party's 
cause. Rules of Civ.Evid., Rules 403, 611; Rules 
App.Proc., Rule 52(b). 
[7] Pretrial Procedure 307A ~45 
307 A Pretrial Procedure 
307 All Depositions and Discovery 
307 AII(A) Discovery in General 
307 Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307 Ak45 k. Facts Taken as Established 
or Denial Precluded; Preclusion of Evidence or 
Witness. Most Cited Cases 
Exclusion of nurse as expert witness was im-
proper, where opposing party's objection that wit-
ness was not designated as soon as practicable was 
based solely on length of time case had been 
pending, which by itself did not establish lack of 
due diligence. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 166b, subd. 6, par. b. 
[8] Pretrial Procedure 307 A ~45 
307 A Pretrial Procedure 
307 All Depositions and Discovery 
307 Ail(A) Discovery in General 
307 Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307 Ak45 k. Facts Taken as Established 
or Denial Precluded; Preclusion of Evidence or 
Witness. Most Cited Cases 
Party opposing witness has burden of produ-
cing evidence to show that designation was not 
made as soon as possible. Vernon's Ann.Texas 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 166b, subd. 6, par. b. 
[9] Appeal and Error 30 €;;;;>230 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
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Failure to make timely offer of proof as to what 
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nurse, as excluded expert witness, would have testi-
fied resulted in failure to preserve error on appeal; 
counsel made no informal offer of proof and offer 
of deposition while jury was deliberating was un-
timely. Rules App.Proc., Rule 52(b). 
PO] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1056.1(11) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVT(J) 11 Exclusion of Evidence 
30kl 056 Prejudicial Effect 
30kl056. I In General 
30kl056.l(I I) k. Particular 
Types of Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 30kl056.1(3), 299kl8.130 Physicians 
and Surgeons) 
Appeal and Error 30 ~1056.1(10) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)l I Exclusion ofEvidence 
30kl056 Prejudicial Effect 
30k 1056.1 In General 
30kl056.1(4) Particular Actions 
or Issues 
30kl056.l(IO) k. Negligence 
and Torts in General. Most Cited Cases 
Health 198H €=>820 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
I 98HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk815 Evidence 
198Hk820 k. Admissibility. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl8.70 Physicians and Surgeons) 
In medical malpractice action, exclusion of ex-
pert medical witness' testimony as to cause of pa-
tient's postsurgery intestinal leak was harmful error; 
excluded testimony was critical in and of itself, as 
Page 3 
it was material to issues hotly contested throughout 
trial and error probably did cause rendition of im-
proper judgment. Rules App.Proc., Rule 81(b)(l); 
Rules of Civ.Evid., Rules 403, 611. 
(ll) Trial 388 €=>43 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k43 k. Admission of Evidence in Gen-
eral. Most Cited Cases 
If party is denied right to make fair presenta-
tion to jury, trial 'court has not acted reasonably and 
has abused its discretion. 
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B.C. Sims, plaintiff below, appeals a take-
nothing judgment in a medical malpractice case. By 
eight points of error, he complains of adverse rul-
ings by which the trial court excluded his expert 
witnesses and limited the presentation of evidence. 
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We reverse and remand. 
I. Facts 
Sims entered Spohn Hospital for colon surgery, 
during which Dr. Fred Brackett removed a cancer-
ous portion of Sims's colon. Following surgery, 
Sims developed intestinal blockage which Dr. 
Brackett treated by non-surgical methods, including 
administering large doses of Reglan, a drug used to 
increase intestinal motility. The non-surgical meas-
ures were unsuccessful at relieving the blockage, 
and doctors Brackett and Appel performed a second 
operation. The surgeons relieved the obstruction by 
passing a tube with a balloon-type tip through the 
length of the intestine. While doing this, they ex-
amined the intestine and noted no signs of leakage. 
However, despite the second surgery, Sims's 
condition continued to deteriorate. Within a day, he 
was placed in intensive care where he remained for 
over forty days. Sims suffered intense pain, high 
fever, redness on the right leg, decreased flexion in 
the right foot, and a green, bilious discharge from 
his incision. He claimed that these *452 signs in-
dicated an intestinal leak and infection. The infec-
tion became so severe that Sims went into shock. 
Because of his weakened condition, he was treated 
conservatively with large doses of Flagyl (an anti-
biotic) and painkillers. Treatment of the infection 
was overseen by Dr. Michael Bullen, a specialist in 
infectious diseases. Dr. Jack Cortese, a kidney spe-
cialist, was also brought in to prevent kidney failure . 
The conservative treatment succeeded in 
strengthening Sims generally, but he continued to 
experience problems. Exploratory surgery was per-
formed. This third operation revealed an abscess in 
Sims's abdomen, which Dr. Brackett corrected sur-
gically. Sims had also developed gangrene in his 
right leg, which the doctors had to amputate. Fur-
ther, he now suffers from brain damage which he 
had not suffered before his entry into Spohn Hos-
pital for the colon surgery. 
II. General Procedural Facts 
Page:, ot 'J 
Page4 
Sims sued all of the doctors, Spohn Hospital, 
and its nurses and pharmacists for negligence. He 
alleged and produced evidence that during the first 
operation, Dr. Brackett "nicked" the bowel, the 
hole was not closed, and bowel fluids leaked into 
his abdominal cavity, causing infection and severe 
pain. The infection was not timely discovered by 
any of the doctors, and it eventually spread to the 
lower extremities, resulting in gangrene and requir-
ing necessitating the leg's amputation. The large 
doses of medication he received, especially of 
Flagyl, Sims claimed, led to nerve and brain dam-
age. Sims further alleged that the doctors failed to 
get the Sims's informed consent on treatment, that 
Spohn's nurses failed to properly chart his condition 
and to compel the doctors to take note of his symp-
toms. He faults Spohn's nurses and pharmacists for 
administering the unusually large doses of Flagyl 
and Reglan without question or verification. 
The defendants presented a united front at trial, 
maintaining that there had been no acts or omis-
sions constituting negligence and that Sims's prob-
lems resulted from his own health conditions and 
the known risks of surgery. They all agreed that 
Sims was too weak to undergo more surgery after 
the second operation and that the conservative 
treatment he received was the best course. They at-
tributed the gangrene to Sims's pre-existing circula-
tion problems and low blood pressure. The nerve 
and brain damage, they argued, was due to a stroke. 
They produced evidence that the large amount of 
medications given was proper according to recent 
medical publications. 
From the outset of trial, examination of the wit-
nesses was very time-consuming. By the second 
day, the trial judge, frustrated by the pace, forbad 
all redirect and re-cross examination of witnesses. 
Trial continued in the following way: appellant 
would examine his witness then each of the four de-
fendants would cross-examine. When a defendant 
called a witness, that defendant would conduct his 
direct examination, appellant would cross-examine, 
and then the three remaining defendants would 
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cross-examine. The record shows that in the six 
days it took appellant to present his case-in-chief, 
Sims presented nine witnesses, and much trial time 
was consumed by motions and objections from all 
the parties. 
III. Exclusion of Expert Testimony 
By points one and two, Sims claims that the tri-
al court abused its discretion by excluding two of 
his expert witnesses. Dr. Charles Felger was ex-
cluded on the grounds that his testimony was cumu-
lative of a prior expert and Nurse Riley on the 
grounds that although she was designated thirty 
days before trial, she was not designated as soon as 
practicable. 
[1][2] The court has the authority to exclude 
testimony to avoid the needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence. TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 403, 611. 
Evidence that is relevant may properly be excluded 
under Rule 403 if its probative value is substan-
dally outweighed by considerations of undue delay 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
When a trial court makes a decision to admit or to 
exclude evidence in which it weighs competing le-
gitimate factors in reaching his decision, the court 
exercises discretion. See Downer v. Aquamarine 
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 
{Tex.1985). The trial *453 court has discretion to 
choose among only legitimate and legal alternat-
ives. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 
S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, no writ) 
.. A reviewing court will not disturb the ruling un-
less the trial court abuses that discretion. Lorusso v. 
Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 821 
{Tex.1980); Ponder v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex.App.-Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). 
[3] In reviewing a claim of trial court error, we 
conduct a three-stage review. First, we determine 
whether the claimed error was preserved for our re-
view, then, whether the trial court committed error, 
and finally, whether the error was harmful. 
[4][5] Sims's first expert medical witness was 
Page 6 of9 
Page 5 
Dr. Keith Fannin, a doctor board certified in gener-
al surgery. Dr. Fannin testified to various acts and 
omissions on the part of the defendants that led to 
Sims's complications. During rigorous cross-
examination, the defendants challenged Dr. Fan-
nin's opinions because he was a friend of Sims FN2 
and he lacked board certification in a more particu-
larized specialty. 
FN2. Dr. Fannin was a friend of Sims's and 
stated that the two of them had sometimes 
gone fishing together. 
Appellant also called Dr. Charles Felger, 
formerly a teaching physician at Austin's Bracken-
ridge Hospital and board certified in internal medi-
cine. Soon after appellant began his direct examina-
tion of Dr. Felger, the trial judge called a bench 
conference. After a lengthy discussion, the court 
determined that Dr. Felger's testimony would be 
wholly cumulative of Dr. Fannin's. The court ruled 
that Felger would not be allowed to testify and that 
appellant must proceed with other witnesses. 
At the first stage, we determine whether the er-
ror was properly preserved. To preserve a com-
plaint that the trial court improperly excluded evid-
ence, the complaining party must make an offer of 
proof as to what the excluded witness would have 
testified. Such an offer must be made before the 
court's charge is read to the jury. TEX.R.APP.P. 
52(a) & (b); TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 103(b). Appellees 
argue that Sims's offer of proof as to Dr. Felger's 
testimony was untimely because Sims did not make 
his bill of exceptions until after the jury began de-
liberating. However, Sims made an informal offer 
of proof that was sufficient under appellate rule 
52(b) which states: 
No formal bills of exception shall be needed to 
authorize appellate review of the question wheth-
er the court erred in excluding the evidence.... A 
transcription of the reporter's notes showing the 
offer, whether by concise statement or question 
and answer, showing the objections made, and 
showing the ruling thereon, when included in the 
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record certified by the reporter, shall establish the 
nature of the evidence, the objections, and the 
ruling .... No further offer need be made. 
TEX.R.APP.P. 52(b) (emphasis added). 
Before excluding Felger's testimony, the trial 
judge sua sponte ordered a bench conference in 
which he questioned counsel regarding the sub-
stance of Felger's testimony. That conference was 
recorded by the reporter and is part of the statement 
of facts. Counsel emphasized that Felger is board 
certified in internal medicine and specializes in 
gastroenterology. His testimony would have shown 
"a separate, independent view of what transpired." 
Dr. Felger would have given specific testimony on 
the standard of care for recovery, operative notes, 
and hospital charting procedures. After a long 
bench conference in which counsel continued to de-
scribe Dr. Felger's expected testimony, the judge 
excluded the evidence as cumulative. The court 
could not properly have so ruled unless he knew the 
essential substance of Dr. Felger's testimony. We 
hold this bench conference, outside the hearing of 
the jury that apprised the court of the nature of the 
evidence and was recorded by the court reporter, 
was an informal offer of proof and was sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of rule 52(a). See generally 
Ledisco Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 
951, 959 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) 
. Finding *454 the record sufficient to preserve er-
ror, we next look to whether the court erred. 
The cause of Sims's intestinal leak was a con-
tested issue. Defendant Brackett gave several dif-
ferent explanations for its cause, including an inad-
vertent surgical nick. Dr. Fannin, the general sur-
gical expert for the plaintiff, had the firm opinion 
that the leak was caused by a surgeon's nick; 
however, his credibility was diminished because he 
was a friend of the plaintiff and not a specialist. In 
contrast, Dr. Felger was a board certified internist, 
specializing in gastroenterology and had taught at a 
large metropolitan hospital. The difference in the 
two expert's credentials and Felger's lack of a per-
sonal relationship with Sims in all likelihood would 
Page ·1 ot 9 
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have enhanced Felger's credibility compared to 
Fannin's. 
[6] In a medical malpractice trial expert medic-
al testimony is a necessity, and the matters at issue 
are addressed by opposing experts. In order for the 
trial court to exclude Dr. Felger's testimony it must 
have found that its probative value was " substan-
tially outweighed by ... [the] needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence." TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 403 
(emphasis added). To exclude evidence under Rule 
403, the trial court must conduct a balancing test 
and only when the balance weighs significantly on 
the side of judicial efficiency may relevant evid-
ence be excluded as cumulative. The excluded evid-
ence here had great probative value and was not 
merely cumulative of Dr. Fannin's testimony. See In 
re Watson, 720 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.1986) (trial 
court erred in excluding 81 letters holding they 
were not "merely cumulative" and were the 
strongest rebuttal evidence available); Ponder, 840 
S.W.2d at 479 (error in excluding part of expert 
witness' testimony on causation, a hotly contested 
issue, alleged to be merely cumulative); see also 
Jones v. Colley, 820 S.W.2d 863, 866-67 
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). The test 
is not merely whether the evidence to be adduced 
from the two witnesses is similar, but also whether 
the excluded testimony would have added substan-
tial weight to the offering parties' case. If so, it is 
error to exclude it. Bohmfalk v. Linwood, 742 
S.W.2d 518 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (trial 
court improperly excluded disinterested witness 
whose testimony corroborated testimony of inter-
ested witness). 
We hold that the trial judge abused his discre-
tion in excluding Dr. Felger's testimony on the 
hotly contested issues in this case. 
[7] Appellant complains of the court's exclu-
sion of Nurse Riley as an expert witness by point 
two. Sims designated Nurse Riley and a pharmacist 
as expert witnesses on the thirtieth (30) day before 
trial. Spohn Hospital moved to strike on grounds 
she was not designated "as soon as practicable" un-
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der rule 166b. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(6){b). Fur-
ther, in response to appellant's designation, Spohn 
designated nurse and pharmacist experts seventeen 
days before trial. Appellant pointed out that Spohn 
designated a nurse and two doctors as experts 
(which they decided not to call) the day appellant 
designated their nurse. The trial court struck all of 
those experts as a sanction against both parties' 
"gamesmanship." 
[8] The party opposing a witness has the bur-
den of producing evidence to show that the desig-
nation was not "as soon as practical." Mentis v. 
Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (1994). Spohn claimed 
that appellant never designated Nurse Riley in an-
swers to the interrogatories it propounded shortly 
after suit was filed in 1989. The objection is the 
same as that found to be inadequate in Mentis. Id at 
15. Simply advising the court how long the case 
had been pending does not by itself establish as 
lack of due diligence. Id. at 16. 
[9] We hold that the trial court erred in striking 
Riley; however, appellant cannot demonstrate harm 
because Nurse Riley's deposition testimony is not 
properly before us. Counsel made no informal offer 
of proof and the deposition was not timely offered. 
FNJ We overrule point two. 
FN3. The deposition was offered while the 
jury was deliberating. 
In order to determine whether the error exclud-
ing Felger was harmful, we review the entire pro-
ceedings and briefly outline the procedural context 
in which both Riley's and *455 Felger's testimony 
were excluded. Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.1989); Ponder, 840 
S.W.2d at 479. 
IV. Conduct of the Trial 
[l O] The trial judge has the power and obliga-
tion to control his courtroom for the purposes of as-
certaining the truth, promoting judicial economy, 
and protecting witnesses. TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 6ll(a) 
. Rule 611 states: 
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The court shall exercise reasonable control over 
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and presenting evidence so as to ( l) make the in-
terrogation and presentation effective for the as-
certainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless con-
sumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment. 
Id (emphasis added). The court has some lee-
way in the order of proceedings in multi-party 
cases. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 265 (not specifically ad-
dressing the order of cross-examination when there 
are multiple "adverse" parties). However, Rule 611 
and other rules governing conduct of a trial, must 
be construed to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined. 
TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 102. We consider the trial 
court's conduct of this trial as background for ap-
pellant's complaints. FN4 
FN4. Appellant makes this complaint by 
point of error four, however, the point is 
not preserved for our separate review. 
On day two of trial, the court, in the interest of 
speed of presentation of the case, denied the parties 
redirect and recross examination of witnesses ex-
cept on leave of court.FN5 Re-direct is "intended to 
permit the witness to explain answers given on 
cross-examination and to amplify new material eli-
cited for the first time. The intent is to prevent the 
jury from being left with a false and incomplete 
picture created by the latitude counsel is afforded 
on cross-examination and counsel's ability to use 
leading questions. It is sometimes said that re-direct 
examination for this purpose is a matter of right. 
See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Norwood, 76 S.W.2d 
166, 167-68 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1934, writ 
dism'd); Martini v. Power Banking Co., 33 S.W.2d 
466, 469 (Tex.Civ.App.-F01t Worth 1930, writ 
dism'd); see generally RAY, GUIDE TO THE 
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 621 (Texas Practice 1980). 
FN5. The trial judge refused Sims's request 
to redirect Fannin to rebut new material the 
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defendants elicited on cross. 
The prohibition on re-cross and re-direct exam-
ination continued in force during the defendants' 
case-in-chief. Doctors Cortese and Bullen each test-
ified during his own case-in-chief. Doctors Cortese 
and Bullen each testified during his own case-
in-chief, Sims cross-examined, and the remaining 
defendants then followed, "cross-examining" an es-
sentially friendly witness. Therefore, the appellees 
were able to use each other as experts to exonerate 
themselves, with no opportunity for rebuttal by ap-
pellant. Appellant's counsel attempted to alleviate 
the disparity by requesting a different order of ex-
amination, but he was denied. Finally, Brackett and 
Appel only presented evidence consisting of an-
swers to written interrogatories from several indi-
viduals Dr. Fannin claimed to have consulted while 
preparing for the case. This evidence came in after 
the trial court recessed the trial for one month fol-
lowing the plaintiffs and two defendants' case-
in-chief. 
[11] The control given the trial judge must be 
exercised reasonably; a party must be given a fair 
opportunity to present its case so the jury may as-
certain the truth. Prezelski v. Christiansen, 775 
S.W.2d 764, 766 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 
1989), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 782 
S.W.2d 842 (Tex.1990). If a party is denied the 
right to make a fair presentation to the jury, the 
court has not acted reasonably and has abused its 
discretion. The exclusion of Felger's testimony as 
well as the denial of redirect and recross examina-
tion denied appellant the opportunity to meet and 
rebut appellees' defenses and to present his case. 
While we need not determine whether the 
aforementioned procedures were proper, they suf-
fice to establish the context in which the exclusion 
of Dr. Felger's testimony occurred. These proced-
ures magnified the harmful effect of the exclusion 
of Felger's testimony. Even allowing that rules 403 
and 611 somewhat limit the right to re-direct and 
re-crossexamination, considerations of due *456 
process and fundamental fairness require us to con-
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elude that the trial court's orders here overstepped 
the bounds of reasonability, denied appellant his 
right to re-direct, and compounded the harm appel-
lant suffered. The excluded testimony was critical 
in and of itself, as it was material to issues hotly 
contested throughout the trial. Mentis, 870 S. W.2d 
at 16. Moreover, we are convinced that the error 
here amounted to such a denial of appellant's rights 
as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably 
did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. 
TEX.R.APP.P. 8l(b)(l). Felger's exclusion, com-
bined with other procedural rulings made the trial 
materially unfair and therefore constituted harmful 
error. See generally Soejje v. Stewart, 847 S.W.2d 
311, 315 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, writ 
denied). We sustain appellant's first point of error. 
The exclusion of Riley's testimony, which we 
have held to be abuse of discretion, was not pre-
served. We overrule point two. 
Because of our disposition of point one, we do 
not address appellant's additional points of error. 
TEX.R.APP.P. 90(a). Accordingly, we REVERSE 
the trial court's judgment and REMAND the cause 
for a new trial. 
FORTUNATO P. BENA VIDES not participating. 
Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1994. 
Sims v. Brackett 
885 S.W.2d 450 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
Michael Robert KOBOS, a minor child two years of 
age, By and Through Michael KOBOS and Rebecca 
Kobos, his parents and next friends; Michael Kobos 
and Rebecca Kobos, Appellants (Plaintiffs), 
V. 
Charles EVERTS, M.D.; Richard G. Sugden, M.D.; 
Kenneth L. Lambert, M.D.; Kenneth L. Lambert, 
M.D., P.C., a Wyoming professional corporation; 
Teton Radiology Associates, P.C., a Wyoming pro-
fessional corporation; James R. Little, M.D.; 
Thomas Pockat, M.D.; Jackson Pediatrics, P.C., a 
Wyoming professional corporation; John Does 1-X; 
and Doe Partnerships, Corporations and/or Other 
Entities 1-X, Appellees (Defendants). 
No. 86-12. 
Jan. 17, 1989. 
Rehearings Denied Feb. 28, 1989. 
Appellants' Motion for Costs on Reversal Granted 
in Part and Denied in Part Feb. 28, 1989. 
Medical malpractice action was brought against 
five physicians alleging improper hip treatment of 
osteomyelitis and septic arthritis of one-year-old 
child. The District Court, Teton County, John D. 
Troughton, J., entered judgment on jury verdicts in 
favor of four defendant physicians and directed ver-
dicts for all five. Plaintiffs, child and his parents, 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Urbigkit, J., held 
that: (1) instruction defining circumstances in 
which physicians were liable for acts or omissions 
involving exercise of judgment was reversible error 
when negligence claims involved misdiagnosis 
nonaction thesis; (2) fact that after x-rays were 
taken in clinic immediate medical attention was 
found to be required belied adequacy of earlier care 
given to patient by defendant radiologist at least to 
extent of creating question of fact for jury; and (3) 
record would not support exclusion of expert testi-
mony from pathologist and pediatrician on behalf 
of plaintiffs. 
.Page '2 ot '25 
Page I 
Reversed and remanded for retrial. 
Cardine, CJ., and Thomas, J., filed specially 
concurring opinions. 
Brown, J., retired, filed opinion dissenting in 
part and concurring in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €;::;;)1064.1(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVl(J) Harmless Error 
30XVl(J) 18 Instructions 
30k 1064 Prejudicial Effect 
30kI064.l In General 
30k1064.1(2) Particular Cases 
30k1064.1(8) k. Negligence 
and torts in general. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl8.130 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Health 198H ~827 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
l 98Hk827 k. Instructions. Most Cited 
(Formerly 299kl8.100 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Instruction in medical malpractice prosecution-
that physicians or surgeons were not liable if acts or 
omissions upon which plaintiffs' claims were pre-
dicated involved exercise of honest judgment de-
rived after careful and necessary investigation and 
that judgment was approved by respectable portion 
of competent and respectable physicians or sur-
geons in same line of practice and there was noth-
ing to indicate that approval was not honestly made 
or that approval, judgment, or acts or omissions 
were unreasonable-was reversible error in action in 
which negligence claims were based on misdia-
gnosis or nonaction thesis; the phraseology given 
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did not define duty of due care, but spoke of re-
sponsibility for moral decision and honesty. 
[2J Negligence 272 ~201 
272 Negligence 
272I In General 
272k201 k. Distinction or relationship 
between negligence and intentional conduct. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 272kl) 
Intent is not factor in negligence, since negli-
gence precludes intended conduct. 
[3] Health 198H ~708 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
l 98HV(C) Particular Procedures 
198Hk708 k. Radiology, ultrasound, and 
other medical imaging. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl5(17.1), 299kl5(17) Physicians 
and Surgeons) 
Radiologists have responsibilities to patients 
and to other physicians which are similar to those 
of pathologists-accurate diagnosis. 
l4] Health 198H ~825 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
l 98Hk824 Questions of Law or Fact and 
Directed Verdicts 
l 98Hk825 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 299kl8.90 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Fact that after x-rays were taken in clinic im-
mediate medical attention was found to be required 
belied adequacy of earlier care given to patient by 
radiologist at least to extent of creating question of 
fact regarding radiologist's negligence. 
[SJ Health 198H ~825 
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198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
l 98HV(G) Actions and Proceedings · 
198Hk824 Questions of Law or Fact and 
Directed Verdicts 
198Hk825 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 299kl8.90 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Directed verdict should not have been granted 
for defendant radiologist in medical malpractice ac-
tion involving claims of improper hip treatment of 
osteomyelitis and septic arthritis of one-year-old 
child at time when physician who had specialized 
in diagnostic radiology and forensic medicine had 
testified adversely as to defendant radiologist's 
compliance with due care standard; issue of negli-
gence had been presented. 
l6] Evidence 157 ~538 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XIl(C) Competency of Experts 
157k538 k. Due care and proper conduct 
in general. Most Cited Cases 
Orthopedic surgeon was competent to express 
opinion concerning whether x-ray and bone scan 
analysis done by radiologist was negligent and that 
defendant orthopedic surgeon should have read 
bone scan himself, in medical malpractice action 
against physicians involving claims of improper hip 
treatment of osteomyelitis and septic arthritis of 
one-year-old child. 
[7J Trial 388 ~56 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k56 k. Cumulative evidence in gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
Record did not support exclusion of expert 
testimony from pathologist and pediatrician in med-
ical malpractice action as cumulative; two of the 
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defendant doctors were pediatricians, and defense 
was postured on approach to lay blame for medical 
problems suffered on nondefendant operating sur-
geon through defendant's pathological testimony. 
(8] Trial 388 ~llO 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 10 k. Presentation of evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
Medical malpractice plaintiffs should not have 
been precluded from inquiring of office secretary 
regarding number of telephone calls received re-
garding child's medical problems and discussion 
with acquaintance of deposition testimony to lay 
foundation for impeaching secretary with testimony 
from acquaintance that she lied at her deposition 
when she stated she did not know how many times 
parent had called; trial court order insulated secret-
ary from testimony about her subsequent comment 
regarding her deliberate misstatement on relevant 
issue and that action could not be justified on ex-
pectation secretary would reiterate impeachable 
testimony. 
[91 Appeal and Error 30 ~971(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k971 Examination of Witnesses 
30k971(3) k. Cross-examination. Most 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court had no basis for disagreeing 
with discretional decision of trial court sustaining 
irrelevancy objection to cross-examination question 
of defendant doctor, where there had been no offer 
of proof at trial and materials furnished in discov-
ery which might have shown relevancy of question 
were not contained in record on appeal. 
*535 Lawrence B. Hartnett, Jackson, for appellants. 
J.E. Vlastos of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, P.C., 
Casper, for appellees Everts and Teton Radiology 
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Associates, P.C. 
Frank D. Neville and Michael Golden of Williams, 
Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee 
Sugden. 
Paul B. Godfrey of Godfrey, Sundahl & Jorgenson, 
Cheyenne, for appellee Lambert. 
Carl L. Lathrop of Lathrop, Rutledge & Boley, 
Cheyenne, for appellee Little. 
Lawrence A. Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, 
Sheridan, for appellee Pockat. 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ., and BROWN,FN* J., Retired. 
FN* Retired June 30, 1988. 
URBIGKIT, Justice. 
Presented for appellate review is a six week 
medical malpractice trial against five physicians in-
volving claims of improper hip treatment of osteo-
myelitis and septic arthritis of a one year old child, 
which resulted in verdicts in favor of four defend-
ants and directed verdicts for all. The issues encom-
pass excluded witnesses, denied cross-examination, 
directed verdicts and contended erroneous negli-
gence instruction. 
We reverse and remand for retrial. 
I. ISSUES 
Although variously stated by appellants and the 
five separate appellees who are differently affected, 
the appellate issues presented include: 
*536 I. Basic medical malpractice negligence 
instruction; 
2. Directed verdict for the radiologist; 
3. Subsequent directed verdicts for other ap-
pellees after they secured a favorable jury verdict; 
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4. Trial court decision denying appellants the 
right to call the appellee doctors as adverse wit-
nesses during their case in chief; and 
5. Contested witness exclusion and evidentiary 
decisions of the trial court: 
a. Limitation on testimony of appellants' expert 
radiologist to consider standard of care as contrib-
utory to the injury sustained; 
b. Limitation of testimony of expert witnesses 
regarding standard of care of radiologist which was 
rejected either as cumulative or not competent; 
c. Denied use of Michael Lagios, M.D. as an 
expert witness on the basis that his testimony would 
be cumulative; and 
d. Denied use of Lawrence Madoff, M.D. as an 
expert witness on the basis that his testimony would 
be cumulative. 
II. FACTS 
Appellants include Michael Robert Kobos, a 
young child, and his parents of Jackson, Wyoming. 
In 1981, as the date of these events, the one year 
old developed a right hip pain. The patient was first 
evaluated in office and through telephone contact 
by Jackson doctors, James R. Little, M.D. and asso-
ciate intern, Thomas J. Pockat, M.D. With the 
young child's condition producing "essentially nor-
mal x-rays," he was then seen by a general pediatri-
cian, appellee Richard G. Sugden, M.D., whose of-
fice was in the same building as Dr. Little's. Con-
sultation followed with yet another doctor, appellee 
Kenneth L. Lambert, M.D., a Jackson orthopedic 
surgeon. In this period of regular examinations as 
the child's problem continued, x-rays were taken 
and reviewed by appellee radiologist Charles 
Everts, M.D., with the continued finding of an es-
sentially normal condition for the medical evalu-
ation. 
After about two and one-half months of this 
course of action with care limited to continuous of-
fice visits and no improvement, medical reference 
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was made by Dr. Sugden for the child to be evalu-
ated at the University of Utah Medical Center in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The serious condition as dia-
gnosed in Utah required apparent surgery, which 
was done by return to Jackson and performed by 
Dr. William Mott. Following surgery, the diagnosis 
was made of chronic osteomyelitis (infected bone). 
As a result of either a developmental infected 
bone condition or surgical misadventure by Dr. 
Mott, growth plate damage resulted to the femur 
which will bring about significant future hip growth 
and use problems for the child. The broad character 
of factual issues considered at trial was whether the 
delayed medical attention while the infected bone 
condition developed precipitated the recognized in-
jury or whether Dr. Mott, in final curative surgery, 
caused the permanent injury damage during the sur-
gical process. Consequently in litigative approach, 
appellees denied diagnosis delay or treatment fault 
and blamed Dr. Mott as the surgeon who operated. 
The record of the lengthy trial can be summed up as 
including complicated evidence and a significant 
number of expert witnesses. Qualification of appel-
lants' expert witnesses at trial was particularly 
painstaking in time, detail and opposition. 
Ill. PROPER INSTRUCTION 
[1] A principal issue in this appeal is appel-
lants' challenge to the instructions, which included 
Instruction No. 18 as subject to the most detailed 
objection at trial and upon appeal. Instruction No. 
18 states: 
You are instructed that physicians and surgeons 
are not liable for mere errors of judgment, 
provided there has been a careful examination 
and ordinary care and skill has been exercised. 
In other words, if, from all the evidence it ap-
pears by a preponderance that the acts or omis-
sions of the defendants, each or all of them, upon 
which plaintiffs' claims are predicated clearly in-
volved *537 and constituted an exercise of an 
honest judgment, arrived at after careful and ne-
cessary investigation, and 
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a. The judgment is approved by a respectable 
portion of competent and reputable physicians 
or surgeons in the same line of practice, and 
b. There is nothing to indicate that the approval 
is not honestly made, or that the approval, the 
judgment or the acts or omissions are unreason-
able, 
Then, the defendants, each or all of them, are 
not Iiable.FNJ 
FNI. Eight other· specific medical malprac-
tice instructions were given, which in-
cluded in general text: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
The Plaintiffs contend that Michael 
Robe1t Kobos was at different times a 
patient under the care and treatment of 
each of the Defendant doctors. Plaintiffs 
claim that the Defendants, each or all of 
them, were negligent in their care and 
treatment of Michael Robert Kobos, 
which negligence was the proximate 
cause of injuries and damages suffered 
by Plaintiffs. 
Each Defendant denies the Plaintiffs' 
claim asserted against him. 
The Plaintiffs have the burden of prov-
ing their claims against each Defendant 
by a preponderance of evidence. 
{The factual basis for the denial of pa-
tient-doctor status implicit in the instruc-
tion is not demonstrable from trial evid-
ence.) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
In this action, the Plaintiffs have the bur-
den of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence with respect to each Defendant 
the following: 
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1. The Defendant was negligent; and 
2. The negligence of the Defendant was 
the proximate cause of the injury to the 
Plaintiffs; and 
3. The nature and extent of the injuries 
claimed to have been so suffered, the 
elements of Plaintiffs' damage and the 
amount thereof. 
In determining whether an issue has 
been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you should consider all of the 
evidence bearing upon that issue regard-
less of who produced it. The existence of 
such proposition must be more probable 
than its nonexistence. [Emphasis in ori-
ginal.] 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Generally, negligence means the failure 
to use ordinary care. 
Negligence as that term is used in these 
instructions with respect to the Defend-
ant physicians means the failure to exer-
cise the skill, diligence and knowledge, 
and to apply the means and methods 
which would reasonably be exercised 
and applied under similar circumstances 
by members of the profession in good 
standing and in the same line of practice. 
The burden is upon the Plaintiffs to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that each Defendant failed to exercise 
the degree of care and skill required 
from him. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I I 
It is the duty of a physician or surgeon 
who holds himself out as a specialist in a 
particular field of medical, surgical or 
other healing science, to have the know-
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ledge and skill ordinarily possessed, and 
to use the care and skill ordinarily used, 
by reputable specialists practicing in the 
same field and under similar circum-
stances. 
One who holds himself out as a special-
ist in that field and who undertakes dia-
gnosis or treatment in his speciality is re-
quired to use the skill and care required 
of such a specialist. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
In order to prove negligence, it is neces-
sary for Plaintiffs to prove by a prepon-
derance of expert medical testimony that 
a Defendant doctor failed to use the 
standard of care given to you in the fore-
going instructions and such failure was a 
proximate cause of the injury com-
plained of. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
If the origin of the alleged injuries is ob-
scure and not readily apparent, or if 
there are several equally probable causes 
of the condition, it is the burden of the 
Plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance, 
through competent expert medical testi-
mony, that among the possible causes of 
the alleged injuries there is a reasonable 
probability (that is to say, the most likely 
cause was) the negligence, if any, of 
each Defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are instructed that in rendering 
medical services to a patient, a physician 
does not impliedly warrant or guarantee 
the success of his treatment or operation. 
The physician does impliedly warrant 
that he possesses and will exercise such 
professional skill and learning as are or-
dinarily possessed by medical practition-
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ers practicing in the same field and un-
der similar circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
The law presumes that a physician or 
surgeon has carefully and skillfully 
treated or operated on his patient. There 
is no presumption of negligence from the 
fact of an injury or adverse result. 
However, this presumption is rebuttable 
and may be overcome by a preponder-
ance of the testimony and evidence 
which establishes negligence or lack of 
reasonable care on the part of a physi-
cian or surgeon in his medical diagnosis, 
his performance of surgical procedures, 
and his care and treatment of patients. 
*538 Appellants assert that Instruction No. 10 
was a correct articulation of the law and that In-
struction No. 18 was improper as contrary to Vas-
sos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (Wyo.1981) (Vassos 
[) and Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284 
(Wyo.1983) (Vassos JI). We agree. 
In Vassos I, 625 P.2d at 772-73, as recognizing 
that a malpractice action is usually a form of negli-
gence litigation, this court observed: 
[T]he existence of the physician-patient relation-
ship established the duty. The standard is fixed as 
that which is required of a reasonable person in 
light of all the circumstances. * * * A malpractice 
contention is also one of those circumstances. 
The more specific standard for malpractice ac-
tions is that a physician or surgeon must exercise 
the skill, diligence and knowledge, and must ap-
ply the means and methods, which would reason-
ably be exercised and applied under similar cir-
cumstances by members of his profession in good 
standing and in the same line of practice.* * * 
The skill, diligence, knowledge, means and 
methods are not those "ordinarily" or "generally" 
or "customarily" exercised or applied, but are 
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those that are "reasonably" exercised or applied. 
Negligence cannot be excused on the grounds 
that others practice the same kind of negligence. 
Medicine is not an exact science and the proper 
practice cannot be gauged by a fixed rule. * * * 
* * * such circumstances are not of such common 
knowledge, the jury must depend upon testimony 
of experts to explain the standard and thus pre-
vent a conclusion based on conjecture and specu-
lation. * * * In other words, an additional ques-
tion of fact must be answered when the circum-
stances are such that the reasonable person stand-
ard is not within the common knowledge of the 
jury. 
[2] Furthermore, strict adherence to the so-
called locality rule is not appropriate. DeHerrera v. 
Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, 590 P.2d 
1342 (Wyo.1979); Vassos II, 658 P.2d 1284. We 
cannot accommodate acceptance of the instruction 
given within the criteria of the Vassos rule after the 
timely objection at trial that the instruction would 
confuse or mislead the jury as to the appropriate 
principle of law. Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 
(Wyo.1983). The phraseology given simply does 
not define a duty of due care but bespeaks in re-
sponsibility to moral decision and honesty, and as 
the principal instruction, constitutes reversible er-
ror. Intent is not a factor of negligence since negli-
gence precludes intended conduct. Globe Indem. 
Co. v. Blomjield, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372 (1977) 
; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 3 at 473 (1966); W. Pross-
er & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 31 at 169 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
A leading authority has been identifiable within 
the Wyoming criterion which provides that there 
are two applicable standards of care to be applied in 
malpractice cases. 
The first, which was correctly charged, holds the 
doctor to the standard of care measured by the 
knowledge and ability of the average physician or 
specialist in good standing in the community 
where he practices. This is the standard of reas-
Page 8 of25 
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onable care. Liability is premised upon the failure 
to exercise reasonable care, so measured. A doc-
tor is also subject to a separate duty which re-
quires him to use his best judgment, but which 
does not make him liable for mere error in judg-
ment, provided he does what he thinks is best 
after careful examination. * * * "An error of 
judgment charged is appropriate in a case where a 
doctor is confronted with several alternatives and, 
in determining the appropriate treatment to be 
rendered, exercises his judgment by following 
one course of action in lieu of another." 
1 S. Pegalis and H. Wachsman, American Law 
of Medical Malpractice § 2:9 at 69, 71-72 (1980) 
(quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 
760 (1898)). It is noteworthy where a careful exam-
ination is given and clear alternative treatment 
courses exist, that an error of judgment charge may 
additionally be appropriate. Appellants were en-
titled to contend that the alternatives were not em-
braced in this *539 case since, generally speaking, 
nothing was done during the critical period as med-
ical treatment which effectively addressed the phys-
ical problem as later disclosed by x-ray analysis 
and surgical intervention. 
The instructions must be considered as a whole 
in order to determine whether the instructions as 
a whole are fair. But the introductions must 
clearly reflect the factual situation presented in 
the case as well as the applicable law. 
1 D. Louisell and H. Williams, Medical Mal-
practice § 11.38 at 11-134 (1988) (footnotes omit-
ted). The test of standard of care in a malpractice 
case is ordinary skill and diligence as possessed by 
members of the profession generally. "Reasonable 
and ordinary care, skill, and diligence" is the test 
denominated in 4 Reid's Branson Instructions to 
Juries, ch. 146, § 2442 at 473 (1987 Cum.Supp.). 
See similarly, PIK 2d 15.01 at 66 (2d ed. 1977) 
(although continuing to include some category of 
the locality rule). It is apparent that there is a differ-
ence in the concepts of the law between a bad result 
achieved with care and a less than careful bad 
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choice. Excluding the Wyoming deleted locality 
rule, the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions properly 
inform: 
In [treating] * * * a patient, a [doctor] * * * 
must possess and apply the knowledge and use 
the skill and care that is ordinarily used by reas-
onably well-qualified [doctors] * * * in similar 
cases and circumstances. A failure to do so is a 
form of negligence that is called malpractice. 
IPI 2d 105.01 at 319 (1971). 
A physician's conduct * * * must be measured 
against what a physician having and using that 
knowledge, skill and care of physicians practi-
cing in the same field of practice in the same or 
similar locality at the same time would or would 
not do under the same or similar circumstances. 
CJI 2d 15:2 at 313 (1988). The mere error in 
judgment criteria as relied upon by the trial court 
for instruction comes from Wright v. Conway, 34 
Wyo. 1, 241 P. 369 ( 1925). That concept is now 
subsumed within the modernized standards for 
present day professional practitioners invoking 
skill, diligence, knowledge, and application of 
means and methods reasonable under the circum-
stances by persons within the profession. Clearly, 
as we specifically stated in Vassos I, 625 P.2d at 
772, "[n]egligence cannot be excused on the 
grounds that others practice [ or approve of] the 
same kind of negligence." Under the misdiagnosis 
non-action thesis of appellants' claims of negli-
gence, the jury instruction was improper. 
IV. DENIAL OF RIGHT TO CALL APPELLEES 
AS ADVERSE WITNESSES IN APPELLANTS' 
CASE IN CHIEF 
During trial, appellants were advised by the tri-
al court, at a point which, as a consequence, was 
near the end of their case in chief, that: 
You will not be permitted to call the Defendant 
Doctors as adverse witnesses because it's the 
judgment of this Court if they are called for dir-
ect examination and you have the opportunity to 
cross-examine on the substance of their testi-
Page IJ or L) 
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mony, this case is going to go faster. That's based 
not only upon my experience, in general, that that 
is a quicker way to handle adverse parties but it's 
also based upon what I've observed in this 
courtroom concerning what's happened in this 
courtroom with respect to individual witnesses. 
You think the Court is unreasonable. The Court 
believes that the length of examination of most of 
the witnesses in this case has been unreasonable 
and that a good deal of time could have be[ en] 
saved with respect to-could have be [en] saved 
with examination and cross-examination that was 
more directed and to the point. 
Early the following week, the decision was re-
iterated: 
Now, for the record, the Court indicated last 
week that it would not allow the Plaintiffs to call 
the Defendants during their case in chief and 
would require the Defendants to put them on the 
stand. Now, the reason that the Court did that 
*540 is because the testimony in the case is going 
slow. It was the Court's considered opinion that 
the testimony would go quicker if the direct ex-
amination brought out the testimony of the doc-
tors, leaving the Plaintiffs with the right to cross-
examine. And that that would go quicker in the 
considered opinion of the Court because the 
Court is of the opinion based upon several weeks 
of trial and several weeks of experience with wit-
nesses that are either perceived as being adverse 
by the Plaintiffs or are adverse witnesses, in fact, 
to the Plaintiffs, that during cross-examination in 
Plaintiffs' case, the examination has gone slowly 
because Plaintiffs' Counsel finds himself in the 
position during the presentation of his case in 
chief of wanting to elicit from the adverse parties 
the testimony that is important to his case in chief 
but to avoid the testimony of the adverse parties, 
which is more related to the defense and which is 
adverse to the case in chief. And because the 
Court perceives that Counsel finds themselves in 
that position, Counsel perceives-or the Court per-
ceives Counsel as going very slowly and care-
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fully, attempting to avoid during his case in chief, 
the unfavorable aspects of the testimony of the 
adverse parties. In the attempts to avoid those un-
favorable aspects, the examination goes slowly. 
The Court, in its judgment, thought that if the ad-
verse nature of the testimony is laid out on the ta-
ble quickly, that Counsel would then be-would be 
alleviated-or the problem that Counsel faces of 
trying to avoid that testimony would be alleviated 
because it would be out on the table and Counsel 
would not have to be so careful but could just 
come in and the whole process would go quicker. 
The subject was again reanalyzed by the trial 
court after all other case in chief witnesses had 
been called as then closing that trial segment with 
continued adverse examination denial: 
Well, it's very doubtful at this stage of the 
game that the Defendants are not going to be 
called to the stand. We'll know that after we 
handle the motions. Okay. So let's handle-We'll 
deal with the testimony of the Defendant Physi-
cians offered in Plaintiffs' case in chief at the 
same time that we deal with the motions for dir-
ected verdict that are going to be made this morn-
ing. In other words, if it appears that testimony of 
the Defendant Doctor is going to be critical to 
any motion for a directed verdict insofar as the 
Plaintiff is concerned, then the Court is in a posi-
tion of dealing with that by allowing that Doctor 
to be called. If it's not critical, then the Court can 
stand by its previous ruling that we'll do the * * * 
direct examination and you get your crack at 
them through cross-examination. 
The status of the issue on appeal is problemat-
ical since although discussed, it is not generally ad-
dressed as a designated issue for appeal and is con-
tested by only Dr. Everts in argument. None of the 
litigants in appellate brief have furnished citations 
that a trial court can or cannot, as a matter of dis-
cretion, generally deny to plaintiff the right to call 
an opposing party as an adverse witness. Cf. Hall v. 
Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo.1985), cited by appel-
lants. In anticipation that the problem will not reoc-
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cur on retrial, this court need not presently explore 
whether any circumstance could occur which would 
justify this kind of a general restriction on trial de-
velopment by a litigant.FN2 
FN2. Within the penumbra between due 
process, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 787, 28 L.Ed.2d 
113 ( 1971 ), and reasonable control over 
the presentation of evidence, McCabe v. 
R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 
699 (Wyo.1983), any restriction on rights 
of litigants to plan and present their case or 
for general evidentiary exclusion pursuant 
to W.R.E. 403 should tread softly. 
V. DIRECTED VERDICT FOR RADIOLOGIST 
Without being afforded the opportunity to call 
the physician radiologist as an adverse witness to 
determine what his activities and function may have 
been, the trial court granted a directed verdict in his 
behalf at the close of appellants' evidence. *541 
Thereafter, in appellees' case after trial court an-
nouncement of the directed verdict, the ex-litigant 
testified as an expert witness in behalf of the other 
appellees.FN3 In consideration of appellants' evid-
ence and cross-examination, the trial court justified 
by oral explanation to the attorneys why he would 
grant the directed verdict: 
FN3. Appellants characterize the status of 
the directed verdict for Everts: 
It must be emphasized that after Ap-
pellee Everts received a directed verdict 
in his favor he appeared at trial as an ex-
pert witness for the remaining Appellees, 
and while still glowing with the halo of 
innocence, damned Dr. William Mott as 
the cause of young Michael Kobos' dev-
astating injuries. 
And when you look at all of the evidence with re-
spect to Dr. Everts in that sense and in that light, 
then the Court concludes that the evidence, in the 
light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, establishes 
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that not only did Dr. Everts not fail to properly 
read x rays but that evidence, at best, establishes 
that it was a judgment call for Dr. Everts. The 
beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so to speak. 
Now, finally, the testimony clearly is that you 
can't diagnose osteomyelitis or septic hip in this 
case from the x rays. At least not the x rays-I can 
say it that way. You can't diagnose this by the x 
rays. You can diagnose changes but you cannot 
tell what the changes are. And even if one were 
to conclude that there were changes on October 
14 and 15 at the time of the last x ray plate and 
the last bone scan of Dr. Everts, the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs indicates 
that in order to diagnose septic hip and osteomy-
elitis, something more had to be done. And so 
even if there was a failure to properly read those 
two radiology materials, there's no evidence of 
any direct, proximate cause between that failure 
and the injuries that the Plaintiffs contend oc-
curred, those injuries being from osteomyelitis 
and septic hip which was not treated, which con-
ditions cannot be diagnosed by x rays. 
(3](4] Intrinsic to appellants' case was eviden-
tiary discussion of the duty of the radiologist to ex-
amine and report which is encompassed within a 
standard of due care to his patient. In earlier discus-
sion before the directed verdict had been granted, 
the trial court had analyzed: 
It would appear to the Court in this case that 
the uncontradicted evidence of all of the experts 
is that Dr. Everts had no duty to diagnose; that he 
had no duty to treat. 
This characterization of the duty or lack thereof 
of the radiologist is directly contrary to common 
reasoning (to determine what may be seen) and 
contrary to general precedent. Clayton v. 
Thompson, 475 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss.1985) 
(quoting Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss.1985) 
): 
[E]very doctor "has a duty to use his or her 
knowledge and therewith treat through maxim-
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um, reasonable, medical recovery, each patient, 
with such reasonable diligence, skill, compet-
ence, and prudence as are practiced by minimally 
competent physicians in the same specialty or 
general field of practice throughout the United 
States, who have available to them the same gen-
eral facilities, services, equipment and options." 
[Emphasis in original.] 
(P]roximate cause arises when the omission of a 
duty contributes to cause the injury. Gardner v. 
National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th 
Cir.1962) cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 
728, 9 L.Ed.2d 721 (1963). Harvey v. Silber, 300 
Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483 (1942). "Proximate 
cause here is implicit in the breach of duty. In-
deed, the duty would be empty if it did not itself 
embrace the loss as a consequence of its breach." 
Gardner, supra, at page 287. 
Id. at 445. We agree with appellants' position 
with reference to Vassos II, 658 P.2d 1284 that 
whether a duty exists and the scope of that duty are 
questions of law for the court. Id. at 1287. We 
would also agree with case law and text authority 
that radiologists have responsibilities to patients 
and to other physicians which are similar to those 
of pathologists-accurate diagnosis. 1 D. Louisell 
and H. Williams, *542 supra, at § 3.23 at 3-82. See 
also, Keen v. Prisinzano, 23 Cal.App.3d 275, I 00 
Cal.Rptr. 82 (1972). Factually, the circumstance 
that after x-rays were taken in the Salt Lake City 
clinic and immediate medical attention found to be 
required, belies adequacy of the earlier care given 
to the patient by the Jackson radiologist to the ex-
tent at least that a question of fact for the jury was 
created. DeHerrera, 590 P.2d 1342. 
(5] As an early witness, appellants called Dr. 
Maurice O'Connor who, after initial medical school 
graduation, spent time in general practice, then mil-
itary service, and thereafter was trained for special-
ization in diagnostic radiology. While in that pur-
suit, he also graduated from law school and has 
since described his activity as 75% to 80% in pure 
medicine in the diagnostic radiology specialty and 
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20% to 25% or less in forensic medicine. Extended, 
detailed, and continued objection started from the 
first and continued to the last of his testimony dur-
ing the two and one-half day session while he was a 
witness. The principal attack came by denial of ap-
pellees that the witness could properly state an 
opinion that the medical diagnosis for the small 
child should have come sooner and the treatment 
should have been better in regard to the service by 
all appellee witnesses. In broad category, the type 
of inquiry that developed has since been addressed 
by this court in Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 
233 (Wyo.1988). 
Despite those constant objections by appellees, 
Dr. O'Connor specifically testified that in his opin-
ion the standard of performance of radiologist Dr. 
Everts fell below the standard of appropriate care. 
An attempt was further denied in examining the 
witness to connect described insufficiency of radi-
ology service by cause to the later discovered hip 
condition. In sustaining latter objections, the trial 
court stated that "[t]he Jury doesn't need assistance 
from an expert in that area. The objection is sus-
tained." Subsequently, the following question was 
asked: 
Well, for the record, I have to ask you to put back 
on your radiologist hat and tell me whether you 
have an opinion as to whether or not the failure 
of Dr. Charles Everts as a radiologist to meet the 
standard of care required of him had any causal 
relation to the condition in Mikey Kobos' hip 
which ultimately resulted as you've described it 
on these films? 
The question was answered yes, and the re-
quested opinion floundered on a lack of foundation 
objection as well as competency as sustained. In-
quiry of counsel followed and the trial court re-
sponded: 
THE COURT: Do you want me to tell you on 
the record, in front of the Jury? 
MR. ANDREW HARTNETT: Beg your par-
don? 
Page 12 of25 
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THE COURT: Do you want me to tell me [sic] 
on the record? 
MR. ANDREW HARTNETT: May be I would 
rather you tell me off-the-record, out of the pres-
ence of the Jury. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then let's just leave it 
where it sits. 
The thesis of the trial court was then later ex-
plained by the previously quoted order granting the 
directed verdict. Essentially, the record presents a 
legal determination in divergence with the factual 
record as to the responsibility of the medical doctor 
practicing in the specialty of radiology. The trial 
court denied to appellants the intrinsic expert wit-
ness opinion to completely define the standard of 
care required. 
It is noteworthy how appellee Dr. Everts in 
brief describes the radiologist's participation in the 
medical practice: 
Everts read or interpreted the plain x-ray films 
and the bone scan films. In this regard Everts 
submitted written reports which are a part of the 
hospital records or chart. The actual procedure in 
taking the films, both the plain films and the bone 
scan films, is done by technicians and not by 
Everts. This is the usual method or procedure in 
taking and interpreting radiological tests or pro-
cedures. Everts did not see or touch Michael 
Kobos with respect to the plain films and did not 
actively participate in the procedure generating 
the bone scan films. Several of the exhibits 
offered by *543 Appellants include copies of the 
reports of Everts; however, the same are within 
the hospital chart/record (Exhibit 2). The plain x-
ray films are designated Exhibits 9-1 through 
9-22 and the bone scan films are designated as 
Exhibits 11-7 through 11-10. 
Therefore, the involvement of Everts consists 
entirely of his interpretation of the plain x-ray 
films taken on September 9, September 15, and 
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October 14, and the bone scan films made on Oc-
tober 15, 1981. 
Surprisingly, it is questioned that Dr. Everts 
owed a duty to the patient. Clearly, that contention 
should not be in factual dispute from this record or 
within today's medical world. If the physician per-
forming the service for a patient expects to be paid, 
he has the duty of a doctor to his patient. Dr. Everts 
was a doctor and Kobos was his patient for radi-
ology purposes. Really at issue was due care of the 
medical practitioner. When the directed verdict was 
granted, the witness provided by appellants of un-
questioned competence and medical experience had 
on this record testified adversely (to the extent per-
mitted) as to compliance with that due care stand-
ard. 
Both the duty of the radiologist to make and 
adequately communicate a correct diagnosis is dis-
cussed in Phillips v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 65 
Ohio App.2d 112, 416 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1979), 
where summary judgment was reversed as that 
court said: 
Weighing the facts and competing inferences, as 
we must, in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, it is possible to 
find the existence of a causal relationship 
between a breach of duty and the injury suffered. 
* * * Once the physician-patient relationship has 
been found to exist, as could well be found here, 
the professional responsibilities and duties exist 
despite the lack of proximity, or the remoteness, 
of contact between the two as where a consulting 
physician is involved in the case in only a limited 
manner. Therefore, all physicians involved in a 
case share in the same duties and responsibilities 
of the primary care physician to the extent of 
their involvement. 
It would seem in characterization that the ship 
had slipped sails somehow for directed verdict to be 
granted after the expert testimony had been given 
that the radiologist in performing a service of ex-
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amining and reporting on x-rays did not meet the 
required standard of performance. An issue of neg-
ligence was presented. See a detailed analysis of li-
ability, Clayton, 475 So.2d 439. 
[6] Appellants' problem with medical testimony 
relating to the radiologist's standard of care did not 
yet end. Called as a principal witness for appellants 
was San Francisco, California orthopedic surgeon, 
Dr. Kevin Harrington. After inquiry developed by 
examination of when appellants started to present 
the opinion of the witness in regard to the standard 
of care of the radiologist, a very extensive in cam-
era discussion followed after which the trial court 
ruled in open court statement to the jury: 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. The Court has 
ruled that Dr. Harrington shall not be permitted to 
express an opinion, either directly or indirectly, 
concerning whether the x-ray and bone scan ana-
lysis done by Dr. Everts was negligent or careless 
or whether it was careful and prudent. Any fur-
ther testimony by Dr. Harrington shall not be 
viewed or considered by you as applicable to the 
standard of care required of Dr. Everts. Dr. Lam-
bert's objection at the testimony of Dr. Harring-
ton to the effect that Dr. Lambert should have 
read the bone scan, himself, is without foundation 
and has been sustained by the Court. 
What this meant in trial procedure by trial court 
ruling was that the orthopedic surgeon was not 
competent to express an opinion about x-rays, 
which would also serve to isolate that doctor from 
responsibility whether or not the radiologist had 
made a mistake. Furthermore, this standard of med-
ical practice would establish that the orthopedic 
practitioner had no independent *544 responsibility 
to utilize his knowledge of x-rays in patient dia-
gnosis and treatmenf.FN4 
FN4. The specific decision and ratio de-
cidendi of the trial court was stated to 
counsel: 
The Court notes that [prior trial judge] 
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required the Plaintiffs to designate the 
experts that Plaintiffs would require in 
this case to meet their burden of proof 
and among those experts [was] a radiolo-
gist. Also among those experts [was] an 
orthopedic surgeon. Two separate doc-
tors; two separate physicians. 
The Court, therefore, rules under Rule 
403 that because the testimony of Dr. 
Harrington in the area of radiology will 
be cumulative, it will not be received by 
considerations of undue delay and waste 
of time. If the Supreme Court believes 
that I have abused my discretion in such 
a discretionary ruling, knowing more 
about this difficult trial than I do sitting 
in it, losing hair and developing ulcers, 
then it is the ruling of the Court that Mr. 
Vlastos' objections are sustained. Sus-
tained on the basis that there's no found-
ation indicating that this Witness either 
knows or is competent to establish what 
type of standard,-either knows or can es-
tablish those standards under which radi-
ologists as opposed to orthopedic sur-
geons must practice. 
Obviously, the cumulative characteriza-
tion cannot now be sustained in face of 
the subsequently granted directed verdict 
on the basis of failure of proof of a viol-
ated standard. Consequently, the justific-
ation, if one is to be perceived, must be 
found in a generalized principle that an 
orthopedic surgeon is not qualified to 
testify as to radiology standards, as a 
matter of law. 
Finally, from the standpoint of appellants as 
the developments worsened in character, objection 
was taken to the way this trial evolution was to be 
orally presented to the jury: 
My concern is that any such instruction to the 
Jury, in and of itself, intends to reflect on the 
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credibility of Dr. Harrington and is additionally 
prejudicial to the Plaintiffs case and that no in-
struction at this point in the evidence is necessary 
at all. He has not expressed an opinion regarding 
Dr. Everts nor has he expressed an opinion as to 
the failure of Dr. Lambert in any way in his inter-
pretation. He is qualified to read them and inter-
pret them himself and the instruction would be 
grossly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs. 
The expressed concern was not without unjusti-
fied substance in case progression as a trial devel-
opment. We conclude that the restriction on the wit-
ness' testimony was unjustified and constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. FNs 
FN5. It would not be totally dissimilar to 
consider that a jurist was not qualified to 
critique the academic analysis of his re-
search assistant or the supervising architect 
to review the sufficiency of the contractor's 
work product. 
Physicians who are not specially trained 
in diagnostic roe[n]tgenology may be 
capable of interpreting many X-ray films 
with reasonable accuracy, but as a gener-
al rule they should not rely exclusively 
upon their own interpretation, except in 
very simple cases or in cases coming 
within their own special field such as 
urology or orthopedics. 
1 D. Louisell and H. Williams, supra, at 
3-86 ( emphasis added). As indicated, Dr. 
Harrington was an orthopedic specialist. 
VI. OTHER ISSUES PRESENTED 
ln determination that a retrial is required, we 
would only consider other issues to the extent that a 
reoccurrence of question might again develop. 
a. Directed Verdicts Granted to Drs. Sugden, Lam-
bert, Little and Pockat After the Entry of Defend-
ants' Jury Verdict. 
The considerable discussion of this issue by the 
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litigants does not present any justiciable question 
for us to now determine. The case was submitted to 
the jury, which would not now presently justify our 
decision on a subsequent directed verdict after fa-
vorable verdict. We would, however, observe that 
citations to cases involving a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict are misplaced, since a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict is directed to ad-
versely attack the verdict and not to serve as a com-
patible substitute. See Baker v. Helms, 527 So.2d 
1241, 1243 (Ala.1988) for evidentiary test. In con-
cluding that this particular problem will not likely 
reoccur upon retrial, a further review becomes un-
justified since this result with another favorable 
verdict could not call for application of W.R.C.P. 
50(b). Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 
P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1987); Simpson v. Western Nat. 
Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878 (Wyo.1972). 
*545 The significance in perspective to appel-
lants is only relative to the topic of the excluded 
medical witnesses as being "cumulative." The prob-
lem is presented of the trial court's decisions that 
first the testimony of expert witnesses on violated 
standards of care is cumulative, and then without 
the support of appellants' case by the proposed ex-
pert opinion testimony to foreclose recovery by dir-
ected verdict on the basis of insufficiency of proof. 
FN6 
FN6. This complex, heavily contested and 
argumentatively pursued record bespeaks 
to the conception of the trial court as ac-
commodated by the usage of Instruction 
No. 18 and directed verdicts that judg-
mental mistake cannot create liability if 
that decision is either that nothing was 
wrong or not to do anything; so that only if 
something is done wrong can liability de-
velop. 
b. Denied Testimony of Tendered Witnesses. 
[7] Appellants challenge the denial of tendered 
testimony to be elicited from three proposed wit-
nesses. Appellants had planned to present expert 
testimony from Dr. Lawrence Madoff and Dr. Mi-
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chael Lagios in addition to the adverse examination 
of the appellees. Both witnesses had been deposed 
by appellees at appellees' convenience pursuant to 
specific trial court order. Dr. Lagios was a patholo-
gist at Children's Hospital in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia and Dr. Madoff, a pediatrician. Originally, 
pretrial objection had been taken to the late desig-
nations. Then after being deposed by trial court or-
der following a change in trial judges, the objection 
to trial presentation was sustained on the basis that 
their medical opinion testimony "would be cumu-
lative." The issue of late designation will not reoc-
cur with a new trial, and consequently, its tortuous 
pathway in this extended record will not be pur-
sued. Our consideration of the cumulative issue as 
an exercise of discretion is colored by the sub-
sequent decision of the trial court after verdict that 
a directed verdict emplacing inadequate proof was 
proper. We are also distressed in present decision 
by incomplete opportunity to evaluate the prospect-
ive testimony as "cumulative," since by its very 
nature, it would have been relevant and material if 
admissible. Under any circumstance in the contex-
tual development of this case with the categoriza-
tion pursued by counsel and the trial court, it would 
appear that with an appellee pediatrician and with 
other pediatricians listed as expert witnesses for the 
defense, that app effort to present a pediatrician ex-
pert witness to establish a standard of care and its 
violation would not likely be cumulative. Addition-
ally, the relevance of the pathologist to contest 
testimony of a pathologist who placed the blame on 
the succeeding surgeon, Dr. Mott, seems ex-
traordinarily confined. With retrial, the cumulative 
nature of prospective inquiry should be more 
clearly delineated by the record if rejection reoc-
curs. 
From this record, support for the exclusion cri-
teria carefully defined in Towner v. State, 685 P .2d 
45 (Wyo.1984) is not established. This court there 
said that " Rule 403 [W.R.E.] is an extraordinary 
remedy which should be used sparingly since it al-
lows the court to exclude evidence which is con-
cededly relevant and probative." Id. at 49. In the in-
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stant case, where two of the appellee doctors were 
pediatricians and appellants were disallowed the 
right to call a pediatrician as an expert witness, 'that 
rationale is hard to justify. Discretion, in any event, 
has its limits as we said in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 
894, 897 (Wyo.1986): 
Judicial discretion is a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment ex-
ercised with regard to what is right under the cir-
cumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously. 
In a medical malpractice case, plaintiff requires 
expert testimony for proof. Harris v. Grizzle, 625 
P.2d 747 (Wyo.1981). Denial of the pathologist's 
testimony is similarly questionable where the de-
fense is postured on an approach to Jay the blame 
onto the operating surgeon by defendant's patholo-
gical testimony. Availability of the tendered wit-
ness to plaintiff is similarly required to permit the 
litigant to have the same opportunity to have eleven 
men on *546 the field of play. At the least, all wit-
nesses reasonably available to provide substantive 
evidence should have been permitted to testify be-
fore the trial court executes or at least exiles 
plaintiffs' case to a never to be land. The general 
Jaw is in accord. See United States v. Davis, 639 
F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981), cited by this court with ap-
proval in Towner, 685 P.2d at 49, where evidence 
was "independent corroborative testimony on a ma-
terial issue." See likewise 2 D. Louisell and C. 
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 128 at 68 (1985). As is 
stated in J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence§ 403[06] at 403-95, 403-99 (1986): 
Certainly, Rule 403 does not mean that a court 
may exclude evidence that will cause delay re-
gardless of its probative value. If the evidence is 
crucial, the judge would abuse his discretion in 
excluding it. 
In a case surprisingly similar as involving 
denied testimony of a pediatrician witness, the 
court in Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902 
Page 16 of25 
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(11th Cir.1986) reversed the trial court's decision 
and plaintiff's verdict when the witness was to testi-
fy for defendant. Quoting Weinstein with approval, 
the appellate court found the trial court's action to 
be an abuse of discretion. The testimony of the ex-
pert witness had been excluded as cumulative when 
presented to support the expert testimony of two 
other witnesses in the death case. The appellate 
court considered that the litigant had the right, in 
this case the United States government under the 
federal Tort Claims Act, to present testimony which 
was more comprehensive and at least partially non-
cumulative through use of a pediatrician to testify 
in opposition to pediatricians who were presented 
by the plaintiff. 
The involved principles are well-stated: 
Not all evidence which is entirely duplicative is 
therefore cumulative and excludable. Evidence 
may vary in degree of persuasiveness, and when 
an item of proof which is offered on a point is 
very different in character or persuasive impact 
from an item of proof previously received, the 
former cannot be considered merely "cumulative" 
of the latter. Moreover, at times it is entirely reas-
onable for a party to insist, "One witness is good, 
but two or three will make my case much 
stronger, even though all will testify in a similar 
vein." In short, the discretion of the trial judge to 
exclude cumulative evidence must be exercised 
in a discriminating fashion, and with wisdom, 
particularly where the evidence in question goes 
to issues of central importance in the case. 
2 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, supra at 74-75 
(footnote omitted). See Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart 
Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.1986); Bower 
v. O'Hara, 759 F.2d 1117 (3rd Cir.1985); and 
United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th 
Cir.1976). 
The trial court retains considerable latitude 
even with admittedly relevant testimony in reject-
ing evidence which is cumulative or in requiring 
that evidence be brought to the jury's attention in a 
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manner least likely to cause confusion. However, 
the litigant "is entitled to an opportunity to adduce 
relevant, competent evidence bearing on the issues 
to be tried." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
125, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2911-12, 41 L.Ed.2d 590, reh'g 
denied 419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 157, 42 L.Ed.2d 129 
{1974). Thus, evidence which in the context of the 
litigation is merely repetitious or time consuming 
may be excluded, but only if time consideration 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative 
value of the proffered evidence. M. Graham, Hand-
book of Federal Evidence § 403 .1 at 179 (2d ed. 
1986). 
[8] The denied testimony of proposed witness 
Betty Perkinson (Perkinson) is substantively com-
plex. In compliance with trial court orders, appel-
lants had filed, as a notice of an additional witness, 
Perkinson's name. That witness would testify that 
Jane Fairbanks (Fairbanks), a receptionist in the of-
fice of Dr. Little, had told her that she had improp-
erly answered deposition examination when asked 
if she recalled the number of times that Rebecca 
Kobos had telephoned the doctor's office. Follow-
ing designation, appellee Dr. Little filed a motion in 
limine to prohibit Perkinson from being called as a 
witness and the motion *547 was considered during 
trial and ~hen rejected. 
The sequence of developmental events on the 
issue is interesting. It is indicated in the record, al-
though a copy of a deposition is not included, when 
appellants took the deposition of prospective wit-
ness Fairbanks as the office secretary for Dr. Little, 
that the witness testified she could not recall how 
many telephone calls were made to the office by the 
patient's mother during the defined period. As sub-
sequently discovered evidence, appellants planned 
to tender testimony from an acquaintance of the 
witness, Perkinson, as noticed as an unexpected 
witness who would state that Fairbanks, the office 
secretary, had said to her sometime after the depos-
ition, "I lied at my deposition." "The lawyers asked 
how many times Becky Kobos called over a specif-
ic period of time." "I told them I didn't know." "I 
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wasn't about to help those lawyers." Then to con-
clude in the conversation between the two women, 
Fairbanks related "that woman called one hell of a 
lot." 
For in camera trial inquiry, the office secretary 
Fairbanks was examined by appellants, after which 
a motion in limine was granted against use by ap-
pellants of any testimony from her which would in-
vade the subject of the number of office telephone 
calls received and also the alleged discussion of her 
deposition testimony on the subject with Perkinson. 
Consequently, appellants contended that if she were 
to give the same testimony before the jury, she 
would again lie as she did in the deposition. The 
direction of the examination by appellants as denied 
by the motion in limine was to revisit the depos-
ition inquiry of the witness, and if consistent, then 
impeach with subsequent statement of admitted un-
truth. As first approached by the trial court, the mo-
tion in limine to the initial inquiry of the office sec-
retary was sustained as an attempt to prove the tele-
phone calls through hearsay testimony offered un-
der the guise of impeachment. The premise of the 
denial to appellants of this aspect of the examina-
tion of Fairbanks is unclear at this juncture on ap-
peal. The foundational question for impeachment 
was excluded by the in limine decision as to Fairb-
anks so that the testimony of Perkinson was fore-
closed in advance as lacking anything to impeach. 
The issue problem in present posture is found in 
justification for the motion in limine as limiting in-
quiry of a witness in regard to a prior inconsistent 
statement_FN7 If, in fact, that would have been her 
sworn testimony before the jury as consistent with 
the deposition and inconsistent with statements to 
the acquaintance, then whether the in limine evid-
ence would be properly emplaced to impeach as to 
the fact of the prior inconsistent statement would 
have a more justified structure for issue presenta-
tion. We need not presently assume how the wit-
ness might hereafter testify at trial and if she con-
tinues a course of denied recollection, whether the 
trial court has discretion to deny impeachment. The 
truth is to be found in either what the witness said 
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in deposition or what the other witness stated she 
subsequently said. We do not find a relevancy ques-
tion since obviously the theory of appellants was to 
prove parental concern and continued effort to se-
cure some more satisfying medical recognition of 
perceived increasing physical problems of their 
baby boy. Consequently, we do not necessarily de-
termine whether the impeachment examination is 
subject to discretional exclusion by the trial court, 
but do *548 not find a basis submitted for denial to 
appellants of the foundational inquiry of the office 
secretary. 
FN7. We do not understand the argument 
of appellees in brief that the foundation 
question was never asked which is confus-
ing in consideration of what the trial court 
said during the in camera questioning of 
both women: 
If you have more questions for this wit-
ness [Fairbanks] on the substance of her 
testimony, then you certainly are going 
to be given an opportunity to ask her 
those questions. But this Court has ruled 
and there will be no questions asked of 
this witness concerning the foundations 
for impeachment through prior alleged 
inconsistent statements made to Mrs. 
Perkinson. 
Thereafter, the subject was finalized: 
Anything else, Andy [one of appellants' 
attorneys]? I'm just telling you how the 
cow ate the cabbage. 
MR. ANDREW HARTNETT: I under-
stand that the cabbage has been eaten, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ANDREW HARTNETT: I respect-
fully disagree with the Court. 
This court had occasion in Channel v. State, 
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592 P.2d 1145 (Wyo.1979) to consider the im-
peachment and direct evidence issues implicit in 
W.R.E. 607 and 802. Clear approval for the process 
undertaken by appellants is indicated provided that 
a subsequent limiting instruction is given. In specif-
ic decision, what we have here is that the trial court 
determined to protect the office secretary from the 
"travail" of impeachment by being faced with the 
contention of her later statement that she committed 
perjury in a deposition and then reiterated in the in 
camera examination which indicated her intent to 
continue that posture for the jury presentation. 
Denial of the opportunity to appellants to establish 
the foundation for the impeachment by the first of 
two limiting trial court orders cannot be justified by 
direct citation of authorities presented in appellate 
briefs. 
Detailed review of the prior inconsistent state-
ment inquiry in use and function is found in two re-
cent A.L.R. annotations.FNs It is notable that this 
court in Channel cites the first annotation and then 
the second annotation cites Channel as part of the 
progressively developing concept that permits use 
of prior inconsistent statements as evidence in 
defined circumstances. The not dissimilar subject of 
use of hearsay to prove prior statements if the wit-
ness is now unavailable by lost memory was con-
sidered by the United States Supreme Court in the 
1988 term in approving usage for criminal prosecu-
tion, see United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 
S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988). 
FN8. First, Annotation, Use of Prior In-
consistent Statements for Impeachment of 
Testimony of Witnesses Under Rule 613, 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 
629 (1978) and the later Annotation, Use 
or Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent 
Statements of Witness as Substantive Evid-
ence of Facts to Which They Relate in 
Criminal Case-Modern State Cases, 30 
A.L.R. 4 414 (1984 ). The subject has 
presented problems since not without con-
flict in the federal courts. To be compared 
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are United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 
(5th Cir.1976) (approved and failure to 
give a limiting instruction was not plain er-
ror); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 
(8th Cir.1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 918, 
97 S.Ct. 2182, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) 
(under fairness inquiry and with limiting 
instruction was admissible); and United 
States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 ( 4th 
Cir.1975) (inadmissable). See comment 
and included citations of text authorities, 
120 F.R.D. 299 (1987), relating to W.R.E. 
607. 
Although the application in Owens is different 
as involving substantive testimony rather than im-
peachment, the characterization which it afforded is 
relevant: 
It would seem strange, for example, to assert that 
a witness can avoid introduction of testimony 
from a prior proceeding that is inconsistent with 
his trial testimony, see Rule 80l(d)(l)(A), by 
simply asserting lack of memory of the facts to 
which the prior testimony related. 
Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 845. The witness here, by 
statement that she could remember the number of 
telephone calls, was isolated by trial court order 
from testimony about her subsequent comment of 
deliberate misstatement. 
Appellees' tailored their defense to the im-
peachment denial decision on an abuse of discretion 
concept as not clearly wrong in citing W a/drop v. 
Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo.1985); Brockett v. 
Prater, 675 P.2d 638 (Wyo.1984); and Bacon v. 
Carey Co., 669 P.2d 533 (Wyo.1983). None of 
those cases involve impeachment of contended per-
jurious testimony. Canyon View Ranch v. Basin 
Blee. Power Corp., 628 P.2d 530 (Wyo.1981) as 
also cited presents a relevancy question. The one 
case of somewhat similar character, Diamond Man-
agement Corp. v. Empire Gas Corp., 594 P.2d 964 
(Wyo.1979) addresses impeachment denial as 
harmless error since the compared testimony was 
Page 19 of25 
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not essentially dissimilar. 
The record establishes that the perjury conten-
tion was a concern that the trial court did not want 
to be presented to the jury-even if true. FN9 
FN9. As appellee Little quotes in his brief, 
the trial court's reasoning related: 
"THE COURT: I heard argument on it 
last night. I made a special trip to the 
Teton County Law Library and secured 
from that library legal materials which I 
then took home, along with the depos-
itions of Mrs. Fairbanks. And after din-
ner last night, I did my own reading on 
the law. I read the deposition of Mrs. 
Fairbanks; I studied the statement of the 
proposed testimony; came back into 
Court this morning; heard more argu-
ment on the issue. The Court doesn't feel 
the need for any further legal reference. 
So thank you very much, Mr. Hartnett, 
but I don't want them. 
MR. ANDREW HARTNETT: I take that 
as an order that l should not address the 
Court with legal argument? 
THE COURT: Yes, because it's a matter 
now of the law, not of the facts, and you 
can bring up the law with this or the Su-
preme Court at any time you want. Now, 
the Court has listened carefully to the 
testimony of Mrs. Perkinson. The uncon-
troverted-the uncontroverted evidence in 
this case will be that Mrs. Kobos called 
Dr. Little's office in late August and 
early September of 1981 to express her 
concerns about her child. The proffered 
testimony will not impeach any evidence 
to the contrary. The evidence doesn't im-
peach Mrs. Fairbanks, her testimony be-
ing that she doesn't recall. She has no re-
collection and that's not surprising. I 
couldn't tell you who called me last 
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week. I know I had some telephone calls 
earlier this week but I can't tell you who 
called me. Thus, if it doesn't have the 
purpose or the affect of impeaching the 
credibility of Mrs. Fairbanks and thereby 
discrediting the weight to be given her 
testimony, the only testimony being Mrs. 
Kobos' testimony that I called, then, the 
only other purpose for the testimony is 
to prove the truth of the hearsay asser-
ted, which hearsay would be otherwise 
inadmissible. 
Now, this proffered testimony does 
something else in this case. This 
proffered testimony injects into the case 
an inference, an implication, that Dr. 
Little's a bad man being surrounded by 
those who would commit perjury. Now, 
it is the judgment of this Court after 
watching Mrs. Perkinson carefully and 
after considering all of the aspects of this 
case that if I were a Plaintiffs lawyer in 
this case, I would like to have the Jury 
think that on the other side of me are a 
bunch of perjurers and people who 
would be surrounded by perjurers. Now, 
if there are perjurers, there are remedies 
for that. But the remedies are not in this 
courtroom at this time with this Judge or 
with this Jury. Those remedies are with 
the Teton County Prosecuting Attorney, 
probably a Judge other than John 
Troughton, perhaps Judge Ranck and 
perhaps other Defense Counsel than 
those that are seated in this courtroom 
and, clearly, a different Jury. 
*549 [9] Yet another conflict on testimony is 
presented in this appeal. In cross-examination of 
Dr. Little, appellants' counsel inquired about his ex-
perience in the treatment of children who had os-
teomyelitis or septic artliritis. An irrelevancy objec-
tion was sustained. The inquiry followed an earlier 
motion to compel discovery which had required the 
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doctor to answer questions concerning his treatment 
of MB, a specific patient with a similarly diagnosed 
condition. The relevancy may be indicated if we 
were to review the documents and file as furnished 
with discovery, but it is not in this record. Without 
an offer of proof at trial, this record fails to afford 
us a justification for disagreement with the discre-
tional decision of the trial court. Assumption of fact 
in brief are not exchangeable for an adequately 
presented offer of proof in trial. Nicholls v. Nich-
olls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo.1986); Majority of Work-
"ing Interest Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 721 
P.2d 1070 (Wyo.1986). 
We reverse and remand for retrial. 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, J., filed special 
concurrence opinions. 
BROWN, J., Retired, dissented in part and con-
curred in part and filed an opinion. 
CARDINE, Chief Justice, specially concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the court and, with 
respect to instruction number 18, strongly urge that 
this kind of instruction should not be given a jury. 
It is argument, and it is confusing. Thus, it is incor-
rect to say that physicians and surgeons are not li-
able for mere errors of judgment. They are liable 
for error of judgment if those errors result from 
negligence, that is "the failure to exercise the skill, 
diligence and knowledge * * * reasonably * * * ex-
ercised * * * by members of the profession in good 
standing and in the same line of practice." 
The balance of instruction number 18 seems to 
say that if the acts and omissions of the defendants 
are an exercise of honest judgment, and not unreas-
onable, defendants are not liable. This likewise is 
misleading and a questionable statement of law. 
The question is not whether the judgment *550 of 
the physician and surgeon was honest or dishonest 
but whether the physician failed to exercise the 
skill, diligence, and knowledge reasonably exer-
cised by others. Instruction number 18 states as a 
matter of law that a physician who acts honestly 
and reasonably is not liable. What if he acts hon-
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estly and unreasonably-or acts dishonestly and reas-
onably? This kind of instruction is exceedingly con-
fusing. More than that, the instruction as a whole 
seems to say in lay tenns that a physician who acts 
honestly in reaching a judgment is not liable. That 
is not a correct statement of the law. 
In the vast majority of these kinds of cases, it is 
enough to define for the jury negligence and cause 
in simple tenns, as stated in instruction number 10 
and other instructions found in the court's opinion. 
Where a significant portion of the responsible 
medical community approves two different treat-
ments for the same injury or condition, it is not 
negligence for a physician to choose one treatment 
over the other. For me, that does not involve an er-
ror of judgment at all. It is simply not negligence to 
choose either treatment. An example of two medic-
al procedures for treating the same condition is the 
treatment of a ruptured disc. Neurologically the 
disc is removed without fusion. Orthopedically the 
vertebrae are fused. Both courses of treatment are 
common, accepted by the responsible medical com-
munity, and it generally is not negligence to treat a 
ruptured disc in either fashion. 
An error is a mistake. A mistake may or may 
not result from negligence. But what is gained by 
telling the jury that an error carefully made does 
not result in liability? It is argumentative. It is con-
fusing. It is a clever play on words which implies to 
the jury that a physician is not liable for an error in 
judgment. To balance the instructions, if number 18 
is given, the court ought to advise the jury that a 
mere error in judgment is negligence for which a 
physician or surgeon is liable if such error results 
from negligence. As stated, it is better that neither 
instruction be given but that the term negligence be 
simply defined for the jury. 
THOMAS, Justice, concurring specially. 
I am in accord only with the result reached by 
the majority opinion. I have some views of my own 
with respect to the difficulties engendered by In-
struction No. 18, and those views may accommod-
ate more closely to the objection to that instruction 
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by the plaintiffs as quoted in the separate opinion of 
Justice Brown. I perceive Instruction No. 18 as re-
quiring the jury to accept the approval of the de-
fendants' conduct by expert witnesses so long as 
that approval was honestly made and was reason-
able. In his separate opinion, Chief Justice Cardine 
has pointed out some internal inconsistency in that 
instruction. 
Beyond its inherent departure from established 
legal rules, my perception of the instruction is that 
it does create a standard for recovery which con-
flicts with other instructions which were given by 
the court and are quoted in the majority opinion. 
Particularly, it appears to me to be antithetical to 
Instruction No. 12. 
Furthermore, it is not consistent with the gener-
al instruction, Instruction No. 1, which addresses 
the jury's role with respect to credibility of all wit-
nesses. It is even more inconsistent with Instruction 
No. 6 relating to expert witnesses which reads as 
follows: 
"A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he 
has special knowledge, skill, expertise, traini1_1g, 
or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert 
on the subject to which his testimony relates. 
"Duly qualified experts may give their opinions 
on questions in controversy at a trial. To assist 
you in deciding such questions, you may consider 
the opinion with the reasons given for it, if any, 
by the expert who gives the opinion. You may 
also consider the qualifications and credibility of 
the expert. 
"You are not bound to accept such an opinion as 
conclusive, but should give to it the weight to 
which you find it to be entitled. You may disreg-
ard any such *551 opinion if you find it to be un-
reasonable." 
This court has articulated clearly the proposi-
tion that it is the prerogative of the trier of fact to 
determine what evidence is most dependable. E.g., 
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State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation v. 
Colvin, 681 P.2d 269 (Wyo.1984); Cederburg v. 
Carter, 448 P.2d 608 (Wyo.1968); Cimoli v. Grey-
hound Corporation, 372 P.2d 170 (Wyo.1962). The 
vice in Instruction No. 18 is that, subject to the con-
ditions attached, the jury is required by the instruc-
tion to accept the expert testimony. That is not, and 
should not, be the law. The jury is not required to 
accept it even if they find it to be honest and reas-
onable. 
In addition, this court also has assigned spe-
cifically to the jury the evaluation of expert wit-
nesses, suggesting that their testimony need not be 
accepted. E.g., Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 
233 (Wyo.1988); Thomas v. Metz, 714 P.2d 1205 
(Wyo.1986); Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513 
(Wyo.1983). An additional vice in Instruction No. 
18 is the statement that the jury must find for the 
defendants based upon the approval of the 
"respectable portion of competent and reputable 
physicians or surgeons." The tenor of the instruc-
tion is antithetical to the function heretofore as-
signed to the jury by our cases. 
These problems with Instruction No. 18 were 
exacerbated by other rulings of the district judge. 
His limitation on the use of expert witnesses by the 
plaintiff and the limitation of testimony by some of 
those witnesses was troublesome. The members of 
the jury could have concluded that, in addressing 
these matters as he did, the trial judge clearly indic-
ated his position that the expert witnesses called by 
the plaintiff were not among that "respectable por-
tion of competent and reputable physicians or sur-
geons." The demand for a "respectable portion of 
competent and reputable physicians or surgeons" 
also is contrary to the judge's ruling with respect to 
cumulative testimony. These matters, together with 
the refusal of the court to permit the plaintiffs to 
call the defendants as adverse witnesses in present-
ing their case in chief which was then followed by 
directed verdicts for lack of proof, all made pain-
fully obvious the deprivation of a fair trial so far as 
the plaintiffs were concerned. 
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I add that denying the plaintiffs the right to call 
the defendants as adverse witnesses in presenting 
their case in chief is not a neutral ruling. When 
called in the case presented by the defendants, 
counsel have a clear opportunity to tailor the testi-
mony in chief. Cross-examination then can be 
severely limited to the scope of the direct examina-
tion, and it may tum out to be impossible for the 
plaintiffs to present the significant points support-
ing their theory. Furthermore, a substantial differ-
ence exists between the presentation by the 
plaintiffs, through questions permitted on cross-
examination of salient points followed by an ex-
planation, and the converse in which the defendants 
first of all present their story and counsel for the 
plaintiffs must then try to attack a prepared and 
planned presentation. In the context of weighing 
testimony, the latter is far less favorable to a 
plaintiff, which is why a plaintiff is permitted to 
call a defendant as an adverse witness in his case in 
chief. 
BROWN, Justice, Retired, dissenting in part and 
concurring in part. 
The majority holds that giving Instruction 
Number 18 was reversible error. It states that appel-
lants' challenge to instructions is the principal issue 
on appeal. The court was particularly wroth be-
cause the trial court used the terms "honest judg-
ment" and "honestly" in its instruction, and states 
that the instruction "bespeaks in responsibility to 
moral decision and honesty." 
In the context of Instruction Number 18 and the 
other eight malpractice instructions, it is inconceiv-
able that the jury could have been misled and 
thought defendants' conduct would be excused as 
long as their judgment was not fraudulent or mor-
ally improper. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1086 (1971 ), defines "honest" in part as: "candid 
presentation of the facts," *552 "free of ostentation 
or pretense," "of a creditable nature." Honesty is 
defined on the same page as "adherence to the 
facts." In context, the words "honest" and 
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"honesty" used in Instruction Number 18 could 
only mean adherence to the facts and the jury could 
not have rationally thought otherwise. 
Arguably, terms more precise than "honest" 
and "honestly" could have been used in the instruc-
tion. However, these terms are not novel. In Smith 
v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260, 270 (1941) 
(quoting Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn. 276, 111 N.W. 
264, 267 (1907)), this court said: " 'It would be * * 
* unreasonable to hold a physician responsible for 
an honest error of judgment on so uncertain prob-
lems as are presented in surgery and medicine.' " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appearing on the same page of the opinion in 
Smith, the terms "honest judgment" and "honestly 
made" are used. Justice Blume certainly was not us-
ing the terms honest and honestly as opposed to the 
terms fraudulent, lying, larceny or some other mor-
al deficiency. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota wrote that at 
least twenty-nine other jurisdictions follow the rule 
that physicians are not liable for honest errors in 
judgment. In Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 
N. W.2d 810 (Minn.1986), the court stated: 
"Cases of malpractice may be within the ex-
ception. A physician entitled to practice his 
profession, possessing the requisite qualifica-
tions, and applying his skill and judgment with 
due care, is not ordinarily liable for damages 
consequent upon an honest mistake or an error 
of judgment in making a diagnosis, in prescrib-
ing treatment, or in determining upon an opera-
tion, where there is reasonable doubt as to the 
nature of the physical conditions involved or as 
to what should have been done, in accordance 
with recognized authority and good current 
practice. * * * 
" * * * Most professional men are retained or 
employed in order that they may give the bene-
fit of their peculiar and individual judgment 
Page 23 of25 
Page 22 
and skill. A lawyer, for example, does not con-
tract to win a lawsuit, but to give his best opin-
ion and ability. He has never been held to liab-
ility in damages for a failure to determine dis-
puted questions of law in accordance with their 
final decision by courts of appeal. It would be 
just as unreasonable to hold a physician re-
sponsible for an honest error of judgment on so 
uncertain problems as are presented in surgery 
and medicine." 
[ Staloch,] 100 Minn. at 280-283, 111 N.W. at 
266-67. 
Moreover, in protecting a physician from liab-
ility for mere errors in judgment in choosing 
between alternate diagnoses or treatments, this 
court has followed a rule recognized by at least 
29 other jurisdictions. See also W. Keeton, D. 
Dobbs, R. Keeton and P. Owen, Prosser & Kee-
ton on the Law of Torts 186 (5th Ed.1984). 
Id. at 814 (emphasis added and footnote omit-
ted). 
In Watson v. Hockett, 107 Wash.2d 158, 727 
P.2d 669, 673 (1986), the court stated: 
The "error of judgment" instruction unanim-
ously upheld by this court in Miller, and also pro-
posed by Dr. Hockett in this case, is also proper: 
"A physician or surgeon is not liable for an 
honest error of judgment if, in arriving at that 
judgment, the physician or surgeon exercised 
reasonable care and skill, within the standard of 
care he was obliged to follow." 
(Italics ours.) Miller, 91 Wash.2d at 160 n. 4, 588 
P.2d 734. Henceforth, however, the italicized 
word "honest" should not be used in those cases 
where it is appropriate to give this instruction. 
This is because the use of the word "honest" im-
parts an argumentative aspect into the instruction 
which, as discussed above, does not coincide 
with current jury instruction practice. 
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See also Perkins v. Walker, 406 N.W.2d 189 
(Iowa 1987); Miller v. Kennedy, 91 Wash.2d 155, 
588 P.2d 734 (l 978) ("honest" *553 error of judg-
ment instruction upheld). In 61 Am.Jur.2d, Physi-
cians & Surgeons, § 209 (1981 ), the term "honest 
error" is used in discussing professional judgment. 
"No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds of his objection. " W.R.C.P. 51 
(emphasis added). At the instruction conference, 
counsel for appellants objected to giving Instruction 
Number 18, stating: 
In the first instance, your Honor, I think that Vas-
sos v. Roussalis, where it defines what negligence 
is,-1 mean, what standard of care is, impliedly 
overrules any case that would additionally in-
struct on the issue of error of judgments on the 
first instance. Probably the vast majority of any 
case in the exercise of medicine requires judg-
ment. The question-and that evidence comes into 
the trial. It's up to the Jury to determine if, from 
the facts of the case, that's excused by know-
ledge, skill and diligence in the evidence. To in-
struct about judgment, particularly, calls the at-
tention to the Jury of one of many issues that 
they've heard in the evidence and in certain cir-
cumstances, could-could be tantamount to issuing 
a directed verdict in our judgment. 
Two, I don't think anything in Conway v. 
Wright suggests that the language of the decision 
should be given as an instruction. And I think 
that, clearly, this sets up a situation where a pro-
fessional judgment being exercised, in almost any 
case, requires the Plaintiffs to almost prove, you 
know, beyond a reasonable doubt or prove some 
kind of burden far greater than the law requires. 
The instruction, in my judgment, simply,-you 
know, it's unnecessary to give and it does tend to 
direct a verdict against because, you know, all I 
have to say is while this was a judgmental issue, 
that's for the Jury to decide. 
Page 24 of25 
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It is most difficult to determine precisely what 
appellants are complaining about. At the instruction 
conference, they talk about the instruction imposing 
on them a burden of proof "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" and a tendency to "direct a verdict against 
them." It is noted in appellants' objection that they 
do not complain about the use of the terms "honest 
judgment" and "honestly." This latent concern 
about these terms apparently developed on appeal. 
W.R.C.P. 51 is designed to assist the trial court 
to correct potential errors in the instructions. The 
purpose of the rule is defeated if alleged errors are 
asserted for the first time on appeal. Perhaps if ap-
pellant had properly objected, the court would have 
deleted the terms "honest" and "honestly" or substi-
tuted acceptable terms. Appellants' objection to In-
struction Number 18 does not minimally comply 
with Rule 51, and they should not now be heard to 
complain. 
In its opinion, the majority addresses other is-
sues raised by appellants, and is critical of many of 
the trial court's rulings and determinations. 
However, the majority's reversal is not based on 
those additional issues. Those issues are discretion-
ary matters with the trial court. I see no abuse of 
discretion and would therefore affirm the trial court 
in its determinations. 
With respect to granting a directed verdict in 
favor of Charles Everts, M.D., the radiologist, I 
concur only in the result determined by the major-
ity. I agree with the trial court that there was not 
competent evidence of any direct, proximate cause 
between the conduct and actions of Dr. Everts and 
the injuries appellants contend occurred. The trial 
court, however, improperly granted the directed 
verdict without allowing appellants to call Dr. 
Everts as an adverse witness in their case in· chief. 
Had Dr. Everts testified as an adverse witness, it is 
highly unlikely that he would have made appellants' 
case, but appellants had a right to try to cure the de-
ficiencies in their proofs through the testimony of 
appellee Everts. 
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I would reverse the trial court in granting a 
summary judgment to Dr. Everts and affirm in all 
other respects. 
Wyo.,1989. 
Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Everts 
768 P.2d 534 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Parents of infant who died of iron poisoning 
brought medical malpractice action against United 
States. The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, Alcee L. Hastings, J., 
entered $2,000,000 judgment for plaintiffs, and 
United States appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Roney, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) exclusion of 
testimony of Government's expert as cumulative 
was abuse of discretion; (2) record did not justify 
award of $2,000,000; and (3) plaintiffs were not en-
titled to award of attorney fees. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Kravitch, Circuit Judge,. filed specially concur-
ring opinion. 
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Charles Stack, High, Stack, Lazenby, Bender, Pala-
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Appeals from the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida. 
*904 Before RONEY and KRA VITCH, Circuit 
Judges, and THOMAS FN', District judge. 
FN* Honorable Daniel H. Thomas, U.S. 
District Judge for the Southern District of 
Alabama, sitting by designation. 
RONEY, Circuit Judge: 
In this medical malpractice action brought un-
der the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), the 
United States appeals from a $2 million judgment 
awarded to the plaintiffs, parents of an infant who 
died of iron poisoning. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the 
denial of attorney's fees. The Government chal-
lenges a variety of evidentiary rulings, certain 
"outside research" of the trial judge, numerous fac-
tual findings, the taxing of costs, and the amount of 
damages. We vacate and remand because a Govern-
ment expert witness was erroneously precluded 
from testifying and because the verdict is excessive 
and appears to be based on considerations inappro-
priate in a tort claims case. The denial of attorney's 
fees is affirmed because this Court has recently de-
cided that attorney's fees may not be awarded 
against the United States in a case of this kind. 
Early on the morning of November 2, 1980, 
plaintiffs' twenty-one-month-old son, Carlos, con-
sumed a large quantity of iron tablets. Carlos be-
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came ill and was taken by his parents to Homestead 
Air Force Base Hospital (Homestead) where he was 
treated for acute iron intoxication. At approxim-
ately 2:00 p.m. he was transferred to Jackson Me-
morial Hospital (Jackson Memorial) where he died 
shortly after midnight. 
Many facts in this case were vigorously dis-
puted: the number of pills the child ingested, the 
time at which he ingested them, the date on which 
the mother received the pills which would indicate 
the number of pills left on the date of ingestion, the 
amount of time that elapsed between the parents' 
discovery of the child's illness and their arrival at 
Homestead, and the accuracy of a lab slip indicat-
ing a "free iron level" of 9170 micrograms per deci-
liter (mg/di). These disputed facts bear on the de-
gree of iron toxicity in the child's system present at 
various times, whether Carlos' life might have been 
saved given proper and timely treatment, and what 
party, if any, was at fault for not correctly identify-
ing or treating the condition. The trial court con-
cluded that at least ten specific actions by 
Homestead fell below the standard of care required 
of that type of medical facility, and that its more 
than three-hour delay in administering deferoxam-
ine (an iron antidote) and its failure to transfer him 
to a higher care facility sooner, caused Carlos' 
death. The Government contended that Carlos 
would have died regardless of the treatment that 
could have been given him. 
I. Exclusion of the Expert Witness 
The Government contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of 
Dr. Albert Rauber, professor of Pediatrics at Emory 
University Medical School in Atlanta, and director 
of the Poison Control Center. 
When the Government sought to produce Dr. 
Rauber as its third expert witness, counsel became 
involved in a vigorous dispute over whether the 
Government had waived its right to call Dr. Rauber 
when it allegedly stipulated regarding experts. The 
trial court was obviously troubled over this dispute 
and stated that counsel had put the court in a diffi-
Page 5 of 11 
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cult position. At the end of the colloquy, the court 
indicated that it would exclude Dr. Rauber's testi-
mony because of the stipulation but then stated that 
it would also exercise its discretion to limit the 
number of witnesses under Fed.R.Evid. 403. After 
that, Government counsel was permitted to proffer 
Dr. Rauber's expected testimony. 
Our review of the record leads us to the conclu-
sion that the alleged stipulation relied on by 
plaintiffs was in fact limited to an agreement that 
each party would allow two experts to be deposed 
without subpoena. It does not appear that the Gov-
ernment explicitly waived its right to call more 
*905 than two experts at trial, nor did it ever expli-
citly waive its right to call Dr. Rauber. 
Analysis of this issue, therefore, turns on Rule 
403. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be ex-
cluded for considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evid-
ence. The power to conduct orderly trials includes 
the power to exclude or limit expert testimony. 
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633-34 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1982) (criminal trial); Campbell Indus-
tries v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir.1980) 
. " Rule 403 does not mean that a court may exclude 
evidence that will cause delay regardless of its pro-
bative value. If the evidence is crucial the judge 
would abuse his discretion in excluding it." Wein-
stein's Evidence, Para. 403[06] at 403-59-60 (1982). 
The propriety of excluding Dr. Rauber's testi-
mony under Rule 403 turns on whether his testi-
mony would have been cumulative. Two expert 
witnesses testified at trial for the Government. Dr. 
James Hillman, Director of Pediatric Emergency 
Care Center, Tampa General Hospital, and Medical 
Director of the Tampa Bay Medical Poison Control 
Center was of the opinion that it would have made 
no difference whatsoever if Carlos had begun re-
ceiving intravenous (1.V.) desferal (an iron anti-
dote) the minute he entered Homestead because it 
would, even then, not have been possible to bind 
(neutralize) all the free iron in his blood fast 
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enough to save him. In his opinion the only chance 
of saving Carlos' life would have been to begin 
treatment within twenty minutes of ingestion. Dr. 
Hillman testified that Homestead did as good a job 
as they could have, given the facility and the cir-
cumstances. Despite seeming to acknowledge that 
the deferoxamine and the LV. treatments could 
have begun somewhat earlier, and the Homestead 
medical records could have been more complete, he 
was still of the opinion that this had no impact 
whatsoever on Carlos' death. When responding to 
the court's questions about dialysis or transfusions 
as a mode of treatment, Dr. Hillman responded that 
the problem was that transfusions only provide ac-
cess to circulating blood while the poison, here 
iron, is in the tissues and in "many different 
spaces." Therefore, although iron might be removed 
from the blood, there is no corresponding clinical 
improvement in the patient. Similarly, he believed 
deferoxamine would have been of limited, if any, 
help because it only binds one iron tablet every 
three hours, while the intestines and tissues contin-
ue to absorb the iron. When questioned about Car-
los' serum iron level, free iron level, total iron level 
and binding capacity, Dr. Hillman testified that be-
cause Carlos' iron level was over 9000 mg/di at 
3:00 p.m. by a conservative estimate, it was 25% to 
30% what it had been within two to three hours of 
ingestion. This figure "peaks out" early, within two 
to three hours of ingestion, then "decays" rapidly. 
For this reason, Dr. Hillman surmised that if Carlos' 
iron level was 9,000 at three o'clock at least eight 
hours after ingestion, then it must have been 20,000 
or 30,000 at peak value. According to Dr. Hillman, 
a 1000 mg/di level is potentially lethal. Dr. Hillman 
was aware of no child or adult who had survived an 
iron level in excess of 9,000. He believed Carlos 
must have ingested "above 40," pills, and "in the 
50's at least," to explain the very high iron level so 
late in the day, that the distribution of pills through 
the small intestine goes to a long period of inges-
tion, and that the pills were ingested "very early" in 
the day. 
The second Government expert witness was 
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Dr. Eugene Gitlin, director of medical services, 
Parkway Regional Medical Center, director of the 
Emergency Department of that hospital, associate 
clinical professor at the University of Miami School 
of Medicine, associate medical director of Dade 
County Fire Rescue, teacher of Emergency Medi-
cine at the VA hospital and board certified in in-
ternal medicine and emergency medicine. Dr. Gitlin 
was of the opinion that Homestead was within the 
standard of care required of that type of facility. He 
concluded that Carlos had ingested a "huge" 
amount of iron, 50-60 pills was not inconceivable, 
a lethal dose according to *906 Dr. Gitlin. A blood 
iron level over 9000 mg/di was an "extraordinary 
level." He testified that even if treatment had been 
started within an hour of ingestion, Carlos could 
not have been saved. After reviewing all the docu-
ments which were furnished to him, including med-
ical records and statements of the various treating 
physicians at Jackson Memorial Hospital, Dr. Gitlin 
concluded that the child could not have been saved 
even if he had been brought to Jackson Memorial 
under the conditions specified. 
The district court would not admit the testi-
mony of Dr. Albert Rauber. According to the prof-
fer of Government counsel during trial, Dr. Rauber 
has been a full professor of Pediatrics at Emory 
University Medical School since 1971. He is the 
director of the Georgia Poison Control Center and 
would have been the only expert board qualified in 
Medical Toxicology. He is also board qualified in 
Pediatrics. 
He would have testified, based on his expertise 
in Child Behavior, that it is unlikely that Carlos sat 
down and ate 40-50 pills "at one sitting." This 
would indicate that the child consumed the pills 
over a long period of time, allowing more time for 
absorption prior to arrival at Homestead. In addi-
tion, Dr. Rauber was going to "draw on" certain 
evidence not discussed at trial: medical records, s-
g-o-t and s-g-p-t, which are measures of liver and 
kidney functions. In Dr. Rauber's view, the deteri-
oration in those vital organ functions would not 
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have occurred as rapidly had the child eaten the 
pills at 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. 
Dr. Rauber, like the other Government experts, 
believed that Homestead's treatment was reasonable 
and within the standard of care. He would testify 
that the blood iron level was accurate and very im-
portant in that it is a basis from which to go back 
and "determine the amount of iron that was ab-
sorbed, as opposed to ingested." He would also 
have testified that iron is stored in many places in 
the body, not just in the blood, so "the absorption of 
free iron in the blood is not in the process of ab-
sorbing iron. It flows in from the tissues and must 
first be absorbed from the bloodstream." 
"Basically," Dr. Rauber's testimony would 
have been "that drawing free iron out of the blood 
does not end the absorption of iron, [t]hat it also 
comes out of the tissues [, and that] the mother's 
delay in presenting the child in the early time of in-
gestion was in fact the cause of death .... " 
It appears Dr. Rauber's testimony would have 
been based in part on evidence not relied upon by 
the other experts, namely the liver and kidney func-
tion tests. His analysis was somewhat different. His 
testimony concerning the biochemistry of iron ab-
sorption and treatment would have been more com-
prehensive than that of the other Government ex-
perts and was, therefore, at least partially non-
cumulative. Dr. Rauber had different, and arguably 
better qualifications than the other experts. 
[I] Our review of the record leads us to the 
conclusion that the Government should be able to 
submit the testimony of Dr. Rauber to the court. Li-
ability in this case turns on a proper analysis of 
highly technical material and the highest qualified 
expert should be available to the court. Inasmuch as 
this is a trial without a jury, no new presentation of 
the other evidence before the court need be made, 
but the court must reconsider all of the evidence in 
light of Dr. Rauber's testimony, and reconsider its 
decision as to liability. 
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Although the case is remanded for further evid-
entiary proceedings and reconsideration of liability, 
it is appropriate for this Comt to rule upon the other 
issues raised on appeal for guidance to the district 
court on remand. 
II. Damages 
[2] Although the judgment for $2,000,000 is 
vacated because of the problems at the liability 
stage, this Court would have vacated the judgment 
as excessive in any event. Plaintiffs contend the 
Government is foreclosed from challenging the 
amount of damages on appeal because it was not 
challenged in the motion for new trial. *907 Where, 
as here, damages are set by the judge instead of a 
jury, issues raised during trial and ruled on by the 
trial court need not be raised again in a motion for 
new trial in order to preserve them for review on 
appeal. United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 
599, 601 (9th Cir.1960). The district court awarded 
each parent $1 million for "future loss of support 
and services [and for] past and future mental pain 
and suffering for the duration of their respective 
lives." 
This Circuit has held that the "components and 
measure of damages in FTCA claims are taken 
from the law of the state where the tort occurred .... " 
Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1982) (quoting Ferrero v. United 
States, 603 F.2d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1979)); 28 
U.S.C.A. § 2674. Under Florida law, Fla.Stat.Ann. 
§§ 768.21(1) and (4), the parents of a deceased 
minor child may recover as follows: 
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost 
support and services from the date of the de-
cedent's injury to his death, with interest, and fu-
ture loss of support and services from the date of 
death and reduced to present value. In evaluating 
loss of support and services, the survivor's rela-
tionship to the decedent, the amount of the de-
cedent's probable net income available for distri-
bution to the particular survivor, and the replace-
ment value of the decedent's services to the sur-
vivor may be considered. In computing the dura-
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tion of future losses, the joint life expectancies of 
the survivor and the decedent and the period of 
minority, in the case of healthy minor children, 
may be considered .... 
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may 
also recover for mental pain and suffering from 
the date of injury. 
The predecessor statute to this statute was 
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.03 (1963), repealed in 1972, 
which stated in pertinent part: "[T]he father of such 
minor child, or if the father be not living, the moth-
er may maintain an action ... and may recover, not 
only for the loss of services of such minor child, 
but in addition thereto, such sum for the mental 
pain and suffering of the parent (or both parents) if 
they survive, as the jury may access." Case law in-
terpreting the predecessor statute has been held ap-
plicable to cases arising under the new damages 
statute. Smyer v. Gaines, 332 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1976). 
Florida appellate courts rely heavily on the 
damages awarded by juries in similar cases. In Gre-
sham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1965), the Florida appellate court reduced the jury 
damage award to a father for the death of his elev-
en-month-old son (1) for Jack of evidence upon 
which to predicate the high damages, and (2) be-
cause the award was very high compared to the 
"trend" in the jurisdiction. The court said: 
[T]he appellate courts have been and always 
will be unable to devise a measure or scale by 
which to fix with mathematical certainty the min-
imum and maximum limits of the verdict which a 
jury may lawfully return in the suit of a surviving 
parent for the wrongful death of his child under 
the facts and circumstances peculiar to a particu-
lar case. In appeals testing the amount of the ver-
dict and judgment there is no better criterion 
available than as stated by Mr. Justice Terrell in 
Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, supra, and it must 
of necessity be applied here. In that context, if 
the verdict and resulting judgment do not bear a 
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reasonable relation to the philosophy and general 
trend of prior decisions in such cases, the judg-
ment must be either set aside and a new trial 
awarded or a remittitur imposed reducing it to an 
amount which the appellate court in the exercise 
of its discretionary powers and in good con-
science deems sustainable. 
Id. at 39-40. The court had previously noted 
what Mr. Justice Terrell said in Florida Dairies Co. 
v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85, 88 (1935), as 
follows: 
In cases where damages for mental pain and 
suffering are allowed, it must bear some reason-
able relation to the facts, the status of the parties, 
the *908 amount allowed as compensatory dam-
ages, and the philosophy and general trend of de-
cisions effecting such cases. When we say that 
the amount allowed must bear some reasonable 
relation to such factors, we do not mean that it 
must be equal to, be twice these, or bear any oth-
er arbitrary relation to them, but what we do 
mean is that these and other cognate factors are 
proper elements on which the allowance may be 
predicated. It cannot be predicated on the basis of 
restitution. 
177 So.2d at 37-38. 
[3] In this case, a mortality table and the par-
ents' testimony were offered as evidence of dam-
ages, and nothing more. There is nothing in this re-
cord to show the base upon which this large judg-
ment rests. There was no evidence regarding the 
value of services or support. Gresham said that 
"unless the deceased child had some extraordinary 
income-producing attributes, the cost of maintain-
ing it to maturity would normally exceed the value 
of any services which might likely be rendered by 
the child to the parent." Id at 37. It seems quite ap-
parent that the award here must be restricted to 
mental pain and suffering. 
In showing excessiveness, the party challen-
ging damages may show that the amount is unsup-
ported by the evidence. Bould v. Touchette, 349 
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So.2d 1181, 1184 (Fla.1977). A verdict must be set 
aside if it is so inordinately large as obviously to 
exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range 
within which the trier of fact may properly operate. 
Although excessiveness may be tested by com-
paring the verdict to those damage awards determ-
ined not to be excessive in similar cases, Sanders v. 
Nabisco, Inc., 359 So.2d 46 (Fla. !st DCA 1978); 
Loflin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185 (Fla.1953), we have 
been unable to find any reported case in Florida 
with an award this high. Perhaps some research or 
compilation of similar cases tried in Florida is 
available that could be submitted to the court and 
could thus be made a part of the record to furnish a 
basis for the amount that should ultimately be awar-
ded. 
Nothing has been presented to us, however, and 
there is nothing in the record before the district 
court to justify the amount of damages awarded in 
this case. A plaintiff has the burden of justifying 
the amount of damages that can be awarded even 
though the loss of an infant child can be so devast-
ating that monetary damages are incalculable. The 
determination of liability was a close call, at best, 
and there is no base upon which to permit any pun-
itive consideration to become involved in a damage 
award. In any event, the FTCA specifically prohib-
its an award of punitive damages. Courts should 
guard against punitive and emotional considerations 
influencing awards of damages under the FTCA. If 
liability is found on remand, the district court 
should conduct a further hearing on damages and 
set a damage award consistent with the opinion. 
Several other evidentiary issues were raised on 
appeal. We affirm the district court's ruling in each 
instance, with the following point-by-point discus-
sion. 
Ill. Exclusion of The Risk Management Report 
[4] The district court excluded from evidence a 
"risk management report" prepared by an insurance 
adjuster on behalf of Jackson Memorial under its 
statutory duty to maintain such a report, 
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Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.4l(l)(d). The report was pre-
pared November 20, 1980, eighteen days after the 
child's death, and contained, among other things, 
informal physicians' opinions. In argument over the 
correctness of the district court's ruling, neither 
party has noted that the statute which requires the 
preparation of the risk management report specific-
ally provides that those reports are not admissible 
in evidence: 
The incident reports shall be considered to be 
part of the work papers of the attorney defending 
the establishment in litigation relating thereto and 
shall be subject to discovery, but not be admiss-
ible as evidence in court .... 
*909 Internal Risk Management Statute, 
Fla.Stat.Ann.§ 768.41(4). 
Florida has thus made a legislative judgment 
that in order to insure the reliability and efficacy of 
the required reports, they should not be subject to 
use in litigation. See also Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 
U.S. 109, 113, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943). 
Although not controlling in federal litigation where 
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, the statute un-
dergirds the decision of the trial court. After read-
ing the document, the district court found that it 
was not admissible under either the business re-
cords or public records exception to the hearsay 
rule, Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) and (8). 
Given the circumstances under which the re-
port was prepared and the inclusion in it of non-
contemporaneous unofficial statements, when 
viewed in the context of the above cited statute, it 
was within the district court's discretion to exclude 
the report from evidence. 
IV. Exclusion of letter From Counsel to Expert 
[5] The district court excluded a letter sent by 
plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Cole, to Dr. Holzman, an 
employee at Jackson Memorial. Plaintiffs assert Dr. 
Holzman was a potential plaintiffs' expert witness 
and that the letter was written to him in that capa-
city. In the letter, Cole stated that "the child con-
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sumed 30 to 50" iron pills, that the bottle of pills 
was purchased "approximately October 25, 1980," 
and that plaintiffs discovered the ingestion at 7:00 
a.m. on November 2, 1980. The letter, bearing on 
the number of pills ingested and the swiftness of 
the parents' response, is relevant to the issue of 
fault. After reading the letter and hearing argument 
concerning its admissibility, the district court per-
mitted its use for purposes of impeachment, but 
would not admit it into evidence for the truth of the 
matter stated. 
Defendant, asserting that the exclusion consti-
tutes reversible error, views the letter as an admis-
sion against interest by the authorized agent of a 
party opponent, Mrs. Johnson. According to 
plaintiffs, however, Cole had never met or spoken 
with Mrs. Johnson at the time the letter was written 
and the letter was protected under the attorney work 
product rule. It is apparent that any possible error 
arising from exclusion of the letter, if error at all, 
was harmless. First, the letter and its essential con-
tents were used for impeachment. Second, the trial 
judge, here the trier of fact, examined the letter. 
V. No Exclusion of Mrs. Johnson 
[6] Reiterating an argument raised and rejected 
in pre-trial motions, the Government contends Mrs. 
Johnson is not a proper party and that the district 
court therefore erred in refusing to exclude her 
from the courtroom during trial under Fed.R.Evid. 
615. 
Under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute, sur-
vivors or parents of deceased minor children are not 
explicitly excluded from joining as parties. 
Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 768.16 - 768.27. Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson were both individually listed on the com-
plaint as parties and were awarded damages in their 
individual capacities. The district court did not err 
in allowing Mrs. Johnson to remain in the 
courtroom during trial. 
VI. Trial Judge's "Outside Research" 
This case involved extended and complex med-
ical and scientific testimony on the nature of iron 
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poisoning. The appropriate treatment, survival 
rates, and etiology are a matter of dispute in the 
medical community. The trial judge, apparently in 
order to familiarize himself with the subject matter 
and to put technical testimony into context, consul-
ted medical journals not in evidence prior to hear-
ing the expert testimony. On at least two occasions 
his questioning of expert witnesses referred to the 
journals or reflected his familiarity with the literat-
ure. 
On appeal the Government alleges the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a new trial 
because the "outside research" deprived it of the 
right to trial by an impartial factfinder and to chal-
lenge adverse facts made known to the factfinder. 
The trial judge denied the motion for a new trial be-
cause (1) the Government had failed *910 to object 
during the trial, (2) he did not rely on those 
"outside sources," and (3) any error was harmless. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that courts 
occasionally consult sources not in evidence, ran-
ging anywhere from dictionaries to medical treat-
ises. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
129-162, 93 S.Ct. 705, 715-731, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 
(1973). A trial judge's findings are not necessarily 
tainted simply because he brings his "experience 
and knowledge to bear in assessing the evidence 
submitted at trial." Hersch v. United States, 719 
F.2d 873, 879 (6th Cir.1983). The trial judge may 
not, however, undertake an independent mission of 
finding facts "outside the record of a bench trial 
over which he [presides]." Price Brothers Co. v. 
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th 
Cir.1980). 
[7] It was obvious at trial that the trial judge 
had done "outside research." The Government's 
failure to object during trial constitutes procedural 
default. In any event, the trial judge stated he did 
not rely on those outside sources in reaching his 
conclusions and this appellate court relies on those 
representations. 
VII. Taxing of Costs 
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On March 5, 1984, the Clerk of Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1920, taxed the Government $14,238.90 
for plaintiffs' costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), which 
provides that "[o]n motion served within 5 days 
thereafter, the action of the Clerk may be reviewed 
by the court." The Government, which prior to 
March 5th had prematurely filed itemized objec-
tions, filed a "Motion to Vacate Clerk's Award of 
Costs and Memorandum" on March 8, 1984, incor-
porating its previous itemized objections, wherein it 
asked the court to "vacate the Clerk's award of 
costs pending a ruling on defendant's objections to 
the items of cost sought by plaintiffs." 
[8] This record does not indicate that the dis-
trict court has ruled on the Government's March 8, 
1984, Motion to Vacate. We are, therefore, without 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on the issue of 
costs at this time. Upon remand, the district court 
will have an opportunity to rule on the cost issue. 
VIII. Attorney's Fees Under FTCA 
After the district court awarded $2 million in 
damages to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a peti-
tion for attorney's fees. The court, asserting discre-
tion under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b), declined to make a specific 
fee award, indicating that the $2 million in damages 
was intended to include attorney's fees: "Plaintiffs' 
recovery [is] adequate to allow for the payment of 
attorneys' fees from that recovery, not to exceed the 
statutory limit of25% of the Final Judgment." 
[9] In Florida, a prevailing party in a medical 
malpractice suit is, by statute, entitled to attorney's 
fees. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.56. This Circuit, however, 
recently held that the Florida medical malpractice 
attorney's fee provision does not entitle prevailing 
parties to a fee award against the United States un-
der either the Federal Torts Claims Act or under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Joe v. United 
States, 772 F.2d 1535, 1536 (11th Cir.1985). 
The Court in Joe found nothing in either the 
FTCA or the EAJA to indicate that courts should 
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diverge from the " 'American rule' " which "refers 
to the tradition in the United States that litigants 
must bear their own attorney's fees." Id. at 1537. 
The district court, therefore, had no authority to 
separately award attorney's fees against the United 
States and should not have included in its damage 
judgment any amount "for the payment of attor-
ney's fees." Thus, the denial of a separate judgment 
for fees is affirmed. Although we have already re-
viewed the excessiveness of the damage award, it 
would in any event have to be reconsidered because 
the district court included in it an amount for attor-
ney's fees. 
VACA TED and REMANDED. 
KRA VITCH, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: 
Although concurring in the result, I would ad-
mit in evidence the letter from Mr. Cole to Dr. 
Holzman as an admission against interest by the au-
thorized agent of a party. Rule 80l(D)(2)(D), Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The letter in question was 
written by one of plaintiff's counsel of record dur-
ing the course and within the scope of his authority 
as counsel. The plaintiff contends that the Rule 
does not apply because the attorney had never, at 
that time, spoken to Mrs. Johnson. I see no merit to 
this argument. 
The plaintiff also contends that the letter is 
privileged as being the work product of the lawyer. 
While the document in question was prepared by 
the lawyer in anticipation of litigation, I do not be-
lieve it to contain privileged information, nor was it 
a work product as contemplated by the Rules. 
C.A.11 (Fla.), 1986. 
Johnson v. U.S. 
780 F.2d 902, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1434 
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Parents brought medical malpractice action to 
recover for injuries sustained by their daughter pri-
or to birth. The Fifteenth Judicial District Court, 
Parish of Lafayette, Don Aaron, J., entered judg-
ment on jury verdict for attending physician and 
hospital, and parents appealed. The Court of Ap-
peal, Saunders, J., held that: (1) cumulative expert 
testimony was properly admitted; (2) evidence sup-
ported finding of no negligence on part of attending 
physician; (3) trial court was justified in excluding 
videotape sought to be admitted by parents to estab-
lish bias of defense expert; and ( 4) improper refer-
ence to collateral source benefits did not necessitate 
mistrial or new trial. 
Affirmed. 
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willingness of parties seeking to elicit testimony to 
bear costs of experts, regardless of case's eventual 
outcome. LSA-C.E. arts. 403, 70f" 
[11) Evidence 157 €=>571(3) 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XII(F) Effect of Opinion Evidence 
l 57k569 Testimony of Experts 
157k571 Nature of Subject 
157k571(3) k. Due Care and Proper 
Conduct. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence supported finding of no negligence 
on part of obstetrician-gynecologist who attended 
mother and delivered child born with profound 
brain injuries, notwithstanding expert's testimony 
that majority of child's injuries could have been 
prevented and that child would have been better off 
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had she been delivered even one-half hour sooner, 
and of another expert that failure to assess situation 
sooner was deviation from standard of care. 
1121 Evidence 157 €=>560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XII(D) Examination of Experts 
157k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court in medical malpractice action was 
justified in refusing to permit plaintiffs to impeach 
defense expert for purpose of showing his bias by 
introducing either isolated moments of his video-
taped lectures to claims adjusters or entire tapes; 
court sustained objection to introduction of only 
isolated moments on ground that expert's words 
might be misconstrued, and court reviewed tran-
script and determined that tape would confuse jur-
ors and that it would take at least three hours for 
jury to put tape in proper context, resulting in un-
due waste of time. 
113] Trial 388 €=>133.6(8) 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl33 Action of Court 
388k133.6 Instruction or Admonition to 
Jury 
388kl33.6(3) Statements as to Facts, 
Comments, and Argument 
388kl33.6(8) k. Reference to Insur-
ance or Indemnity. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court in medical malpractice action was 
justified in denying mistrial or new trial based on 
defense counsel's brief reference to fact that certain 
services needed by patient as result of her alleged 
negligent treatment were generally provided by 
government; although such reference amounted to 
improper reference to collateral source benefits, 
reference was brief and question was withdrawn, 
and trial court admonished jury to disregard ques-
tion and not to speculate as to what answer might 
have been. 
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1141 Appeal and Error 30 €;::::)969 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k969 k. Conduct of Trial or Hearing in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €;::::)977(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k976 New Trial or Rehearing 
30k977 In General 
30k977(5) k. Refusal of New Trial. 
Most Cited Cases 
In absence of clear abuse, trial judge's sound 
discretion in denying mistrial or new trial will not 
be disturbed on appeal, especially where there is no 
actual evidence in record that might prejudice 
plaintiffs and trial judge's error, if any, is harmless 
in light of all evidence presented. 
*469 Lawrence N. Curtis, Lafayette, for Anthony 
Frederick etc. 
Donald S. Zuber, Baton Rouge, for Woman's Hosp. 
of Acadiana, et al. 
Marc W. Judice, Lafayette, for Michael Boos, M.D. 
Before STOKER, DOUCET and SAUNDERS, JJ. 
SAUNDERS, Judge. 
This medical malpractice action was brought 
by plaintiffs-appellants, Anthony and Sherie Fred-
erick, to recover damages for devastating personal 
injuries suffered by their minor daughter, Adrien 
Rene, prior to birth. The remaining defendants were 
Dr. Michael Boos, the obstetrician-gynecologist 
who attended Mrs. Frederick and delivered the 
child, and Women's and Children's Hospital, where 
the child was born. 
Plaintiffs' claims were tried before a jury which 
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returned a verdict absolving defendants of any liab-
ility for plaintiffs' damages. From that verdict and 
the district court's judgment in accordance there-
with, plaintiffs perfected this timely devolutive ap-
peal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the 
conclusions reached by the lower court. 
FACTS 
The mother, Sherie Frederick, was originally a 
patient of two codefendant physicians, since dis-
missed, for her pregnancy with Adrien Rene Fred-
erick. Sometime in the evening of December 20, 
1985, the evening before she presented herself to 
the hospital, Mrs. Frederick noted some minor leak-
age of fluid. Evidently her water bag had burst. One 
day or more prior to that time, she had noted some 
unusual movement of her unborn child. Due to the 
leakage the evening before, Mrs. Frederick presen-
ted herself to the Women's and Children's Hospital 
at about 10:00 a.m. on December 21, 1985. Dr. Mi-
chael Boos was on call and attended Mrs. Frederick 
for her original physicians. After admitting Mrs. 
Frederick, her principal nurse applied an external 
fetal monitor to monitor the child's heartbeat. Mrs. 
Frederick was then moved to the labor and delivery. 
area for observation. Dr. Boos first examined her 
approximately one half hour after her arrival at the 
hospital and followed up with additional testing 
twice over the next hour. With no progression in 
the pregnancy apparent, he ruptured Mrs. Freder-
ick's membranes and noted thick meconium and 
amniotic fluid, then applied a scalp electrode *470 
to the fetus, which showed an unfavorable beat to 
beat variability in the child's heartbeats. A routine 
Caesarian Section was decided upon rather than an 
emergency or "crash" one. 
The baby, Adrien Rene Frederick, delivered at 
approximately 3:30 p.m. December 21, 1985, de-
veloped seizures and was diagnosed as having 
suffered from severe fetal maternal transfusion. The 
resultant transfusion of blood into the mother de-
pleted the ability of Adrien's blood to carry oxygen 
to her brain, causing seizures and profound brain 
injuries. 
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ISSUES RAISED 
Plaintiffs-appellants assign as principal error 
the trial judge's refusal in this case to limit cumulat-
ive expert testimony. They also assign as reversible 
error the trial judge's refusal to permit plaintiffs to 
admit into evidence a video tape of one of the de-
fense witnesses teaching a course to claims ad-
justers and his failure to declare a mistrial after one 
of the defendants alluded to collateral source bene-
fits available to plaintiffs. Finally, plaintiffs argue 
that the jury erred in finding no negligence on the 
part of defendants and in failing to award damages. 
For their parts, defendants counter that the trial 
judge did not abuse his considerable discretion in 
his evidentiary rulings and, citing Rosell v. ESCO, 
549 So.2d 840 (La.1989) and related authority, that 
neither judge nor jury committed manifest error in 
their factual determinations that young Adrien 
Rene's injuries arose independent of any negligence 
on the part of defendants. 
CUMULATIVE TESTIMONY 
The principal issue raised in this appeal re-
volves around the new Code of Evidence, specific-
ally the application of articles 403 and 702, and the 
proper level of appellate review required of courts 
of appeal in cases where the trial judge does not 
make known the basis upon which he or she allows 
one party to introduce into evidence, over the ob-
jections of opposing counsel, the testimony of a 
significant number of expert witnesses as to one or 
more identical elements of the case. 
We are, thus, asked to determine the point at 
which a parade of expert witnesses called by one 
party becomes counterproductive to the necessary 
twin goals of fairness and judicial economy. Such 
an inquiry necessarily leads to consideration of the 
Code of Evidence. 
[l] When to exclude expert testimony in a civil 
context on grounds of cumulation is apparently res 
nova among reported cases, at least since the Code 
of Evidence became effective January 1, 1989, pur-
suant to § 12 of Acts 1988, No. 515. The trial court 
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did not articulate the precise basis for its conclusion 
permitting multiple experts to testify as to the 
standard of care practiced by physician Boos. 
Therefore, we are unable to offer the usual defer-
ence attributed to such findings. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 
512 So.2d 839, 843 (La.1987); Thompson v. Pet-
rounited Terminals, lnc., 536 So.2d 504 (La.App. 
1st Cir.1988), writs denied, 537 So.2d 212, 213 
(La.1989). 
The facts peculiar to the case sub judice 
provide us with an opportunity to address several 
criteria among many that may be considered in de-
termining whether to pennit multiple expert testi-
mony as to an element of the case. At the outset, 
except to give it more tone and broaden its fourth 
inquiry to take into account practical considerations 
of judicial administration, we generally adopt our 
brethren's pronouncement on the subject concerning 
the intrinsic value of expert testimony found in 
Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 589 So.2d 1219, 
1223 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writs denied, 592 
So.2d 414, 415 (La.1992): 
"The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal has recently interpreted F.R.E. 403, after 
which the Louisiana rules on expert testimony are 
patterned. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 
939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.1991). The court delin-
eated the following four inquiries for determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony: (I) whether 
the witness is qualified to express an expert opin-
ion, (2) whether the facts upon which the expert 
relies are the same type as are relied upon by oth-
er experts in the field, (3) whether in reaching his 
conclusion the expert used well-founded method-
ology, and (4) assuming the expert's testimony 
*471 passes these tests, whether the testimony's 
potential for unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighs its probative value under the relevant 
rules. Id We adopt those standards as appropriate 
for evaluating the admissibility of expert testi-
mony under Louisiana law." 
(2] Plaintiffs having apparently conceded the 
first three Adams inquiries, our focus here is limited 
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by appellants' assignments of error to the fourth 
Adams inquiry, which must be broadened in the 
present context to concern the cumulative nature of 
the expert testimony to which plaintiffs direct their 
objection. Article 403 of the Code of Evidence re-
quires balancing the testimony's probative value 
against not only unfair prejudice, see Adams, supra, 
but against "considerations of undue delay or waste 
of time" as well. 
The specific prov1s10ns of the Code of Evid-
ence of primary concern here read as follows: 
Art. 403. ~xclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consider-
ations of undue delay, or waste of time. 
Art. 702. Testimony by experts 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise. 
[3] Admitting cumulative expert testimony not 
excludable on other grounds requires its fulfilling 
three conditions. The first condition questions the 
relevance of the testimony to be elicited. The 
second seeks to ascertain that the fact finder will be 
aided by the testimony. The third, balancing the 
probative value of this testimony against substantial 
prejudice, confusion, or inefficiency, guards against 
undue removal of reason from the fact finding pro-
cess, as well as waste. Want of any of the three is 
fatal to admission of an expert's unbridled testi-
mony. 
[4] The first condition imposes only a minimal 
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threshold since all relevant evidence is admissible 
in Louisiana except as otherwise provided by spe-
cific constitutional or legislative pronouncements, 
including the Code of Evidence. LSA-C.E. art. 402. 
LSA-C.E. art. 401 reads as follows: 
Art. 401. Definition of "relevant evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
[5] The second condition applies only to expert 
testimony. Grounded in LSA-C.E. art. 702, it con-
cerns whether the specialized knowledge elicited 
from the expert will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
The need to comply wit~ this condition represents a 
significant departure from the law prior to enact-
ment of the Code of Evidence, insofar as previously 
the inquiry was limited only to asking whether the 
evidence offered by the expert was "obtained only 
by means of special training or experience," not 
whether it would be of actual benefit to the fact 
finder. See LSA-C.E. att. 702, Comment (a) and 3 
J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence~ 
702(02] (1981 ), which it cites. See also, e.g., Hun-
nicutt v. Kent, 434 So.2d 91, 94 (La.App. 5th 
Cir.1982), writ denied, 435 So.2d 442 (La.1983). 
[6] The third condition, mandated by LSA-C.E. 
art. 403, is applicable to all evidence, fact or expert, 
and permits exclusion of evidence whose probative 
value is substantially outweighed by certain 
dangers that threaten the validity of fact finding or 
by considerations of judicial economy. It assumes, 
in fact requires, that the examined evidence is rel-
evant and probative. Judicial administration con-
cerns aside, the chief purpose of this condition is to 
ensure that the evidence does not deny the fact 
finder the ability to reach a conclusion based on ra-
tional grounds. 
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*472 This is not merely of academic or hypo-
thetical concern. Article 1, § 22, of the Louisiana 
Constitution guarantees every citizen, plaintiff or 
defendant, an adequate remedy by due process of 
law, administered without partiality or delay. Im-
properly applied, the Code of Evidence and its in-
terpretive jurisprudence could conspire to under-
mine both the Louisiana Constitution and the very 
purposes for the Code's enactment, "to secure fair-
ness and efficiency in administration of the Jaw of 
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined." LSA-
C.E. art. I 02. For most citizens, the only day in 
court of consequence is the one spent at the trial 
court level because: 
"It is well settled that a court of appeal may not 
set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact 
in the absence of 'manifest error' or unless it is 
'clearly wrong,' and where there is conflict in the 
testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility 
and reasonable inferences of fact should not be 
disturbed upon review, even though the appellate 
court may feel that its own evaluations and infer-
ences are as reasonable." 
Rosell, supra, 549 So.2d at 844, and cites 
therein contained. "The reason for this well-settled 
principle of review is based not only upon the trial 
court's better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as 
compared with the appellate court's access only to a 
cold record), but also upon the proper allocation of 
trial and appellate functions between the respective 
courts." Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 
716, 724 (La.1973). 
Discretion Limited 
[7] Essentially the same concerns articulated 
for giving latitude to trial judges in their factual 
findings justify leaving largely to their discretion 
the admission of ·cumulative evidence, Gormley v. 
Grand Lodge of State of Louisiana, 503 So.2d 181 
(La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 506 So.2d 1227 
(La.1987); Varnell v. Service Merchandise Co., 
Inc., 613 So.2d 1042, 1044 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993), 
and in giving them "great discretion" in deciding 
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which witnesses are qualified as experts, the 
breadth and scope of expert testimony, and the pro-
bative value of expert testimony, Armstrong v. 
Lorino, 580 So.2d 528, 531 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ 
denied, 584 So.2d 1166 (La.1991 ); Comment ( d), 
LSA-C.E. art. 702 and Weinstein and Berger, 
supra, ~ 702 [02] (1981 ); 1 id. ~ 104(03] (1982). 
(Broad, though not boundless, discretion is accor-
ded the trial judge in his determinations as to 
whether expert testimony will be admissible.) 
[8] While trial courts are given wide latitude, 
however, the Constitution of Louisiana does not 
permit appellate tribunals to abdicate their respons-
ibilities in reviewing all findings of the lower 
courts as to either fact or law. To the contrary, the 
Constitution of 1974 provides in Article 5, § 1 O(B): 
"(B) Scope of Review. Except as limited to ques-
tions of Jaw by this constitution, or as provided 
by law in the review of administrative agency de-
terminations, appellate jurisdiction of a court of 
appeal extends to law and facts." 
As a consequence, the jurisprudential rule of 
practice that a trial court's factual findings will not 
be upset absent manifest error is predicated upon 
there being evidence before the trier of fact which 
furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial 
court's finding. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 
1330, 1333 (La.1978); in accord, Rosell, supra; 
Canter, supra. The Code of Evidence provides trial 
courts with the evidentiary rules of the road and de-
serves especial care in its application, if for no oth-
er reason than denial of a litigant's evidentiary 
rights removes the foundation upon which the de-
ference called for in Rosell, Arceneaux, Canter, 
Armstrong, Gormley and Varnell, supra, rests and 
can be grounds for reversal. 
[9] Applying these precepts to the present facts, 
we find no basis for finding that the trial judge ab-
used his great discretion in admitting the cumulat-
ive expert testimony. Defendants offered the sworn 
testimony of two pediatric neurologists, physicians 
who specialize in treating medical diseases of chi!-
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dren's nervous systems. The two attended different 
medical schools; one is now principally a hospital 
administrator, the other a private practitioner. The 
trial judge therefore was correct in permitting each 
to testify, as each one's testimony added dimension-
al *473 perspective to the testimony of the other, 
and the testimony was offered in behalf of different 
parties who could conceivably prove adverse to one 
another. 
Similarly, the trial judge did not abuse his 
much discretion in permitting the testimony of three 
obstetrician-gynecologists in addition to the opin-
ion of the Medical Review Panel. Each differed in 
background and speciality. One graduated from 
LSU medical school, is chief of OB/GYN at a Dal-
las hospital and specializes in fetal-maternal medi-
cine, which includes caring for the mother and fetus 
in high risk pregnancies (i.e., those most likely to 
have complications). Another attended the Uni-
versity of Tennessee Medical School, is board certi-
fied in OB/GYN, surgery, and perinatology, and is 
an academic at the University of Mississippi Med-
ical Center. This expert has followed closely the 
development of babies like Adrien after birth and 
can claim credit for a number of awards and pub-
lished articles. The third OB/GYN called by de-
fendants trained at the University of Oregon, 
chaired the Department of OB/GYN at Tulane 
Medical Center, co-authored a handbook on obstet-
rics and gynecology published in 1992, and has per-
formed years of antenatal diagnosis and treatment 
of birth defects, in addition to contributing to two 
books and several articles pertaining to this subject. 
Nor can we say that the probative value of the 
expert testimony provided by defendants was out-
weighed, let alone substa11tial/y outweighed, by 
any of the concerns articulated in LSA-C.E. art. 403 
. Plaintiffs were free to and did cross-examine op-
posing witnesses and present expert testimony sup-
porting their case. Indeed, a greater danger to these 
proceedings could have arisen had the trial court 
denied defendants the ability to adduce the limited 
volume of expert testimony allowed in this case. 
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[10] Neither we nor the legislature can issue 
broad guidelines for applicability in every case. As 
a general rule, however, it would be safe to say that 
a party has a fundamental right to elicit the medical 
expert testimony of one witness on any point of sig-
nificance to resolution of the issues presented and 
probably a second witness as well, for added per-
spective. As to whether a third or subsequent expert 
should be permitted, a number of factors appear 
pertinent, among them: the background and testi-
monial nature of the witnesses; whether the trier of 
fact is a jury or judge FN1; whether either of the 
parties litigant is a pauper whose lack of means 
would otherwise result in a lack of due process; the 
amount in controversy; the costs in time and money 
which would attend inclusion of the cumulative 
testimony; and the express willingness of the party 
seeking to elicit the testimony to bear the costs of 
the experts, regardless of the case's eventual out-
come. Obviously, these considerations are most 
likely to arise when, as here, a party timely objects 
to another's introduction of cumulative testimony 
under LSA-C.E. art. 403. 
FN 1. "Because in a bench trial the judge 
will often be able to evaluate the testimony 
of an expert without a significant risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, etc., 
in applying this balancing test greater re-
ceptivity to expert testimony may properly 
be shown in a bench trial than in a jury 
case." Note 1, LSA-C.E. art. 702, citing 
Weinstein and Berger, supra, at ~ 701(01], 
et seq. 
Because such decisions necessarily must be 
made on a case by case basis, we attempt here to 
fashion neither a hard and fast rule on the subject, 
nor an exhaustive list of factors which the trial 
judge, whose broad discretion is unaffected by this 
decision, may draw upon. Nevertheless, parties are 
occasionally justified in their concern that a well-
heeled party can obtain its version of justice at the 
trial court simply by retaining an arsenal of "hired 
guns" to prove its case, particularly in the context 
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of a jury trial, then rest on the Canter-Ar-
ceneaux-Rosell line of defense. Protections against 
such a travesty can be found in the Code of Evid-
ence. A party might seek to limit the number of ex-
perts permitted to testify in jury trials, LSA-C.E. 
art. 403, a difficult maneuver least likely to achieve 
the end sought. The concerned litigant may wish to 
have the trial judge instruct the jury that it is not the 
number of experts, but the relevance, credibility 
and probative value of their testimony which is of 
primary concern. 
*474 Another possibility would be to request 
under LSA-C.E. art. 706 that the trial court appoint 
an unbiased expert and disclose to the jury the ex-
pert's special court-appointed status. This underutil-
ized provision enables litigants of modest means to 
have the court use its leverage to distinguish court-
appointed neutral observers who are beyond re-
proach from "hired guns" retained by the highest 
bidder, reducing the perceived need and advantage 
of litigants to hire the most (and most expensive) 
experts to counter (or preempt) those that will (or 
might) be called by their opponents, thus offering 
parties to judicial proceedings greater assurance 
that findings of fact are indeed grounded on a reas-
onable factual basis. 
MANIFEST ERROR 
[11] Plaintiffs also complain that the triers of 
fact erred in finding no negligence on the part of 
defendants and in refusing to award damages to 
plaintiffs, but our thorough review of the volumin-
ous transcript does not support these assertions. We 
cannot say that the triers of fact were clearly wrong 
in determining, consistent with the opinions ex-
pressed by several witnesses, that young Adrien 
would have been no better off had she been de-
livered immediately upon arrival at the hospital. 
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Shelburne, concluded that a 
majority of the injury to young Adrien could have 
been prevented and, further, that the baby would 
have been better off had she been delivered even a 
half hour sooner. His testimony, however, differs 
with Dr. Fleischmann's testimony that it would be 
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difficult to tell whether delivery a half hour or more 
sooner would have made any difference. Even 
though both concluded that young Adrien would 
have been better off had she been delivered just two 
to four hours sooner, this testimony was refuted by 
that of other witnesses, including some who actu-
ally treated Adrien after birth, who testified that the 
unfortunate child sustained her injuries days, or 
even weeks before birth. According to both Dr. 
Burris and Dr. Chalub, the young baby suffered 
seizures as evidenced from twitching, stiffening, 
and changes in breathing several days prior to birth, 
making young Adrien's personal injuries inevitable 
upon birth, when the maternal life support of the 
fetus was severed. For this reason, according to Dr. 
Chalub, it would have made no difference whether 
Adrien was born at 9:00 a.m. or at 3:30 p.m. on the 
day Mrs. Frederick arrived at the hospital. 
The trier of fact apparently was unconvinced 
that Dr. Boos was negligent for failing to pursue 
any of the options suggested by plaintiffs' expert, 
Dr. Chevemak, because it concluded that the young 
fetus was injured before birth. In addition, after 
hearing all of the evidence, the jurors apparently 
determined that the initial symptoms of mother and 
child called for the more cautious approach chosen 
by Dr. Boos and the other medical care providers. 
Another expert produced by plaintiff, neonatologist 
Dr. Fleischmann, concluded that the failure of Dr. 
Boos to assess the situation sooner by rupturing the 
membrane and taking fluid was a deviation from 
the standard of care. The probative value of Dr. 
Fleischmann's testimony, however, was foreshad-
owed by his admission that he had not delivered a 
baby since 1968 and was never an OB/GYN. 
OTHER ASSIGNED ERRORS 
Exclusion of Videotape 
[12) Plaintiffs also complain of the trial judge's 
refusal to permit them to impeach defense expert, 
Dr. Morrison, by showing his bias. When plaintiffs 
sought to introduce isolated moments of his taped 
lectures to claims adjusters in 1984, defendants ob-
jected and expressed their concern that, unless the 
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taped lectures were played in their entirety, Dr. 
Morrison's words might be misconstrued. The trial 
judge sustained defendants' objections and refused 
to permit playing several hours of tapes over 
plaintiffs' objection that the tapes would demon-
strate Dr. Morrison's bias. 
"The admissibility of a videotape is largely 
within the discretion of the trial judge. LaF/eur v. 
John Deere Co., 491 So.2d 624, 632 (La.1986); 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hi-
Tower Concrete Pumping Service, 574 So.2d 
424, 438 (La.App.2d Cir.), writs denied, 578 
So.2d 136, 137 (La.1991); *475Ashley v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., 321 So.2d 868, 872-873 (La.App. 
1st Cir.), writ denied, 323 So.2d 478 (La.1975). 
Determination of the admissibility into evidence 
of videotapes must be done on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the individual facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Douglas v. G.H.R. En-
ergy Corp., 463 So.2d 5, 7 (La.App. 5th 
Cir.1984). The trial court must consider whether 
the videotape accurately depicts what it purports 
to represent, whether it tends to establish a fact of 
the proponent's case, and whether it will aid the 
jury's understanding. Against those factors, the 
trial court must consider whether the videotape 
will unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury, con-
fuse the issues, or cause undue delay. The trial 
court may exclude the evidence if the factors fa-
voring admission are substantially outweighed by 
the factors against admission. Louisiana Code of 
Evidence articles 401-403; Hi-Tower, 574 So.2d 
at 438; Burk v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad 
Co., 529 So.2d 515 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ 
denied, 532 So.2d 179 (La.1988)." 
Malbrough v. Wallace, 594 So.2d 428, 431 
(La.App. I st Cir.1991 ), writ denied, 596 So.2d 196 
(La.1992). 
A careful review of the trial judge's reasons 
shows that he did not abuse his discretion. First, he 
concluded that the tape would take at least three 
hours for the jury to put it in the proper context, 
and this would be an undue waste of time. Second, 
Page 11 of 12 
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even after reading the transcript several times, the 
trial judge concluded that the testimony, subject to 
different interpretations, might confuse the jury no 
matter how much videotape was played. Finally, 
the trial judge concluded that taken out of context, 
introduction of only excerpts from the taped lecture 
would result in unfair prejudice. 
Collateral Source Benefits 
[13] Finally, plaintiffs complain that the hospit-
al's wrongful introduction of collateral source bene-
fits is alone grounds for reversal. 
"Under the 'collateral source' rule, a tort-feasor 
may not benefit, and an injured plaintiffs tort re-
covery may not be diminished, because of bene-
fits received by the plaintiff from sources inde-
pendent of the tort-feasor's procuration or contri-
bution. This rule has been applied to hold that the 
plaintiffs' recovery cannot be diminished by 
amounts paid by Medicare. Womack v. Travelers 
Insurance Company, 258 So.2d 562 (La.App. 1st 
Cir.1972), writ denied, 261 La. 775, 260 So.2d 
701 (1972); Weir v. Gasper, 459 So.2d 655 
(La.App. 4th Cir.1984), writ denied 462 So.2d 
650 (La.1985)." 
Williamson v. St. Francis Medical Center, 559 
So.2d 929, 934 (La.App.2d Cir.1990). 
Our review of the transcript removes any ques-
tion that the hospital did, in fact, seek to introduce 
such evidence during cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Shelburne: 
"Q You mentioned that during the examination-I 
think you said there was a certain standardized or 
plug-in procedure for long-term care of children 
with Adrien's condition. I think you said it was 
something you just sort of plug in, and I'm trying 
to refresh your memory-
A I know what you're-I understand, and I think 
that's exactly what I said. There are certain needs 
that handicapped children with this degree of 
severity of problems have, and there's certain ser-
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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vices that are generally utilized. 
Q And in fact aren't these services generally 
provided by state and local and federal govern-
ment-" 
Immediately after the recited colloquy, 
plaintiffs objected and a bench conference was held 
outside the presence of the jury. Defendants argued 
briefly that the line of inquiry was admissible be-
cause the Disabilities Education Act of I 990, 20 
U.S.C. Sections 1400 and 1409, requires assistance 
for education of all handicapped individuals, but 
then agreed to withdraw the question to avoid con-
fusion. Plaintiffs asked for a mistrial or, alternat-
ively, instructions to the jury that they disregard the 
previous exchange. The trial court acceded to the 
wishes of the parties with the following words to 
the jury: 
"THE COURT: Please be seated. Ladies and 
Gentlemen of the Jury, the last *476 question that 
was asked by Mr. Zuber was a question in which 
he asked, "In fact, aren't these services generally 
provided by state and federal government?" 
Mr. Zuber has agreed to withdraw his question 
at this time, so I want you to disregard the ques-
tion entirely. You are not to consider the question 
nor speculate as to what the answer might have 
been if this witness was allowed to answer the 
question. Does everybody understand? 
THE JURORS: [Indicate "yes"]. 
THE COURT: Okay." 
The trial judge declined to grant plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a mistrial on two grounds: 
"THE COURT: The court is going to deny the 
motion for a mistrial, finding that the mere ques-
tion was asked, but there was no answer in re-
sponse to the question before the jury was re-
moved, and that the court has admonished the 
jury not to speculate as to the answer to the ques-
tion; so I feel that the plaintiffs are not prejudiced 
Page 12 of 12 
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as a result of the asking of the question, and par-
ticularly in view of the admonition given to the 
jury by the court, and I will deny your motion 
and note for the record your objection to the rul-
ing of the court." 
[14] We are unable to conclude that the trial 
judge erred in declining to order a new trial. The 
trial judge was in the best position to assess the pre-
judicial effect, if any, of the hospital's allusion to 
collateral benefits, and in the absence of clear ab-
use, the trial judge's sound discretion in denying a 
mistrial or new trial will not be disturbed on re-
view, DeRosier v. South Louisiana Contractors, 
583 So.2d 531, 538 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 
587 So.2d 700 (La.1991); Luquette v. Bouillion, 
184 So.2d 766, 771 (La.App. 3d Cir.1966); Beg-
naud v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, 
136 So.2d 123, 129-130 (La.App. 3d Cir.1961), es-
pecially where, as here, there is "no actual evidence 
in the record" that might prejudice plaintiffs, Lu-
quette, supra at 770, and the trial judge's error, if 
any, was harmless in light of all of the evidence 
presented. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court and tax plaintiffs with the 
costs of these proceedings. 
AFFIRMED. 
DOUCET, J., concurs. 
La.App. 3 Cir., 1993. 
Frederick v. Woman's Hosp. of Acadiana 
626 So.2d 467 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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1 cumulative evidence. It is not jusl ,nat the 
2 evidence may be cumulative. It is that the --
3 whether the evidence is also needless. 
4 The brief has attempted to show that the 
s evidence is not cumulative. The brief goes through 
6 the fact that the experts' knowledgErtifthe·· · · 
7 community standard is different; that they have 
8 different experience in laparoscopic 
9 cholecystectomies, particularly in comparison to the 
10 plaintiff's two expert witnesses, who have very 
11 little experience in those two subjects; that they 
12 have very little difference regarding the ability to 
13 visualize during one of these procedures. And this 
14 is important to the opinion regarding whether it was 
15 within the standard of practice to decide not to 
16 convert to an open procedure. 
17 The experts have <iff erent opinions with 
1S respect to whether it is the, quote/unquote, 
19 standard of care that applies or the standard of 
20 health care practice or standard of practice, which 
21 are the-· which is the terminology used in 6-1012 
22. and 6-1013. The experts have different opinions as 
23 to whether Dr. Ediger put a clip on the common bile 
24 duct and also with respect to the number of dips 
25 that were used, and this is very relevant in this 
29 
1 case. 
2 Toe experts have different opinions as to 
3 the risk of future problems for Mr. Yoanas. Indeed, 
4 Dr. Sheppard, who is a professor at Oregon Health 
5 Sciences University, says there's absolutely no risk 
6 for Mr. Yoonas. 
7 And they also have differing experience 
8 as expert witnesses. Dr. Celli, for example, was 
9 procured by Mr. Yoonas through an expert witness 
10 service. Many of the defense experts have 
11 absolutely no experience as expert witnesses. 
12 Your Honor, given the status of this 
13 c.ase, given where·we're at, given all of this 
14 information, the court should exercise its 
15 discretion here to wait until the time of trial, 
16 allow plaintiffs to make their case and then 
17 determine at that time If the testimony is 
18 cumulatlve. 
19 There is no reason why Dr. Ediger should 
20 be penalized because there are a number of 
21 physicians who believe that he met the standard of 
22 health care practice and the plaintiffs could only 
23 find one who is willing to come into court and say 
24 that. It1s not fair, Your Honor, and as long as 
25 that testimony is not needlessly cumulative and not 
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1 a drag on the court's understandably limited 
2 resources in lime[ that should be permitted and this 
3 motion should be denied. Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Stubbs. 
5 Your response, Ms. Cunningham. 
6 MS. CUNNINGHAM: Your Honor, I think this 
7 issue is likely to come up in jury selection and 
8 opening argument because as we talk about what we 
9 expect the evidence to show, you need to know 
10 whether or not there's going to be one witness or 
11 four or five. So that's the reason that I've made 
12 the motion pretrial. 
13 I also think that given your order In 
14 this case about disclosure and the fact that the 
15 discovery deadline cutoff has passed, everyone's 
16 opinions have been fully disclosed. So you do have 
17 the information that you need in order to make this 
18 decision because what you have is the complete 
19 disclosures that we were given and, obviously, all 
20 the portions of the depositions that defense counsel 
21 thinks are relevant and show some distinctions 
22 between these. And I think that upon reviewing 
23 these, you can see that distinctions are minor. 
24 Of course they're going to have performed 








and of course they're all going to use slightly 
different words when they talk about it, but the 
bottom line is they all have very similar 
credentials and the same opinion and how many times 
do you need to put that opinion in front of the 
jury? 
7 Very briefly, I don't think it's accurate 
8 to say that we have two expert witnesses who are 
9 going to testify about the same thing. Dr. Dayton 
10 is a treating physician who performed the surgery on 
11 Mr. Yoonas and he was disclosed as an expert in case 
12 there was going to be some kind of foundational 
13 problem or objection to his credentials. That was 
14 It He wasn't asked about causation or anything 
15 else. He was asked about treating things. ~re is 
16 only one expert 
17 I think that it would have been nice if 
18 we had been able to have a hearing on this before 
19 the depositions were taken, and I attempted to do 
20 that, but we all have busy schedules and this was 
21 simply the earliest I could have that hearing held 
22 I kept the depositions to a minimum but 
23 was able to ascertain that everyone does have the 
24 same opinion. I think the bottom line is Rule 403 
25 isn't specific as to when you can exercise your 
32 
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1 judgment and there is no real shov, ... :, or good cause 
2 that we should wait and exercise that at trial after 
3 there has been additional Hme and everything 
4 expended in preparation for trial. The fact is, you 
5 have all the information that I have and all the 
6 information that should exist about the opinions of 
7 these doctors and I think that you should be able to 
B tell whether or not the probative value outweighs 
9 the prejudicial effect. 
10 Every piece of evidence has some 
11 probative value. I'm not saying that three of these 
12 · doctors have nothing worthwhile to say. What I'm 
13 saying is how many times do you need to say the same 
14 thing. 
15 Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 ntE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Cunningham. 
17 Well, I'll say this. In ruling on the 
18 motion, I recognize the question, partiOJlarly under 
19 403 rather than most areas of the rules that 
20 discretion of the trial court gets called into play, 
21 there is no doubt at a certain point the trial court 
22 has an ability to say enough is enough. 
23 Taking the case completely out of the 
24 context of a medical malpractice case, if there was 
25 a case involving an automobile accident where on our 
33 
1 25th witness to say it was a clear and sunny day 
2 before getting ready to sit down and there was no 
3 dispute as to whether it was dear nor whether it 
4 was sunny, the court would undoubtedly probably long 
5 before the 25th witness start exercising its 
6 authority under 403, even though in general my view 
7 of the Rules of Evidence ls that they are, for the 
8 most part, inclusive rather than exdusive of the 
9 admissibility of relevant evidence. 
10 There's no question in my mind but that 
11 these proposed subjects of exdusion are relevant 
12 testimony to present. I cannot conclude that the 
13 presentation of four defense experts in this case 
14 would be needlessly cumulative. I do not think that 
15 it would necessarlly result in·unfair prejudice to 
16' the plaintiff in this action, which is the 
17 touchstone for exdusion. Not only does it have to 
18 be unfair prejudice, but there has to be a 
19 substantral danger that the unfair prejudice, which 
20 I 1m having difficulty identifying, outweighs the 
21 probative value of the testimony. 
22 As I view the testimony of these proposed 
23 experts, It goes to the heart of the litigation in 
24 this case, at least as to the question as to whether 
25 or not Dr. Ediger breached the appropriate standard 
34 
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1 of care. It ap .. __ ,-s there's also spill·over 
2 questions as to future prognosis which may affect 
3 damages. 
4 But under the circumstances, I do not 
5 think it's appropriate to exercise my discretion in 
6 the fashion requested by the plaintiff. The motion 
7 for exdusion or limitation of expert witnesses will 
8 be denied. 
9 I have not addressed the motion to vacate 
10 trial. I know you wanted to hear that, 
11 Ms. Cunningham, here today. I just received before 
12 we came into court, an objection to the proposed 
13 hearing. Honestly, I was not lndined to hear the 
14 motion to vacate the trial today. I would prefer 
15 and I'll direct that you simply notice it for 
16 hearing at the time presently scheduled for our 
17 pretrial cooference. 
18 Just for the parties' benefit, having 
19 reviewed the motion, there is one area that causes 
20 me concern and that is, inasmuch as there's 
21 indications that discovery didn't get fired up until 
22 December, about seven months after I entered the 
23 order governing proceedings, I'm not much moved by 
24 that grounds in terms of the later disdosure of the 
25 identity of the defense experts in this case. 
35 
1 What is more problematic to me is 
2 Mr. Gustavsen's status. I think you'll find I'm a 
3 lot more solicitous of the attorneys perhaps in this 
4 sort of situation than anything else. I don't know 
5 and r will be expecting to see an explanation of 
6 just vvhat Mr. Gustavsen's situation is, just why it 
7 is that he won't be available to participate in this · 
8 litigation. 
9 It is fair to say, in terms of your 
10 discussions between yourselves, if there is a good 
11 reason that Mr. Gustavsen, who Is lead counsel in 
12 this case, if there is a good reason he can't 
13 participate in this litigation, I am likely to grant 
14 the request over th~ objection of Dr. Ediger, 
15 mindful of the defendant's need and legitimate 
16 interest in getting this case promptly tried. Any 
17 continuance would likely be relatively short, but 
18 rll let you just fold that into the hopper for 
19 discussion. We can address the merits of that 
20 motion on the date scheduled for pretrial 
21 conference. 
22 Is there anything further that we should 
23 address at this point from the plaintiff's 
24 perspective, Ms. Cunningham? 
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1 THE COURT: Now take up the case of Strandbakke 1 approval -- the party needs the Court's approval to even llave 
2 versus Moreno. Mr. Kessinger Is present on behalf of the 2 more than two experts on any given Issue, and that's the local 
(} 3 Plalnti~ Strandbakke; Mr. Jones Is present on behalf of 3 rule 43.l In the US District Court of the Eastem Dlsb1ct of 
4 Defendant Moreno. This Is befilre the Court on Plalntll'f's 4 Washington. 
5 Motion to Limlt Defendants Expert Witnesses. 5 The other tiling mentioned In Defendants reply Is 
6 And I have had an opportunity to review materials that G that we are moving to llmlt these·w1tnesses because there are 
7 have been presented by the parties relatlve to this Issue. And 7 bNo paragraphs that are the same In their witness dlsclosure. 
B wit~ that, Mr. Kessln_ger, would you llke to present argument In 8 And I feel I need to point out that the opinions aren't the ~ 
9 support of the motion at this time? 9 same just on two paragraphs. The first -- the first three 
~o MR. KESSINGER: l would. Thank you, your Honor. 10 witnesses after Dr. Moreno who are listed In the disclosure are 
11 May It please the Court, Counsel. As you know, this Is 11 all vascular surgeons. There's Dr. Tullis, Dr. Murray and 
12 a medical negligence case, you have Indicated you have had a 12 Or. Olcott. Dr. Olcott's actually a professor of vascular 
13 chance to review the motion, so I won't spend a tot of time 13 surgery. 
14 re-hashing what It says. A couple prellmlnary matten; I would 14 But their disclosures are the same, 'llrtually 
15 Hke to clear up though. 15 klentlcal. And Dr. Montalbano who Is the fourth expert listed 
16 lhe Defendant's reply has Indicated that the 16 a~er Dr. Moreno, he does have one page of unique Information, 
17 Pia In tiff has retained twenty-seven experts and there's some 17 but the other ten pages of his opinion Is just like the first 
18 clar1flcat1on In Pla1nt1ff's reply brief, but I would llke to 18 ttlree vascular surgeons. 
19 touch on that. The Plaintiff has two medical experts that have 19 So we have got four people saying virtually the. 
20 been hired to present testimony at trial, and there's one 20 same thing. Dr. Montalbano, I wlll concede, that he does have 
21 medical expert thats been hired by the Plalntlff to testify to 21 a little bit of different opinion Information llsted In that 
22 the stanaard o_f care has been violated. And I just wanted to 22 a1se1osure. Then the different information that I round was 
23 make sure that was made clear with the Court. 23 last paragraph of page 79, the last paragraph of page 87, and 
24 The other twenty some medical pr'ovlders that have 24 the first paragraph of page 89 do not appear to be In the 
25 been llsted as witnesses were Just that, they are medical 25 disclosures of the other vascular surgeons; but other than 
(-\ 
... ) 4 6 
1 providers. "They are not people who have been hired 1 that, all of Dr. Montalbano's opinion disclosures are the same. 
2 spedflcally for purposes of lltlgatlon. They are fact 2 And I would -- I have gone through and l nave -- I have tabbed 
3 wltne_sses who happen to have expert opinions. 3 the Identical paragraphs with the ldenUcal Information and I 
4 And Defendant Is aware that those treating doctors 4 would be happy to go through that for the Court, and I doubt 
6 are treating doctors or fact witnesses. In fact, one·of the 5 you want me to go through a hundred pages though. But that 
6 attorneys for Defendant Jeremiah Quane, In fact, contacted one 6 1nrormat1on, Dr. Turns, or. Murray and Dr. Olcott, paragraph 
7 of those expert witnesses without objection from the Plaintiff. 7 for paragraph have the same disclosure, 
8 And that letter from Jeremiah Quarie has been attached to 8 And If I were to start reading this, for Instance, 
9 Plalntlff's reply brief. 9 and to say paragraph 1 under Dr. Tullis reads 'X:'/Z, and then go 
10 This motion has been brought before the Court 10 to the next doctor and read his, my guess Is you would probably 
11 because the Derendant has listed four witnesses with -- in 11 a.it me off and I would expect you to because I would be reading 
12 their witness -- In their expert disclosure with similar, If 12 the exact same thing over and over again. And that's the 
13 not ldentlcal, opinions. This Is a concero to Plaintiff, 13 con~em that we have with the Jury Is that they are gol,:ig to be 
14 Plalntlff concedes that the experts may have different 14 hearing the exact same thing based on this disclosure over and 
15 education and they may have different experiences; however, 15 over again with no variation. Literally no variation In the 
16 that doesn't. merit llstenlng to the same opinion three or for.Jr 16 first three experts, those three vascular surgeons. 
17 times over and over again by the jury anc by the Court. 17 The testimony that they are proposing Is 
18 The Oerendant In their response makes limitation 18 cumulative. Once vou have heard It one time, I don't see any 
19 or expert witnesses sound foreign. The Court clearly has the 19 reason to hear It again. The Defendants talk about needless 
20 right to do that under the clvll rules based on lhe Court's 20 reputation whether it's needlessly cumuli,tlve, on,;e the Jury's 
21 discretion. 21 heard it, anything after that Is cumulative and I -- when It's 
22 I would also note just as an example that the US 22 the exact same thing, I don't see any reason why that should be 
23 District Court of Eastern Washington has local rules that limit 23 repeated. 
24 a party to two expert witnesses on any given issue. lhat's 24 Allowing the Defendants to march 111 four witnesses 
.25 just a -- the Court tlmlts them to two. They need the Court's 25 with ldentlcal opinions flies In the race of the rules of 























































evidence and the rules of procedure. It's contrary to Rule of 
Procedure 1A, It's not speedy, It's not lneKpenslve to have 
these people come In and testify, to have the jury and the 
court have to spend two days perhaps sitting through expert 
testimony that's repetitive. 
I don't need to remind the Court, l'm sure that 
the Defendant will mostly likely test:lfy as an expert on his 
own behalf that he didn't violate the standard of care. And so 
that all of his testimony wlll be on top of Defendant's 
testimony. 
And VJe -- Plalntlff concedes that the first expert 
witness, whomever It might be that Defendant calls, that they 
will have probative value and they certainly should be allowed 
to call their expert, but they shouldn't be allowed to march In 
thre<: more witnesses saying the same thing. It wlll confuse 
the Issue and It wlll tum Into a battle of the experts for the 
jury, and that's not the purpose of the trial. They a re here 
to llsten to the case and to try It on Its merits. Toe 
repeUtlon and accumulatfon of Identical testimony would just 
fly In the face of that. and It would unduly delay these 
proceedings, and It's just •• It's a needless repetition. 
"There Is Just -- there's -· based on the exact same Cllsdosure, 
there's no reason to listen to these people over and over 
again. 
We are not asking for excluslon of any specific 
8 
witness. It doesn't matter to us who they pick. They should 
pick their best quallned expert witness, what we are asking 
for Is that they can't bring them all In one after the other to 
say the same Ullng. 
The Defendants should be limited to one expert to 
testify about the stondard of care and one expert to testify 
about whether that was violated. Betw<:<:n the treating doctor 
and the expert, that will give them two witnesses who are 
testifying presumably that Defendant did not violate the 
standan:l of care. So we would move the Court to llmlt the 
witnesses pur.suant to that motion. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Mr. Jones. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor. 
EssenUally what I'm hearing from the Plaintiffs 
Is the pot calllng the kettle black. Plaintiffs have, in my 
opinion, played games In their documentation that Chey have 
submitted and have maintained Inconsistent positions ror 
purpose or trying to gain a technical or strategical advantage. 
Essentially they ~re s~ylng 1111:hough they listed six standards 
of practice witnesses In their disclosure back In December when 
they were due by the Court's scheduling order, that now they 
really only m1?an to call two. Toey haven't withdrawn the 
others, but despite that fact, they seek to have the oerendant 
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an extremely detailed lengthy and thorough expert witness 
disclosure covering the facts, the opinions and the substance 
of the opinions for the-experts on the various topics that they 
may offer testimony at trial. That's an operative word, "may," 
because there are various experts, they <:ach have their own 
area of expertise as respects to the Issues In this case, and 
so the fact that there are similarities between their lengthy 
disclosures does not mean they will all get up here and read 
their dlsdosures to the Jury. 
In fact, quite the contrary. This will be a 
fascinating trial for the jury up here and for the Court. In 
fact, I dare say, it wlll be one or the most fascinating trials 
that have gone on up here 111 a whlle. Tile jury wlll love the 
medicine In this case, and we have gone out of our way to try 
to find very well qualified and pertinent expert witnesses to 
bring up here and present to this Court and to this jury. 
Now, I think It's worth polntlng out that If the 
Plaintiffs are going to complain that the oerense disclosures 
are similar, then perhaps we should read the Plaintiff's 
disclosure which I submitted as an attachment as Exhibit 
letter c. If you look up what they have ror all of their 
expert witnesses except ror Dr. Johansen, It's Jdentleal, wonl 
for word Identical. 
And they have several statements about Dr. Thome, 
fer example, may testify concemlng the local standanl of care 
10 
as It relates to this dalm. They !iaY the same thing for 
Dr. stolanoff or Dr. Spencer or or. Moreno, my client, or 
Dr. Hedrick. Why ls It okay for the~ to say the same thing 
with respect to the standard of practlce and they don't even 
flesh out their opinions, they Just claim they are going to 
talk about those topics. I go out of my way and provlde 
extreme detail, and all of a sudden I'm c:umulatlve and 
repetitious and therefore I should be limited, but It's okay 
for the Plaintiffs. They can violate the Court rules by not 
giving a detalled disclosure, and rm the one that's subject to 
being Hmlted. n111t doesn't make sense to me. 
Now, the facts In this case are complicated 
medically. The bottom line Is did my dient violate the 
standard of practice, but It's a long road between the 
beginning and the end with respect to the medical Issues In 
this case. 
We will offer testimony from our experts that wlR 
vary with respect to their opinions on ~1hether or not the 
Inferior mesenterlc artery should have been ligated, whether or 
not it should have been left where It: was, and all the 
supporting data that goes in favor and against. We will offer 
varying opinions from our expert as to whether or not the 
perfusion of the colon needed to be checked by pulse Doppler, 
by visual 1nspec:t1on or by toucn which WIii vary amongst the 
various expert witnesses that we have. 
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· 1 We wlll offer varying opinions with respect to the 1 of expert witnesses the Defendant can have in hopes that they 
2 Issue of causation and whether or not It was a cord Infarct due 2 can gain a tactical advnntage in what will be a very medically 
0 3 to lack of blood supply from one of the spinal arteries that 3 complicated trial 4 was ligated as a matter of course when the aorta is severed 4 Now, It's our contention that based on our 
5 for purposes of performing the bypass. we have causation 5 dlsdosures, based on the information contained within our 
6 theories on whether or not the artery of Adamklewlt2 which was 6 . brief, that there has not been a showing that the testimony of 
7 located In a different anatomical position with respect to this 7 these fourwltnesseswlll be needlessly cumulative. And 1 
8 patient. 8 thin\< there are some ways that we can analyze this, and I tried 
9 We have causation theories dealing with whether or 9 to lay some of that out ln my brief. One is just the sheer 
10 not It was an episode of thrombus or a clot that caused this 10 numbers. Plalntlffs listed twenty-seven, we have listed 
11 spinal cord Infarct with respect to this patient, and all of 11 fourteen. They challenge four of ours. 
12 our expert will testify differently on these Issues and they 12 Now, if you look at their disclosure. they show 
13 wUI not be needlessly repetitious. 13 six- standard of practice witnesses. Plaintiffs counsel has 
14 Now, today Is an Important day In this case not 14 conduded his opening argument and has not withdrawn any of 
15 just because we were here but because It's lune 8, and actually 15 those experts. So by she~r numbers alone, they exceed us. l 
·1s It plays well that we are here on the 9th and not the 5th. 16 think It's disingenuous to take the posltlon that well, only 
17 Today Is the discovery cutoff In this case. As a result of 17 two of those are retained experts. Tnat Is not Dart of their 
18 that, this matter IS no longer subject to being resolved by 18 disclosure. Toelr disclosure says ··standard of practice.• 
19 Rule 16(d). This matter is now subject solely to Rule 403 19 I also think It's disingenuous ror them to say 
20 because discovery Is closed, Rule 16(d) In the Defense's 20 that they didn't go out and try to contact all the general 
21 opinion does not apply for purposes of limiting the Oefense 21 surgeons In the community In order to somehow deter the 
22 experts. 22 Defendant from being able to utlllze local experts. And they 
23 Plaintiff's counsel has never asked to take a11y 23 point to the fact that, well, we let you contact Dr. Thome. 
24 depositions of the Defense experts In this case. As a result 24 Well, Dr. Thorne's not going to be too happy with the 
25 and the fact that discovery will be dosed In about three and a 25 Plaintiff's counsel, because when we did talk to him, since we 
(_) 
12 14 
1 half hours, that Issue is now off the table. So the only 1 listed him as someone who could talk about the local standard 
2 grounds upon which to address this moUon from the Defense 2 or practice, he said he was surprised to hear that the 
3. prospective Is Rule 4D3. The arguments that have been advanced 3 Plaintiffs counsel had listed him as an expert witness because 
4 thus far by PlainUff's counsel address solely the Issue of 4 he's never talked to the Plaintiff's counsel, knows nothing 
5 whether testimony Is cumulative, whereas Rule 403 speclflcally 5 about the case and Is furious that he would be listed by the 
6 says "needlessly cumulative.· 6 Plaintiffs without ever being consulted. I think that goes to 
7 An example Is where yOtJ line up twelve witnesses 7 the evidence that we Intend to show at trlal that they are 
8 and th~y all come In and say the light was green. By the time 8 trying to make it more difficult for the Defense to be able to 
9 you get to the sixth one, you don't need J:t,e seventh one to 9 prove their case by contaalng no one and listing all these 
10 know that they are going to say the light was green. That's 10 people. 
11 not the case In a medical malpractice case. 11 Another problem that l have with where this Is 
12 The Issue that was raised by Plaintiff's counsel 12 going Is we complied. We put all the materials d9wn in good 
13 about a battle of eicperts and how that's a bad thir>9, well, 13 faith and on time. On our disdosure deadline of the 23rd of 
14 that may be a bad thing In some people's opinions, but when the 14 February, we put all the information possible down. If you 
15 Idaho Legislature passe·d Idaho Code section 6·1012, that's what 15 compare that with the Plaintiffs disclosure, we got another 
16 they established. Medical malpr1>ctlce cases are a battle of 16 disdosure from the Plaintiffs yesterday regarding their 
17 experts. Plaintiff has the ability to hire as many experts 17 experts listing new opinions that have never been heretorore 
18 witnesses as they want. ln fact, I dare say if they had hired 18 lald out. So I find It very surprising that the Plaintiffs can 
19 four experts and we had eight, they would be here today saying 19 take the position that we should be limited when we have 
20 we should only have four. 20 c:omplled with the rules. They have not. 
21 I find It odd and somewhat unralr thot it's up t:o 21 Now, with respect to the numbers. The fact that 
22 the plaintiffs to dictate hpw many expert witnesses the Defense 22 we have llsted these four expert witnesses, I want to talk 
23 should be allowed to utilize. They are seeking millions of 23 about them briefly for a moment because this issue of limiting 
24 dollars In this case, and they are hoping that they can Z4 the defense Is just outrageously important to us as the Court 
25 convince this Court to screw the Defense, to limit the number 25 can understand. Dr. Hurray was contacted by my client during 
S of 8 sheets Page 11 to 14 of 2.6 
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1 the treatment of this particular patient. His name appears in 1 neurosurgeon, he's in a totally different subspccialty. His 
2 · the medical records, It's our contention that Dr. Murray Is the 2 opinions are_ golog to focus mainly on the Issues iJSsocia_ted 
0 3 equivalent of a treating health care provider In this case. If 3 with the blood supply to the spinal cord, the pre-operative 4 the Plaintiffs are going to take the position that all these 4 Imaging studies and whether or not there were any red nags In 
5 other doctors they listed are just treaters so they don't 5 there that would have suggested that the excessive 
6 count, then neither should Dr. Murray regardless of the fact G collateralization of the vasculature that this patient had 
7 that he may offer standard of practice opinions, as wlll the 7 woul~ have suggested she was likely to suffer a spinal rord 
8 sta nclard of practice treaters they nave listed. So he doesn't 8 Infarct during an aorta! bl-femoral bypa~ procedure. That's 
9 even count In this equation. 9 one of the reasons why we seek to have this particular witness 
10 They have als1;1 listed a Dr. McBride and a 10 called. I can _only presume the Plaintiff seek to have him 
11 Dr. Stolanoff which In their latest reply brief, they admit are 11 excluded because they didn't chose to 11st a neurosur9eon. We 
12 not treaters. Regardless of whether or not they have retained 12 did. They had the first shot at it. If they wanted a 
·13 them, they have listed them as experts who wlll testify In the 13 neurosurgeo·n, they could have listed one. 
14 standard of practice. They haven't withdrawn them. So add up 14 Now, with respect t1;1 the 403 analysis, It's the 
15 th~ numbers, McBride, Stolanoff, Johansen. They have three. 15 Defense contention that at this junct\lre it cannot be 
16 The Defense has Tullls, Olcott and Montalbano which is a 16 determined fairly as to whether or not the testimony from these 
17 different subspectalty, We have three. It doesn't matter how 17 witnesses will amount to a needlessly cumulatlve presentation 
18 you add It up, there's either equality or the plalntlffs have 18 of evidence. Until the witnesses testify, this Court Is well 
19 an e>ecesslve number of standard of practice e>eperts than the 19 suited at the time of trial to put the brakes on any testimony 
20 Defense. 20 It deems to be needlessly cumulative. That determination . 
21 Now, In my brief for the Court, I_tried to outline 21 cannot be made at this Juncture. For those reasons, we feel 
22 In addition to the fact that Dr. Murray has his own area of 22 that It's premature to be addressing the issue under 403. The 
23 specialty and unique testimony that he offers, he gets patients 23 Plaintiff's witnesses have not testified, the Issues (lave not 
24 from this area. When there are trouble cases that leave the 24 been laid out for the Defense to then address in Its case in 
25 Lewiston Valley, they go up to Lewiston. That's one reason why 25 chief. Until that time has come to pass, it's unfair from the 
() 
16 18 
1 his testimony Is so important. 1 Defense prospective for this Issue to be brought to the 
2 With respect to Dr. Olcott, Plaintiffs counsel 2 surface. 
3 has Nsted this Or. Johansen who Is a big gun coming in from 3 Now, there Is another Issue that Is not In my 
4 Seattle where he works at a teaching institution there. It's 4 briefing that I think also bears fruit on this. The Defense Is 
5 only fair that we should have an academic expert which is why 5 listed a number of expert witnesses. let's say at the tlme of 
6 we have listed Dr. Olcott. He's somebody that .:Vm cx:,me ln and 6 tric1I If the Defense Is limited to one at this particular point 
7 talk about the training aspects and how on an academic parity 7 in time, my e>Cpcrt falls to qu;;illfy, or my expert Is severely 
8 level our dlent did not make any mistakes in this case as 8 Impeached at trial such that his credibility Is worthless. I 
9 Dr. Johansen and their academic expert Is going to contend. 9 have listed four, but If I'm limited now, my client's ability 
10 ,hose two experts come down t1;1 the weight or their 10 to mount a slgnlncant and adequate defense to these 
11 Cl/s, which one of them's more Impressive, Ifwe are limited on 11 allegations Is diminished and destroyed because prematurely In 
12 not being able to can Olcott, all of a sudden we don't have an 12 advance of trial, things may happen ultimately that I can't 
13 academic expert and in the eyes of the jury, they may view 13 predict that may Impair one of my witness' presentations at 
14 Plaintiffs expert as far superior. The fact that we have 14 trial. For that reason alone, I should not be limited. 
15 listed one, we. should be allowed to call that person. lie will 15 Also the fact that each one of these experts is 
16 offer his own testimony. that will not be needlessly cumulative. 16 testifying as ta what the standard of practice is for different 
17 That's two of the three. 17 reasons, as the case authorities that I presented to the Court 
18 With respect to or. Tullis, he's our only Idaho 18 in my brief outline, It's good to have more than one. One 
19 guy. lhe Issue Is was the local standard of practice violated. 19 gives weight and dimension to the testimony of the last one to 
20 That's what 6-1012 says. That's why we have Dr. Tul~s who·· 20 the Issues that are being. presented. Now, there's a line there 
21 although he's not from Lewiston, he is at least an Idaho 21 , we acknowledge and concede that fact, but that line is drawn 
22 vascular surgeon who will be able to offer testimony on how 22 at the time of trial. That line Is not drawn now. 
23 things are done In Idaho. And he has worked outside of the 23 Nothing under Idaho Code 6·1012 limits the number of 
24 Boise area. That's why we helve those three experts listed. 24 witnesses that the Defense can call, and there hasn't been any 
25 Now, the fourth, Paul Montalbano, since he is a 25 case authorities that have been presented by the Plaintiffs 
Page 15 to 18 or 26 6 of 8 sheet! 
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1 which say in a medical malpractice case after the close of . 1 that now and say, well, they are not going to say the same 
2. discovery that the Defense should be limited based on what 2 thlng. that's quite convenient to come In here today and say 
() 3 their expert witness disclosure says or based on the number of 3 they are not going to say the same thing, but the disclosure's 
4 witneSS<?S that they have. 4 here, It's In the record. 
5 We provided this Court with a detailed disclosure, 5 I hope he's right about it being a fascln a ting 
6 Plaintiffs put it In the record, the Court has a copy of it, we 6 trial, the jury would probably like that. 
7 think we have played by the rules, we think we have been fair, 7 I would disagree with Counsel's assessment of the 
8 we think thet this motion Is unfair to the Derense ror all the 8 rules as far as discovery being dosed, these don't apply any 
9 reasons we have stated and we ask that It would be denied. 9 more. Even if that were the case, this hearing, we attempted 
10 Thank you. 10 to have It earlier, It didn't work out. The Court dearly has 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr, Jones. 11 a discretion to limit the number of witnesses In this case and 
12 Mr. Kessinger, any rebuttal? 12 Plaintiff believes that's appropriate. 
13 NR. KESSlNGER: Thank you, your Honor. We have 13 The new dlsclosure, in fact we did supplement 
14 heard a lot of talk about equality and Inequity and unfairness 14 disdosure precisely because of Defendant's complaint listed In 
15 and l would Invite Defense Counsel right now to stipulate to 15 his brief. We dld supplement our disclosure of Kaj Johansen, 
16 one expert on eacll issue on the record If that's what he's 16 and that was In an effort to be fair to Defense. He had made 
17 iooldng for, that kind of fairness, that kind equality. 17 some complalnts In his brief, so we gave him all the 
18 Counsel, any Interest? 18 Information we had about that opinion In an effort to appease 
19 MR. JONES: Finish your argument, Counsel. 19 him. 
20 MR. KESSINGER: Defense Counsel has indicated that 20 Counsel's talked about Dr. N urray being the 
21 Plaintiffs ~ave been-engaging In game playlng, hiding the ball, 21 equivalent of a treater. We don't have any objection to 
22 that hasn't happened, your Honor. As you know, these cases arc 22 Dr, Murray coming In and testlfylrig this ls what happened, this 
23 complex and there's a lot going on at the same time. Plaintiff 23 ls what we talked about. But rendering -- rendering opinions 
24 reels that the dlsclosure rules were met with his dlsciosures, 24 on the ultimate Issue would be -- would be outside the realm of 
25 ade<juate explen?tron has been given for the number of witnesses 25 what we would expect from him If he's Just coming In and 
0 20 22 
1 who were dfsclosed as experts, and that is that they were 1 testifying as someone who maybe perhaps participated In that 
2 treating people -- treating doctors, they have expert opinions, 2 treatment. If he Wilnts to come'ln and say, yeah, the doctor 
3 they are fact witnesses with expert opinions. 3 conta.cted me a.nd we discussed 'X'f and Z, we wouldn't be opposed 
4 Defense has just spent a lot of time explaining 4 to that. But coming in and rendering on opinion on the 
6 how_ e11ch of these medical experts have different expertise and 5 ultimate issue of whether the standard of care was violated, we 
6 how their opinions are going to be dlrferent. Defense spent 6 would have a problem with that. 
7 approximately 18 pages per expert explaining their opinions. 7 They ane welcomed to call Dr, Olcott, they can 
8 And In those 18 pages, there's no differences except for 8 call whichever expert they want, it's the repetition that is 
9 education and their experience at different fadlitles, [ 9 clearly outlined In this dlsdosure over and over and over 
10 don't think that's the kind of differences that make their 10 agatn. counsel llas mentioned that Tullls is the only [daho 
11 testimony nonrumulative. And I .don't think the jury -- I don't 11 guy. Olcott can famllilllize himself with the standard of care 
12 think lt's going to be helpful for the Jury to know that one 12 through Tullis If needs be. 
13 was ·- one was educated in Kentucky and the other was educated· 13 He talked about the concern that maybe his experts 
14 In Indiana, I don't think that makes any difrerence In the 14 will fall to qualify, maybe their credibility will be 
15 case. And those -- those, as it turns out, are the only 15 c:ompromlsed, those are risks we all run with all our eKperts, 
16 differences that Defense can point out in the first three 16 ihat's the way that this process works ls that experts er.: 
17 witnesses, that being •• that being Tullls, Murray, Olcott. 17 going to be exposed to some cross eicamlnatlon and sometimes 
18 And then Montelbono, we concecled he does have one page of 18 that hurts the witness' opinion. 
19 unique Information out of the 11-pagc opinion dlsc:losure. So 19 At the very least, at the very least we would ask 
20 he does •• he does perhaps have spme unique information. 20 that the Court limit Defendant's experts similar to what we see 
21 And, again, we are not requesting that these 21 in the Fecleral Rules, and that being two experts on a srnglci 
22 people not be allowed to testify, what we are requesting is 22 issue. They have already got the treater who Is going to 
23 that they can't come In here and testify e bout the same thing 23 testify regarding these Issues. He is an expert. He's going 
24 over and over again, and that's what the disclosure tells us 24 to carry a lot of weighl with the Jury In and or himself. At 
25 they are going to do. And Defense would like to work around 25 most we would ask that the. Court allow them two witnesses for 





















































each issue which is In llne with other jurisdictions, Is In no 
way contrary to the case law that Defendants side or --
Defendants case law stands for the proposil:!on that the court 
can llmlt witnesses at its dlsc:retlon so long as the court goes 
through the correct process and follows the rule. A number of 
those - at least two of those cases were remanded with the 
eippcllate court saying, yeah, you can limit the witness, Just 
make sure vou tell us why. And that's what we are asking that 
the court does. 
It's unfair to the Plalntlff, you know, there's 
been lot or talk of unfairness, It's unfair to the PlalntJ!f to 
march In four people in a raw saying the exact same thing. And 
so we would renew our request that the Court llmlt the number 
of witnesses Defense can call. 
TiiE COURT: lllank you, Mr. Kessinger. 
Well, thank you both for your presentations and 

















This, of course, Is governed In my analysis for 18 
purposes or this aftemoon Is rollowlng Idaho Rule of Evidence 19 
403 where It talks about the Court can exclude·relevant 20 
evidence for differing reasons. And clearly all the evidence 21 
that's been dlSOJssed through these witnesses would be relevant 22 
evidence to this case, I think that's clear. 23 
I did have an opportunity obviously, anel I wouie! 24 
refer speclflcally to Defendant's memorandum on pages 21 and 25 
26 
argument comes up durlng the trial and I start agreeing wlth 
that argument. But at this point In time, I'm having 
dlfnculty agreeing with It based on what's presented before me 
today. 
SO based on that, In my review of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403, In recognizing It's In my discretion, r flnd that 
the evidence Is relevant and I don't find that It would be a 
waste of time or a needless presentation of cumulative evidence 
based on my review of the materials today. 
So with that, did you have anything further, 
Mr. Kessinger? 
p.m.) 
MR. KESSINGER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright Thank you. Mr. Jones? 
MR. JONES: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright Thank you both. 
(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded at 1:40 
M ~ 
22, where It's described what the four positions, backgrounds 1 
are and their areas of expertise and what they would expect 2 
their testimony to be, so they are all relative ·- I'm sorry, 3 
relevant and there would certainly be probative value rrom 4 
those experts. 5 
The rule goes on to give the Court dlsc:reUon to 6 
exdude that evidence for various reasons. And one of those, 7 
and maybe the most Important of which, Is whether that evidence 8 
would be cumulative In this particular case. And flrst of all, 9 
I think the four expert witnesses that have been discussed from 10 
my review of the lnrormaUon relative to those witnesses, I 11 
can't conclude at this Ume that that would be a needless 
presentation of cumulative evl(lence. 
Mr. Kessinger, I understand what you are saying 
relative to the Information that's been disclosed to you, J 
guess I'm not so persuaded that the evidence is going to be so 
repetitious that In my discretion I woulcl exclude It at this 
point In time. I think Mr. Jones Is correct in that -- well, 
two things. At this point in time l'm not persuaded to 9r11nt 
the motion. l think Mr. Jones Is correct In that It's somewhat 
premature at this point In time to limit tile evidence under 












testimony Is cumulative, J can revisit that and that would 23 
apply to either side of this, SO quite orten In these cases I 24 
have to kind of take a wait and see approach and sometimes that 25 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES 
This Memorandum is submitted in opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion 
seeking to unfairly limit the number of defense experts to only one per subject matter 
despite the fact that Plaintiff has in excess of this number himself. This is a medical 
malpractice case involving the death of Krystal Ballard who passed away in July 2010. 
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Plaintiff claims that the patient died as a result of malpractice by the Defendants which 
resulted in the decedent becoming infected which ultimately resulted in her death. . 
Plaintiff contends his claims are supported by the opinions of a number of 
experts in various fields including plastic surgery, infectious disease and pathology. The 
Defense disputes Plaintiff's claims and has identified experts to rebut these allegations. 
Despite the different backgrounds and specialties of these physicians, Plaintiff's counsel 
claims that pursuant to a rule of evidence, Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, the court should 
enter an order in advance of the trial limiting the defense to not more than one expert 
witness, other than the defendant himself, to testify on any given subject. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's Motion should be denied. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish That The Probative Value Of 
The Testimony To Be Provided By Defendants' Expert 
Witnesses Is Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of 
Presenting Needlessly Cumulative Evidence as required under 
IRE 403 
As an initial starting point, the defense raises the standing and/or propriety 
of the Plaintiff to even bring the pending motion at this juncture in the case which is based 
solely on a rule of evidence. Expert witness disclosures are not evidence, nor are they 
admissible as evidence, but rather they are a discovery tool utilized to prepare for trial. 
The defense contends that Rule 403 has no application whatsoever at this pretrial stage 
and that this rule of evidence does not provide the Plaintiff with a vehicle or mechanism by 
which the number of defense experts can be limited months in advance of a trial. 
' 
In terms of addressing the application of Rule 403 if we were in a trial 
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setting, additional background should be considered by the court. There are multiple 
Defendants in this case including Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Laser and Med Spa. The 
complex medical issues in this case cover an unusually large number of areas including 
the performance of multiple cosmetic procedures and the equipment involved therein, the 
proper sterilization of surgical equipment and maintaining a proper sterile surgical field, 
the identification and treatment of a septic infectious process, the effectiveness of various 
antibiotics, the cause and effect of multi-system organ failure and theories as to the cause 
of death for this particular patient. 
Due to the number of medical issues in this case, Plaintiff has listed the 
opinions of not less than three retained experts to address both standard of practice and 
causation issues including: Dean Sorensen, M.D., George Nichols, M.D. and Keith 
Armitage, M.D. These individuals are disclosed as experts in various areas of medicine 
including plastic surgery, anatomical, clinical and forensic pathology and infectious 
disease. See Plaintiff's First and Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants First 
Set of Interrogatories attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibits A and 
B. 
In order to oppose these experts, the defense disclosed six retained experts 
including: Gregory Laurence, M.D., a cosmetic surgeon with his background and training 
in family practice medicine in which he is boarded; Charles Garrison, M.D., forensic 
pathology; Thomas Coffman, M.D., infectious disease; John Lundeby, M.D., a cosmetic 
surgeon with his background and training in general surgery in which he is boarded; 
Geoffrey Stiller, M.D., who completed a fellowship in cosmetic surgery on top of his 
background in general surgery; and Angier Wills, M.D., a plastic surgeon. In response to 
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the Plaintiff's request that the defense voluntarily agree to reduce the number of its 
experts prior to conducting depositions, the Defense withdrew Dr. Wills thereby 
effectively reducing the number of retained defense experts on the issues of standard of 
practice and causation to five. See the professional credentials and curriculum vitae for 
each of these experts attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit C. 
At issue is whether Rule 403 provides a basis upon which the court may 
limit the number of defense experts during discovery, as opposed to the number of 
experts that may ultimately testify at trial. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In terms of interpreting and applying Rule 403, Idaho courts have 
consistently determined that "the language of I.RE. 403 tilts in favor of admissibility." 
State v. McGuire, 135 Idaho 535, 540 20 P.3d 719 (Ct. App. 2001). Only if the probative 
value of the testimony is "substantially outweighed by danger of needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence," may a trial court exclude relevant evidence. See State v. Knight, 
120 Idaho 862, 865, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1996). In addition, "statements by witnesses 
which corroborate the facts, to which another has already testified, are not necessarily 
inadmissible because they are cumulative." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 22, 878 
P .2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994 ). Instead, "Rule of Evidence 403, prohibits the introduction of 
needlessly cumulative evidence." Id. 
Under the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 403, in order for the 
relevant testimony of any of the defense experts to be limited in any way, the Plaintiff must 
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show that the presentation of such testimony from the Defense experts would amount to 
the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The fact that evidence to be 
provided by an expert witness may be similar or even cumulative to that of another 
witness does not, standing alone, meet the threshold test for exclusion under the Rule 
upon which the Plaintiff's motion is solely based. Rather, the evidence must be 
"needlessly" cumulative before the Court can even consider whether to limit it. The 
defense contends that such a determination cannot be made months prior to trial before 
the Plaintiff has presented any evidence. 
The Plaintiff's Motion fails to establish anything more than sheer 
speculation that based solely on the number of Defense experts that their respective 
testimony would even be cumulative as opposed to needlessly cumulative as specifically 
stated by Rule 403. What opinions, facts and foundation the defense experts may testify 
to at trial as broadly set forth in the Defendants' Expert Disclosure cannot be fairly relied 
upon during discovery as grounds to limit the number of experts at this point. Unique to 
the nature of this case and equally critical to the Court's resolution of this matter, is the 
fact the parties are required to prove their respective cases by way of expert testimony 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Idaho Code§ 6-1012 provides: 
Proof of community standard of health care practice in 
malpractice case 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or 
death of any person, brought against any physician and 
surgeon or other provider of health care, including, without 
limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant, nurse 
practitioner, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse 
anesthetist, medical technologist, physical therapist, hospital 
or nursing home, or any person vicariously liable for the 
negligence of them or any of them, such claimant or plaintiff 
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must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, 
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a 
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community in which such care allegedly was or should have 
been provided, as such standard existed at the time and place 
of the alleged negligence of such physician and surgeon, 
hospital or other such health care provider and as such 
standard then and there existed with respect to the class of 
health care provider that such defendant then and there 
belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it was 
functioning. Such individual providers of health care shall be 
judged in such cases in comparison with similarly trained and 
qualified providers of the same class in the same community, 
taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields 
of medical specialization, if any .... (Emphasis added). 
In order for the jury to understand what will be complex medical matters, 
experts will be relied upon by both parties to explain, rebut and educate the jury. As part 
of this process, experts will discuss in detail the medical issues in question and offer their 
varying opinions on whether Dr. Kerr's care and treatment in question complied with the 
local standards and practices of health care within the community to which he is held as 
well as their varying opinions as to the cause of the patient's death. See Idaho Code § 
6-1012. 
Indeed, a review of the defense disclosure shows the Defendants fully 
complied with the rules governing expert witness discovery in this case. The Defendants 
provided Plaintiff with an extremely detailed and timely Expert Witness Disclosure setting 
forth the opinions and factual basis expected to be presented on a variety of topics. See 
Defense Disclosure attached to the Affidavit of Scott McKay as Exhibit A. The 
Defendants cannot be faulted for complying with Rule 26(b)(4) in disclosing their experts' 
opinions regarding the substance, foundation and subject matter of their opinions. The 
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Defendants have set forth the full scope of the potential of the experts' testimony, but this 
does not mean that the experts will ultimately testify as to each and every opinion and 
issue stated therein. 
This is because the Plaintiff goes first, has the burden of proof and the 
defense must plan ahead and be prepared at trial to meet and oppose the evidence and 
adverse opinions offered. Plaintiff's complaint that he is somehow outnumbered is 
insufficient to limit the defense's ability to present key testimony on the main issues in this 
case. Plaintiff has not cited any legal authority to support his argument that based on 
numbers alone the defense should be limited. There are multiple reasons why the 
testimony of defense experts will not be needlessly cumulative. 
First, each of the Defendants' standard of health care practice experts will 
offer unique and relevant testimony on various aspects of the standard of practice topic 
which will not be needlessly cumulative. The Defendants have disclosed three retained 
experts regarding the standard of health care practice. Of these experts, Gregory 
Laurence, M.D. is from Tennessee and has a background in family practice medicine a 
specialty which the Plaintiff does not have; John Lundeby, M.D., is from Spokane, 
Washington and was involved in providing cosmetic surgery training to the Defendant Dr. 
Kerr; and Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. from Moscow, Idaho, and has a background in general 
surgery, another specialty which the Plaintiff does not have. Each one of these experts 
approach this case from a different perspective and simply because their respective 
disclosure reflects that they will be prepared to address similar topics does not mean that 
the presentation of their testimony at trial will result in the presentation of needless 
cumulative evidence. 
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Moreover, simply because these experts reach the same or similar 
conclusions that Dr. Kerr did not violate the applicable standard of health care practice is 
not a basis to limit or preclude their testimony on the key issues in the case which is 
governed by the unique statutory scheme set forth under Idaho Code §6-1012. This is 
significantly different from a situation where a party seeks to call multiple witnesses to 
testify on the same fact, such as whether a traffic light was green or red immediately prior 
to an automobile accident. Under that scenario, the defense concedes there would be 
little value to calling five witnesses to all say what color the light was at the time of the 
accident. 
In contrast, a review of the Defendants' Expert Disclosure regarding the 
standard of health care practice experts establishes that there are different reasons and 
different aspects to their respective testimony. Each of these experts provides a unique 
aspect to the case that the Defendants should be entitled to present. In order to give a 
complete disclosure, and in an effort to avoid the potential argument by the Plaintiff that 
certain opinions were not disclosed, there is naturally going to be some overlap to 
testimony and to the disclosure itself in order to ensure compliance with Rule 26(b)(4). 
Many district courts in Idaho take the strict position that if an opinion is not set forth in the 
expert disclosure, then it cannot be presented by the witness at trial. Mindful of this 
position, the defense takes great pains to ensure the expert disclosure is complete. As a 
result, there is no justifiable reason for the Court to conclude at this early discovery phase 
juncture, that the highly relevant testimony of these experts will be needlessly cumulative 
and therefore subject to exclusion and/or limitation. 
Second, each of these three experts come from different practice 
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backgrounds and gained their knowledge of the applicable standard of practice in a 
variety of ways. For example, Dr. Laurence is from Tennessee a_nd has a background in 
family practice medicine rather than general surgery or plastic surgery like the Plaintiff's 
expert, Dr. Sorensen. This is a critical difference since Dr. Kerr has an anesthesia 
background and has been criticized by Plaintiff's expert because he does not have a 
general or plastic surgery background. Similarly, although Dr. Lundeby has a general 
surgery background, he will explain to the jury that he is actively involved in providing 
training to physicians from other medical specialties like family practice, ob/gyn, 
dermatology and anesthesia to perform the very procedures at issue without need of any 
formal general or plastic surgery residency as has been advanced by Plaintiff in this case. 
Finally, Dr. Stiller is the only Idaho physician. His testimony is unique from 
that perspective in addition to the fact that he has knowledge that many, if not most, of the 
physicians in Idaho who are performing the surgery at issue in this case are not plastic 
surgeons, but rather some other specialty like Dr. Kerr. Furthermore, since there are 
additional claims against not only Dr. Kerr, but also the Defendant spa facility regarding 
sterilization procedures and techniques, the Defense is entitled to call witnesses who may 
be capable of rendering opinions more for one defendant than another. The Defense 
cannot get the breadth of this testimony from one witness and the rules do not require or 
advocate for Dr. Kerr to be limited as Plaintiff contends. 
Third, if the Defendants are limited to a certain number of experts prior to 
trial, this may result in unfairly prejudicing the defense. For example, if one of these 
three standard of practice witnesses should fail to qualify as an expert at trial for any 
reason, or should a defense expert be meaningfully impeached, then the Defendants 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES - 9 
000550
would need to rely upon a similar expert to establish certain issues. The fact that the 
defense has retained multiple experts should entitle them to be available at the trial if 
needed. In addition, the Plaintiff's experts may be permitted to testify on issues that 
requires a certain Defense expert to rebut which the Defense has taken the time and 
effort to properly identify and disclose in full compliance with the rules of discovery. 
Thus, the difficulty in even considering placing limits on the Defense experts at this stage 
is that it is impossible to predict what will happen at trial or how Plaintiff will present his 
case. 
Plaintiff is seeking millions of dollars in damages from the defense in this 
case. In order to fairly defend against these claims the Defense took the time and made 
the investment into utilizing the right experts for this case. As a result, the defense 
should be entitled to present the testimony of its timely retained and properly disclosed 
standard of practice experts. It is premature to decide at this juncture where the parties 
are still engaged in discovery whether the testimony of these witnesses at trial will amount 
to the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Rule 403 does not provide the 
Plaintiff with a mechanism by which the Defense can be limited during discovery. As a 
result, the Plaintiff's Motion should be denied. 
8. The Plaintiff's Motion Should Be Denied Consistent With The 
Case Authorities From Numerous Jurisdictions Which Have 
Refused To Limit The Number Of Medical Experts In Similar 
Cases 
While there is no Idaho authority specifically regarding I.R.E. 403 and its 
application to limit the number of expert witnesses in a medical malpractice action, there 
are a number of other jurisdictions with similar or identical Rules of Evidence which have 
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addressed this issue. For example in the very recent case of McLean v. Liberty Health 
System, 62 A.3d 922 (N.J. 2013), the New Jersey Appellate Court held that the district 
court in a medical malpractice case had abused its discretion in only allowing the plaintiff 
to call one standard of care expert. McLean involved the death of a teenager whose 
family sued various health care providers claiming that they had failed to timely diagnose 
and treat him for an infection. Id. at 924. At trial, counsel for the plaintiff sought to 
produce the testimony of multiple standard of practice experts in the same field of 
emergency medicine, but the court refused to allow him to call more than one in response 
to the defense position that allowing more than one expert would be duplicative. Id. at 
926. 
Reversing the district court, the McLean court stated: 
We now hold that the trial court erred in limiting expert 
witnesses to only one per side for each relevant field of 
medicine, in particular, on the crucial issue of deviation 
from accepted standards of medical care . .. Nothing in 
our rules of evidence, or other laws or rules, gives a trial 
court authority to balance the number of witnesses 
presented by each side at the trial. Nor is the trial court 
authorized by N.J.R.E. 403 or any other rule or law to bar 
crucial evidence merely on the ground that it duplicates 
another witness's testimony. McLean, 62 A.3d at 928. 
(Emphasis added). See McLean Decision attached to the 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit D. 
The McLean court further observed: 
Here, the testimony that plaintiff wished to present went to the 
heart of her case: whether defendant deviated from accepted 
standards of care for an emergency room physician. 
Although a second expert would have taken more time at the 
trial, it might have been time well spent. In the field of 
medicine, second opinions are often sought to test the 
accuracy of a diagnosis or the benefits and risks of 
proposed treatment. Surely it cannot be said that 
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additional expert testimony in a case that involved 
complicated issues of emergency and diagnostic 
medicine had such low probative value as to . be 
substantially outweighed by its partially repetitive 
nature . .. We note that Rule 403 does not refer to "duplicative 
evidence" but to "needless ... cumulative evidence that might 
cause undue delay in the trial and a waste of time. McLean, 
62 A.3d at 929. (Emphasis added). 
Another example can be found in the case of B.C. Sims v. Brackett, 885 
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), the Court held that the exclusion of an expert medical 
witness's testimony as to the cause of the patient's post-surgery intestinal leak on the 
grounds that such testimony was cumulative was improper. The Texas court discussed 
the fact that in a medical malpractice trial expert testimony is a necessity and the matters 
at issue are addressed by opposing experts. Id. at 454. In order for the trial court to 
exclude testimony, it must not just be cumulative, but rather the probative value of the 
expert's testimony must be "substantially outweighed by ... [the) needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence." Id. In applying the Texas nearly identical equivalent of Idaho's 
Rule 403, the Court stated: 
To exclude evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must 
conduct a balancing test and only when the balance weighs 
significantly on the side of judicial efficiency may relative 
evidence be excluded as cumulative .... The test is not 
merely whether the evidence to be deduced from the two 
witnesses is similar, but also whether the excluded 
testimony would have added substantial weight to the 
offering party's case. If so, it is error to exclude it. B.C. 
Sims, 885 S.W. 2d at 454. (Emphasis added). 
The Court concluded that the excluded witnesses credentials and specialty gave their 
testimony great probative value which was not purely cumulative. Id. Where a party is 
denied the right to make a fair presentation to the jury, the court has not acted reasonably 
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and has abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness on a "hotly contested 
issue" in the case. Id. See B.C. Sims Decision attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition as Exhibit E. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reached a similar result in Kobos v. 
Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 546 (Wyo. 1989). There the Court stated: 
Not all evidence which is entirely duplicative is therefore 
cumulative and excludable. Evidence may vary in degree of 
persuasiveness, and when an item of proof which is offered 
on a point is very different in character or persuasive impact 
from an item of proof previously received, the former cannot 
be considered merely "cumulative" of the latter. Moreover, 
at times it is entirely reasonable for a party to insist, 
"One witness is good, but two or three will make my case 
much stronger, even though all will testify in a similar 
vein." In short, the discretion of the trial judge to exclude 
cumulative evidence must be exercised in a 
discriminating fashion, and with wisdom, particularly 
where the evidence in question goes to issues of central 
importance in the case. Kobos, 768 P .2d at 546 (Emphasis 
added). 
See Kobos Decision attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit F. See 
also 2 D. Lonise/1 and C Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 128 at 7 4-75 (1985); Hill v. Bache 
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1986); Bower v. O'Hara, 759 F.2d 
1117 (3rd Cir. 1985); and United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976). See 
a/so the case of Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1986), where the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the District Court abused its discretion excluding a third medical 
expert witness when the witness had different credentials and would have offered slightly 
different evidence and analysis. See Johnson Decision attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit G. 
Finally, in Frederick v. Woman's Hospital of Acadiana, 626 So.2d 467 
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(La. Ct. App. 1993), the Louisiana Court held that cumulative expert testimony was 
properly admitted. In Frederick, the defendants in a medical malpractice case offered 
the testimony of two pediatric neurologists. Id. at 472. The two physicians attended 
different medical schools; one was principally a hospital administrator, the other was a 
private practitioner. The court determined that the trial judge was correct in permitting 
each to testify, as each one's testimony added dimensional perspective to the testimony 
of the other. Id. at 472-73. 
The Frederick court also held that the trial judge properly admitted the 
testimony of three obstetrical-gynecologists. Id. at 473. Each witness differed in 
background and sub-specialty. One graduated from L.S.U. Medical School, was chief of 
08/GYN at a Dallas hospital and specialized in fetal-maternal medicine. Another 
attended the University of Tennessee Medical School, was board-certified in 08/GYN, 
surgery and perinatology, and was a professor at the University of Mississippi Medical 
Center. The third OB/GYN called by the defendants trained at the University of Oregon, 
chaired the Department of 08/GYN at Tulane Medical Center, co-authored several books 
and had performed years of antenatal diagnosis and treatment of birth defects. The 
court concluded that the probative value of the testimony from each of these three 
experts, although similar, was not substantially outweighed by any concerns articulated in 
Rule 403. Id.; see also Hall v. Brookshire Bras., 831 So.2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
See Frederick Decision attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit H. 
In further opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Defendants submit the 
transcript from an oral ruling by the Honorable Joel D. Horton in the case of Yoonas v. 
Ediger, Ada County Case No. CV Pl 00002490. The transcript, a copy of which is 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESSES - 14 
000555
attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Exhibit I, is an excerpt of the hearing 
before (now Supreme Court Justice) Judge Horton on a similar plaintiff's motion to limit 
defense experts in a medical malpractice case. The defense in that case sought to call 
four experts in addition to the defendant. The excerpt provided contains Judge Horton's 
oral ruling that the presentation of four defense experts would not be needlessly 
cumulative. Similarly, the Defendants submit the transcript from an oral ruling by the 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in the case of Strandbakke v. Moreno, Nez Perce County, No. 
CV 05-0002547. The transcript, a copy of which is attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition as Exhibit J, reaches the same conclusion as the court in Yoonas. The court 
in Strandbakke concluded that the expert testimony was relevant, would not be 
needlessly cumulative can could not be limited in advance of trial just as the Plaintiff has 
argued in the case at bar. 
This is a complex medical malpractice case involving several different areas 
of medicine including: cosmetic surgery, general surgery, forensic pathology, 
bacteriology, infectious disease, toxicology, anesthesiology, emergency medicine, 
internal medicine and urology. The issues in this case involve not only the performance 
of cosmetic surgery in multiple areas of the body, but also the determination of the cause 
for the patient to become septic and the various bacterial issues which are involved. The 
patient in this case died of unusual circumstances and the autopsy records, tissue slides 
and blood samples in this case have been or will be reviewed and evaluated by multiple 
specialists in medicine. The Defendants are entitled to present this evidence to the jury 
and the opinions of the properly disclosed witnesses. Similar to the decisions reached 
by courts from other jurisdictions, as well as Idaho District Courts, the Defendants 
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respectfully request this Court rule that at this early juncture there is no evidence before 
the Court which would support the Plaintiff's proposal to limit the number of Defense 
experts from three to one and deny said Motion. 
111. 
CONCLUSION 
Excluding and/or limiting several of the defense experts from being able to 
testify on the key standard of practice and causation issues in this case despite the fact 
they were timely and properly disclosed would unfairly prejudice and hamper the 
Defendants' ability to present an effective defense, especially in light of the complicated 
nature of the medicine in this case. The complex medical issues in this case require 
significant expert witness testimony, which the jury should be entitled to receive without 
the arbitrary limitations proposed by Plaintiff. Each of the Defendants' expert witnesses 
will provide a different dimensional perspective to the testimony of the other without 
needlessly re-plowing the same ground. Thus, the number of retained standard of 
practice expert witnesses disclosed by the Defendants (three) are not excessive, and 
should not provide a basis to limit the experts to be called by the Defendants at trial on the 
most critical issues in the case. 
Any decisions regarding the cumulative nature of the testimony to be 
proffered by the Defendants' expert witnesses can be adequately controlled and 
monitored by the Court at trial. The Plaintiff has yet to put on their case-in-chief and 
none of the Defense experts have testified or even given deposition testimony. It will not 
be known until the time of trial what evidence the Defendants will need to present in their 
case-in-chief through various experts. For all of the reasons discussed herein, the 
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Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude 
Cumulative Expert Witnesses. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
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To: Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
deposition of Dr. Geoffrey Stiller on Friday, July 19, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. PST, at the law offices 
of Tim_ Gresback, 210 East ?1h Street, Moscow, Idaho 83843, at which place and time you are 
invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. · 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
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10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
' ' 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from defense counsel in this 
case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By: L ~~~----
Dav~ 
Scott McKay , 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 3, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, and files his 
Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Cumulative 
Expert Witnesses. By their memorandum in opposition, Defendants attempt to justify a parade of 
defense experts on standard of care by looking to persuasive authorities, and by emphasizing that 
"each one of [their] experts approach this case from a differing perspective .... " (Defs.' Memo in 
·Opp. 7.) Defendants also attempt to convince the Court that there is no vested authority granting 
this Court the discretion to limit expert witnesses during discovery. 
In fact, there is Idaho case law specifically recognizing this Court's discretion to limit the 
number of expert witnesses during discovery. Many of the persuasive authorities provided by 
Defendants actually comport with the limitation requested by Plaintiff. And because differing 
perspectives should not obscure the fact that only one standard of care applies in this case, the 
Court would be well within its discretion to limit Defendant in accordance with Plaintiff's Motion 
to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses. 
As an initial point, nowhere in Plaintiffs motion does he "[complain] that he is somehow 
outnumbered . . . . " (Id) Defendants' statement to the contrary should be disregarded. So, too, 
should Defendants' related assertion that "Plaintiffs Motion fails to establish anything more than 
sheer speculation that based solely on the number of Defense experts that their respective 
testimony would be cumulative." (Id.) The reason for this is obvious: Plaintiff need not speculate 
as to the cumulative nature of defense experts' testimony because "Defendants provided .Plaintiff 
with an extremely detailed ... Expert Witness Disclosure .... " (Id at 6.) The clearly repetitive 
expert opinions contained within that disclosure speak for themselves as to the cumulative nature 
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hearing transcripts ( or excerpts thereof) without val~d, corresponding court orders, those purported 
"authorities" should be ignored. 
Defendants would have this Court believe that no precedential authority exists to support 
the Court's limitation of expert witnesses during discovery. This is simply incorrect. In Edmunds 
v. Kraner, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
Our law and our rules of civil procedure both provide that courts have the 
authority to limit the number of expert witnesses prior to trial. We have long 
recognized that courts have broad, inherent powers to control discovery. See 
Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 749, 86 P.3d 458, 463 (2004). This includes 
the inherent authority to limit the number of expert witnesses during 
discovery. See Hansen, 974 P.2d at 1161 (finding no abuse of discretion where 
district court disallowed three expert witnesses prior to trial when it did not 
preclude the party seeking to use the witness testimony from raising a relevant . 
issue). We have also advised that 'Judges should not hesitate to exercise 
appropriate control over the discovery process." Sierra Life Ins., Co. v. Magi<; 
Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 801, 623 P.2d 103, 109 (1980) (quoting 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1649, 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 134 
(1979)). 
Our rules of civil procedure and the express purposes behind our discovery rules 
likewise recognize the court's authority to limit the number of expert witnesses. 
Rule 16( d)( 4) provides that a court may limit the number of expert witnesses prior 
. to trial. Rule l(a) requires that the rules of civil procedure "be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." 
142 Idaho 867, 877-78, 136 P.3d 338, 348-49 (2006) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is not, as 
Defendants suggest, premature to grant the requested relief. 
And with regard to the case law provided in support of Defendants' argument, it is prudent 
to note those cases are consistent with Plaintiffs proposed limitation. In McLean v. Liberty Health 
System, for instance, the Court ruled that "the trial court erred in prohibiting plaintiff from 
presenting testimony by a second malpractice liability expert .... " 430 NJ.Super 156, 162, 62 
A.3d 922, 926 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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In B. C. Sims v. Brackett, a case involving claims against surgeons, an infectious disease 
specialist, a kidney specialist, nurses, phannacists, as well as the hospital in which those medical 
professionals worked, the Texas Court of Appeals employed a Rule 403 analysis in determining 
"that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding [ a medical expert who the plaintiff intended 
to offer on the standard of care for recovery]." 885 S.W.2d 450, 451-454 (1994). The improperly 
excluded expert was board certified in internal medicine, and the lower court ruled that his 
testimony would be cumulative of a board certified general surgeon who had previously testified. 
Id. at 453. 
In Johnson v. US., a medical malpractice case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for continuation of the 
bench trial below, in part, because the government should have been allowed to offer an expert 
witness in.child behavior in addition to its two other experts. 780 F.2d 902, 904-906 (1986). 
And in Kobos v. Everts, the Supreme Court of Wyoming employed a Rule 403 analysis in ruling 
that a the trial court erroneously precluded the plaintiff from offering a pediatrician and a 
pathologist in a case involving defendant pediatricians, orthopedic surgeons, and radiologists. 768 
P.2d 534, 536, 545 (1989). 
Though Defendants cite these cases in support of their opposition, there are two reasons 
why those cases provide more support for Plaintiffs motion than for Defendants' opposition. 
First, in none of these cases are five experts being offered to shed light on any single issue. In this 
case, however, Defendants seek to tender five experts as to standard of care. Additionally, these 
cases involve multiple defendants of varying specialties. Accordingly, it would follow that, in 
cases where multiple standards of care would apply, greater numbers of standard of care experts 
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In this case, no such demand exists. Plaintiff, by his Complaint, invokes a single standard 
of care. Therefore, it is inevitable that Defendants' proposed standard of care experts -- all five of 
them -- would provide needlessly cumulative evidence on the one standard of care that applies in 
this case. Differing expert perspectives do nothing to mitigate this reality, and the Court would be 
well within its discretion to limit Defendants' experts in accordance therewith. This case is about 
one doctor's conduct, whether or not Defendants seek to emphasize the diverse perspectives of its 
proposed expe11s, which is a transparent attempt to justify inappropriately cumulative expert 
witnesses. 
And while Defendants state that the limitation requested by Plaintiff "may result in 
unfairly prejudicing the defense[,]" practical consideration of this issue reveals that Plaintiff will 
be severely and unfairly prejudiced without such a limitation. (Defs.' Memo in Opp. at 9.) Not 
only will Plaintiff incur massive costs associated with expert discovery, most notably on expert 
depositions, but Defendants will directly benefit from these expenditures. Specifically, with a 
deposition transcript for each of their expert witnesses in hand, Defendants will be able to pick and 
choose which of the five standard of care experts they prefer to call at trial, excuse the remainder, 
and simultaneously reduce their trial expenses. Plaintiff's costs balloon while Defendants enjoy 
very apparent strategic and cost benefits. 
Because this Court's authority to limit expert witnesses during discovery is explicitly 
recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, because the authorities provided by Defendants fail to add 
merit to their argument, and because Plaintiff will suffer significant and unfair prejudice without 








include Defendant, Dr. Kerr, on any single topic. 1. 
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Dated this gth day of July, 2013. 
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P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
~008/009 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
6 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 8, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by 
delivering the same facsimile and United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
1 Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank.Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
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.Gfegory Haddad 
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P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants lJ ORIGINAL 
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Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 •. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENSE 
EXPERTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This Supplemental Memorandum is submitted in opposition to Plaintiff's 
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Reply Brief which raises an entirely new ground in support of his Motion which was not 
addressed in Plaintiff's initial Memo. Plaintiffs Motion and supporting documents were 
based solely on the application of Rule 403 to which the defense responded. Now, in his 
reply brief the Plaintiff cites for the first time to the Supreme Court case of Edmunds v. 
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006). The portion of the case cited by the 
Plaintiff did not involve a Rule 403 analysis, but rather a totally separate basis involving 
the potential application of Rule 16(d) which involves pretrial conferences. In fairness, 
and in ·order to address this entirely new issue, the defense has submitted this 
supplemental memorandum in order to respond to this new issue. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Law Does Not Require The Court To Limit The 
Defendants' Experts 
The defense contends that the Edmunds decision does not apply in this 
case, nor does it set forth any requirement that the Court limit the number of defense 
expert witnesses in this case. Edmunds was a malpractice case involving an alleged 
overdose of the antibiotic Gentamicin causing one of the plaintiffs to suffer from 
neurotoxicity and ototoxicity. The defendant hospital, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center (SARMC), moved for summary judgment as to all of the plaintiffs' claims. In 
opposition to this motion, the plaintiffs filed the second affidavit of their expert, Dr. 
Hollander as well as an affidavit of an additional expert Dr. Rotschafer. The district court 
struck these affidavits as being untimely and granted the hospital's motion. The plaintiff 
appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by 
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excluding the testimony of Ors. Hollander and Rotschafer. The Court in Edmunds 
concluded that the affidavit of Dr. Rotschafer, who had never been disclosed, was 
untimely and properly excluded by the district court. Id. at 873, 136 P .3d at 344. 
However, as to the affidavit of Dr. Hollander, the Court found that Dr. Hollander had 
previously been disclosed by plaintiffs as an expert witness before the disclosure 
deadline had passed and that the opinions set forth in Dr. Hollander's second affidavit 
were timely offered in opposition to the issues raised by the hospital's motion for summary 
judgment. Id. at 344-46, 136 P.3d at 873-875. 
Since the District Court's scheduling order did not require anything other 
than the names of the experts to be utilized, the Supreme Court in Edmunds held it was 
error for the trial court to conclude the supplemental affidavit of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. 
Hollander, was untimely. Id. at 346, 136 P.3d at 875. Since the Supreme Court in 
Edmunds concluded it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to have excluded 
the second affidavit of Dr. Hollander, the Court also concluded that the district court erred 
in granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment. Id. 
The Court's resolution of the summary judgment issues in Edmunds was 
dispositive of the entire appeal. Despite this fact, in dicta, the Edmunds court then went 
on to discuss whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that it 
had the inherent authority to limit the number of expert witnesses during pretrial 
discovery. In Edmunds, the hospital identified 53 witnesses in its expert witness 
disclosure against the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs in Edmunds argued that the number of experts disclosed by 
the hospital was excessive and unfairly prevented the plaintiffs from engaging in 
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meaningful discovery as to the opinions of the defense experts. Id. at 348, 136 P.3d at 
877. The Court in Edmunds noted that the trial court had discretion regarding limitations 
on the number of experts utilized by a party and that the district court had erred by 
concluding that its power to limit experts was "simply an evidentiary issue for trial, not a 
discovery matter." Id. The Court stated, "[a]t the very least the trial court should have 
considered the Edmunds' request to limit the number of experts as a discovery issue and 
examined the purposes behind our discovery rules when ruling on the motion." Id. The 
Court in Edmunds reversed and remanded the trial court's decision, but also held open 
the possibility that the trial court could ultimately deny the plaintiffs' motion. 
The decision in Edmunds remanding the issue of limiting experts arose out 
of the plaintiffs' argument that the disclosure of 53 experts was "an abusive tactic that 
prevented genuine discovery of expert opinions by deposition." Id. at 877, 136 P.3d at 
348. The concern by the Court in Edmunds arose out of potential problems obtaining 
expert opinions as to 53 different experts in discovery. The decision did not address 
limiting experts at trial, which is the issue presented in the instant case. Since it was a 
discovery issue, the Court did not address I.R.E. 403 in its decision, and concluded that 
the trial court improperly focused on I.RE. 403 and the evidentiary issues. 
In this case, however, the issue before the Court is vastly different. Here, 
the issue relates to three standard of health care practice experts, plus Dr. Kerr. This is 
a far cry from the defendant disclosure in Edmunds of a whopping 53 experts with no 
opinions produced for any of them. In addition, Plaintiff's reference throughout his reply 
brief to the defense having five standard of practice experts is false and misleading. 
Further, unlike Edmunds, the Defendants in this case disclosed over 100 pages of 
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detailed opinions of their experts, so there is no issue that the Plaintiffs do not know the 
substance of opinions of the experts involved. Indeed, given the scope of the 
disclosures produced, one questions why the Plaintiff is seeking to take the depositions of 
these witnesses at all and that in reality his motion is but a ruse to try and manufacture a 
claim of prejudice simply to try and even out for his client the number of experts set to 
testify at trial. 
At a minimum, nothing in the Edmunds decision requires this Court to limit 
the Defense expert witnesses. Furthermore, it is of important note that the Supreme Court 
did not prohibit the trial court from refusing to limit the number of experts on remand, nor 
did the court set any magic number for experts on any one subject as the Plaintiff seeks to 
have done in this case. Rather, the Court in Edmunds directed the trial court that it was 
allowed to consider the motion to limit as a discovery motion and to not simply pass on it 
as an evidentiary issue. The Court did not, however, give specific guidance as to how 
the trial court could properly analyze the issue or how to analyze the number of experts 
that should be allowed to testify at trial. Plaintiff is seeking several million dollars from 
the Defendants who contend it would be an abuse of discretion to limit the defense to less 
than those experts currently listed to testify on the key issues in this case. There is no 
blanket rule set forth by Edmunds which says the defense can only call one expert on a 
topic as alleged by the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argues that his trial costs will increase because of the cost of having 
to conduct the depositions of each of the defense experts. This is a perplexing 
statement. There is no requirement that Plaintiff's counsel take any expert depositions. 
In point of fact, counsel for the defense rarely takes the depositions of the Plaintiff's 
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experts. This is because the rules of discovery entitle a party to rely on the contents of 
the disclosure and interrogatory responses to Rule 26(b)(4) interrogatories. Thus, to the 
extent the Plaintiff wants to argue that his costs will increase if he has to take all of the 
defense expert depositions, this is a tactical decision on his counsel's part and not a 
requirement of discovery, nor should such an argument serve as a valid basis upon which 
to limit the minimal number of defense experts in this case. For these reason, the 
defense respectfully requests that Plaintiffs Motion to limit be denied. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013. 
( 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENSE EXPERTS by delivering the same to each of 
the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
LIMIT DEFENSE EXPERT - 7 
000577
Judge Bail 071013 Tara Villi . I Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
04:07:35 PM I j CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Mo/Limit Expert Witnesses 
I I 
:lii~ii!i:~~ li~;:ri;; ~=-~f I~~~1!1~~J~t~~=::;ert: Witnesses===:= 
04:14:24 PM IT. Jones I Argues in opposition of Motion to Limit Expert Witnesses 
04:28: 14 PM l S. McKay I Responds 
·············-·······················-·············· ·r···"""""""·············••oooooooooo ................................................................................................................... --.. - ................. - ........ _ ................................................................................................................... . 
04:34:09 PM I Judge ! Will not limit Expert witnesses but gives additional time for 
I 1' Depositions. The Defense has to pay for half of the expense 
I I in regards to the Tennessee expert deposition. 
I ! 
04:42:11 PMJJudge iMr. Jones will submit an appropriate order 
000578
<· ~ 
; cf '1 
tci& 
~l3 
S"'Z;3 Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 . 2!5 QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
t..!:> US Bank Plaza 
b,d 101 South Capitol Boulevard 
O Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
\'\\ Boise, Idaho 83701 
b,-.....j Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JUL 2 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clark 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 






BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 22nd day of July, 2013, I served 
Defendants' Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's Third Set of Discovery Requests, 




together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the 
method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
· Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
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QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
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101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH .MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESS 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 10 day of July, 2013 
pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses, the parties having 





appeared by and through their respective attorneys, the Court having considered the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel hereby orders as follows: 
Plaintiff's Motion seeking to limit the number of defense witnesses is hereby 
DENIED. However, in order to allow for the depositions of the defense experts to occur, 
Plaintiff's counsel shall be provided additional time beyond the time set in the current 
scheduling order. In addition, the defense shall pay for one-half of the deposition fee 
charged by Dr. Gregory Lawrence. 
Approved as to form: 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
Scott McKay, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ZArj 
DATED this __ day of July, 2013. 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO-;---,lio?~;._-
AM_._ ----t-~.!/l ") : 
JUL,2 5 2013 
CHRl~R D. RICH, Clerk 
"'' JAMIE MARTIN DEPuTv ' 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE 
SUBPOENA 
Defendants Brian C. Kerr, M.D. and Silk Touch Laser, LLP hereby provide 
notice that they intend to serve the attached subpoena directed to the Idaho State Tax 
Commission, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(2). 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA - 1 
ORIGINAL 
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DATED this 25th day of July, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
B "'-.---++-~~....,..,_.;,.._ ___ _ 
Jer 1ah A Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA - 2 
000585
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA by delivering 
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA- 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
l ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
Jrerniah A. Quane 
000586
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, !SB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SUBPOENA(RECORDS) 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
PO BOX 36 
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to produce the following documents, 
records or objects, including electronically stored information: 
1. Any and all tax and income records, including any and all related or 
supporting documents, for Krystal M. Ballard  
deceased, for the years 2007 through 2010. 
2. Any and all tax and income records, including any and all related or 
supporting documents, for Charles K. Ballard for 
the years 2007 through 2013. 
You are commanded to produce the requested documents on or before 
August 26, 2013 to Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, P.O. Box 1576, Boise, Idaho 83701. 
Defendants Brian C. Kerr, M.D. and Silk Touch Laser, LLP shall reimburse you for any 
reasonable copying charges. 
You are further notified that if you fail to produce or permit copying or 
inspection of the documents requested above at or before August 26, 2013, you may be 
held in contempt of court and the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100 
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this· 
Subpoena. 
By order of the Court. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2013. 
SUBPOENA(RECORDS)-2 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By~:=....\....J-..:.~~~==~......----
Jere \ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
000588
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-IOqO; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. O\d(G FILED 
A.M. P.M .. ___ _ 
JUL 2 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHELSIE PINKSTON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
· liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
632969 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AMENDED NOTICE 
TO TAKE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF DR. JOHN P. 
LUNDEBY,MD 
000589
To: Dr. John P. Lundeby, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 / 
Boise, ID 83 70 I I 
I 
l 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
! 
deposition of Dr. John P. Lundeby, M.D., on Friday, July 26, 2013 at 8:30 a.m. at law offices of 
Ramsden and Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814, at which place and 
i 
time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
' 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, fa~es, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
2 




10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiff's counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. ~ 
Dated this } day of July, 2013. 
BAILffj GL S , P 
Respectfu~llY. Submitted, 
By: V 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 




CZ.TE OF SERVICE 
I ~ereby certify that on the· __ ' day of July, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DR. JOHN P. 
LUNDEBY, M.D., by delivering the same to the following via FACSIMILE, 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
4 
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ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE .JONES MpCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza \ 
101 South Capitol Bqulevard 
Suite 1601 \ 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO ....... - , ---i;1c~~o---r.b"""• rj'fFrl't-t-
A.M.- <a cw C .P.M., __ .... j __ """'--
JUL 3 1 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cbrk 
8y ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV QC 1204 792 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
DUCES TECUM OF DR. DEAN 
SORENSEN 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF and his counsel of record: 
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YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, will take testimony on 
oral examination of Dr. Dean Sorensen before a court reporter and notary public with the 
firm of M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., commencing on Wednesday, the 21st day of 
August, 2013, at 11:00 a.m., and continuing thereafter from day to day until such time as 
the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the law offices of Nevin, Benjamin, 
McKay & Bartlett LLP, Boise, Idaho 83702, at which time and place you are notified to 
appear and take such part in the examination as you may deem proper. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Deponent is instructed to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae; 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part; 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of 
interrogatories, deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action 
number, jurisdiction, counsel of record, and outcome of case; 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and 
correspondence prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in 
this case, including your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have 
pertaining_ to this case; 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and 
computer documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation 
of this case and the formulation of your opinions (deposition transcripts and exhibits need 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF DR. DEAN SORENSEN - 2 
000594
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only be identified and not produced); 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial; 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in 
prepara.tion of your testimony and/or opinions; 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches 
and diagrams prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection 







j I ·,· ,l, 
f ' 





9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole 
or in part, in formulating your opinion or testimony; 
10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or 
referred to in arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, 
you are requir~d to bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were 
taken in the instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed 
which were not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, 
slides, etc.) you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case. 
1.5. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from defense 
counsel .ir:i this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF DR. DEAN SORENSEN - 3 
000595
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procedures, rules, regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or 
to which you will refer to support your opinions in this case. 
DATED this 31 51 day of July, 2013. 









• Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF DR. DEAN SORENSEN - 4 
000596
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF 
DR. DEAN SORENSEN by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
. P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
· James B. Perrine 
BAILEY.& GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
°Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
eremiah A. Quane 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF DR. DEAN SORENSEN - 5 
000597
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrin~ jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
· Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
AUG 12 2ata. 
CHRISTOPHER D - . 
Sy CHRISTINE 'e~f ;,, C/sfk 
DEP/,lf'{ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
634880 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF DR. THOMAS 
COFFMAN, M.D. 
000598
To: Dr.Thomas Coffman, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
deposition of Dr. Thomas Coffman, M.D., on Tuesday, August 20, 2013 at 11:00 a.m. mountain 
time at law offices of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, US Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 
Suite 1601, Boise, ID 83701, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in 
such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 




9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; · 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, ·standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this rday of August, 2013. 
BA~ S ER, LLP / 
Respec~ty Submitted, 
By: \j!_ tCd1 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
634880 
000600
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DR.THOMAS 
COFFMAN, M.D., by delivery of email to the below: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
634880 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
: t'11li F~----
AUG 1· l 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
634880 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
DEPOSITION OF DR. THOMAS 
COFFMAN, M.D. 
000602
To: Dr.Thomas Coffman, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
deposition of Dr. Thomas Coffman, M.D., on Monday, August 19, 2013 at 11 :00 a.m. mountain 
time at law offices of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, US Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 
Suite 1601, Boise, ID 83701, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in 
such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6: Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 




9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. ,l V 
Dated this ~ day of August, 2013. 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION 
634880 
000604
. . ' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th/&of August, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF DR.THOMAS COFFMAN, 
M.D., by delivery of email to the below: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 





',~ .;- ·_;.; --:. 
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
I 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
"-·------;;;:;c,;--,7'1...,_ __ 
A.M. ____ F~l~t ; ..- : 
AUG f 3 2013 
CHR1Si0PH!R 0, RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
D!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOU<;H MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
../ 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
000606
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the .Defendants that a copy of Plaintiffs Second Supplemental Response to Defendants' 
Notice Duces Tecum of Taking the Video Deposition of Charles Ballard, together with a copy of 
this Notice of Service of Discovery, has been served upon counsel indicated on the ?ertificate of 
service oelow. 
DATED this 61h day of August, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLET1:' LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Service of Discovery by delivering the same to the following via email and 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
~ 
P. Gregory Haddad 
000608
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (IS:S #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP . 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BATLEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff · 
, :~-·--_ -_ -_ -_ -_ ~_,F:,~=.~--f'-lr.'33~-----:-
AUG 1 4 2013 
CHAISTOPH!R 0. FllCH, Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEVEFI 
OEPU1V 
.IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
. . 
OR·\ G\ NAL 
000609
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiffs Third Supplemental Response to Defendants' First 
Set of Interrogatories, together with a copy of this Notice of Service of Discovery, has been 
served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of service below. 
l/ I--
DATED this_,_ day of August, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By: --~-.d-Z--. -~--~zS=--s,,.....~. 
Davi . Nevm 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
000610
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,;-... 
I hereby certify that on the 1'1 day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foreg?ing Notice of Service of Discovery by delivering the same to the following via 
facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 







David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
· P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-NO. z;:;rr,)2: FILRD 
A.r~.~~-~.M·-· ---=~~--
AUG 2 S 2013 
CHRISTCJPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Ely ELVSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF · 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d!Q/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants . 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF 
ADDRESS 
000612
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT and THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED PARTIES, and their attorneys ofrecord: 
PLEASE TAKE N_OTICE that Bailey & Glasser, LLP's Montgomery, Alabama office 
has moved, and its new address is: 
J.B. Perrine, Esq. 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone: (205) 988-9253 
Fax: (205) 733-4896 
Please amend your certificate of service and pleadings accordingly. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By:·&~ 
l P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 2 
000613
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Change of Address by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
fl!~ 
'James B. Perrine 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS - 3 
000614
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NE¥JN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. Fll.~D n ?7?_ 
- ____ P.M . ...-"1-.1------A.M. 
AUG 3 0 20\3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri< 
By OAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, and 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO OFFER 
TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL 
EXPERT BY VIDEO 
TELECONFERENCE AND 
REQUEST FOR LEA VE TO 
PERMIT SAME ' 
ORIGlNAL 
000615
Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, hereby gives notice of his intent to offer the 
testimony of plaintiffs medical expert, Keith Armitage, M.D. during trial through video 
teleconference via simultaneous electronic transmission. Plaintiff will take responsibility for 
coordinating and establishing this video feed into the courtroom. Through this video feed, Dr. 
Armitage will be visible and able to communicate with the Court, counsel and jury during his 
testimony. 
Good cause exits for permitting Dr. Armitage to appear and testify in this manner. 
Plaintiffs counsel has just learned that Dr. Armitage has conflicting travel including a scheduled 
trip to Qatar during the time that Plaintiff will present Plaintiffs case in chief. As a result, Dr. 
Armitage is unable to travel to Boise and present testimony at the time Plaintiff requires him to do 
so. Dr. Armitage is a necessary and important witness to the presentation of Plaintiffs case. He is 
an infectious disease specialist who will testify to the cause of Krystal Ballard's death - an issue 
that is disputed by the parties. Plaintiff will be significantly prejudiced unless he is able to present 
the testimony of this medical expert. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks leave of court to present the testimony of Dr. Armitage during 
trial as described above. 
Dated this 301h day of August, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
2 - PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO OFFER TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL EXPERT 
BY VIDEO TELECONFERENCE AND REQUEST FOR LEA VE TO 
PERMIT SAME 
000616
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 - PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO OFFER TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL EXPERT 
BY VIDEO TELECONFERENCE AND REQUEST FOR LEA VE TO 
PERMIT SAME 
000617
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
by faxing the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O.Box519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Facsimile - 208-780-3930 
' 
Scott McKay 
4 - PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO OFFER TESTIMONY OF MEDICAL EXPERT 
BY VIDEO TELECONFERENCE AND REQUEST FOR LEA VE TO 
PERMIT SAME 
000618
_David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (]SB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Crai:iberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 




AUG 3 O 2G~3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
625782 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 




Plaintiff gives notice that a telephonic status conference will be held on Wednesday, 
September 4, 2013, at 3:00 p.m. MDT, in the above case. Plaintiff will initiate the call and have all 
parties on the line before calling the court at 208-287-7561. 
Dated this 301h day of August, 2013. 
625782 
Respectfully submitted, 





BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
000620
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 30, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
by faxing the same to the following: 
625782 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP · 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
't A.M.~ /{? FIL~~ ----
SEP O 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION OF 
DR.GREGORY LAURENCE 




To: Dr. Gregory Laurence 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition of Dr. Gregory Laurence, on Friday, September 6, 2013, at 3:00 p.m., 
central time, at Interactive Solutions, 3860 Forest Hill Irene Road, Suite 10, Memphis, TN 
38125, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you 
deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes; memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
2 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
642159 
000623
10. All file( s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have .reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, m,edical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this day of August, 2013. 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
642159 
000624
• I I ,. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on theJt=gust, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION OF DR. 
GREGORY LAURENCE by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
4 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
642159 
000625
Judge Bail 090413 Tara V1llereal Penny Tardiff Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
3:01 :04 PM I jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Telephonic Status Conf. 
-~:~~:~~··=~ ,~",::e Haddad- - -1~~1:e~::eof the· Plaintiff-- -- - -- ---- --- - -
3:03:30 PM iJeremiah Quane ion behalf of the Defendant 
}~~:;: ··=~ -:~~d::ddad ___ -!:::::~::.continuance.of. the JuryTrial_··-··--··-···--······-
3:13:47 PM iJudge tvacates the Jury Trial. Re-sets Jury Trial (10 days)-
1 !November 5@ 9:30 am. 
-Sir--
9/4/2013 1 of 1 
000626
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 ,... 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
P.M----
SEP O 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clar,k 
By DAYSHAOS~ '.' ·\ 
DEPtffi 
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
000627
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Answers to Defendants' 
First Set of Interrogatories, together with a copy of this Notice of Service of Discovery, has 
been served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of service below. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
000628
. CW'1CATE OF SERVICE 1 
I hereby certify that on thef day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Service of Discovery by delivering the same to each of the following via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: ,, 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
P. Gregory Haddad 
000629
FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-04792 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING 
AND ORDER GOVERNING 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
This case is set for Jury Trial to commence on the Tuesday, November 5, 2013 at 09:30 AM and 
, 
continue for ten (10) days. No trial proceedings will be held 011 Mondays, because it is the Court's 
criminal calendar day. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED: 
1. All pretrial motions, with the exception of Motions in Limine, shall be heard and 
completed at least twenty-eight (28) days before the trial date. A Judge's copy of all motions and 
memoranda in support thereof should be filed directly with chambers. *Motions in Limine must be 
flied not later than two (2) weeks prior to trial. No Motions filed after that time will be considered. 
Motions in Limine shall be heard on the morning of trial, unless otherwise scheduled by the Court. 
a. The last day to file written discovery (Interrogatories and request for production of 
documents) shall be no later than ninety (90) days prior to trial. '(I AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS/ JT 1/4 
000630
b. The plaintiff shall disclose all expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one 
hundred eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
c. The defendants shall disclose all expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one 
hundred twenty (120) days prior to trial. 
d. The last day for the taking of any discovery depositions shall be no later than sixty (60) 
days prior to trial. 
e. The last day to file amendments to join any additional parties shall be no later than one 
hundred eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
f. **MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHALL BE FILED NO LATER 
THAN NINETY (90) DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
**NO HEARING ON ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT WILL BE PERMITTED IN 
THE SEVENTY-FIVE {75} DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO TRIAL, REGARDLESS OF 
WHEN THE MOTION IS FILED. 
**IT IS ADVISABLE TO SCHEDULE YOUR MOTION FOR HEARING AS SOON 
AS FEASIBLE. 
** ALL WITNESSES ARE TO BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME AND ADDRESS. 
2. Not later than fourteen (14) days before the trial date, counsel for all parties to the action 
shall hold a conference for exchange of information and discussion of matters specified by I.R.C.P. 16(a) 
and 16(b). 
3. Not later than seven (7) days before trial: (a) each attorney shall certify to the Court in 
writing that such Exchange of Information Conference has taken place and furnish with such certification 
a list of the names of persons disclosed as possible witnesses pursuant to Rule 16(a)(4), and a descriptive 
list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence, reciting which exhibits counsel have agreed may be 
received in evidence without objection and those to which no objection will be made on grounds other 
than irrelevancy or immateriality; or (b) in lieu thereof, all counsel may join in submitting a written 
stipulation in conformance with Rule 16(b ). 
AMENDED NOTICE OFT.RIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS/ JT 2/4 
000631
4. Any objection to the date of this trial must be made by any party within fifteen (15) days 
from the date of this notice. 
5. All exhibit lists must be submitted to the Court five (5) days prior to trial. 
6. All requested jury instructions must be submitted to the Court, both hard copy and e-
mailed to lsimsdouglas@adaweb.net fourteen (14) days prior to trial. 
7. This Order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified for good cause 
shown to prevent manifest injustice. 
8. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of this order, which may include 
assignment of the trial date to another case. 
9. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an 
alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case if the assigned judge is unavailable. 
The following is a list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G. D. Carey 
Hon. Gregory M. Culet 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr. 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Justice Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Justice Linda Copple Trout 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Hon. W. H. Woodland 
All Sitting Fourth District Judges 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 
40(d)(I), each party shall have the right to file one (I) motion for disqualification without cause as to any 
alternate judge not later than ten (I 0) days after service of this notice. 
DATED Monday, September 9, 2013. 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on the ~day of September, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
DAVID Z. NEVIN 
SCOTTS. MCKAY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
POST OFFICE BOX 2772 
BOISE ID 83701-2772 
JEREMIAH A. QUANE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POST OFFICE BOX 519 
BOISE ID 83701-0519 
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000633
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
l=iLEo P.M ___ _ 
SEP f .6 2013 
CHR4STOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAi{ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE 
VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
OF DR.GREGORY LAURENCE 
AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
645827 
000634
To: I?r. Gregory Laurence 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition of Dr. Gregory Laurence, on Wednesday, October 2, 2013, at 11:00 
a.m., central time, at Interactive Solutions, 3860 F~rest Hill Irene Road, Suite 10, Memphis, TN 
38125, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you 
deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions (deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
2 
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10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information· (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
· 14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. ~ 
Dated this JJ day of September, 2013. 
Resr2:e Uy ubmitted, 
BA EYi LA , LP 
By: 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
645827 
000636
• ' . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I hereby certify that on the /J:_ day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
OF DR. GREGORY LAURENCE by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 'South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
G~ 
P. Gregory Haddad 
4 
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ORIGINA .... 
:~-----·F_I~-~-~?t 
Jeremiah A. Quane. ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
SEP 1 6 2013 
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attor~eys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEPUTY 
. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
vs. ' 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
DUCES TECUM OF RECORD 
CUSTODIAN FROM SAINT 
ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF 
MEDICAL IMAGING 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF and his counsel of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE. TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, will take testimony on 
oral examination of a record and imaging study custodian of the Saint Alphonsus 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF RECORD CUSTODIAN FROM 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING - 1 
000638
2013/09/16 16:12:23 5 /8 
Department of Medical Imaging before a court reporter and notary public with the firm of 
l 
M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., commencing on Wednesday, the 231d day of October, 
2013, at 11 :00 a.m., and continuing thereafter from day to day until such time as the 
taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the law offices of Quane Jones McColl, 
PLLC, 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Ste. 1601. Boise, Idaho 83702, at which time and place 
are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may deem proper. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Deponent is instructed to bring the following: 
1. The CT study performed at 10:09 on July 25, 2010 on Krystal Ballard 
(4/19/1983) and interpreted by Dr. Howard Schaff that represents the CT study. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF RECORD CUSTODIAN FROM 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING - 2 
000639
2013/09/1616:12:23 6 /8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 161h day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF RECORD CUSTODIAN FROM SAINT ALPHONSUS Dl;:PARTMENT OF· 
MEDICAL IMAGING by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
. NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James 8. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
. Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF RECORD CUSTODIAN FROM 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING - 3 
000640
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Saint Alphonsus 
l'MJW!ffllnl ti llllllic,.I~ 
1ta~K-~~I Jc"".IO &:IXll1•,all:15t.J,r 
Patient: BALLARD, KRYSTAL 
COB: 4/18/1983 EMP1: 04828667 
Site: SARMC PTIMOD: ER/CT 
Raf. Prov: MA TTtEW B. CAMPBELL MD &am: 43952414 
f.(ld. Provld1111: .EMERGENCY ZZPH'l'SICIAN 
EXAM DATE: 7/25/2010 I0:09 
Gem State ,/l 
Radio\,iy· 
VisitJAcct; 102060027411020600274 
MRN: 000807064 . 
Room/Bed: I . ER 
Con11ut: 
PROCEDURE: CTOF 1lj [ CHEST, ABDOMEN. AND C~LVIS WITHOUT CONTRAST 
COMPARISON: None. 
INDfCA TIONS: Recent liposuction with severe respiratory distress and hypotension. Patient has been resuscitated 
with 6 t of fluid. Acute renal failure. 
TECHNlQUE: CT scan of the chest, 11lx.lunwn, and pelvis was performed without the administration of intravenous 
contrast. 
filNOINGS: Assessment of bowel and solid purenchymal organs is limited without IV contrast. 
NECK BASE: Numlal. 
LUNGS: nilatcral diffuse airspace disease. nonspecific but most likely represents ARDS. 
MEDlASTINUM: Endotracheal tube terminates above the level of the cariria in satisfactory position. 
CARDIAC; Nonna!. 
PLEl:RA/CHEST WALL: Normat. 
LIVER: Pcriportal edema likely due to resuscitation. 
BlLlARY: . Nonna!. 
PANCREAS: Normal. · 
SPLEEN: Nonna I. 
KIDNEYS: Several bilateral punctate intrarenal calculi. No hydronephrosis. 
ADRENAUi: Nonna!. 
AORTAN ASCULAR: Nonna!. 
RETROPERITONEUM: Nonnol. 
130WELiM.ESENTER Y: Nonnal. Nasogastric tube tenninates in the st~1mach. 
ABDOMINAL WALL: Extensive stranding of the subcutaneous fat involving the abdominal wall and gluteal regions 
bilaterally. There is gas ide111ified within the upper anterior abdominal wall and upper left 
glut~I region. 111is could be related to recent liposuction. Secondary infection cannot be 
excluded. No focal fiuid collection is evident. 
PELVIC ORGANS: Foley catheter identified in a nomlistcnded urinary bladder. 
BONES: Small amount of free intraperitoneal fluid likely rela~ed 10 muscitation. 
CONCLUS(QN: Extensive stranding or tile subcutaneous rat Involving the abdom in1tl wllil 11nd gluleal regions 
consistent with the clinic11l history of rcceot liposuction. There is soft tissue ga11 identified 
within the upper abduminal "·all and left gluleal region. This could be related lo recent 
liposuction. Secondary Infection ls not excluded. No focal fluid collection is evident. 
t:xtensi"e bil11ter11I pulmonii ry air spscc disease most likely represenls ARDS. Bilati:ral small 
pleural erruslons are evident. 
Periportal edema ond small volume ascltes likely due to volume res11scih1llnn. 
CONFIDENTIAL PLTF000265 .,,_ .. 
000641
2013/09/1616:12:23 8 /8 
Continued Re.port - Pago 2 of2 
Patien RYSTAL 
DOB: EMPI: 04828667 
Sita: SARMC PT/MOD: ER/CT 
Rtf. Prov: MATIHEW 6. CAMPBELL MD Elam; 43952414 
Aid. Providers: EMERGENCY ZZPHYSICIAN 
EXAl\1 DATE.: 7/15/1010 10:09 
BIiaterai nephrolithiosis. 
Diclllil!d by: Howard Schafl'. M.lJ. on 7l2~i201 D at I 0:43 
Approved by: Howard Scllaft: M.ll. on 7"25/20)(1 di 10:43 
CONFIDENTIAL PLTF000266 
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ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
::-._-_-_-_-_-_-_F:=IL-~~-.f.:l,*-"'1".'""'?--....--~~ 
SEP 1 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE 
SUBPOENADUCESTECUM 
Defendants Brian C. Kerr, M.D. and Silk Touch Laser, LLP hereby provide 
notice that they intend to serve the attached subpoena duces tecum directed to the Saint 
Alphonsus Department of Medical Imaging, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
'QTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 1 







2013/09/16 16:05:47 5 /10 
45(b)(2). 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA 
DUCES TECUM by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method-indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, lda~o 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Pfa;ntiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Pfa;ntiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594~9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 2 
000644
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
THE STATE OF IDAHO SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING 
1055 N. Curtis Road 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 1 
000645
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that, all and singular business and 
excuses being laid aside, a record and imaging study custodian of th~ Saint Alphonsus 
Department of Medical Imaging is to appear before a court reporter and notary public with 
the firm of M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., commencing on Wednesday, the 23rd day 
of October, 2013, at 11:00 a.m., at the law offices of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 101 S. 
Capitol Boulevard, Ste. 1601, Boise, Idaho 83702, to testify as a witness at the taking of a 
deposition in the above-entitled action. 
You are further commanded to bring with you, and produce at the time and 
place, the following imaging study: 
1. The CT study performed at 10:09 on July 25, 2010 on ~rystal Ballard 
(4/19/1983) and interpreted by Dr. Howard Schaff that represents the CT study. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time 
specified above, that you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party 
may recover from you the sum of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by 
your failure to attend.as a witness. 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 2 
000646
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DATED this 161h day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
B ""'""==---t-t--t-:f-tr'\Oh'"---='-----
j erem i u ne, Of the Firm 
Attorne s for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 161h day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SUBPOENADUCESTECUM-3 
' 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
(X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[XJ Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 





Pallant: BALLARD, KRYSTAL 
DOB: EMPt: 04828667 
Sia: PT/MOD: ER/CT 
Ref, Prov: MATIHEW 8. CAMPBELL MD E:i:am: 4395l414 
/dd. Providers: .EMERGENCY ZZPHYSICIAN 






Room/Bed: I ER 
Contrast: 
PRocEouRE: ,r2ED•t: cuEsiz AeooMrN, AND £ELv1s wuuouTcoNTRAsI 
COMPARISON: None. 
. INDICATIONS: Recent liposuction with severe respiratory distress and hypotension. Pacient has been resuscitated 
with 6 L of fluid. Acute renal failure. 
TECHNIQUE: CT scan of the chest, abdumcn, and pelvis was performed without the administration of intravenous 
contrast. 
FlNDINGS: Assessment of bowel w1d solid porenchymal organs is limited without IV contrast. 
NECK BASE: Normal. 
LUNGS: Bilateral diffuse airspace disease, nonspecific but most likely represents ARDS. 
MEDIASTlNUM: Endotracheal tube rerminales above the level of the carina in satisfactory position. 
CARDIAC: Nonna!. 
PLEL:RA/CHEST WALL: Nonna!. 








BOWELiMESI::N l'£R Y: Nonna!. Nasogasiric lube terminates in the swmach. 
ABDOMINAL WALL: Extensive stranding of the subcutaneous fat involving the abdominal wall and gluteal regions 
bilaterally. There is gas identified within the upper anterior abdominal wall and upper left 
gluteal region. This could be related to recent liposuction. Secondal)' infection cannot be. 
exduded. No focal fluid collection is evident. 
PELVIC ORGANS: Foley catheter identified in a nondistcndcd urinary bladder. 
BONES: Small oinount of tree intraperitoneal fluid likelr related co resuscita1ion. 
CONC:LllS[ON: Extensive stranding of lhe subcutaneous fat Involving the abdominai w111l 11nd gluteal regions 
conslstut with the clinical history of recent liposuction. There is soft tissue gas identified · 
within tbe apper abdominal v,all and lefl gluteal region. This could be related to recent 
liposuction. Secondary Infection Is Dot excluded. No r()(al nuid collection Is evident. 
Extensi"e bilaterial puhuon:iiry air space disease most likely represent~ ARDS. Bllatcral sruail 
pleural erlusloos are evident 
Periportal edema and small volume ascites likely due to volume resuscitaUon. 
CONFIDENTIAL PLTF000265 
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Continued Report • Page 2 of 2 
Patient: BALLARD, KRYST AL 
D08: 4119/1983 EMPI: 04828667 
Sita: SARMC PT/MOD: ER/CT 
Ref. Prov: MATIHEW B. CAMPBELL MD Eum: 43952414 
"'1d. Providers: EMERGENCY ZZPH'l'SIClAN 
EXAM DATE: 7/2S/201010:09 
Bilaieral nephrolithiasis. 
Dicwtd by: Howard S.:hafl: M.D. on 7/25i2010 a110'43 







Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
:/q/ t j PILBD -~-,..i---lP.M ___ _ 
SEP 18 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH Clark 
By CHRISTINE sweer' 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MOTION FOR (AUTOMATIC) 
DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE JUDGE, PER THE 
COURT ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9, 
2013 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PLLC, and pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(1), respectfully 
moves this Court to grant an automatic disqualification of The Honorable Darla 
MOTION FOR (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE JUDGE, PER 
THE COURT ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 1 
000650
Williamson from presiding over the above-entitled matter as an alternative judge. 
DATED this n day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jer m1 A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Att rneys for Defendants 
MOTION FOR (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE JUDGE, PER 
THE COURT ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 2 
000651
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR (AUTOMATIC) 
DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE JUDGE, PER THE COURT ORDER OF 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
MOTION FOR (AUTOMATIC) DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE JUDGE, PER 
THE COURT ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 3 
000652
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
:~. qq 1 FIL~.~----
SEP 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV QC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 161h day of September, 2013, I served 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
000653
20, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the 
method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
000654
Sep 2013 03:36p Bailey & Glasser LLP 
3045949709 p.3 
ORIGINAL 
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN: McKAY & BARTLEIT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
SEP 2 0 2013 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranben-y Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 3 5244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH.i~ 
By KATHY SlMi. 
Doplllf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE F01;RTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/bia SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH ~ED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED 
AND VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF 
CHARLES GARRISON, M.D. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
648690 
000655
Sep 20 13 03:36p Bailey & Glasser LLP 
To: Charles Garrison, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
3("\45949709 p.4 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the videotaped and 
video conference de.position of Charles Garrison, M.D., on Monday, September 23, 2013, at 
4:00 p.m., MDT, at Kumm & Reichert, 1305 East Center Street, Pocatello, Idaho 83201, at 
which place and ti.me you are invited to appear and take pru.t in such deposition as you deem 
proper. · 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
J. An updated copy of your Cuniculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in vvhich you have given testimony by way of inte1Togatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your1 investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assjst you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions (deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). · 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at u"ial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in com1ection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
, 9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
2 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
648690 
000656
Sep 20 13 03:37p Bailey & Glass ' LP 
p.5 
10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred. to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; · 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; " 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviev,,red for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All con-espondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and 
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you ·will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 20th day of September, 2013. 
P. Gregory Haddad 
J runes B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMTK, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
648690 
000657
Sep 20 13 03:37p Bailey & Glasse• LLP 3"45949709 p.6 
. . . , 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF CHARLES GARRISON, M.D., by Facsimile, upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
4 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
648690 
000658
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NO., ___ "'iira~~--
A.M. z - .. ~,..,:;~ 
SEP 2 8 2018 
CHRISTOPHER r,, RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Charles Ballard 
vs. 
Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. et al. 
For: 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1601 
Boise, ID 83702 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff(s): 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Defendant(s): 
Case Number: CV OC 1204792 
:ss 
) 
Received by TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC on September 23, 2013 to be served on SAINT 
ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING. 
I, Spencer K. Kent, who being duly sworn, depose and say that on Monday, September 23, 2013, at 2:32 
PM, I: 
SERVED the within named Saint Alphonsus Department of Medical Imaging by delivering a true copy 
of the Subpoena Duces Tecum, Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum to Theresa Jones, Risk 
Management Specialist, a person authorized to accept service on behalf of Saint Alphonsus Department 
of Medical Imaging. Said service was effected at 999 N. Curtis Rd., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83706. 
I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over 
the age of Eighteen years and not a party to the action. 
Our Reference Number: 131782 
Client Reference: Jeremiah A. Quane 
'· 
Subscribed and sworn before me today 
Monday, September 23, 2013 
000659
" - " ( 
I ' ' 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
THE STATE OF IDAHO SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING 
1055 N. Curtis Road 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 1 
000660
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that, all and singular business and 
excuses being laid aside, a record and imaging study custodian of the Saint Alphonsus 
Department of Medical Imaging is to appear before a court reporter and notary public with 
the firm of M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., commencing on Wednesday, the 23rd day 
of October, 2013, at 11 :00 a.m., at the law offices of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 101 S. 
Capitol Boulevard, Ste. 1601, Boise, Idaho 83702, to testify as a witness at the taking of a 
deposition in the above-entitled action. 
You are further commanded to bring with you, and produce at the time and 
place, the following imaging study: 
1. The CT study performed at 10:09 on July 25, 2010 on Krystal Ballard 
(4/19/1983) and interpreted by Dr. Howard Schaff that represents the CT study. 
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time 
specified above, that you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party 
may recover from you the sum of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by 
your failure to attend as a witness. 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 2 
000661
I I " 4 
I 
I I • 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jeremi . u ne, Of the Firm 
Attorne s for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
U11~ 
VJeremiah A. Quane 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM - 3 
000662
.. 
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11tltl..Golao ........... lD lll1Clll-l:1!11,l,r 
Patient; BALLARD, KRYSTAL 
DOB: EMPI; 04S28667 
Sitt: SARMC PT/MOD: ER/CT 
Ref. Prov: MATTHEW 8. CAMPBELL MD Exam: 43952414 
ldd. Providers: .EMERGENCV ZZPHYSICIAN 





Room/Bed: I ER 
Contrast: 
PROCEDURE: CTOf JUI CHEST. ABDOMEN. AND PELVIS WITHOUT CONTRAST 
COMPARISON: None. 
JNDICA TIONS: Recent liposuction with severe respiratory distress and hypotension. Patient has been resuscitated 
with 6 L of fluid. Acute renal failure. 
TECHNIQUE: CT scan of the chest, abdomen, and pelvis was perfonned without the administration of intravenous 
contrast. 
FINDINGS: Assessment of bowel and solid pnrenchymal organs is limited without IV contrast. 
NECK BASE: Nonnal. 
LUNGS: Bilateral diffuse airspace disease, nonspecific but most likely represents ARDS. 
MED1AST1NUM: Endotracheal tube tenninutes above the level of the carina in satisfactory position. 
CARDIAC: Normal. 
PLEt:RA/CHEST WALL: Normal. 








BOWEL/M.ESENTER Y: Nonnal. Nasogasrric tube tenninates in the stomach. 
ABDOMINAL WALL: Ex.tensive stranding of the subcutaneous fat involving the abdominal wall and gluteal regions 
bilaterally. There is gas identified within the upper anterior nbdominal wall and upper left 
gluteal region. This could be related to recent liposuction. Secondary infection cannot be 
excluded. No focal fluid collection is evident. 
P~LVIC ORGANS: Foley catheter identified in a nondistcndcd urinary bladder. 
BONES: Small amount of free intraperitoneal fluid likely related to resuscitation. 
CONCLUSION: Extensive stranding or the subcutaneous fat Involving the abdominal wllll and gluteal regions 
consistent with the clinical history o1 recent liposuction. There is soft tissue gas identified 
within the upper abdominal "'·all and left gluteal region. This could be related to recent 
liposuction. Secondary Infection Is not excluded. No focal fluid collectlon Is evident. 
Extensi-.·e bilater-.al pulmona&ry air space disease most likely represents ARDS. Bilateral small 
pleural effusions are evident. 
Periportal edema and small volume ascltes likely due to volume resuscitation. 
CONFIDENTIAL PLTF000265 
000663
I • .. 
Continued Report - Page 2 of 2 
Patient: KRYST AL 
DOB: EMPI: 04828667 
Sita: SARMC PT/MOD: ER/CT 
Ref, Prov: MATIHEW B. CAMPBELL MD Exam: 43952414 
lcld. Providers: EMERGENCY ZZPHYSICIAN 
EXAM DATE: 7/l5/l0IO 10:09 
Bilateral nephrolithiasis. 
Dictfil~ by: Howard Schaft: M.D. on 7i25i2010 at 10:43 
Approved by: Howard Schaf!: M.D. on 7/2S/20IU at I0:43 
CONFIDENTIAL PLTF000266 
V111t/Acct: 102060027 4/102060027 4 
MRN: 000807064 






SE1_·} O 20,., 
Ada Countv Clerk 
David Nevin (ISB #2180) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO 
A.M·-:/;-:Q:-/~Q:;--irup1u;cro:-----
___,~./-,__--P.M ....... ______ __ 
SEP 3 U 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO 
TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF DR. GREGORY 
LAURENCE 
. '\ 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
647330 
000665
To: Dr. Gregory Laurence 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition of Dr. Gregory Laurence, on Wednesday, October 2, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., 
mountain time, at Regus, 950 West Bannock Street, #1100, Boise, Idaho 83702, at which place 
and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. An updated copy of your Curriculum Vitae. 
2. A list of all publications authored by you, in whole or in part. 
3. A list of all cases in which you have given testimony by way of interrogatories, 
deposition, sworn statement or trial, including style of case, civil action number, jurisdiction, 
counsel of record, and outcome of case. 
4. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, computer notes and correspondence 
prepared by you or on your behalf in connection with your involvement in this case, including 
your investigation and preparation of any opinions you have pertaining to this case. 
5. A copy of all notes, memoranda, e-mail, faxes, correspondence and computer 
documents received by you to assist you in connection with your investigation of this case and 
the formulation of your opinions ( deposition transcripts and exhibits need only be identified and 
not produced). 
6. Any exhibits which you plan to use at trial. 
7. Any documents or publication referred to or relied upon by you in preparation of your 
testimony and/or opinions. 
8. All calculations, documents, work papers, drawings, maps, sketches and diagrams 
prepared by you, on your behalf, or which you plan to utilize in connection with your 
investigation, testimony and/or opinions. 
9. A list of all authorities and publications upon which you rely, in whole or in part, in 
formulating your opinion or testimony. 
10. All file(s) and all documents you have kept, maintained, reviewed or referred to in 
arriving at your opinions (if you have discarded any materials whatsoever, you are required to 
bring a list of such items); 
2 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
647330 
000666
11. A list of all depositions you have read and/or reviewed which were taken in the 
instant case, along with the deposition transcripts themselves; 
12. Transcripts of all depositions and other materials you have reviewed which were 
not taken or included in the instant action; 
13. Copies of all medical records and other medical information (x-rays, slides, etc.) 
you have reviewed for your testimony in this case; 
14. Copies of your billing statement for time spent working on this case; 
15. All correspondence, including attachments, to and from the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this case; and ---
16. Copies of any and all criteria, standards, guidelines, policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, medical literature and/or articles you intend to rely upon or to which you will refer 
to support your opinions in this case. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 27th day of September, 2013. 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2?1h day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF DR. GREGORY LAURENCE by Facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza~ 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
4 




~j1 . SEP 3. o 2013 
~ Ada county Clerk 
~l ,J'.?oavid Nevin (!SB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
ID" Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Penine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:1w ~,~~----
sEP 3 O 2013 
CHRISTOPHER o: RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an I.daho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF SUSAN KERR 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
650653 
000669
To: Susan Kerr 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition duces tecum of Susan Kerr, on Wednesday, October 2, 2013, at 12:00 
p.m., mountain time, at Regus, 950 West Bannock Street, #1100, Boise, Idaho 83702, at which 
place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. A copy of all documents and data that comprise or relate to the "records of Silk touch, 
records and data she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of Krystal Ballard, 
photos of Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures" as referenced in 
Defendants' Supplemental Answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 20 dated September 16, 2013 
concerning Susie Kerr. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 2?1h day of September, 2013. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2?1h day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF SUSAN KERR by Facsimile upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
OCT O 4 2G13 
CHR4ST0PHER 0, filCH GI 
By STEPHA.Nie Vlf.:, , ' er/, 
OiPIJfy AfC 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDE.R KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 3rd day of October, 2013, I served 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
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. . . 
INTERROGATORIES, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel in the 
above-entitled matter by the method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FIU!O 
-P.M_,. __ _ 
OCT f- 0 2Dt.3 
CHRISTOPHER o. '1lCH. r.if' ., 
Sy CHRISTINE SWerri .. 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the ath day of October, 2013, I served 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1, 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 1 
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together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel in the above-entitled matter by the 
method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
000675
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
::-:---·---...__:?3._ ~i;;t}b: 
ocr , ·1 20,a 
CHFHSTOPHeR O RIO 
By STEPHANI& VI""~, 0/ork . 
D&ury 'wlptK ·~ -
~· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, , 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTON FOR 




NOW COMES Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by counsel, and moves the Court for entry of a 
protective order. The protective order at issue should be entered because Plaintiff and 
Defendants previously agreed to the language contained therein. 
On July 31, 2013, Plaintiffs counsel presented Defendants' counsel with a draft 
stipulated protective order for review. (Exhibit A, Email from B. McAllister to J. Quane and T. 
Jones.) On August 1, 2013, defense counsel approved the language of the proposed stipulated 
protective order. (Exhibit B, Email from T. Jones to B. McAllister.) The next day, defense 
counsel signed the agreement and returned the signed stipulation electronically. (Exhibit C, 
Email from T. Jones to B. McAllister, Aug. 2, 2013.) Plaintiffs counsel signed the stipulated 
protective order on August 6, 2013, and mailed it to the Clerk for filing the same day. (Exhibit 
D, Correspondence from P. Gregory Haddad to Clerk enclosing stipulated protective order 
(unrelated enclosure omitted).) 
On or around August 13, 2013, a member of the Clerk's office contacted Plaintiffs local 
counsel to explain that the parties' stipulation could not be filed without a proposed protective 
order to be entered by the Court. On September 4, 2013, Plaintiffs counsel provided defense 
counsel with a proposed protective order for review and approval; there is no substantive 
difference in content between the original stipulation and the proposed order. (Exhibit E, Email 
from B. McAllister to J. Quane and T. Jones with attachments.) 
Having received no response from defense counsel, Plaintiffs counsel followed-up with 
defense counsel on September 11, 2013. (Exhibit F, Email from B. McAllister to J. Quane and 
T. Jones.) On September 23, 2013, having still received no response, a paralegal for Plaintiffs 
counsel contacted defense counsel to seek defense counsel's approval of the proposed protective 
order. (Exhibit G, Email from F. Caruthers to J. Quane and T. Jones.) Defense counsel elected 
2 
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to ignore Plaintiffs counsel's communications once again. 
Plaintiff now ~eeks entry of the proposed protective order, attached hereto at Exhibit H. 
Plaintiff made every effort to obtain Defendants' approval of the proposed protective order. And 
because there is no substantive difference between the content of the original stipulation, which 
all parties endorsed, and the order currently being submitted for entry, Plaintiffs counsel 
respectfully requests that the proposed Protective Order attached hereto at Exhibit H be entered. 
r-
Dated this_!_/_ day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
~ P. Gregory Haddad 
/ James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _!l_ ~f October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Protective Order by delivering the same to the 
following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
l3. Gregory Hadd;id 












PM Message ID: 
Gentlemen: 
Brian J. McAllister 
Wednesday, July 31, 2013 9:04 AM 
~aq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' 
Philip G. Haddad; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Farrah Caruthers 
Ballard v. Kerr, et al. - Draft Stipulated Protective Order 
634879.pdf 
365602 
Attached please find a draft stipulated protective order. Please let us know whether the language contained therein is 
acceptable. ' 











Brian and Greg: 
Terry Jones <tsj@quanelaw.com> 
Thursday, August 01, 2013 3:33 PM 
Brian J. McAllister; Jeremiah A. Quane 
Philip G. Haddad; smckay@nbmlaw.com; Farrah Caruthers 
RE: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. - Draft Stipulated Protective Order 
We have reviewed the proposed document and find it acceptable. Please put date lines on the signature lines and we 
will sign it and return it to you. Please provide us with your proposed order you intend to submit along with the 
stipulation so we may approve it. 
Terry. 
From: Brian J. McAllister [mailto:bmcallister@baileyglasser.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2013 7:04 AM 
To: Jeremiah A. Quane; Terry Jones 
Cc: Philip G. Haddad; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Farrah caruthers 
Subject: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. - Draft Stipulated Protective Order 
Gentlemen: 




Brian J. McAllister :: Lawyer 
2855 Cranberry Square:: Morgantown WV 26508 
Office 304.594.0087 :: Fax 304.594.9709 
This message and any attached documents contain infonnation from the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended 
recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute. or use this information. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail then 
delete this message, 
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure -To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you than any US lax advice comained in 1h1s communicallon (including 
any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of(i) avoiding penalties under 1he internal Revenue Code. or (ii) promoting, marke11ng. 













Terry Jones <tsj@quanelaw.com> 
Friday, August 02, 2013 1:21 PM 
Brian J. McAllister; Jeremiah A. Quane 
smckay@nbmlaw.com; Philip G. Haddad; Farrah Caruthers 
RE: Balard v. Kerr • Stipulated Protective Order 
20130802110637 .pdf 
Assuming the document you sent me is the same as the prior version aside from the date lines, here is a signed 
copy. The confusion regarding the order is simply that we usually see a proposed order for the court to sign regarding 
the stipulation of the parties. If you are satisfied without a separate order then please sign and submit the document 
and then we are ready to receive the tax records. 
Terry. 
From: Brian J. McAllister [mallto:bmcallister@baileyglasser.com] 
Sent: Friday, August 02, 2013 10:52 AM 
To: Terry Jones; Jeremiah A. Quane 
Cc: 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Philip G. Haddad; Farrah caruthers 
Subject: Balard v. Kerr - Stipulated Protective Order 
Terry-
Per your request, attached please find the stipulated protective order with date lines included, which can be returned to 
us once you've had a chance to sign. 
With reference to your request for a draft proposed order, perhaps there is some confusion. It was our intention to 




Brian J. McAllister:: Lawyer 
2855 Cranberry Square:: Morgantown WV 26508 
Office 304.594.0087 : : Fax 304.594.9709 
This message and any attached documents contain information from the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended 
recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this information. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail then 






a BAILEY &GLASSERu.P 
Clerk of the District Court 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Dear Clerk: 
August 6, 2013 
Lawyers 
Internet www.baileyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-0087 Fox (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cranbcny Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Enclosed for filing in the above referenced matter, enclosed please find the following: 
I. Stipulated Protective Order; and 
2. Notice of Service of Discovery. 
Copies have been emailed to counsel of record. Thank you for your assistance in this 
matter. 
PGH/das 
Enclosures (as stated) 
Sincerely, 
Isl P. Gregory Haddad 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
cc: Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. (via U.S. Mail and email) 
Terrence Jones, Esq. (via U.S. Mail and email) 
Scott McKay, Esq. (via email) 
J.B. Perrine, Esq. (via email) 
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IN THE DJSTIUCT COURT FOR Tiffi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK. 
TOUCH LASER. LLP, an Idaho limited 
liabiJity partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
The parties to this action have detennined that certain infonnation to be filed with the 
Court or produced during discovery by the parties to this action is Confidential (as defined 
below), the unauthorized disclosure of which would be detrimental to the Jegitimate commercial 
or privacy interests of the parties. Accordingly, based upon the stipulation of the parties, upon 
consideration of the record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(c) of the Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure, the parties. by their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows: 
1. When used in this Order, the word "document" includes. but is not limited to 
documents produced by any party or nonparty in this action whether pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, subpoena, or by agreement; responses to requests for admissions, requests for 
000688
production, and/or interrogatories; deposition transcripts and exhibits; and any portions of any 
court papers which quote from or summarize any of the foregoing. 
2. All documents or testimony designated as confidential in accordance with this 
order shall be used solely for the prosecution and/or defense of this action and for no other 
purpose. 
3. Any party or nonparty producing documents which contain or disclose 
commercially sensitive infonnation, proprietary information, financial information, or personal 
health infotmation may designate such documents as confidential. The party or nonparty 
producing agreed.upon "CONFlDENTJAV' documents shall stamp such documents with the 
notice "CONFIDENTIAL." 
4. Any party' or nonparty giving testimony in thjs action may designate as 
"CONFIDENTIAL'' that portion of the testimony containing or disclosing commercially 
sensitive information, proprietary information, financial infonnation, or personal health 
information by advising the reporter of such confidentiality. The reporter shall separately 
transcribe those portions of the testimony so designated and shall mark the face of the transcript 
as "CONFIDENTIAL" as the designating person may direct. Each party or nonparty shall have 
twenty (20) days after receipt of the transcript of any deposition (as certified by the Court 
Reporter) within which to notify the other party in writing of the portions of the transcript that It 
wishes to designate as Confidential Information. Prior to the expiration of such twenty (20) day 
period, all information disclosed during a deposition shall be treated as though designated 
confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the parties and the witness, or ordered by the Court. 
5. Confidential documents or testimony may be referred to in pleadings, motions and 
briefs, and may be used in depositions and marked as deposition exhibits in this action. However, 
2 
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no such document or testimony shall be used for any of these purposes unless it, and that portion 
of the court paper in which the confidential infonnation is revealed, is appropriate]y marked 
confidential and filed under sea] with the Clerk of the Court. If a court pleading refers to a 
Confidential document but does not reveal the content of the Confidential document the pleading 
need not be filed under seal (although the Confidential document, if attached, shalJ be file under 
seal). 
6. Except as set forth above, or with the prior written consent of the party or 
nonparty asserting confidential treatment, no document or testimony designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" and no infonnation contained in it or obtained from it may be disclosed to 
any person other than: 
a. The Court, its staff, and court reporters; 
b. Counsel for the parties in this action and their staff; 
c. Independent experts retained by counsel for the parties to assist them in 
litigation; 
d. Potential witnesses; and 
e. The parties in this action. 
7. Any independent expert or potential witness to whom any document or testimony 
designated as confidential is disclosed must agree to be bound by the tenns of this Protective . 
Order and to be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for contempt and any other appropriate 
proceedings in the event of an alleged or actual violation of this Order. Each such person to 
whom confidential testimony or documents is disclosed must sign a document stating that he or 
she has read this Order and agrees to comply with its terms and to be subject to the jurisdiction 




8. This Order shall not prevent the disclosure of documents to the persons who were 
the authors or addressees of the documents or arc shown as having received copies of them. 
9. Documents produced by parties or nonparties (i.e., materia1s produced from 
personal or business tiles, not deposition transcripts, court papers and so on) which are 
designated confidential and all copies of them (other than exhibits of record) shall be destroyed 
or returned to the party producing such documents when the action is concluded. 
10. The restrictions and obligations relating to documents or testimony designated as 
confidential in accordance with this Stipulated Protective Order shall not apply to any document 
or infonnation: l) which all parties agree in writing were publicly known at the time it was 
produced; 2) which this Court rules was publicly known at the time it was produced to the 
receiving party; or 3) which this Court rules has since become publicly known through no fault 
of the receiving party. 
11. If a party or nonparty, through inadvertence, produces any confidential document 
without labeling or marking or otherwise designating it as such in accordance with the provisions 
of this Stipulated Protective Order, the designating party may give written notice within 30 days 
of discovery to the receiving p!)rty that the document is deemed confidential and should be 
treated as such in accordance with the provisions of this Stipulated Protective Order. The 
receiving party must treat such document as confidential from the date such notice is received. 
Disclosure, prior to the receipt of such notice, of a confidential document to persons not 
authorized to receive it shalt not be deemed a violation of this Stipulated Protective Order; 
provided, however, that the party making such disclosure shall notify the designating party in 
writing of all such unauthorized persons to whom such disclosure was .made and shall use best 
4 
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efforts to secure the return of all such confidential documents. The inadvertent disclosure of a 
confidential document by a producing part)' without designation at the time of disclosure shall 
not be trcatcd as a waiver of the confidentiality of the subject matter. 
12. Nothing contained in this Stipula~cd Protective Order shalJ be construed to require 
production of a confidential document or testimony that is privileged or otherwise protected from 
discovery. lfa party, through inadvertence, produces a document that it believes is immune from 
discovery· pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product privilege, such 
production shaJI not be deemed a waiver of any privilege, and the producing party may give 
written notice to the receiving party that the document or infonnation produced is deemed 
privileged and that return of 1he document or infor:mation is requested. Upon receipt of such 
writt~n notice, the receiving party shall immediately gather the original and all copies of the 
document or information of which the receiving party is aware and shall immediately return the 
original and all such copies to the producing party. The return of the document(s) and/or 
infoll!lation to the producing party shall not preclude the receiving party from later moving the 
Court to compel production of the returned documents and/or infonnation. 
13. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall prevent any party or nonparty to 
this action from seeking modification of this Order or from objecting that a document or 
testimony has been inappropriately classified as confidential. In addition, nothing in this Order 
shall prevent a party from objecting to discovery which it believes to be otherwise impro.per. All 
parties and non parties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve any dispute over the designation of 
doc~ments as confidential on an infonnal basis before presenting the matter to the Court for 
resolution. ln any motion brought to challenge or sustain a designation as confidential, the 




David Z. Nevin 
. BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 




Attorneys for DefeTidants 












Brian J. McAllister 
Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:57 PM 
1aq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' 
Philip G. !-iaddad; J.B. Perrine; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Farrah Caruthers; Brian J. 
McAllister 
Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Stipulation for Protective Order.pdf; Proposed Protective Order.pdf 
The Clerk's office requested that we present the Stipulation for Protective Order with a changed title and a proposed 
Protective Order. I believe the Clerk and the Court will be satisfied with the attached. 
As you will see, there is no substantive difference between the stipulated protective order we previously presented to 
the Clerk and the attached documents. Please review when you have a moment, and please sign both documents if they 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, a~d LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
STIPULATION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The parties to this action have determined that certain information to be filed with the 
Court or produced during discovery by the parties to this action is confidential (as defined 
below), the unauthorized disclosure of which would be detrimental to the legitimate commercial 
or privacy interests of the parties. Accordingly, based upon the stipulation of the parties, upon 
consideration of the record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rul~ 26(c) _of the Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure, the parties, by their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows: 
1. When used in this Order, the word "document" includes, but is not limited to 
' 
documents produced by any party or nonparty in this action whether pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, subpoena, or by agreement; responses to requests for admissions, requests for 
production, and/or interrogatories; deposition trans·cripts and exhibits; and any portions of any 
court papers which quote from or sum~arize any of the foregoing. 
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2. All documents or testimony designated as confidential in accordance with this 
order shall be used solely for the prosecution and/or defense of this action and for no other 
purpose. 
3. Any party or nonparty producing documents which contain or disclose 
commercially sensitive information, proprietary information, financial information, or personal 
health information may designate such documents as confidential. The party or nonparty 
producing agreed-upon "CONFIDENTIAL" documents shall stamp such documents with the 
notice "CONFIDENTIAL." 
4. Any party or nonparty giving testimony in this action may designate as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" that portion of the testimony containing or disclosing commercially 
sensitive information, proprietary information, financial information, or personal health 
information by advising the reporter of such confidentiality. The reporter shall separately 
transcribe those portions of the testimony so designated and shall mark the face of the transcript 
as "CONFIDENTIAL" as the designating person may direct. Each party or nonparty shall have 
twenty .(20) days after receipt of the transcript of any deposition (as certified by the Court 
Reporter) within which to notify the other party in writing of the portions of the transcript that it 
wishes to designate as Confidential Information. Prior to the expiration of such twenty (20) day 
period, all information disclosed during a deposition shall be treated as though designated 
confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the parties and the witness, or ordered by the Court. 
5. Confidential documents or testimony may be referred to in pleadings, motions and 
briefs, and may be used in depositions and marked as deposition exhibits in this action. However, 
no such document or testimony sha11 be used for any of these purposes unless it, and that portion 
of the court paper in which the confidential information is revealed, is appropriately marked 
2 
000697
confidential and filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court. If a court pleading refers to a 
Confidential document but does not reveal the content of the Confidential document the pleading 
need not be filed under seal (although the Confidential document, if attached, shall be file under 
seal). 
6. Except as set forth above, or with the prior written consent of the party or 
nonparty asserting confidential treatment, no document or testimony designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" and no information contained in it or obtained from it may be disclosed to 
any person other than: 
a. The Court, its staff, and court reporters; 
b. Counsel for the parties in this action and their staff; 
c. Independent experts retained by counsel for the parties to assist them in 
litigation; 
d. Potential witnesses; and 
e. The parties in this action. 
7. Any independent expert or potential witness to whom any document or testimony 
designated as confidential is disclosed must agree to be bound by the terms of this Protective 
Order and to be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for contempt and any other appropriate 
proceedings in the event of an alleged or actual violation of this Order. Each such person to 
whom confidential testimony or documents is disclosed must sign a document stating that he or 
she has read this Order and agrees to comply with its terms and to be subject to the jurisdiction 




8. This Order shall not prevent the discl~sure of documents to the persons who were 
the authors or addressees of the documents or are shown as having received copies of them. 
9. Documents produced by parties or nonparties (i.e., materials produced from 
personal or business files, not deposition transcripts, court papers and so on) which are 
designated confidential and all copies of them (other than exhibits of record) shall be destroyed 
or returned to the party producing such documents when the action is concluded. 
I 0. The restrictions and obligations relating to documents or testimony designated as 
confidential in accordance with this Stipulated Protective Order shall not apply to any document 
or information: I) which all parties agree in writing were publicly known at the time it was 
produced; 2) which this Court rules was publicly known at the time it was produced to the 
receiving party; or 3) which this Court rules has since become publicly known through no fault 
of the receiving party. 
11. If a party or nonparty, through inadvertence, produces any confidential document 
without labeling or marking or otherwise designating it as such in accordance with the provisions 
of this Stipulated Protective Order, the designating party may give written notice within 30 days 
of discovery to the receiving party that the document is deemed confidential and should be 
treated as such in accordance with the provisions of this Stipulated Protective Order. The 
receiving party must treat such document as confidential from the date such notice is received. 
Disclosure, prior to ·the receipt of such notice, of a confidential document to persons not 
authorized to receive it shall not be deemed a violation of this Stipulated Protective Order; 
provided, however, that the party making such disclosure shaJI notify the designating party in 
writing of all such unauthorized persons to whom such disclosure was made and shall use best 




confidential document by a producing party without designation at the time of disclosure shall 
not be treated as a waiver of the confidentiality of the subject matter. 
12. Nothing contained in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed to require 
production of a confidential document or testimony that is privileged or otherwise protected from 
discovery. If a party, through inadvertence, produces a document that it.believes is immune from 
discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product privilege, such 
production shall not be deemed a waiver of any privilege, and the producing party may give 
written notice to the receiving party that the document or information produced is deemed 
privileged and that return of the document or information is requested. Upon receipt of such 
written notice, the receiving party shall immediately gather the original and all copies of the 
document or information of which the receiving party is aware and shall immediately return the 
original and all such copies to the producing party. The return of the document(s) and/or 
information to the producing party shall not prec]ude the receiving party from later moving the 
Court to compel production of the returned documents and/or information. 
13. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall prevent any party or nonparty to 
this action from seeking modification of this Order or from objecting that a document or 
testimony has been inappropriately classified as confidential. In addition, nothing in this Order 
shall prevent a party from objecting to discovery which it believes to be otherwise improper. All 
parties and nonparties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve any dispute over the designation of 
documents as confidential on an informal basis before presenting the matter to the Court for 
resolution. In any motion brought to challenge or sustain a designation as confidential, the 








David Z. Nevin 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By: ___________ _ 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The parties to this action have determined that certain information to be filed with the 
Court or produced during discovery by the parties to this action is confidential (as defined 
below), the unauthorized disclosure of which would be detrimental to the legitimate commercial 
or privacy interests of the parties. Accordingly, based upon the stipulation of the parties by their 
respective counsel, upon consideration of the record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26( c) 
of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
I. When used in this Order, the word "document" includes, but is not limited to 
documents produced by any party or nonparty in this action whether pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, subpoena, or by agreement; responses to requests for admissions, requests for 
000702
production, and/or interrogatories; deposition transcripts and exhibits; and any portions of any 
court papers which quote from or summarize any of the foregoing. 
2. All documents or testimony designated as confidential in accordance with this 
order shall be used solely for the prosecution and/or defense of this action and for no other 
purpose. 
3. Any party or nonparty producing documents which contain or disclose 
commercially sensitive information, proprietary information, financial information, or personal 
health information may designate such documents as confidential. The party or nonparty 
producing agreed-upon "CONFIDENTIAL" documents shall stamp such documents with the 
notice "CONFIDENTIAL.'' 
4. Any party or nonparty giving testimony in this action may designate as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" that portion of the testimony containing or disclosing commercially 
sensitive infonnation, proprietary information, financial information, or personal health 
information by advising the reporter of such confidentiality. The reporter shall separately 
transcribe those portions of the testimony so designated and shall mark the face of the transcript 
as "CONFIDENTIAL" as the designating person may direct. Each party or nonparty shall have 
twenty (20) days after receipt of the transcript of any deposition (as certified by the Court 
Reporter) within which to notify the other party in writing of the portions of the transcript that it 
wishes to designate as Confidential Information. Prior to the expiration of such twenty (20) day 
period, all information disclosed during a deposition shall be treated as though designated 
confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the parties and the witness, or ordered by the Court. 
5. Confidential documents or testimony may be referred to in pleadings, motions and 
briefs, and may be used in depositions and marked as deposition exhibits in this action. However, 
2 
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no such document or testimony shall be used for any of these purposes unless it, and that portion 
of the court paper in which the confidential information is revealed, is appropriately marked 
confidential and filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court. If a court pleading refers to a 
Confidential document but does not reveal the content of the Confidential document the pleading 
need not be filed under seal (although the Confidential document, if attached, shall be file under 
seal). 
6. Except as set forth above, or with the prior written consent of the party or 
nonparty asserting confidential treatment, no document or testimony designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" and no information contained in it or obtained from it may be disclosed to 
any person other than: 
a. The Court, its staff, and court reporters; 
b. Counsel for the parties in this action and their staff; 
c. Independent experts retained by counsel for the parties to assist them in 
litigation; 
d. Potential witnesses; and 
e. The parties in this action. 
7. · Any independent expert or potential witness to whom any document or testimony 
designated as confidential is disclosed must agree to be bound by the terms of this Protective 
Order and to be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for contempt and any other appropriate 
proceedings in the event of an alleged or actual violation of this Order. Each such person to 
whom confidential testimony or documents is disclosed must sign a document stating that he or 
she has· read this Order and agrees to comply with its terms and to be subject to the jurisdiction 




8. This Order shall not prevent the disclosure of documents to the persons who were 
the authors or addressees of the documents or are shown as having received copies of them. 
9. Documents produced by parties or nonparties (i.e., materials produced from 
personal or business files, not deposition transcripts, court papers and so on) which are 
designated confidential and all copies of them ( other than exhibits of record) shall be destroyed 
or returned to the party producing such documents when the action is concluded. 
10. The restrictions and obligations relating to documents or testimony designated as 
confidential in accordance with this Stipulated Protective Order shall not apply to any document 
or information: 1) which all parties agree in writing were publicly known at the time it was 
produced; 2) which this Court rules was publicly known at the time it was produced to the 
receiving party; or 3) which this Court rules has since become publicly known through no fault 
of the receiving party. 
11. If a party or nonparty, through inadvertence, produces any confidential document 
without labeling or marking or otherwise designating it as such in accordance with the provisions 
of this Stipulated Protective Order, the designating party may give written notice within 30 days 
of discovery to the receiving party that the document is deemed confidential and should be 
treated as such in accordance with the provisions of this Stipulated Protective Order. The 
receiving party must treat such document as confidential from the date such notice is received. 
Disclosure, prior to the receipt of such notice, of a confidential document to persons not 
authorized to receive it shall not be deemed a violation of this Stipulated Protective Order; 
provided, however, that the party making such disclosure shall notify the designating party in 
writing· of all such unauthorized persons to whom such disclosure was made and shall use best 
4 
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efforts to secure the return of all such confidential documents. The inadvertent disclosure of a 
confidential document by a producing party without designation at the time of disclosure shall 
not be treated as a waiver of the confidentiality of the subject matter. 
12. Nothing contained in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed to require 
production of a confidential document or testimony that is privileged or otherwise protected from 
discovery. If a party, through inadvertence, produces a document that it believes is immune from 
discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product privilege, such 
production shall not be deemed a waiver of any privilege, and the producing party may give 
written notice to the receiving party that the document or information produced is deemed 
privileged and that return of the document or information is requested. Upon receipt of such 
written notice, the receiving party shall immediately gather the original and all copies of the 
document or information of which the receiving party is aware and shall immediately return the 
original and all such copies to the producing party. The return of the document(s) and/or 
information to the producing party shall not preclude the receiving party from later moving the 
Court to compel production of the returned documents and/or information. 
13. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall prevent any party or nonparty to 
this action from seeking modification of this Order or from objecting that a document or 
testimony has been inappropriately classifi~d as confidential. In addition, nothing in this Order 
shall prevent a party from objecting to discovery which it believes to be otherwise improper. All 
parties and nonparties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve any dispute over the designation of 
documents as confidential on an informal basis before presenting the matter to the Court for 
resolution. In any motion brought to challenge or sustain a designation as confidential, the 
burden of establishing confidentiality shall be on the designating party. 
5 
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SO ORDERED this __ day of September, 2013. 
Approved By: 





David Z. Nevin 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6 
Deborah A. Bail, Judge 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By: ------------Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 












Brian J. McAllister 
Wednesday, September 11, 2013 4:31 PM 
~aq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' 
Philip G. Haddad; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; 'Debi Presher (dpresher@nbmlaw.com)'; 
Farrah Caruthers; Brian J. McAllister 
FW: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Stipulation for Protective Order.pdf; Proposed Protective Order.pdf 
When you have a moment, would you please review the attached documents, sign them, and return them to me for 
filing, or alternatively, let me know what revisions you feel are required? 
Many thanks. 
Brian 
From: Brian J. McAllister 
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:57 PM 
To: 'jaq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' 
Cc: Philip G. Haddad; J.B. Perrine; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Farrah caruthers; Brian J. McAllister 
Subject: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stlpulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Gentlemen-
The Clerk's office requested that we present the Stipulation for Protective Order with a changed title and a proposed 
Protective Order. I believe the Clerk and the Court will be satisfied with the attached. 
As you will see, there is no substantive difference between the stipulated protective order we previously presented to 
the Clerk and the attached documents. Please review when you have a moment, and please sign both documents if they 
are acceptable. We will file shortly thereafter. 
Thank you. 
·-------------
Brian J. McAllister :: Lawyer 
2855 Cranberry Square :: Morgantown WV 26508 
Office 304.594.0087 :: Fax 304.594.9709 
This message and any attached documents contain infonnation from the law finn of Bailey & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended 
recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this information. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail then 
delete this message. 
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure -To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you than any U.S. taX advice contained in this communication (includi~g 
any attachments) is not int~nded or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i} avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) promoting, markctmg, 









Monday, October 07, 2013 10:41 PM 
Brian J. McAllister 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
FW: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Stipulation for Protective Order.pdf; Proposed Protective Order.pdf 
Importance: High 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal :: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
From: Farrah Caruthers 
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 11:42 AM 
To: jaq@guanelaw.com; 'Terry Jones' (tsj@guanelaw.com) 
Cc: Philip G. Haddad; Scott McKay (smckay@nbmlaw.com) (smckay@nbmlaw.com); Brian J. McAllister; 
dpresher@nbmlaw.com; Farrah Caruthers 
Subject: FW: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Importance: High· 
Mr. Quane and Mr. Jones: 
Have you had a chance to review the attached documents? Please advise. 
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. 
Farrah Carnthers 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal :: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
From: Brian J. McAllister 
. Sent: Wednesday, September 11, 2013 4:31 PM 
-------··· ··---··----· 
To; 'jaq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' . 





Subject: FW: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Gentlemen-
When you have a moment, would you please review the attached documents, sign them, and return them to me for 
filing, or alternatively, let me know what revisions you feel are required? 
Many thanks.· 
Brian 
Brian J. McAllister:: Lawyer:: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.594.0087 
From: Brian J. McAllister 
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2013 1:57 PM 
To: 'jaq@quanelaw.com'; 'tsj@quanelaw.com' 
Cc: Philip G. Haddad; J.B. Perrine; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com'; Farrah Caruthers; Brian J. McAllister 
Subject: Ballard v. Kerr - Revised Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order 
Gentlemen-
The Clerk's office requested that we present the Stipulation for Protective Order with a changed title and a proposed 
Protective Order. I believe the Clerk and the Court will be satisfied with the attached. 
As you will see, there is no substantive difference between the stipulated protective order we previously presented to 
the Clerk and the attached documents. Please review when you have a moment, and please sign both documents if they 
are acceptable. We will file shortly thereafter. 
Thank you. 
Brian J. McAllister:: Lawyer 
2855 Cranberry Square :: Morgantown WV 26508 
Office 304.594.0087 :: Fax 304.594.9709 
This message and any anached documents contain information from the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended 
recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this information. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail then 
delete this message. 
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure· To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you than any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including 
any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of(i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) promoting, marketing, 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The parties to this action have det~nnined that certain information to be filed with the 
Court or produced during discovery by the parties to this action is confidential (as defined 
below), the unauthorized disclosure of which would be detrimental to the legitimate commercial 
or privacy interests of the parties. Accordingly, based upon the stipulation of the parties by their 
respective coW1sel, upon consideration of the record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26( c) 
of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1.. When used in this Order, the word "document" includes, but is not limited to 
documents produced by any party or nonparty in this action whether pursuant to the Idaho Rules 





production, and/or interrogatories; deposition transcripts and exhibits; and any portions of any 
court papers which quote from or summarize any of the foregoing. 
2. All documents ·or testimony designated as confidential in accordance with this 
order shall be used solely for the prosecution and/or defense of this action and for no other 
purpose. 
3. Any party or nonparty producing documents which contain or disclose 
commercially sensitive information, proprietary information, financial information, or personal 
health information may designate such documents as confidential. The party or nonparty 
producing agreed-upon "CONFIDENTIAL" documents shall stamp such documents with the 
notice "CONFIDENTIAL." 
4. Any party or nonparty giving testimony in this action may designate as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" that portion of the testimony containing or disclosing commercially 
sensitive information, proprietary information, financial information, or personal health 
information by advising the reporter of such confidentiality. The reporter shall separately 
transcribe those portions of the testimony so designated and shall mark the face of the transcript 
as "CONFIDENTIAL" as the designating person may direct. Each party or nonparty shall have 
twenty (20) days after receipt of the transcript of any deposition (as certified by the Court 
Reporter) within which to notify the other party in writing of the portions of the transcript that it 
wishes to designate as Confidential Information. Prior to the expiration of such twenty (20) day 
period, all information disclosed during a deposition shall be treated as though designated 
confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the parties and the witness, or ordered by the Court. 
5. Confidential documents or testimony may be referred to in pleadings, motions and 
briefs, and may be used in depositions and marked as deposition exhibits in this action. However, 
2 
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no such d~cument or testimony shall be used for any of these purposes unless it, and that portion 
of the court paper in which the confidential information is revealed, is appropriately marked 
confidential and filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court. If a court pleading refers to a 
Confidential document but does not reveal the content of the Confidential document the pleading 
need not be filed under seal (aithough the Confidential document, if attached, shall be file under 
seal). 
6. Except as set forth above, or with the prior written consent of the party or 
nonparty · asserting confidential treatment, no document or testimony designated as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" and no information contained in it or obtained from it may be disclosed to 
any person other than: 
a. The Court, its staff, and court reporters; 
b. Counsel for the parties in this action and their staff; 
c. Independent experts retained by counsel for the parties to assist them in 
litigation; 
d. Potential witnesses; and 
e. The parties in this action. 
7. Any independent expert or potential witness to whom any document or testimony 
designated as confidential is disclosed must agree to be bound by the terms of this Protective 
Order and to be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for contempt and any other appropriate 
proceedings in the event of an alleged or actual violation of this Order. Each such person to 
whom confidential testimony or documents is disclosed must sign a document stating that he or 
she has read this Order and agrees to comply with its terms and to be subject to the jurisdiction 





8. This Order shall not prevent the disclosure of documents to the persons who were 
the authors or addressees of the documents or are shown as having received copies of them. 
9. Documents produced by parties or nonparties (i.e., materials produced from 
personal or business files, not deposition transcripts, court papers and so on) which are 
designated confidential and all copies of them (other than exhibits of record) shall be destroyed 
or returned to the party producing such documents when the action is concluded. 
10. The restrictions and obligations relating to documents or testimony designated as 
confidential in accordance with this Stipulated Protective Order shall not apply to any document 
or infonnation: 1) which all parties agree in writing were publicly known at the time it was 
produced; 2) which this Court rules was publicly known at the time it was produced to the 
receiving party; or 3) which this Court rules has since become publicly known through no fault 
of the receiving party. 
11. If a party or nonparty, through inadvertence, produces any confidential document 
without labeling or marking or otherwise designating it as such in accordance with the provisions 
of this Stipulated Protective Order, the designating party may give written notice within 30 days 
of discovery to the receiving party that the document is deemed confidential and should be 
treated as such in accordance with the provisions of this Stipulated Protective Order. The 
receiving· party must treat such document as confidential from the date such notice is received. 
Disclosure, prior to the receipt of such notice, of a confidential document to persons not 
authorized to receive it shall not be deemed a violation of this Stipulated Protective Order; 
provided, however, that the party making such disclosure shall notify the designating party in 




efforts to secure the return of all such confidential documents. The inadvertent disclosure of a 
confidential document by a producing party without designation at the time of disclosure shall 
not be treated as a waiver of the confidentiality of the subject matter. 
12. Nothing contained in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed to require 
production of a confidential document or testimony that is privileged or otherwise protected from 
discovery. If a party, through inadvertence, produces a document that it believes is immune from 
discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product privilege, such 
production shall not be deemed a waiver of any privilege, and the producing party may give 
written notice to the receiving party that the document or information produced is deemed 
privileged and that return of the document or information is requested. Upon receipt of such 
written notice, the receiving party shall immediately gather the original and all copies of the 
document or information of which the receiving party is aware and shall immediately return the 
original and all such copies to the producing party. The return of the document(s) and/or 
information to the producing party shall not preclude the receiving party from later moving the 
Court to compel production of the returned docum.ents and/or information. 
13. Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall prevent any party or nonparty to 
this action from seeking modification of this Order or from objecting that a document or 
testimony has been inappropriately classified as confidential. In addition, nothing in this Order 
shall prevent a party from objecting to discovery which it believes to be otherwise improper. All 
parties and nonparties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve any dispute over the designation of 
documents as confidential on an informal basis before presenting the matter to the Court for 
resolution. In any motion brought to challenge or sustain a designation as confidential, the 
burden of establishing confidentiality shall be on the designating party. 
5 
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SO ORDERED this __ day of ________ ,, 2013. 
Prepared By: 




David Z. Nevin 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Deborah A. Bail, Judge 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~~.j~~.:::~J~.----,,,= 
OCl 1 5 2013 
CHAIST0~H~R O. RICH1 Cl·~r~ 
;y til.Y!sHIA HOLM~S 
bliPUft 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF RECONVENED 
VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO 
CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF 
CHARLES GARRISON, M.D. 
NOTICE OF RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
653278 
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To: Charles Garrison, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, reconvene the 
videotaped and video conference deposition of Charles Garrison, M.D., on Tuesday, October 
15, 2013, at 3:00 p.m., MST, at Kumm & Reichert, 1305 East Center Street, Pocatello, Idaho 
83201, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you 
deem proper. 
Plaintiff does not waive any objections to the untimely disclosed opm10ns of Dr. 
Garrison, which were first brought to Plaintiffs attention at the original deposition of Dr. 
Garrison. Plaintiff reserves the right to move to exclude opinions of Dr. Garrison, which 
Defendants failed to timely supplement. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. Any and all documents, articles, publications, slides, and/or photos of slides reviewed, 
referred to, or relied upon by you in forming your opinion related to fat embolism, or which 
support your opinion related to fat embolism. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 9th day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAIL GLASSER, LLP 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
NOTICE OF RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify· that on the 9th day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF CHARLES GARRISON, M.D., by Facsimile, upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
3 
NOTICE OF RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION 
653278 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
'NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite. 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~~~~iJ~ ___ . ·~~ 
oer , 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl3r1, 
By l::LYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 
RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED 
AND VIDEO CONFERENCE 
DEPOSITION OF 
CHARLES GARRISON, M.D. 




To: Charles Garrison, M.D. 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, reconvene the 
videotaped and video conference deposition of Charles Garrison, M.D., on Wednesday, 
October 16, 2013, at 5:00 p.m., MST, at Kumm & Reichert, 1305 East Center Street, Pocatello, 
Idaho 83201, at which place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition 
as you deem proper. 
Plaintiff does not waive any objections to -the untimely disclosed opinions of Dr. 
Garrison, which were first brought to Plaintiffs attention at the original deposition of Dr. 
Garrison. Plaintiff reserves the right to move to exclude opinions of Dr. Garrison, which 
Defendants failed to timely supplement. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. Any and all documents, articles, publications, slides, and/or photos of slides reviewed, 
referred to, or relied upon by you in forming your opinion related to fat embolism, or which 
support your opinion related to fat embolism. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 11th day of October, 2013. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF RECONVENED VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION OF CHARLES GARRISON, M.D., by Facsimile, upon the 
following: 
\ . 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
3 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 




DCT 1 7 2013 
CHA/STOPHER D 
By DAYSHA os:RCH, Clerk 
DEPUTY N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
625782 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
000726
Plaintiff gives notice that his Motion for Protective Order will be heard at 9:30 a.m. on 
Tuesday, November 5, 2013. 
Dated this 17th day of October, 2013. 
625782 
Respectfully submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 17, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
by faxing the same to the following: 
625782 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 






David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), · smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B. Perrine, jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (208) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. fill.ED t.f 6 : 
A.M.----P,,M .. -~---
QCT 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
1 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
I 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 




Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental Answers to Defendants' First 
Set of Interrogatories, together with a copy of this Notice of Service of Discovery, has been 
served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of service below. 
DATED this 181h day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~~~~~~~-==----~~-_-----._, ~ 
David Z. Nevin c_,J 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 18, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice 
of Service of Discovery was served upon the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE JONES McCOLL PLLC 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1576 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO,---'Ffl-ED__,U...,._~._..,.tJ"!t"-
AM,-~~~M ..... : .t..,__ __ _ 
OCT 2 1 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PLLC, and move this Court, pursuant to Rules 103, 104, 401, 402, 403, 
701 and 803 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and Rules 16 and 47(i) of the Idaho Rules of 
. /Civil Procedure for Orders in Limine as to the following issues: 
V DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1 
000732
1) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, that Defendant Dr. Kerr or 
any of the defense witnesses, including Dr. Kelly O'Neil, have ever had any complaints 
filed against them or proceedings or orders of any kind before any state licensing entity in 
any jurisdiction that they have ever been licensed in. 
2) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that Dr. Kerr or any 
of the defense witnesses, including Kelly O'Neil have ever been previously sued for 
malpractice or settled a malpractice claim in any jurisdiction. 
3) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, that Dr. Laurence has been 
the subject of any criminal indictments or grand jury proceedings in any jurisdiction. 
4) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that any of the 
Defendants have liability insurance, the availability of insurance or the issue of insurance 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2 
000733
• 
in any way at all. 
5) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that any of the 
Defendants or any of the defense witnesses have ever been previously represented by 
Jeremiah Quane or any of the attorneys with the firm Quane Jones McColl, PLLC. 
6) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the effect of this or any 
medical malpractice case on the cost of health care or the implementation of the 
affordable care act also known as "Obamacare." 
This Motion in Limine is based upon the Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motions in Limine filed contemporaneously herewith, in addition to the court 
record, files, and pleadings otherwise on file in this action. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2013. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3 
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W I ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 51 day of October, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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<....,,,,) 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
OCT 2 1 2.0\3 
R\"'H C\etk C\iR\STOPHER D. V • 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Terrence S. Jones, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1 
000736
says: 
1. I am a member of the law firm Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, attorneys 
of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, and the following statement are 
made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Hathcock 
v. Wood, 815 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 2001), which is offered in support of Defendants' Motions 
in Limine. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of 
Heshelman v. Lombardi, 183 Mich.App. 72,454 N.W.2d 603 (1990), which is offered in 
support of Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of King v. 
Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), which is offered in support of Defendants' 
Motions in Limine. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Manhardt 
v. Tamton, 832 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), which is offered in support of 
Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of Morrow v. 
Stivers, 836 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), which is offered in support of Defendants' 
Motions in Limine. 
7. Attached_ hereto as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of Noble v. 
Lansche, 735 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), which is offered in support of Defendants' 
Motions in Limine. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Stickney 
v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 244 Kan. 147, 768 P.2d 253 (1989), which is offered in support of 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2 
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Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
' . . ~ 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of October, 2013. 
(SEAL) 
CORINA FERRIS 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
. Commission expires 03/01/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 51 day of October, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile 05) 733-4896 




815 So.2d 502 
(Cite as: 815 So.2d 502) 
Supreme Court of Alabama. 
Ben Cleburn HA TH COCK 
V. 
Marshall WOOD and Reba Wood. 
1982225. 
March 16, 2001. 
Motorist and passenger in lead vehicle brought 
personal injury action against driver of following 
vehicle arising out of rear-end accident. The Circuit 
Court, Etowah County, No. CV-96-330,William H. 
Rhea III, J., entered jury verdict awarding $200,000 
to the motorist and $600,000 to passenger-husband. 
Defendant driver appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Brown, J., held that: (1) whether driver breached 
duty of care by not anticipating that vehicles he was 
following might stop was issue for jury; (2) evid-
ence concerning probationaiy status of plaintiffs' 
medical expert's professional license improperly re-
lated to specific evidence bearing on witness's repu-
tation for veracity; (3) motorist's comment that she 
and her husband had been unable to afford consist-
ent medical care and that they had been forced to 
sell their home to pay for husband's treatment prop-
erly provided jury with a concise explanation to im-
plication raised by defense counsel that they were 
exaggerating extent of husband's original injuries or 
that his current physical condition could not be 
found to have been proximately caused by the auto-
mobile accident, given the I 0-month lapse in treat-
ment; (4) motorist was entitled to general damages 
of $200,000, largely to compensate her for loss of 
husband's consortium; and (5) passenger was en-
titled to general damages of $600,000, largely on 
basis of claim to compensate for mental anguish. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €=>207 
Page 2 of 11 
Page I 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30k207 k. Arguments and Conduct of 
Counsel. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant driver's counsel failed to object to 
accident victims' counsel's comment requesting jury 
to compensate victims for their injuries so that they 
could regain their home, and, thus, the alleged error 
was not preserved for review. 
12] Automobiles 48A ~245(15) 
48A Automobiles 
48A V Injuries from Operation, or Use of High-
way 
48A V(B) Actions 
48Ak245 Questions for Jury 
48Ak245(2) Care Required and Negli-
gence 
48Ak245(15) k. Vehicles Follow-
ing, Overtaking, or Passing. Most Cited Cases 
Whether driver breached duty of care by not 
anticipating that the vehicles he was following 
might stop was issue for jury in personal injury ac-
tion against driver arising out of rear-end motor 
vehicle accident. 
[31 Appeal and Error 30 €=>866(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
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an appeal from a ruling on a motion for a judgment 
as a matter of law (JML) is materially indistin-
guishable from the standard by which it will review 
a summary judgment, that is, whether the nonmov-
ing party has presented substantial evidence in sup-
port of his position. 
[4] Evidence 157 ~597 
157 Evidence 
157XIV Weight and Sufficiency 
157k597 k. Sufficiency to Support Verdict or 
Finding. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence is "substantial" only if it is of such 
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the 
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer 
the existence of the fact sought to be proved. 
[51 Judgment 228 €=>199(3.10) 
228 Judgment 
228VI On Trial oflssues 
228VI(A) Rendition, Fonn, and Requisites in 
General 
228k199 Notwithstanding Verdict 
228k199(3.I0) k. Where There Is No 
Evidence to Sustain Verdict. Most Cited Cases 
Judgment 228 €=>199(3.11) 
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228VI On Trial oflssues 
228VI(A) Rendition, Fonn, and Requisites in 
General 
228k199 Notwithstanding Verdict 
228kl 99(3.11) k. Where Undisputed 
Facts Entitle Movant to Judgment as Matter of 
Law. Most Cited Cases 
Judgment as a matter of law (JML) should be 
entered only when there is a complete absence of 
proof on a material issue or where there are no dis-
puted questions of fact for the jury to detennine. 
[6] Appeal and Error 30 €=>927(7) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
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30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to 
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict 
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and 
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most 
Cited Cases 
In determining whether material questions of 
fact exist on motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(JML), the appellate court must view the evidence 
presented at trial in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. 
[7] Evidence 157 €=>560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
l 57XII(D) Examination of Experts 
157k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence concerning probationary status of 
medical expert's professional license improperly re-
lated to specific evidence bearing on witness's repu-
tation for veracity in personal injury action arising 
from motor vehicle accident. Rules of Evid., Rule 
608(b). 
[8] Appeal and Error 30 €=>232(.5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30k232 Scope and Effect of Objection 
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ment. Most Cited Cases 
Only kind of evidence that may be presented as 
to an expert's character for truthfulness is evidence 
regarding the expert's general reputation in the 
community for untruthfulness, or opinion testimony 
from another competent witness. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 608. 
110] Trial 388 (:;;;;)130 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl30 k. Evidence to Rebut Statements. 
Most Cited Cases 
Motorist's comment that she and her husband 
had been unable to afford consistent medical care 
and that they had been forced to sell their home to 
pay for husband's treatment properly provided jury 
with a concise explanation for implication raised by 
defense counsel that they were exaggerating extent 
of husband's original injuries or that his current 
physical condition could not be found to have been 
proximately caused by the automobile accident, 
given husband's I 0-month lapse in treatment. 
[111 Evidence 157 (:;;;;)107 
157 Evidence 
157IV Admissibility in General 
157IV(A) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Is-
sues 
157kl07 k. Pecuniary Condition. Most 
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Page 3 
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l 57k107 k. Pecuniary Condition. Most 
Cited Cases 
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Evidence regarding a party's financial condi-
tion may be admissible when the party's opponent 
has opened the door by commenting upon or asking 
questions concerning the party's financial standing. 
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388IV(B) Order of Proof, Rebuttal, and Re-
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115k127.72 Loss of Consortium, Ser-
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Most Cited Cases 
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157XII(F) Effect of Opinion Evidence 
157k569 Testimony of Experts 
157k571 Nature of Subject 
157k571(10) k. Damages. Most 
Cited Cases 
Injured motorist was entitled to general dam-
ages of $200,000 for accident in which her vehicle 
was struck from behind, though her medical ex-
penses for rib and chest pain was $1,068.50, given 
that bulk of claim was intended largely to com-
pensate her for loss of husband's consortium; hus-
band's medical expert testified that head injury hus-
band had suffered in accident had altered his per-
sonality and had caused him to become emotionally 
fragile, and evidence suggested that husband's con-
dition left him permanently unable to support, com-
fort, and care for wife. 
[16] Damages 115 €=>127.15 
115 Damages 
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I 15VII Amount Awarded 
l l 5Vll(B) Injuries to the Person 
115k127.12 Head and Neck Injuries in 
General; Mental Impairment 
115k 127.15 k. Brain Injuries in Gener-
al; Mental Impairment. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 115k 130.1) 
Damages 115 €=>140.7 
115 Damages 
115VII Amount Awarded 
1 I 5VJI(E) Mental Suffering and Emotional 
Distress 
115k140.7 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 115k140.5) 
Award to injured passenger of general damages 
of $600,000 for accident in which vehicle in which 
he was a passenger was struck from behind was not 
excessive, given that bulk of his claim was intended 
largely to compensate for mental anguish from ac-
cident; evidence suggested that passenger fre-
quently experienced intense emotional outbursts 
and generally suffered from depression because of 
his chronic pain and his inability to work, that his 
suicide attempt was another acute indicator of his 
mental condition, and medical expert suggested that 
passenger's head injury had caused a permanent 
change in his cognitive ability, memory, and emo-
tional capacity to handle elements of daily life. 
(17] Appeal and Error 30 €='1004(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(l) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)2 Verdicts 
30k1004 Amount of Recovery 
30kl004(6) Particular Cases and 
Items 
30kl 004(8) k. Personal Injuries. 
Most Cited Cases 
On review of a jury verdict on the ground of 
excessiveness of damages award, Supreme Court 
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focuses on the plaintiff, and must ask what the 
evidence supports in terms of the loss or harm 
suffered by the plaintiff. 
1181 Appeal and Error 30 €;:::)1004(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(1)2 Verdicts 
30kl004 Amount of Recovery 
30k1004(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
In the absence of a flawed verdict, Supreme 
Court may not invade the jury's province to award 
compensatory damages. 
*505 Barbara F. Olschner and J. Mark Hart of 
Olschner & Hart, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant. 
Gregory S. Cusimano, Michael L. Roberts, and 
David A. Kimberley of Cusimano, Keener, Roberts 
& Kimberley, P.C., Gadsden, for appellees. 
BROWN, Justice. 
This negligence case arises out of an auto-
mobile accident that occurred on March 19, 1994. 
The defendant Ben Cleburn Hathcock appeals from 
a judgment entered upon a jury verdict awarding 
$600,000 to the plaintiff Marshall Wood and 
$200,000 to the plaintiff Reba Wood. We affirm. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
On the morning of March 19, 1994, Ben Hath-
cock was traveling west, behind three automobiles, 
on Highway 278, which connects Piedmont and 
Gadsden. Dorothy Law was driving the first 
vehicle, the one the farthest ahead of Hathcock; 
Reba Wood, with her husband Marshall Wood as 
her passenger, was driving the second vehicle; an 
unknown person was driving the third vehicle, the 
vehicle immediately ahead of Hathcock. According 
to the evidence presented at trial, Law, driving the 
lead automobile, activated her left tum signal as she 
reached the crest of a hill, to indicate her intent to 
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turn into the driveway of a private residence. As 
Law stopped on the highway to allow an oncoming 
car to pass, Mrs. Wood prepared to stop behind her. 
The third vehicle, however, swerved to the right 
and headed toward the shoulder of the road past the 
Woods' vehicle. Hathcock, who testified that he did 
not see Law's turn signal or brake lights, quickly 
applied his brakes and turned to the right also; his 
vehicle hit the rear of the Woods' vehicle, at an 
angle, shoving it into Law's vehicle. 
Mr. and Mrs. Wood were injured in the acci-
dent. Soon after the accident, they sought medical 
treatment for their injuries at a hospital emergency 
room. Mrs. Wood complained of rib and chest pain; 
she was treated and released that same day. Her 
medical expenses totalled $1,068.50. Mr. Wood 
was treated for a neck strain and was given a cer-
vical collar, and he, too, was released that same 
day. This visit to the hospital provided Mrs. Wood's 
only treatment, but the record suggests that it 
merely marked the beginning of Mr. Wood's treat-
ment. 
Over the next two years, Mr. Wood sought 
treatment from several doctors. On April 7, 1994, 
almost three weeks after the accident, Mr. Wood 
sought treatment for his neck. He was diagnosed 
with a neck strain; he did not return for treatment 
until February 2, 1995. At that time, he was con-
tinuing to complain about pain in his neck. On 
March 22, 1995, Mr. Wood sought treatment from a 
chiropractor; the chiropractor treated him 34 times, 
until August 1995. After Mr. Wood had concluded 
the chiropractic treatments, he sought medical at-
tention, in December 1996, from a new physician. 
The record suggests that, after that time, Mr. Wood 
sought regular treatment from several physicians, 
including a neurosurgeon, for pain in his neck, 
shoulders, and back, as well as for what he alleges 
was a deteriorating mental condition. 
*506 [l] The Woods sued Hathcock on March 
18, 1996, alleging that Hathcock had negligently or 
wantonly caused the 1994 automobile accident. As 
the trial began, defense counsel suggested in her 
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opening argument that the evidence would show 
that Mr. Wood's alleged injuries were exaggerated, 
or, alternatively, were not related to the 1994 acci-
dent. She specifically stated that the evidence 
would show significant gaps of time between treat-
ments, especially during the year following the ac-
cident. At the conclusion of the opening statements, 
the Woods' counsel called Mrs. Wood as his first 
witness. During her testimony, Mrs. Wood on sev-
eral occasions referred the Woods' financial condi-
tion, indicating that it was poor, and at times sug-
gesting that it caused them to delay Mr. Wood's 
medical visits. Mrs. Wood also said that as a result 
of the accident she and her husband had been poor 
and that their poverty had caused them to lose their 
house and their upholstery business. Defense coun-
sel, who had previously made a motion in limine to 
exclude all testimony as to the Woods' poverty, 
properly objected to Mrs. Wood's statement. FNI 
FN 1. Defense counsel, however, did not 
object to statements made by plaintiffs' 
counsel during his closing argument, in 
which he asked the jury to compensate the 
Woods for their injuries so that they could 
regain their home. Therefore, any error in 
regard to those statements in the closing 
argument of the plaintiffs' counsel has not 
been preserved for review. 
The trial court entered a judgment as a matter 
of law ("JML") in favor of Hathcock on the wan-
tonness claim, but submitted the negligence claim 
to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the Woods, awarding them $600,000 for Mr. 
Wood's physical injuries, mental anguish, and lost 
earnings and $200,000 for Mrs. Wood's physical in-
juries and the loss of consortium of her husband. 
Hathcock moved for a remittitur or, alternatively, 
for a new trial. The court conducted a hearing on 
the motion and then denied it. The court entered a 
judgment on the verdict. This appeal followed. 
II. Analysis 
[2] Hathcock first argues that the trial court 
erred in not entering a JML for him on the Woods' 
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negligence claim because, he says, he did not 
breach a duty of care. He contends that he was driv-
ing at a safe speed and was following the vehicle in 
front of him at a lawful distance, but that he was 
nevertheless unable to see that the Woods' vehicle 
was stopping, because his view of its brake lights 
was obstructed by the vehicle between the Woods 
and Hathcock. 
[3][4][5][6] The standard by which we review 
an appeal from a ruling on a motion for a JML is 
materially indistinguishable from the standard by 
which we review a summary judgment. Simply, this 
standard is " 'whether the nonmoving party has 
presented substantial evidence in suppo1t of his po-
sition.' " Norfolk So. Ry. v. Bradley, 772 So.2d 
1147, 1150 (Ala.2000) (quoting K.S. v. Carr, 618 
So.2d 707, 713 (Ala.1993)). Evidence is 
"substantial" only if it is "of such weight and qual-
ity that fair-minded persons in the exercise of im-
partial judgment can reasonably infer the existence 
of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders 
Life Assurance Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 
(Ala.1989). A JML should be entered only when 
"there is a complete absence of proof on a material 
issue or where there are no disputed questions of 
fact for the jury to determine." Norfolk So., supra, 
772 So.2d at 1150 ( quoting K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d 
at 713). In determining whether material *507 
questions of fact exist, the court must view the 
evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Given that principle, we 
must resolve all factual disputes in favor of the 
Woods. 
Hathcock relies, in part, on Tinsley v. Hender-
son, 613 So.2d 1268 (Ala.1993). In that case, 
Henderson was driving down a two-lane road, at a 
speed below the legal limit, when his truck struck 
and killed Timothy Tinsley, as Timothy was riding 
his bicycle. Timothy's parents sued Henderson, 
claiming that he had negligently or wantonly 
caused the accident. This Court affirmed a sum-
mary judgment in Henderson's favor, holding that 
the Tinsleys had failed to present substantial evid-
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ence indicating that Henderson's actions were not 
reasonably prudent. Tinsley, 613 So.2d at 1271. 
This present case is distinguishable from Tins-
ley, because Hathcock could reasonably have ex-
pected that the vehicles traveling in front of him 
could suddenly slow down or stop at any time; in-
deed, slowing down or stopping is part of the nature 
of traffic on a two-lane road. Thus, while Hathcock 
claims he was confronted with "a sudden emer-
gency not of his making," he was not presented 
with an unexpected emergency as Henderson was in 
Tinsley. The jury could reasonably infer from the 
evidence that Hathcock breached a duty of care by 
not anticipating that the vehicles he was following 
might stop. See Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564, 
567 (Ala.1994) ("a motorist is negligent if he fails 
to discover a vehicle that he reasonably could have 
discovered in time to avoid injury"). 
[7] Hathcock also argues that the trial court 
erred by not allowing defense counsel to cross-
examine Dr. Thomas Conboy, one of the Woods' 
expert witnesses, as to the probationary status of his 
professional license. The trial court refused to ad-
mit this evidence, concluding that its prejudice out-
weighed its relevance. In Ayres v. Lakeshore Com-
munity Hospital, 689 So.2d 39 (Ala.1997), this 
Court stated the following general rule regarding 
the cross-examination ofan expert witness: 
"[T]he trial judge has substantial discretion as to 
the questions a party is allowed to ask of an ex-
pert witness. The scope and extent of cross-
examination [are] vested in the trial court's sound 
discretion, and this court will not reverse on the 
basis of the trial court's rulings regarding cross-
examination unless an abuse of discretion has oc-
curred." 
689 So.2d at 41. Thus, we must determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion by cur-
tailing defense counsel's cross-examination as to 
matters involving Dr. Conboy's probation imposed 
by his governing professional association. 
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[8] Hathcock argues in his brief that the evid-
ence of Dr. Conboy's probation was relevant to 
show bias on the part of Dr. Conboy. The record, 
however, reveals that during a hearing on pretrial 
motions defense counsel repeatedly urged the trial 
court to allow this evidence on the basis that it was 
germane to the question of Dr. Conboy's veracity. 
FN2 The record also shows *508 during the trial 
defense counsel made a similar argument during 
her offer of proof: "This is a serious case, and the 
defendant ought to be able, in fairness, to qualify 
[Dr. Conboy's] truthfulness .... " This Court's consid-
eration of this issue is limited to the grounds raised 
before the trial court. See Lance, Inc. v. Ramanaus-
kas, 731 So.2d 1204, 1220 (Ala.1999) (stating that 
"specific objections waive all other objections"). 
FN2. On one occasion, defense counsel 
stated during her offer of proof: 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think this 
[evidence] is huge, when as an expert-
I'm not talking about some little article 
he wrote somewhere out in the universe. 
I'm talking engaged as an expert witness, 
testified falsely, and has admitted to 
testifying falsely. And I can't, according 
to the plaintiffs, cross-examine this ex-
pert in front of the jury about his giving 
false testimony in regard to his qualifica-
tions. The most basic thing that an expert 
does is to tell you what he can and can't 
do." 
We believe that this colloquy, which oc-
curred at the end of the hearing, accur-
ately summarized defense counsel's ar-
guments before the trial court. 
[9] The Alabama Rules of Evidence clearly al-
low cross-examination as to "matters affecting the 
credibility of the witness." Rule 61 l(b), Ala R.Evid 
. Rule 608, however, requires the trial judge to keep 
a watchful eye on evidence concerning the charac-
ter or conduct of a witness. Rule 608(b), which 
governs evidence of specific conduct by a witness, 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt= Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=E4 7F ... 10/21/2013 
000747
815 So.2d 502 
(Cite as: 815 So.2d 502) 
states: 
"Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
witness's credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may be not be in-
quired into on cross-examination of the witness 
nor proved by extrinsic evidence." 
The only kind of evidence that may be presen-
ted as to an expert's "character for truthfulness" is 
evidence regarding the expert's "general reputation 
in the community for untruthfulness," or opinion 
testimony from another competent witness. Charles 
W. Gamble, McE/roy's Alabama Evidence § 
142.01(3) (5th ed.1996). The excluded evidence in 
this case, however, is rather specific in that it per-
tains to certain events that led to Dr. Conboy's be-
ing placed on probation by his licensing board. Be-
cause specific evidence bearing on a witness's repu-
tation for veracity is forbidden by Rule 608(b ), 
Ala.R.Evid, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by preventing defense counsel 
from exploring these matters. We further conclude 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ex-
cluding evidence of Dr. Conboy's probation, which 
is inextricably intertwined with these previous acts. 
[IO] Next, Hathcock argues that the trial court 
erred by allowing Mrs. Wood to comment on the 
Woods' poor financial condition. He contends that 
her comments were unfairly prejudicial and re-
quires a reversal of the judgment. We disagree. 
[11][12] "It is well settled that it 'is highly pre-
judicial to a defendant for the jury to be improperly 
informed as to the ... poverty of the plaintiff.' " 
Bennett v. Brewer, 682 So.2d 448, 449 (Ala.1996) 
(quoting Liberty Nat'/ Life Ins. Co. v. Kendrick, 282 
Ala. 227, 230, 210 So.2d 701, 703 (1968)). Con-
sequently, evidence of this character is generally in-
admissible, see Miller v. Dacovich, 355 So.2d 
1109, 1110 (Ala.1978); Johnson v. Harrison, 404 
So.2d 337, 339-40 (Ala.1981); Mutual Sav. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 765 So.2d 652, 654 
(Ala.Civ.App.1998); and McE/roy's Alabama Evid-
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ence, supra, § 189 .05( I). Nevertheless, we have re-
cognized that evidence of this character "may be 
relevant and admissible when it goes to a material 
issue in the case." Johnson v. Harrison, 404 So.2d 
337, 339 (Ala.1981 ). 
Mrs. Wood's testimony as to the loss of the 
family business was admissible for purposes of 
proving the damages claimed, because it supported 
an inference that the Woods lost the business be-
cause injuries he sustained in the March 19, 1994, 
accident caused Mr. Wood to be unable to work. 
Therefore, Mrs. Wood's comments concerning the 
Woods' poverty tended directly to prove Mr. 
Wood's diminished earning capacity; thus, they 
were relevant to a material issue in the case. See 
generally Carnival Cruise lines, Inc. v. Snoddy, 
457 So.2d 379, 381 (Ala.1984) ("In a *509 personal 
injury action, a plaintiff is entitled to recover both 
the value of the work time lost prior to trial ('lost 
earnings') and the value of the reduction in his abil-
ity to earn a living ('impairment of earning capa-
city')."). 
[13][14] Evidence regarding a party's financial 
condition may also be admissible when the party's 
opponent has "opened the door by commenting 
upon or asking questions concerning [the] party's 
financial standing." McE/roy's Alabama Evidence, 
supra, § 189 .05(2)( c ). Rebuttal evidence, however, 
must not be "substantially unconnected with the 
[previously admitted] illegal evidence." Cook v. 
Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 288, 147 So.2d 831, 835 
(1962). 
Counsel for Hathcock suggested in her opening 
statement that the temporal gaps in Mr. Wood's 
medical treatment called into question his claim 
that his injuries were caused by the automobile ac-
cident or called into question whether his injuries 
were as severe as he maintained they were. In 
Alabama Power Co. v. Bruce, 209 Ala. 423, 96 So. 
346 (1923), this Court addressed similar facts with 
respect to a plaintiff who underwent a surgical pro-
cedure that he alleged had been made necessary by 
an accident he alleged had been caused by the de-
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fondant IO months earlier. In that case, defense 
counsel commented during closing arguments that 
the plaintiffs delay in seeking treatment suggested 
that his injuries either were not caused by the acci-
dent or were not as serious as he had claimed. 
Plaintiffs counsel responded in his closing argu-
ment by stating that the plaintiff had not sought 
medical treatment because of the poverty of the 
plaintiffs family. The defendant argued on appeal 
that the statements of the plaintiffs counsel were 
improper and warranted an order granting a new tri-
al. This Court disagreed, holding that the poverty 
argument by the plaintiffs counsel was not improp-
er, given the prior suggestion by defense counsel 
regarding the plaintiffs failure to obtain immediate 
medical treatment. Alabama Power, 209 Ala. at 
427, 96 So. at 349. In that case, defense counsel's 
remarks made the plaintiffs poverty evidence relev-
ant for an admissible purpose. 
We conclude that the principle applied in 
Alabama Power Co. v. Bruce also applies in the 
present case. Defense counsel's opening statements 
suggested to the jury that the evidence would show 
that Mr. Wood did not see a physician concerning 
his injuries for almost IO months after visiting the 
doctor on April 7, 1994. The thrust of this state-
ment was to suggest either that Mr. Wood was ex-
aggerating the extent of his original injuries or that, 
given the nearly I 0-month lapse in treatment, his 
current physical condition could not be found to 
have been proximately caused by the automobile 
accident. In response to these remarks and in anti-
cipation of defense counsel's theory of the case, 
Mrs. Wood testified that she and her husband had 
been unable to afford consistent medical care and 
that they had been forced to sell their home to pay 
for his treatment once they could no longer ignore 
the necessity for it. Mrs. Wood's testimony as to the 
Woods' inability to afford medical care, therefore, 
provided the jury with a concise explanation for 
why her husband let almost 10 months pass without 
seeking treatment for his maladies. Further, her 
testimony regarding the sale of the family home ex-
plained why they could later afford adequate treat-
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ment. Consequently, given the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the trial court did not err by allowing 
this evidence. 
[ 15] [ 16] Finally, Hathcock argues that the 
$800,000 award of compensato1y damages was ex-
cessive. Specifically, he contends that the evidence 
did not support the individual awards to Mr. and 
Mrs. Wood *510 totalling $600,000 and $200,000 
respectively. 
[l 7][18] We have consistently held that jury 
verdicts carry a presumption of correctness and that 
that presumption is strengthened when the trial 
court denies a motion for a new trial. Northeast 
Alabama Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Owens, 584 So.2d 
1360, 1366 (Ala.1991 ). The appellate courts of this 
state do not favor setting aside a jury verdict if do-
ing so can be avoided. Id. When we review a jury 
verdict on the ground of excessiveness, our review 
focuses on the plaintiff, and we must ask what the 
evidence supports in terms of the loss or harm 
suffered by the plaintiff. Daniels v. East Alabama 
Paving, Inc., 740 So.2d 1033, I 044 (Ala.1999). In 
the absence of a flawed verdict, no statute allows us 
to invade the jury's province to award compensat-
ory damages. Id. 
The evidence suggests that Mrs. Wood incurred 
medical expenses totalling $1,068.50. The evidence 
as to the total medical expenses incurred by Mr. 
Wood is unclear. Although evidence indicated that 
Mr. Wood had incurred medical expenses totalling 
$4,358.25, that amount was payable only to a single 
physician. The record indicates that Mr. Wood saw 
numerous other medical and psychological profes-
sionals, but we are unable to determine the cost of 
those services from the record before us. Whatever 
the value or the cost of those services may have 
been, it is apparent that the bulk of Mr. Wood's 
award, like the bulk of Mrs. Wood's award, was in-
tended to compensate for more than medical costs. 
While Mrs. Wood's damages award was apparently 
intended largely to compensate her for the loss of 
her husband's consortium, Mr. Wood's award en-
tailed elements of lost earnings (based on his testi-
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mony that he had projected the year 2013 as his 
year of retirement) and, importantly, mental an-
guish. 
Regarding the award to Mrs. Wood, we note 
that the jury heard a substantial amount of evidence 
regarding Mr. Wood's mental condition after the ac-
cident. Dr. Conboy, testifying for the Woods, con-
cluded that the head injury Mr. Wood had suffered 
in the accident had altered his personality and had 
caused him to become emotionally fragile. The 
evidence suggests that Mr. Wood's condition left 
him permanently unable to support, comfort, and 
care for Mrs. Wood. Consequently, we are reluctant 
to disturb the jury's award to her. 
MuchofMr. Wood's$600,000compensatory-dam-
ages award was apparently attributable to his claim 
for damages for mental anguish. With respect to 
awards to compensate for mental anguish, we have 
stated: 
"A physical injury or physical symptom is not 
a prerequisite for a finding of mental anguish. 
Kmart Corp. v. Kyles, 723 So.2d 572, 578 
(Ala.1998). A plaintiff is required only to present 
some evidence of mental anguish, and once the 
plaintiff has done so the question whether the 
plaintiff has suffered mental anguish and, if so, 
the question of how much compensation the 
plaintiff is entitled to for the mental anguish are 
questions for the jury, Kyles, 723 So.2d at 578." 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So.2d 
166, 178 (Ala.2000). 
The record contains ample evidence regarding 
Mr. Wood's mental condition following the acci-
dent. The evidence suggests that he frequently ex-
perienced intense emotional outbursts and generally 
suffered from depression because of his chronic 
pain and his inability to work. Mr. Wood's expert 
testimony suggested that his head injury had caused 
a change in his cognitive ability, *511 his memory, 
and his emotional capacity to handle elements of 
daily life. The evidence also suggests that Mr. 
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Woods attempted suicide in 1998; a suicide attempt 
is another acute indicator of his mental condition. 
Considering the totality of this evidence, we are re-
luctant to disturb a judgment based on the jury's 
verdict. 
III. Conclusion 
We conclude that the trial court properly 
denied the defendant's motion for a remittitur or a 
new trial. The judgment is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
HOUSTON, SEE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., 
concur. 
Ala.,2001. 
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Patient brought action against physician for al-
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failure to diagnose and treat her heart attack. The 
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al court's unique ability to judge weight and credib-
ility of testimony and should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of jury unless record reveals miscar-
riage of justice. 
14J Evidence 157 €=>571(3) 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XII(F) Effect of Opinion Evidence 
l 57k569 Testimony of Experts 
157k571 Nature of Subject 
I 57k57 l (3) k. Due Care and Proper 
Conduct. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was insufficient to establish that 
physician was negligent in failing to diagnose and 
treat patient's heart attack; physician testified that 
patient complained of only mild tightness in her 
chest and exhibited no symptoms of heart problems 
after complete examination, although expert testi-
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tied that physician had not obtained adequate his-
tory from patient and that electrocardiogram would 
have revealed patient's condition. 
151 Trial 388 C:;;;)235(7) 
388 Trial 
388VII Instructions to Jury 
388VII(C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
388k231 Sufficiency as to Subject-Matter 
388k235 Weight and Effect of Evid-
ence 
388k235(7) k. Testimony of Ex-
perts and Other Opinion Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Jury instruction regarding evaluation of testi-
mony of expert witnesses was not disfavored in-
struction on weighing of expert testimony; thus, 
court was not required to state reasons on the re-
cord for instruction. MCR 2.5 I 6(D)(3). 
[61 Appeal and Error 30 €=>1064.1(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XYI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)l 8 Instructions 
30k I 064 Prejudicial Effect 
30k I 064.1 In General 
30k I 064.1 (2) Particular Cases 
30k1064.l (8) k. Negligence 
and Torts in General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl 8.130 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Improperly instructing jury on inherent risks in 
medical treatment in medical malpractice action in 
which plaintiff did not claim that fact of her injuries 
was proof of malpractice did not have sufficient ef-
fect on verdict to require reversal. 
[7] Evidence 157 €=>77(6) 
157 Evidence 
157II Presumptions 
157k74 Evidence Withheld or Falsified 
157k77 Failure to Call Witness 
157k77(6) k. Attorneys or Physicians 
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as Witnesses. Most Cited Cases 
Physician's failure to present expe11's testimony 
regarding malpractice after expert reviewed pa-
tient's medical records did not entitle patient to in-
ference that expert's testimony would have been fa-
vorable to her, where patient had opportunity to 
question expe11 regarding his opinion as to breaches 
of standard of care, but chose not to do so. 
[8] Appeal and Error 30 €::=>302(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(D) Motions for New Trial 
30k302 Sufficiency and Scope of State-
ment of Grounds 
30k302(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 299k18.130 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Issue of whether physician's attorney concealed 
expert opinion concerning whether malpractice had 
occurred was not preserved for appeal in medical 
malpractice action, where patient did not object to 
alleged concealment at trial and did not claim con-
cealment of evidence in motion for new trial. MCR 
2.61 l(A)(l)(t). 
[9] Appeal and Error 30 €=>281(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(D) Motions for New Trial 
30k281 Necessity in General 
30k281(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Certain motions, such as challenges to verdicts 
on ground that they are against great weight of 
evidence, must be raised in motion for new trial in 
order to preserve them for appeal. 
110) Appeal and Error 30 €=>204(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation m Lower 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt= Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=E4 7F ... 10/21/2013 
000753
454 N.W.2d 603 
183 Mich.App. 72,454 N.W.2d 603 
(Cite as: 183 Mich.App. 72,454 N.W.2d 603) 
Cou1t of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30k202 Evidence and Witnesses 
30k204 Admission of Evidence 
30k204(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Issues regarding admission or exclusion of 
evidence are properly preserved by timely objection 
on the record. 
1111 Appeal and Error 30 €=>289 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(D) Motions for New Trial 
30k287 Review of Proceedings at Trial 
30k289 k. Rulings as to Evidence. 
Most Cited Cases 
Timely objection on the record, with response 
by opposing counsel and ruling by trial judge, 
should create adequate record from which to review 
admission or exclusion of evidence; there is no ad-
ditional requirement that party restate his or her 
evidentiary objections anew in motion for new trial. 
112) Appeal and Error 30 €=>971(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Comt 
30k971 Examination of Witnesses 
30k971(3) k. Cross-Examination. Most 
Cited Cases 
Witnesses 410 €=)267 
410 Witnesses 
41 OIII Examination 
41 Olll(B) Cross-Examination 
41 Ok267 k. Control and Discretion of 
Court. Most Cited Cases 
Scope of cross-examination, like admission of 
evidence, is matter within trial court's discretion, 
and court's determination should not be reversed 
absent abuse of that discretion. 
1131 Evidence 157 €=>560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XII(D) Examination of Experts 
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l 57k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence that expert witness had been named 
as defendant in prior medical malpractice action 
was not admissible for impeachment purposes. 
MRE 404(b), 608(b). 
1141 Evidence 157 €=)560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
I 57XII(D) Examination of Experts 
157k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Mere fact that someone has been named as de-
fendant in malpractice lawsuit may not be used to 
impeach his or her credibility as expert witness. 
I] 5) Appeal and Error 30 €=>1026 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J) 1 In General 
30k1025 Prejudice to Rights of Party 
as Ground of Review 
30kl 026 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
To determine whether error is harmless, two in-
quiries must be made: whether error is so offensive 
to maintenance of sound judicial process that it can 
never be regarded as harmless; and whether Court 
of Appeals can declare belief that error was harm-
less beyond reasonable doubt. 
(16] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1048(6) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
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30XVl(J)9 Witnesses 
30kl048 Rulings on Questions to Wit-
nesses 
30kl 048(6) k. Cross-Examination 
and Re-Examination. Most Cited Cases 
Error arising when expe1t witness was cross-
examined regarding prior medical malpractice ac-
tion that had been brought against him was harm-
less in medical malpractice action. 
**604 *73 Field & Field, P.C. by Samuel T. Field, 
Kalamazoo, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Bremer, Wade, Nelson, Mabbitt & Lohr by *74 
Phillip J. Nelson and Michael D. Wade, Grand Rap-
ids, for defendants-appellees. 
Before MlCHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and SULLI-
VAN and ALLEN,FN' JJ. 
FN* Glenn S. Allen, former Court of Ap-
peals judge, sitting on the Comt of Ap-
peals by assignment. 
MICHAEL J. KELLY, Presiding Judge. 
Plaintiff Eva Heshelman appeals from a jury 
verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendants 
Kenneth Lombardi, M.D., and Battle Creek Medic-
al Associates, P.C. Plaintiff sued defendants for al-
leged medical malpractice arising from Dr. Lom-
bardi's failure to diagnose and treat her heart attack. 
Following a four-day trial, the jury found that Dr. 
Lombardi had not been negligent in his diagnosis or 
treatment of plaintiff and rendered a verdict for de-
fendants. 
Plaintiff testified that on February 26, 1985, at 
around 11 :00 a.m. she felt sudden chest pains and 
pain in her left arm. Plaintiff was fifty-nine years 
old and had a prior history of atherosclerotic artery 
disease. Plaintiff had undergone an operation in 
1982 to remove atherosclerotic obstructions. 
Plaintiffs family had a history of heart disease. 
Plaintiff also smoked and had been smoking for the 
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past thi1ty-five years. 
After feeling chest pains, plaintiff went to see 
Dr. Lombardi. She testified that when she arrived at 
Lombardi's office she was perspiring and had al-
most fainted. When Lombardi examined her, she 
told him that she was suffering pain in her chest 
and in her left arm. According to plaintiff, Lom-
bardi did not question her in detail about her symp-
toms. Plaintiff testified that Lombardi told her that 
the causes of her complaints were that she was 
working too hard, was overweight, and was 
smoking too much. Dr. Lombardi did not give 
plaintiff an electrocardiogram. 
*75 When plaintiff returned home, her pain did 
not subside. At around 7:00 p.m. that evening, 
plaintiff went to a hospital emergency**605 room, 
where she was diagnosed as suffering from a 
myocardial infarction. Plaintiffs heart was dam-
aged as a result of this infarction. A cardiac cathet-
erization indicated that her right coronary artery 
was totally occluded. An angiogram performed in 
April of 1987 indicated that the artery was still oc-
cluded but that her other blood vessels were normal 
and her overall heart function was good. 
At trial, plaintiffs expert, Dr. Crane, testified 
that a physician confronted with a patient complain-
ing of chest pains should first check the patient's 
medical history. Crane faulted Dr. Lombardi's fail-
ure to obtain adequate information on plaintiffs 
history. Crane testified that Lombardi's failure to 
adequately check plaintiffs history led to inad-
equate treatment and diagnosis. In Dr. Crane's opin-
ion, an electrocardiogram performed at the time of 
Lombardi's examination would have demonstrated 
a cardiac abnormality. 
Dr. Lombardi testified that when he examined 
plaintiff she complained only of mild tightness in 
her chest and did not mention pain in her arms. 
Lombardi testified that he had taken a proper his-
tory from plaintiff and that his method of charting 
was common practice. Lombardi said he examined 
plaintiff and listened to her heart and that she was 
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not sweating or exhibiting other symptoms of a 
heart attack. Lombardi diagnosed plaintiff as hav-
ing a respirato1y infection. Lombardi testified that 
he was familiar with the standard of care applicable 
to specialists in internal medicine and that he had 
not violated that standard of care. 
Defendants also presented an expert witness, 
Dr. Dykman, who testified regarding plaintiffs 
damages. Dr. Dykman specifically stated that he 
was *76 not testifying regarding the standard of 
care or any breach thereof. 
Following the jury verdict in favor of defend-
ants, plaintiff moved for a new trial based upon al-
leged instructional error and the verdict being 
against the great weight of the evidence. The court 
denied plaintiff a new trial. Plaintiff appeals as of 
right, raising four issues. 
I 
The first issue we address is whether the jury's 
verdict was against the great weight of the evid-
ence. Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in not 
granting her a new trial on this basis. We find no 
error. 
[1)[2][3] Whether to grant a motion for a new 
trial is within the trial court's discretion. Termaat v. 
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co., 362 Mich. 598, 602, 
107 N.W.2d 783 (1961). The standard of review is 
whether the verdict was against the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence. Troyanowski v. Village of 
Kent City, 175 Mich.App. 217, 223, 437 N.W.2d 
266 (1988). In determining whether the evidence 
was overwhelming, this Court should give defer-
ence to the trial court's unique ability to judge the 
weight and credibility of the testimony and should 
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury un-
less the record reveals a miscarriage of justice. Id. 
[4] Review of the record does not indicate that 
the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming evid-
ence. The trial presented a credibility contest 
between plaintiff Eva Heshelman and defendant Dr. 
Lombardi. Plaintiff testified as to one set of facts, 
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which indicated that she suffered from severe 
symptoms and that Lombardi gave her only a curs-
ory examination. Lombardi testified that plaintiff 
complained only of mild tightness in her *77 chest 
and, after a complete examination, she exhibited no 
symptoms of heart problems. Plaintiffs expert testi-
fied that, based upon plaintiffs testimony, Dr. Lom-
bardi violated the necessary standard of care by not 
obtaining an adequate hist01y from plaintiff and 
that an electrocardiogram would have revealed 
plaintiffs condition. Lombardi testified that he did 
not violate the standard of care and that his examin-
ation of plaintiff did not indicate that an electrocar-
diogram was necessary. The jury evidently found 
Dr. Lombardi's testimony more credible and found 
that he had not been negligent in his treatment of 
plaintiff. We are bound by the assessment of the 
witnesses' credibility made by the jury and the trial 
court. 
**606 II 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury, claiming several instructional er-
rors. We find no error requiring reversal. 
[5] The court gave the following instruction re-
garding the testimony of expert witnesses. 
In this case, a number of doctors have given 
their opinions as experts in the field of internal 
medicine. Experts are permitted to give their 
opinions as to matters on which they are experts. 
You should consider each expert opinion re-
ceived in evidence, but you are not bound to fol-
low the opinion of an expert. You may give each 
opinion whatever weight you believe it deserves. 
In determining whether or not to believe the 
opinion of an expert or which opinion to believe, 
you should consider the reasons and facts upon 
which the expert bases his or her opinion and 
whether those facts are true. You should also 
consider the qualifications and believability of 
the expert in light of all the evidence in the case. 
*78 This instruction is essentially the same as 
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CJI 5:2: 12, now CJl2d 5.10. 
Plaintiff argues that this instruction was erro-
neous under MCR 2.5 I 6(D)(3), which provides: 
(3) Whenever the SJI committee recommends 
that no instruction be given on a particular mat-
ter, the court shall not give an instruction on the 
matter unless it specifically finds for reasons 
stated on the record that 
(a) the instruction is necessary to state the ap-
plicable law accurately, and 
(b) the matter is not adequately covered by oth-
er pertinent standard jury instructions. 
Plaintiff points out that the comments to SJI2d 
4.10 recommend that no instruction on "weighing 
expert testimony" be given. Plaintiff reasons that 
the court erred by giving this instruction regarding 
expert testimony without stating reasons on the re-
cord for this particular instruction. 
We note that CJ! 5:2:12, upon which the com-
plained-of instruction was patterned, is followed by 
commentary also recommending that no instruction 
be given regarding "weighing expert testimony." 
From this, it is evident that the committee did not 
consider CJ! 5:2:12 to be such a "weighing" in-
struction and one not to be recommended. Thus, the 
instruction given by the trial judge, which tracked 
CJI 5:2: 12, was not a disfavored weighing instruc-
tion, and the court did not need to comply with 
MCR 2.5 l 6(D)(3) in order to read it to the jury. 
[6] Plaintiff claims that the court erred in giv-
ing SJI2d 30.04, which provides: 
There are risks inherent in medical treatment 
that are not within a doctor's control. A doctor is 
not liable merely because of an adverse result. 
*79 However, a doctor is liable if the doctor is 
negligent and that negligence is a proximate 
cause of an adverse result. 
Plaintiff argues that this instruction was inap-
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propriate because plaintiff never argued that the 
mere fact of her injuries was proof of malpractice. 
In Jones v. Porretta, 428 Mich. 132, 146, 405 
N.W.2d 863 (1987), our Supreme Couit noted that 
where a plaintiff makes such an argument a similar 
instruction could be given. 
Where proofs put the significance of an adverse 
result in issue, it may be more appropriate to ex-
plain the physician's duty of care by advising the 
jury that there are inherent risks in medical treat-
ment which are beyond the physician's control. 
Despite the fact that this instruction may not 
have been entirely appropriate for this fact situ-
ation, we find that any error which resulted was 
minimal and had no effect on the verdict. At worst, 
this instruction was "nothing more than an innocu-
ous recitation of what a reasonable juror already 
understands." Jones, supra, at p. 144, 405 N.W.2d 
863. This instruction did not have any significant 
effect on the verdict. 
[7] Plaintiff also argues that the trial court im-
properly refused to give SJI2d **607 6.01, regard-
ing failure to produce evidence or a witness. SJI2d 
6.0la provides: 
The [plaintiff/defendant] in this case has not 
offered [the testimony of 
------'/ . As this evidence was 
under the control of the [plaintiff/defendant] and 
could have been produced by [him/her], and no 
reasonable excuse for the [plaintiffs/defendant's] 
failure to produce the evidence was given, you 
may infer *80 that the evidence would have been 
adverse to the [plaintiff/defendant]. 
Plaintiff argues that, because defendants had 
their expert witness, Dr. Dykman, review plaintiffs 
medical records to form an opinion regarding 
whether Dr. Lombardi breached the standard of 
care and then did not present Dykman's testimony 
regarding malpractice, plaintiff was entitled to the 
inference that his testimony would have been dam-
aging to defendants. 
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Review of the record reveals that the parties 
deposed Dr. Dykman in March of 1988 and that at 
that time he had not formed an opinion as to wheth-
er malpractice had occurred. Due to this Jack of in-
formation regarding Dykman's opinion, plaintiffs 
counsel asse11ed that he would object to the admis-
sion of testimony by Dykman regarding the breach 
of the standard of care unless he was given this in-
formation prior to trial. The day before trial, Dyk-
man testified by way of a video deposition regard-
ing Dr. Lombardi's treatment of plaintiff and 
whether it breached the standard of care. Because 
plaintiffs counsel did not have adequate time to 
conduct further discovery regarding Dykman's 
opinion as to malpractice, defense counsel offered 
Dykman's testimony only with regard to plaintiffs 
damages, and not in regard to the standard of care 
or its breach. In his cross-examination of Dykman, 
plaintiffs counsel emphasized that his testimony 
did not go to the standard of care or its breach, and 
did not question Dykman as to whether any mal-
practice occurred. 
There is no indication that defendants con-
cealed the evidence of Dykman's opinion from 
plaintiff because it was damaging to defendants. 
This case is not analogous to the situation where a 
witness is unavailable due to the actions of a pai1y. 
Plaintiff*81 had the opportunity to question Dr. 
Dykman regarding his opinion as to breaches of the 
standard of care, but chose not to do so. Plaintiff 
was not entitled to the inference that Dykman's 
testimony regarding whether malpractice occurred 
would have favored plaintiff. The trial court prop-
erly refused to give SJI2d 6.0la. 
III 
[8] Plaintiff argues that this case must be re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing because of 
newly discovered evidence which had been con-
cealed by the misconduct of defense counsel. 
Plaintiff argues that this evidence is favorable and 
that its absence entitles her to a new trial. The 
newly discovered evidence in question is the previ-
ously mentioned opinion of Dr. Dykman regarding 
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malpractice. Plaintiff argues that Dykman had con-
cluded that malpractice occurred; defendants claim 
that Dykman had concluded that no malpractice oc-
curred. The available record does not reveal the 
nature of Dykman's opinion in this matter. 
Plaintiff did not object to this alleged conceal-
ment at trial, despite the fact that plaintiffs counsel 
was evidently aware of any concealment. Nor did 
plaintiff object to this claimed concealment of evid-
ence in his motion for a new trial. Since plaintiff 
made no objection below, the issue was not ad-
dressed by the trial court and there is no record 
from which to review the issue. Thus, plaintiff has 
not properly preserved this issue for appeal. Janda 
v. Detroit, 175 Mich.App. 120, 129, 437 N.W.2d 
326 (1989). 
Additionally, we note that MCR 2.61 l(A)(l)(f) 
provides: 
A new trial may be granted to all or some of 
the *82 parties, on all or some of the issues, 
whenever their substantial rights are materially 
affected, for any of the following reasons: 
* * * * * * 
(f) Material evidence, newly discovered, which 
could not with reasonable **608 diligence have 
been discovered and produced at trial. 
The evidence in question was not newly dis-
covered. As previously noted, plaintiff could have 
questioned Dr. Dykman regarding this matter, but 
chose not to. With any degree of reasonable dili-
gence, plaintiff could have discovered this evidence 
and produced it or obtained a ruling at trial. 
IV 
Plaintiff argues that reversal is required be-
cause the trial court permitted defense counsel to 
cross-examine plaintiffs expert, Dr. Crane, regard-
ing an unrelated malpractice suit brought against 
Crane. We agree that this was erroneous, but find 
that reversal is not required. 
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We first address defendants' contention that, by 
failing to raise the issue in her motion for a new tri-
al, plaintiff did not properly preserve it for review. 
We disagree. Defendants rely on Palmiter v. Mon-
roe Co. Bd. of Road Comm'rs, 149 Mich.App. 678, 
692, n. 2, 387 N.W.2d 388 (1986), and Krzysiak v. 
Hinton, 104 Mich.App. 134, 139, 304 N.W.2d 823 
( 1981 ), for the proposition that an issue is waived 
unless raised in a motion for a new trial. 
In Krzysiak, supra, at p. 139, 304 N.W.2d 823, 
the Court stated that, where the plaintiffs chal-
lenged, for the first time on appeal, the trial court's 
refusal to give certain voir dire questions, the 
plaintiffs were obligated to raise this issue in their 
motion for a new trial in order to preserve it for ap-
peal. 
*83 Plaintiffs were obligated to raise this issue 
in their motion for new trial and failure to do so 
constitutes waiver of the question on appeal. Fail-
ure to raise the issue in the motion for new trial 
deprives us on appeal of the benefit of the trial 
court's view regarding its reason for denial. 
Our interpretation of the Krzysiak Court's lan-
guage indicates that the panel did not find the issue 
unpreserved solely due to the failure to raise it in 
the new trial motion, but because the challenging 
party did nothing below to create a record regarding 
the issue raised on appeal, either by objection or 
motion on the record. 
[9][10] Certain motions, such as challenges to 
verdicts on the ground that they are against the 
great weight of the evidence, must be raised in a 
motion for a new trial in order to preserve them for 
appeal. People v. Cage, 83 Mich.App. 534, 538, 
269 N.W.2d 213 (1978); People v. Mattison, 26 
Mich.App. 453, 459, 182 N.W.2d 604 (1970). The 
purpose behind this rule is clear: if these issues 
were not previously raised in this manner, there 
would be no record regarding them to review on ap-
peal. However, issues regarding the admission or 
exclusion of evidence are properly preserved by a 
timely objection on the record. MRE 103 provides 
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in relevant part: 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not 
be predicated upon a ruling which admits or ex-
cludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
pmty is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admit-
ting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof In case the ruling is one ex-
cluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
*84 was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shows 
the character of the evidence, the form in which it 
was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
[11] A timely objection on the record, with a 
response by opposing counsel and a ruling by the 
trial judge, should create an adequate record from 
which to review the admission or exclusion of evid-
ence. There is no additional requirement that a 
party restate his evidentiary objections anew in his 
motion for a new trial. We reject the contrary asser-
tions from Palmiter and Krzysiak. 
**609 [12] The scope of cross-examination, 
like the admission of evidence, is a matter within 
the trial court's discretion, and the court's determin-
ation should not be reversed absent an abuse of that 
discretion. Wilson v. Stilwill, 411 Mich. 587, 599, 
309 N.W.2d 898 (1981). During his cross-
examination of Dr. Crane, defense counsel ques-
tioned him regarding a medical malpractice case in 
which he had been sued. The trial court permitted 
this line of questioning over plaintiffs objection, 
ruling that it was admissible as it went to the weight 
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and credibility of Dr. Crane's testimony. 
[13][14] We find that the trial judge abused his 
discretion by permitting this line of questioning. 
Evidence of prior malfeasance by a witness is ad-
missible only under very specific circumstances 
and for very specific reasons. MRE 608(b); MRE 
404(b). Under MRE 608(b), specific instances of a 
witness' conduct may be inquired into on cross-
examination only where they are probative of truth-
fulness or *85 untruthfulness, and only to inquire 
into that witness' or another witness' truthful char-
acter. The fact that Dr. Crane was named a defend-
ant in a malpractice suit is in no way probative of 
his truthfulness. Nor was this fact probative of Dr. 
Crane's competency or knowledge. Highly compet-
ent and knowledgeable physicians have been sued 
for malpractice. Mere unproven accusations of mal-
practice stated in a complaint cannot be used as a 
basis for attacking a physician's knowledge and 
credibility. Such allegations of malpractice are ana-
logous to unproven charges of criminal activity. Ar-
rests and charges not resulting in conviction may 
not be used for impeachment. People v. Falkner, 
389 Mich. 682, 695, 209 N.W.2d 193 (1973). Sim-
ilarly, the mere fact that someone has been named 
as a defendant in a malpractice lawsuit may not be 
used to impeach his credibility as an expert witness. 
See Ecco, Ltd. v. Balimoy Mfg. Co., inc., 179 
Mich.App. 748,752,446 N.W.2d 546 (1989). 
[l 5][16] Despite this error, W(, find that re-
versal is not required. To determine whether an er-
ror is harmless, two inquiries must be made: (I) 
whether the error is so offensive to the maintenance 
of a sound judicial process that it can never be re-
garded as harmless; and (2) whether this Court can 
declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 
551, 563, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972). The admission 
of this improper impeachment question and Dr. 
Crane's answers was not so offensive to the main-
tenance of a sound judicial process that we could 
never regard it as harmless. See People v. Allen, 
429 Mich. 558, 612, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988). We 
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also conclude that, in light of the testimony presen-
ted at trial, the suppression of this question and Dr. 
Crane's answer would have had no effect on the 
jury's verdict. Any error did not prejudice plaintiffs 
case *86 and, therefore, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Affirmed. 
SULLIVAN, J ., concurred. 
GLENNS. ALLEN, Judge (concurring). 
While I concur with the majority's opm10n, 
write separately to express my disagreement with 
defendants' interpretation of Krzysiak v. Hinton, 
104 Mich.App. 134, 304 N.W.2d 823 (1981), and 
Palmiter v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Road Comm'rs, 149 
Mich.App. 678, 692, n. 2, 387 N.W.2d 388 (1986). 
l do not construe Krzysiak or Palmiter, supra, as 
authority for the proposition that the failure to raise 
in a motion for a new trial the propriety of a trial 
court's ruling on requested jury instructions or the 
admissibility of evidence in itself renders the ques-
tion unpreserved for appellate review. ln Krzysiak, 
counsel did not object on the record when the trial 
court declined to ask certain voir dire jury ques-
tions. Thus, in the absence of something in the re-
cord by way of an objection, a motion, or a sub-
sequent motion for a new trial, the issue of the pro-
priety of the court's ruling is unpreserved. 
The Palmiter panel's reliance on Krzysiak was 
made only by way of a footnote. Because the refer-
ence was fleeting and thereafter the Court discussed 
the issue on **610 its merits, I consider Palmiter 
enfeebled authority for the rule stated. 
Mich.App., 1990. 
Heshelman v. Lombardi 
183 Mich.App. 72,454 N.W.2d 603 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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William Bryan KING, M.D., Appellant, 
V. 
Priscilla BYRD, individually and as Guardian, 
Friend and Natural Parent of Kenan A. Byrd, a 
minor, Appellee. 
No. 97-1384. 
Aug. 26, 1998. 
Clarification, Certification and Stay of Mandate 
Denied Sept. 11, 1998. 
Mother whose son was brain damaged during 
birth brought medical malpractice action against 
doctor. The Circuit Court, St. Lucie County, Rupert 
Jasen Smith, Senior Judge, entered judgment on 
jury verdict for mother. Doctor appealed. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Warner, J., held that: (1) re-
cord supported trial court's finding that reason for 
seeking to exercise peremptory challenge against 
black veniremember was pretextual, and (2) de-
fense counsel opened door to attacks on his ethics 
by seeking to impeach experts with details regard-
ing cases in which he had represented them. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
(11 Jury 230 ~33(5.15) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k33 Constitution and Selection of Jury 
230k33(5) Challenges and Objections 
230k33(5. l 5) k. Peremptory Chal-
lenges. Most Cited Cases 
Record supported trial court's finding that doc-
tor's reason was pretextual for seeking to exercise 
peremptory challenge against black veniremember 
in medical malpractice action brought by mother 
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whose son was brain damaged during birth, where 
reason was that veniremember was single mother of 
two young children; counsel began explanation by 
stating that he could strike someone if he didn't like 
their haircut, which may have evinced to court a 
lack of credibility, and veniremember responded 
during questioning that she could put aside sym-
pathy. 
[2] Evidence 157 ~155(5) 
157 Evidence 
157IV Admissibility in General 
157IV(E) Competency 
157k155 Evidence Admissible by Reason 
of Admission of Similar Evidence of Adverse Party 
157kl55(5) k. Admission of Similar 
Evidence When First Evidence Was Inadmissible. 
Most Cited Cases 
Defense counsel opened door to attacks on his 
ethics by expert witness in medical malpractice ac-
tion when defense counsel sought to impeach 
plaintiffs experts with details regarding cases in 
which he had represented them, including grievance 
filed against one expert alleging that he had com-
mitted act constituting sexual battery on a patient. 
[3J Evidence 157 ~558(4) 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157Xll(D) Examination of Experts 
157k558 Cross-Examination 
157k558(4) k. Irrelevant, Collateral, or 
Immaterial Matters. Most Cited Cases 
Defense counsel's cross-examination of 
plaintiffs expert in medical malpractice case, about 
matters in which counsel had represented expert in 
unrelated procedure, was irrelevant and should not 
have been allowed, as it was not a proper attack on 
expert's credibility. West's F.S.A. §§ 90.608-90.610. 
(41 Appeal and Error 30 C;;:)207 
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30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings 
Thereon 
30k207 k. Arguments and Conduct of 
Counsel. Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €;;;;)121(4) 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 13 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
388kl21 Comments on Evidence or Wit-
nesses 
388kl21(4) k. Remarks Reflecting on 
Credibility of Witnesses. Most Cited Cases 
Plaintiff's counsel's use of the term "hired gun" 
to refer to defense expert during closing argument 
was improper but did not rise to level of funda-
mental error. 
*832 Mark Hicks and David J. Maher of Hicks & 
Anderson, P.A., Miami and David Spicer of Bobo 
Spicer Ciotoli Fulford, West Palm Beach, for appel-
lant. 
Edna L. Caruso of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & 
Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach and Willie E. 
Gary and Paul Mark Lucas of Gary, Williams, Par-
enti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sper-
ando, Ft. Pierce, for appellee. 
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING 
WARNER, Judge. 
We deny the appellant's motion for rehearing, 
grant appellee's motion, grant the motion for clari-
fication and withdraw our previously issued opin-
ion and substitute the following in its place. 
After a heated trial in this medical malpractice 
case, the jury awarded appellee/Priscilla Byrd 
$7,633,000 as compensation for brain damage to 
her son which occurred during his birth. Appellant, 
Dr. William King, contends that the trial was 
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flawed because the trial court: (I) refused to permit 
the exercise of a peremptory challenge as to one 
juror, (2) permitted counsel to attack defense coun-
sel's ethics during the examination of two wit-
nesses, (3) permitted improper closing argument, 
and (4) erred in the application of its ruling on the 
statute of limitations. We affirm on all issues. 
[l] In voir dire, the defense sought to exercise 
a peremptory challenge on the first juror, Tisha 
Williams. Upon initial questioning, Ms. Byrd's at-
torney asked for Ms. Williams's background, and 
she revealed that she worked for the sheriff's de-
paitment, had twin five-year-old girls, and was 
single. Defense counsel's voir dire was very short. 
In fact, he individually questioned only Ms. Willi-
ams and one other juror. He prefaced *833 his 
questioning with a statement to the jury regarding 
the case and specifically questioned whether the 
jurors could lay aside sympathy for Ms. Byrd's six-
year-old brain damaged son. As to Ms. Williams, 
he asked her whether, after having seen Ms. Byrd's 
little son, she could determine that Ms. Byrd was 
not entitled to any money if the evidence showed 
that the doctor didn't do anything wrong. Ms. Willi-
ams responded that she could do that. He asked her 
how she generally felt about medical malpractice, 
to which she replied that she had never dealt with 
anything like it. Finally, he asked her whether she 
could listen to complicated medical testimony in a 
week and one-half long case and render a verdict. 
Ms. Williams stated that she could. 
During the jury selection process, defense 
counsel exercised a peremptory challenge as to Ms. 
Williams. Plaintiff's counsel objected, stating that 
Ms. Williams was a black woman who had said she 
could be fair. In response, defense counsel stated 
that: 
I'm entitled to strike anybody, if I don't like the 
way they cut their hair. But this is a single moth-
er, virtually the same age, with two young chil-
dren. She's going to identify, whether she's black, 
white or anything else. She's a single mother with 
young children, that's the last person I would 
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want on the jury, regardless of their color. 
The court responded that: 
Well, the computer picks these jurors and 
you've got to give me a better reason to excuse 
her than she's a single mother with two children. 
MR. GARY (plaintiffs counsel): If I may, your 
Honor, she's the one that said, when he asked her, 
gave her the microphone, she was one of the few, 
could you walk out of here and find for the de-
fendant against this lady. She said, yes, I could 
do it. 
MR. SPICER (defense counsel): I don't believe 
it, Your Honor. And I've given you my reasons. 
If you took twenty lawyers and you didn't say 
what color she was, they would tell you they 
don't want a single mother with two young chil-
dren on this jury. There would not be a defense 
attorney that would want this juror on their trial. 
Defense counsel renewed his request to exer-
cise a peremptory strike as to Ms. Williams at the 
end of jury selection, but the court again denied the 
motion. 
Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764 
(Fla.1996), clarified the process for challenging 
peremptory strikes of jurors on the grounds of ra-
cial bias: 
A party objecting to the other side's use of a 
peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) 
make a timely objection on that basis, b) show 
that the venireperson is a member of a distinct ra-
cial group, and c) request that the court ask the 
striking party its reason for the strike. If these ini-
tial requirements are met (step I), the court must 
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the 
reason for the strike. 
At this point, the burden of production shifts to 
the proponent of the strike to come forward with 
a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If the explan-
ation is facially race-neutral and the court be-
lieves that, given all the circumstances surround-
Page 4 of 7 
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ing the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the 
strike will be sustained (step 3). The court's focus 
in step 3 is not on the reasonableness of the ex-
planation but rather its genuineness. 
(footnotes omitted). The supreme court poin-
tedly limited the review of appellate courts in such 
determinations on challenges to peremptory strikes: 
Accordingly, reviewing courts should keep in 
mind two principles when enforcing the above 
guidelines. First, peremptories are presumed to 
be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
Second, the trial court's decision turns primarily 
on an assessment of credibility and will be af-
firmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. The 
right to an impartial jury guaranteed by article I, 
section 16, is best safeguarded not by an arcane 
maze of reversible error traps, but by reason and 
common sense. 
Id at 764-65 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis ad-
ded). Applying the principles of Melbourne to this 
case, we find that plaintiffs attorney adequately 
complied with step one *834 by objecting that Ms. 
Williams was an African-American woman. 
Without really waiting for the court to request an 
explanation, in accordance with step two, the de-
fense offered that its reason for striking Ms. Willi-
ams was because she was a single mother with two 
small children who might identify with the plaintiff. 
That is a race-neutral reason for the challenge (even 
though it is not gender-neutral). See Smith v. State, 
662 So.2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The 
court responded by stating that the reason was in-
sufficient to justify excusing her. We interpret this 
as a determination that the reason was not genuine 
and was a pretext, thereby fulfilling step tlu·ee of 
the analysis. 
Having reviewed the record, we cannot con-
clude that the decision was clearly erroneous. De-
fense counsel began his explanation of the reason 
for striking by stating that he could strike anyone 
even if he didn't like the cut of their hair. This may 
have evinced to the court a lack of credibility of 
any of the following explanations. In addition, the 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt= Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=55C6... 10/21/2013 
000764
716 So.2d 831, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D 1980 
(Cite as: 716 So.2d 831) 
defense questioned Ms. Williams regarding her 
ability to put aside sympathy, to which she respon-
ded that she could. In questioning, the defense 
seemed more interested in Ms. Williams's ability to 
understand the trial proceedings than her sympathy 
for Ms. Byrd. 
As appellate judges, we were not at the trial. 
We did not see the expressions, hear the tones of 
voices, or observe the general dynamics of the 
courtroom. That is why Melbourne left decisions 
with respect to peremptory challenges to the trial 
court. Because those decisions tum on credibility 
determinations which encompass the assessment of 
all the circumstances and dynamics of the trial set-
ting, appellate review is very narrow indeed. We 
must respect that discretion. Since we cannot find 
that the decision is clearly erroneous, we affirm. 
[2] The next point raised is more troubling to 
us from the standpoint of attorney conduct. Appel-
lant complains of attacks on defense counsel's eth-
ics during the trial. Defense counsel opened the 
door to such attacks because of what we perceive to 
be highly questionable conduct at trial. Two of 
plaintiffs experts were former clients of defense 
counsel and he sought to impeach these expe1ts 
with details regarding the cases in which he had 
represented them. When plaintiffs counsel objec-
ted, particularly with respect to the ethics of such 
an attack, defense counsel informed the court that 
he had been in contact with the Florida Bar and had 
received an opinion over the phone that this type of 
questioning was not unethical as long as privileged 
information was not brought up.FNI The court al-
lowed general questions as to the first doctor. 
FNl. We are unaware of any rule that al-
lows admissibility of evidence to be de-
termined by a telephone call to the Florida 
Bar. 
Later, another medical expert for the plaintiff, a 
neuropsychologist, testified to the injuries sustained 
by Ms. Byrd's son. During cross-examination, de-
fense counsel went into questions about his back-
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ground, ability and competence: 
Q. Doctor, is there anything about your back-
ground that Mr. Lucas did not talk about that re-
flects upon your credibility and your ability? 
A. Maybe you need to refresh my memory. 
Q. I'll be glad to do so if you can't think of any-
thing. 
Plaintiffs counsel objected, and during a bench 
conference, it became known that defense counsel 
had represented this doctor in a grievance proceed-
ing filed by a patient. The doctor had been put on 
probation, was not allowed to see female patients 
without supervision, and was charged with incom-
petence. He was on probation at the time of the ex-
amination conducted on Ms. Byrd's son. At the 
bench conference, plaintiffs counsel objected to 
this line of questioning and maintained that it was 
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Defense counsel 
replied that the grievance was "public record," and 
that any lawyer in the state could use any public re-
cord. Plaintiffs counsel objected that the grievance 
was irrelevant and immaterial. Nevertheless, the 
court decided to let it in. 
*835 Defense counsel then questioned the doc-
tor extensively about the charges filed by the State 
Board of Psychological Examiners, alleging that he 
was incompetent and had committed an act consti-
tuting sexual battery on a patient. The doctor admit-
ted that he was charged but stated that he was ac-
quitted or put on probation. When pressed, he said 
"I was put on probation. They didn't find me guilty. 
There's no proof of it. Your firm represented me, 
you should know. " Defense counsel persisted in go-
ing through the entire grievance, including the fact 
that, as part of his probation, the doctor had to put 
letters in female patients' files regarding the 
charges. The doctor protested that what was done 
was pursuant to defense counsel's firm's advice. 
The doctor questioned what this had to do with the 
diagnosis he offered in connection with this case, 
which is a question we also ask. 
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On redirect, plaintiffs counsel asked the doctor 
for the name of the law firm which had represented 
him in the grievance proceeding, to which the doc-
tor replied, "I will be in contact with them today; 
Bobo Spicer." At that point, defense counsel objec-
ted and maintained that the doctor had no right to 
accuse him of anything since the Bar had said that 
the questioning was permissible. The court allowed 
plaintiffs counsel to ask a few additional questions 
to clarify that the doctor acted on the advice of his 
lawyers in the grievance proceeding. On recross, 
defense counsel showed the doctor a copy of the 
State of Florida file on his license and asked wheth-
er anything he questioned him on was not contained 
in this public document. To that, the doctor replied, 
"I don't know. I would have to sit here for an hour 
and read this public record. I think it's highly uneth-
ical you bring these things up to harm a child and 
discredit me." After a few more questions and sim-
ilar answers, the questioning concluded. Despite 
this highly extraordinary cross-examination with 
matters involving the doctor's handling of female 
patients, the defense never put on any evidence of 
its own to impeach his opinions with respect to the 
condition of Ms. Byrd's son. That testimony went 
unchallenged. 
[3] We agree with the appellee that the court 
should never have allowed such cross-examination 
in the first place. It was entirely irrelevant as it was 
not a proper attack on the witness's credibility. See 
§§ 90.608 - .610, Fla. Stat. (1997); Farinas v. State, 
569 So.2d 425, 429 (Fla.1990); Miles v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 564 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 
But having let it in, defense counsel's cross-
examination of the doctor on the incident opened 
the door to the doctor's claims of unethical conduct. 
FN2 We ourselves have substantial concerns as to 
the ethics of defense counsel's attacks on his former 
client. See R.Regulating Fla.Bar 4-1.6, 4-1.9. While 
defense counsel claimed that anything in a public 
document can be revealed, even against a former 
client, the rule states that an attorney may not use 
information relating to the representation of a 
former client to the disadvantage of that client ex-
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cept as rule 4-1.6 would perm it with respect to a 
client or "when the infonnation has become gener-
ally known." R.Regulating Fla.Bar 4-1.9(b). We are 
not prepared to state that all information contained 
in any public document is "generally known" with-
in the meaning of the rule. It seems to us highly 
questionable that an attorney could attack, embar-
rass, and malign a former client with matters on 
which he represented and counseled that client, 
where such matters have no relevance to the pro-
ceeding in which the client is a witness and are not 
proper impeachment. We are aware that on the 
criminal side of the bench, public defenders fre-
quently withdraw from representation of a current 
client when a former client may be required to be 
impeached on matters involving the public defend-
er's representation of that client. We do not think 
the standards of ethics on the civil side should be 
any less. However, it is not our responsibility to in-
terpret the rule of professional conduct in this case. 
Suffice it to say that, given this extraordinary and 
uncalled for attack on a former client, defense 
counsel opened the door about as wide as he could 
to *836 the counter charge of ethical violations. We 
find no error. 
FN2. The charges of unethical behavior 
made in front of the jury were made by the 
doctor-witness, not the lawyers for the 
plaintiff. 
[4] Appellant also· challenges comments by the 
plaintiffs attorney in closing argument. Since de-
fense counsel made no objections, the issue is not 
preserved. See Murphy v. International Robotics 
Sys., Inc., 710 So.2d 587, 587-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1998). Although some of counsel's remarks in clos-
ing argument were improper/N3 we do not deem 
the unobjected comments to rise to the level of fun-
damental error. Id. 
FN3. We specifically condemn counsel's 
use of the term "hired gun" to refer to a de-
fense expert. See Budget Rent A Car v. 
Jana, 600 So.2d 466, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1992). 
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Finally, we find no error in the trial court's or-
der detennining the date when Ms. Byrd became 
aware of the possibility of medical negligence. 
Based on Dr. King's own argument at the summary 
judgment hearing, the comt determined that she did 
not have knowledge of any actual medical malprac-
tice prior to 1992. While the appellant argues on 
appeal that the comt erred because there was evid-
ence that she could have discovered it at an earlier 
time, this was not the argument presented to the tri-
al court and appears to us to be made for the first 
time on appeal. 
For these reasons, we affirm the final judgment 
of the trial court. 
GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. 
Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1998. 
King v. Byrd 
716 So.2d 831, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D 1980 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District. 
Erin MANHARDT, as next friend and parent of 
Christopher Manhardt, a minor, and Erin Manhardt, 
individually, Appellant, 
V. 
Shameem TAMTON, M.D., Susan W. Short Pediat-
rics, P.A., Naples Community Hospital, Inc., and 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 
Collier County Public Health Unit, Appellees. 
No. 2D00-2044. 
Sept. 4, 2002. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 2002. 
Mother brought medical malpractice action for 
injuries caused when her newborn son contracted 
meningitis at birth. After a verdict was entered for 
defendants in the Circuit Court, Collier County, 
Jack R. Schoonover, J., mother appealed. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Covington, J., held that trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to grant mother 
new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
11) Evidence 157 €=>560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
l 57XII(D) Examination of Experts 
l 57k560 k. Contradiction and impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Whether medical expert had ever been sued 
was irrelevant in medical malpractice case, and 
questioning him on cross-examination about prior 
malpractice suits against him was improper attack 
on expert's credibility. 
[21 Trial 388 €=;)124 
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388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 13 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
388kl24 k. Comments on character or 
conduct of party. Most Cited Cases 
Closing argument of pediatrician's attorney in 
which he gratuitously announced that this was pedi-
atrician's first lawsuit was improper in medical mal-
practice case, given court's instruction prohibiting 
mention of prior lawsuits. 
13] Trial 388 €=>114 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 13 Statements as to Facts, Comments, 
and Arguments 
388kl 14 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
During trial, prejudicial information can be 
conveyed by comment from trial counsel pur-
portedly made in jest. 
[41 Trial 388 €=>106 
388 Trial 
388V Arguments and Conduct of Counsel 
388kl 06 k. Control by court in general. Most 
Cited Cases 
Counsel's trial conduct must always be so 
guarded that it will not impair or thwart orderly 
processes of fair consideration and determination of 
cause by jury. 
[5] New Trial 275 €=>29 
275 New Trial 
275II Grounds 
275II(B) Misconduct of Parties, Counsel, or 
Witnesses 
275k29 k. Conduct of counsel. Most Cited 
Cases 
New Trial 275 €=>32 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrearn.aspx?mt= Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=E4 7F ... 10/21/2013 
000769
832 So.2d 129, 27 Fla. L. Weekly 02006 
(Cite as: 832 So.2d 129) 
275 New Trial 
27511 Grounds 
27511(8) Misconduct of Pa1ties, Counsel, or 
Witnesses 
275k32 k. Harmless error. Most Cited 
New trial was required in medical malpractice 
action where totality of all errors and inproprieties, 
which included improper attack on credibility of 
plaintiffs expert witness and gratuitous comment in 
closing argument by pediatrician's counsel that this 
was pediatrician's first law suit, was pervasive 
enough to raise doubts as to overall fairness of trial 
court proceedings and errors were pervasive enough 
to prejudice plaintiffs case as to all defendants. 
*129 Scott Trell of Law Offices of Scott Trell, 
Miami, and Marvin Weinstein of Grover, *130 
Weinstein & Trop, P.A., Miami, for Appellant. 
Esther E. Galicia of George, Hartz, Lundeen, 
Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens, Fort Lauder-
dale, for Appellees Shameem Tamton, M.D., and 
Susan W. Short Pediatrics, P.A. 
Tricia B. Valles, Ronald J. Lamb, and William E. 
Hahn of Hahn, Morgan & Lamb, P.A., Tampa, for 
Appellee Naples Community Hospital, Inc. 
Jeffrey D. Kortkamp of Henderson, Franklin, Star-
nes & Holt, Fort Myers, for Appellee Department 
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Collier 
County Public Health Unit. 
COVINGTON, Judge. 
The appellant, Erin Manhardt, individually and 
as next friend and parent of Christopher Manhardt, 
a minor, brought this medical malpractice action 
against the appellees, Shameem Tamton, M.D., 
Christopher's pediatrician; Susan W. Short Pediat-
rics, P.A., Dr. Tamton's employer; Naples Com-
munity Hospital, Inc., the employer of the nurses 
who cared for Christopher immediately following 
his birth; and Florida Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services and the Collier County Public 
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Health Unit, the employers of Dr. Auditori, the ob-
stetrician who delivered Christopher. The lawsuit 
initially arose from physical injuries Christopher 
suffered upon contracting meningitis at birth. The 
suit continued, however, subsequent to Christoph-
er's death. After a ju1y trial, a verdict was rendered 
in favor of the appellees. Ms. Manhardt now con-
tends that numerous errors vitiated the fairness of 
the proceedings in the trial comt. We agree and re-
verse. 
At 4:30 a.m. on September 15, 1991, Ms. Man-
hardt presented at Naples Community Hospital for 
labor and delivery. At that time, she had a history 
of vaginal Group B strep infection. The infection, 
however, caused no overt disease in Ms. Manhardt. 
Ms. Manhardt's son, Christopher, was born at 
11: 19 a.m. on the aforementioned date. Ac,cording 
to hospital records, Christopher's initial newborn 
assessment revealed that, for all intents and pur-
poses, he was a normal, healthy, full-term baby. At 
3:45 a.m. on September 16, 1991, however, a nurse 
reported that Christopher was having trouble 
breathing and that he was beginning to run a fever. 
The results of a blood culture revealed that Chris-
topher had contracted meningitis caused by Group 
B streptococci. Antibiotics were thereafter admin-
istered to the infant. At 12:50 p.m., he was trans-
ferred to another hospital for treatment. 
For a time, Christopher survived the meningitis 
, but he was rendered severely handicapped as a 
result. Thus, in December 1993, the instant lawsuit 
was filed for compensatory damages. The com-
plaint alleged that the appellees were negligent in 
failing to render proper medical care and treatment 
to Ms. Manhardt and Christopher at the time of 
Christopher's birth. It was averred that, but for the 
appellees' negligent care and treatment, Christoph-
er's meningitis and resulting injuries could have 
been prevented. 
Christopher died on November 5, 1996, at age 
five. In September 1997, Ms. Manhardt filed a 
third-amended complaint. It essentially alleged, 
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among other things, that but for the negligence of 
the appellees, Christopher would not have suffered 
the severe and permanent injuries that culminated 
in his death. 
In November 1999, a ten-day jury trial pro-
ceeded on Ms. Manhardt's third-amended com-
plaint. After the ju1y rendered its verdict for the ap-
pellees, Ms. Manhardt filed a motion for new trial. 
She claimed that various trial errors prejudiced 
*131 the jury and that the verdict was otherwise 
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In 
December 1999, the trial court entered a final judg-
ment upon the jury's defense verdict. In March 
2000, a hearing was held on Ms. Manhardt's new 
trial motion. In April 2000, the trial court denied 
the motion for new trial, and this timely appeal en-
sued. 
On appeal, Ms. Manhardt contends she is en-
titled to a new trial on the basis of myriad trial er-
rors. We address two of Ms. Manhardt's claims, in 
particular. It is our conclusion, however, that a 
combination of errors and improprieties casts doubt 
on the integrity of the proceedings in the trial court. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial 
should not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing 
of an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Estate of 
Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490, 495-96 (Fla.1999); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 707 So.2d 1110, 1111 
(Fla.1998); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669, 672-73 
(Fla.1959). The showing necessary to overturn the 
denial of a motion for new trial is not as great as 
that necessary to overturn an order granting such a 
motion. Castlewood Int'! Corp. v. LaF/eur, 322 
So.2d 520, 522 (Fla.1975) (citing Cloud, 110 So.2d 
at 673). " '[D]iscretion is abused only where no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court.' " Manasse, 707 So.2d at 1111 
(quoting Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 
(Fla.1990)); see also Ramey v. Winn Dixie Mont-
gome,y, Inc., 710 So.2d 191, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1998) (quoting Delong v. Wickes Co., 545 So.2d 
362, 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). Nonetheless, a "trial 
judge should always grant a motion for a new trial 
Page 4 of 6 
Page 3 
when 'the jwy has been deceived as to the force 
and credibility of the evidence or has been influ-
enced by considerations outside the record.' " 
Brown, 749 So.2d at 497 (quoting Cloud, 110 So.2d 
at 673); see also McCloud v. Sherman Mobile Con-
crete Co., 579 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991 ); 
Surety Mortgage Inc. v. Equitable Mortgage Res., 
Inc., 534 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Un-
der those circumstances, "[t]he trial judge's discre-
tion permits the grant of a new trial although it is 
not clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury 
was wrong." Brown, 749 So.2d at 497. 
In this case, counsel for Dr. Tamton asked one 
of Ms. Manhardt's experts, Dr. Noel, if he had ever 
been sued. Dr. Noel gave an inaudible response, 
and counsel for Ms. Manhardt objected. The trial 
court overruled the objection, and the following ex-
change ensued: 
[Dr. Tamton's Counsel]: Did you think you did 
anything wrong when you were sued? 
[Dr. Noel]: I didn't. 
[Dr. Tamton's Counsel]: Did you defend your- self? 
[Dr. Noel]: Yes. 
At that point, Ms. Manhardt's counsel unsuc-
cessfully moved for a mistrial. Counsel argued that 
the foregoing line of questioning was irrelevant and 
prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion. 
Sometime later, however, the issue was revisited. 
The trial court then instructed counsel for both 
parties to refrain from asking any party or expert 
about prior lawsuits. 
[l] The questions propounded to Dr. Noel were 
irrelevant to Dr. Noel's expertise and otherwise 
constituted an improper attack on his credibility. 
See Tormey v. Trout, 748 So.2d 303, 306 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1999) (citing Farinas v. State, 569 So.2d 425, 
429 (Fla.1990), and holding that, in a personal in-
jury case, cross-examination of medical expert 
about prior administrative discipline was improper 
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credibility attack); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Wolfson, 773 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2000) (stating that credibility of medical expert 
*132 was improperly attacked when she was asked 
about peer review that caused suspension of her 
surgery privileges at certain hospitals). The impro-
priety was exacerbated by the fact that Dr. Noel, of 
all the medical experts who testified, was the only 
witness whom the trial court allowed to be ques-
tioned about prior lawsuits. We therefore conclude 
the jury was likely deceived as to the force and 
credibility of the medical evidence in this cause and 
that such deception likely prejudiced Ms. Man-
hardt's case. 
[2] This comt also concludes that the prejudice 
arising from the improper credibility attack on Dr. 
Noel was compounded by inappropriate comment-
ary from Dr. Tamton's counsel during closing argu-
ment. At that time, counsel gratuitously announced 
and otherwise emphasized that this was Dr. 
Tamton's first lawsuit. Defense commentary of that 
nature is usually intended to prejudice a plaintiffs 
case in the eyes of the jury. See Ridarsick v. 
Amirkanian, 147 So.2d 580, 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1962) (involving counsel's misconduct in re-
peatedly offering evidence that the trial comt had 
already excluded). That is especially true here, giv-
en the trial court's instruction prohibiting the men-
tion of prior lawsuits. Untoward practices of the 
kind at issue can be very effective in medical mal-
practice cases, which always involve "a battle of 
expert witnesses." Cenatus v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., 
Inc., 689 So.2d 302, 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) 
(citing Lake v. Clark, 533 So.2d 797, 799 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1988)). 
We take this opportunity to note further con-
cern regarding a comment from Dr. Tamton's coun-
sel as to the "Miami Beach" accent of one of Ms. 
Manhardt's attorneys. At one point during trial, Ms. 
Manhardt's counsel, Mr. Weinstein, attempted to 
impeach Dr. Tamton based on various aspects of 
her pretrial deposition. In doing so, Mr. Weinstein 
had some difficulty communicating with Dr. 
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Tamton, who is from India. Because of that diffi-
culty, Mr. Weinstein repeated many of his ques-
tions. Thereafter, Dr. Tamton's counsel, Mr. 
Stevens, began his examination of Dr. Tamton by 
stating, "Dr. Tamton, I promise you three things: I 
won't repeat myself, I won't use your deposition, 
and I won't speak with an accent from Miami Beach 
.... " Mr. Weinstein immediately objected. He ar-
gued, among other things, that the remark consti-
tuted an improper reference to his religion. Mr. 
Stevens insisted that he did not intend to cast reli-
gious aspersions but only made the comment in jest. 
[3][4] In Ridarsick, the Third District observed 
that "a question asked during a trial may convey 
prejudicial information even though the answer is 
excluded." 147 So.2d at 580 (citing Blanton v. But-
ler, 81 So.2d 745 (Fla.1955)). We note that, during 
a trial, prejudicial information can likewise be con-
veyed by a comment from trial counsel purportedly 
made in jest. We thus remind counsel, as we have 
reminded others in the past, that trial conduct " 
'must always be so guarded that it will not impair 
or thwart the orderly processes of a fair considera-
tion and determination of the cause by the jury.' " 
Murphy v. Murphy, 622 So.2d 99, 102 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1993) (quoting Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. 
Strickland, 88 So.2d 519, 523 (Fla.1956)); see also 
Anderson v. Watson, 559 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1990). 
[5] Therefore, based on the foregoing, we con-
clude the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant Ms. Manhardt a new trial. The totality of 
all errors and improprieties, including those not dis-
cussed herein, was pervasive enough to raise doubts 
as to the overall fairness of the trial court proceed-
ings. Collectively, the errors here were also pervas-
ive enough to prejudice Ms. Manhardt's case *133 
as to all of the appellees. See Mitchell v. Bonnell, 
770 So.2d 1292, 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); see also 
Klose v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Ft. Lauder-
dale, Inc., 673 So.2d 81, 83 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1996). 
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Accordingly, this cause is reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. Points on appeal not other-
wise discussed are either without merit or are moot 
because of our holding. See, e.g., Murphy, 622 
So.2d at 100. 
Reversed and remanded. 
BLUE, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., concur. 
Fla.App. 2 Dist.,2002. 
Manhardt v. Tamton 
832 So.2d 129, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2006 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 
Len W. MORROW, D.M.D., and Daniel and Mor-
row, P.S.C., Appellants, 
V. 
Robert R. STIVERS, Appellee. 
No. 90-CA-997-MR. 
Jan. 24, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied April 10, 1992. 
Discretionary Review Denied By Supreme Court 
Oct. 14, 1992. 
Physician appealed from judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court, Fayette County, George E. Barker, J., 
entered on verdict in medical malpractice action. 
The Court of Appeals, Dyche, J., held that: (I) de-
positions of patient's experts who were not called to 
testify and whose depositions came into possession 
of defendant physician through inadvertence were 
properly excluded; (2) fact that one expert's license 
had been suspended for five years because he had 
passed hepatitis to patients was a collateral matter 
which could not be the subject of cross-ex-




[l] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=>203 
307 A Pretrial Procedure 
307 All Depositions and Discovery 
307 Ail(C) Discovery Depositions 
307 Ail{C)5 Use and Effect 
307Ak201 Use 
307 Ak203 k. Parties entitled to use 
and availability of deponent. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court properly excluded deposition of ex-
pert who was not called at trial by patient and 
whose deposition came into possession of physi-
cian's counsel through inadvertence, in the absence 
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of showing of exceptional circumstances. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 26.02(4)(b). 
(21 Witnesses 410 ~267 
410 Witnesses 
41 OIII Examination 
41 OIII(B) Cross-Examination 
41 Ok267 k. Control and discretion of 
court. Most Cited Cases 
Scope and duration of cross-examination rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial couit in both 
civil and criminal cases. 
[31 Trial 388 €=>186 
388 Trial 
388Vll Instructions to Jury 
388VII(A) Province of Court and Jury in 
General 
388k 186 k. Comments by judge on evid-
ence in general. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's admonition to jury to disregard 
any reference to physician's report which had been 
ruled inadmissible did not impermissibly detract 
from properly admitted opinion of another physi-
cian who had reached the same conclusion. 
14[ Witnesses 410 ~270(1) 
410 Witnesses 
41 OIII Examination 
4 lOIII(B) Cross-Examination 
41 Ok270 Cross-Examination as to Irrelev-
ant, Collateral, or Immaterial Matters 
41 Ok270(1) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Witness cannot be cross-examined on collateral 
matter which is irrelevant to the issues at hand. 
(51 Evidence 157 €=>558(7) 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XIl(D) Examination of Experts 
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I 57k558 Cross-Examination 
I 57k558(7) k. Discrediting witness or 
disparaging testimony in general. Most Cited Cases 
Fact that physician testifying as expert had his 
license suspended for five years because he had 
passed hepatitis to several patients was collateral to 
his knowledge or ability to testify as to causation 
and he thus could not be cross-examined about it. 
[61 Pretrial Procedure 307A ~204 
307 A Pretrial Procedure 
307 All Depositions and Discovery 
307 All(C) Discovery Depositions 
307 All(C)5 Use and Effect 
307Ak201 Use 
307Ak204 k. Purpose. Most Cited 
Cases 
Trial court properly precluded introduction of 
discovery deposition prior to playing of video taped 
evidentiary deposition from the same witness where 
the discovery deposition was offered to show in-
consistencies and could have been read during the 
video taping of deposition, at which point the op-
posing party would have had the opportunity to re-
habilitate the witness. 
[7] Evidence 157 €=)555.4(3) 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157Xll(D) Examination of Experts 
157k555 Basis of Opinion 
157k555.4 Sources of Data 
157k555.4(3) k. Hearsay or evid-
ence otherwise incompetent. Most Cited Cases 
Once its application is justified, rule providing 
that statement made to an expert is not inadmissible 
hearsay if it is the kind of information that the ex-
pert customarily relies upon in the practice of his 
profession is broad enough to encompass state-
ments made to psychologists. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
803(4), 28 U.S.C.A. 
[8] Trial 388 €;;;;>62(2) 
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388 Trial 
3 881V Reception of Evidence 
3881V(B) Order of Proof, Rebuttal, and Re-
opening Case 
388k62 Evidence in Rebuttal 
388k62(2) k. Scope of evidence in re-
buttal. Most Cited Cases 
Expert testimony that patient did not suffer a 
stroke during surgery was appropriate rebuttal testi-
mony, in medical malpractice action, to respond to 
defense testimony suggesting that patient suffered 
stroke during surgery when his blood pressure 
dropped too low, insofar as the new element of 
causation, low blood pressure, was not, and could 
not have been, addressed on direct. 
[9J Appeal and Error 30 ~302(6) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(D) Motions for New Trial 
30k302 Sufficiency and Scope of State-
ment of Grounds 
30k302(6) k. Sufficiency of evidence 
and amount ofrecovery. Most Cited Cases 
Where motion for new trial alleged excessive-
ness only as to the awards for future medical ex-
penses and lost earning capacity, reviewing court 
could not consider the amount awarded for current 
medical expenses and physical pain and suffering. 
[101 Damages 115 ~127.3 
115 Damages 
I 15VII Amount Awarded 
l 15VII(A) In General 
115k127.3 k. Excessive damages in gen-
eral. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly l 15k128) 
Under the "first blush rule," damages award is 
excessive if the mind is immediately shocked and 
surprised at the great disproportion of the size of 
the verdict in relation to the amount authorized by 
the evidence, such that it must have been the result 
of passion and prejudice. 
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1111 Health 198H ~832 
1981-1 Health 
1981-IV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk828 Damages 
198Hk832 k. Amount. Most Cited 
(Formerly 299k 18.110 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Evidence of patient's present and future medic-
al expenses due to injury, decrease in his ability to 
earn money in the future in the amount of $97,000, 
and difficulty in performing his present occupation, 
supported jury award of $20,000 for future medical 
expenses and $57,000 for lost earning expenses. 
*425 Leslie Rosenbaum, Rosenbaum & Rosen-
baum, P.S.C., Lexington, for appellants. 
William J. Gallion, Barbara Ann Kriz, Gallion, 
Baker & Bray, P.S.C., Lexington, for appellee. 
Before DYCHE, HA YES and STUMBO, JJ. 
DYCHE, Judge. 
In this malpractice case, the appellant, Dr. Len 
W. Morrow, an oral surgeon, appeals a judgment of 
the Fayette Circuit Court in which a patient was 
awarded damages for Dr. Morrow's misdiagnosis 
and negligent treatment of facial pain. 
The appellee, Robert R. Stivers, is fifty-eight 
and has worked for Lexington Building Supply for 
the last twenty-six years. Stivers developed a severe 
pain in the left facial area on or about April 10, 
1983. Stivers was examined by Dr. Richard F. 
Hench, who had treated him for high blood pressure 
and seen him for regular checkups. Dr. Hench per-
formed tests on Stivers and diagnosed his condition 
as "atypical facial pain" for which he prescribed 
medication. 
In June of 1983, Stivers continued to suffer 
pain and was examined by Dr. Minyard, a dentist. 
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Dr. Minyard recommended that Stivers be seen by 
the appellant, Dr. Len W. Morrow, and his paitner, 
Dr. Daniel. 
*426 Dr. Morrow examined Stivers and dia-
gnosed the pain as " trigeminal neuralgia " and re-
commended the removal of his infra-orbital nerve. 
On August 18, 1983, Dr. Morrow performed a peri-
pheral neurectomy on Stivers, removing the nerve. 
The peripheral neurectomy was done through 
the tissue on the left gum inside of Stivers's mouth. 
The infra-orbital nerve exits an opening or foramen 
in the bone on the left cheek just below the left eye. 
Dr. Morrow exposed the nerve and cut it. He then 
put alcohol into the opening to destroy the remain-
ing nerve. During the operation, Stivers's left eye 
became dilated and upon awakening from anes-
thesia, he suffered from diplopia or double vision. 
On August 16, 1984, Stivers brought an action 
against Dr. Morrow and his practice group, Daniel 
and Morrow, P.S.C. Stivers alleged that Dr. Mor-
row was negligent in the diagnosis and treatment of 
his facial condition, resulting in painful and per-
manent injuries. Stivers also alleged that he was not 
informed by Dr. Morrow of the risks of the infra-
orbital neurectomy and alcohol application and thus 
he did not give his informed consent. 
Stivers's theory was that the alcohol admin-
istered by Dr. Morrow leaked back into the orbit of 
the eye, damaging nerves which control eye and pu-
pil movement. Further, Stivers alleged that he 
suffered from atypical facial pain, for which a peri-
pheral neurectomy is not a proper treatment. Dr. 
Morrow denied that the alcohol was responsible for 
this damage and maintained that diplopia and the 
other symptoms were due to a stroke suffered by 
Stivers during the operation. 
At the conclusion of a trial held from March 
19, 1990, to March 27, 1990, the jury found for 
Stivers in the total amount of $187,227.00. 
The disputed issues on appeal largely revolve 
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around the trial court's rulings involving the ad-
missibility of ce11ain evidence. 
While taking the deposition of Dr. Dennis 
Sprague, a psychologist who testified at trial for 
Stivers, Dr. Morrow's counsel came into possession 
of a report from a neurologist, Dr. David B. Clark, 
a report by Dr. C. Lee, a radiologist, and a magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) scan. 
Dr. Clark's report, dated March 5, 1986, was is-
sued pursuant to an examination of Stivers, at his 
request. Based on that examination, Dr. Clark ques-
tioned whether the diplopia and the temporary dila-
tion of the pupil were caused by the alcohol applied 
by Dr. Morrow. Dr. Clark suggested that Stivers 
might have suffered a vascular accident (stroke) in 
the upper part of the brainstem because such an in-
jury would account for these symptoms. Dr. Clark 
recommended that the MRI scan be performed on 
Stivers to see ifthere were any evidence of stroke. 
The MRI scan was performed on April 11, 
1986. Dr. Lee examined the images which revealed 
an abnormality in the right side of the brainstem. 
Dr. Lee stated in his report that the abnormality 
"raises the question of a brainstem infarct." 
A deposition taken of Dr. Adrienne Millett, an 
opthalmologist, on March 21, 1990, was placed into 
evidence. Dr. Millett testified that the cause of 
Stivers's condition was very likely the operation 
and the alcohol placed on the infra-orbital nerve, 
resulting in damaged nerve fiber controlling his eye 
movement and his pupil. 
Dr. Millett was asked on cross-examination 
about the reports of Drs. Clark and Lee and the 
MRI scan which had been supplied to her after she 
reached her opinion regarding causation. The ques-
tions basically centered around whether a stroke in 
the brainstem could cause Stivers's condition. Dr. 
Millett stated that it was unlikely that a stroke in 
the brainstem would damage the specific areas in-
jured without any wider effects. Dr. Millett added, 
however, that she would not rule out that possibility 
Page 5 of 10 
Page4 
and would defer to the opinion of a neurologist. 
On September 15, 1989, a hearing was held on 
the use and admissibility of the MRI scan and the 
repo11s of Drs. Lee and Clark. The trial court ruled 
that the MRI scan was admissible. Dr. Lee's report 
and Dr. Clark's repo11 were ruled to be inadmissible 
*427 based on CR 26.02(4). The trial cou11 also 
would not allow admission of depositions of Dr. 
Clark or Dr. Lee. 
The trial court reasoned that if the rules prohib-
it the discovery of the evidence, such evidence 
would not be properly admissible. As a result, the 
trial court would not allow Dr. Morrow's experts to 
rely on the reports of Dr. Clark or Dr. Lee. 
During the trial, Stivers planned to introduce 
the videotaped deposition of Dr. Millett. Prior to 
playing the videotape to the jury, Stivers sought to 
have all references to the reports from Drs. Clark 
and Lee deleted. The trial court ruled that, because 
Stivers supplied the reports to Dr. Millett, the re-
ports had lost their privileged status. Dr. Morrow 
was then entitled to cross-examine her about these 
reports, concluded the trial court. The reports them-
selves were not admitted. 
The trial court prohibited the use of the reports 
with other witnesses. Consequently, the reports of 
Drs. Clark and Lee or their opinions were not ad-
missible despite Dr. Morrow's attempts in connec-
tion with the testimony of Dr. Roger J. Harris, 
Stivers's liability expert, Dr. John M. Gregg, an oral 
surgeon testifying on behalf of Dr. Morrow, and Dr. 
Jerry Anderson, also a defense witness. 
[I] Dr. Morrow first contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing the admission of evidence 
from Drs. Clark and Lee which had been obtained 
outside the discovery procedures outlined in Ken-
tucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CR 26.02(4)(b) provides that: 
A party may discover facts known or opm10ns 
held by an expert who has been retained or spe-
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cially employed by another party in anticipation 
of litigation or preparation for trial and who is 
not expected to be called as a witness at trial, 
only as provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing 
of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the patty seeking discovery to 
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by 
other means. 
Dr. Morrow notes that CR 26.01 describes dis-
covery methods as, inter alia, depositions, interrog-
atories, requests for admission. He argues that CR 
26.02(4)(b) applies only to discovery and not to a 
situation, such as in the instant case, where the ex-
pert's facts and opinions became known outside the 
discovery process. 
In Crenna v. Ford Motor Company, 12 
Wash.App. 824, 532 P.2d 290 (1975), an expert 
who was consulted by the plaintiffs was named by 
them in their answers to interrogatories approxim-
ately nine months before trial. However, the 
plaintiffs indicated that they did not know whether 
the expert would be called at trial. The defendant 
sought, five days before trial, to find out whether 
the expert would be testifying at trial and was told a 
decision had still not been made. The defendant 
then sought to subpoena the expert. The plaintiffs 
responded with a motion to quash the subpoena and 
to bar the expert's testimony which was granted. At 
trial, the defendant attempted to call the expert as a 
rebuttal witness. The trial court ruled that the de-
fendant could not call the expert. 
The trial court's rulings were based on CR 
26(b)(4)(B) which is practically identical to Ken-
tucky CR 26.02(4)(b). The Washington rule does 
not contain the language in CR 26.02(4)(b) refer-
ring to facts and opinions of an expert "who has 
been retained or specially employed .... " Washing-
ton's rule for discovery of experts is more restrict-
ive than is Kentucky's because the former renders 
the expert nondiscoverable if he is expected to testi-
fy at trial, but Kentucky adds the requirement that 
he also be retained or specially employed in anti-
cipation of litigation or preparation for trial. We do 
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not perceive this difference to be significant in the 
instant case. 
The Court in Crenna, supra, 532 P.2d at 295, 
stated: 
We read CR 26(b)(4)(8) as a recog111t1on that a 
trial is still an adversary proceeding and that, so 
conceived, fundamental fairness requires that 
'discovery' not be used to defeat a litigant by 
probing for real or apparent weaknesses in his 
case *428 which may have been revealed in his 
trial preparation. 
The Court concluded that the rulings by the tri-
al court had been proper. 
We agree with the holding in Crenna, supra. 
To allow Dr. Morrow to use the reports of Drs. 
Clark and Lee, or to admit their depositions, would 
undermine the purpose of CR 26.02(4)(b), which in 
part is to encourage prelitigation consultative evalu-
ations. This Court in Newsome v. Lowe, Ky.App., 
699 S.W.2d 748, 752 (1985), stated that consultive 
expert evaluations and the repo1ts rendered under 
CR 26.02(4)(b) were "privileged." We reasoned 
that "if there is no confidentiality in them, the pro-
cedure will not be utilized." Id. 
A factual difference between the instant case 
and Crenna, supra, is that Dr. Morrow came into 
possession of the reports inadvertently, while the 
defendants in Crenna, supra, were supplied with 
the information through answers to interrogatories. 
We do not believe that the reports of Drs. Clark and 
Lee should be given special status, and thus 
rendered admissible, simply because they were not 
obtained by a discovery method. Such a result 
would encourage litigants to bypass the discovery 
process. 
Dr. Morrow cites Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe 
Machine,y, 98 F.R.D. 740 (E.D.Mo.1983), in which 
the Court ruled that the report of a nontestifying ex-
pert was out of the coverage of Fed.R.Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(B) when the report was supplied to and re-
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lied upon by a testifying expert. The Court in Heit-
mann, supra, reasoned that the repo1t was needed 
for effective cross-examination of the testifying 
witness. 
Dr. Sprague testified in his deposition that he 
did not rely on any medical records in forming his 
opinions. Dr. Millett also did not rely on these re-
ports. Thus, Heitmann, supra, is not applicable. 
CR 35.02 is also cited as suppo1t for Dr. Mor-
row's position. CR 35.02 concerns reports of ex-
amining physicians upon the request of the ex-
amined party. In this case, there is nothing in the 
record to show a request and delivery of any reports 
which would require Stivers, under CR 35.02, to 
supply the reports ofDrs. Clark and Lee. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that the trial court 
erred in limiting the cross-examination of all but 
one witness in regard to the reports of Ors. Clark 
and Lee. 
The trial court's reason for this difference was 
that, though undiscoverable under CR 26.02, the re-
ports were supplied to Dr. Millett. The other wit-
nesses, except Sprague, were not at any time sup-
plied with the reports. 
[2] It is a general rule that the scope and dura-
tion of cross-examination rests in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court in both civil and criminal 
cases. Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 
34 (1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060, 110 S.Ct. 
1536, 108 L.Ed.2d 774 reh. denied, 495 U.S. 941, 
110 S.Ct. 2196, 109 L.Ed.2d 524 (1990); Perry v. 
Ernest R. Hamilton Associates, Inc., Ky., 485 
S.W.2d 505 (1972); Commonwealth, Department of 
Highways v. Smith, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 194 (1965). 
The trial court in the case at bar prohibited the 
cross-examination for the purposes of furthering the 
ends of CR 26.02(4). We do not view such action as 
an abuse of discretion. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that the trial court 
erred in admonishing the jury during the cross-
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examination of a defense expe1t to disregard any 
reference to Dr. Lee's interpretation of the 1986 MRI. 
[3] Dr. Jerry Anderson testified as a witness for 
Dr. Morrow. Dr. Anderson had examined the 1986 
MRI, and under cross-examination he made refer-
ences to Dr. Lee's interpretation. A bench confer-
ence ensued and Stivers sought an admonition. The 
trial court subsequently admonished the jury to dis-
regard any references to Dr. Lee's report because it 
had been ruled inadmissible. 
In Seaton v. Rosenberg, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 333 
(1978), relied upon by Dr. Morrow, an expert gave 
opinion testimony concerning a person's cause of 
death. The trial court made remarks about this opin-
ion to the jury which the Supreme Court found 
were prejudicial. Its reasoning was that "the *429 
trial court's remarks at least diluted the effect of 
this evidence and at most effectively removed this 
evidence from consideration by the jury." Id. at 337. 
The admonition in the case at bar did not have 
the same effect as the trial court's remarks in 
Seaton, supra. The jury heard Dr. Anderson's full 
opinion. We do not believe that the admonition de-
tracted from Dr. Anderson's opinion simply because 
he and Dr. Lee had reached the same conclusion. 
The trial court directed the jury to disregard refer-
ences to Dr. Lee's interpretation only because it had 
previously been ruled inadmissible. In Seaton, 
supra, the trial court made statements directly ques-
tioning the accuracy of the expert's opinion. We 
find no error here. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that the trial court 
improperly limited his cross-examination of 
Stivers's liability expert, Dr. Roger J. Harris. 
Dr. Morrow wanted to show that Dr. Harris had 
had his license suspended for five years because he 
had passed hepatitis to several patients. That Dr. 
Harris did not practice for a time due to the infec-
tion received from an institutionalized patient was 
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admitted, but he maintained that he voluntarily re-
linquished his license. Dr. Morrow also wanted to 
introduce testimony that Dr. Harris could only have 
transmitted hepatitis through dirty instruments, 
sexual intercourse, or other exchange of body flu-
ids. The trial court would not admit Dr. Morrow's 
claims. 
[4] The general rule is that a witness cannot be 
cross-examined on a collateral matter which is ir-
relevant to the issue at hand. Shirley v. Common-
wealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, Ky., 281 S.W.2d 891 (1955). 
In Elswick v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 574 
S.W.2d 916 (1978), this Court held that it was not 
abuse of discretion to exclude testimony on cross-
examination when its inflammatory nature out-
weighed its probative value. 
[5] The crucial question then is whether the 
evidence excluded in this case is collateral. We 
think it is. The matter of having hepatitis and thus 
not practicing for a time does not reflect on his 
knowledge or ability to testify on the matters at 
hand, i.e., the causation of Stivers's condition and 
any deviation by Dr. Morrow from the standard of 
care. Further, the inflammatory effect, if the jury 
heard testimony such as that Dr. Harris may have 
had sex with his patients, although unproven, would 
outweigh any probative value it might have. There 
was no abuse of discretion in excluding this evid-
ence. 
[6] Dr. Morrow also complains that he was im-
properly kept from using a deposition to show Dr. 
Harris's lack of knowledge about the possibility that 
Stivers had a stroke. 
Dr. Morrow maintains that the reason the trial 
court prohibited the use of the deposition was that it 
was only a discovery deposition as opposed to an 
evidentiary deposition. That statement is somewhat 
of an oversimplification and is misleading. 
Dr. Morrow wanted to read a portion of a dis-
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covet)' deposition to the jut)' prior to the playing of 
a videotaped evidentiary deposition which was 
made months after the discovery deposition. Dr. 
Morrow wanted to show inconsistencies between 
the two depositions for impeachment purposes. The 
trial comt stated that Dr. Morrow could have used 
the po1tions of the discovery deposition he wanted 
to read during the videotaped deposition. The trial 
court reasoned that if Dr. Harris was impeached, 
Stivers would have no way of rehabilitating him by 
asking Dr. Harris further questions. We think the 
ruling was sound. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that incompetent 
evidence was received from Dr. Sprague. This al-
leged incompetent evidence consisted of the use of 
medical history as related directly to Dr. Sprague 
by Stivers and the diagnosis that Stivers had 
suffered a psychological injm)' as a result. 
In Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S. W.2d 
380, 384 (1990), the only case cited by Dr. Morrow 
in regard to this issue, the Court adopted Rule 
803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence which 
"blurs but does not abolish the distinction between 
testifying*430 and treating physicians." Under 
Fed.R.Evid. 803(4), a statement made to an expert 
is not inadmissible hearsay if the statement is "the 
kind of information which the expert customarily 
relies upon in the practice of his profession." 
Drumm, supra. The rule specifically includes state-
ments of medical history pertinent to diagnosis. 
[7] Dr. Morrow's argument appears to be that 
Sprague's testimony is not admissible under 
Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) because the rule applies to med-
ical purposes but not psychological ones. When its 
application is justified, Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) is broad 
enough to encompass the statements made to psy-
chologists. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 
(4th Cir.1988). The medical history supplied to Dr. 
Sprague was the kind of information customarily 
relied on by psychologists in the practice of their 
profession. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that the rebuttal 
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testimony of Dr. William 0. Witt should not have 
been allowed. 
[8] Dr. Witt, an anesthesiologist, testified that, 
based on the blood pressure readings in the anes-
thesia records for Stivers's surgery, he did not suf-
fer a stroke during the surgery. Dr. Witt was called 
as a rebuttal witness by Stivers to address a ques-
tion which had been raised by one of Dr. Morrow's 
witnesses, Dr. Joseph Zerga, i.e., that Stivers 
suffered a stroke during surgery when his blood 
pressure dropped too low. The trial court ruled that 
Dr. Witt could testify in rebuttal because there was 
a new element as to causation, i.e., low blood pres-
sure, which was not, and could not have been, ad-
dressed on direct. We see no abuse of the trial 
court's discretion on this point. 
Dr. Morrow next contends that, even if the al-
leged errors were harmless individually, the cumu-
lative effect of the errors requires a reversal. 
Most, if not all, of the errors alleged were not 
simply harmless but were not errors. Moreover, be-
cause of the complexities of the case, particularly 
the inadvertent disclosure by Stivers, the trial court 
did a remarkable job in balancing the competing 
rights and interests of the parties. Stivers had a full 
opportunity to prosecute his case and Dr. Morrow 
had a full opportunity to defend himself. Dr. Mor-
row was allowed to use the MRI scan by showing it 
to his experts who then gave testimony concerning 
their findings to the jury. The reports of Drs. Clark 
and Lee were far less conclusive that Stivers had 
suffered a stroke than Dr. Morrow would have us 
believe. There was no cumulative effect of errors in 
this case. 
Lastly, Dr. Morrow argues that the damages 
awarded were excessive. 
The jury awarded Stivers a total of $187,227.00 
in damages. This award consisted of $2,227.00 for 
current medical expenses, $20,000.00 for future 
medical expenses, $108,000.00 for physical pain 
and suffering, and $57,000.00 for lost earning capa-
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city. 
[9] We note initially that appellant's motion for 
a new trial alleged excessiveness only as to the 
awards for future medical expenses and lost earning 
capacity; we may not consider the amount awarded 
for current medical expenses and physical pain and 
suffering, as the trial court was not given an oppor-
tunity to rule thereon. Skaggs v. Assad By and 
Through Assad, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 947,950 (1986). 
[1 O] Dr. Morrow claims that the award is ex-
cessive under the "first blush" rule. That rule 
provides that a damage award is excessive if the 
mind is immediately shocked and surprised at the 
great disproportion of the size of the verdict in rela-
tion to the amount authorized by the evidence, such 
that it must have been the result of passion and pre-
judice. Wilson v. Redken laboratories, Inc., Ky., 
562 S.W.2d 633 (1978); Townsend v. Stamper, Ky., 
398 S.W.2d 45 (1965). 
The "first blush" rule is a mechanism to assist 
the trial court in performing its responsibility 
when called upon to decide whether the award is 
so excessive as to appear "to have been given un-
der the influence of passion or prejudice." CR 
59.0l(d). In its entirety it is that "a verdict may 
be set aside as excessive *431 only if 'it is (so) to 
such an extent as to cause the mind at first blush 
to conclude that it was returned under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice on the part of the 
jury.' " Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, Inc., 
supra, 562 S.W.2d at 636. 
On the other hand, the appellate function is 
properly described in Prater v. Arnett, Ky.App., 
648 S.W.2d 82 (1983): 
"Upon reviewing the action of a trial judge in 
(granting or denying a new trial for excessive-
ness), the appellate court no longer steps into 
the shoes of the trial court to inspect the ac-
tions of the jury from his perspective. Now, the 
appellate court reviews only the actions of the 
trial judge ... to determine if his actions consti-
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tuted an error of law. There is no error of law 
unless the trial judge is said to have abused his 
discretion and thereby rendered his decision 
clearly e1TOneous. Further, the action of the tri-
al judge is presumptively correct ... " 648 
S.W.2d at 86. 
Our earlier opinion discussing review of the 
question of excessive damages in City of Louis-
ville v. Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179 (1964) ex-
presses essentially the same analysis as Prater v. 
Arnett of the different functions of trial and ap-
pellate courts. The basic guideline for appellate 
review is set out in the Allen case as follows: 
"lt serves to emphasize the initial and primary 
role of the trial judge in determining these is-
sues; that his decision shall be prima facie cor-
rect and final; and that only in rare instance 
when it can be said that he has clearly erred, 
i.e., abused his discretion, will he be reversed." 
(Emphasis original.) 385 S.W.2d at 183-184. 
Once the issue is squarely presented to the trial 
judge, who heard and considered the evidence, 
neither we, nor will the Court of Appeals substi-
tute our judgment on excessiveness for his unless 
clearly erroneous. 
In short, the rules governing appellate practice 
do not direct the appellate judge to decide if the 
verdict shocks his conscience or causes him to 
blush. Those rules charge us with the responsibil-
ity to review the record and decide whether, 
when viewed from a standpoint "most favorable" 
to the prevailing party, there is evidence to sup-
port the verdict and judgment. Rogers v. Kasdan, 
Ky., 612 S.W.2d 133 (1981). 
Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 928, 
932-933 (1984) (emphasis original). 
[ 11] There is evidence in the record of Stivers's 
substantial present and future medical expenses due 
to the injury. There is also evidence of the decrease 
in his ability to earn money in the future of 
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$97,780.53 as well as testimony about his difficulty 
performing his present occupation. Stivers testified 
about the pain resulting from this injury and the dif-
ficulties in life due to the pain and double vision. 
We find no clear error nor abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's action. 
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No. 51459. 
June 16, 1987. 
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied July 
21, 1987. 
Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 15, 1987. 
Patient brought medical malpractice action 
against physician who had performed surgery for 
bilateral bunions and hammertoes on patient's feet. 
The Circuit Court, County of St. Louis, Phillip J. 
Sweeney, J., entered judgment for physician, and 
appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Carl R. 
Gaertner, J., held that: (1) evidence that medical 
malpractice plaintiffs expert witness, a physician, 
had voluntarily surrendered his license to dispense 
certain narcotic drugs was inadmissible to impeach 
witness, and (2) erroneous admission of testimony 
concerning witness' surrender of license to dispense 
narcotics was not harmless. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
West Headnotes 
II] Evidence 157 €=>560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157X1I(D) Examination of Experts 
l 57k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence that medical malpractice plaintiffs 
expert witness, a physician, had voluntarily sur-
rendered his license to dispense certain narcotic 
drugs was inadmissible to impeach witness. 
121 Appeal and Error 30 €=>1048(7) 
I 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Rev;'iew 
30XVl(J) Harmless Error 
30XV1(J)9 Witnesses 
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30kl 048 Rulings on Questions to Wit-
nesses j 
I 30k1048(7) k. Credibility, Im-
peachment, Contradiction, and Corroboration of 
Witnesses. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299k18.130 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Erroneous admission of evidence that expert 
for medical malpractice plaintiff had voluntarily 
surrendered his license to dispense certain con-
trolled narcotics was not harmless; forced disclos-
ure of past drug abuse affected neither expert's 
qualifications '.nor his credibility, but rather, served 
only to besmirch his character, and expert's testi-
mony was crucial to plaintiffs case. 
! 
*63 Norton Y. Beilenson, Dolgin, Beilenson, Klein, 
Lake & Nodiff, Clayton, for plaintiff-appellant. 
I 
William L. Davis, Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, 
Cleary, Jaeckel & Keaney, St. Louis, for defend-
ants-respondents. 
I 
CARL R. GA~RTNER, Judge. 
Plaintiff fvlartha J. Noble appeals from a judg-
ment for defendants W. Edward Lansche, M.D., 
and Orthopedic Associates, Inc. in this medical 
malpractice action. She claims trial court error (1) 
in allowing defense counsel (a) to engage in im-
proper cross-examination of her expert witness and 
(b) to go outside the evidence in the case in closing 
argument, (2) by refusing to admit certain photo-
graphs into , evidence and (3) in overruling 
plaintiffs motion to strike for cause a particular 
member of the venire. We reverse and remand. 
I 
Defendant Lansche performed surgery for bi-
I 
' ! 
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lateral bunions and hammertoes on plaintiffs feet in 
May, 1981. Plaintiff alleges an inappropriate pro-
cedure was used with regard to the bilateral bunions 
and the operation was negligently performed as to 
the hammertoes. As a result she claims damages be-
cause her feet were severely *64 disfigured and she 
was unable to pmticipate in her normal activities. 
Further surgery, to alleviate the problems allegedly 
caused by defendants, was petformed by Dr. An-
thony Halinsky. Halinsky was the only expert wit-
ness to testify at trial for plaintiff. 
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude any evidence concerning Halin-
sky's surrender of his license to dispense certain 
controlled narcotics. The trial court overruled the 
motion with the provision that defendants would be 
permitted to establish that Halinsky had indeed sur-
rendered this license and further that the surrender 
was because the doctor had diverted drugs to his 
own use. 
Plaintiffs first point on appeal is that the trial 
court erred in allowing defendants to delve into Dr. 
Halinsky's voluntary surrender of his license to dis-
pense narcotics on cross-examination and in closing 
argument, the latter including a statement that Hal-
insky had personally abused a particular narcotic. It 
is well-settled that the scope of cross-examination 
lies within the discretion of the trial court. On ap-
peal, we will not reverse unless abuse of that dis-
cretion is clearly shown. Powell v. Norman Lines, 
Inc., 674 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Mo.App.1984). Further, 
with regard to cross-examination of an expert wit-
ness, "wide latitude is allowed to test his qualifica-
tions, credibility, skill or knowledge and the value 
and accuracy of his opinion." Id. at 196 (citations 
omitted). 
[I] The evidence in dispute here concerns Hal-
insky's surrender of his license to dispense certain 
narcotics. On cross-examination of Halinsky the de-
fendants established that Halinsky voluntarily sur-
rendered the license because he had a medical prob-
lem with narcotics which was resolved. The effect 
of this surrender upon his medical practice, 
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however, was merely to prevent him from person-
ally dispensing narcotics to his patients. Instead, he 
would give his patients a prescription to be filled at 
a pharmacy. We reject defendants' argument that a 
license to dispense narcotics is so integral to a 
physician's practice that the jury must be made 
aware of its voluntary surrender. The ability to pre-
scribe appropriate narcotics may well be essential 
to the care and treatment of a physician's patient, 
but the right to personally dispense the narcotics is 
of little significance. Moreover, evidence concern-
ing Halinsky's former problem with drug abuse is 
unrelated to his skill, knowledge and qualification 
to express an opinion upon the propriety of the sur-
gical procedure selected by defendant Lansche and 
the quality of Lansche's surgical performance. 
It is important to emphasize that Halinsky lost 
his license to dispense through voluntary surrender 
and not a criminal conviction, as the latter would be 
a proper mode of impeachment on cross-ex-
amination. § 491.050, RSMo.1986, Eichelberger v. 
Barnes Hosp., 655 S.W.2d 699, 704 
(Mo.App.1983). This voluntary action has no more 
impact upon his credibility than an unprosecuted ar-
rest on a criminal charge. We have consistently 
held that evidence of an arrest not resulting in con-
viction is improper impeachment. State v. Lockhart, 
507 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Mo.1974); Kehr v. Garrett, 
512 S.W.2d 186, 193 (Mo.App.1974). Specifically, 
we have held that evidence of drug abuse is not ad-
missible as impeachment of a witness's testimonial 
credibility and, in the absence of some showing of 
relevance to the witness's testimony, evidence of 
prior drug use is properly excluded. Ransom v. 
Adams Dai,y Co., 684 S.W.2d 915, 919 
(Mo.App.1985). In State v. Thompson, 697 S. W .2d 
575, 579 (Mo.App.1985), cross-examination con-
cerning a prior history of alcohol abuse was held 
improper, although not warranting reversal under 
the circumstances. 
[2] The prejudice to plaintiff from this improp-
er cross-examination was amplified in closing argu-
ment when defense counsel stated Halinsky had 
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testified that "he got into personal trouble from us-
ing Demerol." No such evidence was in the record, 
and no such specificity may reasonably be inferred 
from Halinsky's statement "I had a medical problem 
with narcotics which was resolved." Counsel is al-
lowed wide latitude in arguing legitimate inferences 
from the evidence of record, *65State ex rel. Mis-
souri State Hy. Comm'n v. Hensel Phelps Constr. 
Co., 634 S. W.2d 168, 176 (Mo. bane 1982). 
However, it is "axiomatic counsel should neither 
argue nor draw inferences from matters not in evid-
ence and that a trial court errs in permitting such a 
discourse." Berge! v. Kassebaum, 577 S.W.2d 863, 
872 (Mo.App.1978) (citing Hodges v. Johnson, 417 
S. W.2d 685, 689 (Mo.App.1967)). Further com-
pounding the prejudicial effect of the improper im-
peachment were other aspects of the jury argument 
made by defendants' attorney, opening with "let's 
look at the substance of this guy" whose license to 
dispense narcotic drugs had been "surrendered to 
those guys in Jefferson City that watch doctors .... " 
After the overruling of plaintiffs objection, defend-
ants' attorney concluded with a sarcastic reference 
to the hospital through which Dr. Halinsky dis-
pensed drugs. This argument does not even purport 
to suggest how the surrender of his drug dispensing 
license affected his skill, knowledge or qualifica-
tions as an expert medical witness. Rather, its cal-
culated effect was to cast a pall of disparagement 
over the doctor's testimony by reason of irrelevant 
misconduct. We cannot conclude that this argu-
ment, impliedly approved by the trial court's over-
ruling of the objection and request for an instruc-
tion to disregard, did not influence the jury to dis-
count the testimony of plaintiffs only expert wit-
ness. 
Usually the injection of irrelevant evidence 
does not engender the level of prejudice which 
"materially affect[s] the merits of the action," thus 
requiring reversal. Rule 84. l 3(b ). However, this is 
not such an instance. Halinsky's testimony was cru-
cial to plaintiffs case. 
The forced disclosure of Dr. Halinsky's past 
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drug abuse affected neither his qualification as an 
expett witness nor his credibility. It served only to 
besmirch his character. To conclude that such evid-
ence, pe1taining to the one witness whose testimony 
was essential to plaintiffs case, did not materially 
affect the merits of the case would be to ignore the 
poison inherent in the public perception of drug ab-
use. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is re-
manded for a new trial. 
SNYDER, C.J., and SIMEONE, Senior Judge, con-
cur. 
Mo.App. E.D. 1987. 
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Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Charles R. STICKNEY, Appellant, 
V. 
The WESLEY MEDICAL CENTER, A Corpora-
tion, and Ron Morford, M.D., Appellees. 
No. 60773. 
Jan. 20, 1989. 
Automobile accident victim brought medical 
malpractice action against hospital and emergency 
room physician. The District Court, Sedgwick 
County, Kenneth C. Kimmel, J., entered judgment 
in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, 758 P.2d 755 
(unpublished opinion), reversed, and defendants pe-
titioned for review. The Supreme Court, Holmes, J., 
held that: (1) erroneous admission of collateral 
source evidence in medical malpractice action pur-
suant to statute held to be unconstitutional was 
harmless where jury found in favor of physician 
and hospital, and (2) plaintiff was not entitled to 
impeach defendant physician's expert witness by 
use of extrinsic evidence dealing with a collateral 
matter, the negligence of hospital in an unrelated 
lawsuit. 
Reversed. 
Allegrucci, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
West Headnotes 
Ill Evidence 157 ~560 
157 Evidence 
157XII Opinion Evidence 
157XIl(D) Examination of Experts 
157k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
In medical malpractice action, trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in ruling that hospital could 
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introduce impeachment evidence that patient's de-
ceased expert witness' hospital staff privileges had 
been terminated if patient introduced deposition of 
expett witness. 
121 Health 198H ~820 
198H Health 
l 98HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
I 98HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk815 Evidence 
I 98Hk820 k. Admissibility. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl 8.70 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Admission of testimony of emergency room 
nurse assistant, which consisted of her observations 
and treatment of patient and one personal instance 
when she had been involved in an auto accident, 
did not constitute an abuse of discretion in medical 
malpractice action brought by automobile accident 
victim. 
131 Health 198H ~820 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
l 98Hk8 l 5 Evidence 
198Hk820 k. Admissibility. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299kl 8.70 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Question asked of emergency room nurse's as-
sistant as to whether, in her experience, paralysis 
had ever resulted from movement of a patient's 
head was irrelevant in medical malpractice action 
brought by automobile accident victim who did not 
allege that he suffered paralysis following his treat-
ment in emergency room. 
[4] Appeal and Error 30 ~1052(7) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
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30XVl(J) Harmless En-or 
30XVl(J) IO Admission of Evidence 
30k I 052 Defect Supplied or Objection 
Removed Subsequently 
30k I 052(7) k. Evidence as to One 
Issue Made Immaterial by Finding on Another. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299k 18.130 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Erroneous admission of collateral source evid-
ence in medical malpractice action pursuant to stat-
ute held to be unconstitutional was harmless where 
jury found in favor of physician and hospital. 
K.S.A. 60-3403 (Repealed). 
[51 Evidence 157 €;:::)560 
157 Evidence 
157Xll Opinion Evidence 
l 57XII(D) Examination of Experts 
157k560 k. Contradiction and Impeach-
ment. Most Cited Cases 
Patient was not entitled to impeach defendant 
physician's expert witness by use of extrinsic evid-
ence dealing with a collateral matter, the negligence 
of defendant hospital in an unrelated lawsuit. 
[6J Witnesses 410 €=>268(2) 
410 Witnesses 
41 om Examination 
4101Jl(B) Cross-Examination 
41 Ok268 Scope and Extent of Cross-
Examination in General 
41 Ok268(2) k. Knowledge or Source of 
Information. Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses 410 €=>269(1) 
410 Witnesses 
41 om Examination 
41 Olll(B) Cross-Examination 
4I0k269 Limitation of Cross-Examination 
to Subjects of Direct Examination 
410k269(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In medical malpractice action, patient was not 
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entitled to cross-examine a defense witness with re-
spect to matters which exceeded scope of direct ex-
amination and as to procedures of which defense 
witness had no knowledge or expertise. 
**253 *147 Syllabus by the Court 
In an appeal by the plaintiff in a medical mal-
practice action, the record is examined and it is held 
that the trial court did not commit reversible error 
in: (1) ruling that impeachment evidence would be 
admissible if plaintiff introduced the discovery de-
position of a deceased witness; (2) its rulings upon 
the admissibility of evidence; (3) its rulings upon 
objections to certain areas of cross-examination of 
various witnesses; and (4) the admission of collat-
eral source benefits evidence. 
William L. Fry of Fry, Reynolds & Reeves, P.A., 
Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant. 
**254 Carl L. Wagner of Boyer, Donaldson & 
Stewart, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellee Wesley Medical Center. 
Timothy B. Mustaine of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers 
& Eberhardt, Wichita, argued the cause and was on 
the brief for appellee Ron Morford, M.D. 
HOLMES, Justice: 
Charles R. Stickney, the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice action, appeals from a jury verdict find-
ing that neither of the defendants committed medic-
al malpractice nor was negligent in the treatment of 
the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals, in an unpub-
lished opinion filed July 15, 1988, 758 P.2d 755, 
reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial on 
the basis that the admission of collateral source be-
nefits evidence was inherently prejudicial. The 
Court of Appeals did not address the other issues 
asserted by Mr. Stickney in his appeal. We granted 
petitions for review filed by The Wesley Medical 
Center (Wesley) and Ron Morford, M.D., the two 
original defendants. 
On September 30, 1983, at about 3:30 a.m., 
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Charles R. Stickney was involved in an auto acci-
dent in Wichita while en route to work. He was 
transported by ambulance to Wesley. Ambulance 
personnel had placed Stickney on a spine board and 
had protected his neck against movement with a 
cervical collar and foam *148 wedges. These pre-
cautions were standard procedure routinely under-
taken with victims of automobile accidents. Stick-
ney and the spine board were transferred from the 
ambulance to a hospital gurney at Wesley and 
wheeled to its emergency room. 
Upon Stickney's arrival at the emergency room, 
Jeanmarie Epperly, a nurse assistant, and Dr. Ron 
Morford, the emergency room physician, attended 
to the plaintiff. Stickney did not report any neck 
pain or tenderness, and neither Epperly nor Mor-
ford, during their initial examinations of Stickney, 
observed any other signs normally associated with 
neck injuries. 
Dr. Morford sent Stickney to the x-ray lab for 
the purpose of obtaining x-rays of his chest and left 
elbow. Stickney was still confined to the spine 
board with his neck protected by the cervical collar 
and foam restraints. During this period Stickney's 
wife and daughter arrived at Wesley. Upon his re-
turn from x-ray, Stickney was asked to sit up or 
stand up so the spine board could be removed from 
the gurney and returned to the ambulance person-
nel. He sat up and put his legs over the side of the 
gurney. Epperly testified that after 10 to 15 seconds 
Stickney insisted on standing up, even though she 
had told him to wait two to three minutes before he 
stood up. His daughter testified that Stickney slid 
off the side of the gurney toward the floor, his head 
slumping forward, and that her mother blocked his 
fall with her arm. Stickney broke out in a sweat, ap-
peared to be short of breath, and complained of 
dizziness, chest pain, and neck pain. Epperly testi-
fied that she held Stickney's arm while calling for 
help, that he was laid back down on the gurney, and 
that he did not fall to the floor. 
After Stickney's condition stabilized, Dr. Mor-
ford ordered an x-ray of his cervical spine, which 
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revealed a fracture of the second cervical vertebra. 
Stickney subsequently developed a number of com-
plications, necessitating a prolonged hospital stay. 
Stickney filed this lawsuit on September 26, 
1985, seeking damages for injuries and other losses 
sustained because of the alleged malpractice of 
Wesley and Dr. Morford. After a lengthy trial, the 
ju1y returned a verdict finding none of the parties to 
be at fault. 
At the trial, collateral source benefits evidence 
was admitted pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 
60-3403 (subsequently held unconstitutional*l49 in 
Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 P.2d 1058 
[1987], and since repealed). The Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment in this case in reliance upon 
Farley and our recent decision in Harrier v. 
Gendel, 242 Kan. 798, 751 P.2d 1038 (1988). Addi-
tional facts will be set forth as they become relev-
ant to the various issues on appeal. 
**255 [1] The first issue is whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that, if plaintiff introduced Dr. 
Charles Girod's deposition into evidence, the de-
fendants would be permitted to admit certain evid-
ence for impeachment purposes. In the pretrial con-
ference order filed January 27, 1987, Charles 
Girod, M.D., deceased, was identified by the 
plaintiff as a witness by deposition. Dr. Girod had 
been deposed during discovery proceedings by at-
torneys for the defendants. Dr. Girod died after the 
deposition was taken but before trial. Defendant 
Wesley had filed a motion in limine to prohibit in-
troduction of Dr. Girod's deposition, arguing that 
the deposition allowed inadequate opportunity for 
cross-examination of Dr. Girod as plaintiffs expert 
witness. The motion was denied. 
On February 13, 1987, Wesley filed a motion 
seeking permission to introduce evidence that Dr. 
Girod's staff privileges at El Dorado Hospital had 
been terminated. Following a hearing on the mo-
tion, the court ordered production of the documents 
alleged to be pertinent to the matter and ordered 
that they be made available to all counsel. The 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt= Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=E4 7F ... 10/21/2013 
000791
768 P.2d 253 
244 Kan. 147, 768 P.2d 253 
(Cite as: 244 Kan. 147,768 P.2d 253) 
judge specifically reserved until trial the issue of 
whether the documents or related testimony would 
be admissible. Although no record was made of the 
February 20 hearing on the motion, a journal entry 
reflecting the proceedings and the trial court's or-
ders was filed February 27, 1987. The journal entry 
was approved by plaintiffs counsel. 
On March 6, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion in 
limine, in part asking the court to prohibit defend-
ants from presenting any evidence maligning the 
reputation of Dr. Girod. At trial, counsel for Wes-
ley again requested that the court disallow Dr. 
Girod's discovery deposition. The trial court de-
clined to reverse the earlier ruling allowing admis-
sion of the deposition. Wesley then renewed its mo-
tion to admit impeachment evidence. Specifically, 
Wesley sought to introduce evidence that Dr. Girod 
had falsified hospital records pertinent to a medical 
malpractice case in which he was involved while on 
the medical staff of El *150 Dorado Hospital and 
that following peer review proceedings his priv-
ileges at the hospital were terminated. Dr. Girod's 
deposition testimony had been to the contrary in 
that he asserted he had not been the subject of any 
disciplinary proceedings, had not been subjected to 
peer review proceedings by the hospital, had been 
cleared of everything, and had voluntarily resigned 
because of politics and disagreement with the hos-
pital administrator. The trial court held that the de-
fendants would be permitted to impeach Dr. Girod's 
deposition testimony. Plaintiffs counsel then 
moved for a mistrial, arguing that the court's ruling 
was unfair and a complete surprise. The court 
denied the motion. Plaintiff proceeded with the trial 
but elected not to introduce Dr. Girod's deposition. 
The plaintiff argues that the trial court reversed 
its earlier ruling prohibiting defendants from intro-
ducing the impeachment evidence. He contends that 
the ruling was a complete surprise and was a gross 
abuse of discretion and that the hospital documents 
proposed by the defense for introduction were inad-
missible hearsay evidence under K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 
60-460. He also argues that the impeachment evid-
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ence would have been so highly prejudicial as to 
render Dr. Girod's deposition wo1thless. Plaintiffs 
arguments that he was surprised and that the couit's 
ruling was a reversal of a prior ruling are totally 
without merit. In a journal entry filed over three 
months prior to trial, which was approved by 
plaintiffs counsel, the court stated: "The Court spe-
cifically reserves until the time of trial any and all 
rulings upon the admissibility into evidence of any 
of the above documents [the hospital records relat-
ing to Dr. Girod's hospital privileges] or testimony 
relating to said documents." Plaintiffs counsel 
should not have been surprised by the position as-
serted by Wesley or by the court's ruling on this 
matter. 
On cross-examination of an expert witness, 
great latitude is necessarily indulged in order that 
the intelligence of the witness, his powers of dis-
cernment, and his capacity to form a con-ect judg-
ment may be submitted to the jury so it may have 
an opportunity for determining the value of the 
testimony. **256Bourgeois v. State Highway Com-
mission, 179 Kan. 30, 34, 292 P.2d 683 (1956). In 
Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan. 212, 228, 453 P.2d 100 
(1969), this court stated: 
"The latitude permitted in the cross-examination 
of an expert witness is even *151 wider than in 
the case of an ordinary opinion witness. No rule 
can be laid down that would determine the extent 
and limitation of cross-examination allowable in 
every case. Generally speaking, the matter must 
rest in the sound discretion of the judge trying the 
case." 
It is true that the evidence the defendants pro-
posed to use to impeach Dr. Girod's testimony 
would have been extremely prejudicial and dam-
aging. However, it is also clear that, if it had not 
been for the untimely death of Dr. Girod, the evid-
ence could have been used in cross-examination of 
his live testimony. We think it was equally admiss-
ible when plaintiff desired to use the discovery de-
position taken by defendants to his own advantage. 
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Plaintiffs brief on appeal, although not entirely 
clear, seems to assert that the impeaching docu-
ments would amount to inadmissible hearsay evid-
ence pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-460. The 
hearsay argument was not specifically raised before 
the trial court, but even if the issue is properly be-
fore this court, the documents would appear to be 
admissible as business records pursuant to the ex-
ception in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-460(m). We find 
no abuse of discretion by the trial court on this is-
sue. 
The second issue is whether the trial court 
erred in permitting Jeanmarie Epperly to testify as 
an expert and to relate a personal experience as a 
victim of an automobile accident. Plaintiff also ar-
gues that the trial court should have permitted 
plaintiffs counsel to question Epperly concerning 
whether, in her experience, paralysis had ever res-
ulted from movement of a patient's head. 
[2] Jeanmarie Epperly was called by the 
plaintiff as an adverse witness. On direct examina-
tion, plaintiff's counsel asked Epperly about her 
scholastic training and brought out that she was not 
a registered nurse. On cross-examination, counsel 
for Wesley presented evidence as to her educational 
and employment history. There is no support in the 
record for plaintiffs contention that Epperly testi-
fied as an expert witness for the defendants. A II of 
her testimony was directed to her observations and 
treatment of the plaintiff and to one personal in-
stance when she had been involved in an auto acci-
dent. She was allowed to testify that in her own 
case she had been transported to the hospital on a 
spine board with her neck in restraints and was not 
given a cervical spine x-ray after her arrival. One of 
plaintiffs theories was that a cervical spine x-ray 
should have been performed immediately, since he 
was transported to Wesley on a spine board, im-
mobilized*152 by a cervical collar and foam 
wedges. We find no abuse of discretion in the al-
lowance of the testimony, which had some relev-
ance to one of the claims asserted by the plaintiff. 
[3] On redirect examination, plaintiffs counsel 
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asked Epperly the following question: "Have you 
ever had an occasion where a patient in the Emer-
gency Room at Wesley, whose head had been per-
mitted to be moved and as a result of that move-
ment the patient was paralyzed?" Counsel for Wes-
ley immediately objected, arguing the question was 
too vague and general. The court sustained the ob-
jection. 
Generally, the relevance of testimony elicited 
by a party from any witness, and the scope of both 
direct and cross-examination of a witness, is subject 
to reasonable control by the trial court. Exercise of 
reasonable control will not constitute reversible er-
ror absent a showing of abuse of discretion result-
ing in prejudice. Manley v. Rings, 222 Kan. 258, 
261, 564 P.2d 482 (1977). 
Plaintiff did not allege that he suffered paralys-
is following his treatment in the Wesley emergency 
room. The question posed to Epperly was irrelevant 
to this case. Whether or not head movement had 
ever caused a patient paralysis in Epperly's experi-
ence at Wesley had no bearing on any material is-
sue in this case. No error or abuse of discretion has 
been shown. 
**257 [4] The next issue involves the admis-
sion of collateral source benefits evidence pursuant 
to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-3403. At trial, evidence 
was admitted indicating that plaintiff had Team-
ster's Union insurance and that nearly all his medic-
al expenses had been reimbursed. 
Subsequent to the trial of this case a majority 
of this court held K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-3403 un-
constitutional in Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 
740 P.2d 1058 (1987). In Harrier v. Gendel, 242 
Kan. 798, 751 P.2d 1038 (1988), the jury in a med-
ical malpractice action found the defendant doctor 
had not been negligent in any degree, the same as in 
the present case. In Harrier the defendant doctor 
argued that the evidence of collateral source bene-
fits related solely to the issue of damages and that 
the erroneous introduction of the evidence was 
harmless, since the jury returned a verdict of no 
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negligence on the doctor's part. The plaintiff argued 
that the introduction of the collateral source bene-
fits evidence was prejudicial, since it might have 
improperly influenced the ju1y on the issues of liab-
ility and negligence. This court stated: 
*153 "It is impossible to say that the jury's ver-
dict was free from the prejudicial impact of the 
collateral source benefit evidence. To allow the 
introduction of evidence that the plaintiff re-
ceived collateral source benefits is inherently pre-
judicial and requires reversal." 242 Kan. at 802, 
751 P.2d 1038. 
Justice Lockett, in a well-reasoned short dis-
sent stated: 
"I agree with the majority's statement that evid-
ence that a party received collateral source bene-
fits is not admissible in a trial. Farley v. En-
gelken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 P.2d I 058 (1987). Un-
der the instructions, however, the jury was not re-
quired to determine the collateral source issue. 
First, the jury was instructed to determine wheth-
er the defendant, Dr. Gendel, was negligent in his 
treatment of the plaintiff. If the jury found that 
the defendant was negligent, only then could it 
consider the fact that the plaintiff received collat-
eral benefits while determining the compensation 
due the plaintiff. 
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to show that 
jurors disregarded their oath, not as a matter of 
speculation, but as a demonstrable reality. There 
must be more than speculation that it was reason-
ably certain defendant did not receive a fair trial. 
State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 498-99, 731 P.2d 
842 ( 1987). Where a party claims error in the ad-
mission of certain evidence, there is no presump-
tion of prejudice from the introduction of evid-
ence alone; in addition, the party claiming error 
must also prove that the error prejudiced the 
party. Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31, 35, 697 
P.2d 847 (1985). 
"Unlike the majority, I cannot find that as a 
matter of law the improper introduction of evict-
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ence of collateral source benefits into the trial 
was so inherently prejudicial that it caused the 
jurors to disregard their oath and the judge's in-
structions and to decide the case on an improper 
ground. It is true the plaintiff did not receive a 
perfect trial, but he did receive a fair trial. I 
would affirm the judgment." 242 Kan. at 802, 
751 P.2d 1038. 
In view of our holding in Harrier, the Comt of 
Appeals reversed the present case and ordered the 
case remanded for a new trial. Our holding in Har-
rier that the admission of collateral source benefits 
evidence was "inherently prejudicial and requires 
reversal" was controlling at the time of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in this case. 
However, in the very recent case of Wisker v. 
Hart, 244 Kan. 36, Syl. ,r 4, 766 P.2d 168 (1988), 
we overruled Harrier and held: 
"The erroneous admission of collateral source 
evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-3403 
(held unconstitutional in Farley v. Engelken, 241 
Kan. 663, 740 P.2d I 058 [I 987], and since re-
pealed) is held to be harmless e1Tor where the 
jury found the plaintiffs decedent to be 60 per-
cent at fault and, accordingly, did not determine 
damages. Our holding in Harrier v. Gendel, 242 
Kan. 798, 751 P.2d 1038 (1988), to the contrary 
is overruled." 
**258 Wisker controls this issue now before 
the court and requires that *154 we reverse the 
Court of Appeals' opinion herein. In view of the 
very recent opinion in Wisker, we see no need to 
dwell upon this issue further. 
[5] The fourth issue is whether the trial court 
committed reversible error in refusing to permit 
plaintiffs counsel to cross-examine Dr. Greg 
Snyder regarding Snyder's alleged claim against 
Wesley in a prior malpractice action. Plaintiff al-
leges that this line of questioning was designed to 
challenge Dr. Snyder's credibility. 
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Dr. Snyder, a neurosurgeon, was called as an 
expert witness on behalf of Dr. Morford. Dr. 
Snyder had examined and treated Stickney soon 
after his arrival at Wesley. He testified that in his 
opinion Stickney's spinal cord injury occurred dur-
ing the auto accident. He also testified that in his 
opinion nothing done in the emergency room in any 
way caused or contributed to Stickney's prolonged 
hospital stay. 
On cross-examination, plaintiffs counsel in-
quired about a previous malpractice action naming 
Dr. Snyder, Wesley, and others as defendants. The 
witness was asked whether he had claimed in that 
suit that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by Wes-
ley and the defendant radiologists. He responded, "1 
didn't make any claim that was true." The court sus-
tained the objection by Wesley's counsel on the 
ground that the question was immaterial. Out of the 
hearing of the jury, plaintiffs counsel proffered that 
in the prior lawsuit Dr. Snyder was found not at 
fault and 100 percent of the fault was attributed to 
Wesley and the other defendants. Under the doc-
trine of comparative fault, certain pleadings filed on 
behalf of Dr. Snyder had alleged that if there was 
any negligence it was that of Wesley and the other 
defendants and not Dr. Snyder. Counsel argued he 
was entitled to show that Dr. Snyder's statement 
that he had made no claim against Wesley was in-
correct. 
Although the witness had answered the ques-
tion before the court had an opportunity to rule on 
the objection, the ruling sustaining the objection 
was correct. When read in the context of a cold re-
cord the answer, at best, is ambiguous. ln any 
event, the entire line of questioning which related 
to an unconnected case was not material or relevant 
to the issues in this case. Extrinsic evidence of a 
prior inconsistent statement may be admitted for 
impeachment purposes only if the subject matter of 
the inconsistency*155 is material to the instant 
case. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence 
§ 84 (1978). In this case, the plaintiff sought to im-
peach the witness using extrinsic evidence dealing 
Page 8 of 9 
Page 7 
with a collateral matter-the negligence of Wesley in 
an unrelated lawsuit. The evidence was therefore 
properly excluded by the trial court. See State v. 
Carter, 148 Kan. 472, 473, 83 P.2d 689 (1938); 
State v. Ray, 54 Kan. 160, 161, 37 Pac. 996 (1894). 
In State v. Alexander, 89 Kan. 422, Syl. ,r 3, 131 
Pac. 139 (1913), this court held: "Evidence should 
not be admitted to contradict a statement of a wit-
ness elicited upon cross-examination upon a purely 
collateral matter which does not tend to prove or 
disprove an issue in the case, the contradictory 
evidence being offered by the party eliciting the 
statement." 
The scope and extent of cross-examination for 
impeachment purposes rests largely in the trial 
court's discretion. State v. Nixon, 223 Kan. 788, 
794, 576 P.2d 691 (1978); State v. Nix, 215 Kan. 
880, 884, 529 P.2d 147 (1974). We find no abuse of 
discretion in the court's ruling. 
Plaintiff also apparently complains that the trial 
court erred in sustaining objections to other ques-
tions propounded to Dr. Snyder on cross-ex-
amination. This line of questioning pertained to 
whether a cervical spine x-ray should have been 
taken prior to the time Stickney was permitted to sit 
up without wearing a cervical collar, and whether a 
cervical spine x-ray was indeed taken prior to that 
incident. Since plaintiff has not specifically briefed 
his arguments pertaining to this issue, it is waived 
or abandoned. Feldt v. Union Ins. Co., 240 Kan. 
108, 112, 726 P.2d 1341 (1986); Steele v. Harrison, 
220 Kan. 422, 429, 552 P.2d 957 (1976). 
**259 [6] The fifth issue is whether the trial 
court erroneously denied plaintiff his right to cross-
examine Dr. Philip Mills by sustaining various ob-
jections lodged by the defendants. 
Dr. Mills testified for defendant Wesley. He is 
a physician whose specialty is physical medicine 
and rehabilitation. He was initially consulted in the 
Stickney case on December 9, 1983, and was re-
sponsible for directing Stickney's rehabilitation 
therapy from that date until after his discharge from 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?mt=Westlaw&prft=HTMLE&pbc=E4 7F ... 10/21/2013 
000795
768 P.2d 253 
244 Kan. 147, 768 P.2d 253 
(Cite as: 244 Kan. 147, 768 P.2d 253) 
the hospital. 
The record does not support plaintiffs argu-
ment that he was denied his right to cross-examine 
Dr. Mills. Although the court did sustain several 
objections to particular questions raised on *156 
cross-examination, none of the rulings constitute 
reversible error. The scope of cross-examination 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Kearney v. Kansas Public Service Co., 233 Kan. 
492, 501, 665 P.2d 757 (1983). The evidence 
plaintiff sought to elicit concerned events which 
took place when Stickney was first brought to the 
emergency room. The questions not only exceeded 
the scope of direct examination, but Dr. Mills re-
peatedly testified he had no knowledge or expertise 
regarding emergency room procedures. No abuse of 
discretion has been shown. 
The last issue is whether the jury's verdict must 
be set aside and a new trial granted because the jury 
was pennitted to read and examine certain depos-
itions that were not admitted in evidence. This issue 
was never raised before the trial court and is not 
properly before this court for review. Kansas Dept. 
of Revenue v. Coca Cola Co., 240 Kan. 548, 552, 
731 P.2d 273 (1987). In addition, the record is not 
sufficient to afford meaningful review. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed and the judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
SIX, J:, not participating. 
ALLEGRUCCI, Justice, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part: 
I concur with the majority in all but section (4) 
of the syllabus and the corresponding portion of the 
opinion. This court's decision in Harrier v. Gendel, 
242 Kan. 798, 751 P.2d 1038 (1988), was correct 
and I would reverse and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
Kan.,1989. 
Stickney v. Wesley Medical Center 
244 Kan. 147, 768 P.2d 253 
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Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
This is a medical malpractice case set for trial before this court on 
November 5, 2013. Pending before the court are the defense motions in limine. While 
most of the six defense motions in limine are self-explanatory, below is additional 
authority for consideration by the court in support of the defense motions. 
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1. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Any Mention Of Liability 
Insurance. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or reports relating to the issue of Defendants' liability insurance. 
Rule 402 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) prohibits a party from 
introducing any evidence that is not relevant. According to I.R.E. 401, relevant evidence 
"means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probably or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." The disputed facts and issues in this matter relate to 
Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice. The Defendants' possession of liability 
insurance is not likely to make the existence of any fact needed for the determination of 
this claim more or less probable. Therefore, evidence of Defendants' insurance is not 
relevant to this case and Plaintiff should be barred from introducing it at trial. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that information regarding liability 
insurance is relevant, under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this case, any 
potential probative value of evidence regarding the Defendants' insurance coverage is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Plaintiff can prove his claim for 
malpractice without a necessary reference to the Defendants' liability insurance. The 
prejudicial effect of an unnecessary reference to liability insurance, however, is 
substantial. Evidence of a party's insurance coverage is likely to be misused by the jury. 
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Under I.R.E. 411, "[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against 
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or 
otherwise wrongfully." The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
explained that Rule 411 is based on "the feeling that knowledge of the presence or 
absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds." 
Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory committee's note (1972). Although evidence of liability 
insurance may be admissible for a limited purpose, none of the limited applications are 
appropriate for the case at bar. See I.R.E. 411. The mention of liability insurance will 
only put in the minds of the jury that Defendants are insured. See Lehmkuhl v. 
Bowland, 114 Idaho 503, 508; 757 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Ct. App. 1998) (review denied) 
(Idaho Rule of Evidence 411 may be utilized to assure that issues of liability based upon 
insurance are not introduced). Such an inference will unfairly and unnecessarily prejudice 
the jury to conclude that it will not be the Defendants' own personal money that would pay 
any potential verdict. 
The decision whether to allow inquiries relating to insurance during voir dire 
is a matter within the trial court's discretion. See Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 907, 
120 P .3d 289, 295 (Ct. App. 2005). However, "[t]he fact that this practice is not forbidden 
by Idaho law does not mean that a trial court must allow it. " Id. (citing Kozlowski v. 
Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 831, 828 P.2d 854, 860 (1992)). Here, there is no indication that 
allowing Plaintiff's counsel to make statements regarding liability insurance during yoir 
dire will contribute to a purported aim of ferreting out juror bias. Any reference to liability 
insurance during voir dire will be highly prejudicial in that it will signal to the jury that the 
Defendants are insured. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an order prohibiting 
Plaintiff from discussing, in any way, the issue of Defendants' liability insurance. 
2. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Discussing The Issue Of 
Whether Any Defendant or Defense Expert Has Been Sued For 
Malpractice Or Has Any Prior Board Or Licensing Matters. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or reports relating to whether any Defendant or defense expert has been sued 
for malpractice or has been the subject of any prior administrative licensing matter. 
Information regarding any such issue is irrelevant and would be unfairly prejudicial to the 
Defendants. 
Per I.R.E. 401, information regarding an expert's previous lawsuit history 
would be irrelevant and therefore under I.R.E. 402, inadmissible. The disputed facts and 
issues in this matter relate to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice. Whether any 
of the defendants or defense experts have ever been sued for medical malpractice or 
have been involved in any board proceeding has no tendency to make the existence of 
facts related to Plaintiff's allegations of malpractice more or less probable. Therefore, 
information regarding previous lawsuits of any defense expert is irrelevant and is not 
admissible. 
Even if this Court were to find information regarding any of the defense 
expert's medical malpractice lawsuits or prior board proceedings to somehow be 
relevant, its probative value is grossly outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
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Defendants and should be excluded under I.R.E 403. "It is well established that a trial 
court has considerable discretion to exclude evidence for reasons ... that the evidence is 
confusing, and could [be] interpreted in many different ways." Burgess v. Salmon 
River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565 574, 903 P.3d 730, 739 (1994). Any mention that 
a Defendant or defense expert has been sued or has been the subject of a prior board 
matter is unfairly prejudicial because such information could be interpreted by the jury in 
myriad ways which are not applicable to the case at bar. The raising of such a collateral 
issue by Plaintiffs' counsel will result in a protracted mini-trial on such issues which will 
only serve to confuse and distract the jury from the actual limited malpractice issues 
before them. 
Attached to the affidavit of counsel in support of the Defendants' motions in 
Limine are the reported decisions from a number of other jurisdictions wherein the issue 
of using prior disciplinary matters and/or prior malpractice claims for impeachment 
purposes was held improper, see Noble v. Lansche, 735 S.W. 2d (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding evidence that medical malpractice Plaintiff's expert witness physician had 
voluntarily surrendered his license to dispense narcotics was inadmissible 
impeachment); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831,835 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (errorfortrial court 
to allow defense counsel to cross examine plaintiff's expert witness with questions 
concerning past disciplinary proceedings since such questions are an improper attack on 
the witness' credibility); Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W. 2d 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 
(trial court abused discretion in allowing cross examination of medical expert regarding 
prior claims of malpractice as it is not probative of his truthfulness or competency and 
knowledge - such allegations of malpractice are analogous to unproven charges of 
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criminal activity); Stickney v. Wesley Medical Center, 768 P.2d 253 (Kan. 1989) 
(affirming in part on grounds that plaintiff sought to improperly impeach defense medical 
expert with extrinsic evidence involving an unrelated lawsuit); Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 
So.2d 129 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002) (Plaintiff entitled to new trial, in part, after defense counsel 
improperly questioned plaintiff expert about prior lawsuits); Morrow v. Stivers, 836 
S.W.2d 464 (Kent. Ct. App. (1992) (trial court properly precluded counsel from asking 
plaintiff medical expert on cross examination whether he had his license to practice 
medicine suspended for five years due to passing hepatitis to several patients, citing 
general rule that a witness cannot be cross examined on a collateral matter which is 
irrelevant to the issue at hand); Hathcock v. Wood, 815 So.2d 502 (Ala. 2001 )(affirming 
district court's refusal to allow counsel from asking plaintiff medical expert on cross 
examination as to the probationary status of his professional license, citing that under 
Rule 608(b), the only kind of evidence that may be presented as to an expert's character 
for truthfulness is evidence regarding the expert's general reputation in the community for 
untruthfulness or opinion testimony from another competent witness). 
Although no such reported decisions exist on this narrow topic in Idaho, the 
majority of these case authorities have adopted rules of evidence which are identical or 
nearly identical to those in Idaho. These decisions aptly demonstrate the improper 
nature of cross examination questions which seek to delve into an experts past lawsuits 
and board matters. Such allegations are analogous to unproven accusations which may 
not be used for impeachment purposes. The attempt at impeachment using such 
evidence does not address the expert's skill, knowledge, or qualifications as an expert 
medical witness; instead, its calculated effect is to simply cast a pall of disparagement 
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over the doctor's testimony by reason of irrelevant misconduct. For these reasons, such 
evidence should be excluded at the trial. 
In Idaho, medical malpractice actions are governed by Idaho Code § 
6-1012. In this case, Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Kerr is judged relative to his compliance 
with the standard of health care practice applicable to a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. Any discussions of any other suits 
involving any other case or expert, would involve injecting into the trial collateral issues, a 
different standard of health care practice and a different time for which no expert 
testimony has been disclosed. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an 
order prohibiting Plaintiff from presenting evidence or testimony regarding any Defendant 
or defense expert's prior medical malpractice lawsuits, claims and/or licensing matters of 
any kind. 
3. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Presenting Evidence, Or 
Discussing In Any Way, Defense Expert Gregory Laurence, 
M.D.'S Yet To Be Resolved Indictment By A Federal Grand Jury. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or documents of any kind relating to the issue of Dr. Gregory Laurence's federal 
grand jury indictment. 
Dr. Gregory Laurence is a defense standard of practice expert from 
Tennessee. At his October 2013 deposition, Dr. Laurence was questioned by Plaintiff's 
counsel regarding a federal grand jury indictment filed against him and others which was 
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filed in Colorado for alleged violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 - Corrupt 
Endeavor to Obstruct or Impede Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws and 
Aiding and Abetting) and for alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Obstruction of 
Justice). The indictment was handed down in May 2013 and this matter is still simply at 
the indictment phase. No trial date, plea or conviction of any kind has been entered 
against Dr. Laurence. The defense contends that to allow any reference to Dr. 
Laurence's indictment at the trial would be unfairly prejudicial, irrelevant and arguably 
raise an appeal issue. 
Under I.RE. 401, information regarding a defense expert's grand jury 
indictment is irrelevant and under I.RE 402, is not admissible. The disputed facts and 
issues in this matter relate to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice involving the 
death of Krystal Ballard. Whether Dr. Laurence, who is acting as a defense expert, has 
been indicted by a federal grand jury on an unrelated contested tax issue is an entirely 
collateral issue which has absolutely no tendency to make the existence of facts related 
to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice more or less probable. Therefore, 
information regarding his indictment is irrelevant and not admissible. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that information regarding Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment to be somehow relevant, its probative value is grossly 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendants. As a result, it should be 
excluded under I.RE 403. More to the point, I.R.E. 608(b) prohibits the admission of 
extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior misconduct to impeach a witness's credibility. 
While there is an exception under I.RE. 609 for impeachment by evidence of conviction 
of a crime, that exception does not apply to Dr. Laurence's indictment which is not a 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 8 
000804
conviction of any kind. Rule 609(a) states: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness 11 evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the 
nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior 
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant 
to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party 
offering the witness. 
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which I.R.E. 609 
was modeled after, "the following do not qualify as convictions, i.e., are inadmissible 
[under Rule 609]: an indictment, an arrest, acts that may be criminal but have not been 
prosecuted .... " Frazier v. /MED Corp., 2003 WL 1984366, *3 (Del. Super. Ct. April 25, 
2003) (citing 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence§ 
609.03, at 609-13 to 609-14 (citations omitted) (Joseph M. McClaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) 
(internal quotations omitted). In the instant case, extrinsic evidence regarding Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment is inadmissible because not been convicted of a felony. 
If allowed into evidence, Dr. Laurence would be unfairly impeached by the 
jury without him ever being able to defend himself. It would open up an entirely irrelevant 
issue which would consume court time and force the defense to interrupt the trial in order 
to present a mini-trial on the collateral issue of why Dr. Laurence is not guilty of tax 
evasion. Finally, use of the indictment would not even be relevant for impeachment 
purposes because Dr. Laurence did not deny its existence, but rather he truthfully 
admitted in his deposition all about the indictment before opposing counsel elected to 
produce the indictment. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an order prohibiting 
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Plaintiff from presenting any evidence or testimony regarding defense expert Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2013. 
By_-f.-i.~~~~:'.:.........:~'.::..__:=:::::::::: 
Terrence S. Jo s, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for efendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 51 day of October, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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TO: THE ABOVE ENTITLED PARTIES/PLAINTIFFS and their attorneys 
of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Tuesday, the 5th day of 
November, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, 
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before the Honorable Deborah A. Bail, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, the 
undersigned will call up for hearing before the Court Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2013. 
QUANE JONES cCOLL, PLLC 
By~--,&.~~~.;:.=..------,4L-~~~~~ 
Terrence . Jone f the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
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Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS'PROPOSEDJURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
COME NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PPLC, respectfully request the following jury instruction Nos. 1 through 28 
and Special Verdict Form. 
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r, 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
· H . Quane, Of the Firm 
neys for Defendants 
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Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law 
that applies to this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set 
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so 
doing, you must follow these instructions. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one or disregarding others. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital 
to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in 
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered 
and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court 
is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I may sustain an objection to a 
question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an offered exhibit without 
receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question called for testimony that was 
not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, 
I may instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you 
dismiss it from y~inds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence 
~~~NSED °:7' ~~ 




was inadmissible only after it had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider this testimony or exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, 
none of my rulings are intended by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence 
in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but 
they are not themselves evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the 
evidence, then you should disregard it. However, there are two exceptions to this rule: 
(1) An admission of fact by one attorney is binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of 
fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the 
course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the 
interest, bias or prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and 







opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts about which he testified; the 
contradiction, if any, of a witness'~ testimony by other evidence; any statements made 
by the witness at other times that are inconsistent with his present testimony; any 
evidence regarding a witness's general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any 
felony conviction of a witness. 
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the 
circumstances under which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit 










INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each 
party to the suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in 
any way with the parties, their attorneys, agents or witnesses. You are likewise not to 
discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether 
within or without the courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself 
to contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. 
In the event that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your 
decision, you will report it to me promptly. You are not even to discuss the case among 
yourselves until you retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case, 
and you are not to form or express any opinion on the case until you have heard all of 
the testimony and have had the benefit of my instructions as to the law which applies to 
the case. You should not go to the place where any alleged event occurred unless the 









INSTRUCTION NO. 3 









INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
I remind you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you are not to discuss 
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the 









INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use 
the expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, 
considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof 
in the case, without resorting to inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that 
indirectly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, 
by means of proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof 









INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 







IDJI 124. (Modified.) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved 
in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled to neither more nor less 
consideration than you would give the same testimony had the witness testified here. 








INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by an interrogatory and 
an answer to the interrogatory. An interrogatory is a written question from one party 
and answered by another during the course of a case. This evidence is entitled to the 
same consideration you would give had the witness been asked the interrogatory and 
then answered it from the witness stand. 
You will only have the interrogatory and the answer read to you in court. 
Although there is a record of the interrogatory and answer to the interrogatory, this 






I.R.E. 801 (d)(2) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not 
consider it for any other purpose. 







IDJI 127. (Modified.) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by 
a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that at the time and place of the 
incident in question Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care was provided as such 
standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was functioning. 
In addition, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the failure of 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 






The Defendants have no burden of proof on any issue in the case. 
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Individual providers of health care, such as Dr. Brian Kerr in this case, 
shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account their training, experience, and fields 






Idaho Code§ 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The standard of health care practice means the care typically provided 
under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider in the 






Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 
(2003); McDaniel v. Inland and Northwest 
Renal Care Group Idaho, LLC, 159 P.3d 856 
(2007), 144 Idaho 219 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice and 
professional learning, skill and care required of Dr. Brian Kerr only from the testimony of 
those persons, including Dr. Brian Kerr, who have testified as expert witnesses as to 










The quality or appropriateness of the standard of health care practice is 
not for you to decide. 
You must apply the standard of health care practice that you determine to 
be applicable and you must not consider or decide whether that standard of health care 
practice is appropriate, inappropriate or deficient. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 






INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are not permitted to assume or conclude that the standard of health 






Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32 (2007), 
I.C. § 6-1012. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that 
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital where the medical 
care complained of was provided. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 





INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not 






IDJI 230; Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 
P.2d 1122 (1989); Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 
Idaho 591,595,818 P.2d 295,299 (1991). 
><: cpl J ]) '1 .Y\ ll/2 , 1 ~vl\~ 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 









INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
You are instructed, in considering the issue of damages, that a physician 
is not liable for any pre-existing injury, disease, condition or disability which is not the 
natural and proximate result of the actions of the physician. In other words, you cannot 
award damages to the Plaintiff if the damage resulted from the natural progress of any 
injury, disease, condition or disability which is attributable to causes other than the 










INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
You may not include as damages any amount that you might add for the 
purpose of punishing the Defendants or to make an example of them for the public 
good or to prevent other incidents. Such damages would be punitive and they are not 
authorized in this action. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
BAJI 14.61 (6th ed.) 




INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
An award of damages is not subject to any income taxes, and you should 









INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, 
prejudice or passion for or against any party to the action. 
BAJI 1.00 (6th ed.). (Modified) 
GIVEN ' REFUSED 




INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by chance. Thus, 
if you determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover, you must not arrive at the 
amount of damages to be awarded by agreeing in advance to take the independent 
estimate of each juror of the amount to be awarded and then to average such estimates 









INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have 
told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to 
determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you; 
and then you will retire to the jury room for deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations 
are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic 
expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to 
change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph 
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your 
individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do 
so only after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 






INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreperson, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Use only the one conforming to your conclusions and return the other unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill it out, if 
necessary, and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your Foreperson alone will 
sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing 
will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict(s), you will notify 










INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at 
least three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered 
judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges -- judges of the facts. Your sole 










INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict form to use in returning 
your verdict. I will read the Verdict Form to you now: 
We, the Jury, answer the Special Verdict form as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to 
the class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES _____ NO __ _ 
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 







Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 




These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law 
that applies to this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set 
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so 
doing, you must follow these instructions. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one or disregarding others. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital 
to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in 
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered 
and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court 
is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I may sustain an objection to a 
question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an offered exhibit without 
receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question called for testimony that was 
not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, 
I may instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you 
dismiss it from your minds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence 
was inadmissible only after it had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider this testimony or exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, 
none of my rulings are intended by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence 
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in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but 
they are not themselves evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the 
evidence, then you should disregard it. However, there are two exceptions to this rule: 
(1) An admission of fact by one attorney is binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of 
fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the 
course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the 
interest, bias or prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and 
appearance of the witness and the manner in which he gives his testimony; the 
opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts about which he testified; the 
contradiction, if any, of a witness's testimony by other evidence; any statements made 
by the witness at other times that are inconsistent with his present testimony; any 
evidence regarding a witness's general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any 
felony conviction of a witness. 
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In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the 
circumstances under which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit 




As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each 
party to the suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in 
any way with the parties, their attorneys, agents or witnesses. You are likewise not to 
discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether 
within or without the courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself 
to contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. 
In the event that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your 
decision, you will report it to me promptly. You are not even to discuss the case among 
yourselves until you retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case, 
and you are not to form or express any opinion on the case until you have heard all of 
the testimony and have had the benefit of my instructions as to the law which applies to 
the case. You should not go to the place where any alleged event occurred unless the 








I remind you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you are not to discuss 
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the · 




When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use 
the expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, 
considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the 




Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof 
in the case, without resorting to inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that 
indirectly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, 
by means of proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof 




A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 





A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved 
in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled to neither more nor less 




Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by an interrogatory and 
an answer to the interrogatory. An interrogatory is a written question from one party 
and answered by another during the course of a case. This evidence is entitled to the 
same consideration you would give had the witness been asked the interrogatory and 
then answered it from the witness stand. 
You will only have the interrogatory and the answer read to you in court. 
Although there is a record of the interrogatory and answer to the interrogatory, this 
record will not be available to you during your deliberations. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not 
consider it for any other purpose. 





The Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by 
a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that at the time and place of the 
incident in question Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care was provided as such 
standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was functioning. 
In addition, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the failure of 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 
caused the injuries of the Plaintiff. 
The Defendants have no burden of proof on any issue in the case. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Individual providers of health care, such as Dr. Brian Kerr in this case, 
shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account their training, experience, and fields 




The standard of health care practice means the care typically provided 
under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider in the 




You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice and 
professional learning, skill and care required of Dr. Brian Kerr only from the testimony of 
those persons, including Dr. Brian Kerr, who have testified as expert witnesses as to 




The quality or appropriateness of the standard of health care practice is 
not for you to decide. 
You must apply the standard of health care practice that you determine to 
be applicable and you must not consider or decide whether that standard of health care 




You are not permitted to assume or conclude that the standard of health 




As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that 
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital where the medical 




When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not 
a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 
as to whether Plaintiff is or is not entitled to damages. 
000862
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
You are instructed, in considering the issue of damages, that a physician 
is not liable for any pre-existing injury, disease, condition or disability which is not the 
natural and proximate result of the actions of the physician. In other words, you cannot 
award damages to the Plaintiff if the damage resulted from the natural progress of any 
injury, disease, condition or disability which is attributable to causes other than the 




You may not include as damages any amount that you might add for the 
purpose of punishing the Defendants or to make an example of them for the public 
good or to prevent other incidents. Such damages would be punitive and they are not 




An award of damages is not subject to any income taxes, and you should 




You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, 




The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by chance. Thus, 
if you determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover, you must not arrive at the 
amount of damages to be awarded by agreeing in advance to take the independent 
estimate of each juror of the amount to be awarded and then to average such estimates 




I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have 
told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to 
determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you; 
and then you will retire to the jury room for deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations 
are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic 
expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to 
change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph 
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your 
individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do 




On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreperson, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Use only the one conforming to your conclusions and return the other unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill it out, if 
necessary, and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your Foreperson alone will 
sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing 
will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict(s), you will notify 




Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at 
least three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered 
judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges -- judges of the facts. Your sole 




In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict form to use in returning 
your verdict. I will read the Verdict Form to you now: 
We, the Jury, answer the Special Verdict form as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to 
the class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES _____ NO __ _ 
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff for 
Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
Non-Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
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SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury, answer the Special Verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to the 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
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class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES ____ _ NO ---
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the total amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs? 
Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
Non-Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
DATED this __ day of _______ , 2013. 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 2 
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,_ 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 3 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
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PLAINTIFF'S CONSOLIDATED 
MOTIONS IN LIM/NE 
ORIGINAL 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 9-102, Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(c), and the Court's Amended Scheduling Order 
of September 9, 2013, and moves for an order in limine regarding the following matters: 
I. The Possibility that Charles Ballard Might Remarry or Enter Into Another 
Relationship; 
II. Krystal Ballard's Purported Noncompliance; 
III. The Absence of Infection in Other Silk Touch Patients to Prove Compliance with 
the Standard of Care as to Krystal Ballard; 
IV. Life Insurance and Other Collateral Sources; 
V. Dr. Charles Garrison's Untimely Opinion Regarding Fat Embolism and All 
Undisclosed Expert Opinions; 
VI. Defense Experts Who Failed to Properly Familiarize Themselves as to the 
Applicable Standard of Practice; 
VII. Dr. Kerr's Communication with Krystal Ballard's Aunt; 
VIII. Dr. Lundeby's Testimony as to Krystal Ballard's Cause of Death; 
IX. Evidence, Argument, and Special Verdict Pertaining to Third Party Liability; 
X. Testimony of Dr. Kerr Regarding a Medical Malpractice Action Involving 
Plaintiffs Expert, Dr. Sorensen; 
XI. Speaking Objections, Unswom Testimony of Counsel, and References to the 
Parties' Motion Practice While in the Jury's Presence; 
XII. Ad Hominem Arguments and Remarks; 
XIII. Settlement Negotiations; 
XIV. Expert Testimony That Invades the Province of the Jury; and 
2 
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XV. Cumulative Expert Testimony. 
The order in limine should forbid Defendants and Defendants' counsel at trial from 
causing or permitting the jury to hear, read, or otherwise become aware of the foregoing matters 
in any way, whether through the testimony of its witnesses, in cross-examination of Plaintiffs 
witnesses, in colloquy or argument, or in any other manner, and whether in the case-in-chief, 
rebuttal, or surrebuttal. 
A memorandum in support of these motions follows. An Affidavit of Counsel, to which 
all exhibits referenced herein are attached, is filed contemporaneously with these motions. 
MEMORANDUM 
I. THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHARLES BALLARD MIGHT REMARRY OR 
ENTER INTO ANOTHER RELATIONSHIP 
By his Complaint, Charles Ballard asserts a claim for wrongful death and alleges that his 
wife, Krystal Ballard, died as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence and other 
wrongful conduct in connection with a cosmetic surgical procedure performed on July 21, 2010. 
(See Compl., March 16, 2012.) Plaintiff specifically alleges, among other things, that the 
sterilization procedures and techniques implemented, used, and performed . . . while providing 
cosmetic surgery services to Krystal Ballard . . . fell below the standards of care owed to the 
patient. ... " (Id. at ifl6.) 
During his deposition in this matter, Mr. Ballard testified that he has not remarried since 
his wife's passing. (Exhibit A, Ballard Dep. 169:13-15, Feb. 1, 2013.) Plaintiff now moves the 
Court, in limine, to preclude evidence and argument pertaining to the possibility that Charles 
Ballard might remarry or become involved in another relationship because such evidence and 




Idaho's wrongful death statute provides, "When the death of a person is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs . . . may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death .... " Idaho Code § 5-311(1). "In every action under this 
section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be just." 
Id Notably, however, the remarriage of a decedent's spouse is entirely irrelevant in wrongful 
death actions. Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 922-924, 821 P.2d 973, 977-979 
(1991). 
In Westfall, the appellant, Caterpillar, Inc., argued "that the [trial] court improperly 
granted plaintiffs' motion in limine which ... excluded all evidence of Karla Westfall's 
remarriage subsequent to the loss of her husband." Westfall, 120 Idaho at 922, 821 P.2d at 977. 
"According to Caterpillar, evidence of remarriage should [have been] considered by the jury, 
because under LC. § 5-311, 'all the circumstances' should be taken into account to determine an 
award for wrongful death." Id In rejecting Caterpillar's argument, the Westfall Court held that 
"there are a number of soundly based reasons for not admitting evidence of [Ms. Westfall's] 
remarriage, and we are made aware of no good reason for allowing any defendant to inversely 
profit by a court ruling which would be other than that reached by [the trial court]." Id. 
First, the Court looked to Idaho Code § 5-311 and noted that "[ w ]rongful death actions 
' 
are designed to reimburse heirs for their expectations of parental beneficence they would have 
received had the decedent lived."1 The Court continued, "This regime does not allow for 
consideration of financial and other circumstances that arise subsequent to the death of a parent 
who is survived by heirs." Id. 
The Court also considered the origins of the Idaho wrongful death statute, as well as its 
1 Idaho wrongful death actions are equally designed to reimburse heirs, where applicable, for expectations 
of spousal beneficence, as the term "heirs" is defined to expressly include "the decedent's spouse." 
Idaho Code § 5-311 (2)(b ). 
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conformity with "[t]he American doctrine," which "has its foundation in the refusal of [courts] to 
allow the defendant to benefit by his own wrong .... " Westfall, 120 Idaho at 923, 821 P.2d at 
978. In so doing, the Court observed that "[t]he true question is: What had these plaintiffs the 
right to expect to receive from the parent during his life? And for the loss of this they are to be 
compensated. What they got after his death does not enter into the case." Id. (quoting Stahler v. 
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 199 Pa. 383, 49 A. 273 (1901)). For these reasons, the Court 
ruled that "Caterpillar was not entitled to benefit from the fact that decedent's spouse had 
remarried." Westfall, 120 Idaho at 924, 821 P.2d at 979. 
Unlike Westfall, in which the decedent's wife had remarried, this case involves a plaintiff 
who has not yet remarried, and who may never remarry. Likewise, Mr. Ballard may or may not 
become involved in another relationship. Therefore, the prejudice caused by the information's 
irrelevance is compounded by the speculation necessitated by its introduction. Evidence and 
argument centering on Charles Ballard's potential to remarry or potential to become involved in 
a romantic relationship would invite the jury to not only assign weight to completely irrelevant 
evidence, but it would simultaneously encourage the jury to hazard a guess as to the likelihood 
and mitigating value of any such potential remarriage or relationship. For these reasons, it would 
be improper for Defendants to benefit at trial by suggesting that Plaintiff may suffer diminished 
damages on account of a hypothetical remarriage or relationship, which would serve no 
probative value even if Mr. Ballard had remarried or entered into a relationship. Accordingly, at 
the trial of this matter, evidence and argument pertaining to same should be precluded. 
II. KRYSTAL BALLARD'S PURPORTED NONCOMPLIANCE 
By their Answer in this matter, Defendants state as their Third Defense that "Plaintiff and 
Krystal Ballard were guilty of negligence and careless misconduct at the time of and in 
connection with the manners [sic] and damages alleged, which proximately caused and 
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contributed to said events and resultant damages, if any." (Ans. 2, April 16, 2012.) Defendants 
intend to pursue a comparative negligence theory by attempting to establish that Krystal Ballard 
engaged in a "pattern of noncompliance," though these purportedly noncompliant acts were not, 
in fact, noncompliance, and more importantly, though these purportedly noncompliant acts have 
no causal relationship to Krystal Ballard's death. Accordingly, and because Defendants' 
"noncompliance" arguments rely upon speculation, as opposed to facts contained within the 
record of this case, evidence and argument pertaining to same should be precluded. 
Dr. Kerr testified at deposition2 that "[o]ne of the aspects of Krystal's post-operative care 
was her pattern of not doing the things that we had asked her to do." (Exhibit B, B. Kerr Dep. 
86:19-21, Jan. 30, 2013.) 
It became apparent that she was non-compliant with a number of the things that 
we had ... advised her to do because, in fact, she was trying to hide the procedure 
from both her husband, Charles, and, in our opinion, from the military, and it's 
my opinion that this compromised her ability to properly take care of herself. 
(Id. at 86:22 - 87:4.) Dr. Kerr continued, "[M]y experience with patients is that when they are 
trying to hide the procedure, they don't -- they can't change their bandages appropriately, they 
will oftentimes overexert ... [and they] may not take their medications as prescribed." (Id. at 
87:6-14.) 
Dr. Kerr admits that he did not observe Krystal Ballard "around-the-clock" 
postoperatively. (Id. at 87:5-6.) He relies only upon a comment made by Mrs. Ballard days after 
the subject procedures whereby she stated that she may have been too active, as well as a 
"suspicion" that Mrs. Ballard may have been planning to take an Air Force physical training 
exam subsequent to her liposuction and fat transfer procedures. (Id. at 127:8-14, 129:5-10, 
2 Dr. Kerr testified in two separate depositions in this matter: once on his own behalf, and once as a 
designee of the corporate defendant. The instant reference is to Dr. Kerr's testimony on his own behalf. 
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130:6-11.) Dr. Kerr does not recall ever asking Krystal Ballard to elaborate on her postsurgical 
activity, and he conceded, "I have no basis in fact that she [participated in a physical training 
exam]." (Id at 133:14-20.) As a result, Dr. Kerr can opine only that "[Krystal Ballard] may 
have done activities, leave the wound sites open to drainage, and that certainly can be a pathway 
to introduce bacteria." (Id. at 87:20-23 (emphasis added).) 
Dr. Kerr saw Krystal Ballard on July 23, 2010, two days after her liposuction and fat 
transfer procedures, and noted no evidence or suspicion that Krystal Ballard had failed to 
properly attend to her postsurgical wounds. (Exhibit C, Postoperative Examination Record, July 
23, 2010.) Moreover, Donna Berg, an employee of Silk Touch, acknowledged that Krystal 
Ballard stayed home from work on July 23, 2010, and therefore, did not participate in any 
workplace testing that day. (Exhibit D, Email from D. Berg to S. Kerr, July 28, 2010.) 
Defendants also intend to advance a noncompliance theory based upon Krystal Ballard's 
arrival for surgery without anyone to drive her home. (B. Kerr Dep. 136:9-15.) According to 
Dr. Kerr, patients are instructed to have someone else drive them home after cosmetic surgery to 
avoid driving while under the influence of sedatives and for any "other conditions secondary to 
the procedure that would preclude [a patient] from driving home." (Id at 141:6-15.) Dr. Kerr 
eliminated both of these concerns by not administering a sedative during Krystal Ballard's 
procedure, and by conducting postoperative observation of Mrs. Ballard for a sufficient amount 
of time to assure himself that Mrs. Ballard could drive home safely. (Id. at 141:16-21.) He 
performed the scheduled procedures despite his knowledge that Krystal Ballard had no one to 
drive her home. 
According to Dr. Geoffrey Stiller, Defendants' general and cosmetic surgery expert, it 
was Dr. Kerr's choice to proceed, or to not proceed, with Mrs. Ballard's liposuction and fat 
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transfer on account of there being no person to drive Mrs. Ballard home, and it was appropriate 
for Dr. Kerr to proceed with the subject surgery in the absence of a third party driver for Krystal 
Ballard's post-operative transportation. (Exhibit E, Stiller Dep. 118:12-19, 120:19-20, 121:22-
23, July 19, 2013.) Even so, Dr. Stiller remains critical of Krystal Ballard "[b]ecause she didn't 
listen to [Dr. Kerr] in the first place." (Id. at 121 :3-4.) 
Defendants also intend to demonstrate noncompliance by the fact that Krystal Ballard 
failed to take postoperative, narcotic pain medication. (B. Kerr Dep. 117:6-7.) There is no 
dispute that Dr. Kerr prescribed Norco, a drug containing hydrocodone, to manage Krystal 
Ballard's post-operative pain. (B. Kerr Dep. 117:6-11; Exhibit F, Lundeby Dep. 95:19-22, July 
26, 2013) It is also uncontested that Norco does nothing to stop or fight infection. (B. Kerr 
Dep. 118:6-8.) 
Dr. Kerr's order called for Mrs. Ballard to take a pill by mouth every four hours as 
needed for pain. (B. Kerr Dep. 118:15 - 119:2; Lundeby Dep. 96:1-6.) Krystal Ballard voiced a 
preference for Motrin, as · opposed to a narcotic pain medication, out of concern for drug testing 
at her place of employment, the Mountain Home Air Force Base. (B. Kerr Dep. 122:21 - 123:2.) 
During his deposition, defense expert, Dr. Lundeby, acknowledged that Norco had been 
prescribed on an as needed basis, and furthermore, that a patient should not be considered 
noncompliant by preferring Motrin over a narcotic pain medication. (Lundeby Dep. 96:1-6, 
96:19-23.) Furthermore, when asked whether Krystal Ballard's decision to avoid Norco led to 
bacteria entering her body, Dr. Kerr himself admitted that it did not. (B. Kerr Dep. 119:23 -
120:2.) 
For his part, Dr. Stiller also concedes that Krystal Ballard should not be faulted for 
preferring Motrin over a narcotic pain medication: 
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Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you this. You don't know one way or the other. I 
mean, you know she got a prescription for Norco? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. That's the day she came in two days postop? 
A. She got it actually the day of the operation as well. 
Q. True. Well, did she take it? 
A. She said she didn't. 
Q. Okay. Is there anything wrong if she decides to manage it with non-narcotics? 
A. There isn't anything wrong with that, you're correct. 
(Stiller Dep. 125: 17 - 126:5.) 
Defendants' infectious disease expert, Dr. Thomas Coffman, testified that the only 
significance that can be attributed to Krystal Ballard's election to avoid narcotic pain medication 
is that Krystal Ballard's pain must not have been significant enough to justify its usage. (Exhibit 
G, Coffman Dep. 48:16-21, Aug. 20, 2013.) Nevertheless, Dr. Kerr remains steadfast that 
"[p]ain can ... alter a person's behavior." (B. Kerr Dep. 120:11-12 (emphasis added).) "[I]fshe 
was not getting adequate pain control . . . then she would not have followed the instructions on 
how to care for herself .... " (Id. at 123:6-10 (emphasis added).) 
Lastly, Defendants intend to establish noncompliance by the fact that Krystal Ballard 
failed to inform the Air Force of her cosmetic medical procedures. (Stiller Dep. 140:5-8.) And 
while Dr. Stiller admitted that any such failure had no relationship to Krystal Ballard's cause of 
death, it is Dr. Stiller's belief that any deviation from military protocol "shows a pattern of 
noncompliance." (Id. at 140:5-17.) 
Defendants' evidence of purported noncompliance should be precluded because the cited 
acts have no causal connection to Krystal Ballard's death, because Defendants' opinions are 
grounded in speculation rather than factual evidence, and lastly, because some of the purportedly 
noncompliant acts are admitted by Defendants and their experts to be appropriate patient 
conduct. The Idaho Code provides as follows with regard to contributory negligence: 
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Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility resulting in death or in 
injury to person or property, if such negligence or comparative responsibility was 
not as great as the negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility of 
the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative 
responsibility attributable to the person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall 
create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense. 
Idaho Code§ 6-801. 
"The burden of proof of the affirmative defense of contributory negligence is upon the 
party pleading such defense, unless it appears from the evidence introduced by plaintiff." Riley 
v. Larson, 91 Idaho 831,834,432 P.2d 775, 778 (1967) (citations omitted). And in the absence 
of any such evidence introduced by the Plaintiff, Defendants must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, "[t]he elements of a cause of action based upon negligence[, which] can be 
summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring [Krystal Ballard] to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between [Krystal 
Ballard's] conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Brizendine v. 
Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (1976) (citing Prosser, 
Law of Torts 30 (4th ed. 1971)). 
Not one of these elements can be satisfied by exclusive reliance upon unreasonable 
inferences, which would "permit a jury to base its verdict [ as to comparative negligence] on mere 
speculation and conjecture." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 1012, 1019 
(1979) (citation omitted). In fact, "[a]n expert's opinion which is unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record, but which is speculative or conclusory, has little or no probative value, and therefore may 
be excluded because its probative value is 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."' Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47, 
844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Idaho R. Evid. 403). 
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Defendants' noncompliance theory rests upon irrelevant, highly prejudicial, factually 
unsupported, speculative, and causally disconnected information. Defendants hope to tell the 
jury that a patient is noncompliant with doctor's orders when she fails to take narcotic pain 
medication, which the doctor prescribed on an as needed basis. And apart from the fact that the 
"as needed" element of this prescription renders Defendants' position completely nonsensical, 
Defendants' experts openly admit that a patient cannot be faulted for taking Motrin in an effort to 
avoid narcotics. 
Furthermore, Defendants offer no plausible reason to believe that Krystal Ballard's 
avoidance of a narcotic pain medication had any causal relationship to the infection that 
ultimately killed her. Dr. Kerr offers only speculation: "[J]f she was not getting adequate pain 
control ... then she would not have followed the instructions on how to care for herself .... " 
Meanwhile, Defendants' infectious disease expert, Dr. Thomas Coffman, testified that the only 
significance that can be attributed to Krystal Ballard's election to avoid narcotic pain medication 
is that Krystal Ballard's pain must not have been significant enough to justify its usage. 
Defendants also hope to demonstrate a purported pattern of noncompliance by the fact 
that Krystal Ballard arrived for surgery without someone to drive her home. Again, the record in 
this matter provides absolutely no indication of a causal relationship between Krystal Ballard's 
purported noncompliance and her death. 
The same is true with regard to Krystal Ballard's failure to inform her husband, or the Air 
Force, of her liposuction and fat transfer procedures. In essence, Defendants intend to suggest 
that Krystal Ballard may have compromised her postoperative recovery by placing secrecy above 
recovery. This is true even though Defendants' own expert, Dr. Stiller, testified that there is no 
causal relationship between Krystal Ballard's failure to inform the Air Force and her death. In 
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fact, none of Defendants' experts can testify within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that 
Krystal Ballard's purported noncompliance had any causal relationship with her death. To the 
contrary, Defendants' experts admit that no such causal relationship exists. Therefore, in the 
absence of any relevant, probative purpose speaking to Krystal Ballard's purported negligence, 
the true purpose of this evidence becomes clear: to encourage the jury to come to highly 
prejudicial conclusions about Krystal Ballard as a person. 
Because there is no record evidence linking Krystal Ballard's septic death with a lack of 
postoperative care on her part, Defendants intend to showcase irrelevant information that relies 
upon, and demands, impermissible speculation and conjecture. Defendants hope to offer a 
suspicion that Krystal Ballard intended take a physical training exam, though there is no record 
evidence to suggest that she, in fact, took the exam, and though there is evidence directly 
contradicting that suspicion. They hope to interject irrelevant evidence pertaining to Krystal's 
reluctance to take a narcotic medication as needed, for pain. They aim to paint Krystal Ballard 
as noncompliant for failing to arrive for surgery with a designated driver. And Defendants 
intend to state that Krystal Ballard may have compromised her recovery by failing to 
communicate fully with her husband . 
. Because Defendants' noncompliance theory rests upon irrelevant, highly prejudicial, 
factually unsupported, speculative, and causally disconnected information, evidence and 
argument pertaining to Krystal Ballard's purported noncompliance should be precluded. 
III. THE ABSENCE OF INFECTION IN OTHER SILK TOUCH PATIENTS TO 
PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARD OF CARE AS TO KRYSTAL 
BALLARD •. 
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff served his first set of discovery upon Defendants. (See Exhibit 
H, Pl.'s First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions.) 
Interrogatory No. 20 requests as follows: 
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Identify each witness known to you to have information and relevant materials 
to the claims presented in this action or to any defense asserted thereto, and 
for each such person please give a brief summary of each such witness's 
expected trial testimony. 
(Id. at 11.) Request for Production of Documents No. 1 requests "[ a ]11 documents identified or 
referred to in answering any of the foregoing interrogatories." (Id. at 14.) 
During his deposition in this matter, Dr. Kerr was asked to explain the basis or bases for 
his opinion that bacteria had been introduced into Krystal Ballard's body after she left Silk 
Touch. (Exhibit B, B. Kerr Dep. 82:11-23, Jan. 30, 2013.) Dr. Kerr responded, "Because I've 
never had another infection of that nature." (Id. at 82:24-25.) Dr. Kerr clarified that a limited 
number of his post-lipolysis patients had experienced infections, and he admitted that he never 
formally tracked the number of post-surgical patients who experienced infections. (Id. at 83:1-
13.) 
Seven months later, at the deposition of defense expert, Dr. Thomas J. Coffman, 
Defendants, for the first time, provided Plaintiffs counsel with a document, which purportedly 
sets forth the first names of Silk Touch patients, their dates of treatment, and a brief description 
of the procedures performed for each such patient. (Exhibit G, Coffman Dep. 40:19 - 41:4, 
Aug. 20, 2013; Exhibit I, Untitled Spreadsheet.) Dr. Coffman reviewed no other information 
pertaining to these patients. (Coffman Dep. at 41: 11-16.) 
On August 2?1\ defense counsel sent a letter to defense expert, Dr. Gregory N. Laurence, 
which stated, "The staff of Dr. Kerr and his wife have gone through every patient chart for 
operative procedures of every type performed starting in December of 2007." (Exhibit J, 
Laurence Dep. 165:1-13, Oct. 2, 2013.) Dr. Laurence reviewed the spreadsheet, but never 




On September 16, 2013, less than two months prior to trial, over a month after written 
discovery had closed, and ten days after the discovery deposition deadline had passed, 
Defendants served a supplemental response to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 20. (See Exhibit K, 
Defs.' Supp. Ans. to Pl.'s Interrogatory No. 20; Am. Scheduling Order 1-2, Sept. 9, 2013.) By 
that response, Defendants disclosed that Susan Kerr's "expected testimony will relate to records 
of Silk Touch, records and data she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of 
Krystal Ballard, photos of Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures." 
(Defs.' Supp. Ans. to Pl.'s Interrogatory No. 20 at 3.) 
By letter to defense counsel dated September 20, 2013, Plaintiffs counsel noted the 
vagueness of Defendants' supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 20, requested immediate 
production of the records and data compiled by Ms. Kerr, and sought a date upon which Ms. 
Kerr could be re-deposed in light of the newly disclosed information. (Exhibit L, Letter from P. 
Gregory Haddad to Jeremiah A. Quane.) Defense counsel responded by letter on September 26, 
2013, and stated that "[t]he records and data under discussion was prepared shortly before 
August 20, 2013 for the purpose of being a trial exhibit and it did not exist before and therefore it 
was not available for production .... " (Exhibit M, Letter from J. Quane to P. Gregory Haddad 
1.) Defense counsel continued, "In fact, since it will be used only as a trial exhibit, the court 
Order governing further proceedings does not require its identification and disclosure until either 
14 or 7 days before trial." (Id.) Additionally, defense counsel characterized Plaintiffs request to 
re-depose Susan Kerr as untimely. (Id.) 
On September 27, 2013, Plaintiff noticed the reconvened deposition of Susan Kerr. 
(Exhibit N, Notice to Take Video Conference Deposition Duces Tecum of Susan Kerr.) The 
Notice requested that Ms. Kerr bring all records and data underlying her testimony, as disclosed 
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by Defendants' supplemental response to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 20. (Id) Defendants 
refused to produce Ms. Kerr to be re-deposed, and to date, Defendants have failed to further 
supplement their discovery responses to include any data or documentary support for the 
proposed trial exhibit or any additional detail regarding Ms. Kerr's anticipated testimony. 
Evidence pertaining to unrelated patients, or Defendants' postsurgical infection rate, is 
irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff, and lacks any indicia of reliability to serve as the basis 
for expert opinion. Moreover, Defendants should not be allowed to benefit by failing to 
seasonably supplement their discovery responses, by subsequently obstructing Plaintiff's access 
to clearly discoverable information, or by advancing a trial by ambush strategy. 
As an initial matter, "[t]he purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and 
expedient pretrial fact gathering. It follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to 
encourage or reward those whose conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Edmunds v. 
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). "Parties may obtain discovery regarding 
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . 
. . including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of 
any discoverable matter." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). "[A]n important inquiry in determining 
whether a response was given 'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for 
full cross examination?" Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346 (citing Hopkins v. Duo-
Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205,213, 846 P.2d 207,215 (1993) (Bakes, C.J. concurring)). 
In terms of trial evidence, "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Idaho R. Evid. 401. And 
15 
000889
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
Idaho R. Evid. 403. 
Moreover, "[ o ]nee qualified as an expert, a witness may testify in the form of an opinion 
if the expert's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
determine a fact in issue." State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 417, 3 P.3d 535, 542 (Ct. App. 
2000) (citing Idaho R. Evid. 702). "The information, theory or methodology upon which the 
expert's opinion is based need not be commonly agreed upon by experts in the field, but it must 
have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet I.R.E. 702 requirements." State v. Konechny, 134 
Idaho 410,417, 3 P.3d 535, 542 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 
962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
In the instant case, other patients' alleged lack of infections is irrelevant in establishing 
whether Defendants satisfied the standard of practice as to Krystal Ballard, or whether any such 
deviation from the applicable standard of practice caused or contributed to Krystal Ballard's 
death. Additionally, all evidence and argument pertaining to a lack of infections in Defendants' 
patients should be precluded because Defendants, by their untimely, vague, and incomplete 
supplementation of discovery responses, as well as their refusal to produce Susan Kerr for a 
deposition duces tecum, ensured that meaningful cross-examination on the topic would be 
impossible. 
To the degree any relevance can be attributed to the subject evidence, the probative value 
of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury. T~e admission of evidence pertaining to the lack of infections in 
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unrelated patients creates an implicit invitation for the jury to draw extraordinarily prejudicial 
inferences from that information. Specifically, the jury would be enticed to adopt the idea that, 
because Defendants postsurgical infection rate is either low or lower than average, there is a 
reduced likelihood that Defendants exposed Krystal Ballard to bacteria or a resulting infectious 
process. 
What's more, both the methodology used to compile the data, and the data itself, is 
patently unreliable. Susan Kerr, who is not a physician or health care provider, and who is not 
qualified to make determinations as to the signs and symptomology of infections in patients, 
compiled a list of patients who, according to her review of Defendants' records, suffered no 
postoperative infections. And in light of Defendants' failure to recognize Krystal Ballard's 
infection before she died, there is more than sufficient reason to question the accuracy and 
reliability of data purportedly compiled to demonstrate Defendants' low, postsurgical infection 
rate. This unreliability, in combination with the information's irrelevance and its misleading, 
unfairly prejudicial impact, strongly warrants preclusion of the subject evidence. 
Defendants obviously provided their expert, Dr. Coffman, with the spreadsheet marked 
Exhibit I prior to his deposition on August 20, 2013. Almost a month later, less than two months 
prior to trial, a month after written discovery had closed, and ten days after the discovery 
deposition deadline had passed, Defendants supplemented their discovery responses to include 
Susan Kerr's anticipated testimony relative to infections in unrelated patients. And when 
Plaintiff pressed Defendants to produce the discoverable and responsive information underlying 
Ms. Kerr's compilation, Defendants not only claimed that Plaintiff acted in an untimely fashion 
in attempting to obtain it, but they suggested that they had done Plaintiff a favor by producing a 
trial exhibit that Defendants were under no obligation to produce until late October in any event. 
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Now, Plaintiff is left wholly unable to properly and fairly challenge Defendants' alleged 
infection rate information by cross-examination at trial. Defendants quite apparently violated 
discovery rules, and should not be rewarded for engaging in obstructive tactics so clearly at odds 
with the purpose underlying the discovery process. For these reasons, evidence and argument 
pertaining to Defendants' postsurgical infections should be precluded. 
IV. LIFE INSURANCE AND OTHER COLLATERAL SOURCES 
Krystal Ballard applied for, and was covered by, Service Group Life Insurance. (Exhibit 
A, Ballard Dep. 103:6 - 104:14, 105:18-22; 107:5-11, Feb. 1, 2013.) Krystal Ballard was also 
covered by Tri-Care health insurance, which she received automatically through her service in 
the Air Force. (Id at 106:9-15.) The jury should hear nothing of these insurance-related issues. 
"The collateral source rule is a common law doctrine under which an injured party's 
damage award may not be reduced by payments, also intended to compensate the harm caused 
by the tortfeasor, received from third parties. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 920A cmt. b & d 
(1979). Several jurisdictions, including Idaho, have enacted statutes that abrogate the common 
law rule, requiring collateral source payments to be deducted from damage awards. LC. § 6-
1606; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 920A at cmt. d." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 
152 Idaho 741,753,274 P.3d 1256, 1268 (2012). 
However, because Idaho Code § 6-1606 expressly renders death benefits paid under life 
insurance contracts completely irrelevant at the trial of this matter, evidence and argument 
pertaining to same should be precluded. And to the degree evidence of Krystal Ballard's health 
or life insurance can offer any probative value, that evidence would be relevant only after the 
finder of fact renders an award. Accordingly, the jury should be offered no evidence pertaining 
to Krystal Ballard's life or health insurance coverage. 
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V. DR. GARRISON'S UNTIMELY OPINION REGARDING FAT EMBOLSIM AND 
ALL UNDISCLOSED EXPERT OPINIONS 
On June 3, 2013, Defendants served a 108-page supplemental answer to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatory No. 3, which sets forth, in significant detail, the anticipated opinion testimony of 
Defendants' experts. (See Exhibit 0, Defs.' First Supp. Ans. to Pl.'s First Set of 
Interrogatories.) During his deposition on September 23, 2013, which occurred six weeks prior 
to trial, defense expert, Dr. Charles Garrison, testified that fat embolism contributed to Krystal 
Ballard's death. (Exhibit P, Garrison Dep. 47:19-20.) According to Dr. Garrison, he arrived at 
his opinion prior to September 19, 2013, but failed to inform defense counsel until the day prior 
to his scheduled deposition. (Id. at 34:17 - 36:4.) 
Defense counsel takes the position that "when you decide to depose an expert, the areas 
you get into constitute an automatic extension and supplementation of a prior disclosure." (Id. at 
36:7-10.) Mr. Quane continued by stating, "And that's the risk you take when you depose 
experts in Idaho." (Id. at 36:10-11.) And while Defendants reproduced Dr. Garrison for 
deposition on October 17, 2013, to answer questions pertaining to his new causation opinion, 
Plaintiff is left to manage the implications of that new opinion fewer than three weeks prior to 
trial. 
As stated above in reference to Defendants' unwillingness to provide responsive and 
discoverable information pertaining to Defendants' postoperative infection rate, "[t]he purpose 
of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient pretrial fact gathering. It follows, 
therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose conduct is 




"[Parties are] under a duty seasonably to supplement [their discovery responses] with 
respect to any question directly addressed to ... the subject matter on which [an expert] is 
expected to testify, and the substance of the person's testimony." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(e)(l). 
"This rule unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to discovery with 
respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's testimony where the initial responses 
have been rejected, modified, expanded upon, or otherwise altered in some manner." Radmer v. 
Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991) (citing Zolber v. Winters, 109 
Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525 (1986) and Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Supplementation of Responses, § 2048 (1970)). "[A]n important inquiry in determining whether 
a response was given 'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for full cross 
examination?" Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346 (citing Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 
123 Idaho 205, 213, 846 P.2d 207, 215 (1993) (Bakes, C.J. concurring)). 
It is well-recognized that "[a] trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-
compliance with pretrial orders. I.R.C.P. 16(i); Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 
121, 822 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ct.App.1991). Sanctions may include those enumerated in I.R.C.P. 
37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) for discovery violations. I.R.C.P. 16(i). One such authorized sanction is 
the disallowance of specified evidence." Priest v. Landon, 135 Idaho 898, 900, 26 P.3d 1235, 
1237 (Ct. App. 2001); Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Coleco Industries, Inc. v. 
Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.1977) ("Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 
results in exclusion of the proffered evidence."). And "while trial courts are given broad 
discretion in ruling on pretrial discovery matters, reversible error has been found in allowing 
testimony where Rule 26 has not been complied with. Radmer, 120 Idaho 86, 89-90, 813 P.2d 
897, 900-01 (1991) (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980)). 
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In this matter, Plaintiff has, once again, been placed in a position whereby he is forced to 
react to the untimely disclosure of discoverable information in close proximity to trial. Whether 
Dr. Garrison informed defense counsel of his fat embolism opinion of. causation in a timely 
fashion is irrelevant. The prejudicial effect on Plaintiff, with trial quickly approaching, is clear, 
and Plaintiff is unaware of any authority suggesting that Defendants are alleviated from adhering 
to their well-recognized discovery obligations upon the untimely disclosure of an expert opinion 
via the expert's testimony at deposition. Accordingly, Dr. Garrison's opinion pertaining to fat 
embolism, and any undisclosed expert witness testimony, should be precluded. 
VI. DEFENSE EXPERTS WHO FAILED TO PROPERLY FAMILIARIZE 
THEMSELVES AS TO THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PRACTICE 
Defense experts, Dr. Geoffrey Stiller and Dr. Gregory N. Laurence, failed to adequately 
familiarize themselves with the applicable standard of practice in this matter. Therefore, they 
lack competency to offer expert testimony as to the applicable standard of practice in this case. 
Dr. Stiller practiced as a general surgeon in the Boise area up until 2005. (Exhibit E, 
Stiller Dep. 69:5-8, July 19, 2013.) At the direction of defense counsel, Dr. Stiller conferred 
with a cosmetic physician, Dr. Kelly O'Neil to familiarize himself with the standard of practice 
for cosmetic physicians existing in Boise in 2010, the time of Krystal Ballard's liposuction and 
fat transfer. (Id. at 68:21 - 69:13; 69:25 - 70:2.) Dr. Stiller conferred with Dr. O'Neil for 
twenty to forty minutes. (Id. at 71 :20-25.) 
During that time, the two doctors discussed Dr. Kerr's use of Hibiclens, alcohol, and an 
unknown chemical to clean instruments. (Id. at 75:11 - 76:15.) According to Dr. Stiller, Dr. 
O'Neil "didn't see any issues with that." (Id. at 80:25 - 81:5.) When asked whether he 
discussed anything else with Dr. O'Neil pertaining to the cleaning of instruments, Dr. Stiller 
answered in the negative. (Id. at 76:12-15.) With regard to Dr. Kerr's sterilization practices, the 
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two doctors discussed Dr. Kerr's ... steam autoclave, and the fact that [Dr. Kerr used] a 
chemical marker." (Id. at 77:14-18.) There appears to have been no application of these facts to 
a standard of care. 
Dr. Stiller does not recall asking whether Dr. O'Neil used a mixture of alcohol and 
Hibiclens to clean medical equipment and supplies in 2010. (Id. 81 :6-10.) Dr. Stiller did not ask 
Dr. O'Neil whether he used spore counts or whether other area cosmetic physicians conducted 
spore counts in 2010. (Id. at 81: 11-17.) Dr. Stiller did not inquire whether other cosmetic 
physicians used alcohol to clean their hands in 2010. (Id. at 86:1-5.) He made no inquiry of Dr. 
O'Neil to determine whether the standard of practice required instruments to be soaked in a basin 
after cosmetic procedures in 2010. (Id. at 88:14-17.) 
Dr. Stiller has no knowledge of Dr. O'Neil's background, including whether Dr. O'Neil 
had any kind of surgical residency. (Id. at 70:7-16.) Dr. Stiller failed to determine what types of 
machines Dr. O'Neil employed during cosmetic procedures. (Id. at 70:22-25.) Dr. Stiller never 
inquired whether Dr. O'Neil personally performed cleaning, disinfecting, or sterilization of 
reusable equipment and supplies at his practice, nor did he ask Dr. O'Neil to identify the people 
who performed those functions at his practice. (Id. at 71:1-6; 72:16-19.) Moreover, Dr. Stiller 
never determined whether Dr. O'Neil employed written policies or procedures to guide members 
of his practice in the cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilization of equipment. (Id. at 72:20-23.) At 
one point in Dr. Stiller's deposition, when asked whether his conversation with Dr. O'Neil was 
"just kind of a general conversation," Dr. Stiller responded, "Absolutely." (Id. at 74: 1-4.) 
At the direction of defense counsel, Dr. Laurence also conferred with Dr. O'Neil, and 
only Dr. O'Neil, to familiarize himself with the applicable standard of care. (Exhibit J, 
Laurence Dep. 55:6-14; 56:5-15, Oct. 2, 2013.) Dr. Laurence conferred with Dr. O'Neil on two 
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occasions, the second of which lasted thirty to forty-five minutes and serves as the basis of Dr. 
Laurence's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in this case. (Id. at 57:22-24; 63:7-
16.) 
During his communications with Dr. O'Neil, Dr. Laurence never determined that Dr. 
O'Neil actually performed liposuctions or fat transfers in 2010. (Id. at 70:1-6; 71:14-22.) 
According to Dr. Laurence, "[Dr. O'Neil] was clearly knowledgeable about fat transfer, but I 
don't know how much he did it." (Id. at 71: 1-3.) When asked to describe how Dr. O'Neil knew 
of other physicians' liposuction and fat transfer practices and procedures, Dr. Laurence testified, 
"[H]e did not tell me how he knew other physicians did one thing or another." (Id. at 72:4-8.) 
According to Dr. Laurence, "I assumed that, likely, he had enough connections with staff or 
through other people that gave him a sense that other physicians in Boise had a similar 
approach." (Id. at 98:14-17.) Additionally, Dr. Laurence never determined "whether [Dr. 
O'Neil] operated out of ... an office or an accredited facility." (Id. at 104:2-5.) 
"An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must show 
that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care professional for 
the relevant community and time." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002) (citing Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 
P.2d 816 (2000); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994)). "The expert must 
also state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care." Id. "One method for an 
out-of-area expert to obtain knowledge of the local standard of care is by inquiring of a local 




The record in this case demonstrates convincingly that neither Dr. Stiller, nor Dr. 
Laurence adequately familiarized themselves with the applicable standard of care. In both 
instances, Dr. Stiller and Dr. Laurence called a physician referred to them by defense counsel, 
which, on its own, comports with Idaho law. However, their failure to elicit basic foundational 
information pertaining to Dr. O'Neil's qualifications, and their failure to elicit basic information 
as to the cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilization procedures that are at the center of this case 
renders each of them incompetent to offer expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care. 
While it is clear that Idaho law demands explanation of how a particular expert became 
familiar with the applicable standard of care, this requirement would be of little meaning if an 
expert could simply waltz into court and claim to be a standard of care expert based upon a half-
hour and half-hearted conversation yielding few probative, relevant considerations. Yet 
Defendants will surely assert that Dr. Laurence should be considered an expert anyway. And 
while Dr. Stiller could certainly state that he contacted a cosmetic physician who practiced in 
Boise in 2010, what value can possibly be attributed to such a contact when Dr. Stiller can offer 
little more than that Dr. O'Neil "didn't have a problem" with Dr. Kerr's use of Hibiclens, 
alcohol, and an unknown chemical to clean instruments? 
Dr. Stiller does not recall asking whether Dr. O'Neil used a mixture of alcohol and 
Hibiclens to clean medical equipment and supplies in 2010; Dr. Stiller failed to determine 
whether Dr. O'Neil used spore counts or whether other area cosmetic physicians conducted spore 
counts in 2010; Dr. Stiller did not think to ask whether other cosmetic physicians used alcohol to 
clean their hands in 2010; he made no inquiry of Dr. O'Neil to determine whether the standard of 
practice required instruments to be soaked in a basin after cosmetic procedures in 2010; Dr. 
Stiller failed to determine what types of machines Dr. O'Neil employed during cosmetic 
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procedures; he never asked Dr. O'Neil to identify which personnel performed cleaning, 
disinfecting, or sterilization of reusable equipment and supplies at his practice; and Dr. Stiller 
never discerned whether Dr. O'Neil employed written policies or procedures to guide members 
of his practice in the cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilization of equipment. It was, absolutely, 
just kind of a general conversation. 
And apart from the fact that Dr. Stiller so hastily addressed the many aspects of cleaning, 
disinfecting, and sterilization, which are so obviously implicated in this matter, both his, and Dr. 
Laurence's complete failure to ensure that Dr. O'Neil was qualified to provide the information in 
the first instance is extraordinary. Dr. Stiller made no inquiry into Dr. O'Neil's background or 
the setting in which Dr. O'Neil performed whatever services he performed in 2010. Dr. 
Laurence has no idea whether Dr. O'Neil performed any liposuctions or fat transfers in 2010. 
Apparently, he never thought to inquire. 
Dr. O'Neil will never set foot in the courtroom during the trial of this matter, yet 
Defendants' experts hope to justify their competency to testify as to the applicable standard of 
care simply because they made brief telephone calls to a cosmetic physician who may or may not 
himself be qualified to shed sufficient light on the issue. And even if Dr. O'Neil was, or is, so 
qualified, Drs. Laurence and Stiller cannot make a satisfactory showing under Delaney in 
demonstrating how they gained sufficient familiarity based upon their communications with Dr. 
O'Neil because they couldn't have gained sufficient familiarity. Accordingly, they are not 
competent to offer standard of care testimony during the trial of this matter. 
VII. DR. KERR'S COMMUNICATION WITH KRYSTAL BALLARD'S AUNT 
Dr. Kerr testified at deposition that, after Krystal Ballard's death, he communicated 
telephonically with Krystal Ballard's aunt, Angela Neil, and furthermore, that he composed a 
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three-page "written narrative of that conversation." (Exhibit B, B. Kerr. Dep. 42:22 - 45:22; 
105:14-22, Jan. 30, 2013; Exhibit Q, Handwritten Notes of Dr. Kerr.) Dr. Kerr explained that 
his written narrative is not included within Krystal Ballard's medical records "[b]ecause it didn't 
have anything to do with her medical care." (B. Kerr. Dep. 46:2-7.) 
Dr. Kerr recounted the following with regard to his communication with Angela Neil: 
My recollection is that she had expressed that she had been -- she had actually 
talked with -- or family members had talked with Krystal about that time, that 
Krystal had told them that she was having -- that she had fallen down the stairs 
and hurt her back and had not talked about having had a medical procedure. 
(Id. at 45:10-16.) Dr. Kerr continued, "We discussed some of the challenges that had presented 
themselves with -- with her post-operative compliance, and I think I ended with sharing my 
condolences .... " (Id. at 45:17-20.) 
Evidence and argument pertaining to Dr. Kerr's communication with Angela Neil should 
be precluded as inadmissible hearsay. The Rules of Evidence provide that "[h]earsay" is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Idaho R. Evid. 801(c). And unless a hearsay 
statement comports with an exception to the general rule of hearsay exclusion, evidence and 
argument pertaining to such a statement should be precluded. Idaho R. Evid. 802, 803, 804. 
Any statements made by Angela Neil during her conversation with Dr. Kerr would . 
constitute inadmissible hearsay to which no exception applies. The same is true of the hearsay 
contained within Dr. Kerr's written narrative memorializing his conversation with Ms. Neil. 
Accordingly, evidence and argument pertaining to same should be precluded. 
VIII. DR. LUNDEBY'S TESTIMONY AS TO KRYSTAL BALLARD'S CAUSE OF 
DEATH 
During his deposition in this case, Dr. Lundeby testified that "when I looked at this entire 
record, I was very -- it was difficult to figure out exactly why this patient died." (Exhibit F, 
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Lundeby Dep. 83:13-15, July 26, 2013.) Plaintiffs counsel then asked, "At this point in time, 
you don't know whether or not you have enough information to form an opinion as to the cause 
of this patient's death; is that fair?" (Id. at 83:21-24.) Dr. Lundeby responded, "Yeah, I think --
1 think that's fair." 
"[E]xpert medical opinion testimony must be based upon a "reasonable degree of medical 
probability" in order to be admissible. Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 948, 866 
P.2d 969, 971 (1993). Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17, 19 (1997) 
(citing Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 948, 866 P.2d 969,971 (1993)). Dr. John P. 
Lundeby cannot offer an opinion with any degree of medical certainty as to Krystal Ballard's 
cause of death. Therefore, he should offer no such opinion at trial. 
IX. EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT, AND SPECIAL VERDICT PERTAINING TO THIRD 
PARTY LIABILITY 
As her health declined subsequent to the liposuction and fat transfer procedures at issue, 
Elmore Ambulance Service transported Krystal Ballard to Elmore Medical Center; shortly 
thereafter, Life Flight transported Krystal Ballard to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
where she died. Because Defendants failed to assert third party claims against these, or any 
other, parties, and because the record in this matter is wholly undeveloped as to third party 
liability, Defendants are not entitled to present the issue of third party liability to the jury, 
whether by argument, by special verdict, or otherwise. 
"In Idaho, LC. § 6-802 provides that the court, at the request of any party, may direct the 
jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of 
negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to each party." Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 
Idaho 681, 687, 39 P.3d 621, 627 (2001). "The decision whether the special verdict shall inquire 
as to the alleged negligence of a non-party raises a question of law, namely whether evidence 
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exists which warrants submission of the matter to the jury." Id (citing Zintek et al. v. Perchik, 
163 Wis.2d 439, 471 N.W.2d 522 (1991)). "It is the general rule that before nonparties are 
placed on jury verdict forms, there must be a showing that the requisite elements of a cause of 
action against them have been presented at trial. There must have been admitted into evidence 
proof sufficient to make a case in negligence where applicable ... before any non-party can be 
included on the form." Id. (quoting Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536,551, 726 P.2d 
648, 663 (1985) (Bistline J., concurring)). 
In the instant action, Defendants should be precluded from offering evidence and 
argument pertaining to the culpability of absent third parties for a number of reasons. First, 
Defendants never asserted third party claims. If Defendants felt strongly about the culpability of 
third parties, they sh(?uld have, and could have, pursued third party claims against those parties. 
Relatedly, because Defendants asserted no third party claims in this case, the record in 
this matter is completely undeveloped as it pertains to third party liability. Defendants have not 
identified any allegedly negligent nonparties, much less offered evidence of a causal relationship 
between any such liability and Krystal Ballard's death. Therefore, permitting Defendants to 
advance a theory of third party liability would not only force Plaintiff to defend a theory that the 
parties never adequately discovered, but additionally, the jury would be left to speculate as to the 
true nature and scope of any absent parties' purported culpability. For these reasons Defendants 
should be precluded from advancing a theory of third party liability, whether by argument or by 
special verdict. 
X. TESTIMONY OF DR. KERR REGARDING A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CASE INVOLVING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT, DR. SORENSEN 
Defendants disclosed the following with regard to Dr. Kerr's anticipated trial testimony: 
Depending on the proof submitted at trial and the testimony of Dr. Sorensen 
and/or the tenor or implication of his testimony and opinions, Dr. Kerr may 
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describe the lawsuit against Dr. Sorensen in Boise that resulted in the jury 
rendering a verdict of malpractice against him and assessing damages of a 
substantial amount against him. 
(Exhibit 0, Defs.' First Supp. Ans. to Pl.'s First Set of Interrogatories 18.) Because Dr. Kerr 
has no personal knowledge of the litigation involving Dr. Sorensen, and because the information 
is not of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subjects at issue in this case, Dr. Kerr's testimony as to Dr. Sorensen's 
medical malpractice case should be precluded. 
Rule 602 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that "[a] witness may not testify to a 
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of 
the testimony of the witness. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to 
opinion testimony by expert witnesses." Rule 703 provides as follows: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts 
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
Additionally, "an expert witness may provide an opinion '[i]f scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue."' Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013) 
(quoting Idaho R. Evid. 702). "Therefore, after the court qualifies a witness as an expert, it 
"must determine whether such expert opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence." Id. (citing State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 246, 192 P.3d 1065, 
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1070 (2008)). "Pursuant to I.RE. 704, an expert's testimony is not inadmissible merely because 
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided in the case; however, '[e]xpert testimony that 
concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts 
utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience is inadmissible.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66, 253 P.3d 727, 740 (2011)). "[E]vidence is generally inadmissible 
under I.RE. 702 if it vouches for the credibility of another witness." Id. (citing State v. Perry, 
139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003)). 
Dr. Kerr had no role in the medical malpractice action involving Dr. Sorensen. 
Therefore, he has no personal knowledge upon which he can rely in offering the subject 
testimony. And though Rule 703 allows expert witnesses to base opinions upon otherwise 
inadmissible facts and data learned during the course of litigation, those facts and that data must 
be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject. Of course, facts pertaining to a medical malpractice action defended 
by an adversary expert cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be of a type reasonably relied 
upon by a Defendant expert testifying as to his compliance with the applicable standard of 
practice in this matter. 
Defendants have at their disposal other means by which to elicit testimony pertaining to 
Dr. Sorensen's medical malpractice action. Dr. Kerr should not be allowed to attack the 
credibility of Dr. Sorensen for the sole purpose of invading the province of the jury to make its 
own determination as to Dr. Sorensen's credibility based upon properly admitted testimonial 
evidence. Because Dr. Kerr possesses no personal knowledge of the medical malpractice action 
at issue, because information pertaining to that medical malpractice action is wholly outside the 
scope of information reasonably relied upon by an expert in his field, because Dr. Kerr should 
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not be allowed to attack the credibility of an adversarial expert witness, and because Dr. Kerr's 
testimony is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, Dr. Kerr should be precluded from 
offering testimony pertaining to a medical malpractice action defended by Dr. Sorensen. 
XI. SPEAKING OBJECTIONS, UNSWORN TESTIMONY OF COUNSEL, AND 
REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES' MOTION PRACTICE WHILE IN THE 
JURY'S PRESENCE 
At the trial of this matter, all counsel should be precluded from offering speaking 
objections, unswom testimony, and references to the parties' motion practice in the jury's 
presence. "In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making 
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury." Idaho R. Evid. 
103(c); see also State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26-27, 205 P.3d 671, 675-676 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding error in trial court's failure to strike attorney's improper, unswom "correction" of 
witness's testimony). 
By this motion, Plaintiff seeks not only to preclude counsel from offering the substantive 
bases for objections and references to the parties' motion practice, but Plaintiff seeks to also 
preclude counsel from offering personal observations or experiences derived from other, 
unrelated cases in the jury's presence. Any such statements are likely to expose the jury to 
precisely the type of irrelevant and prejudicial information Rule I 03( c) is designed to address, 
and which cannot be "unheard" whether or not a motion to strike is offered. Accordingly, 
speaking objections, references to the parties' motion practice, and unswom attorney testimony 
should be precluded. 
XII. AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS AND REMARKS 
Plaintiffs lead attorneys in this case practice with Bailey & Glasser, LLP, a firm based in 
Charleston, West Virginia. P. Gregory Haddad practices from Bailey & Glasser's office in 
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Morgantown, West Virginia; J.B. Perrine practices from Bailey & Glasser's office m 
Birmingham, Alabama. 
Defendants should be precluded from arguing or suggesting that Plaintiff's attorneys, or 
that out-of-state-attorneys, lack credibility, or make any direct or indirect disparaging remarks 
concerning Plaintiff's counsel. Any such suggestion, or derivative thereof, is improper at any 
stage of this trial, including during opening statements and closing arguments. For this reason, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preclude at the trial of this matter any and all ad 
hominem arguments and remarks. 
XIII. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
Evidence and argument pertaining to settlement negotiations should be strictly precluded 
pursuant to Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Rule 408 provides as follows: 
Evidence of (I) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, 
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the 
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of 
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course 
of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence 
is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation. 
Idaho R. Evid. 408. 
Plaintiff foresees no permissible purpose for the introduction of evidence pertaining to 
settlement negotiations in this case. To the degree Defendants perceive a permissible purpose, 
Plaintiff requests that Defendants be required to proffer the related evidence out of the jury's 
presence, and that the Court conduct a Rule 403 balancing analysis in determining the 
admissibility of the proffered evidence prior to its presentation. (See Davidson v. Beco Corp., 
114 Idaho 107, 111, 753 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1987)). 
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XIV. EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT INVADES THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY 
Defense experts in this case should be precluded from offering conclusions as to the 
ultimate issues to be decided in this matter when the jury is duly qualified to draw its own 
conclusion based upon common sense, life experience, evidence, and the law. Defense experts 
should also be precluded from offering testimony as to the credibility of other witnesses. Any 
such testimony would invade the province of the jury. 
"[A]n expert witness may provide an opinion '[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue."' Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013) (quoting Idaho R. 
Evid. 702). "Therefore, after the court qualifies a witness as an expert, it "must determine 
whether such expert opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence." 
Id. (citing State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,246, 192 P.3d 1065, 1070 (2008)). "Pursuant to I.R.E. 
704, an expert's testimony is not inadmissible merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided in the case; however, ' [ e ]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the 
average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal 
experience is inadmissible."' Id. (quoting State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66,253 P.3d 727, 740 
(2011)). "Additionally, evidence is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 702 if it vouches for the 
credibility of another witness." Id. (citing State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 
1235 (2003)). 
In this case, Defendants' experts should not be allowed to present testimony as to the 
ultimate issues to be decided in this wrongful death case, nor should they be allowed to make 
credibility determinations pertaining to other witnesses. Jurors are typically well qualified to 
make these determinations without being spoon fed by either party's expert witnesses (or fact 
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witnesses, for that matter), and such testimony is likely to unfairly prejudice Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that his Motion in Limine to Preclude Expert 
Testimony That Invades the Province of the Jury be granted. 
XV. CUMULATIVE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
The parties argued Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses in July of 
this year. At that time, Defendants argued for Plaintiffs motion to be denied because of the 
varied backgrounds of their expert witnesses. 
Since the time of that hearing, it has become clear that all of Defendants' expert 
witnesses relied exclusively upon the same cosmetic physician, Dr. Kelly O'Neil, to become 
familiar with the applicable standard of care. Therefore, no matter how varied Defendants' 
experts' backgrounds are purported to be, any standard of care opinions offered by Defendants' 
experts must be considered needlessly cumulative because those opinions are based upon the 
standard of care perspective of one physician. Moreover, Defendants' expert witness disclosure 
demonstrates that the cumulative nature of defense experts' testimony does not end at the 
standard of care. 
On June 3, 2013, Defendants served a supplemental answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory 
No. 3, which calls for expert witness information. (See Exhibit 0, Defs.' First Supp. Ans. to 
Pl.'s First Set of Interrogatories.) By their 108-page disclosure (not including attachments), 
Defendants explicitly identify four experts who they intend to offer as standard of care witnesses: 
the Defendant, Dr. Kerr; Gregory Laurence, M.D., John Lundeby, M.D., FACS, FAACS; and 
Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Thomas Coffman will offer a standard of care 
opinion to the degree he opines "that Dr. Kerr was not required to test for spores or mold .... " 
(Id. at 52.) 
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According to Defendants, Drs. Kerr, Laurence, Garrison, Coffinan, and Lundeby will 
testify as to "facts of the case," causation, and damages. (Id. at 2, 22, 43, 63.) Defendants intend 
to offer Dr. Stiller's testimony to address "facts of the case" and causation. All of these expert 
witnesses are intended to offer testimony on "the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard." (Id. at 
2, 22, 43, 63, 85.) 
Defendant's supplemental answer to Plaintiffs third interrogatory is replete with 
example·s of cumulative evidence. With regard to the applicable standard of care, for example, 
Defendants intend for "Dr. Kerr [to] explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for his facility to be certified, inspected, or approved by any 
organization or governmental agency .... " (Id. at 4-5.) Defendants intend for Dr. Lundeby to 
provide the exact same testimony. (Id. at 25.) 
Additionally, Drs. Kerr, Lundeby, Coffman, and Stiller will all testify that Defendants 
employed proper techniques to maintain sterility at Silk Touch. (Id. at 15, 24, 53, 64, 87.) 
Relatedly, Defendants intend to offer Dr. Garrison to testify that there is no evidence to establish 
"that there was any breach of sterility in this case." (Id. at 47; see also id. at 48 ("[S]terilization 
procedures were adequate to maintain a proper sterile field.").) These are but some of the 
examples of cumulative expert testimony contained with the subject discovery response. 
In an attempt to resolve this dispute without Court involvement, counsel exchanged 
correspondence on this issue. (Exhibit R, Letter from J.B. Perrine to Terrence S. Jones, June 20, 
2013; Exhibit S, Letter from Terrence S. Jones to J.B. Perrine, June 21, 2013.) It is Defendants' 
position that they will not run afoul of Rule 403 because their disclosed experts are "from 
different specialties of medicine." (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff maintains disagreement with Defendants' 
position, and the dispute remains unresolved. 
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Plaintiff filed a Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Witnesses on June 26, 2013. The 
parties subsequently argued their positions before the Court. (See Exhibit T, Hr'g Tr., July 10, 
2013.) At that time, Defendants argued that, though their expert opinions may overlap, any such 
overlap is excused due to their experts' varied backgrounds. (Id at 11-13.) What Defendants 
failed to mention, however, is that all of their experts consulted with one cosmetic physician for 
the purpose of becoming familiar with the applicable standard of practice in this case, thus 
rendering their backgrounds far less relevant. 
It is axiomatic that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Idaho R. Evid. 403; see also Burgess v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995) (cumulative expert 
testimony properly excluded pursuant to Idaho R. Evid. 403). In this matter, the overtly 
cumulative nature of Defendants' anticipated expert witness testimony is unfairly prejudicial to 
Plaintiff. Defendants' 108-page answer to Plaintiffs third interrogatory contains numerous 
examples of cumulative testimony as to multiple elements of Plaintiffs cause of action. Because 
Defendants' disclosed expert witness testimony is so blatantly in violation of Rule 403, 
Defendants should be precluded from introducing such cumulative evidence at trial. 
Defendants are simply wrong to suggest that they will not run afoul of Rule 403 on 
account of their expert witnesses' varied medical specialties. The fact remains that those experts 
have been retained to offer opinions as to a single cause of action. To some degree, all experts 
have different backgrounds, yet that does not justify duplication of testimony on the same subject 
matter. This is especially true where, as in this case, all of Defendants' out-of-state experts were 




Plaintiff takes no issue with the fact that Defendant may elect to offer expert testimony to 
supplement that of Dr. Kerr on any particular element of Plaintiffs cause of action. However, 
the breadth, scope, and depth of cumulative testimony demonstrated within Defendants' 
discovery response is wholly inappropriate, as it is clearly and unfairly prejudicial. 
Dated this 22"d day of October, 2013. 
• 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
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Q. Well, more than once. 
A. Okay. About five times out of the year, maybe, 
give or take a few. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It wasn't always the same destination, as well. 
Q. Do you know if your -- if Krystal ever, during 
the time you were married, ever filled out any written 
applications for any kind of insurance? 
A. It was -- sir, we have an SGLI on Base, so you 
fill that out. You're not required to, but you're 
encouraged to fill out an SGLI, an insurance package 
through the Air Force. 
Q. 
done that? 
THE REPORTER: Are you saying, "STLI"? 
THE WITNESS: "SG" -- "SGLI" 
THE REPORTER: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: -- through the Air Force. 
(BY MR. QUANE) You're aware that she had 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of insurance is that? 
A. Life insurance. 
Q. Okay. It's issued through the Air Force if 
you acquire the life insurance? 
MR. HADDAD: Hold on one second. Just -- to 
the extent that life insurance is a collateral source, 
[103] 




















































I'll have a continuing objection, so go ahead and answer. 
MR. QUANE: I'm just talking about an application. 
MR. HADDAD: Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Can you say the 
question again? 
Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Well, what I'm getting at, 
are you aware of Krystal ever applying -- filling out 
papers to acquire any kind of insurance? 
I'm interested in what she may have written 
down on an application for insurance that might cover 
something to do with her health. That's the -- what 
I'm asking -- why I'm asking the question. 
A. The insurance -- just the SGLI life insurance 
package through the Air Force. 
Q. Well, but d:i,d she 
A. That's all I know of. 
Q. Are you aware that she filled out any 
applications to get the insurance through the Air Force? 
A. Sir, I believe -- if I'm understanding you 
correctly, that is a type of application to receive the 
insurance. 
Q. Yeah -- to get insured? 
MR. HADDAD: Right. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
Q. (BY MR. QUANE) You're aware of her having 
[104) 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Do you know if -- and the type of 
insurance she is applying for is what you've described? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. And that's life insurance of some sort? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any memory specifically of 
any questions asked on the applications about her health? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know if she ever got insured health 
insurance-wise --
A. Sir --
Q. -- through the Air Force? 
A. I don't understand. 
MR. HADDAD: Are you switching from life insurance 
to health insurance because you --
Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Any kind of insurance that she 
got through the Air Force. 
A. Just the life insurance package. 
Q. Okay. She got insured, though? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. HADDAD: It's automatic, Jerry, just to 
let you know. 
[105] 




















































Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Did she get any health 
insurance through the Air Force? 
A. Isn't life insurance and health insurance the 
same thing? 
Q. Well, there's kind of a difference. Some 
"life insurance" means insurance that's on you, but when 
you die, benefits are paid. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And then there's health insurance that pays 
for medical bills. 
A. No, sir. Through the Air Force you have Tri-Care, 
and Tri-Care pays for all medical bills. 
Q. Okay. So that's -- she gets that automatically 
for being in the Air Force? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. But the Air Force -- but you can 
apply for life insurance and get it -- or you don't need 
to apply for life insurance, and you don't get it? 
A. Correct, sir. 
Q. Okay. All right. So the only type of 
application for any kind of insurance that your wife 
applied for would be life insurance? 
A. Yes, sir, that I'm aware of. 
Q. Okay. And I believe you named the name of the 
insurance company --
[106] 




























A. No, sir. 
Q. -- did you? 
A. No. It's just called an "SGLI." 
Q. Okay. S 
A. "SGLI." 
Q. Okay. Do you know what that's -- is that 
an acronym -- do you know what an "acronym" is? 
A. An "acronym"? 
Q. Letters that mean something. 
A. Yes, sir. I believe it means "Service Group 
Life :Insurance" -- I believe. 
Q. Okay. Did -- does your -- during the time you 
were married, did you and Krystal own any automobiles? 
A. "Own" as in paid off --
Q. No 
A. or "owned" as in -- we had automobiles with 
loans on them, yes. 
Q. Were you buying automobiles? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many? 
A. Okay. During the time that we were married? 
Q. Yes. 
A. During the time we were married, we purchased 
two automobiles. 
Q. Okay. Was one of them dedicated to you to 
[107] 





















































Q. Okay. And you don't know if they're required 
to do one when an Airman passes away --
A. No, sir. 
Q. -- that's on active duty? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever talked to anyone at the 
Air Force Base about that subject -- without going into 
any details? 
A. About 
Q. About there being an investigation by the 
Air Force into why your wife passed away? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, since your wife's death, you have 
not remarried; correct? 
A. I have not remarried. 
Q. Okay. Have you dated a female since your 
wife's death? 
A. What do you classify as "date"? 
Q. The common ordinary meaning of "dating." 
A. Like, had a girlfriend? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you had a girlfriend? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you -- have you gone out with a girl since 
[169) 





Brian Calder Kerr, MD 
Date: January 30, 2013 
Case: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Case No: CV QC 1204792 
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR#716, RPR, CRR, CBC 




Internet: www .associatedreportinginc.com 






















































be understandable, but it may have --
And it's not a big deal. We'll get a 
copy of it. But it may have been responsive to 
other requests that we made. But we'll get a copy 
of it, and it's not a big -- big issue. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Did you ever reach out 
to any of the physicians at Saint Alphonsus who may 
have been colleagues of yours while you were a 
staff member there that you recognize may have 
treated Krystal Ballard to find out their 
perspective on what had happened? 
A. No. 
Q. How about at Elmore Medical Center? Did 
you ever reach out to anybody·at Elmore Medical 
Center to try to find out from their perspective 
what had happened? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever contact Mr. Ballard after 
hearing of Krystal's death and try to find out what 
had happened? 
A. No. 
Q. Other than making a request -- reviewing 
records from Elmore and Saint Alphonsus and 
requesting the autopsy report, did you do anything 
else to reach out to any person or entity to find 
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out what had happened to have caused Krystal 
Ballard to die five days after you had performed 
liposuction surgery on her? 
A. I had a conversation with Krystal 
Ballard's aunt. 
Your question was did I reach out. At 
the time of the I didn't know who it was I was 
calling, but I had a conversation with Krystal 
Ballard's aunt. 
Q. And I said "reach out," and that's the 
way I phrased things. And that means did you make 
a call or write to anybody. And just to make sure 





-- did you contact anybody by phone, 
letter, or e-mail other than Krystal Ballard's 
aunt? 
A. My recollection --
Not other than her aunt. 
Q. Okay. Now, going back to that, was that 
a phone call? 
A. She called my cell phone, and then I 
returned the call. 
Q. As best you can recall, when was that in 






























proximity to learning of Krystal Ballard's death? 
A. I have -- I wrote a note about that 





My recollection, that it was within 
about a week time period. 
Q. Did you call on your using your cell 
phone, to your recollection? 
A. To my recollection, I don't remember if 
it was a cell phone. I remember I made the call at 
my office, so it would either be on my cell phone 
or the office phone. 
Q. Okay. Again, we'll get a copy of 
whatever recordation you made concerning that 
conversation with Krystal's aunt. 
Give me your general recollection of 
what that conversation involved. 
A. Right. She explained that Charles had 
asked her to go through messages that had -- that 
were on her cell phone, and I had made several 
calls to her cell phone after the last conversation 
that I had with her and Charles to follow up. That 
would have been on Sunday and, I believe, even 
Monday morning. 
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And I had left a message requesting her 
to return a call. And so my understanding is that 
she -- as she retrieved those calls, she saw that 
there were several calls from me. I don't know 
that she knew who I was. I didn't 
But she called and -- to inform me that 
Krystal had passed away. And I expressed my 
condolences to her and had a -- I believe it was 
about a five- to ten-minute conversation with her. 
My recollection is that she had 
expressed that she had been -- she had actually 
talked with -- or family members had talked with 
Krystal about that time, that Krystal had told them 
that she was having -- that she had fallen down the 
stairs and had hurt her back and had not talked 
about having had a medical procedure. 
We discussed some of the challenges that 
had presented themselves with -- with her 
post-operative compliance, and I think I ended with 
sharing my condolences and 
But I do have a 
of that conversation. 
a written narrative 
Q. Did anybody ask you or advise you to 
document these calls that were coming in after 
Krystal's death? 
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No one advised me to. A. 
Q. Is there any reason, if it involved the 
care and treatment of your patient in close 
proximity to her death, why that would not be 
included in her medical chart? 
A. Because it didn't have anything to do 
with her medical care. 
Q. But there were issues concerning her 
medical care that came up in that conversation, 
weren't there? 
A. I guess -- I mean, that's a judgment 
call. I mean, it didn't have any direct bearing on 
her care. It may have been reflections about it, 
but not part of her care. 
Q. Okay. So as I understand it, Krystal's 
aunt had called your phone because she had seen, to 
your understanding, log entries on Krystal's phone 





And she called you --
Voice messages; I'm assuming that she 
heard the voice message requesting that she call, 
recognized that there were several calls from one 
individual, and then returned that call. 
Q. Okay. She called you, and then you 























































rephrase it again or restate it again. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I got a little sidetracked with the 
question. 
Q. Fair enough. That happens when 
objections are made. Sometimes people lose track, 
and there's nothing wrong with asking me to 
rephrase or restate the question. 
In reviewing 
Strike that. 
Is it your opinion that the bacterial 
rods found in the tissue of Krystal Ballard more 
likely than not were introduced into her body after 
she left your facility as opposed to being 
introduced into her body during the procedure 
itself? 
A. Yes, it's my opinion. 
Q. Okay. And why do you hold that opinion? 
Other than saying, "It's my education, training, 
and experience," what specific fact in the medical 
records or your education, training, and experience 
tells you that that bacteria got into her body 
after she left Silk Touch? 
A. Because I've never had another infection 
of that nature. 
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Q. Have you had patients that have had 




At any time? 
Well, anytime you've been doing 
Yes. A. 
Q. Okay. On how many -- what percentage if 
you've --
Well, first of all, do you track at 
Silk Touch the number of infections that occur 





Okay. Do you have a general idea of 
what percentage of patients undergoing lipolysis at 
Silk Touch experience an infection that is 
diagnosed post-procedure? 
A. Not an exact number, but a general idea, 
which would be less than 1 percent. 
Q. All right. How many of those patients 
died? 
None. A. 
Q. In the other patients other than Krystal 
Ballard, how was the post-operative infection 
diagnosed? 
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And those are --
But it's limited to those surgical 
sites. 
Q. Right. I mean, it's is there any 
doubt in your mind whether it occurred --
While you may dispute that it occurred 
intraprocedurally, there's no doubt in your mind, 
is there, Doctor, that bacteria gram-negative 
bacteria was in Krystal Ballard at some point? 
Correct. A. 
Q. All right. That being the case, do you 
have an opinion from the time she steps in to have 
the procedure done on July 21 up until the time of 
her death, when during that course that bacteria 




I have an opinion. 
What is your opinion? 
One of the aspects of Krystal's 
post-operative care was her pattern of not doing 
the things that we had asked her to do. 
It became apparent that she was 
non-compliant with a number of the things that we 
had both written and orally advised her to do 
because, in fact, she was trying to hide the 























































procedure both from her husband, Charles, and, in 
our opinion, from the military, and it's my opinion 
that this compromised her ability to properly take 
care of herself. 
And while I didn't have around-the-clock 
observation of her, my experience with patients is 
that when they are trying to hide the procedure, 
they don't -- they can't change their bandages 
appropriately, they will oftentimes overexert or do 
activities that they shouldn't otherwise because 
they're trying to not draw attention to the fact 
that they've had anything done. 
They may not take their medications as 
prescribed because --
In particular, in Krystal's case, on 
several occasions, she wanted to know what drugs 
would show up in a drug screen and would indicate 
that she was taking certain medications or imply, 
but when pressed would admit that she was not. 
And so my opinion is is that she may 
have done activities, leave the wound sites open to 
drainage, and that certainly can be a pathway to 
introduce bacteria. 
And my opinion is that at some point, 
bacteria from the outside entered and one of 
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Q. Well, that's your memorialization of it. 




Is what I've shown you that we'll mark 
as No. 5 the only time you wrote something and sent 




Yes, that is the only time. 
All right. If I could have that back so 





(Deposition Exhibit No. 5 was marked.) 
(BY MR. HADDAD) The next document that 
Mr. Quane handed me at the break, we'll mark as 
No. 6, which is a three-page document that 
memorializes or appears to memorialize the 
conversation you had with Angela Neil, the aunt of 
Krystal Ballard. 
Is that correct? Let me hand that to 




Okay. Is that all in your handwriting, 
everything that's contained on those three pages? 
A. I don't believe the front handwriting is 
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Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you this: First 
of all, is there any medication that you prescribed 
for Krystal Ballard that you, in fact, know she did 
not take as prescribed? 
A. In my record, she admitted to have not 






And that's a narcotic pain medication? 
Correct. 
What narcotic does it have in it? 
Hydrocodone. 
Okay. Do you know that when they were 
looking at -- or doing a toxicology screen -- I 
can't remember if it was Elmore or Saint 




I -- I've seen that toxicology report. 
Would that suggest to you that, in fact, 
in order for the toxicology report to be positive 
for Hydrocodone, it would mean that Krystal 
actually took the Norco that you prescribed? 
A. Not in the time frame that I prescribed 
it. I know that when I had the conversation with 
Charles, I asked him to give her a Norco, which he 
said he did. 
























































A. Or would. 
Q. Let me ask you this: Norco is a pain 
medication, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It doesn't stop or fight an infection, 
does it? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And it's usually written 
And I don't have the actual 
prescription, but when you write for a narcotic 
pain medication, typically you write it to be taken 
by the patient on an as-needed basis? 
A. Often, yes. 
Q. Okay. I mean, is there 
Do you have a note that actually tells 
us whether or not, for instance, you told -- or 
wrote a prescription, "Take one tablet every four 
hours as needed for pain," or words similar to that 
to describe a -- a frequency that you were 
prescribing that pain medication for? 
A. You know, it would typically be every 
four to six hours as needed. 
Q. Okay. And the "as-needed'' part means 
the patient can elect to take a narcotic pain 
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And there's nothing inappropriate 
whatsoever about a patient deciding to take Motrin 
versus a narcotic, is there? 
A. 
Q. 
Well, repeat the question. 
Sure. First of all, did you tell --
Did you ever write Krystal a 
prescription for Motrin? 
A. 
Q. 
I did not write it. 
Were you aware or suggest that Motrin 
would be an appropriate pain -- or 
anti-inflammatory for her to take? 
Yes. A. 
Q. Okay. Motrin can both help relieve pain 




All right. And there's nothing 
inappropriate at all about a patient deciding to 
take Motrin for pain versus taking a narcotic for 




Okay. Well, do you think in any way, 
shape, or form not taking Norco, a narcotic, or not 
taking it as you prescribed it led to bacteria 























































getting in Krystal's body? 
A. No. 
Well, I'll digress. I'll strike that, 
using your phrase. 
Q. You don't get to strike it, but you can 
add to it. 
A. Okay. If someone --
Someone's behavior may be altered 
because they are in a lot of pain and not 
controlling their pain symptoms. Pain can -- can 
alter a person's behavior. 
Q. Do you have any basis in fact as you sit 
here today to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that Krystal Ballard either not taking 
a narcotic for pain or not taking it as prescribed 
actually caused or contributed to bacteria getting 
in her body? 
A. I believe it may have. 
Q. You actually are going to testify in 
court if this goes to trial and say, "She didn't 
take narcotic pain medication, she took Motrin, and 
that may have influenced bacteria getting in her 
body• II 
Is that going to be your testimony? 
MR. QUANE: I object to the form, and I'm 
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Let me go back. 
Is it going to be is it your 
testimony to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that Krystal Ballard taking 
prescription Motrin instead of a narcotic pain 
medication actually caused or contributed to her 
having bacteria in her body? 
A. Yes. 
Q. · And based on what set of specific facts 
known to you support your opinion that taking 
Motrin instead of a narcotic caused or contributed 
to Krystal Ballard getting bacteria in her body? 
Tell me every fact that supports that opinion. 
A. I don't know if I can tell you every 
fact. 
Q. Tell me any facts that support that 
opinion. 
A. My opinion is that because she did not 
want to --
She expressed to us that she was 
concerned that narcotics would -- could show up in 
a drug test, a a random drug screen by the 
military. It was apparent from what she was 
stating that she had not told her commanding 
























































officer or anyone in the military and was very 
concerned that they not be able to discover that. 
She asked on several occasions about 
both narcotics and the antibiotics that were 
prescribed. 
She was complaining of pain, and if she 
was not getting adequate pain control, which, in my 
opinion, Norco is a better is a stronger pain 
medication, then she could have not followed the 
instructions on how to care for herself, changing 
her bandages, appropriate rest, other 
post-operative care issues because she was dealing 
with pain rather than dealing with her operative 
care. 
Q. Okay. I asked you --
I don't mean any disrespect. Sometimes 
I ask·for what facts support it, and people that 
haven't been in deposition answer a question 
they believe is responsive to the question. 
Do you know the difference between 
fact and an opinion? 
A. Will you explain it to me? 
Q. Okay. When you -- your opinion is 
Krystal Ballard, by not taking a narcotic but 
instead taking Motrin, that that caused or 
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25 12: 10 
Q. 
the gun. 
Okay. First of all, I kind of jumped 
Where is the note that talks about her 
overexerting herself? 
A. Let me take a minute to see --
Q. Sure. 
A. -- if I can find it. 
Q. You can look at any other documents you 
need to. You tended to focus on that, but to the 
extent it's somewhere else, that's fine. 
A. On the right side column, 7/24, it says, 
"Talked with by phone, complains of buttocks pain, 
says she has she was better this morning, a.m., 
but may have been too active." 
Q. Okay. Do you equate the word "active" 
meaning --
And then down lower 
I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
A. 
Q. 
A. Then down lower, it says, "Ice yesterday 




Okay. All right. 
Is that the fact that it says --
Is "TW" "talk with"? Is that what it 
"Talk with," yeah. 
Okay. And let me read as I understand 
























































Q. Fair. It doesn't really suggest one way 
or the other, does it? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. "Patient says she was better this 
a.m. but may have been to," again, it's t-o, 
"active this morning." 
A. Okay. 
Q. What activity was she doing? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. You said she overexerted. 
Now, obviously, there's a certain level 
of activity that you permit and then certain level 
of activity that you think in the immediate 
post-operative period, a patient should refrain 
from. 
Is that fair? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And in our --
Q. Okay. 
A. In our pre-operative instructions, it 
specifically states to avoid overexertion for two 
weeks. 
Q. Okay. 
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Now, to shed some light on this --A. 
Q. Let me ask -- let me ask you something 
first, and then I'll let you shed your light. I 
don't want to cut you off. 
Okay. A. 
Q. Do you know specifically what activities 
she was performing on 7/24 in order for you to 
reach an opinion she overexerted herself and 
exceeded your post-operative instructions? 
A. No, but I can tell you what our fear 
was. 
Q. First I want to know fact; then you can 




No facts support an opinion that she 
overexerted and exceeded your instructions. 
Is that fair? 
A. Other than her statement that she said 
she had overexerted. 
Q. Well, she said she was too active. I 




That she was too active. 
Okay. That could mean she got out of 
bed. To a patient, that may be too active given 
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Okay. And I interpret the 7/23 note 
that appears on STMS 12 as actually her coming into 
your office and you're doing an examination and 
assessment. 
Is that a fair reading? 
That's a fair reading. A. 
Q. Is there anything in that July 23, 2010, 
note where you had a chance to talk with Krystal 
face-to-face, examine her, where there's any 
notation that she did this PT examination the day 
before or the day of your exam? 
There's not a notation. A. 
Q. All right. In fact, while you might 
have had a fear she might have done a was 
scheduled for a PT exam, you do not have a basis in 






Is that true? 
I don't have a basis in fact that she 
Okay. 
I have a suspicion. 
Now, let's look at that 
Well, we'll come back to that 7/23. I 
want to kind of -- I don't want to digress every 























































care to explore, is the issue of taking Motrin or 
not taking the Norco as often as you might have 
liked, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. What other non-compliance issues do you 
think are pertinent to Krystal's taking care of 
herself? 
A. Okay. The --
In our pre-operative visit with her, 
both in the oral discussion and in the written 
instructions, it specifies that she needed to have 
someone to drive her home from the procedure. And 
when she arrived, having received those 
instructions and telling us that she would, she, in 
fact, did not have someone there. 
Another point of discussion was that she 
needed to have someone to take care of her, and she 
acknowledged that she would, and then we had to 
we discussed 
At some point she revealed that she had 
not told her husband. We strongly advised that she 
should tell her husband because to do otherwise 
would compromise her care. She agreed to do that. 
When we saw her back on the 23rd, we --
she revealed to us that she had not told him. We 
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sedative to do the procedure, and Krystal was told 
that she could not take the sedation. And if she 
chose to take the sedation during the procedure, 
then she didn't have that option to drive herself 
home. 
Q. Okay. Going back to my question, it's 
because you might get a medication that sedates you 
during a procedure. That's the reason why you 
wanted somebody there to drive her, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
That's part of the reason. 
Okay. What is the other reason or the 
other part? 
A. If they had, you know, other conditions 
secondary to the procedure that would preclude them 
from driving home. 
Q. Okay. And you've kind of excluded those 
concerns by, one, not giving her a sedative, and, 
two, observing her for a sufficient period of time 
after the procedure where you felt comfortable she 





All right. I think the other issue 
that you raised about compliance was whether 
or not Krystal should tell her husband that she had 
had this procedure, correct? 
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July 28, 2010 
Donna Berg [donna@silktouchmedspa.com] 
Wednesday, July 28, 2010 12:23 PM. 
susie@sllktouchmedspa.com; Donna@silktouchmedspa.com 
Krystal Ballard 
_ Certffication _. bet 
I am writing this today regarding my involvement and care of Krystal Ballard. 
I met her July 13'" for a Smart Lipo consultation. Dr. Kerr was involved with the consultation as well. 
She had had Lipo suction at another facility on her back two years ago and was unhappy about her abdominal fat. She 
wanted to get it done as soon as possible, While her husband was gone but did not have someone to drive her. 
Dr. Kerr discussed her options of not having oral sedation if she was going to drive herself. He also suggested she 
consider getting a hotel room for one nite and drive home the following day if need be. Dr. Kerr would not let her leave the 
Spa if he did not feel she was ok on her own. 
July 21•\ Krystal had her Smart Lipo procedure. I visited with her several times, she was up beat and jokative. 
July 22nd I called Krystal in the morning to see how she was doing. Krystal was alone and was caring for herself. She said 
she was not sick but in pain. I asked if she was taking her medications and encouraged her to have something to eat so 
she didn't get sick. Krystal called later that day to ask for a RX for Extra Strength Motrin for her pain. She said she was 
having a test at wor1< the next day and could not take prescription pain pills. Dr. Kerr called In the RX to Walmart in Mt. 
Home. 
July 23rd. Krystal called in the morning to reschedule her follow up appointment in the late afternoon for eariier. She took 
the day off work and needed to see Dr. Kerr. I told her to come in as soon as she could and Dr. Kerr would work her into 
his schedule. 
Krystal came in Friday afternoon, Dr. Kerr had met with her and so had Susie Kerr. A RX was called into Walgreen's and· 
Krystal was resting in one of our rooms until the RX was ready. I went in to visit with her, she said she was not sick but in 
pain. She asked for some juice which I brought her along with a Zofran for nausea. I went to Walgreen's to pick up RX so 
she could rest 
July 261h. I called Krystal in the morning and left her a message to see how she was doing. At that time, I did not know she 
had gone to the ER over the weekend. Later, I was told she had been flown to St. Al's in Boise. Dr. Kerr asked me to call 
to check up on her and at that time was told she had passed away ear11er that day. 
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1 Q. In terms of the machine that you all have used 
2 since March of 2012, you don't know who the manufacturer 
3 is? 
4 A. I don't remember. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you know what the manufacturer 
6 recommends in terms of how to clean and disinfect and 
7 sterilize that equipment? 
8 A. The equipment, itself, is just an engine to pull 
9 tissue. It doesn't have any contaminants to it. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. So everything going to it is disposable. 
12 Q. What about the hand piece? 
13 A. The hand piece is my liposuction cannulas. 
14 Q. Okay. Okay. The hand piece, as you understand 
15 it, that Dr. Kerr used was because he used ultrasound? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. Okay. Have you been provided the manual from the 
18 manufacturer of the machine Dr. -- the vaser machine 
19 Dr. Kerr used on Krystal Ballard? 
20 A. I have not. 
21 Q. Okay. Now, at some point in time, Doctor, during 
22 the -- when you were asked to -- to review this case, I 
23· know there was some correspondence from Mr. Jones' 
24 office about contacting Dr. O'Neil so that you could 
25. talk to him, Dr. O'Neil, about the standard of practice 
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1 as it exists in Boise, correct? 
2 A. At the time of this incident, correct. 
3 Q. Okay. Because you had not practiced in Boise or 
4 the sounding area, correct? 
5 A. I had practiced in Boise and the surrounding area 
6 up until 2005. 
7 Q. As a general surgeon? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. But they wanted you, as I understand it, 
10 to talk to Dr. O'Neil about the standard of practice 
11 during the time that Krystal Ballard had her procedure 
12 for cosmetic procedures? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. All right. Do you know when you spoke to 
15 Dr. O'Neil? 
16 A. End of May, beginning of June. 
17 Q. I mean, do you have any -- first of all, do you 
18 have any notes that you've made in your review of any 
19 materials? 
20 A. I do not. 
21 Q. Do you have anything that you've kept in any type 
22 of electronic format concerning notes about your case 
23 review? 
24 A. I have not. 
25 Q. What type of -- what type of practice does 
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6 BY MR. HADDAD: 
I'm sorry? 
A cosmetic physician, I 
7 Q. What type of background does he have? 
8 A. I don't know offhand. 
Page 70 
9 Q. Okay. Do you know whether he had any kind of 
10 surgical residency? 
11 A. I do not know offhand. 
12 Q. Okay. I mean, when you say you don't know 
13 offhand, did you ever before you spoke to him, did 
14 you ever try to find out what type of background 
15 Dr. O'Neil had in terms of his practice? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. When you were talking to him, did you ask him how 
18 he was trained, both in -- through medical school, 
19 residency and in cosmetic procedures? 
20 A. No. I asked him about the standard of practice 
21 in Boise at that point in time. 
22 Q. Okay. We'll get to that. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil 
23 what type of machine he used at his office? For 
24 instance, do you know whether he used the vaser? 
25 A. I did not ask him, and I do not know. 
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1 Q. Do you know if Dr. O'Neil's practice is such that 
2 he has strike that. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil 
3 personally performs the cleaning, disinfecting and 
4 sterilizing of equipment and supplies that are reusable 
5 at his office? 
6 A. I don't know. 
7 Q. Do you know what type of cleaners Dr. O'Neil 
8 uses? 
9 A. I do not know. 
10 Q. Do you know what type of disinfectants Dr. O'Neil 
11 uses? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Do you know if Dr. O'Neil uses an autoclave? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil takes spore 
16 counts? 
17. A. I do not. 
18 Q. Did you ever ask him any of those questions? 
19 A. I did not. 
20 Q. I mean, how long was your conversation with 
21 Dr. O'Neil that you utilized to gain an understanding as 
22 to the standard of practice for a cosmetic physician at 
23 the time Krystal Ballard had her procedure? How long 
24 was your call? 
25 A. About 20 to 40 minutes. 
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1 Q. (Indicating). 
2 A. Twenty to 40 minutes. 
3 Q. Twenty to 40 minutes. All right. I want you to 
4 recount for me everything you discussed with 
5 Dr. O'Neil. 
6 A. That will be a very -- a 20-minute to 40-minute 
7 conversation to discuss that. Do you want me to go 
8 through every aspect of it? 
9 Q. Well, let me break it down. Then I'll ask you 
10 kind of a catchall question. And if it takes time, it 
11 takes time. 
12 A. Sounds good. 
13 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil does cosmetic 
14 procedures in his own office? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. All right. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil has 
17 specifically dedicated staff who do the cleaning, 
18 disinfecting and sterilizing? 
19 A. I don't know. 
20 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil has written 
21 policies and procedures in his office dealing with 
-
22 cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing equipment? 
23 A. I do not. I did not ask. 
24 Q. All right. What were the general topics, and 
25 then we might get into specifics, that you discussed 
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1 Q. Okay. How many -- I mean, what was it like 
2 practicing in Boise, was that just kind of a general 
3 conversation, or what 
4 A. Absolutely. 
5 Q. Then what was the point of -- I mean 
6 A. How many physicians there were --
7 
8 
Q. -- it may not have any relevance, but I just want 
to know, does asking him, g~e, what was it like 
9 - practicing? How many cosmetic physicians in Boise? How 
10 did that lead you to have an understanding as to the 
11 standard of practice in Boise? 
12 A. As far as the standard of practice in Boise, 
13 which physicians, what kind of physicians perform --
14 were performing and where they were performing their 
15 procedures. 
16 Q. Okay. What type of physicians in Boise were 
17 performing cosmetic procedures? 
18 A. As -- Dr. Kerr was doing it, as well as 
19 Dr. O'Neil was doing it. And I think he said there was 
20 an -- not an ophthalmologist, but an ER doc. Again, 
21 these were all non-plastics people and who was doing it. 
22 And there was five in total. There might have been an 
23 OB that was doing it as well, as far as I remember. 
24 Q. Okay. To your recollection, there were only five 
25 physicians in Boise doing cosmetic procedures? 
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1 A. No. There were five cosmetic physicians doing 
2 procedures. 
3 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, all five were 
4 nonsurgical trained? 
5 A. I don't know if they were surgical trained. 
6 Q. Now, when you say you discussed the sterilization 
7 and the adequacy of the sterilization as described, are 
8 you talking about as Dr. Kerr described in his 
9 deposition? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Tell me specifically what it was you and 
12 Dr. O'Neil talked about in terms of the adequacy of the 
13 sterilization as described in Dr. Kerr's deposition. 
14 A. Sure. We talked about his cleaning of the 
15 instruments. We talked about the sterilization of his 
16 instruments. 
17 Q. Okay. Is that it? I mean, can you be any more 
18 specific? When you say you talked about the cleaning, 
19 what did you all talk about in terms of cleaning the 
20 instruments? 
21 A. We discussed what Dr. Kerr had said he did. 
22 Q. Okay. What did Dr. Kerr say he did? 
23' A. Well, he mentioned, at some point in time, t~at 
24 he did both the Hibiclens and the alcohol, as well as he 
25 also talked about using a chemical, which he didn't know 
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1 the name of. 
2 Q. Okay. Now, how is -- okay. I'm sorry, I 
3 interrupted you --
4 A. No worries. 
5 Q. and I shouldn't do that. 
6 A. No worries. 
7 Q. You said alcohol, Hibiclens --
8 A. Uh-huh. 
9 Q. -- and some unknown chemical Dr. Kerr couldn't 
10 remember the name of? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. Okay. Anything else dealing with the cleaning of 
13 instruments that you all talked about, other than the 
14 types of solutions Dr. Kerr described he used? 
15 A. Not that I can tell you right now, no. 
16 Q. Okay. Do you know in your practice whether you 
17 use alcohol to clean instruments? 
18 A. Do we use alcohol to clean instruments? I will 
19 use alcohol to clean instruments on the field if I need 
20 to, yes. 
21 Q. When you say "on the field," what does that mean? 
22 A. My surgical field. 
23 Q. Okay. But as far as once they go back with 
24 Ms. Blake, do you know what she uses? 
25 A. She uses a -- a -- a hospital-grade cleaner, as 
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1 well as the -- the disinfectant. 
2 Q. Okay. I mean, saying a hospital-grade cleaner, 
3 what's 
4 A. There's -- well --
5 Q. what's the active ingredient? 
6 A. An acetylene, something, something something. I 
7 don't know. 
8 Q. All right. Okay. Let me ask you this. You 
9 talked about alcohol, Hibiclens; and, obviously, you 
10 couldn't have much discussion about the appropriateness 
11. of some unknown cleaner, correct? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. All right. 
14 A. Well, we also talked about his autoclave, the 
15 steam autoclave, and the fact that he did use a chemical 
16 marker. 
17 Q. All right. That's more the sterilization side. 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. I look at it differently, but --
20 A. wei1, the sterilization side is important. 
21 Q. Okay. It is. We were going to get to that, but 
22 I was breaking them down. But we can deal with them all 
23 together --
24 A. No worries. 
25 Q. if it's easier for you. Do you know whether 
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1 whether Hibiclens is an appropriate solution to use? 
2 A. I have not researched it. 








THE WITNESS: Just a moment. 
MR. HADDAD: Sure. 
THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
MR. HADDAD: We're still good? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
MR. HADDAD: All right. 
11 BY MR. HADDAD: 
12 Q. What is the active.ingredient of Hibiclens? 
13 A. I don't know. 
14 Q. Do you know what -- now, did Dr. O'Neil tell you 
15 he uses alcohol? 
16 A. As far as him using alcohol? 
17 Q. To clean medical equipment or supplies. 
18 A. To clean medical equipment, again, it's not the 
19 mixture -- it's not alcohol. It's the mixture of 
20 alcohol and Hibiclens. And alcohol and Hibiclens is 
21 what I use to cleanse patients as far as a cleaner and 
22 disinfectant. That being said, again, it's not a 
23 disinfectant. It's to sterilize the -- it's used to 
24 clean the tissue. So ... 
25 Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not he used a 




1 alcohol-Hibiclens solution, mixture, to clean medical 
2 equipment and supplies? 
3 A. I asked him whether that was an adequate cleaning 
4 at that point in time in Boise with Dr. Kerr. And he 
5 agreed that he didn't see any issues with that. 
6 Q. Did he say he did it? He used -- that Dr. O'Neil 
7 specifically said, I used alcohol and Hibiclens in a 
8 mixture to clean medical equipment and supplies? Did 
9 you ask him that? 
10 A. I did -- I don't remember. 
11 Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not he took 
12 spore counts? 
13 A. I did not ask him. 
14 Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you that other physicians in 
15 Boise that do cosmetic procedures did or did not do 
16 spore counts? Or did that not come up? 
17, A. It did not come up. 
18 Q. Again --
THE WITNESS: No. Just my wife. 19 
20 MR. HADDAD: Sometimes that can be more 
21 important than any other call you get. 
22 BY MR. HADDAD: 
23 Q. The various places that you practice -- or have 
24 practiced -- I'm going to back up so I can kind of get 
25 them here. And we'll go in most recent. In March, 2012 
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1· Q. Okay. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not 
2 using alcohol to clean your hands before a procedure was 
3 or was not something that other Boise nonsurgically 
4 trained physicians did? 
5 A. I did not. 
6 Q. Do you do regular maintenance, or have somebody 
7 do regular main~enance,· on your autoclave? 
8 A. I do. 
9 Q. Okay. How often do they come and check the 
10 autoclave to make sure it was working appropriately? 
11 A. I think it's once a year they come by. 
12 Q. The other facilities that you worked in, or were 
13 involved with, do you have an understanding that they, 
14 likewise, had routine maintenance and upkeep of their 
15 autoclaves? 
16 A. I don't know. 
17 MR. JONES: Object to form. Vague. 
18 BY MR. HADDAD: 
19 Q. I mean, do you know if at any other place, when 
20 you were at Palouse back in '05 to '08, do you know 
21 whether the -- somebody came and checked the autoclave 
.22 to make sure it was ·functioning properly? 
23 A. They were the hospital's, so I did not check. 
24 Q. All right. Were you trained at Southeast -- or 
25 Southcenter Cosmetic Center and Hair Restoration, did. 




1 it out? Have you 
2 A. They put a sticker on it. That's all I know. 
3 Q. They come and say, I've inspected it? 
4 A. Exactly. 
5 Q. All right. When instruments are taken from the 
6 procedure room that you use at Linea, and then you go in 
7 and you put them in a basin to soak; is that correct? 
8 Do you do that process? 
·-
A. I don't do that process. 
Q. Okay. Do you know how it's done? 
A. I know they're put in a basin to soak. 
Q. Do you know what kind of solution is used? 






14 Q. Okay. When you were_ talking to Dr. O'Neil, did 
15 you ask him whether or not instruments taken from the 
16 procedure room are put in -- in a basin to soak? 
17 A. I did not ask him that, no. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you ask him -- we'll leave it at that. 
19 In looking at the medical records, is it -- do you have 
20 the general opinion that Krystal Ballard died as a 
21 result of sepsis? 
22 A. Krystal B~llard died as a result of shock. I 
23 don't know if it was sepsis. 
24 Q. Okay. If you were to give a differential 
25 diagnosis as to what caused the shock in Krystal 




2 Q. Okay. Well, if he knew before he actually 
3 performed the procedure that she did not have somebody 
4 to drive her home, would that be appropriate or 
5 inappropriate in Boise to proceed with -- with the 
6 liposuction in any way? 
7 A. Depends on the clinical situation. 
8 Q. Well, there's no clinical situation. You're 
9 there to have a cosmetic, elective procedure. 
10 A. It is a clinical situation. So yes, it does 
11 depend on the clinical situation. 
12 Q. So he could have gone -- he could have said, 
13 Krystal, I know that you didn't bring somebody here to 
14 drive you home, and I'm going to do it anyway, correct? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. Or he could have said, you don't have somebody to 
17 bring you home, take you home, so I'm not going to do 
18 the procedure? 
19 A. That -- it's his choice. 
20 Q. Okay. So it's -- it's his choice to either 
21 proceed or not proceed? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Okay. Now, what's the clinical situation that 
24 might make him go on -- go forward with the procedure 
25 even if he knows she doesn't have somebody to drive her 
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1 appropriateness of him performing liposuction on this 
2 patient knowing, if he did know beforehand,· that she 
. 
3 didn't have anybody to drive her home? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Vague. 4 
5 THE WITNESS: It's a clinical decision. And 
6 it's his choice on whether he's going to do it or not. 
7 BY MR. HADDAD: 
8 Q. Well, you make clinical decisions every day. 
9 A. I do. 
10 Q. There are sometimes -- people can make good 
11 clinical decisions, and people can make poor clinical 
12 decisions, correct? 
13 A. Certainly. 
14 Q. Okay. I'm trying to get into the fact of what 
15 clinical situations make him doing this procedure on 
16 Krystal Ballard an appropriate clinical decision when he 
17 knew she didn't have somebody to drive her home? 
18 A. Is your question whether it was appropriate for 
19 him to do this or not? And I agree with his 
20 appropriateness to do this procedure on her. 
21 Q. Okay. Then I'm asking, why are you critical of 
22 her for not bringing somebody when Dr. Kerr could have 
23 said, I'm just not going to do it? 
24 A. You're right, he could have just said that. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. You're right, he could have. 
2 Q. Now --
3 A. However, what makes me critical of her? Because 
4 she didn't listen to him in the ~irst place. 
5 Q. Oh, I see. So he could have stopped it, but the 
6 fact that she didn't bring somebody with him (sic), he's 
7 off the hook by using his clinical decision? 
8 A. Oh, it's just like 
9 MR. JONES: Object to form. Argumentative. 
10 THE WITNESS: -Thank you. It's like me 
11 prescribing an antibiotic to a patient and them not 
12 taking it. 
13 BY MR. HADDAD: 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. Same difference. 
16 Q. Well, let me ask you this. Is -- do you -- so 
17 there's -- even though she didn't bring somebody there 
18 to his office on the day of the liposuction when he 
19 (sic) should have, when she was instructed to, you 
20 thought it was still okay for him to do the procedure, 
21 knowing she was going to drive herself home, correct? 
22 A. I find no fault in him doing the procedure and 
23 letting her drive herself home. 
24 Q. Okay. Now, that's one issue of noncompliance, I 
25 think, Dr. Kerr mentioned. First of all, do you know 
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1 Q. Okay. Hydrocodone versus non. 
2 A. ,Hydrocodone, correct. 
3 Q. Is there patients of yours that opt for using 
4 over-the-counter pain and anti-inflammatories in lieu of 
5 narcotics? 
6 A. There are. But when they're calling coming in 
7 complaining of pain, I recommend narcotics. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. And I prescribe the narcotics. 
10 Q. And the day he actually -- she came in 
11 complaining of pain on the 23rd, two days postop, he 
12 prescribed her Norco, and she to~k the Norco, right? 
13 MR. JONES: Object to form. Foundation and 
14· time. 
15 THE WITNESS: We don't know. 
16 BY MR. HADDAD: 
17 Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you this. You don't know 
18 one way or the other. I mean, you know she got a 
19 prescription for Norco? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. Okay. That's the day she came in two days 
22 postop? 
23 A. She got it actually the day of the operation as 
24 well. 
25 Q. True. Well, did she take it? 
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1 A. She said she didn't. 
2 Q. Okay. Is there anything wrong if she decides to 
3 manage it with non-narcotics? 
4 A. There isn't anything wrong with that, you're 
5 correct. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. However, when it's prescribed and she's told to 
8 take it and she doesn't, again, and comes -- if she's 
9 complaining of pain, it comes down to non-compliance. 
10 Q. Okay. Did that cause -- did Norco cause -- can 
11 not taking a narcotic cause a patient to have -- to get 
12 an infection? 
13 A. Again, we don't know if she has an infection. 
14 Q. I'm asking you generally, as a medical doctor, if 
15 somebody is prescribed narcotics following a liposuction 
16 and they don't take the narcotics because they choose to 
17 treat it with Motrin, is that going to cause an 
18 infection? 
19 A. No, not necessarily. 
20 Q. Well, you said "not necessarily." I want to know 
21 the circumstances by which ~aking or not taking a 
22 narcotic --




A. theoretical question. I'm not going to answer 
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1 Q. Okay. I understand. I'm just wondering -- well, 
2 noncompliant means you've not followed the directions of 
3 a physician. 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. All right. I don't know what it is, other than 
6 just not following military protocol and not telling 
7 them exactly why you might be having a procedure done. 
8 A. It shows a pattern of noncompliance, does it not? 
9 Q. I want to know -- no, I disagree, and that's why 
10 we're here. I want to know what the effect of not 
11 telling the military -- if she didn't tell the military 
12 or her commanding officer about the procedure, how did 
13 that cause or contribute to her death? 
14 A. It shows -- it points a direction of 
15 noncompliance. 
16 Q. How did it 
17 A. It does not show any cause of death. 
18 Q. Okay. That's all I want to know. Why is that 
19 why is that so hard? 
20 A. Well (inaudible) the question. 
21 MR. JONES: Let's -- let's -- Counsel, let's 
22 not be argumentative. 
23 BY MR. HADDAD: 
24 Q. My question's not very hard. I want to know what 
25 the causal effect of not telling the military has on her 
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that cause, meaning "Sepsis with probable toxic shock 
syndrome"? 
I reviewed this case and looked at it and -- well, 
I -- I guess that's a very broad question and I'm 
trying to figure out the best way to answer it for 
you. 
I think the clinical picture that she 
presented would be consistent with sepsis. The toxic 
shock syndrome, from my medical recollection and 
training, is probably not used accurately here in that 
my understanding of toxic shock syndrome is not a gram 
negative sepsis, which seems to be the question in the 
medical record. But when I looked at this entire 
record, I was very -- it was difficult to figure out 
exactly why this patient died. 
Okay. 
Like I say, the clinical picture would be most 
consistent with sepsis. I can see why the coroner's 
office and the medical examiner put that. 
You just haven't Let me see if I can rephrase what 
you said, and if I mess it up, you let me know. At 
this point in time, you don't know whether or not you 
have enough information to'form an opinion as to the 
cause of this patient's death; is that fair? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
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not Ms. Ballard was taking hydrocodone to alleviate 
pain prior to the time she presented to Elmore Medical 
Center? 
Can I look at the record? 
Sure. And the reason I'm saying is there's a list of 
medications that the patient's on that reflect that 
one of them is hydrocodone. 
That was my recollection, but I wanted to look at 
that. 
MR. JONES: So you're asking him if there's 
evidence in the medical record that suggests or 
supports the conclusion that the patient had been 
taking hydrocodone at the time she arrived at Elmore 
Medical Center. 
MR. HADDAD: On or before the time she 
arrived, yes. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, hydrocodone is on her 
current medications. 
(BY MR. HADDAD) Is that the -- I mean Dr. Kerr 
prescribed a drug called Norco, N-0-R-C-O. That is a 
hydrocodone, right? 
Yes. 
All right. What was the schedule that was ordered, or 
at least reflected in the records from Elmore as far 
as the schedule that the patient was to take it? 
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The Elmore record says, "Hydrocodone PO 4 hours prn, 11 
and it's "10/325," so 10 milligrams/325 milligrams. 
And in layperson speak, that means you're to take a 
pill by mouth every 4 hours as you may need it for 
pain. 
Yes. 
So a large measure of it is whether a patient takes a 
narcotic is based upon how much pain the patient's in 
and whether they can tolerate that level of pain 
without taking a narcotic; correct? 
Yes. 
She was taking Motrin for pain; do you have an 
understanding of that? 
It's listed on there as well, I think. 
Did Dr. Kerr reference the fact she wanted Motrin, as 
opposed to a narcotic, when she saw him in follow-up 
to the liposuction procedure? 
Yes. 
Is there anything wrong, in terms of a compliance of a 
patient, who choses to take Motrin versus a narcotic 
to manage their pain? 
MR. JONES: Objec~ to the form. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
(BY MR. HADDAD) I mean do you have a -- have you 
formed an opinion as to whether or not there was some 
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but do you know any of the solutions that were 
used by Dr. Kerr as part of his cleaning and 




You have listed private practice 
infectious disease. I take it the bulk of your 
practice is probably being called in on a consult 
in a hospital setting? 
A. Correct. 
Page 40 
Q. Okay. Your private practice, does that 
simply involve follow-up to patients that you 
might have consulted with in the hospital that 
need outpatient assessment and treatment? 
A. Yeah. We do -- we see patients, you 
know, outpatient consults in the office, too, for 
different kinds of things, fevers or swollen 
glands, things like that. And we have a pretty 
big HIV practice that we take care of. 
Q. Now, Doctor, among the materials that 
you brought with you, Mr. Quane kind of explained 
it to me off the record, but I want to explain it, 
make sure I have an understanding on the record. 
There appears to be as part of the packet of 
materials that you brought with you comprising 




























name of patients, dates of treatment, and then the 
procedures performed at Silk Touch. Is that your 
understanding? 
A. That is. 
Q. Do you have an understanding as to how 
these sheets were created? 
A. I believe that the people at Silk Touch 
pulled up the names of -- and procedures of people 
they worked on the last several years and compiled 
them. 
Q. Is there anything else other than 
getting this list that had the patient name, the 
date of treatment, and procedure, is there 
anything else you were given or shown regarding 
patient outcomes in any of these patients? 
A. No. 
Q. There is -- Mr. Quane has it for you. 
He indicated that it might contain certain tabs to 
it, which is the defendants' answers to the third 
set of discovery requests. And you understand 
part of this incorporates anticipated opinions 

































whatever he uses there in the office looks like. 
Q. Okay. Now, there's a notation under 
the 7-23 chronology part of your notes, "Hasn't 
used Norco." And there looks like there's an 
exclamation in your notes. Is that the way it was 
written in Dr. Kerr's record or is that 
exclamation something you felt was important 
enough that she hasn't used Norco that you wanted 
to highlight? 
A. I think I highlighted it. 
Q. What significance does that have? 
A. Well, Norco is a pain medication. 
You're not using it. So it's you know, usually 
if people are having a lot of pain, they'll use 
Norco. 
Q. Okay. Is the only significance from an 
infectious disease or physician standpoint, an 
expert reviewer of this case with respect to Norco 
is if she's not using Norco, her degree of pain 
must not be that significant? 
A. That would be my interpretation. 
Q. And you hold that without the knowledge 
of how Dr. Kerr and Ms. Kerr described how Krystal 
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A. "Document" means originals or any exact copies of written, recorded, transcribed, 
punched, filmed, taped, or graphic matter, however and by whomever prepared, produced, 
reproduced, disseminated or made, including but not limited to, any memoranda, intraoffice or 
interoffice communications, letters, studies, reports, summaries, articles, releases, notes, records of 
conversation, minutes, statements, comments, speeches, testimony, notebooks, drafts, data sheets, 
work sheets, records, statistics, charts, contracts, diaries, bills, accounts, graphics or oral records, 
presentations of any kind (including, without limitations, photographs, plats, charts, graphs, 
microfiche, microfilm, videotape recording and motion pictures), tapes, data processing sheets or 
cards, computer or word processing disks, or other written, printed, typed, aural, or recorded 
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means all copies or reproductions of all the foregoing items upon which notation in writing, print, 
or otherwise has been made that do not appear as originals. To the extent the data processing cards, 
magnetic tapes, or other computer-related materials are produced, produce all programs, 
instructions, and other similarly related information necessary to read, comprehend and otherwise 
utilize said data processing cards, magnetic tapes, or other computer-related materials. 
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group, government agency and agent, firm or other business enterprise or legal entity, which is not 
a natural person, and means both singular and plural. 
C. "Oral," when used in conjunction with a term connecting information refers to any 
spoken expression, exchange, or transmission of thoughts, messages, information, or the like, at 
any time or place, and under any circumstances whatsoever. 
D. "Define," when used with the reference to a phrase or term, means (a) state the 
meaning of the phrase or term; and (b) identify each person known by you to have personal 
knowledge regarding the ineaning of such phrase or term upon whose testimony you presently 
intend to rely at trial. 
E. "Describe" means to explain fully by reference to underlying facts rather than 
conclusion of fact or law. 
F. "Identify," when used with reference to a natural person, means to state his or her 
(a) full name; (b) present business and/or residence address and telephone numbers; (c) present 
business affiliation, address, title or position; (d) if different from (c), the group, origination or 
business the person was representing at any time relevant to the answer to a specific interrogatory; 
and ( e) home address. If this information is not known, furnish such information as was last 
known. 
G. "Identify," when used with reference to a business entity, means to state its (a) full 
name; (b) form of organization ( e.g., corporation, partnership); ( c) place of incorporation; and ( d) 
address of its principle place of business. If this information is not known, furnish such 
information as was last known. 
H. "Identify," when used with reference to an act, action, activity, omission or event, 
means to state (a) the identity of each person who participated in such act, action, activity, 
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omission, or event; (b) the date and place of such act, action, activity, omission, or event in detail; 
and (c) the identity of each person having knowledge or the act, action, activity, omission, or 
event. 
I. "Identify," when used in reference to a document, means to state (a) the type of 
document or some other means of identifying it (e.g., letter, memorandum, report, etc.); (b) its 
subject matter; (c) the identity of its author; (d) the identity of each addressee or recipient; (e) the 
identity of each person to whom copies were sent and each person by whom copies were received; 
(f) its title and date; and (g) its present location and the identity of its custodian (if any such 
document was, but is no longer in the possession of or subject to the control of you or your 
counsel, state what and when disposition was made of it. 
J. "Identify," when used with reference to a conversation, oral communication, 
discussion, oral statement or interview, means; (a) state the date upon which it took place; (b) 
identify each person who participated in it, witnessed it and/or overheard it; ( c) state what was said 
by each person, including the issues and matters discusses; and ( d) identify each document which 
describes or relates to it. 
K. "Communications(s)" and/or "communicate" shall mean all occasions on which 
information was conveyed from one person or entity to another, either: (a) through a 
document; or (b) verbally, either in person or by telephone (including phone messages or 
alerts); or ( c) by means of any other mechanical or electronic device. 
L. "Complaint" refers to any communication from anyone expressing negative views 
or suggestions for improvements, irrespective of whether the concern raised in the communication 
was investigated or verified (by you) or at your direction. 
M. "RELEVANT TIME PERIOD" means July 13, 2010 to present. 
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N. In construing or interpreting these interrogatories, all words in the plural may be 
read in the singular, and vice versa whichever reading which results in the provision of the larger 
amount of information or documents being the correct reading. 
0. In construing or interpreting these interrogatories, all words of a conjunctive 
meaning (e.g., "and") may be read in the disjunctive meaning (e.g. "or"), and vice versa, or both, 
whichever reading which results in the provision of the larger amount of information or documents 
being the correct reading. 
P. "Documents and Things to be Produced", means original documents and things if 
they exist and all non-identical copies. If such originals do not exist or are not in the possession or 
control of the Defendant, it means any additional copy of said originals and all non-identical 
copies thereof. 
Q. "You" and/or "yours" means Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., Silk Touch Laser, LLP, 
and Silk Touch Laser, LLP d/b/a Silk Touch Med Spa, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser 
Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the interrogatories set forth 
below are to be answered within thirty (30) days of service, fully and separately in writing, under 
oath, and in accordance with the above cited rule. Answers to these interrogatories must include 
not only information in your personal knowledge and possession, but also any and all information 
available to you, including information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys or 
employees. If a claim of privilege is made as to any such information, you must specify the basis 
for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged. 
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If any document identified in an answer to an Interrogatory was, but is no longer in your 
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in existence, describe what 
disposition was made of it or what became of it. Your answer must be based not only on 
documents in your personal possession, but also on any documents available to you, including 
documents in the possession of your agents, attorneys, accountants or employees. No document 
requested to be identified or produced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue of a record 
retention program or for any other reason. 
These interrogatories are continuing and your responses to them must be supplemented to 
the maximum extent authorized by law and the applicable rules. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please identify the person(s) responding to these 
interrogatories and requests, their date(s) of birth, and addresses for the past five years. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please provide the employment history for the last ten 
years of Dr. Brian Calder Kerr and any agent, servant, or employee who had any interaction or 
communication with Krystal Ballard. Please include with this answer the employer name, the job 
title and duties; the dates of such employment; the reason for leaving employment; and the salary 
or wages for each employment. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name and addresses of each person whom 
you intend to call as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which each expert is expected 
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to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions of each expert, a summary of the grounds for 
each opinion of each expert, and a summary of each expert's qualifications. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please state in detail the legal and factual basis for 
any claim or defense by you that someone other than you are liable for the death of Krystal Ballard 
and the Plaintiffs damages stemming from the same. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please identify the manufacturer, model, and serial 
number of all equipment or machinery used in Krystal Ballard's procedure. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state with specificity the education, training 
and experience which qualified Dr. Brian Calder Kerr to perform the cosmetic procedure at issue 
and produce a copy of all training material, certificates or licenses documenting his experience 
performing cosmetic procedures such as the one performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please identify all hospitals or Joint Commission 
accredited facilities at which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr has privileges to perform the cosmetic 
procedures performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify any individual employed by or acting 
on behalf of you who currently has authority and/or access to perform any type of cosmetic 
procedure using the Cynosure Smartlipo Machine; any individual who had this authority/access 
from January 1, 2005 through July 21, 2010 to perform such procedures and produce all 
documents to support this answer. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Does Silk Touch Laser, LLP have any policies 
procedures, bylaws or standards to assess and credential agents, servants or employees to perform 
computer cosmetic procedures. If yes, please describe each one and produce all documents 
regarding the same. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state the date of the first cosmetic procedure 
performed by Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, and specifically the first Smart Lipo procedure and first fat 
transfer procedure; the location each procedure was performed and all education and training Dr. 
Brian Calder Kerr had received to perform the procedures. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: For the equipment identified m response to 
Interrogatory No. 5, did the manufacturer of the equipment provide any training, seminars, 
workshops, in services, etc. (collectively, "training") which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr or agents, 
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servants or employees of Silk Touch Laser, LLP attended. For each training, please list the date of 
each training, the individuals who attended each training, the person and/or entity which pro:1ided 
the training, and a description of the matters discussed during the training. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please identify all facilities at which you currently 
hold privileges to practice medicine. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please provide the name and address(s) of any third 
party entity or organization that performs any kind of inspection, evaluation, or screening of Silk 
Touch Laser, LLP. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please provide the name and address( es) of any third 
party entity or organization that inspects the sterilization practices and procedures at Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, including, but not limited to the equipment and instruments used in the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify the manufacturer, model number and 
serial number of all equipment used to sterilize the equipment used in Krystal Ballard's procedure, 
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including but not limited to the hand piece, cannulas and the fiber, and produce the sterilization 
logs, as well as a copy of any services or repairs on the equipment. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please identify any and all communication between 
Dr. Brian Calder Kerr and Krystal and/or Charles Ballard which occurred after the procedures 
were performed on Krystal Ballard. For each communication, please identify the type or nature of 
the communication (e.g., phone call, email, text message), provide the phone number and/or email 
address of the phone and/or email account that was used to make the communication, provide the 
substance of each communication as verbatim as you can, identify each recording, message or 
memorialization of each communication, and produce all recordings, messages, and 
memorialization's of each communication. 
·Answer: 
INTERROGATORYNO. 17: Please list all persons in the room with Dr. Brian 
Calder Kerr and Krystal Ballard while procedures were being performed on Krystal Ballard and 
each individual who made contact with and/or inserted any instrument or equipment into Krystal 
Ballard during the procedures. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please state whether Dr. Brian C. Kerr or Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, has ever been cited, sanctioned or fined by any governmental, regulatory, or licensing 
agency. 
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Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: List any and all inspections and/or investigation~ 
conducted by a federal, state of local agency, or any other independent organization in which Dr. 
Brian C. Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, and/or any employee, agent or independent contractor was 
found to be in violation of any federal, state or local statute or regulation from 2005 to present. If 
the inspection or the investigation was conducted by an independent organization, state the 
organizational standard that was alleged to violated, from 2005 to present. For each, state the name 
of the agency conducting the inspection and /or investigation; the date of the inspection and /or 
investigation; the findings of the inspections and/or investigations; all actions taken by you to 
rectify any alleged deficiencies and the ultimate disposition of the matter. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify each witness known to you to have 
information and relevant materials to the claims presented in this action or to any defense asserted 
thereto,' and for each person please give a brief summary of each such witness's expected trial 
testimony. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: State the liability coverage, policy number, insurance 
company, maximum amount of liability coverage for each policy including the amount per person, 
the amount of all persons and the content of any insurance agreement you have available to satisfy 
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part or all of any judgment which may be entered in this action, or to indemnify or reimburse for 
payments made to satisfy a judgment. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please identify and describe each procedure, policy, 
and/or protocol for sterilization of each individual and/or piece of equipment which participated in 
or was used during the procedure on Krystal Ballard. 
Answer: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please describe any training, seminars, workshops, in 
services, etc. ( collectively, "training") which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr or agents, servants or 
employees of Silk Touch Laser, LLP attended for each procedure, policy, and/or protocol for 
sterilization identified and described in Interrogatory No. 22. For each training, please list the date 
of each training, the individuals who attended each training, the person and/or entity which 
provided the training, and a description of the matters discussed during the training. 
Answer: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Requests for Admissions 
set forth below are to be answered within thirty (30) days of service, fully and separately in 
writing, under oath, and in accordance with the above cited rule. 
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1. Admit that you performed a liposuction procedure on Krystal Ballard with a 
Cynosure Smartlipo Machine. 
RESPONSE: 
2. Admit that Krystal Ballard's procedure was performed by Dr. Brian Calder Kerr. 
RESPONSE: 
3. Admit that Krystal Ballard's death resulted from bacteria which entered into her 
body during the procedure performed by Dr. Brian Calder Kerr. 
RESPONSE: 
4. Admit that Krystal Ballard's death was caused by the negligence of Dr. Brian 
Calder Kerr and /or other agents, servants, and employees of Silk Touch Laser, LLP. 
RESPONSE: 
5. Admit that Dr. Brian Calder Kerr has no professional training and/or certification 
qualifying him to perform the procedures performed on Krystal Ballard. 
RESPONSE: 
6. Admit that prior to the purchase of the Cynosure Smartlipo Machine that Dr. Brian 
Calder Kerr, had no previous experience with performing liposuction procedures. 
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RESPONSE: 
7. Admit that each document produced pursuant to these discovery requests,is 
authentic under Idaho Rule of Evidence. 
RESPONSE: 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 34 and other applicable provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
you are requested to produce and serve upon counsel for the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, within 
thirty (30) days of service of this request the following: 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified or referred to in answering any of 
the foregoing interrogatories. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 2: · Each document about which Dr. Brian Calder Kerr has in his 
possession, custody, and control pertaining to the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedures. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 3: The curriculum vitae or resume of each expert you intend to 
call as an expert witness at trial. 
Response: 
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REQUEST NO. 4: All reports provided to you by any witness (expert or lay) 
that you have received in relation to this case. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 5: All warnings or other disclosure information given to any 
patients considering a liposuction or fat transfer. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 6: All photographs or videotapes taken of Krystal Ballard 
before, during and after the Smartlipo procedure on July 21, 2010. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 7: All invoices, purchase orders, and receipts regarding any 
and all repairs and manufacturing of the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's procedure. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 8: Produce each and every document or tangible thing which you 
intend to utilize as an exhibit and/or demonstrative aid at the trial of this matter. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 9: Any and all medical and billing records of Krystal Ballard. 
Response: 
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REQUEST NO. 10: Produce a copy of any and all citations issued to or against 
you or any of your employees or agents, by any governmental or regulatory agency. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 11: Produce all maintenance, ownership, operation and other 
records in your possession relating to, in any way, the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedure. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 12: All manuals, including clinical and service manuals, 
regarding the equipment used on Krystal Ballard's surgery. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 13: Any and all written agreements made between you and 
Krystal Ballard. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 14: A copy of Dr. Brian Calder Kerr's curriculum vitae. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 15: A complete copy of every liability, excess and/or umbrella 
insurance policy that could provide coverage for the claims asserted in the Complaint. 
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Response: 
REQUEST NO. 16: All proposals, memoranda, communications or any other 
documents concerning any review or inspection of Silk Touch Laser, LLP, conducted by federal, 
state or local agency, or any quasi-governmental organization, non-for-profit organization during 
the past ten years. 
Response: 
REQUEST NO. 17: All documents including, but not limited to, any written 
material, film, video, recording, book, or policy and procedure that was provided to any employee 
for purposes of training, demonstrating, describing or instructing employees on the proper use, 
maintenance, functionality, and sterilization of the equipment used during Krystal Ballard's 
procedure. 
Response: 
DATED this 61h day of June, 2012. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
By ·~~ 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June &> , 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for 
Admission to Defendants, Brian Caltler Kerr, M.D; Silk Touch Laser, LLP· an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and Silk Touch Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, dlb/a 
Silk Touch Med Spa, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med 
Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise by delivering the same to the following via: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
D U.S. Mail (postage prepaid) 
X Hand Delivery 
D Facsimile 
D Overnight Mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
By _ ___;;;:; _____________ ~_ ~~Scott McKay 
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Last Name First Name Date ofTx I orocedures 
Susan 12.2007 abdomen, love handles, flank 
Tiffanv 12.2007 unner arms, abdomen 
Erica 12.2008 abdomen, love handles, flank . 
t¥.iK~ ................. .. 
i 
I ' 
.......... ~- -·-···. ··- -·~·-· . . ·-. ·- .......... j 
. l 
: 12.2007iabdomen, love handles & flank 
: . 
·! •• - ... , ••• . . " ............................................. _.,_ ............... . 
i : 
.... ·- ............... ____ ·--·-·- ............... ~ ................................... --· .... ; 





Last Name First Name Date ofTx procedures ... ...... --.......................... ,: 
Vicki 01.29.08 .• neck ' 
Julie 02.01.08. full ab, love handles, bra fat ... 
ruth 02.02.08 · lower ab, under bum, outer hios 
-· ' • ..... ' ' • "'" I 
........... -......... . .......... ·-···-, .. ~ 
--
Jane 02.08.08- inner/outer thioh, knees .. 
Matthew 02.08.08. abdomen, flanks ... 
Nancy 02.11.08 neck, full abdomen & luvs -
Matthew 02.21.08 abdomen, chest .. 
Ruth 02.25.08· luvs, inner thiah .... 
Jennifer 02.28.08· banana roll, inner & outer thiah 
• ·-····-··· -······ ............. -··1 
- . " . . . .......... ···-. " --··! 
-""" ... . .............. -· -i 
' -- ---··-·----····--·---.. ··j 
-·-···· -·· ·---····· ....... ·--·· l 
... 
Char 02.29.08- abdomen -· ··-··-· ................ _ ................ ,J 
Patty 03.03.08· abdomen 
" --.. -.... ·--····---·-·· .... -J 
Pattv 03.03.08, abdomen 
Chervl 03.04.08· abd, flank & loves -
Timothy 03.11.08. abdomen, flanks ·-
_ ........ -·---_ ....... - ................. J 
I 
_ ........ _ ........... ···------ - •.• j 
-· ... -...... _ ...................... --! 
Joni 03.13.08 abdomen, neck -
Kristyn 04.03.08, abdomen, flank, inner thiQh, tootsie roll, uooer arm 
i 
..... ·--·-·--··· ............... -... 1 
Simone 04.07.08 abdomen & flank -· ---·- ·-····--······-········ ..... i 
Dee 04.09.08 abdomen, flanks 
Cindy 04.11.08 abdomen -
Tauni 04.17.08 inner & outer thiQh, tootsie roll ·-' Tonya 04.18.08 abdomen, hios, inner thiQh -
Dennis 04.19.08 abdomen, flanks, neck -
Mvrna 05.08.08 flanks,abdomen .. 
Cindv 05.13.08 abdomen - ... 
I 
-····· ................ ··--···""•""! 
I ·····----·-.......... _ .. ________ --{ 
l .. - . . . .. . . 1 
---.............. -..... ---.. ·-····-··-.. ! 
- .. --····-·····--·--····-···-·· - -·: 
 ..... .. .. ...................... j 
Molly 05.13.08 abdomen -· 
Sheila 05.15.08 abdomen, outer lea, flanks, Fat transfer to face 
·--·-· ·-··-··-····-····- ........... ! 
' . 
LeAnn 05.19.08 full ab .. 
Vicki 05.19.08 flank & bra area .. 
Patricia 05.20.08 inner and outer thiah .. 
Melinda 05.21.08 inner & outer thiQhs .. 
Jennifer 05.21.08 inner & outer thiahs 
Debbie 05.22.08 abdomen, flank 
·-· ....... _ . - ··- ............ 1 
····-----·-······"·• _., ........ ! 
······--·- ....... ·········-····--···-! 
JoAnn 05.22.08 abdomen, chin 
Kimber 05.29.09 ' abdmen & flank .. 
Kim 06.06.08 I' abdomen & love handles 
Diane 06.26.08 abdomen " -
i 
______ ,. ..... --···-···········- ···i 
i . -· ·-·· ................. -.... , ... _ "i 
l 
............. ··-.. ...... .... • . •! 
Teresa 07.03.08 abdomen, flanks -
Teresa 07.03.08 ' abdomen, flanks .. 
Randae 07.10.08 abdomen, flank, neck . 
Pattv 07.11.08 abdomen touch up .. 
Pattv 07.11.08 lower abdomen 
..... :.-~~ .. ~- ... ---~-..... --···· .. t 
~:~=::.~~:~:~~==~::~-~~~:~=~-! 





















Marion 09.17.08 · 
Jenny 09.19.08 · 
Michelle 09.23.08 
Jennifer 09.25.08 
Ernie 09.26.08 · 
Kimber 10.02.08 · 
Lisa 10.07.08 · 
Pattv 10.30.08 






uooer & lower abdomen 
abdomen, fllank 
abdomen 
abdomen, bra & back fat, 
abdomen, lateral waist 








abs & flank 
abdomen 
abdomen, lat waist, flank and lateral bra area 
outer & inner thioh, buttocks 
waist, flank., bra, neck, bra fat 
arm, lat waist, flank 
abdomen, lateral waist & thigh 
inner/outer thioh. knees 
luvs, hest 
abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
outer & inner thioh, abdomen 
abdomen, flank, waist and bra area, arms, butt 
abdomen, waist, fat transfer to face 
inner & outer thiohs 
arms 
fulll ab, hios, luv, bra 
abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
abdomen, chin, inner thighs, arms 
-· ·--·-·········--····---, 
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Shanna 06.13.08 · 
Tara 06.15.09 · 
Cheryl 06.22.09 · 
; Chervl 06.24.09 
Anthony 07.06.09 







Glenn 09.03.09 · 
Teresa 09.04.09 · 
Teresa 09.04.09 
Chris 09.08.09, · 
Phvllis 09.17.09, · 
Ann 09.21.09 • 
Maureen 09.22.09 · 
Carol 09.23.09 
outer & inner thiqh & knees 
abd, lat waist & thorax 
full abd, luv & flank 
abd touch up, bra fat 
neck 
abdomen & luv handles 
ankles, arms 
neck 
Uooer & lower arms, fat transfer to face 
arm, fat transfer to breasts 
knees, f/t to breast 
inner thiqh, ft to face and breast 
full ab, flank, bra fat 
abd, luv, bra fat, flank 
full ab, armoit 
abd, lateral waist & flank 
leQ, thiQh, arm, chest wall, flt to breast 
outer thighs, f/t to buttocks scar 
ab, luv, flank, flt to butt 
abdomen, waist,bra fat, knees and right 
uooerfeq 
abdomen, lateral waist, inner & outer thigh, 
uooer lat buttocks, fat transfer to face 
neck 
full ab, waist & flank 
inner thiQh,bra fat. fat transfer to breast? 
abdomen, lateral waist 
ab & fat transfer to face 
breast, neck 
full ab, love handles 
abd, waist, neck f/t to breast 
full ab, waist ft to face/hands/breast 
breast, full ab 
full ab, flank, inner/outer thiqh 
abd, lateral waist & flank 
abdomen & waist 
abdomen and lateral waist 
breast 
abd anterior, lower inner thiah 
full abd, lat waist & flank 
full abd, inner thigh 
full abdomen 
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Jennifer 09.25.08 outer thiahs ' .. -·· - . . ..... -·· ....... __ , ..... . 
linda 09.25.09. arms ; -
LaDoena 09.30.09. abd,flank .. _,, .. , ... _ ........... -............... . , 
LaDoena 09.30.09. abd, flank, bra fat 
oladvs 10.01.09. ab.bra fat. fat transfer to breast 
Tarena 10.02.09 abdomen, flank, love handles -
________ .. _________ ..... ·-·-.. - ! 
---··-- .. . ................. j 
, __ ,.,, ..... ___ ... _____ ,,,.,., -········i 
Lori 10.14.09 Lower ab, neck, 
Katie 10.21.09, outer & inner thiqh flt to breast 
Minni 10.22.09, abdomen, flank 
Lisa 11.13.09· love handle, flank, outer thigh 
--.. -- ............. _ .......... ·-·'"··I 
............................... -.... _ ... i 
__ ... .,_,. .... _ .. __ .. _ .......... ·-·! 
Brandy 11.16.09 abdomen, flanks .. .... ········-·--· ...... ···- .. --- .... ..; 
Helena 11.18.09 ab, love handles, neck 
Jackie 11.19.09, uooerknee,arms 
! ---·-....... , .. ---···-·-- ..... -i 
.. 
Marion 11.20.09 ankle, calfs, inner thioh, axilla, flank, ! .............. -,.-...... _ ..................... h. 
ruth 11.23.09 knees, lateral waist 
' Julia 11.24.09 outer & inner thh:ih, ft to breast 
---... -.......... _ .................. ._ ... ! 
-····-··-·- .. · .. -·······-··· .... -....... : 
Theresa 11.25.09 abd, lat waist, neck f/t to breast .. .................... - ............. - ......... i 
Ashlev 12.04.09, abdome, lateral waist & flank .. 
Jim 12.11.09 abd, waist, chest 
Travis 12.14.09 neck 
Alvson 12.15.Q.9 abdomen, lat waist & flank 
Becky 12.17.09 ab, luv, innerthiqh 
LeaAnn 12.18.09 abd, waist, butt f/t 
Adrienne 12.18.09 outer thigh .. -·- ............................... -............ .. 
Caivun 12,21.09 I ab, luv, bra fat, ' 
Janina 12.23.09 ' abd, waist, neck f/t to breast 
John 12.24.09· chest 
Theresa 12.24.09 outer & inner thiQh f/t to breast .. 
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Jennifer 3.5.10 






Patricia 3.18.10 .. 
Jessica 3.19.10, .. 
Michelle 3.22.10 ,1 
Dwavne 3.23.10,,: 
Geo 3.24.10 .. 
Elsie 3.25.10 . 
Kim 3.25.10 .. 
Ruth 4.5.10 ... 
Julia 4.6.10 • 
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Sara 4.16.10' arms, FAT breast 
Joanna 4.16.10 abd, waist 
·-· 
... 
Phvllis 4.19.10 ... touch uo 
- ............ ~··---··--... -·-·-
-·---····---·-····--.. ···-··. j 
. ... 
Jackie 4.21.10,. 3 areas, touch uo, FAT ·-
Denise 4.30.10· abd, FAT to face 
Sandy 4.13.10 abdomen FAT -
Patty 4.13.10 abd TU, bra, Fat transfer 
1 
-··-····· .. ·-·. ,._... .. ...... ····-·! 
.. 
Rebecca 4.22.10 · abd -
Kathleen 4.30.10 thiahs --
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_,, ___ , ..................... ··-~ 
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Deborah 5.2.10,. arms -
Jeanie 5.4.10 ab, flank, FAT to breast -· 
Marianne 5.6.10 3 areas FATto butt 
............... ____ .... ,, ...... ----·..! 
--.. ···-···-· ............................... ! 
--·--·-··-............ -.. -....... -, .. ,-:, Trina 5.7.10~ abd, waist thiah, FAT BUTT .. 
Dianne 5.14.20~0 abd, FAT to face --
Loretta 5.17.10 abd, flank, bra, FAT ... 
Rhonda 5.18.2010 Thiahs, FAT breast & butt -· 
Bette 5.18.18 · flanks, arms ·-· 
; -........................... "i 
......................... ,_ .... , ................ j 
l ............... -- ... ·-· .... -·-· .. ·-····; 
_ ..... ---.. ----------------·-·-! 
.. -·· - i 
Melissa 5.20.10 ab,flank i 
Gwen fat transfer 
·-
5.25.10 
--.... , ............. -···-. _, ............ -·, 
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Debbie 5.26.10 inner, outer thiah, FAT breast 
Jackie 5.28.10 revision thiahs, FAT thiahs ·-
Paula 5.28.10 abd .. 
Barbara 6.2.1·Q ab, waist, bra fat -· 
Marv 6.3.10 abd, thiahs 
··-··.. ... .. --- .. -. 
--· ... _. ... ... . . . ....... , 
._........... ... . . ........... _i 
. . ........... ,_ -· -- ... _, .. -·i 
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Lucv 6.4.10 3 areas FAT to hands ; ... """ ............. -·-·- .... . ....... . 
Meaan 6.8.1(:J, abd, flank FAT 
Sheri 6.8.10 neck, iowels .. 
Valerie 6.9.10 ab.flank 
j ...... ,._ ..... ._ ...... -·i 
-· 
Sallv 6.16.1·0 outer thiah, flank, FAT ......... _ .............................. ! 
Brianna 6.17.10 .. knees, thiahs, flank -.. -.................................. _ .. ,,: 
Melinda 6.18.10, abdm, flank waist 
Deborah 6.20.10 
'• ··-
abd, flank, bra 
. . .................. ·-··· ... , 
.. 
Sara 6.21.10 ab, waist, bra fat, -· 
........... -........................ _, ........... ! 
................ _ .................. i 
Pamela 6.22.18 . neck, iaw, abd, FAT to face -
Tracy 6.24.10 . abdomen, flank 
Brenda 
... 
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Carolvn 7.1.10 abdm flank, FAT to face 
Linda I -7.7.10 abd 
Kave 7.6.10 abd, flank, arms, FAT to breast 
Shawn 7.13.10 neck 
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Ballard Krvstal 07.21.10 
Roxann 07.22.10 






























Ashlev 9.28.10 · 
Molly 09.30.10 




Joanna 10.5.10 : 
Linda 10.14.10 
Bette 10.15.10 
full abdomen, luv handles, flank & fat 
transfer to butt 
abd, lat waist 
Abd, flanks, fat transfer breast 
arms, FAT to breast 
abd,flank,neck 
iaw, neck 
ab, luvs, fat transfer breast 
abd, lat, waist, flank, breast 
thighs 
neck 







abd, fat transfer breast 
uooer & lower ab 
abd, fat transfer 
ab, flank, fat transfer 
ab, flanks, 
elbo, inner knee , thioht 
abd, uooer ab, lat waist & back 
abd, chest 
upper, lower abdomen lan:ie 
arms 
abs, flanks, Juvs 
abd,flank 
arms, bra 
abd, butt banana roll 
abd, flank 
abd, lat waist, flank 
inner outer thl!'.lh 
lat waist, flank, chest, fat transfer to face 
chest, axilla 
chest 
abd, lat waist flank. 
abd, flank, chest, fat transfer to butt, breastt 
lat waist touch uo 
ant ab touch uo 
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arm, breast fat transfer .. 
thiahs, fat transfer breast .. 
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abd, breasts neck 
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touch up ab 
outer, inner thiQh 
abd, flank, ftransfer breast 
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Gregory N. Laurence, MD October 2, 2013 Bal __ rd v. Kerr, Silk Touch 
[55) 
vibration or energy or heat to the tissue to help 
process the fat or help with the contouring before 
you actually do the removal of the fat. 
I've used just about everything that's 
out there. 
Q. Okay. In terms of a cosmetic practice, 
have you spoken to any physicians that practiced in 
Boise, Idaho, in 2010 which is the time period that 
Krystal Ballard had a procedure about the standard 





Yes, I did. 
Who did you speak with? 
Dr. Kelly O'Neil who practiced in this 
area around that time. 
Q. And I think within the materials that 
are either part of Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2, 






Yeah, it's 2. 
-- there's reference to Dr. O'Neil. 
And you remember speaking with him? 
That's correct. 
All right. Is your discussions with 
Well, first of all, did you rely upon 
Dr. O'Neil exclusively in order to understand what 




























Gregory N. Laurence, MD October 2, 2013 Bal __ rd v. Kerr, Silk Touch 
[56] 
the standard of practice was in Boise, Idaho, in 
2010 in performing similar procedures and services 
to patients in --
MR. JONES: Object to form; vague. 
THE WITNESS: There were no other physicians 
that I spoke to who practiced in Boise, Idaho, 
around that time to whom I spoke or communicated in 
any way. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. And Dr. O'Neil is 
a physician that you were referred to by Mr. Quane 
to contact in order to avail yourself of what the 
standard of practice was in Boise in in 2010, 
correct? 
A. Yeah, correct. I did not know him 
before. 
Q. Okay. Basically, counsel for Dr. Kerr 
told you, "You need to learn what the standard of 
practice was in 2010, and here's the guy that can 
tell you what the standard of practice is," and 
they named Dr. O'Neil, correct? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
THE WITNESS: So, yes, I spoke to him after 
they referred me to him as someone who was 
reliable. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Did you know 
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[57) 
Dr. O'Neil from any other circumstance other than 
the fact that counsel for Dr. Kerr told you to 
contact him about understanding the standard of 
practice? 
A. I'd never run into him at a meeting or 
anything like that, correct. 
MR. JONES: Counsel, we don't have the 
benefit of coffee or water or anything in this room 
like you do, so I'd like to take a break when you 
get to a point --
MR. HADDAD: Okay. It will be just --
Well, let's do it now. Let's go off the 
record. 
(Break taken from 10:11 a.m. to 10:21 a.m.) 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Doctor, in terms of your 
conversations --




I'm sorry. The video skipped. 
I'm sorry. I was looking down, so that 
probably had something to do with it. 
Dr. Kelly O'Neil, have you spoken to him 




All right. What I see, Doctor, within 
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[63] 
Ballard's medical· records? 
A. Again, I don't know whether he had 
reviewed them or not, and I -- and I don't recall 
if there was anything in particular that he said 
that would have, by inference, made me be able to 
say that he had or had not. 
Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that it was --
the longer telephone call is the one that you used 
as the basis by which you came to learn what the 
standard of practice was in Idaho in 2010? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
THE WITNESS: I think that a combination of 
the review of all the records and in combination 
with the conversation with him was what I relied 
upon to be able to say that Dr. Kerr was within the 
standard of practice for the area. 
Q. 
to that. 
{BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Well, we'll get 
I understand you reviewed the medical 
records, but in terms of familiarizing yourself 
with the standard of practice in Idaho, is it fair 
to say that familiarizing yourself with what the 
standard of practice was in Boise, Idaho, in 2010 
was really based upon the longer call with 
Dr. O'Neil? 
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[70] 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) I mean, I think you 
presumed it, but you didn't specifically ask him, 
"During the calendar year 2010, did you do 
liposuction?" 
A. I did not ask the number of cases he had 
done in any particular month or year, correct. 
Q. Okay. In terms of fat transfer, did you 




Did Dr. O'Neil tell you that he 
performed fat transfers in 2010? 
A. We talked about fat transfer 
specifically. 
Fat transfers are an area of liposuction 
where s·ome doctors really, really are excited about 
it, and some do very little fat transfer. And I 
don't recall whether I asked him if fat transfer 
was something that he did routinely with every one 
of his liposuctions or with 10 percent. But he 
certainly was familiar with that aspect. 
We talked very specifically about the --
the.different options that the physician had with 
regard to the addition of PRP, the addition of --
whether the fat was spun down or just gravity was 
used to separate out. 
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[71) 
And so he -- he was clearly 
knowledgeable about fat transfer, but I don't know 
how much he did it. 
Q. Based upon your discussions with 
Dr. O'Neil, was it your understanding that during 





Would you ask that question again? 
Yes. 
It sounded -- I'm sorry. It sounds like 
something that you had already asked, but maybe 
it's a little bit different. 
Q. Maybe a little bit different. 
Do you know one way or the other whether 
or not, during the calendar year 2010, Dr. O'Neil 
had performed any fat transfer procedures based 
upon your discussions with him? 
A. Okay. So you're asking the same 
question about fat transfer that you were about 
liposuction. I understand. 
The same answer. I'm not -- I did not 
ask him specifically what his caseload looked like. 
Q. Okay. When Dr. O'Neil was talking about 
other physicians in Boise, did he tell you -- did 
you have a discussion about what other physicians 
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[72] 
did in their office practice as it relates to the 
fat transfer procedure? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, we did. 
Did Dr. O'Neil tell you how he came to 
learn how other physicians in Boise might either do 
liposuction or fat transfer? 
A. You know, no, he did not tell me how he 
knew other physicians did one thing or another. 
Q. Okay. In your discussions with 
Dr. O'Neil, did he tell you that his facility was 




You're talking about Dr. O'Neil --
Yes. 
-- and whether his facility was or was 
not accredited? 
We certainly did talk about the 
accreditation issue, and he related to me that 
that there were a variety of practice situations in 
Boise where these type of procedures were performed 
in both accredited and facilities that were not 
accredited. He did not --
He could have told me whether his 
facility currently or in Boise was or was not, but 
I don't recall. 
Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you how he came to 
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[98) 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you how he came to 
learn the whole process that you described to him 
you did -- cleaning, disinfecting, and 
sterilizing -- how he learned what other physicians 
did in their practices? 
A. You know, I know that in my office, the 
only way I have to know exactly what my peers do is 
that sometimes we share staff and employees. So a 
lot of my staff that has come in are people that 
worked somewhere else. 
So I can say from my standpoint, I 
generally know that the way I approach 
sterilization is similar to other physicians. 
I assumed that, likely, he had enough 
connections with staff or through other people that 
gave him a sense that other physicians in Boise had 
a similar approach. 
Q. But you don't know that specifically, do 
you? 
A. That's -- I cannot tell you how he knew 
that, correct. 
Q. · Now, you talked about a medical 
equipment specialist. 
What is a medical equipment specialist 
in terms of what you just referred to a moment ago? 
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[104] 
facility or not in 2010? 
A. We mentioned that earlier. I had 
mentioned that he did not tell me whether he 
operated out of a -- an office or an accredited 
facility. 
Q. In terms of materials, I understand that 
you've seen the disclosure that purports to have 




I think I understood your 
What did you say again? 
Well, there's a -- we were provided, as 
part of the discovery, your name and several pages 
that followed your name that says, "Here's the 




Have you seen that? 
Yes, I have. 
Okay. When did you first see that? 
I saw that --
I believe it was sent to me earlier, but 
I reviewed it yesterday for the first time. I 
think I probably lost it in my stack of paperwork, 
and I feel like I'd seen it before. It sounded 
like me talking. 
But it was prepared by my attorneys 
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[165] 
Sound Surgical Technologies 
First of all, do you know if Sound 
Surgical Technologies was a manufacturer of the 
liposuction machine? 
A. It was the -- the manufacturer of not 











Yes, Sound Surgical is the manufacturer 
Did you review their operator's manual 
with respect to what recommendations they make as 
to how to clean, disinfect, and sterilize the 




I did not; I did not. 
Doctor, you've given --
This is part of the packet of file 
materials that's part of your file that was 
produced. I think that's No. 2, I think. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Give me a second here. I'll look 
through my sticky notes here. 
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A. I have not. I have looked at this 
sheet, but I haven't looked at the corresponding 
charts. 
Q. Okay. But in any event, you were given 




Is it your opinion, Doctor, that --
Well, you had mentioned Ms. Ballard, in 
your opinion, experienced a urosepsis. 
A. 
Q. 
Is that correct? 
That's correct. 
And you believe that's what caused the 
sepsis and shock that she experienced? 
A. The -- to -- to my best evaluation, 
that's what I would say. 
Q. Okay. And obviously, we have certain 
standards in the law for opinion testimony. 
Are you able to say one way or the other 
to a reasonable degree of probability that 
Ms. Ballard had a urosepsis? 
A. 
Q. 
I would just say more likely than not. 
Okay. Do you have an opinion, more 
likely than not, that the urosepsis caused her to 
die? 
A. Yes, I believe she died of sepsis. 





vtr l 7 2073 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Jeremiah A. Quane jaq@quanelaw.com 
September 16, 2013 
Clerk of the District Court 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Dear Clerk: 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 780-3939 Telephone 
(208) 780-3930 Facsimile 
www.quanelaw.com 
Enclosed for filing with the Court regarding the above-referenced matter, 
please find an original and one (1) copy of a NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
(Defendants' Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20). 
Please file the original, returning the conformed copy in the self-addressed 
stamped envelope provided. Please contact my office if you have any questions. Thank 




Jeremiah A. Quane 
David Z. Nevin/Scott McKay 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
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SEP l ·7 '2013 
. ' . 
. J.er~miah A. Quane, 1$.B No. 977 
.. TarreD.~e -S .. J,one_s; ISB;No, '5811 
QUANE JONES McC9LL,· PLLC 
US 'Bank Plaza 
1 Q1 ·Soyth Capitol Bp~.i'l~vara 
Suite 16C:)'1 
P .. O. Box 1576 
Boisel Idaho 83701 . 
Telep'ifo·ne (208)-780..:3.939 
.Fac$iniile (29B) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defenc;lants . . ·-
IN 'tr.i6 .01STRfCT. COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL )llSTRiCt 
·bi::- THE,STATE OF IDAHG>, IN AND 




· BRIAN CALDER K6RR" ,>M'.D.· ·SH::K· 
• ... . .... ,. ~ , . • I . ' • • ... 
TQUCH kASERt L.LP; an Idaho .limited 
liability partn·ership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, ah· Idaho Umited 'liability: 
part.ne'rship, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
· ahdldr SILK· TOUCH MED SPA 'AND . 
LAS6R CENTER, ·and/or· Sl.LK TOUGH, 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE,-; 
' 
Defendants. 
. NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
. : QISC'OVERY 
" .·., ·-· , .. ""'{- -·, --- ..... ' 
TO;. THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
. ' 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 161h day of September, 2013, I se_rved 
. ' 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 





--~ ..... , -·· .. _ .. _,,_ ~ - "' ---- ·----.. ~---
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20, together with a copy of this Notice, upon cou·nsel in the above-entitled matter by the 
method indicated below: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
001031
.. 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ·1ss No. 977 
Terrence S; Jones, ISB No. 5811 · 
QUANE JONES McCOLL1 PLLC 
US Bank Pl~~a 
· 101 $quth Capitol Soulevard. 
·Suite 1601 · · 
P:O. Box 1576 . 
Boise, Idaho 83701 . 
· T~Iephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780:-~930 
Attorn~ys for Defendants · 
SEP l 7 2.ff13 
· .IN 'IHE DISTRIGT COURT OF 
THE POURTH JUDICIALDJSTRICT 
-OF THE STATE,OF IDAHO; IN AND 
· F0R.THEGOUN1"¥ OF,ADA 






AN$WE~ T9 ~.l!\INTlfF'S 
:. BRIAN · GAL.DER KERR .· M D SltK 
' ' , . . ' ~, ' 
TOUCH LASER,· LLP, an Idaho :limited 1 · 
liability partnership; and. S'IL:.K T_QUCH ·1 
LASER, LLP, an. Idaho· litnifeq liaoility' 
partnership, d.ba SIL,J< TOU~H MEO SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND: 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Def~hda11ts. 
. lN.T.ERROGATORY NO. 20 
: 
Defendants hereby provide supplemental answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory. . . :· 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify each witness known to you to have 
information and relevant materials to the claims presented in this action or to any defense 
asserted thereto, and for each person please give a brief summary of each such witness's 
expected trial testimony. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: In addition 
to the individuals named in the Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20 
dated September 24, 2012, the following: 
1. Dr. Howard Schaff - Expected trial testimony relates to the CT 
examination of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center. 
2. Cody Murphy- Expected trial testimony relates to the events, issues 
and matters described in the records of Elmore Ambulance Service for July 25, 2010. 
3. Wendy Vanderburgh -.Expected trial testimony relates to the events, 
issues and matters described in the records of Elmore Ambulance Service for July 25, 
2010. 
4. Dr. Billy Morgan - Expected trial testimony relates to his evaluation 
of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and the 
matters described in his Consultation Report. 
5. Melisa Fellows - Expected trial testimony unknown since defense 
counsel has not spoken with her, although attempted. Charles Ballard mentioned her in 
his second deposition and said he spoke with her about her involvement with Krystal 
Ballard. 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20-2 
001033
6. Susie Kerr - In addition to the matters and testimony in her 
deposition, her expected testimony will relate to records of Silk Touch, records and data 
she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of Krystal Ballard, photos of 
Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures. 
7. Briana Kerr - Expected trial testimony is the testimony in her 
deposition and the events of the procedure performed by Dr. Kerr on Krystal Ballard. 
8. Donna Berg - Expected trial testimony is the testimony in her 
deposition and her interactions with and observations of Krystal Ballard. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
. . 
By . -.: ... \fb\:._":\ 
Jeieriii~_h·-A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20 - 3 . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20 by delivering the same to each of the following, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James 8. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Jeremiah A. Quane 





Via Facsimile Only 208-780-3930 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
PO Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Re: Ballard v. Ken; et al. 
Dear Mr. Quane, 
Lawyers 
Internet www.baileyglasser.com 
Phone (304) S94-0087 Fax (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26S08 
ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
September 20, 2013 
I am in receipt of "Defendants' Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20", 
served on September 16, 2013. In your supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 20, 
you identify Susie Kerr as being expected to testify to "Silk Touch, records and data she 
compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients," etc. I do not know exactly what she 
compiled at this point given the vague response, but take issue with Ms. Kerr apparently 
compiling information at the 111h hour; over 15 months after the service of the original 
requests; after a motion to compel requiring you to respond to the interrogatories; after 
Ms. Kerr's deposition as a fact witness and 30(b)(6) representative; and after a 
significant number of expert depositions. We will certainly raise this issue with the Court 
due to the untimeliness of this supplementation, but not having the benefit of how the 
Court will address this issue, and without waiving any objection, we need you to provide 
the following: 
1.) Records, data or documents she compiled as referenced in the supplemental 
answer to Interrogatory No. 20. This would also be required as part of your duty to 
supplement request for production No. 1, which asks for "all documents identified or 
referred to in answering any of the foregoing interrogatories." We do NOT want a 
mere summary of the information, but all documents she actually used and relied 
upon in compiling the information. Without the actual documents, our ability to fully 
cross-examine Ms. Kerr would be impeded. 
2.) A date on which Ms. Kerr can be re-deposed to address the possible testimony 
referenced by this late supplementation. 
648691 
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September 20, 2013 
Page 2. 
Given our current trial date and the need to obtain this information immediately, I would 
like the documents faxed to· my office within the next 3 business days. This should not 
be difficult since apparently it has already been compiled by Ms. Kerr. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
PGH/das 
cc: Scott McKay, Esq. (via facsimile only) 
J.B. Perrine, Esq. (via facsimile only) 
648691 
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Quane Jones McColl. pnc 
Attorneys at Law 
.Jeremiah A. Qvone jaq@qvonelcrN .com 
VLA FACSIMILE (304) 594-9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAlLEY & GLASSER LLP 
September 26, 2013 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
Our File No. 1107 /25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
US i3ank Plaza 
101 S. Copilol Boulcvod 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
·Boise. ID 83701 
(208) 780-3939 Telephone 
(208} 780-3930 facsimile 
www.quonclow.com 
The records and data compiled by Susie ~err regarding inf~ctions af:1d 
patients which you erroneously claim was untimely supplemented in my Answer- to your 
Interrogatory Number 20 was produced for you at your deposttion of Dr. Coffnian (?n 
August 20, 2013. You have had this data for one month before you ever brough~ .up the 
subject of deposing Susie Kerr. If anything, you are the one who is untimely and you· 
seem to always cast blame on me for your dilatory conduct. The records.and.data under 
discussion was prepared shortly before August 20, 2013 for the purpose-of being a trial 
exhibit and it did not exist before and therefor it was not available for production or 
reference in supplementation to answers to written discovery. In fact, since it will be 
used only as a trial exhibit, the court Order govern1ng further proceedings· does -not 
require its identification and disclosure until either 14 days or 7 days before. trial: The 
Order also provides that the last day to take discovery deposftions shall be no later than · 
sixty (60) days prior to trial. Your request to depose Susie Kerr (Septembe·r 20. _20"13) · 
was not made within the time frame of the Court Order. 
I must have you provide me with legal authority and support for your 
claimed right to depose Susie Kerr. I did you a favor by producing the data at the 
deposition of Dr. Coffman on August 20, 2013. 
001040
P. Gregory Haddad 
September 26, 2013 
Page 2 
13/09/26 15:39:45 4 /4 
You also contend that Dr. Garrison untimely discfosed his opinion on fat 
emboli at his deposition for the first time. I agree that his opinion .was first disclosed at 
his deposition but I do not agree it was untimely. It was formed-by Dr. Garrison a few 
days before his deposition and therefor it was not subject to di·sclosure in· his two prior 
expert disclosures or at any time before it was formulated by him. He did not tell me 
about his opinion until the day before the deposition. I am always amazed when lawyers 
take depositions of opposing experts and ask about opinions of tfie expert not 
previously disclosed. It makes no sense or logic why lawyers want to know of opinions 
of experts that have not been previously disclosed when such untjiscl~sed opinions are 
not admissible in evidence. Why ask? You are the one who caused the new opinion of 
Dr. Garrison on fat embolism to be brought out and as a result, you must now live with 
the opinion. But for you, it would not even exist. The deposition ·of an oppo~ing expert 
taken after the expert has given a disclosure of opinions constitutes a vaUd disclosure of. 
opinions elicited at the deposition, even ff new. You did the same thing at the deposition 
of Dr. Coffman and I objected but you persisted and got an opinion of sorts on an issue 
not previously described in the disclosure of Dr. Coffman. You ~lso went into details 
about fat embolism and the basis for the opinions of Dr. Garrison anhe depositior:1. This 
included references to the chest x-ray at Elmore Medical Center. and the report of Dr. 
Morgan, both of which made reference to fat embolism. You now claim that.you cpuld 
not adequately prepare for his deposition because you did not have notice-9fhis opinion 
in advance. This is an absurd position because you would not be prepared when you 
brought up the matter of fat embolism which you should not have done, but you did. You 
must live with your contention that you were not prepared and I know of n·o legal°· · · 
authority that gives you the right to take another deposition of Dr. Garrison. You have 
put yourself in an awkward position and if you will provide me legal· authority and · 
support for taking another deposition of Dr. Garrison I will consider your request. · 






BAILEY &G LASSERLLP 
Lawyers 
fntemet www.baileyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9109 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
September 27, 2013 
Clerk of the District Court 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find for filing with the Court the NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF SUSAN KERR in regard to the 
above-referenced matter. Copies have been mailed to counsel of r~cord. Thank you 




Isl P. Gregory Haddad 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
cc: Jeremiah Quanerrerrence Jones (via facsimile) 
Scott McKay, Esq. (via facsimile) 
J. 8. Perrine, Esq. (via facsimile) 
650730 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF SUSAN KERR 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
650653 
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To: Susan Kerr 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition duces tecum of Susan Kerr, on Wednesday, October 2, 2013, at 12:00 
p.m., mountain time, at Regus, 950 West Bannock Street, #1100, Boise, Idaho 83702, at which 
place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. A copy of all documents and data that comprise or relate to the "records of Silk touch, 
records and data she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of Krystal Ballard, 
photos of Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures" as referenced in 
Defendants' Supplemental Answer to Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 20 dated September 16, 2013 
concerning Susie Kerr. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 27th day of September, 2013. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
650653 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF SUSAN KERR by Facsimile upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Banlc Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 






Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
1 O 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOtJCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Defendants hereby submit their First Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name af1d addresses of each person 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 1 
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whom you intend to call as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which each 
expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions of each expert, a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion of each expert, and a summary of each expert's 
qualifications. 
SUPPLMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: 
1) Brian C. Kerr, M.D. 
Clo Quane Jones McColl PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. Suite 1601 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 780-3939 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Kerr is a physician licensed by the 
state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Kerr has engaged in the medical 
specialty of anesthesiology and cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Kerr 
will testify as a non-retained expert witness at the trial as to his compliance with the 
applicable standard of health care practice with respect to all of the medical services 
rendered to the patient/decedent Krystal Ballard. Dr. Kerr will testify that he has actual 
knowledge of the standard of health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that he met such 
standard taking into account his background, training, experience and field of medical 
specialization with respect to any and all medical services rendered to the patient. 
Part of the basis for Dr. Kerr's opinions include: his background, training, 
research, practice and experience in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed 
physician in Boise, Idaho, his prior involvement in the peer review process while working 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 2 
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as an anesthesiologist, his involvement as an anesthesiologist on thousands of surgeries, 
his prior medical staff privileges, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures like 
liposuction are performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in performing a large volume of 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic 
liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting procedures are performed, 
his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments needed to perform the nature 
and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his knowledge of the scope of 
practice of cosmetic providers in Boise, Idaho and elsewhere, and his knowledge of the 
types of medical providers who perform cosmetic procedures like the ones at issue in this 
case and his knowledge of the manner and method by which surgical equipment and 
surgical procedure facilities are maintained in a sterile fashion. Dr. Kerr will explain his 
training and experience at the Mayo Clinic during his residency in anesthesiology 
1989-1992 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the anesthetic procedures he 
performed, was taught and observed. He will explain the same matters for his experience 
as a staff anesthesiologist at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise from 
1992 to 2008. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for achieving sterile operating conditions and the 
disinfection of instruments and equipment and that the similar matters undertaken for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard were used and exceeded. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that the infection rates at Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center were and are for in excess of any infections he has encountered which 
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are essentially zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily 
treated successfully with no adverse consequences. 
By way of these and other professional experiences in Boise, Idaho, Dr. 
Kerr will testify that he has actual knowledge of community standards of health care 
practice applicable to him. During his professional career in Boise, Idaho, he has been 
acquainted with physicians who perform cosmetic procedures who are not plastic 
surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds including: 
family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and gynecology. 
Dr. Kerr has become acquainted with the nature· and scope of the practice of these other 
cosmetic procedure providers and the procedures utilized by them in this specialty in 
Boise, Idaho in 2010, including the procedures utilized for maintaining a sterile field and 
how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment and instruments utilized for 
cosmetic procedures including the procedures at issue in this case. Dr. Kerr will explain 
that the standard of health care practice for plastic surgeons is not the standard of health 
care practice for him or physicians who practice in the same medical specialty he does. 
Dr. Kerr will describe and offer testim9ny on the training he received for the 
procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard and refer to the publications, data and 
documents that have been produced in discovery on this subject that are incorporated 
herein by this reference and explain the numerous similar procedures he performed 
before his treatment of Krystal Ballard, consisting of 199 liposuctions through July 20, 
2010 and 33 fat transfers through July 20, 2010. 
Dr. Kerr will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for his facility to be certified, inspected or approved by 
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any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his clinic and the 
instruments he.used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to conduct his 
medical practice and the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
During Dr. Kerr's professional career in Boise, Idaho, he has received 
specific training in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and 
ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will testify that he had adequate training and experience 
to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. He will 
testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these types of 
procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was appropriate for the 
procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based 
setting without general anesthesia and that he had proper facilities, equipment and 
personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health 
care practice. As reflected in his deposition testimony and discovery responses which 
are hereby incorporated as if set forth in full, Dr. Kerr had performed these procedures on 
numerous other patients before and since the procedure at issue in this case. Dr. Kerr will 
testify that he possesses the professional knowledge and experience that allows him to 
express the opinions and testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that he has never had a patient experience a 
post-operative complication like the one alleged in this case nor has he ever had a patient 
experience a post-operative infection of this nature, nor a patient death. Based in part on 
his review of this case and in consultation with experienced and trained medical 
professionals in several other areas of medicine including infectious disease and 
pathology, he will testify that the patient's death was not due to any error or omission on 
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his part or the part of anyone associated with his practice. He will testify that he 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. Or. Kerr will explain the 
procedures he performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal Ballard, 
starting on July 23, 201 O through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same sterile and 
disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and there were 
no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will explain the same 
m_atters in regard to the multitude of procedures her performed before the procedure he 
performed on Krystal Ballard. He will render the opinion that his liposuction and fat 
transfer procedures did not cause or result in the introduction of any bacteria to the 
patient. Dr. Kerr actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and that his 
opinions will be stated on a more probable than not basis or reasonable medical certainty. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that nothing he elected to do or not do with respect to the 
medical services provided to Krystal Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the applicable local 
standard of health care practice which in turn caused or contributed to any damages or 
injuries to the patient. Dr. Kerr will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was 
not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the standard of health care 
practice by him. He will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable to 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise is established 
by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way they typically 
practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, publication, 
foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. Dr. Kerr's testimony at 
trial will necessarily contain a mixed component of both factual and expert testimony. He 
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will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care typically provided under 
similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic 
surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will express and define the local standard 
of practice as it existed in Boise in 2010 with respect to the medical issues in this case 
consistent with his deposition testimony, prior discovery responses and the contents of 
this disclosure which are hereby incorporated. He will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. The standard of healthcare practice for physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and no perfect outcome was ever 
warranted or represented to the patient. The standard of practice applicable includes as 
.. 
a major element aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of science 
which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. Dr. Kerr will be 
prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why his care in this 
case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all operative 
procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Kerr will explain that 
post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized risk factor 
that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care practice by 
the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, infections may 
occur. Dr. Kerr will explain the advice and information given to Krystal Ballard in regard to 
the risk, benefits and options he provided to Krystal Ballard on two occasions before his 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in his medical records. Dr. Kerr will 
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explain the standard of health care practice that is applicable to him and that everything 
undertaken by him in his care and treatment of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of the 
standard of health care practice, based on the class of health care provider to which he 
belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Kerr will explain that the standard 
of health care practice provides that he is to be judged and evaluated in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, taking into account 
his training, experience and field of medical specialization. 
As part of his testimony and consistent with his specialty of anesthesiology 
and cosmetic surgery, Dr. Kerr is expected to testify concerning the totality of medical 
services provided to Krystal Ballard. As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss his 
training and the certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery. He will discuss his care and treatment of the 
patient as outlined in the patient's medical records as well as his c·onversations and 
interactions with the patient and her husband as discussed in the documents produced in 
discovery and/or attached as exhibits to Dr. Kerr's deposition. To the extent it is relevant 
to his opinions, he will also discuss his continuing education courses since transitioning 
from anesthesia to cosmetic procedures including his further knowledge of cosmetic 
surgery which includes both the Vaser procedure and fat injection procedures and how 
they are performed in different locations in this body. 
With respect to the fat injection, he will discuss how a person's own fat may 
be used to improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less 
needed (usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will 
explain how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site 
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being treated. Before the procedure, the areas from where the fat is being removed are 
injected with a fluid to minimize bruising and discomfort. The fat is removed from the body 
by a cannula through a small incision. He will discuss how the fat is prepared to be 
reinjected back into the patient's body and then placed into the desired area using either a 
smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He will explain how some of the 
fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume over time, which is often 
addressed by injecting more than is needed at the time to achieve the desired end result. 
Over a few weeks, the amount of transferred fat will decrease. He will explain how the 
fat transfer procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was consistent with 
the local standard of practice given th~ nature and extent of the procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss the entries in his records 
including his first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she desired, 
the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic procedure, he 
will discuss the patient's health history form, the fact that she had previously had a 
liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this type, the general state of the 
patient's health, the operative report and a detailed explanation of how he did the 
procedure on July 21, 2010, he will discuss the patient's vital signs and her clinical 
condition before during and after the surgery as well as at the post-operative visit with the 
patient, his pre-operative, intra operative and post-operative discussions, instructions and 
directions shared with the patient and then ultimately the discussions he had with 
I 
patient's· husband and aunt, he will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
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to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, he will 
explain the artistic nature of the procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the 
cannula back and forth to feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result. 
As part. of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will explain the manner and method by 
which the adipose tissue harvested is then drained and prepared for reinjection, how the 
instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each procedure, he 
will discuss those pieces of equipment and/or attachments and medical goods which are 
new versus sterilized for reuse between patients and/or procedures, he will discuss the 
pre and post-operative antibiotics he administered to the patient and the reasons why 
· they were appropriate, he will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
to him or even to be suffering from any signs or symptoms of any infection beyond general 
localized pain in her buttocks which would be expected initially from this type of 
procedure. He will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did not 
have any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus or other signs of 
active drainage from the operative sites, there was no swelling or signs of a rash or 
change in condition of the skin surrounding the area. Dr. Kerr will explain how he 
looked for and documented the absence of these signs and symptoms during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and her 
husband prior to her death. He will testify that at no point did the patient present to him 
as having an infection nor did the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to 
refer the patient, prescribe a different course of medical care or obtain any further 
diagnostic testing than was done. He will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods 
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and the fact that they do not exist on the skin nor would they be found on his instruments, 
but rather they are a class of bacteria which resides in the bladder, bowels and urinary 
tract of a patient. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss why the Vaser procedure is an appropriate method of 
removing unwanted adipose tissue in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will testify that he 
had adequate training and experience to perform the surgical procedures on the patient in 
question and that he performed these procedures in conformity with the local standard of 
practice to which Dr. Kerr is held. He will explain how the field of laser lipolysis with the 
use of tumescent anesthesia has expended in recent years. He will discuss how when 
considering different types of the body for lipolysis that each area has its own unique 
geography and involves a degree of physician judgment as to how much material to 
remove and/or reinject into each location. He will explain the positioning of the patient, 
incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, choice of instruments, his 
artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient expectations, and patient 
education and counseling from the informed consent phase through the postoperative 
follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical illustrations as well 
as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at issue including 
those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies produced to date. 
As part of his testimony, he will explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
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Small-diameter probes are then inserted into the body through small incisions. He will 
explain how by resonating at a high ultrasonic frequency, the pr~bes literally shake loose 
fat cells - while leaving blood vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The 
loose fat cells mix with the tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using 
gentle suction. After the surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote 
maximum skin retraction, smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to 
traditional liposuction. 
Dr. Kerr may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. He will 
discuss his operative report and how he creates his medical record documentation, how 
and why he selected the antibiotics in question including the decision on July 23 to place 
the patient on 500 mg of Keflex and that this was an appropriate broad spectrum antibiotic 
to provide the patient given her location in Mountain Home, he will explain how the 
affected area is expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the 
affected area, the instructions g_iven to the patient, he will discus:s the cardinal signs of an 
infection and how he specifically evaluated, questioned the patient and documented 
regarding these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the 
amount of time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that he took the 
appropriate amount of time to address this patient during her procedure on July 21, 2010. 
He will discuss his knowledge of the various cosmetic organizations to which he belongs 
and/or has knowledge of, what they offer their members and the opportunities to 
associate with colleagues and obtain continuing education in thi:s emerging field. Dr. Kerr 
will explain the matter he undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal Ballard and 
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assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical sites, 
including abnormal odor, and thus there was no evidence or suggestion of infection of the 
sites. 
He will discuss how on July 26, 2010 he learned around 1 p.m. that Krystal 
Ballard had died. After the patient's death he sent a document setting forth his list of 
concerns to the coroner who he asked for a copy of the autopsy record. He will discuss 
the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in her urine 
and that this is consistent with an infectious process in the patient's bladder. This is also 
an area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist. He will 
discuss how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC count of 14.7. .He 
will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery. He will comment 
upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address the patient's bladder or perform any 
microscopic examination of that organ to address the nature of, the bacteria identified in 
the positive UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. Dr. Kerr is 
expected to offer testimony on the autopsy report of Dr. Glen Graben and the matters he 
described in his deposition in regard to the report, including the fact that Dr. Graben did 
not perform a microscopic evaluation of the bladder and .urinary tract with the exception of 
the kidneys. 
Dr. Kerr is also expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and 
how this can be signs of dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys 
were not functioning properly. He will address the vague and confusing nature of the 
autopsy report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of 
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acute inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, it is not clear which surgical 
sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the tissue 
sections where harvested from on the patient. Dr. Kerr will render the opinion, more 
likely than not, that the gram negative bacterial rods, if they existed, were introduced into 
the patient's surgical site sometime after the procedure rather than being introduced 
during the procedure. He has never had a patient experience such an infection in all his 
years. Dr. Kerr will testify that few of his patients who have undergone a lipolysis 
procedure have ever experienced any kind of post-operative infection and none of those 
patients died and all of them were diagnosed based on clinical observation. These were 
limited cellulitis based on clinical suspicion and not based on a culture result. Dr. Kerr will 
explain that if the opinions of Dr. Dean Sorensen are valid, there should have been other 
infections of patients before and after the procedure on Krystal Ballard, and there were 
not. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that when he saw the patient on July 23, two days post 
operatively, he did not observe any evidence of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. 
He will discuss how the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband 
and the military and that she was noncompliant with what she had been told both in 
writing and verbally about how to care for herself. He will discuss how the patient 
erroneously reported that she had fallen and injured her back and claimed this was the 
source of her pain rather than admit she had cosmetic surgery performed. He will 
discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking her medications because she did not 
want proof of them to show up in any drug screen she might take with the military. He will 
also discuss how the patient admitted to engaging in activities she was told to refrain from 
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in order to allow her body time to heal. He will discuss his concern that the patient was 
not properly changing her bandages and caring for herself as instructed and how during 
any of these times would have been an opportunity for the bacteria in question to be 
introduced into her system. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that he and his employees followed the appropriate 
sterile technique in regards to the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. He will 
explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do everything 
right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced into the 
surgical site. He will discuss the patient's admission that she was not taking the narcotic 
pain medication Norco and was instead taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not 
appear to be providing the patient with adequate pain control. He will explain how the 
patient was not following the instructions on how to care for herself, change her 
bandages, and get appropriate rest. He will discuss the patient's disclosure that she had 
a PT e~am in the military scheduled for a day or two after the procedure and was told that 
she should not engage in that activity. He will discuss how the patient agreed to tell her 
husband that she had the cosmetic procedure done so he could help care for her, but 
then she failed to do so on multiple occasions. He will explain that when the patient 
showed up on July 21 to have the procedure she did not have someone present to drive 
her home as she was instructed to do. Dr. Kerr will discuss how he did not use a 
sedating drug with the patient and then observed her for a period of time after the 
procedure before allowing her to drive home and even offered to have a taxi take the 
patient home. 
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The patient was placed on 500 mg of Keflex per day for 1 O days as of the 
July 23 visit. He would have removed the bandages in order to personally observe the 
area of the wound to check for signs and symptoms of infection. He will testify that the 
amount of bruising and edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would 
expect to see at that point postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did 
not require him to obtain a complete blood count on the patient on ~uly 23 in order to 
determine what her white count was at that time. He will discuss his training in 
performing liposuction he received from both John Lundeby and at the Keller Medical 
Institute. He will discuss his experiences with and the differences between Smart Lipo, 
Ultrasonic liposuction and traditional liposuction. He will discuss his background, 
training and experience in the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique. 
He will discuss how this is an office based procedure which is not required to be 
performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order to perform 
such a procedure. He was not required, nor does·the standard of practice require that 
his facility be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the AAACH or 
AAAASF. 
He will discuss how his procedure room is prepared for surgery, how the 
patient, himself, his assistant and the patient are all prepared for surgery and the sterile 
technique utilized. He will discuss the autoclave he uses, how it operates and how it 
helps him maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will testify that he was not 
required to test for spores or mold and that these issues have nothing to do with the case. 
He will discuss the areas around the patient which are considered part of the sterile field 
depending on the nature and type of procedure at issue. He will discuss the operation 
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and use of the Vaser ultrasonic lipolysis machine utilized for the procedure in this case. 
He will explain how the tumescent lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the 
patient. He will explain how the Vaser procedure is done with the device in place under 
the skin without direct visualization. He will discuss how he harvested 400 cc of fat from 
the patient's anterior abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of 
fat from the patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this case 
was utilized for less than eleven minutes despite the fact the patient was in the procedure 
room for around four" hours. He will discuss the different cannulas used to aspirate the 
fat and the artistic technique required to accomplish the desired aesthetic outcome. 
He will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle 
and syringe and that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection 
phase of the procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for 
the same needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the 
patient. He will discuss his informed consent discussion with the patient including the 
contents of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. He will 
discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis and fat 
. injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the patient 
both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they fail to 
. comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will develop 
complications. He will discuss and interpret the entries in his medical records. 
Dr. Kerr will render his opinions consistent with the requirements of Idaho 
Code §6-1012 and 6-1013. In this regard, he will challenge the foundation as well as 
rebut the opinions of the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of 




consent, he will testify that he discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the 
risks normally attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by 
the patient was valid in all respects consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code 
§39-4506. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss his preoperative clinical 
examination including evaluation of the regions to be lipo-contoured including review for 
hernias, . scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, the quality of the skin and its 
elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location of fat deposits. He will 
rebut any testimony by Plaintiffs experts that he improperly performed the lipolysis 
procedure, the fat injection procedure, that he improperly sterilized his equipment or that 
he did anything to cause the patient's death. Depending on the testimony of Dr. Dean 
Sorensen at trial, Dr. Kerr may offer testimony on and descriptive of the fact that Dr. 
Sorensen is a competitor of his and advertises his belief that non-plastic surgeons should 
not do liposuction, such as his website that states "unfortunately, there are a number of 
procedures being performed by physicians who are not trained in plastic surgery. These 
non-plastic surgeons often utilize technologies that have catchy names and are 
expensive but in clinical trials have not shown any significant improvement over the 
standard tumescent liposuction techniques. Patients are advised to select a procedure 
that is safe and effective based on scientific results performed by a Board Certified plastic 
surgeon and to ignore the marketing hype so common today." Depending on the proof 
submitted at trial and the testimony of Dr. Sorensen and/or the tenor or implication of his 
testimony and opinions, Dr. Kerr may describe the lawsuit against Dr. Sorensen in Boise 
that resulted in the jury rendering a verdict of malpractice against him and assessing 
damages of a substantial amount against him. Dr. Kerr may testify that Dr. ~orensen has 
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never observed or seen the operating procedures of his, including his sterile techniques, 
use of instruments, disinfectant matters and the way he performed the procedures on 
Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Kerr will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Kerr will testify 
that he had the best interests of the patient in mind and that he was committed to the 
rendition of his services in full compliance with the applicable local standard of health care 
practice and his experience and capability. He will testify that even in hindsight the patient 
did not present with any increased risk for infection that would have raised any concern 
about her undergoing the procedures on July 21, 2010. At the time of Dr. Kerr's 
procedure on July 21, 2010, there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal 
Ballard and Dr. Kerr will opine that Krystal Ballard was not suffering from a urinary tract 
infection on July 21, 2010. 
Data and other information considered and summary of 
qualifications: In forming his opinions, Dr. Kerr has relied upon his own unique training 
and experience as a licens~d physician engaged in the medical specialty of anesthesia 
and cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 201 O in treating, diagnosing, managing and 
caring for patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of 
other cosmetic surgeons and care providers, his knowledge that it is within his specialty 
and capability to perform the procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, 
. . 
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his interactions with cosmetic providers, and his membership and participation in various 
medical associations, including those in the state of Idaho. The data upon which his 
opinions are based include his medical education, training, skill, experience, his 
experience practicing cosmetic surgery within Boise, his review of the care and treatment 
experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the course of his career in 
medicine in Boise. 
Dr. Kerr will discuss the ability, competence and proficiency of Brianna Kerr 
as a surgical assistant and the manner in which she maintains sterile conditions for 
surgeries, and the fact that she did nothing in the surgery of Krystal Ballard that would 
create or contribute to an infection. 
His opinions are also based upon the findings of various other health care 
provjders for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies and other 
testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and recommendations 
for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and interactions before, 
during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all medical records, 
affidavits, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Kerr's professional 
background and qualifications were discussed in his deposition and are incorporated 
herein. As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, he 
has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including his own, his 
employees, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered his medical 
records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance Service, Life Flight, 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's Office and the 
Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or medical records 
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are produced, they will also be considered. Dr. Kerr will explain the weight changes of 
Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 25, 2010 at Elmore 
Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 she weighed 180 
pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these changes in weight. 
At Elmore Medical Center, July 25, 2010, the treating physician evaluated 
the buttocks and abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no 
redness, warmth or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 
% hours after admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. 
Alphonsus on July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very 
high and proof of fluid overlaid. Dr. Kerr will explain these factors and their relative 
significance in terms of the possible reasons for the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Kerr will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center and 
the clinical findings are indicative of a developing urinary tract infection or abnormalities 
that developed after his procedure of July 21, 201 O and if gram negative rods were in fact 
present at autopsy in certain locations, they came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard 
or her intestinal tract and were not introduced during his surgical procedure. Bacteria was 
found in the urinalysis at Elmore. 
It is expected that Dr. Kerr will explain pertinent anatomy, infectious 
processes, pathophysiology of infections, nidus for infections, gram negative rods, types 
of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were negative for growth, 
antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard regarding what drugs 
would show up on drug test by the Air Force. He will also explain the post-surgery matters 
he undertook and his efforts to assist Krystal Ballard, including the importance of the 
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post-treatment instructions given to Krystal Ballard as denoted in his medical records and 
the evidence that is consistent with non-compliance by Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Kerr reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Kerr reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth in this 
disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded broadly in 
order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. Dr. Kerr has 
not testified in any matter in the last four years. He is not a retained expert. His 
curriculum vitae was previously produced and is incorporated by this reference. 
2) Gregory Laurence, M.D. 
Germantown Aesthetics 
7475 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, Tennessee 38138 
(901) 624-5605 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Laurence is a· physician licensed 
in the state of Tennessee to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Laurence is board 
certified in both family practice and laser surgery and has engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Laurence will testify as a 
retained expert witness at the trial. Dr. Laurence will testify that he has actual knowledge 
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of the standard of health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in. the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr met 
such standard taking into account Dr. Kerr's background, training, experience and field of 
medical specialization with respect to any and all medical services rendered to the 
patient. 
Dr. Laurence will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Laurence's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed physician, his experiences in the peer 
review process associated with his hospital staff privileges at Baptist Memorial Hospital 
and St. Francis Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, his experience of having performed 
hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures 
like liposuction and fat transfers were performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in 
performing a large volume of liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of 
how the Vaser ultrasonic liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting 
procedures are performed, his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments 
n!3eded to perform the nature and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his 
knowledge of the scope of practice of cosmetic providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, Idaho and 
elsewhere, his knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform cosmetic 
procedures like the ones at issue in this case and his knowledge of the manner and 
method by which surgical equipment and surgical procedure facilities are maintained in a 
sterile fashion. As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also explain his training and 
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experience at the University of Tennessee during his residency in family practice in 
1992-95 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the procedures he performed, was 
taught and observed. He will explain the same matters for his experience in his own 
aesthetics surgical center which he operates in Germantown, Tennessee from 2003 to 
the present. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at 
his own surgical facility in Tennessee for achieving sterile operating conditions and the 
disinfection of instruments and equipment and maintaining a sterile operative field and 
that the similar actions and efforts undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been described for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard in this case were used and exceeded in his opinion. Dr. 
Laurence will testify that the infection rates descrit;>ed by Dr. Kerr in his deposition and 
discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are essentially 
zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated successfully 
with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how this is evidence that the 
sterility pro'cedures employed by the Defendants in this case were appropriate and 
working properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that during his professional career he has been 
acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic procedures that are not 
plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds 
including: family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and 
gynecology. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic surgery by 
various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. Dr. Laurence has become acquainted 
with the nature and scope of the practice of these other cosmetic procedure providers and 
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the procedures utilized by them in this specialty, including the procedures utilized for 
maintaining a sterile field and how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment 
and instruments utilized for cosmetic procedures including the procedures at issue in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health care practice for plastic 
surgeons is not the standard of health care practice in the same medical specialty as his 
and Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had proper training and 
experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal Ballard. As part of his 
testimony, he is expected to refer to the publications, data and documents that have been 
produced in discovery on this subject and explain the numbers of similar procedures he 
has performed. Dr. Laurence will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard 
of health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to· be certified, inspected or 
approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. He will 
testify that he was not required to test for spores or mold and that these issues have 
nothing to do with the case. 
During Dr. Laurence's professional career he has received specific training 
in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and ultrasonic assisted 
lipolysis. He will testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of training obtained 
by Dr. Kerr and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to 
perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. Dr. Laurence 
will testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these types of 
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procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was appropriate for the 
procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based 
setting without general anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, equip~ent and 
personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health 
care practice. Dr. Laurence will testify that he possesses the professional knowledge 
and experience that allows him to express the opinion and testimony described in this 
document. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the fact this patient experienced a 
pqst-operative complication like the one alleged in this case which resulted in a patient 
death does not establish that the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will 
testify that postoperative infections are not proof of a violation. He will render the opinion 
that the patient's death was not due to any error or omission on Dr. Kerr's part or the part 
of anyone associated with his practice. He will discuss his own sterilization techniques, 
training and experience in this area which will help support his opinion that Dr. Kerr 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 201 O through July 31, 201 O in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
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but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in 
regards to the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the 
surgical technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer 
procedures did not cause or result in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. 
Laurence actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and will express all 
opinions stated herein on a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the specific issues set forth in this 
disclosure, but he will also testify globally that nothing Dr. Kerr elected to do or not do with 
respect to the medical services provided to Krystal Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the 
applicable local standard of health care practice which in turn caused or contributed to 
any damages or injuries to the patient. Dr. Laurence will testify that the unfortunate death 
of Krystal Ballard was not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable 
to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Laurence will testify regarding his various publications, honors and university 
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appointments as set forth in his curriculum vitae which is hereby incorporated as if set 
forth in full. He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide him with 
opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of cosmetic 
surgery including his affiliations with the American Institute of Ultrasound Medicine, the 
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the American Society of Cosmetic 
Breast Surgeons, and the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians. 
Dr. Laurence will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, 
Dr. Laurence will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 
201 O with respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and 
any deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if 
set forth in full. Dr. Laurence holds the opinion and will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the 
records and deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was 
ever warranted or represented to this patient. 
Dr. Laurence will explain how the standard of practice applicable includes, 
as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of 
science which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. He will 
render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate post-operative instructions and 
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properly followed the patient and communicated with her and her family. Dr. Laurence 
will be prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why Or. Kerr's 
care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all 
operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Laurence will 
explain that post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized 
risk factor that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care 
practice by the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, 
infections can and do occur. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice 
and information to Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. Dr. 
' Laurence will explain that everything undertaken by Dr. Kerr in his care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the standard of health care 
practice, based on the class of health care provider to which Dr. Kerr belonged and in 
which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health 
care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged and evaluated in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, taking into account 
his training, experience and field of medical specialization and not by a plastic surgeon 
which Plaintiff is unfairly trying to do in this case. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss his training and the 
certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. 
Kerr. He will discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's 
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medical records and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. 
Kerr's documented conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Laurence will 
discuss and explain to the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be 
used to improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less 
needed (usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will 
explain how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site 
being treated. He will explain how before the removal procedure begins the areas from 
where the fat is being removed are injected with a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize 
bruising and discomfort to the patient. He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or 
fat is freed and ultimately removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small 
incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss and describe how the adipose tissue is then 
prepared to be re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the 
desired area using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He 
will render the opinion that the manner, method and volume by which Dr. Kerr re-injected 
the adipose tissue back into the patient was appropriate in all respects. He will explain 
how some of th~ fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume over time, which 
is often addressed by the physician having to re-inject more adipose tissue into a specific 
location to achieve the desired end aesthetic result. He will explain how the fat transfer 
procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was consistent with the local 
standard of practice given the nature and extent of the procedure. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the entries in Dr. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Laurence will also discuss Dr. Kerr's 
operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, the 
patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at the 
post-operative visit with the patient. He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's 
post-operative discussions, instructions and directions shared with the patient and then 
ultimately the discussions he had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Laurence will 
explain that Krystal Ballard appeared to be in good health and without a urinary tract 
infection before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and there is no evidence that she had a 
urinary tract infection and that the pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue,- how the Vaser device operates 
to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, and 
the amount of traction applied to free the adipose tissue. From his unique perspective as 
a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Laurence will ~xplain the artistic nature of the liposuction 
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procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the cannul~ back and forth in order to 
feathe~ the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the 
location of the procedure and the body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. 
In the process of providing his opinions that the care by Dr. Kerr was 
appropriate, Dr. Laurence will also explain the manner and method by which the adipose 
tissue harvested was then drained and prepared for reinjection. He will also discuss how 
the instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each procedure, 
he will discuss these pieces of equipment as well as their various attachments as well as 
describing the medical equipment which is new versus that which must be re-sterilized for 
reuse between patients and/or procedures. Dr. Laurence will discuss the pre and 
post-operative antibiotics administered by Dr. Kerr to the patient and explain why they 
were appropriate medications to give to the patient as a prophylaxis against infection. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
per the medical records and deposition testimony. He will discuss the expected 
localized pain patients can expect to experience following a fat transfer procedure. To 
the extent it becomes relevant to aid in expressing his favorable opinions, Dr. Laurence 
may also discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did not have any fever 
or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus or other signs of active 
drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling or signs of a rash or change 
in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked 
for and then properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during 
his postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and 
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her family prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point 
did the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, nor did the standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a different course of 
medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, 
Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods and the fact that such 
organisms do not exist on or in the skin, nor would they be found on surgical instruments. 
Instead, they represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of 
a patient. He will testify that Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform 
the surgeries in question, that Dr. Kerr's medical records contain an adequate description 
of the care rendered and the discussions with the patient, that Dr. Kerr implemented 
appropriate sterility techniques and conditions for surgery and that he used correct 
solutions for cleaning and disinfecting instruments and assuring that operative conditions 
were adequately sterile to guard against the risk of infection. He will testify that 
postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions which are not the 
~ubject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are impossible to 
prevent. 
To the extent the surgical selection is questioned or needs further 
explanation at trial, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to discuss why the Vaser procedure is 
an appropriate method of removing unwanted adipose tissue in a patient like Krystal 
Ballard. As part of his testimony and in order to expand upon his background and 
experience in cosmetic surgery, Dr. Laurence may offer testimony explaining how the 
field of laser lipolysis with the use of tumescent anesthesia has developed in recent years. 
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This may include testimony addressing that when considering different types of the body 
for lipolysis that each area has its own unique geography and involves a degree of 
physician judgment as to how much material to remove and/or re-inject into each location. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to explain the positioning of the 
patient, incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, choice of 
instruments, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient expectations, 
and patient education and counseling from the informed consent phase through the 
postoperative follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical 
illustrations as well as various can nu las and related instrumentation for the procedures at 
issue including those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies 
produced to date. 
As part of his testimony, he will explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally 
invasive. technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
With the use of exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then 
inserted into the body through small incisions. He will explain how by way of using a 
resonating high ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while 
leaving blood vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix 
with the tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using gentle suction. After 
the surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin 
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retraction, smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to traditional 
liposuction. 
Dr. Laurence may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area, the 
instructions given to the patient, he will discuss the cardinal signs of an infection and how 
Dr. Kerr's records and deposition ·evidence that he specifically and appropriately 
evaluated and questioned the patient and then documented in his rec.ords regarding 
these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the amount of 
time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that there was nothing usual or out 
of character regarding the amount of time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. 
As outlined above, Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge of the various 
cosmetic organizations to which he belongs and/or has knowledge of, what they offer 
their members and the opportunities to associate with colleagues and obtain continuing 
education in this emerging field. Dr. Laurence will explain the adequacy of the 
postoperative evaluation Dr. Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal 
Ballard and assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical 
sites, including absence of any abnormal odor or other evidence or suggestion of 
infection of any of the surgical sites. 
He will discuss his review and comments of the autopsy record and the 
patient's subsequent treatment records. By way of example, Dr. Laurence is expected to 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 35 
001082
discuss the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in 
her urine. Based on his experience in family practice, he will render the opinion that this 
laboratory finding is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious 
process located within the patient's bladder. He will explain how the bladder is also an 
area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist in the face of an 
infection. 
Dr. Laurence will also comment upon the significance from his perspective 
regarding how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC count of 14.7. 
He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery, stress and 
dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address the 
patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any microscopic 
examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in the positive 
UA performed at EJmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. He is also expected to 
discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how this can be signs of dehydration as well 
as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were not functioning properly. 
Dr. Laurence will address the vague and confusing nature of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of acute 
inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which 
surgical sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the 
tissue sections where harvested from on the patient. Dr. Laurence will render the 
opinion, more likely than not, that the gram negative bacterial rods were introduced into 
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the patient's surgical site sometime after Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure rather than being 
introduced during the procedure. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July°23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncompliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging position the patient elected to place herself and her health 
care provider in by erroneously reporting to her husband that she had simply fallen and 
injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain rather than admit she 
had cosmetic surgery performed. 
In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability to provide her with care and 
to make decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria ·in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that Dr. Kerr and his employees followed the 
appropriate sterile technique in regards to the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
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He will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do 
everything right and still h.ave situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced 
into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods claimed to have been 
identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. He will discuss the patient's 
admission that she was not taking the narcotic pain medication Norco and was instead 
taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not appear to be providing the patient with 
adequate pain control. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and 
edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would expect to see at that point 
postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to 
obtain a complete blood count on the patient on July 23 in order to determine what her 
white count was at that time. He will discuss his background, training and experience in 
the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique in his practice in order to lay a 
foundation for his opinions as to the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's sterile technique. Dr. 
Laurence will discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which 
are not required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required 
in order to perform such procedures. Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr 
was not required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his 
facility be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the MACH. or 
AAAASF or any governmental agency. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's 
procedure room was properly prepared for surgery and to protect and preserve an 
appropriate sterile field. He will discuss the autoclave at issue, how it operates and how 
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it helps Dr. Kerr maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will discuss the areas 
around the patient which are considered part of the sterile field depending on the nature 
and type of procedure at issue. He will discuss the operation and use of the Vaser 
ultrasonic lipolysis machine utilized for the procedure in this case. He will explain how 
the tumescent lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will expiain 
how the Vaser procedure is done with the device in place under the skin without direct 
visualization. He will discuss how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat 
from the patient's anterior abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 
cc of fat from the patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this 
case was utilized for less than eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the 
nature of the procedure. 
As it relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiff'_s experts, Dr. Laurence 
will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and 
that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection phase of the 
procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for the same 
needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. He 
will discuss the adequacy of the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient 
including the content of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. 
He will discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis 
and fat injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the 
patient both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they 
fail to comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will 
develop complications. 
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Dr. Laurence will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of 
the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, he will testify 
that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the risks normally 
attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by the patient was 
valid in all respects. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. 
Kerr's preoperative clinical examination including evaluation of the regions to be 
lipo-contoured including review for hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, 
the quality of the skin and its elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location 
of fat deposits. He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr improperly 
sterilized his equipment or that Dr. Kerr did anything to cause the patient's death. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also address and explain the 
weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 
25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 
she weighed 180 pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these 
changes in weight. He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore 
Medical Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks 
and abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, 
warmth or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours 
after admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. Alphonsus 
on July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very high and 
proof of fluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on causation, Dr. Laurence 
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will explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of the possible reasons 
for the ·death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center 
and the clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection the developed after his 
procedure of July 21, 201 O and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or her intestinal tract 
and were not introduced during his surgical procedure. As part of his testimony, it is 
expected that Dr. Laurence will explain pertinent anatomy, infectious processes, 
pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram negative rods, types of 
bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were negative for growth, 
antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard regarding that drugs 
would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Laurence will 
testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not present with any increased risk 
for infection that would have raised any concern about her undergoing the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's procedure on July 21, 2010, 
there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal Ballard. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Laurence has relied upon his own unique training and 
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experience as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery 
in Tennessee in treating, diagnosing, managing and caring for patients like Krystal 
Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of other cosmetic surgeons and care 
providers, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 
201 O and his knowledge that it is within Dr. Kerr's specialty and capability to perform the 
procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, and his membership and 
participation in various medical associations and organizations as set forth herein. The 
data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, training, skill, 
experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the care and 
treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the course of his 
career in medicine. 
Dr. Laurence's opinions are also based upon the findings of various other 
health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Laurence's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including Dr. Kerr's, 
employees of Silk Touch, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered Dr. 
Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance 
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Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's 
Office and the Plaintiffs expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or 
medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Laurence reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Laurence reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial 
will depend to an· extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of 
the Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. 
3) Charles Garrison, M.D. 
P.O. Box 4226 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
208.891 .8505 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, causation, damages and the care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Garrison is a physician licensed 
by the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Garrison has engaged in the 
medical specialty of forensic pathology at all times relevant herein which he practices in 
Pocatello and Boise, Idaho. Dr. Garrison will testify as a retained expert witness at the 
trial and his testimony will address the issue of the cause of the patient's death. Part of 
the basis for Dr. Garrison's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice 
and experience in performing forensic pathology and in determining disease processes 
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as well as the cause of death of patients like Krystal Ballard as part of his regular practice 
of medicine. 
Dr. Garrison will render opinions which refute and rebut the opinions, 
conclusions and methodology advanced by Plaintiff's experts including the opinions of 
George Nichols, M.D. and Keith Armitage, M.D. who claim that the bacterial infection 
which the patient died from was a direct result of bacteria introduced during the July 21, 
2010 procedure and who further claim that the presence of gram negative rods are proof 
of a breach in sterility by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' experts contend that the toxic 
shock and multisystem organ failure which the patient suffered from occurred as a result 
of contaminated equipment of the Defendants. Dr. Garrison, who has viewed and 
analyzed the medical and autopsy records as well as the tissue pathology slides from the 
post mortem examination, will refute these opinions at trial. 
Dr. Garrison will render his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. Dr. Garrison's medical specialty, training, experience and knowledge enable 
him to render the opinions expressed in this document, which includes the subjects of 
bacteria, bacterial infections, virus, gram negative rods, types of bacteria that embrace 
gram negative rods, the presence and location of gram negative rods, sepsis, toxic shock, 
cause of death of patients from sepsis and toxic shock and bacteria that inhabit the skin, 
urinary tract and bowel. He will testify that the presence of gram negative bacteria in the 
wounds of Krystal Ballard, are by no means proof to a reasonable medical certainty, that 
a breach in sterility occurred in the surgical procedure. He will explain that although the 
patient's. death involved gram negative sepsis, to contend as Plaintiffs' experts do, that 
the etiology of her sepsis was a primary infection of the wound Which occurred as a result 
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of a breach in sterility, is to ignore the medical facts of the case, and wound infections in 
general. 
He will testify that for Plaintiffs' experts to state that there are no other 
reasons for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria introduced 
intraoperatively during the procedure as a result of contaminated equipment, is to ignore 
the process of postoperative wound infections, their etiology, the facts of this case, the 
patient's presenting symptoms and treatment course, how wounds are evaluated to 
determine the presence or absence of an infection and the routes by which they occur. 
In this regard, Dr. Garrison will explain post-operative wound infections and compare 
them to other infectious processes, including those associated with the patient's urinary 
track bacteria and abnormal urinalysis. 
He will testify regarding how infections become septic. He will render the 
opinion that the sepsis which led to the septic shock and multi-system organ failure was 
caused by the patient's primary infection which was the urinary track, not any wound 
infection as alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. In this regard, he may also discuss the fluid 
retention and weight gain of the patient in the days prior to her death associated with her 
organ failure, but yet there was never any overt signs of the patient having any wound 
infection at the locations of the fat transfer or liposuction. The presence of gram negative 
bacteria in the surgical wound(s) of Krystal Ballard is simply proof of their presence, but 
by no means is it proof that they arrived there by or through the surgical procedure of Dr. 
Kerr. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Garrison will explain the difference between a 
primary versus a secondary infection and how it relates to the onset of sepsis in a patient 
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like Krystal Ballard. He will render the opinion that the patient's sepsis and subsequent 
septic shock and death were not proximately caused by any bacteria introduced into the 
operative field during Dr. Kerr's July 21, 201 O liposuction and fat transfer procedure. He 
will testify that Dr. Nichols conclusions are not only medically flawed and inaccurate, but 
they fail .to take into consideration any other diagnostic evaluation that might have been 
done to further define the etiology of the infection, and reach such a conclusion with 
proper and appropriate medical investigation. 
He will testify that the most that can be said about the presence of gram 
negative bacteria allegedly found in the wounds of Krystal Ballard at autopsy is simply 
that it is proof of their presence at that location - which location cannot be determined for 
certainty since the tissue samples were not labeled as to precise location. He will testify 
that such a bacterial finding at autopsy is by no means definitive proof to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that the gram negative organism, whatever it was, arrived 
there by or through the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr, nor does such a finding 
at autopsy establish that the patient's death was due to any breach in sterility or cleaning 
protocol of any of the equipment, instruments or facility within the Silk Touch Med Spa 
facility. 
Dr. Garrison will testify that he would expect to see gram positive organisms 
populate the site of the operative wound if in fact the sepsis was due to a skin infection 
caused by a breach in sterility as alleged. He will explain how in this case the presence 
of the gram negative organisms repres~nted a secondary process to the patient's 
ongoing urinary tract infection. In this regard, he will explain the process by which a 
urinary tract infection can lead to sepsis in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will testify 
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that he has not seen a circumstance wherein a gram negative rod resulted in sepsis, 
septic shock followed by the death of the patient. 
He will testify that the autopsy conducted in this case did not identify any 
specific organism. He will discuss how in most cases of a postoperative surgical wound 
infection, that he generally observes signs and symptoms of infection due to a breach in 
sterility within two to three days of surgery which did not occur in this case. He will 
discuss how the evidence in this case demonstrates that both Dr. Graben, Dr. Kerr, the 
patient's husband and the patient prior to her death all describe a patient and an operative 
site which is not grossly infected at any time, even at autopsy. He will testify that the 
absence of evidence of any gross infection at the surgical site is wholly inconsistent with it 
having caused the patient's death as Plaintiffs' experts contend. In this regard, Dr. 
Garrison will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient presented without 
evidence of any fever and without evidence of any warmth, redness or drainage to the 
wound site. He will discuss and explain the significance of such a finding. 
He will testify that there is nothing from the autopsy, the depositions, the 
medical records or the tjeath of the patient which establish to any reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that there was any breach of sterility in this case. He will discuss the 
autopsy report including the fact that the tissue samples do not identify with any degree of 
specificity where they were taken from which further compounds the relevance of the 
finding of gram negative rods.· He will testify that Plaintiffs' experts cannot state to any 
degree of medical certainty that the mere presence of gram negative organisms was in 
any way caused by, evidence of, or the result of a breach in sterility or cleaning protocol 
by any of the Defendants or their employees. In the opinion of Dr. Garrison, it is most 
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probable, which means to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the gram 
negative bacteria came from the bowel or urinary tract of Krystal Ballard where they 
reside and that their presence was not due to their being introduced during the procedure 
by Dr. Kerr. 
As further support for his opinions, he will discuss the significance of the fact 
that there were not any other postoperative infections reported or experienced by any 
patient who was seen at the Silk Touch Med Spa before or since this patient's procedure 
and how this is further evidence that the sterilization procedures at the facility were 
adequate to maintain a proper sterile field. As part of his testimony, he will discuss how 
the process of sterilization works and how bacteria are eliminated by various cleaning 
processes and how there is not just one approved way to maintain a sterile field. As part 
of his testimony, he may also discuss how different types of bacteria are susceptible to 
different cleaning techniques, temperature and/or antibiotics. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Garrison will discuss different types of bacteria, 
how bacteria multiply, how they react to different parts of the human body, where they 
normally live in the human body, how they are identified in various standard tests, how the 
body fights off and/or responds to and/or relies upon different types of bacteria, where 
various types of bacteria normally reside within and on the human body, how different 
kinds of gram negative bacteria organisms are known to reside within the human urinary 
tract and bowels as well as within fecal matter. 
For purposes of explaining his testimony he is expected to discuss general 
anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as 
the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. He may 
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discuss how antibiotics are able to travel throughout the body, how infection within certain 
types of tissue can be harder to treat depending on the vascularity of the area of the 
infection (such as treating localized infections in fatty tissue versus in muscle) and 
whether or not an infection is localized versus systemic. It is expected that Dr. Garrison 
will use during his testimony demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy and/or 
pictures of the patient and/or of the bacteria. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Garrison has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of forensic pathology, in· 
evaluating laboratory results, tissue samples, autopsy records, consultations with other 
physicians and otherwise managing and identification of bacterial disease processes in 
patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits, customs and practice 
experiences of other forensic pathologists who address medical situations like those 
presented in this case, and his membership and participation in various medical 
associations, including those in the state of Idaho. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing forensic pathology, his review of the 
care and treatment of the patient by Dr. Kerr and others, and his review and consideration 
of the depositions and discovery responses taken and/or disclosed to date in this case. 
His opinions are also based upon the findings of various other health care providers for 
the patient, the results and values of various laboratory and infectious disease studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
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interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Garrison's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae, 
which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
As part of his review, he has had available to review and consider the 
medical records of Silk Touch Med Spa, Dr. Brian Kerr, the records of Elmore Medical 
Center, Elmore Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
the Ada County Coroner's Office and portions of the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. 
In the event further depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be made 
available to this witness for consideration. 
Dr. Garrison reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Garrison reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with the law. The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden 
has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to 
respond. 
4) Thomas Coffman, M.D. 
125 East Idaho, Suite 203 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, causation, damages and the care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
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Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Coffman is a physician licensed 
by the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Coffman is engag~d in the 
medical specialty of infectious disease at all times relevant herein which he practices in 
Boise, Idaho. Dr. Coffman will testify as a retained expert witness at the trial and his 
testimony will address the issue of the cause of the patient's death and the fact that death 
did not result from the events of the procedure of Dr. Kerr. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Coffman's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in infectious diseases and in determining disease and infectious processes as well as the 
cause of death of patients like Krystal Ballard as part of his regular practice of medicine. 
Dr. Coffman will render opinions which refute and rebut the opinions, 
conclusions and methodology advanced by Plaintiff's experts including the opinions of 
George Nichols, M.D. and Keith Armitage, M.D. who claim that the bacterial infection 
which the patient died from was a direct result of bacteria introduced during the July 21, 
2010 procedure and who further claim that the presence of gram negative rods are proof 
of a breach in sterility by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' experts contend that the toxic 
shock and multisystem organ failure which the patient suffered from occurred as a result 
of contaminated equipment of the Defendants. Dr. Coffman, who has viewed and 
analyzed the medical and autopsy records as well as the tissue pathology slides from the 
post mortem examinati"on, will refute these opinions at trial. 
Counsel for the Defendants have requested access to blood samples, 
tissue samples and gram stained samples from the autopsy which are to be evaluated by 
Dr. Coffman and other defense experts, however, as of the writing of this disclosure, only 
the tissu·e sample slides have been produced by the Coroner's office. Arrangements are 
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still being made and the defense is still waiting to receive both the gram stained slides and 
the blood samples for further evaluation and testing. As a result, Dr. Coffman is unable 
to complete his work on this matter thus far. The opinions of Dr. Coffman which are 
known thus far are set forth herein and it is expected that additional opinions will be 
supplemented once the missing materials identified above have been made available for 
review. 
Dr. Coffman will render his opinions on a more probable than not basis 
which is to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Dr. Coffman's medical specialty, 
training, experience and knowledge enable him to render the opinions expressed in this 
document, which includes the subjects of bacteria, bacterial infections, virus, tissue 
types, gram negative versus gram positive rods, types of bacteria that embrace gram 
negative and gram positive rods, the presence and location of gram negative versus gram 
positive rods and the methodologies for reviewing each, sepsis, toxic shock, cause of 
death of patients from sepsis and toxic shock and identification and type of bacteria that 
reside and inhabit the skin, urinary tract and bowel. 
He will testify that Dr. Kerr was not required to test for spores or mold and 
that these issues have nothing to do with the case. Dr. Coffman will discuss other 
disease processes which are known to cause a rapid patient death such as occurred in 
this case. He will discuss how infections lead to sepsis and toxic shock. He will testify 
that based on his view of the tissue slides that he sees evidence of white blood cells which 
can be evidence of the reparative process following surgery. He will testify as to why he 
believeE! the blood cultures were negative as well as what the various components of a 
complete blood count mean to him as an expert in infectious disease. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will discuss where gram negative 
versus gram positive bacteria are known to reside in the body. He will testify that gram 
negative bacteria do not reside on or in the skin, but instead reside within the urinary tract 
and bowel. He will testify that even if gram negative bacteria were observed in any of the 
tissue samples that this does not rule out that the patient may well have had an ongoing 
infection in another area of her body such as her urinary tract. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will testify that he has substantial 
experience in identifying bacteria and other cellular structures and organisms in tissue 
samples obtained from the human body. He will testify that he is regularly called upon in 
his specialty in infectious disease to make such determinations and that he is capable of 
identifying the differences between a gram negative versus a gram positive bacteria on 
properly prepared slides as well as being able to further classify and define specific 
species of bacteria and other organisms and cellular structures within the human body. 
Dr. Coffman will render the opinion that based on his review of the materials 
to date that any sepsis, toxic shock or other infectious process suffered by the patient was 
not caused by or in any way due to a lack of sterility or failure to properly clean and 
maintain the equipment and/or sterile field by Dr. Kerr and/or his office staff. 
He will rebut the Plaintiffs' experts wherein they opine that there are no 
other reasons for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria 
introduced intraoperatively during the procedure ·as a result of contaminated equipment. 
In this regard, he will discuss the process of postoperative wound infections, their 
etiology, the facts of this case, the patient's presenting symptoms and treatment course, 
how wounds are evaluated to determine the presence or absence of an infection and the 
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routes by which they occur. In this regard, Dr. Coffman will explain post-operative 
wound infections and compare them to other infectious processes to the extent not 
otherwise discussed by other defense experts. 
He will testify regarding how various infections can lead to the condition 
known as sepsis. He will render the opinion that the sepsis which allegedly led to the 
septic shock and multi-system organ failure was caused by the patient's primary infection 
which was not a wound infection as alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. As part of his 
testimony, Dr. Coffman will explain the difference between a primary _versus a secondary 
infection and how it relates to the onset of sepsis in a patient like Krystal Ballard. He will 
render the opinion that the patient's sepsis and subsequent septic shock and death 
cannot be blamed on Dr. Kerr's July 21, 2010 liposuction and fat transfer procedure. 
He will testify that Dr. Nichols conclusions are not only medically flawed and 
inaccurate, but they fail to take into consideration any other diagnostic evaluation that 
might have been done to further define the etiology of the infection, and reach such a 
conclusion with proper and appropriate medical investigation. Even assuming arguendo 
as to the findings by Dr. Graben, Dr. Coffman will testify that the most that can be said 
about the presence of gram negative bacteria allegedly found in the wounds of Krystal 
Ballard at autopsy is simply that it is proof of their presence at that location - which 
location cannot be determined for certainty since the tissue samples were not labeled as 
to precise location. 
Dr. Coffman will testify that such a bacterial finding at autopsy, is by no 
means definitive proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the gram negative 
organism arrived there by or through the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr, nor 
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does such a finding at autopsy establish that the patient's death was due to any breach in 
sterility or cleaning protocol of any of the equipment, instruments or facility within the Silk 
Touch Med Spa facility. 
Dr. Coffman will testify that he would expect to see gram positive organisms 
populate the site of the operative wound if in fact the patient's sepsis was due to a skin 
infection caused by a breach in sterility as alleged. Dr. Coffman will discuss and explain 
the process by which a urinary tract infection can lead to sepsis in a patient like Krystal 
Ballard. He will testify that he has not seen a circumstance wherein a gram negative rod 
resulted in sepsis, septic shock followed by the death of the patient. It is the opinion of Dr. 
Coffman that the infectious process of Krystal Ballard, as stated in the autopsy report, 
came from bacteria from her urinary tract or bowel that developed after the procedure of 
Dr. Kerr. 
He will testify that the autopsy conducted in this case failed to identify any 
specific organism. He ~ill discuss how the evidence in this case demonstrates that both 
Dr. Graben, Dr. Kerr, the patient's husband and the patient prior to her death all describe 
a patient and an operative site which was not grossly infected at any time. He will testify 
that the absence of evidence of any gross infection at the surgical site is inconsistent with 
such an alleged infection as having caused the patient's death as Plaintiffs' experts 
contend. In this regard, Dr. Coffman will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how 
the patient presented without evidence of any fever and without evidence of any warmth, 
redness or drainage to the wound site. He will discuss and explain the significance of 
such a finding. 
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He will testify that there is nothing from the autopsy, the depositions, the 
medical records or the death of the patient which establish to any reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that there was any breach of sterility in this case and that the 
conclusions stated by the Plaintiff's experts on this topic are without a factual basis in the 
record. He will discuss the autopsy report, the photos, blood tests, tissue samples and 
gram staining. He will testify that Plaintiffs' experts cannot state to any degree of medical 
certainty that the mere presence of gram negative organisms were in any way the result 
of a breach in sterility or cleaning protocol by any of the Defendants or their employees. 
As further support for his opinions, he will discuss the significance of the fact that there 
were not any other postoperative infections reported or experienced by any patient who 
was seen at the Silk Touch Med Spa before or since this patient's procedure and how this 
is further evidence that the · sterilization procedures at the facility were adequate to 
maintain a proper sterile field. He will render the opinion that for the patient to have 
suffered from an infection due to a breach in sterility caused by any failure in the cleaning 
and sanitizing protocol of the defendants, that one would expect to see substantial 
evidence of other contaminated equipment related postoperative infections which there 
are none of in this case. 
From his unique perspective as an expert in infectious disease, as part of 
his testimony Dr. Coffman may also discuss the process of medical equipment 
sterilization and how bacteria are eliminated by various cleaning processes and how 
' . 
there is not just one approved way to maintain a sterile operative field. As part of his 
testimony, he may also discuss how different types of bacteria are susceptible to different 
cleaning techniques, temperature and/or antibiotics. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Coffman will be prepared to discuss different 
types of bacteria, how bacteria multiply, how they react to and survive in different parts of 
the human body, where they normally reside within the human body, how they are 
identified in various standard tests, how the body fights off, responds to and/or relies upon 
different types of bacteria, how different kinds of gram negative bacteria organisms are 
known to reside within the human urinary tract and bowels. 
For purposes of explaining his testimony he is expected to discuss general 
anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as 
the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. He may 
discuss how antibiotics are able to travel throughout the body, how infection within certain 
types of tissue can be harder to treat depending on the vascularity of the area of the 
infection (such as treating localized infections confined to fatty tissue versus infections 
which are able to make their way into muscle and the blood stream) and whether or not an 
infection is localized versus systemic. It is expected that Dr. Coffman will use during his 
testimony demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy and/or pictures of the patient 
and/or of the bacteria. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Coffman has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of infectious disease in 
evaluating laboratory results, tissue samples, blood tests, gram staining, operating 
laboratory equipment, autopsy records and otherwise managing and identification of 
bacterial disease processes in patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits, 
customs and practice experiences of other infectious disease specialists who address 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES - 57 
001104
medical situations like those presented in this case, and his membership and participation 
in various medical associations, including those in the state of Idaho. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing medicine in the area of infectious 
disease, his review of the care and treatment of the patient by Dr. Kerr and others, and his 
review and consideration of the depositions and discovery responses taken and/or 
disclosed to date in this case. His opinions are also based upon the findings of various 
other health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory 
and infectious disease studies and other testing and observation, treatment plans, 
consultations, referrals and recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from 
such medical services and interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. 
Kerr as described in all medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. 
Dr. Coffman's professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae, which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
As part of his review, he has had available to review and consider the 
medical records of Silk Touch Med Spa, Dr. Brian Kerr, the records of Elmore Medical 
Center, Elmore Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
the Ada County Coroner's Office and portions of the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. 
In the event further depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be made 
available to this witness for consideration. 
Dr. Coffman reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Coffman reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
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in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with the law. The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden 
has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to 
respond. 
5) Alan W. Frankie, Ph.D. 
1491 Lewis Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Subject Matter: Damages an~ economic analysis. 
Substance of Opinions and Expected Testimony: Dr. Frankie is an 
economist and retired professor from Boise State University. He has been an economist 
in Boise, Idaho, continuously from 1984 to the present. Dr. Frankie will respond to and 
rebut the opinions of the patient's economic expert, Cornelius Hofman. It is expected 
that Dr. Frankie will render opinions regarding discount rates and present value 
calculations regarding the patient's special damages claims. He may also testify 
regarding inflationary rates for annuities. 
The economic report of Plaintiff's expert, Cornelius Hofman, was not 
.produced until May 14 by means of the Plaintiffs second supplemental answers to the 
written interrogatories of the Defendants. By court order dated May 16, 2012, the 
Defendant's disclosure of experts shall be disclosed 60 days after the Plaintiff's 
disclosure of experts. It is impossible for Dr. f rankle to respond to and submit his 
· opinions on the report of Mr. Hofman at this time and should the court allow Mr. Hofman to 
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render testimony and opinions at trial over the objection of the defendants, the expert 
opinions of Dr. Frankie should not have to be disclosed until 60 days after May 14, 2013. 
As a result, Defendants reserve the right to supplement the opinions of Dr. 
Frankie. As part of his opinions, however, he is expected to address the issue of 
consumption rates and how the Plaintiff has improperly calculated the decedent's rate of 
consumption in order to inflate claims for future Jost wages. In this regard, he will address 
the permissible categories of damages eligible to the Plaintiff in this case, namely, the 
damages for wrongful death are measured by the support the Plaintiff as the surviving 
spouse would have received had the decedent lived. He will discuss the absence of any 
children in this case and that no support would have been provided by the decedent to 
support any children. 
Dr. Frankie will also discuss the improper assumptions in earnings and the 
failure to consider other income and expense offsets which exist by virtue of both the 
Plaintiff and the decedent being members of the military. By law in Idaho, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover any amounts for loss of inheritance, loss of income or loss of 
accumulation which are deemed speculative, particularly here where in the decedent was 
only 27 years of age, had been married for less than four years and had been in the 
military for such a short period of time. Dr. Frankie will discuss the speculative nature of 
said damages and how these categories relate to the improper opinions advanced by Mr. 
Hofman. 
Dr. Frankie is still in need of additional tax records for Charles Ballard and 
we currently have no tax records for Krystal Ballard despite the outstanding requests for 
these records. Dr. Frankie has further opinions he may render once being provided with 
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these missing tax records as well as being able to comment on the fact that Mr. Hofman 
did not request or utilize such records when generating his report purporting to forecast 
the current and future losses of the Plaintiff. 
Dr. Frankie will dispute the consumption rates relied upon by Mr. Hofman in 
the range of 24 %. He will further testify Plaintiff has not produced a credible projection of 
earnings or anticipated promotions/advancements for either the Plaintiff or the decedent. 
For purposes of responding to the report of Mr. Hofman, Dr. Frankie has assumed a 
similar projection of earnings for both Charles and Krystal Ballard. He will discuss the 
absence of data and reports from the Air Force as to what track, if any, the decedent and 
Charles Ballard are/were on as respects aspirations for advancement, further 
promotions, raises in income, etc. Dr. Frankie will also comment upon the fact that Mr. 
Hofman has not produced item No. 39 relied upon as a basis for some of his opinions in 
his report. 
Regarding the issue of loss of household services, Dr. Frankie will comment 
upon the lack of any documentation regarding what household services, if any, that the 
decedent provided in order to arrive at his conclusion. 
There are additional issues which have not been addressed by Mr. Hofman 
including the fact that often the decedent and the Plaintiff were not living together and if 
they were it was often only half time. Mr. Hofman's report fails to factor this key 
component of household services. 
Based on the limited information available, for the household services, one 
assumes each spouse spends 38% of the time on indivisible tasks, 31 % on tasks for 
themselves and 31 % on tasks for the other. Charles Ballard therefore only lost the 38% 
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for services that were concerned with indivisible tasks. The 31 % of tasks that the 
decedent did for the Plaintiff are therefore cancelled out because he is no longer having to 
do the 31 % for the decedent. Thus his only potential household services loss is for those 
indivisible tasks she performed which they shared equally. 
Underlying Facts and Data: Dr. Frankie will rely on his education, training 
and experience as an economist; the use and recognition of standard and accepted 
economic data, government reports, publications and authorities; his experience teaching 
economics and finance at Boise State University; his review of the economic loss report of 
the patient's experts and his assumptions and calculations for determining the annual 
costs for household services and lost wages associated with an individual like Krystal 
Ballard. 
Dr. Frankie reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
recognized economic literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure. 
Additional materials which Dr. Frankie may ultimately review and consider for forming his 
opinions is unknown and reserved based on the foregoing. The Defendants have not 
received the income tax returns or documents that reflect the earnings of the decedent 
over the past several years even though they were requested of the Plaintiff to be 
produced several months ago. As a consequence, Dr. Frankie does not have this 
material showing the decedent's actual earnings which Dr. Frankie will utilize to further 
criticize the invalidity of Mr. Hofman's opinions. In the event Dr. Frankie is deposed his 
deposition testimony is hereby incorporated into this disclosure as if set forth in full. 
Dr. Frankie reserves the right not to offer any of the opinions set forth herein 
as this disclosure is prepared with the assistance of counsel and is worded broadly in 
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order to comply with the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be 
offered at trial will depend entirely on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the 
testimony of Plaintiffs and their experts. Plaintiff has the burden of proof and only after 
that burden has been met can the defense determine what evidence and testimony will be 
needed to respond. 
Dr. Frankie's Curriculum Vitae setting forth his qualifications and prior 
publications is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
6) John Lundeby, M.D., FAGS, FAACS 
Shape Cosmetic Surgery and Med Spa, PLLC 
524 W. 6th Ave 
Spokane, Washington 99204 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Lundeby is a physician licensed in 
the state of Idaho and Washington to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Lundeby is 
board certified by the American Board of Surgery and the American Board of Cosmetic 
Surgery and has engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery at all times 
relevant herein. Dr. Lundeby will testify as a retained expert witness at the trial. Dr. 
Lundeby will testify that he has actual knowledge of the standard of health care practice 
applicable to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, 
Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr met such standard taking into account Dr. 
Kerr's background, training, experience and field of medical specialization with respect to 
the medi.cal treatment rendered to the patient. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
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of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Lundeby's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed physician, his experiences in the peer 
review process associated with his hospital staff privileges at Kootenai Medical Center 
and Northwest Specialty Hospital, both in Idaho, his experience of having performed 
hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures 
like liposuction and fat transfers were performed in Boise in 2010. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his experience in performing a large volume of 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic 
liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting procedures are performed, 
his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments needed to perform the nature 
and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his knowledge of the scope of 
practice of cosmetic providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, Idaho and elsewhere, and his 
knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform cosmetic procedures like the 
ones at issue in this case. As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby may also explain his 
training and experience at the University of Washington and the San Joaquin General 
Hospital in 1991-96. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his 
deposition and discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are 
essentially zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated 
successfully with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how this is evidence 
that the sterility procedures employed by the Defendants in this case were adequate and 
working properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
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Dr. Lundeby will testify that during his professional career he has been 
acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic procedures that are not 
plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds 
including: family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and 
gynecology. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic surgery by 
various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. Dr. Lundeby has become acquainted 
with the nature and scope of the practice of these other cosmetic procedure providers and 
the procedures utilized by them in this specialty. Dr. Lundeby will explain that the 
standard of health care practice for plastic surgeons is not the standard of health care 
practice in the same medical specialty as his and Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had proper training and 
experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal Ballard. He will testify 
that Dr. Kerr did not need any residency in general or other surgical field in order to 
competently perform the liposuction and fat grafting procedures at issue in this case. As 
part of his testimony, he is expected to discuss the fact that he provided training to Dr. 
Kerr at his office in Spokane and that Dr. Lundeby has trained many physicians in 
performing a variety of cosmetic procedures. 
He will testify that he has performed cosmetic surgery with Dr. Kerr and has 
witnessed his habits and customs in this regard in a surgical setting. Dr. Lundeby is 
expected to refer to the publications, data and documents referred to in his attached 
curriculum vitae. He is expected to discuss the numbers of similar procedures he has 
performed. Dr. Lundeby will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected or 
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approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
During Dr. Lundeby's professional career he has received and provided 
specific training in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and 
ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of 
training obtained by Dr. Kerr and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and 
experience to perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these 
types of procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was 
appropriate for the procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in 
an office based setting without general anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, 
equipment and personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local 
standard of health care practice. Dr. Lundeby will testify that he possesses the 
professional knowledge and experience that allows him to express the opinion and 
testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the fact this patient died does not establish that 
the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will testify that postoperative 
infections, if that is what occurred in this case, are not proof of a violation in operative 
technique, patient selection or breach in sterility. He will render the opinion that based 
on the record in this case that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the patient's 
death was not due to any error or omission on the part of Dr. Kerr or his practice. 
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Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 201 O through July 31, 201 O in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection proc~dures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Lundeby will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in 
regards to the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that the surgical 
technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer procedures would 
not have caused or resulted in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. Lundeby 
actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and will express all opinions 
stated herein on a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. Dr. Lundeby will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was not 
and cannot be assumed or proven to be the result of violations of the standard of ·health 
care practice. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable 
to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
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publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Lundeby will testify regarding his various publications, honors, committee and 
university appointments as set forth in his curriculum vitae which is hereby incorporated 
as if set forth in full. He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide, 
him with opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of 
cosmetic surgery including his affiliations with the American Society for Laser Medicine 
and Surgery, the American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, the National Society of 
Cosmetic Physicians, the American College of Surgeons and both the Idaho and 
American Medical Associations. 
Dr. Lundeby will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, 
Dr. Lundeby will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 
2010 ~ith respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and 
any deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if 
set forth in full. Dr. Lundeby holds the opinion and will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the 
records and deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was 
ever warranted or represented to this patient. 
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Dr. Lundeby will explain how the standard of practice applicable includes, 
as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of 
science which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. He will 
render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate post-operative instructions and 
properly followed the patient and communicated with her and her family. Dr. Lundeby 
will be prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why Dr. Kerr's 
care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all 
operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Lundeby will 
explain that post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized 
risk factor that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care 
practice by the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, 
infections can and do occur. 
To the extent he is asked to address the issue of informed consent, Dr. 
Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice and information to 
Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the procedure on July 21, 
2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. Dr. Lundeby will explain that 
the surgical care by Dr. Kerr of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the 
standard of health care practice, based on the class of health care provider to which Dr. 
Kerr belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Lundeby will explain that the 
standard of health care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged and evaluated in 
comparison with similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, 
taking into account his training, experience and field of medical specialization and not by 
a plastic surgeon which Plaintiff is unfairly trying to do in this case. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss his training and the 
certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. 
Kerr. He will discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's 
medical records and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. 
Kerr's documented conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. He 
will discuss the training classes he provides to physicians, like Dr. Kerr, regarding 
introduction to and advanced applications for liposuction procedures. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Lundeby will discuss 
and explain to the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be used to 
improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less needed 
(usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will explain 
how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site being 
treated. He will explain how before the removal procedure begins the areas from where 
the fat is being removed are injected with a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize 
bruising and discomfort to the patient. He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or 
fat is freed and ultimately removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small 
incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's facility did not need to be 
certified in order to operate in Idaho. He will testify that there is no evidence that Dr. Kerr 
went too deep and entered the abdominal cavity or otherwise impacted the bowel in any 
way so as to contaminate the operative field during the liposuction procedure. He will 
discuss the pain response a patient would be expected to give if the fascia were to have 
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been impacted, particularly where the patient did not have any sedatives on board for the 
procedure. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss and describe how the adipose tissue is prepared to 
be re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the desired area 
using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He will discuss 
how the fat is deposited above the muscle and in some instances within portions of the 
muscle. He will discuss the skill in making injections with accompanies performing fat 
transfer procedures and that it takes a degree of artistic talent, but that it is not otherwise 
generally a technically challenging or physically taxing activity for a cosmetic surgeon to 
engage in. 
He will render the opinion that the manner, method and volume by which Dr. 
Kerr re-injected the adipose tissue back into the patient was appropriate in all respects. 
He will explain how some of the fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume 
over time, which is often addressed by the physician having to re-inject more adipose 
tissue into a specific location to achieve the desired end aesthetic result. He will explain 
how the fat transfer procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was 
consistent with the local standard of practice given the nature and extent of the 
procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss the entries in Dr .. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
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that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the preoperative preparation of the patient 
utilizing Hibiclens and alcohol. He will discuss how physicians and hospitals use 
Hibiclens to cleanse patients as well as their own hands and exposed parts of their bodies 
before surgery to prevent the spread of bacteria, infection, or disea_se to patients. It is also 
used to cleanse wounds to prevent the spread of bacteria and infection. Dr. Lundeby will 
render the opinion that the skin preparation and surgical sterile technique for the surgery 
in using Hibiclens and alcohol were appropriate and good agents to use for that purpose. 
To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Lundeby will also discuss Dr. 
Kerr's operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, 
the patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at 
the post-operative visit with the patient. He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's 
post-operative discussions, instructions and directions shared with the patient and then 
ultimately the discussions he had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Lundeby will 
explain that Krystal Ballard was in good health before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and 
there is no clinical evidence that she had a urinary tract infection and that the 
pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within the standard of health care practice. 
He may discuss the fact that sometimes patients will elect not to disclose 
health conditions to the physician which may impact the timing of an elective procedure. 
The reason for this nondisclosure is generally because they are concerned that the 
physician will cancel or postpone the procedure which may be inconvenient to a patient 
due to the fact that the patient desires to achieve a recovery by a specific date. 
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Dr. Lundeby will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, and 
the amount of traction applied to free the adipose tissue. From his unique perspective as 
a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Lundeby will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction 
procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the cannula back and forth in order to 
feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the 
location of the procedure and the body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
per the medical records and deposition testimony while she was seen by Dr. Kerr. He 
will discuss the expected localized pain patients can expect to experience following a fat 
transfer procedure. To the extent it becomes relevant to aid in expressing his favorable 
opinions, Dr. Lundeby may also discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the 
patient did not have any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus 
or other signs of active drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling or 
signs of a rash or change in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his experience in caring for postoperative wounds and infections 
based on his long history of performing all manner of both cosmetic and general surgery. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked for and then 
properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and her 
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family prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point did 
the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, nor did the standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a different course of 
medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was ~one. He will testify that 
Dr. Kerr was not required to obtain any diagnostic tests before electing to perform surgery 
on July 21. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss his knowledge of gram negative rods and the fact that such 
organisms do not exist on the skin, nor would they be found on surgical instruments 
following an appropriate cleansing through an autoclave. Instead, he will discuss how 
they represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of a patient. 
He will testify that postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions 
which are not the subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are 
impossible to prevent. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will be prepared to explain the 
positioning of the patient, incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient behavior, 
choice of instruments, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient 
expectations, and patient education and counseling from the informed consent phase 
through the postoperative follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various 
anatomical illustrations as well as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the 
procedures at issue including those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and 
supplies produced to date. 
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In connection with describing his opinions and the basis therefore, Dr. 
Lundeby may be called upon to explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally invasive 
technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will explain how 
the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as tumescent fluid which 
numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also temporarily expands 
the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. With the use of 
exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then inserted into the 
body through small incisions. He will explain how by way of using a resonating high 
ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while leaving blood 
vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix with the 
tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using gentle suction. After the 
surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin retraction, 
·smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to traditional liposuction. 
Dr. Lundeby may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area, the 
instructions given to the patient, he will discuss the cardinal signs of an infection and how 
Dr. Kerr's records and deposition evidence that he specifically and appropriately 
evaluated and questioned the patient and then documented in his records regarding 
these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the amount of 
time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that there was nothing usual or out 
of character regarding the amount of time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on 
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July 21, 2010. He will testify that the records and deposition testimony document that Dr. 
Kerr is a caring, hands on physician who goes to great lengths to monitor and be available 
for his patients. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain the adequacy of the postoperative evaluation Dr. 
Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal Ballard and assessing whether 
there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical sites, including absence of any 
abnormal odor or other evidence or suggestion of infection of any of the surgical sites. 
He will render the opinion that in order for Dr. Kerr to have infected the patient in some 
manner at the time the surgery was performed on July 21, that there would have to have 
been evidence of infection at the location of the surgery by the time of the autopsy or at 
Elmore Medical Center. He will testify that the abse.nce of any evidence of infection at 
the injection or liposuction sites is proof to Dr. Lundeby that the patient was not infected 
during the surgery and that her death is due to some other cause. 
He will discuss his review of the autopsy record and the patient's 
subsequent treatment records. By way of example, Dr. Lundeby is expected to discuss 
the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in her urine. 
Based on his experience in general surgery, he will render the opinion that this laboratory 
finding is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious process located 
within the patient's bladder or urinary tract. He will explain how the bladder is also an 
area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist in the face of an 
infection. He will discuss the concept of how infections, like a urinary tract infection, can 
be spread hematogenously or via the blood stream. 
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Dr. Lundeby will also comment upon the significance from his perspective 
regarding how the patient did not present to Elmore Medical Center with any fever, but 
had a WBC count of 14.7. He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including 
surgery, stress and dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to 
address the patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any 
microscopic examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in 
the positive UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. He is also 
expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how this can be signs of 
dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were not functioning 
properly. 
Dr. Lundeby will discuss how the patient presented to Elmore Medical 
Center with a blood gas pH of 6.99 and how this is· dangerously low and provides strong 
evidence that the patient was ext~emely ill by that point and that she needlessly delayed 
seeking _medical attention despite the urging and instruction of Dr. Kerr and his staff. He 
will testify that the patient's decision to delay returning for further care to either Dr. Kerr or 
the ER after July 23 is the reason she died and that if she had returned sooner that she 
more likely than not would have been saved. He will discuss how the cost of vanity and 
the patient's apparent unrelenting desire for secrecy resulted in her own tragic demise. 
He will discuss with the jury that it is not the physicians fault when the patient fails to do as 
they are instructed and return when their condition worsened as it clearly did long before 
this patient ultimately elected to seek medical help and was transported critically ill to 
Elmore Medical Center. 
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Dr. Lundeby will address the vague and confusing nature of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of acute 
inflammatory cells within tissue 'from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which 
surgical sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the 
tissue sections where harvested from on the patient. In this regard, Dr. Lundeby will 
discuss how there are commonly a variety of bacteria located near the surface normally of 
wound sites which is not evidence of an infection, but that the more important inquiry 
which would be more indicative of an infection is whether the gram negative rods were 
located within the deeper issues under the wound sites which cannot be determined from 
the autopsy documents in this case. 
He will discuss the normal wound biology is to see evidence of bacteria on 
the surface. Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion, more likely than not, that the gram 
negative bacterial rods were introduced into the patient's surgical site sometime after Dr. 
Kerr's surgical procedure rather than being introduced during the procedure. Dr. 
Lundeby will render the opinion that based on his experience that gram negative rods do 
not result in the sudden and unexpected patient death such as occurred in this case. He 
will discuss the fact that the autopsy records eliminate embolism as a cause of death for 
this patient. Despite this finding at autopsy, he will testify that it would be extremely 
uncommon {outside of necrotizing fasciitis which attacks the soft tissue and the fascia or 
tissue covering the muscle and can cause rapid death) for an alleged soft tissue infection 
to spread, become septic and kill a patient within the limited time frame at issue in this 
case. In this regard, he will discuss how sepsis is a presumptive clinical diagnosis which 
is compounded in this case due to the absence of any positive blood cultures. Dr. 
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Lundeby is expected to offer testimony on several aspects of the autopsy report of Dr. 
Groben, starting with sepsis with probable toxic shock syndrome of unknown etiology and 
manner of death natural. His inspection of the incisions through the surgical sites reveal 
reparative changes, but no gross evidence of an infectious process. No pockets of pus or 
discolored fluid are seen. No evidence of erythema around the incisions sites. 
Subcutaneous fat and muscle of the abdominal wall, lower back and buttocks show no 
areas of necrosis or discoloration associated with reparative changes and no pockets of 
discolored fluid or pus. These autopsy findings are consistent with and support his 
opinion that bacteria were just introduced during the procedure of Dr. Kerr. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncompliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging. position the patient elected to place herself and her health 
care provider in by erroneously reporting to her husband that she had simply fallen and 
injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain rather than admit she 
had cosmetic surgery performed. 
In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
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essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability to provide her with care and 
to make _decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Lundeby will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique 
and that one can do everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria 
can become introduced into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods 
claimed to have been identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. He will 
discuss the patient's admission that she was not taking the narcotic pain medication 
Norco and was instead taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not appear to be 
providing the patient with adequate pain control. 
Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and 
edema observed on July 23 was consistent with what he would expect to see at that point 
postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to 
obtain a urinalysis or complete blood count on the patient on July 23. Dr. Lundeby will 
discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which are not 
required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order 
to perform such procedures. Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr was not 
required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his facility 
be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the MACH or AAAASF or 
any governmental agency. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will explain how the tumescent 
lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain how the Vaser 
procedure is done with the device in place under the skin without direct visualization. He 
will discuss how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat from the patient's 
anterio_r abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of fat from the 
patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this case was utilized 
for less than eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the nature of the 
procedure. 
As it relates to r~butting the testimony of the Plaintiff's experts, Dr. Lundeby 
will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and 
that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection phase of the 
procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for the same 
needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. He 
will discuss the adequacy of the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient 
including the content of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case . 
. He will discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis 
and fat injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the 
patient both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they 
fail to comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will 
develop complications. 
Dr. Lundeby will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of 
the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, he will testify 
that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the risks normally 
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attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by the patient was 
valid in all respects. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. 
Kerr's preoperative clinical examination including evaluation of the regions to be 
lipo-contoured including review for hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, 
the quality of the skin and its elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location 
of fat deposits. He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr did anything to 
cause the patient's death. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby may also address and explain the 
weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 
25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 
she weighed 180 pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these 
changes in weight. He will discuss the concept of third spacing of fluid or leaking of fluid 
out of cellular structures due to the body's global inflammatory response. He will discuss 
this in connection with efforts which were made to maintain fluid volume for the patient 
once she presented at the hospital. He will testify that a weight gain of 50 pounds due to 
efforts to maintain fluid volume in the face of the patient's condition would not be 
unexpected. 
He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore Medical 
Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks and 
abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, warmth 
or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours after 
admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at St. Alphonsus on 
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July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very high and proof 
of fluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on causation, Dr. Lundeby will 
explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of the possible reasons for 
the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Lundeby will testify th~t the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center 
and the clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection that developed after the 
procedure of July 21, 201 O and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they were more likely to come from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or 
her intestinal tract and that they were not introduced during his surgical procedure. As 
part of his testimony, it is expected that Dr. Lundeby will explain pertinent anatomy, 
infectious processes, pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram 
negative rods, types of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were 
negative for growth in this case, antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal 
Ballard regarding that drugs would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Lundeby will 
testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not present with any increased risk 
· for infection that would have raised any concern about her undergoing the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's procedure on July 21, 2010,. 
there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal Ballard. 
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Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Lundeby has relied upon his own unique training and experience 
as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic and general surgery 
in Spokane, Washington in treating, diagnosing, managing and caring for elective 
procedure patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of 
other cosmetic surgeons and care providers and the way they perform the procedures at 
issue in this case, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho standard of practice applicable to Dr. 
Kerr in 201 O and his knowledge that it is within Dr. Kerr's specialty and capability to 
perform the procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, and his 
membership and participation in various medical associations and organizations as set 
forth herein. The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the 
care and treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the 
course of his career in medicine. 
Dr. Lundeby's opinions are also based upon the findings of various other 
health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Lundeby's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
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As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered. and reviewed the depositions of Dr. Kerr. He has also reviewed and 
considered Dr. Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore 
Ambulance Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County 
Coroner's Office and the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further 
depositions or medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Lundeby reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Lundeby reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial 
will depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of 
the Plaintiff and his experts .. 
7) Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. 
Palouse Surgeons 
2400 West A Street Suite 1 O 1 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1778 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, standards of health care practice, causation, 
and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts known and opinions held: Dr. Stiller is a physician 
licensed in the state of Idaho to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Stiller is board 
certified in both general and cosmetic surgery and has engaged in the medical specialty 
of cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Stiller will testify as a retained expert 
witness at the trial. Dr. Stiller will testify that he has actual knowledge of the standard of 
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health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of 
cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion, and based on his own 
unique background, that Dr. Kerr met such standard taking into account Dr. Kerr's 
background, training, experience and field of medical specialization with respect to any 
and all medical services rendered to the patient. Dr. Stiller actually holds the opinions 
expressed in this document and will express all opinions stated herein on a more 
probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
Dr. Stiller will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for ~r. 
Stiller's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience in 
performing general and cosmetic surgical procedures as a licensed physician, his 
experiences in the peer review process associated with his hospital staff privileges in 
Idaho, his experience of having performed hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his 
knowledge of how cosmetic procedures like liposuction and fat transfers are performed, 
including how they were performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in performing a large 
volume of liposuction and fat transfer procedures. 
Dr. Stiller will explain his knowledge of how the Vaser ultrasonic liposuction 
procedure is performed, his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments 
needed to perform the nature and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his 
knowledge of the scope of practice of cosmetic surgery providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, 
Idaho and elsewhere, his knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform 
cosmetic procedures like the ones at issue in this case and his knowledge of the manner 
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and method by which surgical equipment and surgical procedure facilities are maintained 
in a sterile fashion. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller may also explain his training and 
experience at the Graduate Hospital in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during his residency in 
general surgery 1997-2001 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the procedures 
he performed, was taught and observed, including his role as chief resident. He will 
explain the same matters for his experience in his own surgical facility which he currently 
operates at Palouse Surgeons in both Pullman, Washington and Moscow, Idaho. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at his 
own facility in Moscow, Idaho for achieving and maintaining sterile operating conditions 
and the disinfection of instruments and equipment and maintaining a sterile operative 
field and that the similar actions and efforts undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been 
described for the procedure on Krystal .Ballard in this case were used and exceeded in his 
opinion. Dr. Stiller will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his 
deposition and discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are 
essentially nil. 
He will comment upon how this is evidence that the sterility procedures 
employed by the Defendants in this case were appropriate and working properly at the 
time of the surgery at issue in this case. Dr. Stiller will testify that during his professional 
career ~e has been acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic 
procedures that are not plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different 
medical backgrounds. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic 
surgery by various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. 
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He may also discuss his various publications and presentations on 
cosmetic surgery including liposuction and fat transfers as set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae. Dr. Stiller will discuss how he has become acquainted with the nature 
and scope of practice he and other cosmetic surgical procedure providers utilize as well 
as the procedures utilized by them in this specialty, including the procedures utilized for 
maintaining a sterile field and how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment 
and instruments utilized for cosmetic surgical procedures including the procedures at 
issue in this case. He will testify that there is more than one way to achieve proper 
sterilization. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that the standard of health care practice for a plastic 
surgeon is not the same standard of health care practice for someone in the same 
medical specialty as his and Dr. Kerr. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had 
proper training and experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal 
Ballard. As part of his testimony, he is expected to refer to the publications, data and 
documents that have been produced in discovery on this subject and explain the numbers 
of similar procedures he has performed. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard of 
health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected or 
approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. During 
Dr. Stiller's professional career he has received specific training in various lipolysis 
procedures including traditional, laser assisted and ultrasonic assisted lipolysis. He will 
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testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of training obtained by Dr. Kerr and 
that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform the 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. 
He will testify that it was appropriate for the procedures at issue to be 
performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based setting without general 
anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, equipment and personnel to do these 
procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health care practice. Dr. 
Stiller will testify that he possesses the professional knowledge and experience that 
allows him to express the opinion and testimony described in this document. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that the fact this patient experienced a post-operative 
complication like the one alleged in this case which resulted in a patient death does not 
establish that the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will testify that 
postoperative infections are not proof of a violation. He will render the opinion that the 
patient's death was not due to any error or omission on Dr. Kerr's part or the part of 
anyone associated with his practice. He will discuss his own sterilization techniques, 
training and experience in this area which will help support his opinion that Dr. Kerr 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments. and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. 
Dr. Stiller will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
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how if there had been a failure to adequately steriliz~ the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Stiller will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in regards to 
the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures performed on 
Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that gram negative bacteria do not cause 
sepsis or toxic shock as alleged in this case. As part of his testimony, he will discuss the 
urinalysis obtained at Elmore Medical Center which revealed plus 3 bacteria, white and 
red blood cells, elevated white blood cell count with a left differential shift and ketones. As 
part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that the surgical technique 
employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer procedures did not cause or 
result in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. Stiller will testify regarding the 
specific issues set forth in this disclosure, but he will also testify globally that nothing Dr. 
Kerr elected to do or not do with respect to the medical services provided to Krystal 
Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the applicable local standard of health care practice 
which in turn caused or contributed to any damages or injuries to the patient. 
Dr. Stiller will be rendering his testimony based on his own unique 
perspective as a general and cosmetic surgeon and the training and practice experience 
he has received. Dr. Stiller will testify that the unfortunate death of Krystal Ballard was 
not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the standard of health care 
practice. Dr. Stiller will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable to 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
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established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any speciatty·board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Stiller will testify regarding his various publications, honors and university 
appointments at the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians and the University of 
Washington School of Medicine WWAMI program as set forth in his curriculum vitae 
which is hereby incorporated as if set forth in full. 
He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide him 
with opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of cosmetic 
surgery including his affiliations with the American College of Surgeons, American 
Academy of Cosmetic Surgery and the Idaho Medical Association. He will discuss what 
these organizations offer their members and the opportunities to associate with 
colleagues and obtain continuing education in this emerging field. 
Dr. Stiller will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by physicians engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller 
will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 2010 with 
respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and any 
deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if set 
forth in full. Dr. Stiller holds the opinion that compliance with the standard of practice 
does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and compliance is intended to 
minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and unintended results. 
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He will explain that the standard of healthcare practice for physicians 
engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the records and 
deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was ever 
warranted or represented to this patient. Dr. Stiller will explain how the standard of 
practice applicable includes, as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as 
opposed to the application of science which may vary depending on the patient and care 
circumstances. He will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate 
post-operative instructions and properly followed the patient and communicated with her 
and her family. Dr. Stiller will testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why 
Dr. Kerr's care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice to which he is 
held. 
As with all operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility 
and Dr. Stiller will discuss that post-operative infections, if they should develop, are an 
accepted and recognized risk factor that are usually not due to inappropriate care or 
violations of the standard of health care practice by the physician and that under the best 
of circumstances and medical care, infections can and do occur even under the best of 
care conditions. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice 
and information to Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. 
Dr. Stiller will explain that everything undertaken by Dr. Kerr with regard to 
his care and treatment of Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the 
standard of health care practice typically provided, based on the class of health care 
providc::r to which Dr. Kerr belonged and in which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Stiller 
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will explain that the standard of health care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged 
and evaluat~d in comparison with similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same 
class as himself, taking into account his training, experience and field of medical 
specialization and not by a plastic surgeon. 
In order to support his opinions, Dr. Stiller is expected to discuss the training 
he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic 
surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. Kerr. He will 
discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's medical records 
and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. Kerr's documented 
conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Stiller will discuss and explain to 
the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be used to improve the 
appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less needed (usually the 
thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will discuss his research 
and publications on this topic. He will explain how typically, the transferred fat results in 
an increase in volume of the body site being treated. He will explain how before the 
removal procedure begins the areas from where the fat is being removed are injected with 
a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize bruising and discomfort to the patient. 
He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or fat is freed and ultimately 
removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss and describe how the adipos~ tissue is then prepared to be 
re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the desired area 
using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. With use of 
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demonstrative exhibits and various medical instruments, he will explain both the lipo and 
fat injection process to the jury. He will render the opinion that the manner, method and 
volume by which Dr. Kerr re-injected the adipose tissue back into the patient was 
appropriate in all respects. 
Dr. Stiller will explain how some of the fat that is transferred often does not 
maintain its volume over time, which is often addressed by the physician having to 
re-inject more adipose tissue into a specific location to achieve the desired end aesthetic 
result. He will explain how the fat transfer procedure was done using a local anesthetic 
and that this was consistent with the local standard of practice given the nature and extent 
of the procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will discuss the entries in Dr. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Stiller will also discuss Dr. Kerr's 
operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, the 
patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at the 
post-operative visit with the patient. 
He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's post-operative discussions, 
instructions and directions shared with the patient and then ultimately the discussions he 
had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Stiller will explain that Krystal Ballard was in 
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good health before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and there is no clinical evidence that 
she had a urinary tract infection and that the pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within 
the standard of health care practice. He will render the opinion that the patient 
developed an infectious process in her urinary tract after the procedures by Dr. Kerr which 
had nothing to do with the surgery or the sterilization procedures used by the Defendants 
in this case. In order to further illustrate his testimony to the jury, Dr. Stiller will discuss the 
technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction procedure including how the local anesthetic is 
given, how the tumescent anesthetic is prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose 
tissue, how the Vaser device operates to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the 
cannulas are placed, the amount of energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired 
impact on the adipose tissue, and the amount of traction applied to free ·the adipose 
tissue. 
From his unique perspective as both a general and cosmetic surgeon, Dr. 
Stiller will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction procedure and the laborious aspect 
of moving the cannula back and forth in order to feather the tissue and achieve the 
desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the location of the procedure and the 
body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. In the process of providing his opinions 
that the care by Dr. Kerr was appropriate, Dr. Stiller will address the method by which the 
adipose tissue harvested was drained and prepared for re-injection. He will also discuss 
how the instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each 
procedure, he will discuss these pieces of equipment as well as their various attachments 
and describe that medical equipment which is new versus that which must be re-sterilized 
for reuse between patients and/or procedures. 
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Dr. Stiller will discuss the appropriate nature of the pre and post-operative 
antibiotics administered by Dr. Kerr to the patient and explain why they were given not for 
an infection, but rather as a prophylaxis against infection. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion 
that the evidence in this case establishes that the patient never appeared infected or 
septic while being treated by Dr. Kerr. He will discuss the localized pain patients can 
expect to experience following a fat transfer procedure into the buttocks region. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did 
not demonstrate having any fever or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of 
pus or other signs of active drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling 
or signs of a rash or change in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor 
when she was seen by Dr. Kerr and when she was seen at Elmore Medical Center the 
day before her death. 
Dr. Stiller will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked for 
and then properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during his 
postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and her 
husband prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point 
did the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, toxic shock or sepsis, nor did the 
standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a 
different course of medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. 
Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, Dr. Stiller will 
discuss his knowledge of various bacteria including gram negative rods and the fact that 
such organisms do not exist on or in the skin, nor would they be found on surgical 
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instruments in the event of a breach in sterility. Instead, he will discuss how they 
represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of a patient. 
He will testify that Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform 
the surgeries in question, that Dr. Kerr's medical records contain an adequate description 
of the care rendered and the discussions with the patient, that Dr. Kerr implemented 
appropriate sterility techniques and conditions for surgery and that he used correct 
solutions for cleaning and disinfecting instruments and assuring that operative conditions 
were adequately sterile to guard against the risk of infection. He will testify that 
postoperative infectiC?ns can and do occur even under ideal conditions which are not the 
subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are impossible to 
prevent. 
As part of his testimony and in order to expand upon his background and 
experience in cosmetic surgery, Dr. Stiller will discuss how the field of laser lipotysis with 
the use of tumescent anesthesia has developed in recent years. This may include 
testimony addressing that when considering different types of the body to undergo 
lipolysis that each area has its own unique geography and involves a degree of physician 
judgment as to how much material to remove and/or re-inject into each location. As part 
of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will be prepared to explain the positioning of the patient, 
incision sites for various injections and instruments, patient selection, choice of 
instrument sizes and positioning, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of 
patient expectations, and patient education and counseling from the informed consent 
phase through the postoperative follow up period. 
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He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical illustrations as well as· 
various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at issue including those 
depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies produced to date. As part 
of his explanation of how the Vaser Lipo process works, he will describe it as a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
With the use of exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then 
inserted into the body through small incisions. 
He will explain how by way of using a resonating high ultrasonic frequency, 
the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while leaving blood vessels, nerves and 
connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix with the tumescent fluid, which is 
then removed from the body using gentle suction. After the surgery, patients are 
prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin retraction, smoother results 
with minimal recovery time compared to traditional liposuction which requires far greater 
traction and trauma to the surrounding anatomical structures. 
Dr. Stiller may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area and 
the instructions given to the patient. He will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's records 
and deposition testimony evidence that he appropriately evaluated and questioned the 
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patient and then documented in his records these issues on each encounter he had with 
the patient. 
He will discuss the amount of time it takes to perform the procedures in 
question and that there was nothing usual or out of character regarding the amount of 
time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on July 21, 2010. Dr. Stiller will explain the 
adequacy of the postoperative evaluation Dr. Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for 
evaluating Krystal Ballard and assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of 
infection of the surgical sites, including absence of any abnormal odor or other evidence 
or suggestion of infection of any of the surgical sites. He will discuss his review and 
comments of the autopsy record and the patient's subsequent treatment records. He will 
discuss the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center. 
He will render the opinion that the laboratory data at Elmore Medical Center 
is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious process located within 
the patient's bladder which occurred postoperatively and not located within the operative 
area of Dr. Kerr. He will explain how gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate 
and exist in the urinary tract. Dr. Stiller will also comment upon the significance from his 
perspective regarding how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC 
count of 14.7. He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery, 
stress and dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address 
the patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any microscopic 
examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in the positive 
UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. 
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He is also expected to discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how 
this can be signs of dehydration as well as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were 
not functioning properly. Dr. Stiller will address the confusing aspect of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist referred to an increase in the amount of acute inflammatory 
cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which surgical sites he is 
referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the tissue sections 
where actually harvested from the patient. · Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that the gram 
negative rods were introduced into the patient's surgical site(s) sometime after Dr. Kerr's 
surgical procedure rather than being introduced during the procedure and that their 
introduction had nothing to do with the cleanliness and/or sterility of Dr. Kerr's facility and 
equipment. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
physician that the patient repeatedly_ concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncompliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging position the patient placed herself in despite the advice and 
instruction of her health care provider by erroneously reporting to her husband that she 
had simply fallen and injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain 
rather than admit she had cosmetic surgery and needed help monitoring her care and 
condition. 
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In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability. to provide her with care and 
to make decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that Dr. Kerr and his employees followed the 
appropriate sterile technique in regards to the procedure performed on Krystal Ballard. 
He will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do 
everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced 
into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods claimed to have been 
identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. Dr. Stiller will render the 
opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and edema observed on July 23 was 
consistent with what he would expect to see at that point postoperatively. 
He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to obtain 
a complete blood count on the patient on July 23 in order to determine what her white 
count was at that time. Dr. Stiller will discuss his background, training and experience in 
the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique in his practice as further 
support for his opinions as to the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's sterile technique. Dr. Stiller will 
discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which are not 
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required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required in order 
to perform such procedures. Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr was not 
required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his facility 
be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the AAACH or AMASF or 
any governmental agency. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's 
procedure room was properly prepared for surgery and to protect and preserve an 
appropriate sterile field and that he did not require additional rooms or locations to store 
and clean equipment. He will discuss the autoclave at issue, how it operates and how it 
helps Dr. Kerr maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will discuss how an 
autoclave operates, how it is loaded, what is done to maintain an autoclave, how it is 
tested and that Dr. Kerr was not required to do more with his autoclave that he has 
described in this case. 
Dr. Stiller will describe the areas around the patient which are considered 
part of the sterile field depending on the nature and type of procedure at issue. With 
respect to the lipo procedure in this case, he will explain how the tumescent lidocaine is 
mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain how the Vaser procedure is 
done with the device in place under the skin without direct visualization. He will discuss 
how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat from the patient's anterior 
abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 cc of fat from the patient's 
left lateral waist flank. He will testify that these were not excessive amounts and may 
comment upon the findings set forth at autopsy and in the autopsy photos demonstrating 
the areas of adipose tissue within the patient. 
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Dr. Stiller will discuss how the Vaser in this case was utilized for less than 
eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the nature of the procedure. As it 
relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiff's experts, he will explain how the fat was 
injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and that there were no incisions 
made into the patient during the injection phase of the procedure. He will testify that it 
was a proper and acceptable technique for the same needles to be used to inject the fat 
into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. Dr. Stiller will discuss the adequacy of 
the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient including the content of the 
informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. He will discuss the risk of 
infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis and fat injection procedure. 
As part of his testimony, and to. the extent it is an issue at trial, Dr. Stiller will discuss how 
the consent form discusses with the patient both pre and post treatment instructions and 
how it warns the patient that if they fail to comply with these instructions may increase the 
possibility that the patient will develop complications. He may also discuss his 
experiences in discussing risks and benefits with patients and the fact that certain 
patients fail to follow the advice and instructions and end up with an unexpected and/or 
dis~atisfactory result. 
Dr. Stiller will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of the 
expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, to the extent not 
covered by other witnesses, he will testify that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the 
nature and the extent of the risks normally attendant to the procedure in question such 
that the giving of consent by the patient was valid in all respects. As part of his 
testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's preoperative clinical 
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examination including evaluation of the regions to be lipo-contoured including review for 
hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, the quality of the skin and its 
elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location of fat deposits. 
He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiffs experts that Dr. Kerr improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr improperly 
sterilized his equipment or that Dr. Kerr did anything to cause the patient's death. Based 
on his own unique surgical perspective, Dr. Stiller may also address and explain the 
significant documented weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 201 O she weighed 
135 pounds. On July 25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At 
autopsy on July 26, 2010 she weighed 180 pounds. He will discuss the medical reasons 
and significance of these changes in weight as it relates to the issues of fluid overload and 
organ failure. 
He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore Medical 
Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks and 
abd(?men of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, warmth 
or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours after 
admission. He may also comment upon the findings at autopsy which documented no 
frank evidence of an infection as aptly depicted in the autopsy photos. He may further 
address and explain to the jury how at Elmore Medical Center the patient's cardiac 
ejection fraction was noted to be only 17% which is poor. In addition, later at St. 
Alphonsus on July 25, 2010, the patient's central venous pressure was measured at 20 
which is very high and proof of fluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on 
causation, Dr. Stiller will explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of 
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the causes for the death of Krystal Ballard all of which have nothing to do with the care 
and treatment rendered by Dr. Kerr. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center and 
the clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection the developed after his 
procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they more likely than not came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or 
her intestinal tract and were not introduced during Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure. As part 
of his testimony, it is expected that Dr. Stiller will discuss and explain pertinent anatomy, 
infectious processes, pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram 
negative rods, types of bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were 
negative for growth, antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard 
regarding that drugs would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
It should be noted that in response to the Plaintiffs counsel's concern about 
the defense experts, Dr. Stiller will testify such that he avoids the presentation of needless 
cumulative testimony by tailoring his responses such as to avoid excessive duplication of 
other defense experts. As part of his testimony, Dr. Stiller may be called upon to discuss 
the patient's anatomy including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, 
organs as well as the body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and 
antibiotics. This may include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits 
depicting general anatomy and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment 
itself. 
Dr. Stiller will testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not 
' 
present with any increased risk for infection that would have raised any concern about her 
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undergoing the procedures on July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's 
procedure on July 21, 2010, there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal 
Ballard. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Stiller has relied upon his own unique training and experience as 
a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of general and cosmetic surgery in 
Moscow, Idaho in consenting, diagnosing, treating, operating, managing, caring for and 
following up with patients like Krystal Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices 
of other cosmetic surgeons and care providers, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho 
standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 2010 and his knowledge that it is within Dr. 
Kerr's specialty and capability to perform the procedures in question as part of his 
practice of medicine (regardless of the fact that Dr. Kerr also happens to be board 
certified in anesthesia), and his membership and participation in various medical 
associations and organizations as set forth herein. 
The data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, 
training, skill, experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the 
care and treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the 
course of his career in medicine. Dr. Stiller's opinions are also based upon the findings 
of various other health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various 
laboratory studies and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, 
referrals and recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical 
services and interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as 
described in all medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. 
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Stiller's professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached 
curriculum vitae which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including Dr. Kerr's, 
employees of Silk Touch, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered Dr. 
Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance 
Service, Life Flight, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's 
Office and the Plaintiffs expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or 
medical records are produced, they will also be considered. 
Dr. Stiller reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
co_ntinues. He reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth in this 
disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded broadly in 
order to comply with rule 26{b)(4}. The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial will 
depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. 
DATED this 31 51 day of May, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Je ah . Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
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following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
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Scott McKay 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
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Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered, w/ attachments 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, w/o attachments 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
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Name: Brian C Kerr 
Mailing Address: 252 W. Meadow Ridge, Eagle ID, 83616 
Office Phone: (208) 939-8442 
Foreign Language: Fluent in Spanish 
EDUCATION: 
College: 
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 
Degree: B.S. Zoology 1984 
Medical School: 
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 
Degree: Doctor of M~dicine 1988 
POSTGRADUATE TRAINING 
Internship: Transitional Residency 198.8-89 
Deaconess Medical Center, Spokane, WA 
Residency: Anesthesia 




St. Gabriel Hospital, New Prague, MN 1989-90 
Lake City Hospital, Lake City, MN 1990-91 
Anesthesia: Staff Anesthesiologist 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 1992-2008 
Aesthetics: 
Medical Director Silk Touch MedSpa 1999-present 
Lipolysis Surgeon 2007- present 
CERTIFICATION AND LICENSURE 
Basic Life Support 
· Advanced Cardiac Life Support 
American Board of Anesthesia 




7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
(901) 752-4999 
Gregory N. Laur~nce, M.D .. 
Professional Experience 
Medical Director, Complete Medical Care Germantown & Germantown Aesthetics Surgery Center 
Hospital Laparotomy privileges . . 
Qualified in Japaroscopic procedures 
Obstetrical Family-centered care 
Capable abdominal and vascular ultrasound 
Training, experience, and proven ability in office cosmetic surgery, facial and body 
American Academy of Family 
Diplomat 1995-2000 
Board Fellow 2000-present 
Certification Physicians 
8880 Ward Parkway 
Kansas City, Missouri 64114-2797 
September 1995-present 
American Hoard of Laser Surgery 
2009 - present 
Diplomat · · . 
Medical Tennessee #2!?017-lssued 10/26/93 
Licensure State of Tennessee Division of Health 
Related Boards. Expires 6/30/2013 ' 
Idaho, pending licensure 
Utah, pending licensure 
Fellow 
Medical May2008 American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Education Surgery 
July 1995-June 1996 The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
Fellowship in Advanced Women'$ Health 
Director, Charles E. Cquch, M.D., 
FACOG 
July 1992-:June 1995 The University of Teni:iessee, Memphis 
UT/Sai!'lt Francis Family Practice 
Residency Program Memphis, TN 
August 1988-June 1992 University of Texas at Houston Medical 
School, Houston, Texas-M.D. Degree 
June 1992 
Previous January 1987-May 1_987 University of Houston, Houston, Texas 
Education Graduate Studies 
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September 1981-May 1986 Baylor University 
Waco, Texas 
B.S. Deoree in Bioloav 
American Institute of Ultrasound in 
Society Medicine (AIUM) 1994-present 
Memberships 
Association of American Physicians 
and Surgery 1999-present 
American Academy of Family 
Physicians {AAFP) 1992-present 
American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Surgeons 2003-present 
National Society of Cosmetic 
Physicians 2011-present 
American.Congress of Phlebology 
2009-present . 
Hospital Baptist Memorial Hospital - East, 
Appointments Department of Family Medicine 
Chairman October 1999 - 2000 
Baptist Memorial Hospital - East, 
Medical Executive Committee, 2000 
Tenet/St. Francis Hospital, 
Maternal/Fetal Well-Being Committee 
1998-2000 
Methodist Hospital, FP/08 Joint 
Practice Committee 1998 -2000 
University The University of Tennessee, 
App_ointments Memphis 
Department of Family Medicine 
Clinical Instructor July 1. 1995-June 
30, 1996 
Associate Clinical Professor Jt,Jly 1, 
1996-present 
Hospital Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Appointments Saint Francis Hospital Methodist Hospital 
5959 Park Avenue 1265 Union Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38119 Memphis, TN 38104 
August 7, 1995-present December 1, 1996-2003 
Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Baptist Memorial Hospital Delta Medical Center 
899 Madison Avenue 3000 Getwell Road · 
Memphis, TN 38146 Memphis, TN 38118 
October 1996-present September 12, 1996-present 
(901 ) 369-8517; fax 369·8503 






Private Practice (August 1996-1999) 
Peabody Healthcare 
6005 Park Avenue Suite 4248 
Memphis, TN 38119 
Private Practice (August 1999-2002) 
Laurence Family Practice & Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2002-2008) 
Germantown Family Practice & 
Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (2003-present) 
Germantown Aesthetics, LP 
7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August ~008-
present) 
Complete Medical Care Germantown 
7 485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2009-
present) 
The Vein Institute 
7 485 Poplar Pike · 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Laurence, Gregory; Orientale, 
Eugene, Jr., "Colorectal Cancer: 
Screening Diagnosis and 
Management,• Manual of Family 
Practice; ed.: Robert B. Taylor, 
publisher: Little Brown. 1996. 
Laurence, Gregory, ijObstetrical 
Privileging in Memphis," Tennessee 
Family Physician; ed.: J. Lou Manning, 
pg 8-9, winter 1999. 
Laurence, Gregory, "MemoryGel TM 
Breast Implant Post-Approval Study," 
IRB Company, Inc; ed.: Clinical Study. 
5271 Mentor PAS 
June 30 - July 3, 2001 
July10 -July 12, 2002 
June 2003 
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Subfascial Breast Augmentation 
Internal Mastopexy 
J. Dan Metcalf, MD (Oklahoma City, OK) 
Transumbilical Breast Augmentaion 
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June 2004 I Robert Shumway, ly'ID (LaJolla, CA) 
t 
June2003 ! Biplanar Breast Augment~tion 
I 




Transumbilical Breast Augmentation 




Adam Baker, M.D. 
References 2120 Merchants Row Ste 2 
Germantown, TN 38138 




Susan Nelson, M.D. 
2032 Satinwood 
Memphis, TN 38119 
(901) 758-8287 
William Macmillan Rodney, M.D. 
Chairman University of Tennessee 
Department of Family Medicine, 1989-
1997 l 
6575 Black Thorn Cove 




Malpractice State Volunteer Mutual Insurance 
Insurance Company 
Carrier 
1 M/3M coverage 8/5/96 to present 
10'f Westpark Drive, Suite 300, P.O. 
Box 1065 J 
Brentwood, Tennessee 37024-1065 
(615) 377-1999 or (800) 342-2239; fax 
(615) 377-9192 
DEA Certificate BL3847083, exp 3/31/2014 
University of Tennessee Community 
Honors Physicians Award for teaching medical 
students 2003 · 
"Physician Champion" for Baptist 
Memorial Hospital Celebrate Nursing 
I 
Germantown News Reader's Choice 
Award "Best Physician" - 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004,' 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009,2010,2011 
Plastic Surgery. Practice 
Best of 2011 
Named 'One of the Top Cosmetic 
Surgeons in the Nation' 
The Aesthetic Awards 2011-2012 
Awarded 'Best Non-Surgical Facial 
Reiuvenation' 
M:\Dr Laurence cv\rev05092012 
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CURRICULUM VITAE 
ALAN W. FRANKLE 
Permanent Residence 
1491 Lewis Lane 









Business Administration, Major in Finance, College of Business and Public 
Administration, University of Arizona, 197 4. 
College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona, 1969. 
Industrial Distribution, Clarkson College of Technology, 1966. 
Academic Positions 
2009 - Professor Emeritus, Finance and International Business, Boise State 
Present University 
1984-2008 · Professor of Finance and International Business, Boise State 
Universitv. (Tenured) 
2007-2013 Visiting Professor, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus, Denmark 
Summer 
2009 Visiting Professor GSBA, Zurich, Switzerland 
Summer 
2006 Visiting Professor Scuola Amministrazione Aziendale, Torino, Italy 
Spring 
2004 Visiting Professor, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 
Summer 
2003-2003 Visiting Professor, ITESM, Guadalajara, Mexico 
2002-2002 Visiting Professor, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand 
2002-2002 Visiting Professor, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Bilbao, Spain 
2000 Visiting Professor, Scuola Amministrazione Aziendale, Torino, Italy 
Summer 
1997 - Visiting Professor, Scuola Amministrazione Aziendale, Torino, Italy 
1997 
1994 Visiting Professor, ScuC?la Amministrazione Aziendale, Torino, Italy 
Summer 








Associate Professor of Finance (Tenure), University of Tulsa, 600 College 
Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma 7 4104. 
Assistant Professor of Finance, School of Business, State University of 
New York at Albany, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12222. 
Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, College of 
Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona. 
Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, College of Business and Public 
Administration, University of Oregon. 
Part-time Instructor of Finance, College of Business and Public 
Administration, University of Arizona. 
Administrative Positions 
1996-1997 Director of International Business Programs, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho 
83725. 
Responsible for all administrative duties concerning the International Business Programs 
including class· schedules, faculty coordination, faculty and staff recruiting, budgeting, and 





Chairman of Department of Marketing and Finance, Boise State University, 
Boise, Idaho 83725. 
Responsible for all administrative duties concerning the marketing and 
finance faculty including curriculum development, class scheduling, 
recruiting of faculty and staff personnel, budgetary matters, and liaison with 
other University units and corporate enterprises in the community. 
Chairman of Department of Finance and Real Estate, University of Tulsa, 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104. Responsible for all administrative duties 
concerning the finance faculty including curriculum development, class 
scheduling, recruiting of faculty and staff personnel, budgetary matters, and 
liaison with other University units and corporate enterprises in the 
community. 
Area Coordinator, S.U.N.Y. Albany, Albany, New York 12222. Responsible 
for all internal activities concerning the finance faculty. These 
responsibilities included curricula development, class scheduling, recruiting 
faculty, and merit recommendations. 
Sub-Program Director, S.U.N.Y. Albany, Albany, New York 122Z2. 
Responsibilities included all aspects of the finance area's involvement with 
the M.B.A. program. The most demanding aspect of Sub-Program Director 
is the role of chief consultant for projects with M.B.A. students acting as 
staff to lend expertise in all areas of financial management and 
applications. 
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Summers of 1987, 










Visiting Professor of Finance for the Russian American School of Business 
Administration in Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk in the Russian Far 
East. The program is run by the Free Market Business Development 
Institute at Portland State University. Taught free market managerial 
finance to Russian entrepreneurs and government officials. 
Led student workshop on International Business and Finance to Europe. 
Traveled in England, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Belgium 
Slovenia, and Hungary. Organized visits to Arthur Andersen, The Royal 
Bank of Scotland, H.J. Hienz, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Credit Suisse, 
Sherson Lehman, lvoclar, McDonalds, Mercedes, Bank of America and 
many government agencies. 
Faculty intern for Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., Boise, Idaho. Worked 
with the Project Finance group evaluating world-wide construction projects. 
Financial economist and Economic Fellow with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission resulting from participation in the AACSB-Sear 
Fellowship program. Member of a study group participating in projects 
addressing long-range concerns of the Commission and private industry 
with respect to the capital markets. These studies involved analyzing and 
making recommendations concerning the role of banks in the securities 
markets relating to institutional investment programs and impact on broker-
dealers, structure, and market efficiency of the securities industry, 
effectiveness of the Commission's full disclosure and reporting system, and 
the impact of new legislation on investors and markets. Specific emphasis 
was directed towards activities involving the municipal market. 
Research Associate, National Science Foundation Grant, "Improving State 
and Local Government Cash Management," (on leave from S.U.N.Y. 
Albany). Responsibilities included the development and application of cash 
management techniques for more effective cash management, evalu~tion 
of banking services and relationships with state and local governments, 
and the evaluation of alternative policy recommendations for a more 
effective cash management operation. 
Industrial Engineer, IBM, Owego, New York. Worked in the production 
control department as a junior engineer responsible for meeting schedules 
and expediting special government projects through commercial production 
line. Member of task force involved with automating high speed production 
line for printed circuit boards. 
"Forensic Economics", expert witness for local and regional law firms, 1991-2013 .. 
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Curriculum Vitae (continued) 
"Capital Budgeting for Public Utilities", Idaho Power Corporation, 1994. 
"Position Justification" Idaho Power Corporation, 1993. 
"ESOP" Valuation, Extended Systems Inc., Boise, Idaho 1987 -1991. 
Idaho Insurance Commission, "Merger Analysis," Boise, Idaho, 1988. 
Idaho First National Bank, Boise, Idaho, 1986, "Forecasting Loan-Loss Provisions." 
Expert Witness Tulsa Law Firm, 1983, "Valuation of Closely Held Firm." 
Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, 1981-82, "Alternative Funding Sources." 
Page4 
Professional Insurance Agents of (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut), 1978-79, "An Analysis of 
Agency Profits." 
Council of State· Housing Agencies, research association studying "An Analysis of Mortgage 
Revenue Bonds," 1979. 
New York State External Degree Program, Finance Sub-Committee, 1974-79. 
Environmental Protection Agency, research associate studying "Financing the Local Share of 
Constructing Municipal Wastewater Treatment Facilities," 1976-77. 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS 
Boise State University, Micro-MBA instructor for finance, 1993-1997. 
· Boise State University, Professional Development Program, instructor for finance, 1993-2005. 
"Accounting and Finance for Non-financial Managers", CMD Certificate Program, Fall 1998, 
Spring 1999. 
Finance for Executives," J. R. Simplot Company, 1991. 
"Accounting and Finance for Production Managers," Micron Technology, Inc., 1990, 1992. 
"Financing Strategies," Professional Management Development Center, Boise State University, 
June 6, 1989, Sun Valley, Idaho. 
"Accounting and Finance for Non-financial Managers," J.R. Simplot Company, Food Division, 
May 23 and 24, 1989, Boise, Idaho. 
"Accounting and Finance for Executives," J.R. Simplot Company, Food Division, January 24 and 
25 and March 2 and 3, 1989, Boise, Idaho. 
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Curriculum Vitae (continued) Page5 
"Accounting and Finance for Non-financial Managers," Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., February 15 and 16, 
1990, Boise, Idaho. 
"Accounting and Finance for Non-financial Managers, Boise Cascade Corporation, September 27 
and 28, 1988, April 4-5, 1990, Boise, Idaho. 
"Accounting and Finance for Attorneys," December 2-4, 1987 and May 6-7, 1988, Boise, Idaho. 
"Corporate Liquidity Management," Idaho Public Accountants, May 16, 1986, Boise, Idaho. 
"Corporate Liquidity Management," Professional Management Development Program, Boise State 
University, Boise, Idaho, May 13-15, 1985. 
"Corporate Liquidity Management," Management Development Center, University of Tulsa, 
May 3-6, 1983. 
"Innovative Financing Techniques," presented at the Southwest Municipal Finance School, Texas 
Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, May 25, 1982. 
"Professional Insurance Agents of New Jersey Cost of Business," testimony before Insurance 
Commission, State of New Jersey, September 25, 1979. 
"Professional Insurance Agents Cost Study Survey," New York State Professional Insurance 
Agency Convention, September 18, 1979. Co-presented with W. Christian Buss. 
"Disclosure Economics and the Market for Municipals," presented for the staff of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, April 1 o, 1978. 
"Cash Budgeting and Forecasting" and "Evaluating Financial Services and Banking 
Relationships," presented at the Junior and Senior Professional Advancement Conference for 
Municipal Finance Executives, May 22-28, 1977, The University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh. 
JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS (REFEREED) 
"Fact-finding in State and Local Government: Using a Municipal Finance Expert in Collective 
'Bargaining," The Public Manager, Winter 2003-04, pp. 11-13. Co-authored with Alan Herzfeld. 
"Cash Management of Practices of Stock Exchange Listed New Zealand Companies: Research 
Findings," Journal of Financial Management and Analysis, July-December 1993, pp. 33-42. 
Co-authored with Kate Brown. 
"Reserve Requirements and the Inflation Tax: A Comment," Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking, August 1990. Co-authored with L. Dwayne Barney and Harry White. 
"Investment Practices of the Domestic Cash Managers," Journal of Cash Management, May/June 
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Curriculum Vitae (continued) Page6 
1987, pp.50-53. Co-authored with J. Markham Collins. 
"Constructing a Loan Loss Model for Consumer Loans," Journal of Retail Banking, Fall 1987, pp. 
65-70. Co-authored with James D. Hogan and C. Mike Merz. 
"International Cash Management Practices of Large U.S. Firms," Journal of Cash Management, 
July/August 1985, pp. 42-48. Co-authored with J. Markham Collins. 
"Liquidity Services and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case for Money Market Mutual Funds," 
Journal of Financial Research, Summer 1983, pp. 141-152. Co-authored with Hany Shawky and 
Ronald W. Forbes. 
"Characteristics of Temporal Price Behavior of Long-Term Corporate Bonds," Review of 
Economic and Business Research, Winter 1980-81, pp. 43-55. Co-authored with Clark A 
Hawkins. 
"Voluntary Social Reporting: !so-Beta Portfolio Analysis," Accounting Review, July 1980, pp. 467-
479. Co-authored with John C. Anderson. 
"Old Tools and Techniques: Help Solve Hospitals' Cash Flow Problems," Journal of Commercial 
Bank Lending, March 1979, pp. 29-37. Co-authored with Robert J. Halonen. 
"Tax Exempt Revenue Bonds: Are Ratings a Proxy·for Credit Quality?," Review of Business and 
Economic Research, Winter 1978-79, pp. 68-77. Co-authored with Ronald W. Forbes. 
"The Impact of the Disclosure of the Environmental Effects of Organizational Behavior on the 
Market: Comment," Financial Management, Summer 1978, pp. 76-78. Co-authored with John C. 
Anderson. 
"Capital Budgeting Procedures Under Inflation: Comment," Financial Management, Autumn 
1976, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 86-87. 
"An Estimate of Convertible Bond Premiums: Comment," Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, June 1975, pp. 369-373. 
"A Note on Beta Coefficients for Convertible Bonds," Journal of Finance, March 1975, pp. 207-
210. Co-authored with C. A. Hawkins. 
"The Behavior of Convertible Debenture Premiums: Comment," Mississippi Valley Review of 
Business and Economics, Winter 1973-7 4, pp. 65-68. Co-authored with C. A. Hawkins. 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS (NON-REFEREED) 
"The Russian Far East: The Economic Wild West," Idaho's Economy, Winter 1993, pp. 1-4. 
''The Advent of 'Nonbank Banks': What Does it Mean to Idaho," Idaho's Economy, Winter 1987, 
pp. 6-7. Co-authored with Michael B. Bixby. 
001166
Alan W. Frankie 
Curriculum Vitae (continued) Page7 
The Impact of New Federalism on Tulsa, Oklahoma," Administrating the New Federalism, edited 
by Lew G. Bender and James A. Stever, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, January 1986. Co-
authored with Raymond Rosenfeld. 
''A Survey of Hedging By Large Nonfinancial Corporations," lntermarket, September 1985, pp. 32-
33. Co-authored with J. Markham Collins. 
"The Financial Management of State and Local Governments," Chapter 4 in The Municipal Bond 
Handbook: Vol. 2, edited by Sylvan Feldstein, Frank Fabozzi, and Irving Pollack, Homewood, IL: 
Dow Jones-Irwin, 1983. 
"The Oklahoma Portfolio Summary," Oklahoma Business, April 1982. 
"State Industrial Base Firm Foundation for Significant Future Growth," Oklahoma Business, 
September 1981, pp. 9-16. 
"Effects of Proposition 13 on Tax-Supported Municipal Bonds in California, The Property Tax 
Revolt: The Case of Proposition 13, edited by George G. Kaufman and Kenneth T. Rosen, 
Cambridge, MA: The Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981. Co-authored with Ronald W. Forbes 
and Philip Fischer. 
"Tax-exempt Housing Bonds Continue to Attract Public Sector," American Banker, October 15, 
1979, pp. 12 and 36. Co-authored with Philip Fischer and Ronald W. Forbes. 
"Public Debt in the Northeast: The Limits of Growth;" The Northeast: Managing a Way Out, 
proceedings of a symposium on legislative actions for survival in the credit market, the Council for 
Northeast Economic Action, April 1977, pp. 103-154. Co-authored with Ronald W. Forbes and 
Christopher A. Carter. 
FUNDED RESEARCH 
Case Analysis, "ULA-Equipment," Funded by NIBEN, University of Washington, 2004-05. 
"Ada County Consolidation Study: Fire and Emergency Services" Ada County, 1993-94. 
Co-authored with Stephanie Witt. 
"Position Justification," Idaho Power Corporation, 1992. 
"Forecasting Loan-Loss Provisions," co-authored with Mike Merz and Brad Brown. Funded by 
Idaho First National Bank, 1987. 
"Alternative Funding Sources: Meeting the Capital Expenditure Needs of the City of Tulsa," et al., 
Office of Business Research, University of Tulsa, 1981-83. Funded by the Economic 
Development Commission of Tulsa and the Metropolitan Tulsa Cham~er of Commerce. 
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"An Analysis of Agency Costs for Personal Lines of Insurance," October 1979. Prepared for the 
Professional Insurance Agents of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Co-authored with W. 
Christian Buss. 
"An Analysis of Mortgage Revenue Bonds," published by the Council of State Housing Agencies, 
April 1979. Co-authored with Philip Fischer and Ronald W. Forbes. 
TEXTS AND CLASS MATERIALS 
Study Guide to Accompany Principles of Financial Management, by Benton E. Gup, John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., 1983. 
Instructor's Manual to Accompany Principles of Financial Management, Benton E. Gup, John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1983. 
PROFESSIONAL PARTICIPATIONS 
Papers 
uUltra Light Adventure Equipment: A Buyout? Presented at the College Teaching & Learning 
Conference, San Juan Puerto Rico, March 17-20, 2008. 
"Global Net Discount Rates: A Statistical Update" Presente~ at the winter meetings of the 
National Association of Forensic Economists in Hawaii, February 6-8, 2004. 
"Global Net Discount Rates: An Initial Analysis," with Philip Fry. Presented at the National 
Association of Forensic Economists international meeting in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, February 2-
5, 2001. 
"Position Justification: A Proactive Workforce Strategy," with Nancy K. Napier. Presented at the 
Pan-Pacific Conference, Chiba, Japan, May 27-31, 1996. 
"Pricing the Tradeoff of Interest Savings and Conversion Value for Convertible Bonds," with C.A. 
Hawkins, Western Decision Science Institute Meetings, Lihue, Hawaii, March 19-22, 1991. 
"Cash Management Practice of Listed New Zealand Companies," Western Decision Sciences 
Institute Meetings, Lihue, Hawaii, March 18-21, 1991. Co-authored with Kate Brown. 
"Pricing New Issue Convertible Bonds: Yields versus Conversion Values," Decision Science 
Institute Meetings, Boston, Massachusetts, November 23-25, 1987. Co-authored with Norman 
Gardner and Clark A. Hawkins. 
"Estimating the Cost of Construction Guarantees: An Option Pricing Model Application," Decision 
Science Institute, Honolulu, November 23-25, 1986. Co-authored with Patrick W. Shannon and I. 
George Pool. 
"International Cash Management Practices of 'Fortune 1000' Firms," Eastern Finance Association, 
001168
Alan W. Frankie 
Curriculum Vitae (continued) Page9 
Williamsburg, Virginia, April 24-27, 1985. Co-authored with J. Markham Collins. 
''The Effect of Restricted Borrowing on OTC Common Stock Performance," Eastern Finance 
Association, Orlando, Florida, April 18-20, 1984. Co-authored with Richard C. Burgess. 
"The Investment Performance of Money Market Mutual Funds," Financial Management 
Association, Cincinnati, October 21-24, 1981. Co-authored with Hany Shawky and Ronald W. 
Forbes. 
"Yield Determinants for Corporate Tax Exempt Bonds," Financial Management Association, 
Boston, October 11-13, 1979. Co-authored with Philip Fischer. 
"Proposition 13: A Study of Bond Market Efficiency," Western Economic Association, Las Vegas, 
June 17-21, 1979. Co-authored with Philip Fischer and Ronald W. Forbes. 
"Comparative Market Efficiency for Regulated and Unregulated Fixed Income Securities," 
Western Economic Association, Las Vegas, June 17-21, 1979. Co-authored with David Chase. 
"Margin Effects and Bidirectional Causality of Equity and Convertible Bond Prices," Western 
Economic Association, Las Vegas, June 17-21, 1979. Co-authored with Unghi Lim. 
"Municipal Underwriting: Interindustry Competition," Southern Finance Association, Washington, 
D.C., November 1978. Co-authored with George Kaufman and Ronald W. Forbes. 
"Efficient Markets for Corporate Bonds: Some Empirical Evidence," Western Finance 
Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 20-26, 1978. Co-authored with Clark A. Hawkins. 
"Market Effects of Voluntary Municipal Disclosure," Western Finance Association, Kana, Hawaii, 
June 20-26, 1978. Co-authored with Ronald W. Forbes. 
"Voluntary Social Reporting: An Isa-Beta Portfolio Analysis," Eastern Finance Association, 
Boston, April 20-22, 1977. Co-authored with John C. Anderson. 
"Market Impact of Social Disclosure: An Initial Inquiry," Financial Management Association, 
Montreal, Canada, October 14-16, 1976. Co-authored with John C. Anderson. 
"An Objective Methodology for Determining Homogeneous Risk Classes for Industrial Bonds," 
Eastern Finance Association, Columbia, South Carolina, April 1976 .. Co-authored with Ronald W. 
Forbes and Arthur Hierl. 
"Defining Homogeneous Risk Classes for Municipal General Obligation Bonds," Western Finance 
Association, Las Vegas, June 1976. Co-authored with Ronald W. Forbes and Arthur Hierl. 
"The Optimum Convertible Bond Financing Decision: Corporate Behavior Indicated by a Model of 
Investor Preference," workshop presentation, Financial Management Association, San Antonio, 
October 15-16, 1972. 
Discussant 
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"Economic Perspectives on Global Enterprise Management," (three papers), Western Academy of 
Management International Meetings, Leuvin, Belgium, June 21-24, 1992 
"A Conceptual Options Framework for Capital Budgeting" by Lener Trigeorges, Decision Science 
Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, November 23-25, 1987. 
"The Merger Acquisition Game: Is There a Winner's Curse?", by Frederick Dark, Financial 
Management Association, October 15-17, 1987. 
"Tests of Duration Based on Bond Pricing Models," by G. 0. Beirwag, George Kaufman, Cynthia 
Latta, and Gordon Roberts, Financial Management Association, Denver, October 9-12, 1985. 
"A Comparative Analysis of the Selection of Acquisition Candidates: Probit Versus Logit and 
Discriminant Analysis," by Ronnie Clayton and M. Andrew Fields, Financial Management 
Association, Atlanta, October 22, 1983. 
"The Effects of Term-to-Maturity on Tax-Exempt Bond Default Premia," by Paul Leonard, 
Financial Management Association, San Francisco, October 13-16, 1982. 
''The Impact of Convertible Debt Registration on Security Prices," by Steven Katz and Steven 
Lilien, Northeast American Accounting Association, New York City, April 20-22, 1977. 
Chairman 
Track Chairman for Finance, Western Decision Science Institute, Palm Springs, California, 
March 9-11, 1987. 
"Options" session, Decision Science Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 23-26, 1986. 
"Investment Potpourri" session, Midwest Finance Association, Louisville, Kentucky, April 1981. 
"Convertible Bonds" session, Financial Management Association, Seattle, October 13-15, 1977. 
Professional Affiliations 
National Association of Forensic Economics 
Pan-Pacific Business Association 
Community Service 
President of the Pioneer Inn Home-owners Association, 1995-2001. 
Bogus Basin Ski Racing Alliance, Financial Vice President, 1988-91. 
Bogus Basin Ski Racing Alliance, Board of Directors, 1987-93. 
Idaho Red Cross, Finance and Audit Committee, 1986-89. 
Tulsa Economic Summit, Speaker, 1982. 
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Tulsa Ad Hoc Committee on Mortgage Revenue Housing Bonds, 1980. 
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Office Address: 
John P. Lundeby, MD, FACS, FAACS 
Curriculum Vita 
Shape Cosmetic Surgery and Med Spa, PLLC 
AAAHC Accredited Surgery Center 
524 W. 61h Avenue 
Spokane,WA 99204 
Birth Information: 
Cottonwood, Idaho USA 
Current Positions: 
Owner- Shape Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
Nov 2009-current 
Owner- North Idaho Surgery, PLLC 
Nov 2009-current 
Previous Positions: 
Co-Owner- The Laser & Vein Center, PLLC, dba Reflections Med Spas 
Jan 2005-Jan 2010 
Co-Owner- Lake City Surgeons, PLLC 
Jan 2005-current 
Senior Partner and Owner- Palouse Surgical Associates, PLLC 
Aug 1996-Dec 2007 
Education: · 
University of Washington School of Medicine, MD 
Jun 1991 
University of Idaho, BS Zoology with Chemistry Minor 
May 1987 
North Idaho College, AAS Machine Shop 
May 1982 
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Postgraduate Medical Education: 
Chief Resident in General Surgery 
San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jul 1994-Jun 1996 
Resident in General Surgery 
San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jul 1992-Jun 1994 
Intern in General Surgery 
.San Joaquin General Hospital, Stockton, CA 
Jun 1991-Jun 1992 
Professional licensure/Certification: 
Board Certified, American Board of Cosmetic Surgery, 
Body, Breast & Extremity Surgery 
2012-current 
Board Eligible, American Board of Laser Surgery 
2010 
Board Certified, Recertifie~, American Board of Surgery 
2006-current 
Board Certified, American Board of Surgery 
1997-2006 
Idaho State Medical License 
1997-current 
Washington State Medical License 
1996-current 
California State Medical License 
1992, now inactive 
DEA Certificate Idaho 
1992-current 
DEA Certificate Washington 
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2008-current 
Idaho Board of Pharmacy Certificate 
1997-current 
Diplomat, National Board of Medical Examiners 
1992 
Advanced Cardiac Life Support Certified 
1989-current 
Advanced Trauma Life Support Certified 
Current 
Pediatric Life Support 
Previously Certified 
Professional Society Memberships: 
Fellow, American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery 
Faculty Member, National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Fellow, American College of surgeons 
Member, American College of Phlebology 
Member, American Society for Laser Medicine and Surgery 
Member, Idaho Medical Association 
Member, Kootenai Benewah Medical Society 
Member, Spokane County Medical Society 
Member, Washington State Medical Association 
Member, American Medical Association 
Committee Appointments/Offices Held: 
Chairman, Executive Committee and Medical Staff Committee, Shape Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
2009-present 
Chairman, Medical Quality Improvement Committee, Shap.e Cosmetic Surgery & Med Spa, PLLC 
2009-present 
President, Kootenai-Benewah Medical Society 
2007-2008 
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Trauma Director, Kootenai Medical Center 
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Secretary Treasurer/President Elect, Kootenai Benewah Medical Society 
2006-2007 
Chairman, Board of Directors, Palouse Surgery Center, LLC 
2002-2004 
Chief of Surgery, Gritman Medical Center 
Chief of Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Chief of Trauma, Gritman Medical Center 
Co-Director, Intensive Care Unit, Pullman Memorial Hospital 
Chief of Surgery, Pullman Memorial Hospital 
Vice President Medical Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Secretary Treasurer Medical Staff, Gritman Medical Center 
Member, Medical Staff Executive Committee, San Joaquin General Hospital 
Editorial Board, Hospital Physician 
President, San Joaquin General Hospital Housestaff Association 
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Most Outstanding Surgical Trainee 
San Joaquin General Hospital 
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Faculty/Teaching Positions: 
Clinical Faculty, NSOCP 
2009-present 
Clinical Lecturer, Cynosure Corporation 
2008-present 
Certified Trainer in Laser Medicine, Cutera 
2006-2008 
Clinical lnstru~tor, Surgery 
Department of Surgery 
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University of Washington 
1997-2008 
Affiliate Faculty, Clinical Instructor 
WWAMI Program 
University of Idaho 
1997-2008 
Medical Staff Appointments: 
-Kootenai Medical Center 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
2005-present, currently Community Associate Staff 
Northwest Specialty Hospital 
Post Falls, Idaho 
2005-2012 
Northern Idaho Advanced Care Hospital 
Post Falls, Idaho 
August 2006-2012 
Research/Presentations/ Articles: 
"Lasers in Clinical Medicine", Houston, TX 
Dec2010 
"Arm Liposuction", NSOCP, Tucson, AZ 
Nov 2010 
"Pitfalls to Avoid in Liposuction", NSOCP, Tucson, AZ 
Nov 2010 
"Las~rs in Clinical Medicine", Cynosure, Seattle, Las Vegas, Austin, 
Houston, New York City, Greenwich, Phoenix, Chicago 
2009-2010 
"Smartlipo: A Clinician's Perspective", Seattle, WA 
Aug 2008 
"Smartlipo for Practitioners", Seattle, WA 
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"Vein Therapy Using the Cutera 1064 nm Laser", Cutera Clinical Forum, Washington, DC 
May 2007 
"Thoracic Trauma", CE presentation to the ED Nurses, Kootenai Medical Center, 
Mar2007 
"Chest Trauma", CE presentation to Coeur d'Alene Fire Department Paramedics 
Feb 2007 
''Vein Treatment Using the 1064 nm Cutera Laser", Corporate Webinar, Cutera International 
Jan 2007 
"Body contouring: Dr. Michelangelo?", North Idaho Business Journal 
Dec2006 
"Varicose Vein Treatment'', Risk M,anagement presentation, NPIC, Portland, OR 
Nov2006 
"Insurance and Varicose Veins'', North Idaho Business Journal 
Sep 2006 
"Dare to be Bare", North Idaho Business Journal 
May 2006 
"Laparoscopic Nissen Fundoplication" CME presentation, Kootenai Medical Center 
Apr2006 
"Embarrassing Rosacea Can Be Controlled", North Idaho Business Journal 
Feb 2006 
"Scar Treatment Starts with Prevention, Then Appropriate Care", North ldah9 Business Journal 
Dec 2005 
"Consider Laser Safety", North Idaho Business Journal 
Nov2005 
"Varicose Veins Now Very Treatable", North Idaho Business Journal 
Sep 2005 
'What to Look For in a Med Spa", ~orth Idaho Business Journal 
2005 
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2001 
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2000 
"Wound Healing'', CME presentation, Gritman Medical Center 
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"Post Traumatic Chylous Ascites in a child: Review of the Literature and Case Report", 
Stockton Surgical Society 
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Mining and Mechanical Institute, Freeland, PA 
Eastern College, SL Davids, PA 
Graduated Magna Cum Laude with a B.S. in Biology and minor in 
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University of Minnesota Medical School 
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Hair Restoration, Inc. Seattle, WA 
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Surgery Clinic, Interim Chief of Medical Staff 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Boise, ID 
Associate Staff General Surgeon without compensation 
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General Surgeon Locum Tenem 
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Sept 2007-Aug 2008 Southcenter Cosmetic Surgery & Hair Resoration, Inc., 
Seattle, WA 
Cosmetic Surgery Fellow 
Sept 2008-Mar 2009 Genesis ENT and Plastic Surgery, Charlotte, NC 
Cosmetic Surgeon 
Apr 2009-Mar 2010 Uplift Cosmetic Surgery, Laser and Skin Center, Charlotte, NC 
Owner 
Mar 2010- Feb 2012 Shape Cosmetic Surgery and Medspa, Spokane, WA 
Cosmetic Surgeon 
Mar· 2012-present Palouse Surgeons, LLC, Pullman, WA 
Cosmetic and General Surgeon 
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Aug 2005-Aug 2008 Affiliate Faculty University of Washington Medical School 
WWAMI program 
20010-present Faculty of the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Publications: 
Stiller, GD, et al: A Unique Method of Body Contouring after Massive Weight Loss. 
The American Journal of Cosmetic Surgery. 3:130 
Weese, JL, et al: Neoadjuvant chemotherapy, radical resection with intraoperative 
radiation therapy (IORT): Improved treatment for gastric adenocarcinoma. 
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Abdominoplasty Complications. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
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Breast Augmentation Approaches. National Society of Cosmetic 
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Facial Rejuvenation with Facelift and Fat Transfers. National Society 
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Brazilian Butt Lift. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
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Hand Rejuvenation using Autologous Fat Transfer. National Society of 
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Mini-Facelift National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
Lipo-Abdominoplasty. National Society of Cosmetic Physicians 
1998 Robert Lauks Award: chosen by faculty as the exemplary surgical 
resident in overall knowledge and care of the surgical patient (one award 
given per year for the entire residency) 
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2001 Paul Nemir Award: chosen by faculty and peers as the senior surgical resident 
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2005 USAF Meritorious Service Medal 
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Medical License: 
State of Idaho 
State of Washington 
State of North Carolina expired, not renewed 
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Board Certified by the American College of Surgery 2003, re-certified 2012 
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A Unique Method of Body Lifting After Massive 
Weight Loss 
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
A Unique Method of Body Lifting After Massive 
Weight Loss 
Geoffrey Stiller, MD, FACS; E.AntonioMangubat, MD,, FAACS; Wael Kouli, MD, FACS,· Lisa Precht, MD 
Introduction: The epidemic of obesity has provided a 
new cosmetic challenge in postbariatric body reconstruc-
tion. Traditionall;y, body lift procedures and circumferential 
liposuction have been used to address the excess skin and 
adiposity present after weight 'loss. After applying alveolar 
abdominoplasty principles to circumferential body lifts, we 
describe our experience of the first 24 lipo-circwnferential 
body lift procedures perfonned as single-stage outpatient 
surgery. 
Materials and Methods: Between October 2007 mu/-
August 2009, 24 patients underwent a total body lift using 
our lipo-circumferential body lift technique. The operative 
teclmique is described. lntraoperative and postoperative 
complications are compared with published series. 
Results: All procedures were_perfonned as a singl.e-stage 
outpatient procedure. The last 20 patients did not receive 
postoperative drains. Seven patients underwent additional 
procedures perfonned in the same setting. No intraoperative 
ormajorpostoperative complications occurred. Five patients 
(20.8%) had posterior wound dehiscence ( <2 cm). Five 
patients (20.8%) had anteriorwowtd dehiscence ( <2 an). Th!o 
patients (8.3%) had mi,wr wound infection. Thlo patients 
(8.3%) had cellulitis. One patient (4.2%) had umbilical 
necrosis. An overall minor complication rate of 58% was 
reported. 
Conclusions:· Our technique of lipo-circwnferential body 
lift is a safe and effective procedure to address the body 
contouring after massive weight loss in a single stage, 
outpatient procedure. 
Since its inception in 1966, bariatric surgery has offered the greatest degree of sustained weight 
loss to the morbidly obese.1 Weight loss of 50 kg or 
Received for publication December 6, 2010. 
From the SouthCenter Cosmetic Surgery, Tukwila, Wash. 
Corresponding author: Geoffrey Stiller, Mi), FACS, Shape Cosmetic 
Surgery, 524 W 6th Ave, Spokane, WA 99204 (e-mail: geoff_stiller@ 
hotnulilcom). 
more is common, resulting in significant improvement 
in patient health but leaving body deformities due to 
loose hanging skin. Body contouring after massive 
weight loss bas naturally grown in frequency. More than 
52000 body contouring procedures were performed in 
postbariatric weight loss patients in 2003, and a 36% 
increase was estimated for 2004. 2 
Body contouring surgery is rapidly undergoing 
modification and refinement The contour deformities 
resulting from massive weight loss create diverse and 
often unexpected changes that involve virtually every 
body part. Traditional panniculectomy is rapidly fading 
from the standard of care. With the increase in the 
number of successful weight loss patients comes an 
increased need and demand for refined contouring 
procedures in all regions of the body. No longer are 
patients and their physicians willing to accept a normal 
· body mass index (BMI) with all it.s health benefits; 
their demand to look better and feel better is naturally 
increasing and presents several technical challenges 
for the cosmetic surgeon. · 
The abdominoplasty has been the mainstay of skin 
removal after weight loss; however, in postbariatric 
procedures, traditional abdominoplasty has limitations. 
Severe skin laxity affects the entire body; thus new 
methods were pioneered to deal with the circumferential 
skin excess, including belt lipectomy. buttock lift. and 
body lift. 
A relatively new technique in body contouring, 
lipo-abdominoplasty, was first described in 2000 by 
Dr A velar. 3 Since that time, the procedure has evolved, 
and several papers have described variations. The con-
ventional operative approach to addressing excess skin 
employs flap elevation, vessel ligation, and limited 
liposuction: An additional procedure is often required 
for body sculpting after excess skin excision. Chal-
lenging the traditional paradigm, the technique of 
lipo-abdominoplasty uses aggressive liposuction that 
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Figure 1. A 45-year-oldfemale patient who lost 120 pounds through diet and exercise; 1.5 years postoperative from a 
lipo-circwnferential body lift and a medial thigh lift. All body lift scars are hidden by her usual undergarments and bikini. 
mobilizes the flap and minimizes the need for exten-
sive flap dissection and vessel ligation and preserves 
the vascular supply. 
With more than 200000 bariatric procedures 
performed yearly in North America,' the increased 
number of bariatric surgery patients has fueled 
demand for cosmetic procedures after massive weight 
loss; abdominoplasty, mastopexy, and circumferential 
body lifts are more frequently performed to achieve 
optimal aesthetic results. 
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Figure 2. A 35-year~oldfemale who underwent an open gastric byp~s. Maximum /,,odj mass in4e~ (lJMl) wasS:3. At the tim~ 
of circumferential. body lift and open ventral hernia repair; her BM/ was 33. Pictures taken 3 months postoperatively. 
!n published experience with body lift procedures,. 
the average hospjtaf stay is up to 5 days~ with multiple 
patients requiring at least 1 unit of blood, and the 
length of drain placement ranges from 2 to 5 weeks.s.-1 
This report highlights the important advantages of 
applying the lipo-abdominoplasty concept to the cir-
cumferential body lift. With thls new technique, 
advantages include short operative times, the ability to 
perform the procedure safely in an outpatient setting, 
elimination of drains, and reduced recovery time. 
Methods 
Twenty-four patients underwent our new body lift 
procedure from October 2007 to August 2009. A 
retrospective review was performed to evaluate opera-
tive times, liposuction aspirate volume, and complica-
tions. Postoperative follow-up ranged from 1 month to 
3 years. 
The patient is marked in the preoperative holding 
area in the standing position. The patient is asked to 
wear a bathing suit or undergartnent for the initial 
marking. After the: borders of the UJld.ergartnent are 
marked, it is removed. The midline is marked anteriorly 
and posteriorly. The level of the anterior superior iliac 
crest (AIC) is then marked laterally and posteriorly to 
mark the most superior aspect of the proposed incision. 
The lax skin of the buttock and lateral thighs is then 
pushed upward to achieve maximum movement of the 
skin superiorly to the level of the AIC, and a mark is 
left at that level of the respective anatomy. This marks 
the estimated position of the inferior borders of the 
posterior and lateral incisions, and symmetric lines are 
drawn on the opposite side. 
The superior incision is estimated in a similar fashion 
by pulling the skin downward, and estimated superior 
incisions are determined and marked. We emphasize 
that these incisions are estimates, and that final and more 
precise borders will be determined intraoperatively. 
Anterior incisions differ considerably from traditional 
abdominoplasty in that they do not converge laterally. 
Instead, they join their respective superior and inferior 
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intraoperatively to maximize skin excision witho~t 
excessive tension, and to adjust the indsion location 
to fall with.in the previously marked qndergarment to 
maximize scar camouflage. Details of thfs adjustment 
are described. later. 
Finally, the areas of liposuction are marked, including 
the anterior and posterior torso, and often the lateral 
thighs. 
Once the patient is brought to the operating room, 
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sQlµtion is infused into the operative areas. After a wait 
of at least 15 minutes to acquire vasoconstriction, lipo-
suction is perfonned. In the areas to be excised, more 
aggressive liposuction i$ perfonned to debulk more fat. 
When the posterior liposuction is completed, the 
previously marked skin incisions are assessed using 
towel clips to approximate the superior and inferior 
lines. Typically, more skin can be excised safely and 
the clips are adjusted to include more skin. Inferior 
and superior adjustments are then marked to achieve 
the best incisional symmetry and location. The clips 
are removed, and the final incision lines are drawn. 
This method provides an added measure of confidence 
that the wound can be easily closed with good location 
and symmetry. 
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Figure 4. A 4S-year-old who lost 60 pounds through diet and exercise. Pictures taken 3 months postoperatively. 
The incision is made through the dermis with care 
taken to enter only the superficial subculaneous layer 
while leaving Scarpa's layer intact. We believe that an 
intact Scarpa's fascia preserves lymphatic drainage 
and eliminates the need for drains. 
The skin is then quickly avuJsed off the fascia using 
blunt dissection. Bleeding is usuaJJy minimal aod is 
easily controlled with suture ligation. Electrocautery is 
often unnecessary. Once the skin edges are reapproxi-
mated using towel clips, the superior flap is tacked 
inferiorly at the midline with a O polydioxanone surure 
(PDS) by suturing the superficial fascia! system to the 
fascia above the sacrum. The wound is closed in layers 
using interrupted 3-0 Monocryl for the deep dermal 
layer and a running subcuticular with 3-0 Monocryl to 
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CHA :S GARRISON, M.D. - Septeml 
Video Deposition 
~3, 2013 
first disclosure was the end of May. 
Q. When were -- you•re looking at your 
computer. Were you E-mailed that disclosure? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And would you agree with me that that 
disclosure on your computer does not reflect fat 
embolism as a pathological diagnosis? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Were you ever given any subsequent 
disclosures that Mr. Quane filed reflecting what 
your opinions were? 
A. The most recent one, which did not 
have 
Q. What was the date of that? 
A. I believe the date on that is about 
September 19th, if I'm reading this correctly. 
Q. All right. On September 19th, did the 
disclosure reflect fat embolism as a pathological 
d~agnosis? 
A. No, sir. It did not. 
Q. Okay. Is it your testimony that some 
time after September 19, you arrived at the 
conclusion that Crystal Ballard had a fat 
embolism? 
A. No, sir. Prior to that. 
tntreport@ida.net T& T Reporting, LLC 208.529.5491 




























CHA ...:5 GARRISON, M.D. - Septemt 
Video Deposition 
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Q. So on the September 19th disclosure, it 
does not reflect an opinion that you had already 
formed about fat embolism; is that accurate? 
A. I had not formed that opinion as such. 
35 
It was one of the thoughts that I had in my mind 
that I was trying to sort through, and that's why it 
was not discussed with Mr. Quane. 
Q. So you've -- some time after 
September 19th, you have cemented an opinion that 
Crystal Ballard had a fat embolism? 
A. That's correct, sir. 
MR. HADDAD: We're going to mark this 
part of the deposition as being an unfair disclosure 
of new opinions not set forth in any type of 
disclosures beforehand, and certainly something I'm 
not prepared to ask about since it's not appeared in 
any disclosures of any experts in this case. 
So let's go off -- well, let me ask you 
this: Jerry, how are we going to handle this? 
Because obviously, he holds an opinion you didn't 
set forth in his disclosures, you didn't give me 
forewarning on. 
MR. QUANE: Well, I didn't know about 
it --
MR. HADDAD: It's best to deal with this 
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now that we're --
MR. QUANE: Let me explain this: I 
didn't realize this until yesterday, the first time 
Dr. Garrison told me. 
You have chosen to depose him --
MR. HADDAD: So 
MR. QUANE: -- and -- and when you 
decide to depose an expert, the areas you get into 
constitute an automatic extension and 
supplementation of a prior disclosure. And that's 
the risk you take when you depose experts in Idaho. 
And I did not know about this 
MR. HADDAD: Well, Doctor -- Mr. Quane, 
I disagree because I --
MR. QUANE: Let me finish my --
MR. HADDAD: I simply asked him what 
articles he looked at. 
MR. QUANE: Well, you've gone into 
MR. HADDAD: Period. That's it. 
36 
MR. QUANE: -- why didn•t I disclose his 
opinion on this fat embolism previously in my 
disclosures, and the answer is: I did not know 
about it. Dr. Garrison did not tell me about it. 
He told me for the first time yesterday when I met 
with him, and it -- and that•s the reason it hasn•t 
tntreport@ida.net T& T Reporting, LLC 208.529.5491 































A. I can't answer that specifically. 
Q. Okay. You don't know which is better 
for identifying a fat embolism, CT or chest film? 
A. No, sir. I can't answer that. 
Q. All right. Doctor, because I have no 
idea what your opinions are, have you -- what are 
your opinions in this case? 
A. Well, I think she had a fat embolism, 
but I also think that she 
47 
Q. Okay. How did that cause her to have an 
infection? 
A. You didn't let me finish. 
Q. Doctor, I apologize. I'm hearing myself 
and thinking you're ending because there's a lag 
time, so it's not intentional. I apologize for 
that. 
A. My opinion is that the decedent had fat 
embolism syndrome. She also most likely had sepsis 
as well. She also had Systemic Inflammatory 
Response Syndrome. 
Q. Does Dr. Graben mention Systemic 
Inflammatory Response Syndrome? 
A. No. 
tntreport@ida.net T& T Reporting, LLC 208.529.5491 
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BAILEY&GLASSERtLP Phone (334) 262-6485 Fax (334) 262-0657 
201 Monroe Street 
Suite2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
June 20, 2013 
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY 208-780-3930 
Terrence S. Jones, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Dear Mr. Jones: 
In providing dates for experts, please provide dates within the deadlines set by 
the Court for completion of discovery. To the extent this proves impractical for any 
particular expert, we are willing to discuss conducting a deposition after the discovery 
deadline, provided that under no circumstances would such discovery effect the trial 
date. 
We have previously raised with you your disclosure of multiple experts 
concerning the same subject matter. Specifically, you have disclosed five experts, 
including Dr. Kerr, in the area of cosmetic and plastic surgery. We are quite certain the 
Court will not permit you to present redundant expert testimony at trial. Accordingly, we 
ask that you identify no more than two experts in this field. In other words, tell us the 
experts you actually intend to call as your trial witnesses so we can avoid unnecessary 
depositions. If you are not willing to do this, we will seek appropriate relief from the 
Court. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
JBP/flc 
cc: Scott McKay, Esq. (via facsimile only) 
62418~ 
Sincerely, 
Isl James B. Perrine 





Quane Jones McColl. PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Terrence s. Jones lsj@quanelow.com 
VIA FACSIMILE (334} 262-0657 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
June 21, 2013 
Re: Ballard v. Ke" 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Perrine: 
3 /4 
US Bonk Pima 
101 S. Capitol lloulevOC'd 
SI.lite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, IO 83701 
12081 780-3939 Telephone 
(208) 780,,3930 Facsimflo 
www.quonelow.com 
I am writing in response to your letter of June 20th. Regarding the 
depositions of Ors, Garrison and Frankie, their availability in August is based solely on 
their limited schedules. I provided you with earlier dates for Or. Frankie in June, but this 
was wisely deferred until you are able to produce the requested tax records. Please 
understand that we are not looking to change the trial date by having these depositions 
after the discovery deadline. We take the position that we provided you with complete 
expert witness disclosures in conformity with the requirements of discovery and it is 
your decision to take depositions that we believe will simply prove duplicative of these 
disclosures. 
Regarding your claim that we have listed multiple experts on the same 
subject matter, we disagree with your characterization. Rule 403 speaks to the 
prohibition of presenting needlessly cumulative evidence. We are mindful of this rule 
and will not run afoul of it at trial. We have listed several experts from different 
specialties of medicine to testify on behalf of the Defendants. The fact that you elected 
to only list one expert does not mean that we should be so Hmited at trial. The jury is 
entitled to hear from different experts with different background who all agree that Dr. 
Kerr did not violate the applicable local standard of practice. 
In the spirit of cooperation, we will agree to withdraw Dr. Wills as one of 
our experts. This eliminates the need to take his deposition. We do, however, intend to 
001205
Bailey & Glasser LLP 
June 21, 2013 
Page2 
2013/06/21 14:32;33 4 /4 
call all of our remaining experts at trial and will vigorously oppose any efforts to 
otheJWise limit the number of defense expert witnesse .. We do not have an excessive 
number and your decision to include Dr. Kerr i r numerical calculation is improper. 
You may consider this our effort to meet and nfer and informally resolve this matter. 
TSJ/ms 
cc: Scott McKay {via fax) 
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Ballard vs. Kerr, et al 
3 
1 BOISE, IDAHO 
2 Wednesday, July 10, 2013, 2:00 p.m. 
3 
4 THE COURT: I will take up Ballard versus 
5 Kerr. Okay. Wasn't it kind of early days to 
6 limit your witnesses? 
7 MR.McKAY: I don't think so. And I'm 
8 intending to address that. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. McKAY: And I will start with that, if 
11 ··· the court·would ·like·me,to,address ·that·· .. · ... ,. .... , ... --··· · ·· 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Just feel free. 
13 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I didn't hear your 
14 . inquiry. What was it? 
15 THE COURT: I just said, isn't it kind of 
16 early days to be limiting witnesses? 
17 MR. McKAY: Right, and I think that's a fair 
18 question, Your Honor. But this is an issue that's 
19 brought about by a discovery deadline that is 
20 about to expire at the end of this month. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. McKAY: And given the fact that the 
23 defendants have disclosed what we assert are 
24 cumulative experts, we are now -- that we would 
25 like to depose, we have to, you know, basically 
5 
1 this case. It was a liposuction. It was 
2 performed in July of 2010 at his clinic in Eagle, 
3 and at the time she was 27 years old, enlisted 
4 full-time, serving our country through the United 
5 States Air Force and was in excellent health, and 
6 within five days of that procedure, she died from 
7 an infection. 
8 And what we assert in this lawsuit is 
9 she died because this defendant failed to follow a 
10 sterile technique. And we have timely disclosed 
11 an expert, Dean Sorensen -- Dr. Dean Sorensen, who 
12 is going to opine at trial that Dr. Kerr violated 
13 the applicable standard of care. 
14 And in response to that disclosure, the 
15 defendants initially disclosed five experts who 
16 would testify that Dr. Kerr did not violate the 
17 standard of care. 
18 So shortly after they made that 
19 disclosure, then they filed supplemental responses 
20 to -- they served supplemental responses to 
21 pending interrogatories, and they scaled that back 
22 from five to four. 
23 They abandoned, apparently, an 
24 intention to call Dr. Wills. But they still 



















































Case No. CVOC-12-4792 
4 
chase around the country and the state and spend a 
bunch of money and depose these experts, who we 
submit should not be permitted to testify at 
trial, at least not all of these experts shouldn't 
be permitted. 
And if the court were to look at the 
case of Edmunds versus Kraner -- it's a 2006 case, 
142 Idaho 867 -- the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
this very issue, and it's cited in our reply 
brief. 
. ...... ·· -- .. ~,---.Jt!s, discmssed,by, the,defendants,underm, .. ,.. .. 
supplemental brief, and what the court said, it's 
appropriate to consider this issue now at an early 
stage of the proceeding, because to do otherwise, 
you run the risk of running afoul of one of the 
central rules of civil procedure l(A), that the 
focus of which is to bring about a fair, just, and 
inexpensive determination to these civil lawsuits. 
So that's what this is. This is a --
of course, a medical malpractice lawsuit against a 
single physician and his clinic. We represent 
Staff Sergeant Charles Ballard, who is the husband 
and former spouse of Crystal Ballard, Staff 
Sergeant Crystal Ballard, who had a medical 
procedure performed on her by the defendant in 
6 
the exact same issue. And I say at least, because 
some of the other experts, if you looked at their 
107-page expert disclosure, you would see even 
causation experts weigh into the issue of sterile 
technique in this case. 
And so we brought this motion prior to 
the expiration of the discovery deadline to simply 
ask for the court's help to say, "Judge, will you 
rule at this stage of the proceeding that the 
defendant should not be permitted to call more 
than two experts on any single issue?" 
It seems reasonable. This is a --
certainly a matter that is within the court's 
discretion. I mean, that's exactly what the 
Edmunds case says, and we think it also is 
supported by Rule 403. 
There are considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, presentation of cumulative 
evidence. I think that would be presented if the 
defendants in this case are allowed to parade in 
expert after expert to talk about this same issue, 
and that's not how trials operate. 
You know, trials come down to the 
jury's consideration of qualitative evidence, not 
quantitative, and I think that's what's going on 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 here, is the defendants either intend to present a 1 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor, Terry 
2 duplicative quantitative evidence, or if they only 2 Jones appearing for Dr. Kerr. I have had the 
3 intend to call a couple of these experts, and 3 privilege of being before this court in some 
4 there is, you know, somewhat of a shell game going 4 medical malpractice trials with my partner Jerry 
5 on while we are supposed to guess who are their 5 Quane many years ago. 
6 real experts? And so that's the basis for .the 6 This issue similarly came up at that 
7 motion. 7 time, and I have dealt with this issue in a number 
8 They oppose, of course, this motion. 8 of other circumstances. 
9 They argue that because these experts have 9 As an initial matter, the motion that 
10 different backgrounds, that that somehow would 10 was presented to the court was specifically under 
11 permit them to testify as to the -- on the same 11 Rule 403. That's what the motion was based on. 
12 issue, and we submit that that is a distinction 12 That's was what the memorandum was based on. .•. 
13 without a difference. 13 In the reply brief, now the recitation 
14 I mean, every expert, every physician 14 of the Edmunds case, appears we are now looking at 
15 has a different background to some degree, and 15 Rule 16(0). So that's what prompted my 
16 what's at issue, the central issue in this case, 16 supplemental response, which I hope the court will 
17 is whether this single defendant, Dr. Kerr, 17 accept and consider. 
18 violated the applicable standard of care. 18 With respect to the application of each 
19 And I understand, they are entitled to 19 of these rules, I think starting with Rule 403, 
20 present expert testimony on this, and should they 20 our brief put forth, I think, a substantial amount 
21 do that, they should be limited to calling no more 21 of information on why at this particular juncture 
22 than two experts on the issue. So that's our 22 the presentation of three experts plus the 
23 motion, Your Honor. 23 defendant would not amount to the needless 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 24 presentation of cumulative evidence. 
25 Response? 25 It's not simply evidence that's 
9 10 
1 cumulative. It's not simply evidence that's 1 where it said that there was some magic number 
2 similar or duplicative. It's whether we are 2 that was acceptable. 
3 talking about bringing in 25 people to say the 3 Now, the Edmunds decision, if we want 
4 light was green. We are not seeking to do that in 4 to tum to Rule 16(D) for a minute, first of all 
5 this case. 5 we have to view that case for what it stands for. 
6 And I have attempted to provide this 6 The issue in Edmunds dealt with the 
7 court, given the absence of substantial case 7 appropriateness of affidavits of two experts 
8 authority in Idaho, with some fairly point -- 8 submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to 
9 on-point decisions, including the one that was 9 summary judgment, whether or not they were timely, 
10 just decided three months ago in New Jersey, where 10 and whether or not those could be submitted. 
11 this specific issue was addressed on whether or 11 The court ruled in that case one of 
12 not it was appropriate just to limit the number of 12 them was, one of them wasn't. That resolved the 
13 experts to come up with a number. 13 issue on whether summary judgment was proper. In 
14 One of the things that opposing counsel 14 dicta, the court went on to address this issue, 
15 did not explain to the court -- and perhaps he 15 which was novel, of the court concluding, "Well, 
16 will in rebuttal, or his reply -- is how did they 16 this is only a 403 issue. I don't have the 
17 come up with two? What's the magic number with 17 ability to get into it, because it's not a 
18 two? 18 discovery issue. It's an evidentiary issue." 
19 And it'.s -- what I understand they are 19 And the appellate court said, "No, no. 
20 seeking is, it's my client plus one, so it's 20 I want to you understand, I want the district 
21 really one expert witness is what they are seeking 21 court to understand they have this ability, that 
22 to limit it to, and I'm not aware of any case 22 is, an inherent ability, and Rule 16(0) is the 
23 authority that they have tried to provide this 23 impetus for that ability." 
24 court, nor any case authority that I found for 24 Now what was the issue that was of 
25 purposes of opposing this motion for the court, 25 concern in Edmunds? That Saint Al's had listed 53 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 expert witnesses? Okay? Now, in that instance, 1 fact that the three standard of practice experts 
2 we also didn't have a disclosure of all the 2 that the defense has disclosed, one of them is 
3 opinions of each one of those expert witnesses. 3 from out of state in Tennessee, where he has a 
4 In this case, we have not only the 4 family practice background. 
5 disclosure of who these witnesses are, but we have 5 One of them is Dr. Lundeby from 
6 a complete 26(8)(4) disclosure that has been 6 Spokane. He has a general surgery background and 
7 provided addressing the opinions as well as the 7 also provides training to physicians who do 
8 foundation for the opinions. 8 cosmetic procedures like the one at issue, 
9 Now, the concern has been raised that 9 including training that he provided to Dr. Kerr. 
10 somehow these witnesses will be needlessly 10 The last one is Dr. Stiller, who is an 
11- .. cumulafive: "What•has,,to-1:>e ,kept.in mind~iS}··the . ., .... , ...... ··11-·· ··· Idaho. physicianr:fhere·is--very· few-physicians· in,~. '". 
12 fact that these doctors are prepared to come in 12 Idaho that do this procedure - these types of 
13 and testify to this court that they don't believe 13 procedures and consider themselves to be cosmetic 
14 Dr. Kerr violated the standard of practice 14 surgical providers. 
15 applicable to him on a whole different panoply of 15 THE COURT: What's the basis for having a 
16 issues, some of which will be similar, some of 16 family physician from Tennessee? 
17 which will overlap, and some of which will not, 17 MS. JONES: Because he is somebody that's 
18 the issue is not just the opinion that they don't 18 not a plastic surgeon. The plaintiffs have 
19 believe there was a violation. 19 proposed a plastic surgeon is the only one who can 
20 It's the why. Why do you have the 20 do this type of surgery, and that, therefore, 
21 opinion that he didn't violate the standard of 21 since Dr. Kerr, who is an anesthesiologist, 
22 practice? That's where there will be a broad 22 provided this type of surgery, that it was a 
23 variation in the opinions rendered by these I 23 violation for him to do so. 
24 experts. 24 And one of the things that's unique 
25 Now, what also comes into play is the 25 about Dr. Lawrence, Greg Lawrence, is he has a 
13 14 
1 cosmetic practice that's almost identical to the 1 Well, it's not 53 like it was in 
2 cosmetic practice that Dr. Kerr has. And the 2 Edmunds and, more importantly, in Edmunds, they 
3 issue for him goes to, all right, tell us about 3 didn't know the opinions of those experts because 
4 your background, training, and experience, 4 the court's scheduling order didn't require the 
5 Dr. Lawrence, and why you believe you are 5 production of that information. 
6 qualified to render opinions and provide this type 6 In this instance, we have responded not 
7 of care in your own practice when you don't have a 7 only to the court's scheduling order but to 
8 surgical background. 8 interrogatories. Well, we have set forth those 
9 That's what Dr. Sorensen says. He has 9 opinions, the basis for the opinions, and the 
10 a surgical background and, therefore, he is the 10 balance of the information required by Rule 
11 one that dictates as a plastic surgeon. 11 26(8)(4). 
12 THE COURT: Well, wouldn't your training 12 It is the plaintiffs who have decided 
13 physician from Spokane cover that area, too? 13 on their own that they want to take it another 
14 MS. JONES: But he has the surgical 14 step and take those depositions. They don't have 
15 background. We want to be able to present to the 15 to take those depositions. They are saying they 
16 jury someone who doesn't have a surgical 16 want to take those depositions. 
17 background who does this type of surgery. 17 And point of fact, Your Honor, on the 
18 That's the difference. That's the 18 defense side, most of what I do is medical 
19 reason for the three different doctors and the 19 malpractice. Probably less than 50 per cent of 
20 three different specialties that all are involved 20 the time do we take depositions of the opposing 
21 in the provision of cosmetic surgical care. 21 parties' experts, specifically because if there is 
22 And so that's why we take the position, 22 a Rule 26(8)(4) disclosure requirement in place or 
23 Your Honor -- No. 1, the argument is, well, we 23 an expert witness disclosure deadline, whether 
24 shouldn't have to go engage in discovery and take 24 it's by interrogatory or the court's scheduling 
25 all these depositions. 25 order, that rule governs. 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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And we expect and believe that as 
litigants, we are entitled to rely on those 
3 disclosures in order to set forth the opinions. 
4 So to the extent the argument is made, "Well, we 
shouldn't have to spend the money, you don't have 
to spend that money. If you choose to do so, 
5 
6 
7 that's fine," but that shouldn't be used as a 
16 
1 in March of this year, the discussion on page 6 of 
2 that decision, "We hold now that the trial court 
erred in limiting experts to only one per side to 3 
4 ea.ch relevant field of medicine. In particular,· 
5 on the critical issue of the deviation from 
6 accepted standards of medical care, the court's 
7 pretrial ruling was a mistake in exercise of its 
8 basis now, months before trial, to say that three 8 discretionary authority to control the 
9 standard of practice experts in a case involving a 9 presentation of evidence." 
10 patient who died of suspicious circumstances where 10 Now, the court goes on and talks about 
11 they have asked us for millions of dollars in 11 how important it is when the issue for which the 
12 damages -- this isn't a $50,000 car wreck case. 12 limitation is sought goes to a very critical issue 
13 They want millions of dollars in 13 in the case. 
14 damages -- that presenting three experts would be 14 Now, one of the points that was raised 
15 needlessly cumulative, or in violation of the 15 by opposing counsel during his argument, Your 
16 court's discretion under Rule 16(D) to limit us. 16 Honor, was that the defense would be parading 
We believe, and if the court has had a 17 witnesses, expert witnesses up, and that that 
' 
17 
18 chance to look at a view of those decisions that I 18 wasn't appropriate. 
19 have provided attached to my affidavit of counsel, 19 However, the Idaho Legislature seems to 
20 there is some very, I think, helpful discussion by 20 disagree, because in passing Idaho Code Section 
21 way of the reported decisions that I would like 21 6-1012, they specifically require expert witnesses 
22 the court to consider. 22 to put on the evidence. 
23 In particular, this recent decision 
24 from the New Jersey case that we cite, which is . 
25 the McLean versus Liberty Health Systems decided 
23 So without the presentation of experts, 
24 not only can the plaintiff not make a prima fade 
case, but we can't put on a defense for our 25 
17 18 
1 clients. So the Legislature has dictated -- and 1 standard of practice, two for causation. 
2 this is consistent in states across the nation -- 2 The issues in this case, Your Honor, 
3 that these medical malpractice cases do become a 3 are very interesting. The jury is going to be 
4 battle of experts, and that it is a question for 4 fascinated by the medicine in this case. They are 
5 the jury on the credibility of these experts, and 5 going to be fascinated because, obviously, we have 
6 whether or not they are experts that have adequate 6 a terrible outcome, where we have a patient that 
7 credentials, and are they professional witnesses? 7 died. 
8 Are these people that have valid 8 But we have fascinating issues of 
9 opinions that should be relied upon by the 9 medicine, insofar as we are trying to understand 
10 individual members of the jury in forming their 10 how the body responds to either urinary tract 
11 conclusions. 11 infections, to the seeding of bacteria allegedly 
12 And so I can appreciate the argument of 12 from lack of sterility, which is the plaintiff's 
13 plaintiff's counsel trying to even the numbers 13 argument, to issues of how these procedures are 
14 out, but plaintiff's counsel had every opportunity 14 performed. 
15 to list more experts, had he or she wanted to. 15 There are a host of issues, in addition 
16 And certainly in cases where the liability is 16 to which once the patient presented to the 
17 beyond question, I have seen many instances 17 hospital and Moore Medical Center, there are all 
18 involving David Comstock, for example, where he's 18 kinds of problems with her organs. Her various 
19 had no trouble getting multiple expert witnesses 19 organ systems were shutting down in response to a 
20 to support his opinion. 20 septic shock condition. 
21 In addition here, they have three 21 All of this is going to be covered by 
22 experts to cover the waterfront plus their damages 22 various experts in various capacities, and it's 
23 people, so they have three on standard of practice 23 critical to the defense position of presenting 
24 and causation. We have a total of five experts on 24 their case that we be allowed to present these 
25 standard of practice and causation; three for 25 witnesses that we have disclosed thus far. 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 Your Honor, that case is on page 6. 1 deposition, and I certainly would not presume to 
2 Most of what you see there, they talk about the 2 tell an experienced practitioner like Mr. Jones 
3 bottom paragraph on page 6 of that decision. 3 how to practice or defend his cases, but we have 
4 "We see no reason that expert testimony 4 chosen to take the depositions, and the rules 
5 should be treated wholly different from factual 5 allow us to take depositions of experts. 
6 testimony with respect to vital opinions that go 6 We want to hear what they have to say, 
7 to the heart of the disputed issues in this case. 7 we want to take their measure, and so we want to 
8 That's on point, Your Honor, with this 8 take the depositions of the defendant's trial 
9 issue I'm trying to address as to the limited 9 experts. 
10 number that we have here is not anywhere near on 10 And in Edmunds case, it wasn't 53 
11 par with what~was addressed .. ·in•the-·Edmunds--... ~······ · ·11 experts.· What·the·defense·made clear-an appeal· .. ·· 
12 decision, and we think that it's distinguishable 12 was the 53 witnesses that were disclosed included 
13 in that not only was that portion of the decision 13 50-some providers, treating providers, and that 
14 dicta, but in addition to that, the factual 14 there were actually just three experts that they 
15 distinguishing issues in this case are 15 were intending to call at trial. 
16 substantial. 16 And I don't think it's necessary for 
17 And while we recognize the court has 17 the court to look beyond Idaho for authority which 
18 that inherent authority from a discretionary 18 answers this question. And I'm looking at Edmunds 
19 standpoint, we don't believe the evidence 19 now, which reads, "We have long recognized that 
20 justifies the court exercising that discretion to 20 courts have broad inherent power to control 
21 grant the plaintiff's motion at this time and 21 discovery," and they cite a Bailey case. And 
22 would request that the court deny the motion. 22 then--
23 THE COURT: Response? 23 THE COURT: Well, I certainly agree that 
24 MR.McKAY: Thank you, Your Honor. I know 24 that's true. 
25 defense counsel says we don't have to take a 25 MR. McKAY: Right. And this includes the 
21 22 
1 inherent authority to limit the number of expert 1 reply brief because they argued that this is 
2 witnesses during discovery. And then they cite a 2 premature, that the court shouldn't -- the very 
3 Hansen case out of Nevada finding no abuse of 3 question the court started with, you know, why 
4 discretion where a district court disallowed three 4 should I consider this now? 
5 expert witnesses prior to trial. 5 Well, because Edmunds says you should, 
6 THE COURT: Right. 6 and that's what they argue, that you should not, 
7 MR. McKAY: And so two is a reasonable 7 and so we cite Edmunds for that reason. 
8 number. If something were to happen to one of 8 So I think it's appropriate for the 
9 their experts, they would have another expert. Or 9 court to consider that decision, and in fairness, 
10 if they choose to call their client, the defendant 10 their supplemental brief, but it's not dicta. It 
11 Dr. Kerr, they can then call another expert. 11 says what it says, and it says it for a reason. 
12 The problem is, they are seeking to 12 THE COURT: Well, and I agree entirely that 
13 call the same - they are seeking to call experts 13 the court has the power to limit the number of 
14 on the exact same issues, and they shouldn't be 14 expert witnesses in any case after exercising that 
15 permitted to do that. 15 discretion with consideration of all the factors 
16 It runs afoul of Rule 403, it runs 16 that the court should consider. 
17 afoul of Rule l(A), and it runs afoul of the 17 I don't think that -- the problem I see 
18 discovery rule, Rule 16, and so for that reason, 18 with the 403 early is that the overriding purpose 
19 we have asked the court to limit their abilities 19 of the rule is to make sure that all proceedings 
20 to call cumulative experts. 20 are just and that each side has a fair opportunity 
21 And Edmunds was not dicta, as the 21 to fully develop their positions with the ultimate 
22 defense argued in their supplemental motion. And 22 factfinders so that all cases should be justly and 
23 we don't quarrel with them having filed a 23 speedily tried. 
24 supplemental motion or brief. I know the rules 24 And I have no problem in a situation 
25 don't address that. But we cited Edmunds in our 25 where there is an abusive number of witnesses, 
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1 expert witnesses laid out, where it's pretty clear 1 a wise approach. 
2 from what you are seeing in the case that there is 2 But I do think that anyone who has 
3 a lot of hide the ball going on, and there is a 3 tried cases faces situations where testimony is 
4 level of gamesmanship that's basically designed to 4 quite cumulative, and the court has a 
5 put one party out of court because the expense is 5 responsibility to the jury to limit cumulative 
6 so enormous, and I don't think the court should 6 testimony, because it's simply not a good use of 
7 countenance that. 7 their time. 
8 I think that to allow parties to set an 8 The level of hostility that juries 
9 extraordinary number of experts and then to play 9 frequently demonstrate when that's going on tends 
10 hide the ball with which one is actually going to 10 to be highly damaging to the case for whoever is 
11 be the trial expert, I think the court should look 11 doing it. And for many reasons, it's a good idea 
12 carefully and deeply at those cases, and I think 12 for a court to be responsive to objections that 
13 courts can and should limit experts in some 13 testimony is becoming cumulative, or it's 
14 instances. 14 misleading, or it's creating a situation where 
15 The problem I have with this particular 15 there is undue consumption of time. 
16 motion is I don't think, No. 1, that a court 16 I think courts have to be responsive to 
17 should get into just keeping parity between the 17 those objections and deal with it, and it's a 
18 numbers of witnesses on both sides. 18 matter of treating the jurors with respect and 
19 I think that's too crude an approach, 19 making sure that they are not so flooded with 
20 and I think it's so crude that it lends itself to 20 irrelevant or repetitive information that they 
21 unfairness, so I don't think it would be 21 lose sight of what's important in that case. 
22 reasonable for a court to say, "Well, you can have 22 So I have no problem with the fact that 
23 one witness on one issue, and you can have one 23 the court has considerable power in that range. I 
24 witness on the other side of that issue." 24 do have -- it does seem to me, though, that this 
25 I don't think that in and of itself is 25 is not an unreasonable number of witnesses to 
25 26 
1 address the particular issues presented by this 1 farther out. 
2 case, and it seems to me that the more prudent 2 I think counsel's arguments are 
3 approach might be to consider the approach on 3 counterweight to the concern that maybe that's an 
4 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(B)(4), Subsection 4 unnecessary witness. It seems to me that counsel 
5 C, which is to allow discovery to go forward -- 5 makes some good reasons why that could be a useful 
6 because I don't think that having three additional 6 witness, but it does present logistical 
7 witnesses is an enormous burden on discovery, and 7 challenges, and it seems to me it might be more 
8 to apportion the fees somewhat differently for 8 reasonable to deal with that by apportionment of 
9 that reason. 9 fees differently. 
10 For example, it does seem to be for the 10 MS. JONES: Your Honor, with respect to that 
11 witness from Tennessee, it might be reasonable, 11 issue--I'm sure Mr. McKay was going to say this 
12 and I would apportion the fees to that deposition 12 as well -- lead counsel for the plaintiffs is 
13 differently, because geographically that's going 13 actually in Alabama. 
14 to present some challenges, and there may be some 14 THE COURT: Oh, well, then that should be 
15 logistical issues with that. 15 way simpler. I still might require some 
16 So what I would rather do in this 16 apportionment of the fees for the farthest 
17 particular case is allow you to go forward, to 17 geographical witnesses, also in a different 
18 give you some additional time in case the setting 18 specialty. He is a family physician. 
19 of this motion has put you too close to your 19 Seems to me it makes a great deal of 
20 cutoff, to give you some additional time so you 20 sense to have that witness from Spokane because he 
21 can arrange the 'depositions of these witnesses, 21 has very relevant experience. You have a local 
22 and I may -- I'm inclined to require that the 22 witness. There are many reasons why that's a good 
23 defense, at least initially, carry at least half 23 choice. 
24 the fees for the Tennessee witness, because it 24 And so it seems to me it's the family 
25 seems to me it's a family physician, a little bit 25 physician in Tennessee who's really the one who 
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1 raises a question mark beside his name, and it 
2 seems to me that apportioning the fees and giving 
3 him some flexibility on your discovery deadline 
4 might be the better way to adjust for that if you 
5 need it, because I think to bar it altogether at a 
6 discovery stage is a big step. 
7 I wouldn't have any problem when you 
8 are talking about loads of witnesses, because I 
9 have certainly seen the fall of Carthage approach 
10 to litigation, and I think courts have an absolute 
11 affirmativei"dUty tb"inake sure that'doesn'rgo on:· · 
12 But this doesn't seem to me to be that 
13 unreasonable so that the court should completely 
14 bar it. 
15 So I'm not going to limit the experts, 
16 but I will give you flexibility on your 
17 scheduling, and I will also require that there be 
18 an apportionment of the fees so that the entire 
19 cost of that deposition isn't placed on the 
20 plaintiffs. 
21 MR. McKAY: I understand, Your Honor, and I 
22 just want to be -- make sure I understand. 
23 THE COURT: Now, that's not precluding you 
24 from objecting at trial to testimony being 
25 cumulative, because it seems to me that there is a 
29 
1 get through. 
2 MR. McKAY: Right, right. And so -- but the 
3 operative question is going to be whether they 
4 have the opinion that he violated or did not 
5 violate the standard of care applicable to him, 
6 and so if there is this parade of experts saying 
7 the exact same thing, we submit that it will be 
8 cumulative. 
9 And I respect the court's ruling. I 
10 just want to be clear, we plan to, you know, front 
11 this issue at trial. 
12 THE COURT: Oh, I expect you will. 
13 MR. McKAY: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: And, frankly, I'm never opposed 
15 to people pursuing that where it's warranted, 
16 because it's a dreadful use of jury time to be 
17 unduly cum1:,1lative, and I think it's not sensible 
18 for a trial judge to allow it. 
19 MR. McKAY: I agree. Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 MR. JONES: Your Honor, may I just make sure 
21 I clarify and understand the court's order? 
22 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
23 MR. JONES: So the motion as it's been 
24 submitted is denied. 
25 THE COURT: Correct. 
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1 risk of that, and I don't think three extra 
2 witnesses because you already expect the doctor to 
3 cover -- stick up for himself -- I don't think 
4 three extra witnesses is one of those deals where 
5 you are worried that the jury is going to see that 
6 this side of the teeter totter has more people on 
7 it than this side. 
8 But -- and that can be dealt with in an 
9 instruction, but I think it could be a real 
10 problem -- I certainly think it could be a 
11 potential problem; and I have·ho ptb}jlein with 
12 considering the objection at that time. 
13 MR. McKAY: Right. And I think this court 
14 should anticipate that we will be making that 
15 objection. 
16 THE COURT: You bet. Right. I will 
17 anticipate that right now. 
18 MR. McKAY: Right, right and, of course, the 
19 statute that Mr. Jones cites, Idaho Code 6-1012, I 
20 mean, it defines the standard of care, and it's 
21 not that, you know, the fact that these physicians 
22 come from different backgrounds. It doesn't 
23 permit them to then say the standard of care is 
24 different. 
25 THE COURT: Still they have more hoops to 
30 
1 MR. JONES: The court will allow the parties 
2 to extend discovery deadlines, if necessary, to 
3 allow the expert depositions to occur, and then as 
4 relates to the deposition of Dr. Gregory Lawrence, 
5 who's in Tennessee, that as it relates to his fee 
6 for his deposition, for his deposition time, which 
7 is normally covered by the plaintiffs, that the 
8 defense will pay half of that cost. 
9 THE COURT: Right. 
10 MR. JONES: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: I think that would be a 
12 reasonable approach at this point, and we will 
13 deal with the rest when it comes up. But, no, I 
14 would welcome objections to cumulative testimony, 
15 if there is cumulative testimony. 
16 MR. JONES: Does the court require an order? 
17 I'm not -- I'm only bringing that up because we 
18 have lead counsel for the plaintiffs that are in 
19 Tennessee. 
20 THE COURT: That might be a good idea. 
21 MR. JONES: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and run 
23 it by counsel first. 
24 MR. McKAY: Thank you. And the court is 
25 saying that the deadline for taking expert 
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001216



























depositions, that applies to defendants' experts, 
because as I understand it --
THE COURT: Yes, exactly. 
MR. McKAY: -- the defendant doesn't intend 
to depose our experts. 
THE COURT: No. That's just the /:·- to give, 
you a little bit more -- your side a little bit 
more flexibility in dealing with this so that you 
can get their information, because it seems to'me 
it's fairer at this point--
MR. McKAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- to allow both sides to 
explore the other side's experJs and views --
MR. McKAY: Okay. Thankyou,,Your Honor. 
THE COURT: -- than to cut it off. 
MR. McKAY: All right; Thank you. 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to Rule 
51(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Court's amended scheduling order 
of September 9, 2013, and submits Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions and Proposed Special 
Verdict Form. In accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a)(l), an original copy of 
Plaintiffs proposed instructions is attached hereto at Exhibit A; a duplicate copy is attached 
hereto at Exhibit B. Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form is attached hereto at Exhibit C. 
Plaintiff hereby requests that the Court give the following pattern jury instructions, some 
of which have been modified to comport with the underlying circumstances of this case: 
• IDJI 1.07 (Facts Not in Dispute); 
• IDJI 2.10.3 (Charging Elements of Medical Negligence); 
• IDJI 2.20 (Definition ofNegligence); 
• IDJI 2.10.1 (Standard of Care: Health Care Professionals are Specialists); 
• IDJI 2.30.2 (Proximate Cause - "Substantial Factor" Without "But For" Test); 
• IDJI 6.40.1 (Agency Defined); 
• IDJI 6.41.1 (Agency Admitted); 
• IDJI 2.25 (Definition of Willful or Reckless); 
• IDJI 9.05 (Damages for Wrongful Death); 
• IDJI 9.13 (Present Cash Value); and 
• IDJI 9.15 (Mortality Tables). 
Additionally, Plaintiff requests that the jury be instructed on the presumption of general damages 
upon the death of a spouse, as set forth in Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 236, 141 P .3d 
1099, 1105 (2006) (quoting Garner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 294, 206 P.2d 539, 543 (1949)). 
Plaintiff also requests that the jury be instructed as to the differentiation between negligence and 
2 
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informed consent claims, as set forth in Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 894, 120 P.3d 278, 282 
(2005) and Shabinaw v. Brown, 125 Idaho 705, 709, 874 P.2d 516,520 (1994) (same). 
Plaintiff further requests that the proposed special verdict form be employed during the 
trial of this matter. 
Dated this 22nd day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
-~--~--2< 
David Z. Nevin D 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form by delivering 
the same to the following by hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL, PLLC 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 






PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
(Facts Not in Dispute) · 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
At all relevant times, Defendant Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. was a licensed medical doctor 
residing in Idaho and who practiced medicine in the City of Eagle, County of Ada, State of 
Idaho. At all relevant times, Dr. Kerr acted within the course and scope of his employment as an 
employee of Silk Touch Laser, LLP. 
On July 21, 2010, Dr. Kerr performed liposuction and fat transfer procedures on Krystal 
Ballard. Krystal Ballard died on July 26, 2010. At the time of Krystal Ballard's death, Charles 
and Krystal Ballard were married and living together in Mountain Home, Idaho, while both were 
stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Mountain Home, Idaho. 







PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
(Charging Elements of Medical Negligence - Dr. Brian Calder Kerr) 
On his claim of medical negligence against Dr. Brian Calder Kerr for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the Plaintiff has· the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Kerr's failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these 
instructions; 
2. That the acts of Dr. Kerr, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the Plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 










PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
(Charging Elements of Medical Negligence - Silk Touch Laser, LLP) 
On his claim of medical negligence against Silk Touch Laser, LLP for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That an agent of Silk Touch Laser, LLP, failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care as defined in these instructions; 
2. That· the acts of the agent, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the Plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 










PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
(Standard of Care: Health Care Professionals are Specialists) 
A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty to possess 
and exercise that degree and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by other health care 
providers of the same or similar specialty practicing in the community in which such care is 
provided. It is further the duty of health care providers to use reasonable care and diligence in 
the exercise of their skill and the application of their learning. 
Defendant, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr is a health care provider within the meaning of this 
instruction. 








PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
(Negligence Separate from Informed Consent) 
The issue of negligence is completely separate from that of informed consent. A 
physician can be liable for failure to obtain informed consent before treatment without being 
negligent in the actual treatment of the patient. The opposite is also true in that a physician can 
be negligent without failing to obtain before treatment. 
Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 894, 120 P .3d 278, 282 (2005) (informed consent vs. 








PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
(Proximate Cause - "Substantial Factor" Without "But For" Test) 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss, or the damage complained of. It is sufficient if 
it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss, or damage. It is not a proximate cause 
if the injury, loss, or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the death regardless of the extent to 









PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
(Agency Defined) 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act 
for or in the place of the principal. . The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within 









PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(Agency Admitted-Dr. Kerr) 
There is no dispute in this case that, at all relevant times, Dr. Kerr was acting within the 
scope of his authority as an agent of the principal, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, which was doing 
business as Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch Med Spa And Laser Center, and Silk Touch Med 
Spa , Laser, and Lipo of Boise. Therefore, Silk Touch Laser, LLP is responsible for Dr. Kerr's 
conduct at all relevant times. 








PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(Agency Admitted - Briana Kerr) 
There is no dispute in this case that, at all relevant times, Briana Kerr was acting within 
the scope of her authority as an agent of the principals, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr and Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, which was doing business as Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch Med Spa And Laser 
Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise. Therefore, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr 
and Silk Touch Laser, LLP are responsible for Briana Kerr's conduct at all relevant times. 








PLAINTIFF'S INSRUCTION NO. 10 
(Definition of "Willful or Reckless") 
Willful or reckless misconduct, when used in these instructions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, means more than ordinary negligence. Willful or reckless misconduct 
means intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should 
have known not only that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but also 
that his actions involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
IDJI 2.25 (Modified to reflect use of "willful or reckless" from I.C. § 6-1603 regarding the cap 
on non-economic losses); see also Comment (citing c_ases for the proposition that "[t]here 
appears to be no distinction between 'reckless' and 'willful and wanton' or 'willful or 








PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
(Damages for Wrongful Death) 
If the jury decides Charles Ballard is entitled to recover from the Defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Mr. Ballard for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by Defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
1. The reasonable cost of Krystal Ballard's funeral. 
2. The reasonable value of necessary medical care and expenses incurred prior to 
Krystal Ballard's death. 
3. The reasonable value to Charles Ballard of the loss of Krystal Ballard's services, 
training, comfort, conjugal relationship, and society and the present cash value of any such loss that 
is reasonably certain to occur in the future, taking into consideration the life expectancy of Mr. 
Ballard, Krystal Ballard's age and normal life expectancy, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
4. Charles Ballard's loss of financial support from Krystal Ballard, and the present cash 
value of financial support Krystal Ballard would have provided to Charles Ballard in the future, but 
for Krystal Ballard's death, taking into account Mr. Ballard's life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's age 
and normal life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Death is inevitable. Although the law compensates for the untimeliness of a death caused 
by another, no damages are allowed for grief or sorrow. 











PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
(General Damage's Presumed Upon Death of Spouse) 
General damages, such as loss of society and companionship, will be presumed upon 
death when the plaintiff in a wrongful death action is the spouse of the decedent. 
Horner v: Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 236, 141 P.3d 1099, 1105 (2006) (quoting Garner v. 








PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
(Present Cash Value) 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the 
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable 
rate of in_terest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the 









PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
(Mortality Tables -Charles Ballard) 
Charles Ballard is thirty-one years old. Under a standard table of mortality, the life 
expectancy of a thirty-one year-old male is 46.4 years. This figure is not conclusive. It is an 
actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life based upon statistical samples of 
death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be considered in connection with all 
other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy of Charles Ballard, including his occupation, 
health, habits, and other activities. 
IDJI 9.15 (Modified to include information relevant to Charles Ballard); Elizabeth Arias, Ph.D., 









PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
(Mortality ,Tables - Krystal Ballard) 
Krystal Ballard was twenty-seven years old at the time of her death. Under a standard 
table of mortality, the life expectancy of a twenty-seven year-old female is 54.5 years. This 
figure is also not conclusive. It, too, is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining 
length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This 
data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life 
expectancy of the decedent, Krystal Ballard, including her occupation, health, habits, and other 
activities. 
IDJI 9.15 (Modified to include information relevant to Krystal Ballard); Elizabeth Arias, Ph.D., 













The following facts are not in dispute: 
At all relevant times, Defendant Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. was a licensed medical doctor -
residing in Idaho and who practiced medicine in the City of Eagle, County of Ada, State of 
Idaho. At all relevant times, Dr. Kerr acted within the course and scope of his employment as an 
employee of Silk Touch Laser, LLP. 
On July 21, 2010, Dr. Kerr performed liposuction and fat transfer procedures on Krystal 
Ballard. Krystal Ballard died on July 26, 2010. At the time of Krystal Ballard's death, Charles 
and Krystal Ballard were married and living together in Mountain Home, Idaho, while both were 
stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Mountain Home, Idaho. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
On his claim of medical negligence against Dr. Brian Calder Kerr for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Kerr's failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these 
instructions; 
2. That the acts of Dr. Kerr, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3: That the Plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
001241
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On his claim of medical negligence against Silk Touch Laser, LLP for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That an agent of Silk Touch Laser, LLP, failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the acts of the agent, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the Plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 




A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty to possess 
and exercise that degree and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by other health care 
providers of the same or similar specialty practicing in the community in which such care is 
provided. It is further the duty of health care providers to use reasonable care and diligence in 
the exercise of their skill and the application of their learning. 




The issue of negligence is completely separate from that of informed consent. A 
physician can be liable for failure to obtain informed consent before treatment without being 
negligent in the actual treatment of the patient. The opposite is also true in that a physician can 
be negligent without failing to obtain before treatment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss, or the damage complained of. It is sufficient if 
it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss, or damage. It is not a proximate cause 
if the injury, loss, or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the death regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act 
for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within 
the scope of the agent's scope of authority. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
There is no dispute in this case that, at all relevant times, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr was 
acting w~thin the scope of his authority as an agent of the principal, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, 
which was doing business as Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch Med Spa And Laser Center, and 
Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise. Therefore, Silk Touch Laser, LLP is responsible 
for Dr. Kerr's conduct at all relevant times. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
There is no dispute in this case that, at all relevant times, Briana Kerr was acting within 
the scope of her authority as an agent of the principals, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr and Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, which was doing business as Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch Med Spa And Laser 
Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser, and Lipo of Boise. Therefore, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr 
and Silk Touch Laser, LLP are responsible for Briana Kerr's conduct at all relevant times. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Willful or reckless misconduct, when used in these instructions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, means more than ordinary negligence. Willful or reckless misconduct 
means intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should 
have known not only that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but also 
that his actions involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the jury decides Charles Ballard is entitled to recover from the Defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Mr. Ballard for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by Defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
1. The reasonable cost of Krystal Ballard's funeral. 
2. The reasonable value of necessary medical care and expenses incurred prior to 
Krystal Ballard's death. 
3. The reasonable value to Charles Ballard of the loss of Krystal Ballard's services, 
training, comfort, conjugal relationship, and society and the present cash value of any such loss that 
is reasonably certain to occur in the future, taking into consideration the life expectancy of Mr. 
Ballard, Krystal Ballard's age and normal life expectancy, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
4. Charles Ballard's loss of financial support from Krystal Ballard, and the present cash 
value of financial support Krystal Ballard would have provided to Charles Ballard in the future, but 
for Krystal Ballard's death, taking into account Mr. Ballard's life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's age 
and normal life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Death is inevitable. Although the law compensates for the untimeliness of a death caused 
by another, no damages are allowed for grief or sorrow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
General damages, such as loss of society and companionship, will be presumed upon 
death when the plaintiff in a wrongful death action is the spouse of the decedent. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the 
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable 
rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the 
future damages will be incurred. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Charles Ballard is thirty-one years old. Under a standard table of mortality, the life 
expectancy of a thirty-one year-old male is 46.4 years. This figure is not conclusive. It is an 
actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life based upon statistical samples of 
death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be considered in connection with all 
other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy of Charles Ballard, including his occupation, 
health, habits, and other activities. 
001253
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Krystal Ballard was twenty-seven years old at the time of her death. Under a standard 
table of mortality, the life expectancy of a twenty-seven year-old female is 54.5 years. This 
figure is also not conclusive. It, too, is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining 
length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This 
data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as follows: 
QUESTION N0.1: Did Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care 
in his treatment of Krystal Ballard, and if so, was that breach a proximate cause of Krystal 
Ballard's death? 
ANSWER: Yes L_J No L_J 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did Silk Touch Laser, LLP breach the applicable standard of health care 
in its treatment of Krystal Ballard, and if so, was that breach a proximate cause of Krystal 
Ballard's death? 
ANSWER: Yes L_J No L_J 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1 or Question No. 2, you should answer Question 
Nos. 3 through 5. If you answered "No" to Question No. 1 and Question No. 2, you should skip 
all remaining questions and sign the Special Verdict. 
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·' 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the conduct of either or both of the Defendants "willful or reckless" 
as defined in the Court's instructions? 
ANSWER: Yes L_] No L_] 
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount of economic damages sustained by Plaintiff, 
Charles Ballard? 
ANSWER: $ -----------
QUESTION NO. 5: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by Plaintiff, 
Charles Ballard? 
ANSWER: $ -----------
Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your 
deliberations. 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 





COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 9-102, Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(c), and the Court's Amended Scheduling Order 
of September 9, 2013, and responds to Defendants' Motions in Limine as follows. An Affidavit 
of Counsel, to which all exhibits referenced herein are attached, is filed contemporaneously with 
these responses. 
1. DEFENDANTS' FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS IN LIMINE1 SHOULD BE 
DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PUT ON 
EVIDENCE OF DR. O'NEIL'S COMPETENCE TO SERVE AS THE SOURCE 
OF ALL THREE DEFENSE STANDARD OF CARE EXPERTS' KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE. 
In Defendants' Memorandum of Law regarding the exclusion of malpractice and board of 
licensing matters, they reference only such evidence as pertaining to "Defendants" or their 
"experts." Their proposed order, however, broadens the scope of the proposed exclusion to 
include "defense witnesses" including specifically, "Dr. Kelly O'Neil." Dr. O'Neil is neither a 
Defendant here, nor is he a disclosed expert. He is, however, the sole source of information 
about the standard of care in Boise in 2010, upon which Defendants' experts relied to develop 
their opinions. Indeed, all three of Defendants' experts on the standard of care testified that they 
relied on Dr. O'Neil to tell them what the standard of care was in Boise, Idaho in 2010. (See 
Exhibit A, Lundeby Dep. 51:6-13; Exhibit B, Stiller Dep. 18:2-9; Exhibit C, Laurence Dep. 
55:6- 56:15). 
Plaintiff must be permitted to explore the reliability of this central source, as it is a 
demonstrably unreliable one. During his medical career, Dr. O'Neil has been subject to 
numero~s disciplinary proceedings. Specifically: 
1 Defendants move for an order in limine on six separate issues. (See Defs.' Mots. in Limine.) 
Defendants' memorandum of law, however, contains support for only three of those motions. (See Defs.' 










• In 1998, Dr. O'Neil entered into a Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order with the 
Medical Board of California, based on· Dr. O'Neil's admissions that he committed 
"repeated acts of negligence" in the care and treatment of two separate patients. 
(Exhibit D, 1998 Agreement at 3.) 
• Also in 1998, the Idaho State Board of Medicine adopted and incorporated the terms of 
the 1998 California Stipulated Settlement, for the purpose of reciprocal discipline. 
(Exhibit E, 1998 Idaho Order.) 
• In 2004, Dr. O'Neil entered into a Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order with the 
Medical Board of California, arising from allegations that, in 2000, he was grossly 
negligent and/or incompetent and/or committed repeated negligent acts in his care and 
treatment of two female patients who developed post-operative complications after 
being transferred to a hotel for a two day recovery stay pursuant to his arrangements. 
Both patients required emergency hospitalization. (Exhibit F, 2004 Agreement.) 
• In 2005, the Medical Board of California issued a Public Reprimand following Dr. 
O'Neil's probation for the year 2000 infractions. (Exhibit G, Public Reprimand.) 
• In 2007, Dr. O'Neil entered into another Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order 
with the Medical Board of California based on his actions with respect to an elderly 
woman's elective cosmetic surgery and her resulting complications. (Exhibit H, 2007 
Agreement.) 
• In 2008, the Idaho State Board of Medicine issued a Stipulation and Order resolving Dr. 
O'Neil's application for an Idaho license to practice medicine and surgery. The Order 
stated the Board's concerns that Dr. O'Neil "had several malpractice cases" and that 
"the California State Board issued a disciplinary Order" against him. "In addition, 
Applicant incorrectly answered various questions on the application." The Board 
ultimately imposed a fine and issued Dr. O'Neil a restricted license to practice medicine. 
(Exhibit I, 2008 Order.) 
• In 2009, the Medical Board of California formally adopted a Proposed Decision 
ordering that Dr. O'Neil be placed on probation for failing to accurately disclose his 
prior discipline in applications he submitted to Idaho and his discipline in the State of 
Idaho. (Exhibit J, 2009 Decision.) 
The similarity of these infractions to the circumstances of Ms. Ballard's death, coupled with their 
numerosity, overwhelmingly compel a conclusion that they are relevant to whether Dr. O'Neil is 
a trustworthy source as to the standard of care. For this reason, and for all of those detailed 
3 
001260
below, Defendants' motion must be denied. 
a. Dr. O'Neil's Background is Relevant Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 et 
seq., Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b), and Idaho Courts' Application of Idaho 
Code§ 6-1012. 
Putting aside for the moment that Dr. O'Neil is not in fact their "expert," Defendants' 
claim, without explanation, that evidence of an expert's malpractice or licensing revocations is 
simply irrelevant. To the contrary, Dr. O'Neil's history of misconduct, which necessarily 
implicates his credibility and competency, is directly relevant to his knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care. Such evidence is thus admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 402. The fact 
that Dr. O'Neil's opinions form the basis of all three of the defense experts' knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care must outweigh any concern about unfair prejudice under Rule 403. 
Furthermore, Dr. O'Neil's failure to provide truthful responses in his application for an 
Idaho license, which resulted in the imposition of a fine and a restricted license, brings his 
truthfulness within the scope of I.R.E. 608(b ). Providing false information to the State Licensing 
Board is surely a "specific instanc[e] of conduct" that is "probative of [Dr. O'Neil's] truthfulness 
or untruthfulness" and thus appropriate for inquiry on cross-examination. See I.R.E. 608(b ); see 
also discussion, infra, at pages 13-14. 
Underscoring the relevance analysis, this dispute arises from the rule set forth in Idaho 
Code Chapter 10, Medical Malpractice, requiring that an expert's testimony as to the applicable 
standard of care be judged "in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the 
same class in the same community, trucing into account his or her training, experience, and fields 
of medical specialization, if any." Idaho Code § 6-1012. In Dunlap ex rel. Dunlap v. Garner, 
127 Idaho 599 (1995), the Court found that it is sufficient for an out-of-state expert to gain the 
requisite familiarity with the standards of the community by conferring with "local authorized 
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personneI'' and to state that the standard did not deviate from the national standard. 127 Idaho at 
606 ( emphasis added). 
This allowance of consultation with local experts comes with close restrictions. The out-
of-state expert witness must not only show that he or she is familiar with the local standard of 
care for the relevant timeframe and specialty, but the expert must also state how he or she 
became familiar with that standard of care. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 116 (2011) 
(citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160 (2002)). Furthermore, there 
"must be evidence showing that the Idaho physician knows the applicable standard of care." 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37 (2007) (district court properly sustained objection to 
testimony of out-of-state doctor who did not know nature ofldaho doctor's experience or when it 
occurred); see also Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 166 (out-of-state expert's opinion lacked foundation 
when there was no showing that Boise physician would know proper standard of care). Failure 
to strictly adhere to these requirements has resulted in a finding of inadmissibility as to the out-
of-state expert's testimony. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 213 (1994) (Because there 
was no indication that expert inquired of a local doctor, and plaintiff did not state that the local 
standard of care was the same as the national standard, there was not sufficient foundation in 
expert's· affidavit to show that expert had actual knowledge of the applicable community 
standard.); Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801 (2012) (The Court is not required to believe 
out-of-state expert's "conclusory statements that the local unidentified chiropractor was familiar 
with the standard of care.") 
The close scrutiny of an out-of-state expert's consultation with a local "expert" compels 
the conclusion that the local expert's qualifications and competency are admissible to probe the 
foundation for the out-of-state expert's testimony. Plaintiff must, therefore, be permitted to 
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explore this highly relevant information, which forms the basis of not one, but three experts' 
opinions. The jury must be permitted to determine for itself whether Dr. O'Neil indeed "knows 
the standard of care." Ramos, 144 Idaho at 37. 
b. Dr. O'Neil is tlte Source on Which Defendants' Experts Relied, Making His 
Numerous Suspensions and Disciplinary Proceedings Admissible Under 
I.R.E. 705. 
Defendants argue only that Plaintiff be prohibited from mentioning whether "any 
Defendant or defense expert has been sued for malpractice or has been the subject of any prior 
administrative licensing matter." (Defs' Mem. of Law 4-7.) Of course, had Dr. O'Neil actually 
been proposed as an expert, Plaintiff would have had an opportunity to file a challenge to his 
qualifications. Defendants should not be able to hide behind the fact that Dr. O'Neil is not 
testifying when his qualifications are, in fact, at issue due to the permitted reliance on local 
physicians by out-of-state experts. 
The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert is "not rigid" and can 
be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39 (1998). A 
qualified expert is one who possesses "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." 
I.R.E. 702. The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the 
individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony. State v. Burrow, 142 
Idaho 328, 330 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855 (1992)). It is 
axiomatic that Defendants also be prepared to lay foundational evidence that the expert behind 
the expert be qualified on the topic of his or her testimony -- and that Plaintiff be permitted to 
explore that evidence through cross-examination. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence further provide that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of 
opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts 
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or data, provided that the court may require otherwise, and provided further that, if requested 
pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying facts or data were disclosed. The expert may in 
any event be required to disclose the underlying/acts or data on cross-examination." 1.R.E. 705. 
This is all Plaintiff wishes to explore here. Dr. O'Neil is the "underlying fact" of Defendants' 
experts' testimony, and his competence and credibility should be required to be "disclosed." 
c. Alternatively, the Court Should Treat Dr. O'Neil as an Absent Expert and 
Permit Examination of his Conduct as Evidence of his Competence, 
Credibility and Motivations. 
Even if Dr. O'Neil was a testifying expert, Plaintiff would be able to examine his past 
misconduct as evidence of his credibility and competence. Idaho law is clear that expert 
credibility is a question for the jury. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698 (1998). 
Based on this reasoning, the Court in Raybeck v. Danbury Orthopedic Assocs., 805 A.2d 130 
(Conn. App. 2002) upheld the trial court's admission of evidence that an expert witness treated 
his own wife's wrist fracture with a cast where he asserted the standard of care was to use pins, 
noting "it is well settled that the credibility of an expert witness is a matter to be determined by 
the trier of fact." 805 A.2d at 142. Here, Dr. O'Neil is essentially an absent expert, and his 
credibility should be explored for the jury's benefit. 
Consistent with the Raybeck decision, courts across the country have routinely permitted 
cross-examination of an expert witness regarding prior acts, professional license suspension, or 
malpractice suits in order to probe the witness's competency, credibility, and motivations. See 
Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp.I Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1st Cir. 1991) (permitting cross-
examination of an expert witness concerning the suspension of his license as a notary for failure 
to submit required reports, as such inquiry was determined to go to the expert's "standing in the 
community"); Ferris v. Tenn. Log Homes, Inc., 4:06CV-35-M, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26272, *8 
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(W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2010) ("plaintiffs' cross-examination regarding [expert's] prior disciplinary 
proceedings would be probative of [his] competency"; Wischmeyer v. Schanz, 536 N.W.2d 760, 
766 (Mich. 1995) (evidence of prior failed surgeries performed by expert witness admissible to 
show witness's lack of competency); Hock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1257 
(Colo. 1994) (permitting cross-examination of defense medical expert about a civil suit in which 
the expert was a party because the questions were relevant to the expert's credibility and bias); 
Hayes v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 38 Conn. App. 471, 661 A.2d 123, 126 (Conn. App. 1995) 
(trial court erred in precluding plaintiff from questioning defense expert about a medical 
malpractice suit brought against him; an "important function of cross-examination is the 
exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying"); Underhill v. Stephenson, 756 S.W.2d 459, 461 
(Ky. 1988) (trial court erred in prohibiting plaintiff from cross-examining defendant's medical 
expert regarding unrelated medical malpractice case pending against him to show expert's bias); 
Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d 664, 674 (Me. 1997) (trial court erred in barring cross-examination of 
defense expert with respect to a settlement, without an admission of liability, of a prior medical 
malpractice case; the excluded evidence was relevant to a "crucial issue, bias or interest, and if 
admitted, could have had a controlling influence on a material aspect of the case, i.e., whether 
defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care"); Willoughby v. Wilkins, 310 S.E.2d 90, 
97-98 (N.C. App. 1983) (trial judge erred in barring cross-examination of defendants' medical 
expert regarding prior medical malpractice claim; "evidence of prior medical negligence claims 
brought against the expert witness is admissible to show bias or interest on the part of the 
expert.") 
This line of cases illustrates that the cases cited by Defendants in fact represent a 
minority and narrow view regarding the exclusion of evidence about an expert's malpractice or 
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license revocations. Notably, three of the cases cited in Defendants' brief excluded such 
evidence because of its extremely prejudicial effect on the expert personally. See Noble v. 
Lansche, 735 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (evidence that expert physician voluntarily 
surrendered license to dispense narcotics would have revealed that the expert suffered from 
personal addiction); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (involved "highly 
extraordinary cross-examination with matters involving the doctor's handling of female 
patients"; court's main concern was that counsel conducting examination had formerly 
represented the expert in the disciplinary proceeding); Morrow v. Stivers, 836 S.W.2d 424, 429 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (subject testimony about relinquished license would have involved 
implication that expert had sex with patients and contracted hepatitis, making it unduly 
prejudicial). Here, no such salacious details are present, and Dr. O'Neil will not even be on the 
witness stand to potentially face embarrassment about his disciplinary actions. 
In another of Defendants' cases, Heschelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1990), the court forbade "[ m ]ere unproven accusations of malpractice stated in a 
complaint" because such accusations "cannot be used as a basis for attacking a physician's 
knowledge or credibility." Here, the accusations go far beyond mere allegations, and were 
instead the basis of formal disciplinary proceedings and orders. 
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff must be permitted to explore Dr. O'Neil's 
qualifications, competence, and ability to serve as the sole source of Defendants' evidence 
regarding the applicable standard of care. Therefore, Defendants' first and second motions in 
limine should be denied. 
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2. DEFENDANTS' THIRD MOTION IN LIM/NE SHOULD BE DENIED. 
a. Defendants' Retained Expert, Dr. Gregory Laurence, has been Charged with 
Federal Felony Offenses Related to his Medical Practice and the Criminal 
Charges and Evidence Underlying the Criminal Charges are Admissible. 
Defendants have retained Dr. Gregory Laurence of Tennessee and intend to call him as 
an expert witness on the standard of care. To buttress his testimony and credibility, Defendants 
seek to admit in evidence at trial Dr. Laurence's curriculum vitae, which expounds on his 
accomplishments, honors, awards, and purported standing in the medical community, and have 
him also testify to these various matters before the jury. (See Exhibit N, Dr. Laurence's CV and 
Defs.' Ans. to Pl.'s Third Set of Discovery 42, July 22, 2013 ("Dr. Laurence will testify 
regarding his various publications, honors and university appointments as set forth in his 
curriculum vitae .... He will also discuss his various society memberships .... ").) 
In presenting the foregoing picture of Dr. Laurence to the jury, Defendants seek to 
conceal that Dr. Laurence has been charged with serious federal criminal felony offenses related 
to his medical practice. These charges, which Defendants euphemistically characterize as "tax 
evasion," arise out of his medical practice and call into question his character for truthfulness, his 
fitness to practice, and his qualifications to render an opinion concerning the standard by which 
Idaho physicians practice. Additionally, Dr. Laurence faces the very real possibility of 
prolonged imprisonment, imposition of substantial fines, other financial penalties, and the loss of 
his license to practice medicine. These significant financial consequences bear on Dr. 
Laurence's potential motive to serve and testify as a retained expert in this case. 
b. Dr. Laurence Is Charged with Federal Criminal Felonies Arising Out of his 
Medical Practice. 
On May 8, 2013, a federal grand jury in the District of Colorado returned a six count 
indictment charging Dr. Laurence and two co-defendants with various felony offenses ranging 
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from Conspiracy to Defraud the United States to Corruptly Endeavoring to Obstruct or Impede 
the Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws. (See Exhibit K, Indictment, United 
States v. Eva Melissa Sugar, Jerry Lynn Roberts and Gregory Nathan Laurence, U.S. District 
Court, District of Colorado, Criminal Case No. 13-cr-00-193 JLK.) Dr. Laurence was charged 
with this latter crime, as well as Obstruction of Justice. (Id at Counts 5 and 6.) After being 
charged, Dr. Laurence was ordered to surrender his passport and remains free on a personal 
recognizance bond pending trial. (See Exhibit L, Docket No. 19 (Order Setting Conditions of 
Release as to Gregory Nathan Laurence on PR Bond); Exhibit M, Docket No. 22 (Receipt of 
Surrendered Passport as to Gregory Nathan Laurence).) 
Dr. Laurence's medical practice is central to these felony charges. The Indictment at the 
outset of Count 5 alleges: "At all times relevant to the Indictment, Gregory LAURENCE was a 
resident of Tennessee. LAURENCE was a doctor who operated two businesses, Germantown 
Aesthetics, LP ("GA") and Germantown Family Care & Obstetrics, LP ('GFCO')." (Indictment 
at ,r 14.) The Indictment proceeds to describe a sophisticated scheme whereby Dr. Laurence, 
over a nearly seven year period, set up various fictitious trust accounts and entities using his wife 
to facilitate their operation and caused GFCO to issue checks payable to the fictitious trust 
entities, which payments he falsely claimed were legitimate deductions or costs of goods sold, 
thereby reducing GFCO's taxable income. (Id. at 12-13.) The Indictment further describes how 
Dr. Laurence disguised the existence of his cosmetic medical practice, Germantown Aesthetics 
("GA"), and how Dr. Laurence did not file federal income tax returns for this entity for a five-
year period. (Id at 13-14.) It is further charged that Dr. Laurence used another fictitious trust 
entity to pay himself and his employees at GA and GFCO as "independent contractors" to avoid 
paying taxes, that he failed to issue those employees required tax forms, and that he improperly 
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used funds from a so-called Banking Unincorporated Business Organization ("BUBO") account 
to pay for business expenses, school tuition for his children, cars, and credit card payments. (Id. 
at 14.) 
In Count 6 of the Indictment charging Dr. Laurence with Obstruction of Justice, it is 
alleged that, after he was contacted by federal agents and served grand jury subpoenas related to 
GA and GFCO, Dr. Laurence signed and sent to these federal agents, through the US Attorney's 
office, certain documents including "Public Servant's Questionnaires" requesting the 
investigating agents provide personal information about themselves and "Disclosure Statements" 
advising the agents that their failure to respond would result in "Commercial Dishonor," 
financial penalties, and "being a participant in fraud." (Id. at 15.) Dr. Laurence also is alleged to 
have sent another document styled ''Notice of Default and Dishonor of a Lawful Public Servant 
Questionnaire" to one or more federal agents. (Id.) It also is alleged Dr. Laurence failed to 
comply with Orders issued by the federal district court in Colorado compelling production of the 
subpoenaed records. (Id.) 
Germantown Aesthetics or "GA," as used throughout the Indictment, is the entity used by 
Dr. Laurence to practice cosmetic medicine. Defendants note as much in their expert disclosure 
by which they list: "Gregory Laurence, M.D., Germantown Aesthetics." (See Exhibit N, Defs.' 
Ans. to Pl.'s Third Set of Discovery 37, July 22, 2013.) Dr. Laurence describes himself in his 
CV as the Medical Director of Germantown Aesthetics. Similarly, Defendants' disclosure touts 
Dr. Laurence's obstetrical experience, and his CV likewise lists his long association with GFCO, 
the other medical practice described throughout the criminal Indictment. 
c.. Evidence of Criminal Conduct by Dr. Laurence in the Operation of His 
Medical Practice is Admissible, as are the Pending Charges. 
Trial courts in Idaho are afforded broad discretion in cross-examination and in allowing 
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parties considerable latitude in impeaching an opponent's retained experts. The scope of cross 
examination rests in the court's discretion. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 
(1986); State v. Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795, 711 P.2d 741 (Ct.App.1985). In Harmston v. Agro-W, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 814, 820, 727 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Ct. App. 1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
rejected appellants' claim that the cross-examination of their expert was "disrespectful and 
abusive." In upholding the latitude afforded counsel on cross-examination of a retained expert, 
the Court noted that "[ o ]ur system of dispute resolution permits and encourages challenges to the 
credentials and opinions of an opponent's experts. The limiting and control of cross-examination 
is within the province of the trial judge." (Id. (citing State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159,438 P.2d 904 
(1968) and State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255,232 P.2d 669 (1951)). 
Defendants argue that the pending criminal charges against Dr. Laurence are not relevant, 
or, if relevant, outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and not admissible under IRE 608(b) 
and 609 because Dr. Laurence has not yet been convicted. Defendants, however, read IRE 
608(b) to_o narrowly. Moreover, an Idaho Court of Appeals opinion issued just last week 
discusses the distinction between IRE 609 and 608(b) and the broad discretion of a trial judge to 
permit evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness under I.RE. 608(b) -- which discretion 
should be exercised in this case to permit evidence of Dr. Laurence's untruthful character. 
In State v. Bergerud, the trial court precluded the defendant from impeaching a witness 
on cross-examination based upon that witness's conviction of a misdemeanor for lying to police. 
----Idaho---, --- P.3d ----, 2013 WL 5716821 (Ct. App., October 22, 2013). The trial court held 
that such impeachment was not permissible under IRE 608 and 609, which the trial court held 
applies only to felonies. Id. at *4. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
erred in not separately considering the admissibility of such evidence under IRE 608(b) and the 
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discretion of a trial judge to permit such evidence. Id at * 5-6. 
Specifically, IRE 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning 
(1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
(Emphasis added). 
As noted by the Court in Bergerud, although Rule 608(b) prohibits extrinsic evidence of 
a witness's past conduct to attack credibility, it expressly allows cross-examination of the 
witness concerning instances of the witness's conduct if it is probative of the witness's 
truthfulness. (Bergerud at *5 (citing State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P.2d 872, 880 
(1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38, 752 P.2d 632, 640 (Ct.App.1988)). With respect to 
whether the misdemeanor conduct was relevant, the Court further held that "[m]aking a false 
statement to a law enforcement officer, like perjury, is an act that is intimately connected to 
credibility. In fact, it is itself a crime." Id. at *6 (citing LC. § 18-705). "It not only indicates a 
willingness to be dishonest when it serves one's own interest, but a willingness to defy authority 
and break the law when doing so." Id. 
The described conduct of Dr. Laurence in attempting to obstruct and impede the due 
administration of the laws of the United State and in obst~cting justice is far more egregious 
than the witness conduct at issue in Bergerud. Similarly, the described conduct "indicates a 
willingness to be dishonest when it serves one's own interest" and it also shows "a willingness to 
defy authority and break the law when doing so." Of even more significance is the fact that this 
conduct related directly to the medical practice upon which Dr. Laurence relies to testify in this 
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case. That he operated and concealed his medical practice through sham trusts, ginned up 
business deductions, sent federal agents phony forms accusing them of fraud, and sought to 
extract financial penalties is relevant and bears on his character for truthfulness. 
Furthermore, the described conduct demonstrates Dr. Laurence's contempt and disdain 
for the legal process in refusing to comply with the Colorado district court's order that he 
produce grand jury materials directed at his medical and cosmetic medicine practice. If Dr. 
Laurence refused to honor multiple court orders specifically directed at him and his medical 
practice; how can it be assumed that he complied with the legal requirements associated with 
rendering testimony in this case, including the requirement that he adequately familiarize himself 
with the local standard of care? This demonstrates a willingness to "defy authority and break the 
law," particularly when he believes it serves his own self-interest. Accordingly, Plaintiff should 
be permitted to inquire of Dr. Laurence regarding this contempt of the legal process, which is 
probative of his character for truthfulness under IRE 608(b). 
Additionally, Dr. Laurence's character for untruthfulness exists through his medical 
licensure, including in Idaho where he is now licensed. Dr. Laurence testified at his deposition 
that he had not informed any of the three states where he is licensed, including Idaho, of his 
pending felony charges. (Laurence Dep. 168:17 - 169:9, Oct. 2, 2013.) In Idaho, a physician is 
required to report not only a felony conviction but the "commission of any act constituting a 
felony." Idaho Code § 54-1814(1) (licensed physician required to report conviction of a felony); 
Idaho Code § 54-1814(21) (licensed physician required to report commission of an act 
constituting a felony or crime of moral turpitude). In addition, a physician in Idaho, upon 
renewal of his medical license, is required to report, among other matters, whether they have 
been "charged with or convicted of a felony .... " (See Exhibit 0, State of Idaho, Board of 
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Medicine, Physician and Surgeon License Renewal Application Form.) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Dr. Laurence chose to not report his Indictment and 
underlying actions to the appropriate regulatory boards, including the Idaho Board of Medicine. 
This is probative of his character for truthfulness and thus admissible. 
As set forth above, the foregoing evidence is, in fact, relevant, and contrary to 
Defendants' IRE 403 argument, this relevance is not outweighed by any prejudice Defendants 
attribute to the subject evidence. Dr. Laurence is a redundant defense expert on the issue of 
standard of care. Defendants have identified two other physicians they intend to call to address 
the standard of care, one from Idaho and one from Spokane who also maintains a practice in 
Coeur d'Alene. The notion that they will be unfairly prejudiced if the court denies their limine 
motion and/or if they choose to not call a third standard of care expert from Tennessee is 
unavailing. Moreover, it is Defendants who did not adequately vet this expert and were 
surprised when they learned for the first time of Dr. Laurence's indictment at deposition. 
Plaintiff should neither be faulted, nor disadvantaged, simply because Defendants were unaware 
of Dr. Laurence's criminal issues or because Dr. Laurence chose to conceal the subject 
information from defense counsel. In fact, it is Mr. Ballard who will be unfairly prejudiced 
unless he is allowed a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine this expert -- a process our 
systems "permits and encourages." Harmston, 111 Idaho at 820. 
d. The Significant Consequences and Penalties Facing Dr. Laurence Are 
Admissible. 
If convicted, Dr. Laurence faces three years imprisonment and a $250,000.00 fine on 
Count 5 and ten years imprisonment and a $250,000.00 fine on Count 6. (See Exhibit P, 
Information Sheet accompanying Indictment (Docket No. 2-3), United States v. Gregory Nathan 
Laurence, U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, Criminal Case No. 13-cr-00-193 JLK.) In 
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addition, Dr. Laurence faces additional significant financial consequences as a result of a 
prolonged history of failing to file required income tax returns and an alleged attempt to 
minimize his tax obligations through phony deductions and sham trusts. 
More significantly, Dr. Laurence is likely to lose his medical license upon a felony 
conviction. See Tennessee Code Annotated 63-6-214(a)(I0) (grounds for medical license 
revocation include conviction of a felony). As noted above, Dr. Laurence is also licensed in 
Idaho where, like other states, a felony conviction is grounds for revocation of. a physician's 
medical license. Idaho Code § 54-1814(1 ). Committing acts constituting a felony is likewise 
grounds for discipline and a physician is required to report such conduct. Idaho Code § 54-
1814(21 ). 
The foregoing, looming consequences and termination of his income stream provide Dr. 
Laurence with a strong motive to work with Defendants and express a favorable opinion that will 
result in additional, lucrative expert witness work. As such, these charges and myriad of 
consequences are probative and admissible to show motive. IRE 404(b) ( evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible to show motive). In addition, such evidence is 
admissible to show bias on the part of Dr. Laurence. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91, 856 P.2d 
872, 881, (1993) ("[T]he bias, prejudice, or motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented 
in a trial is always material and relevant to effective cross-examination."); see also Cosgrove By 
and Through Win.free v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 476-77, 788 P.2d 
1293, 1299-1300 (1989) (discussing impeachment of expert by evidence of amount earned 
testifying in court). 
Accordingly, Defendants' motion in limine concerning Dr. Laurence should be denied. 
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3. DEFENDANTS' FOURTH MOTION IN LIM/NE SHOULD BE DENIED TO THE 
DEGREE DR. KERR OPENS THE DOOR FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION ON 
THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
Plaintiff generally agrees that "evidence of Defendants' [liability] insurance is not 
relevant to this case .... " (Defs' Mem. of Law 2.) Plaintiff also acknowledges the command of 
I.RE. 411. However, Plaintiff should not be precluded from eliciting testimony and/or from 
introducing evidence demonstrating the existence of Defendants' liability insurance coverage if 
Defendants open the door on this issue. 
Should Dr. Kerr or any other defense witness suggest that no such insurance coverage 
exists, or alternatively, that financial hardship would follow an adverse jury verdict and 
judgment in this matter, Plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to cross-examine on this 
topic not only to challenge the truthfulness of the witness, but also to neutralize the unfairly 
prejudicial effect Defendants themselves recognize by their motion. 
4. DEFENDANTS' FIFTH MOTION IN LIM/NE SHOULD BE DENIED TO THE 
DEGREE IT SEEKS TO PRECLUDE PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESSES. 
By their fifth motion in limin~, Defendants seek to preclude any mention of "the fact that 
any of Defendants or any of the defense witnesses have ever been previously represented by 
[defense counsel]." (Defs' Mots. in Limine 3.) Because this motion seeks to preclude Plaintiff 
from conducting proper cross-examination of Defendants' expert witnesses on the issue of bias, 
Defendants' motion should be denied accordingly. 
As an initial matter, "[t]he scope of cross examination rests in the [C]ourt's discretion." 
Cosgrove By & Through Winfree v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 477, 788 P.2d 
1293, 1300 (1989) (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986); State v. 
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Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795, 711 P.2d 741 (Ct.App.1985)). And "[a]lthough the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence do not specifically address impeachment of witnesses by evidence of bias, the right to 
do so is unquestionable." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook 342 (2d ed. 2005). 
The reason for this is simple: "Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as 
finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence 
which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 
533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 
465, 469 (1984)) (emphasis added). For this reason, because "[i]t would not be unusual for a 
medical expert to have a bias in favor of the party who is paying his expert witness fee ... cross-
examination as to who is paying for the expert is almost always allowed when the expert is 
testifying." Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 109 Idaho 920,925, 712 P.2d 621,626 (1985). 
As the above-referenced tenants of Idaho law demonstrate, the jury is entitled to hear all 
evidence as it pertains to the possible bias of Defendants' expert witnesses. If parties are 
typically allowed to cross-examine expert witnesses as to who is paying them for their testimony, 
Plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to cross-examine Defendants' experts as to the full 
breadth and scope of their relationships with the parties or attorneys who retain them. Surely, if 
the compensation received by the defense experts in this case is probative as to possible bias, so 
too must evidence demonstrating a relationship extending beyond the instant litigation. 
Therefore, to the extent Defendants' motion seeks to preclude Plaintiff from conducting a 
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S. DEFENDANTS' SIXTH MOTION IN LIM/NE REGARDING OBAMACARE IS 
UNOPPOSED. 
By their sixth motion in limine, Defendants seek to preclude evidence pertaining to "the 
effect of this, or any medical malpractice case on the cost of health care or the implementation of 
the [A]ffordable [C]are [Act] also known as "Obamacare." Because Plaintiff has no intention of 
offering evidence or argument pertaining to either of these issues, Plaintiff does not oppose the 
instant motion. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By ~~s 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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.. , . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify th~t on the 29th day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants' Motions in Limine by delivering the same 
to the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IOI S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
::.----F-IL~~l. /\I j ~ = 
OCT 2 9 20\3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL 




Counsel for the parties were ordered to hold a conference for the exchange of information 
and discussion of matters specified by Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
thereafter certify that such a conference has taken place, provide a list of persons disclosed as 
possible witnesses and provide a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in 
evidence reciting which exhibits will be received without objection and those to which no 
objection will be made on grounds other than irrelevancy or immateriality. Court's Amended 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated September 9, 2013. 
Pursuant to this Order and for purposes of exchanging pretrial information, the undersigned 
counsel for plaintiff met with defense counsel at defense counsel's office on October 22, 2013, 
with other plaintiffs counsel participating telephonically from his office in West Virginia. In 
accordance with the foregoing Order, Plaintiff further discloses the following 
1. Possible Witnesses for Plaintiff 
The parties agreed that Plaintiff and Defendants would separately provide a list of 
possible trial witnesses. The following is Plaintiffs list of possible trial witnesses. 
a. Charles Ballard, Plaintiff 
b. Brian Kerr, M.D., Defendant 
c. Susan Kerr 
d. Donna Berg 
e. Briana Kerr Dumas 
f. Karl Olson, M.D. 
g. Matthew Campbell, M.D. 
h. Edward Jong Wook Kim, M.D. 
1. Howard Schaff, M.D. 
J. Erwin Sonnenberg 
k. Glen Graben, M.D. 
l. Dean Sorensen, M.D. 
m. Keith Armitage, M.D. 
n. George Nichols, M.D. 
o. Rachel Towler, Vincent Brooks, Antwan Carlisle, Terri Jones, Jeremy Williams, 
and/or Michael Auel - USAF personnel 




r. Jonelle Cadiz Buchanan (by previously taken Video Deposition) 
s. Cornelius Hofman, GEC Group 
t. Custodians of records or records certifications for: Elmore Medical Center, 
Elmore Ambulance, Life Flight, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
United States Air Force, Tillman Funeral Home, Rost Funeral Home 
2. Exhibits to be Received In Evidence Without Objection 
During the aforementioned conference, the parties agreed that the following exhibits 
would be received in evidence without objection. Where appropriate, bates numbering from 
discovery are included for these exhibits for the convenience of the parties: 
a. Complete medical record and chart for Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr including 
i. Contemporaneous photos of Krystal Ballard 
b. Complete medical record and chart for Elmore Ambulance 
c. Complete medical record and chart for Elmore Medical Center 
d. Complete medical record and chart for Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
e. Complete Medical Record and Chart Ada County Coroner and Dr. Graben 
including 
i. Autopsy Report, Photos, and 
ii. Tissue Slides 
f. Funeral Placards for Krystal Ballard (BALLARDOOO 148, 149) 
g. Photos of Charles & Krystal Ballard ( BALLARD000136, 137,145) 
h. Photo of Krystal Ballard (Tubing) ( BALLARDOOO 146) 
1. Marriage License for Charles and Krystal Ballard (BALLARDOOOOOl) 
J. Death Certificate for Krystal Ballard (USAF00143) 
k. Curricula Vitae for Plaintiff and Defendants' Retained Expert Witnesses 
1. CT Scans of Krystal Ballard 
m. Cell Phone Records of Dr. Brian Kerr and Susan Kerr 
n. Autopsy tissue slides (recuts) and photos of tissue slides (used by plaintiff and 
defendants' experts) 
3. Additional Proposed Plaintiff's Exhibits to Which No Agreement was Reached 
During the aforementioned conference, defense counsel stated an objection to the 
following proposed exhibits from Plaintiff "on all grounds." 
a. Tillman Funeral Home Invoice 
b. Artistic Flowers Invoice 
c. Memorial Program for Krystal Ballard Memorial 
d. Bill from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
e. Bill from Elmore Medical Center 
f. Bill from Rost Funeral Home 
3 
001281
g. Bill from Lifeflight 
h. Memorandum - Extension of Enlistment for PCS for Krystal Ballard (Elmendorf 
AFB) 
1. USAF Records Certification for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
J. Line of Duty Determination for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
k. Awards & Decorations Info for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
I. Air Force Achievement Medal for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
m. Air Force Commendation Medal for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
n. DJMS LES for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
o. DJMS LES for Charles Ballard - USAF 
p. Letter from Major Thomas Brown to SSgt Charles Ballard from 2010 following 
death of Krystal Ballard 
· q. Statement of Service 
r. Enlisted Performance Review 2010 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
s. Enlisted Performance Review 2009 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
t. Enlisted Performance Review 2008 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
u. Enlisted Performance Review 2007 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
v. Reenlistment Eligibility Annex for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
w. Air University CCAF Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
x. BSU Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
y. Embry-Riddle Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
z. University of Maryland Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
aa. Charts and tables generated and/or employed by plaintiffs economic expert 
Cornelius Hofman, GEC Group ( see Assessment of Economic Loss Krystal 
Melissa Ballard dated May 8, 2013) (some tables/charts offered for 
demonstrative or illustrative purposes) 
4. Demonstrative and Illustrative Aids and Exhibits 
Plaintiffs anticipate offering certain exhibits as demonstrative or illustrative aids. These 
include relevant anatomical drawings as well as tables/charts of plaintiffs economic expert 
referenced above and produced in discovery. 
5. Offer of Mediation 
Plaintiff offered to engage in mediation with Defendants. Defense counsel declined. 
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Dated this 29th day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By ~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 291h day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Pretrial Exchange of Information Certification by delivering the 
same to the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 






David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
OCT 2 9 2013 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, . 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT MCKAY 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
COUNTY OF ADA, TO WIT: 
I, Scott McKay, as the attorney for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, subscribed hereto by 
authority duly given, after being duly sworn, upon his oath, state and allege the following. 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff in this litigation. 
2. On this date, Plaintiff filed his Responses to Defendants' Motions in Limine. 
3.' True and accurate copies of the exhibits referenced within Plaintiff_s Responses to 
Defendants' Motions in Limine are attached hereto as follows. 
4. A true and accurate copy of excerpts of the deposition of John P. Lundeby, M.D., 
dated July 26, 2013, is attached hereto at Exhibit A. 
5. A true and accurate copy of excerpts of the deposition of Geoffrey Stiller, M.D., 
dated July 19, 2013, is attached hereto at Exhibit B. 
6. A true and accurate copy of excerpts of the deposition of Gregory Laurence, 
M.D., dated October 2, 2013, is attached hereto at Exhibit C. 
7. A true and accurate copy of the 1998 Medical Board of California Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order pertaining to Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is attached hereto at 
Exhibit D. 
8. A true and accurate copy of the 1998 Idaho State Board of Medicine Order for 
Reciprocal Discipline pertaining to Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is attached hereto at Exhibit E. 
9. A true and accurate copy of the 2004 Medical Board of California Stipulated 




10. A true and accurate copy of the Medical Board of California's Public Reprimand 
of Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D., dated July 15, 2005, is attached hereto at Exhibit G. 
11. A true and accurate copy of the 2007 Medical Board of California Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order pertaining to Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is attached hereto at 
Exhibit H. 
12. A true and accurate copy of the 2008 Idaho State Board of Medicine Stipulation 
and Order pertaining to Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is attached hereto at Exhibit I. 
13. A true and accurate copy of the 2009 Decision of the Medical Board of California 
pertaining to Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is attached hereto at Exhibit J. 
14. A true and accurate copy of the Indictment, dated May 8, 2013, returned against 
Dr. Gregory Laurence in the U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, is attached hereto at 
Exhibit K. 
15. A true and accurate copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release as to Gregory 
Nathan Laurence on PR Bond, issued by the U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, is attached 
hereto at Exhibit L. 
16. A true and accurate copy of the Receipt of Surrendered Passport as to Gregory 
Nathan Laurence is attached hereto at Exhibit M. 
17. A true and accurate copy of excerpts of Defendants' Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiffs Third Set of Discovery, dated July 22, 2013, including a true and accurate copy of the 
Curriculum Vitae of Gregory Laurence, M.D., is attached hereto at Exhibit N. 
18. A true and accurate copy of the Idaho State Board of Medicine Physician and 
Surgeon License Renewal Application Form is attached hereto at Exhibit 0. 
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19. A true and accurate copy of the Information Sheet Accompanying the Indictment 
returned against Dr. Gregory Laurence in the U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, is 
attached hereto at Exhibit P. 
And further affiant saith not. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO; 
COUNTY OF ADA, to-wit: 
~ ~------c:s----
cott McKay 
-Taken, subscribed and sworn to before me thisd q day of October, 2~,lJ· . ,,,,, ,,,, 
r.'' C pr, ,,, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants' Motions 
in Limine by delivering the same to the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, MD; Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
DBA SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA and LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED 


















VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JOHN P. LUNDEBY, MD 
Deposition upon oral examination of John P. Lundeby, MD, 
taken at the request of the Plaintiff, before Danelle Bungen, 
CSR, and Notary Public, at the law offices of Ramsden & 
Lyons, 700 Northwest Boulevard, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 
commencing at 8:30 a.m. on July 26, 2013, pursuant to the 



























John P. Lundeby, MD 
July 26, 2013 
Ballard v. Bria --err, MD; Silk Touch Laser, LLP 









recommend the Vaser equipment be sterilized? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. You used the 
word "instructions." 
(BY MR. HADDAD) Go ahead. 
I have not. 
Okay. Is it fair to say that in the questions that 
you formulated in your mind to ask and discuss with 
Dr. O'Neil, that you utilized the answers given by 
Page 51 
Dr. O'Neil during this 45-minute conversation with him 
to gain an understanding as to what the standard of 
practice was in Boise in 2010? 
To the extent that you can without practicing there at 
the time, yes. 
Okay. Now, have you done, other than that one AMA 
page on staff privileges, have you done any other 
research, medical research, associated with this case? 
Aside from my previous training and experience, I have 
looked over a few things, I've looked at some of the 
surgical prep solution recommendations, looked at some 
of my textbooks about techniques for fat transfer 
and I think that's mainly it. 
All right. Now, surgical prep solution 
recommendations, resources you might have looked at, 
what resources did you use? 
I don't recall the specific resources, I didn't print 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an 
Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, and/or SILK TOUCH MED 
SPA AND LASER CENTER, and/or 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 














DEPOSITION OF GEOFFREY STILLER, M.D. 
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AT MOSCOW, IDAHO 
JULY 19, 2013, AT 9:09 A.M. 
Reported by Nancy K. Towler, CSR, Notary Public 
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Page 18 
1 BY MR. HADDAD: 
2 Q. Have you spoken with any attorneys or any of the 
3 doctors in order to understand the standard of practice 
4 as it might exist in Boise? 
5 A. I have. 
6 Q. Okay. So when I say, have you spoken to anybody 
7 else, that would include that doctor. Is there -- who 
8 did you speak with? 
9 A. Dr. O'Neil. 
10 Q. Okay. What's Dr. O'Neil's first name? 
11 A. I do not know. It would be in my e-mails. 
12 Q. Okay. Other than Dr. O'Neil, have you spoken 
13 with any other physician in order to gain an 
14 understanding as to the standard of practice for 
15 cosmetic physicians practicing in Boise? 
16 A. I have not. 
17 Q. Now, when you worked for Mountain -- first of 
18 all, when is the first occasion that you would have 
19 performed cosmetic procedures? 
20 A. Other than residency where we did -- as a general 
21 surgeon, we were in plastic surgeries, and we did 
22 cosmetic procedures in residency. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. Otherwise, I started my fellowship in 2007, I 
25 believe. And that's when I started. 





Gregory N. Laurence, MD 
Date: October 2, 2013 
Case: Ballard v. Kerr, Silk Touch 
Case No: CV OC 1204792 
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR#716, RMR, CRR, CBC 
































Gregory N. Laurence, MD October 2, 2013 Ballard v. Kerr, Silk Touch 
[55] 
vibration or energy or heat to the tissue to help 
process the fat or help with the contouring before 
you actually do the removal of the fat. 
I've used just about everything that's 
out there. 
Q. Okay. In terms of a cosmetic practice, 
have you spoken to any physicians that practiced in 
Boise, Idaho, in 2010 which is the time period that 
Krystal Ballard had a procedure about the standard 




Yes, I did. 
Who did you speak with? 
Dr. Kelly O'Neil who practiced in this 
area around that time. 
Q. And I think within the materials that 
are either part of Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2, 





Dr. O'Neil . 
Yeah, it's 2. 
-- there's reference to Dr. O'Neil. 
And you remember speaking with him? 
That's correct. 
All right. Is your discussions with 
Well, first of all, did you rely upon 
Dr. O'Neil exclusively in order to understand what 




























Gregory N. Laurence, MD October 2, 2013 Ballard v. Kerr, Silk Touch 
[56] 
the standard of practice was in Boise, Idaho, in 
2010 in performing similar procedures and services 
to patients in --
MR. JONES: Object to form; vague. 
THE WITNESS: There were no other physicians 
that I spoke to who practiced in Boise, Idaho, 
around that time to whom I spoke or communicated in 
any way. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. And Dr. O'Neil is 
a physician that you were referred to by Mr. Quane 
to contact in order to avail yourself of what the 
standard of practice was in Boise in in 2010, 
correct? 
A. Yeah, correct. I did not know him 
before. 
Q. Okay. Basically, counsel for Dr. Kerr 
told you, "You need to learn what the standard of 
practice was in 2010, and here's the guy that can 
tell you what the standard of practice is," and 
they named Dr. O'Neil, correct? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
THE WITNESS: So, yes, I spoke to him after 
they referred me to him as someone who was 
reliable. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Did you know 
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KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. 









The attached Stipulation in Settlement and Dec;ision is hereby adopted by the Division of 
Medical Quality as its Decision in the above-entitled matter. 
· This Decision shall become effective on September 14, 1998 
IT IS SO ORDERED August 14, 1998 
.. 
/'"") ,,-, n ~~ IJ-.t1 · . Y J 
By: \...C'C..-t..,&,.!..Jc:;.C ~ 1£LL&,...Lc_:-~') 
CAROLE HURVITZ, M.D. 
., 
~ Chair - Panel B 
Division of Medical Quality 
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DANIELE. LUNGRE~, Attorney General 
of the State of California 
STEVEN H. ZEIGEN, 
Deputy Attorney General, State Bar No .. 60225 
Department of Justice 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
Post Office Box 85266 
San Diego, California' 92186-5266 
Telephone: (619)· 645-2074 
~ttorneys for Complainant 
.,. 
BEFORE THE 
DIVISION OF l\1EDICAL QUALITY 
l\tIEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation ) NO. 09-93-26899 
Against: ) 
) L-9612025 
KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. ) 












Physician's·and Surgeon's ) . 




Complainant, Ron Joseph, Executive Director of the 
.. 
19 Medical Board of California, by and through his attorney, 
20 Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of the State of California, 
' 
21 by Steven H. Zeigen, Deputy Attorney General, and Kelly J. 
22 O'Neil, M.D. ( 11 resJ;?ondent 11 }~ by and through his attorney Richard 
23 K. Turner, Esq., hereby s~ipulate as follows; 
• 
24 
.. 1. Complainant Ron Joseph is the Executive Director of 
25. the Medical Board of California (Board) and is represented by 
26 Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of the State of California by 





,,-, , ..... 
I " .... .... : 
. I 
l 2. Respondent, Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. is represented by 
2 Richard K. Turner, Esq., who has met with respondent and advised 
3 him concerning the effects of this stipulation. Respondent has 
4 carefully read and fully understands the contents of this 
5 stipulation. 
, 
6 3. The Division of Medical Quality of the Medical 
7 Boa'rd of California, Departmen.t of Consumer Affairs ("Division") 
8 acquired jurisdiction over respondent by reason of the foll~wing: 
9 A. Respondent was duly served with a copy of the 
10 Accusation and First Supplemental Accusa~ion, Statement to 
11 Respondent, Request for Discovery, Form Notice of Defense and 
12 copies of Government Code sections 11507.5, 11507.6 and 11507.7 
(ft 13 as required by section llS-03 and 11505, and respondent timely 
.... ·:.· 
14 filed a Notice of oe·fense within the time allowed by section 
15 11506 of the code. 
·16 B. Respondent has received and read the 
17 Accusation and First Supplemental Accusation, which is pre_sently 
18 on file as Case No. 09-93-26899, OAH No. L-9612025, before .the 
•. 
19 Division. R~spondent understands the nature of the charges 
20 alleged in the Accusation and t~e First Supp~emental Accusation, 
21 and-that the charges and allegations constitute cause for 
22 imposing disciplin~ upon respondent's license to practice 
23 medicin·e which was issued by the Medical Board of California 
24 (''Board"). 
25 4. Respondent and his counsel are aware ·"'of each of 
26 respondent's rights, including the· right to a hearing on the 






r···. •.· . ...... 





2 present evidence in his favor and call witnesses on his behalf, 
or to testify, his right to contest the charges and allegations, 
and other rights·which are accorded to respondent pursuant to the 
California Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11500. et 
seq.}, including the right to seek reconsideration, review by the 
7 superior court, and appellatepreview. 
8 5. Re~pondent freely and voluntarily waives each and 
9 every one of the rights ~et forth _in paragra~h 4. 
10 6 • Respondent understands that in signing this 
11 stipulation rather than contesting the Accusation and the First 
12 Supplemental Accusation, he is enabling the Division to issue the 
/ff'..~. tf) 13 following order without further process. 
14 7. For the purpose of resolving Accusation and First 
. . 
15 Supplemental Accusation No. 09-93-26899, respondent admits he . ~ . 
16 committed.repeated acts of negligence in the care and treatment 
17 of patient J.G., as alleged in paragraph 5 of the Accusation, and 
18 repeated acts of negligence in the care and treatment of patient 
•. 
19 V.F. as alleged in paragraph 15 of the First Supplemental 
20 Accusation, which are attached RS exhibits hereto. Respondent 
21 hereby giyes up his right to contest that cause for discipline 
22 exists based on these charges. The remaining allegations in the 
23 Accusation and Firs~ Supplemental Accusation are di~missed . 
.. 
24 Complainant shall not file any c~se_against respondent 
25 which did not arise from facts occurring subsequent to the date 





1 ~. The admissions made by respondent herein are for 
2 purposes of this proceeding, for any other disciplinary 
3 proceedings by the Division, and for any petition for reinstate-
4 ment, reduction of penal~y, or application for relicensure, and 
! : ·, · 5 shall have no force or effect- in any other case or proceeding. 
6 9 • It is understood by respondent that, in deciding 
7 whether to adopt.this stipula~ion, the Division may receive oral 
8 and written co~m~nications ·from its staff and the Attorney 
9 General's office. Communications pursuant to this paragraph 
10 shall not disqualify the· Division or other persons from future 
11 participa_tion in this or any other matter affecting respondent. 
. . 
12 In the event this settlement is not adopted by the D~visio~, the 
{~,'.": 13 stipulation will not become effective and.may not be used for any 
14 purpose, except for this paragraph, which shall remain in effect . 
. 
15 10. Based upon the foregoing; it is stipulated and . 
16 agreed that the Division may issue the following as its decision 
17. in this case. 
18 ORDER 
•. 
19 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Physician's and Surgeon's 
20 Certificate No. A36888 issued to .. Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D.·, is 
21 revoked. 
22 
I '. Respondent ~ay eriroll in the Physician Assessment and 
23 Clinical Evaluation {PACE) program at the University of 
24 Calif;!nia at San Diego, School of Medicine (UCSD). The subject 
25 matter of the program shall perta.in to patient assessment, 
26 · plastic surgery and anesthesia, or any subject matter determined 
27 appropriate by the program administrator following assessment of 
4 .• 
001305
·r · I 
· 1 respondent. The exact number o( hours and specific content of 
2 the program shall be determined by the PACE program. The 
3 effective date of this order shall be no sooner than the date 
4 upon which the PACE program first offers respondent a position in 
5 the program. 
6 Respondent, while in attendance at the PACE program at 
.. 
7 UCSD medical facilities, may practice medicine for the limited 
8 purpose of participating in the P~CE program. For all other 
· 9 purposes, respondent's medical license i's revoked and he may not 
10 resume the practice of medicine until and.unless he is notified 
11 in writing by the Division that he meets the conditions set forth 
12 in accord with this paragraph . . 
13 If Respondent successfully complete.s the PA~E program, 
14 and all examinations required by the PAC~ program pertaining to 
15 the program's contents, the Division shall timely notify 
16 Respondent. 
17 Upon written notification to respondent that he has 
18 su~cessfully compl~~ed the PACE program, the revocation 
19 previously issued shall be stayed and respondent_ shall be placed 
20 on prob~tion for five (5) years•on the terms and conditions set 
21 .forth below. Within 15 days after the effective date of this 
22 decision, respondent shall provid~ the Division, or its designee; 
23 proof of service that respondent has.served a true copy of this 
.. 
24 deci~ion on the Chief of Staff or.the Chief.Executive Officer at 
25 every hospital where privileges or membership are extended to 
· 26. respondent or where respondent is .employed to practice medicine 






. . r 
l where malpractice insurance coverage is extended to respondent. 
2 1. EDUCATION COURSE 
3 Within 90 days from the effective date of this 
4 decision, and· on an annual basis thereafter, respondent shall 
5 submit to the Division or its designee for its prior app~oval an 
6 ed~cational program or course to be designated by the Division, 
7 which shall not be less than ~o hours per year, for each year of 
8 probation. This program shall be in addition to the Continuing 
9 Medical Education requirements for re-licensure. Following the 
10 completion of each course, the Division or the c~urse provider 
11 may ildminiator un oxilminiltion to tent rcopondont' a knowlod~<J of 
12 the course. Respondent shall provide proof of attenda~ce for 65 
Gr} 13 hours of continuing medical education of which 40 hours were in 
14 satisfaction of this condition and were approved in advance by 
15 the Division or its designee. 
16 2. MONITORING 
17 Within 30 days of the effective date of thi.s decision, 
is re~pondent shall e4bmit to the Division or its designee for its 
19 'prior approval a plan of practice in which respondent's practice 
20 shall be monitored ?Y another ~~ysician who shall provide 
. . 
21 ,periodic reports to the-Division or its designee. 
22 If the monitor resigns or is no longer available, 
23 respondent shall, within 15 day~, move to have a ·new monitor 
.. 
24 ,appointed, through nomination by respondent .an~ approval by the 
25 Division or its de_signee .· 





3. RESTRIQ~IQN OF PRACTICE 1 
2 During probation, respondent agrees not to use general 
3 anesthesi~ in his accredited surgery center. Respondent further 
4 agrees t_hat during probation he shall comply with the 
5 requirements of the Accre~itation Association for Ambulatory 
6 Health Care (AAAHC) concerning the staffing of his surgery 
7 center. ... 
8 During probation, respondent agrees to limit the amount 
9 of aspirate withdrawn during any one liposuc;~ion procedure to 
10 5,000 ccs or less. 
ll During probation, respondent agrees not to remove more 
-12 than 3,000 ccs of aspirate during any liposuction which is done ·· 
([;~~ . . . . 
~- 13 · as part of multiple cosmetic procedures in one sitting. 
14 4. OBEY ALL LAWS 
.• 
15 Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local 
16 laws, all rules governing the pra~tice of medicine in California, 
17 and. remain in full compliance with any court ordered criminal · 
18 prqbation, payments .. _and other orders. 
19 s. QUARTERLY REPORTS 
20 Respondent shall submit quarterly declarat~ons under 
21 penalty of perjury on forms provided by the Div~sion, stating 
22 ~hether there has·been compliance with all the cond~tions of 




6. PROBATION SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM COMPLIANCE 
Respondent shall comply with the Division's probation 
26 surveillance program. Respon~ent shall, at ·all times, keep'the 





,,-·. l .. 
., 
(''. .. ,::.1 .. 
1 which shall both serve as addresses of record. Ch~nges of such 
2 addresses shall be immediately communicat7d in writing to 
3 the Division. Under no circumstances shall a post office box 
4 serve as an address of record; 
5 Respondent sha~l also immediately inform the Division, 
6 in writing_, of any travel to any areas outside the jurisdiction 
. . 
7 of California which lasts, or~is contem~lated to last, more than 
8 thirty (30} days. 
9 7. INTERVIEW WITH THE DIVISION, ITS DESIGNEE OR ITS 
DESIGNATED PHYSICI.AN(S) 
10. 
Respondent shall appear in person for interviews with 
lJ. 














request at various intervals and with reasonable notice. 
8. TOLLING FOR OUT-OF-STATE PRACTICE, RESIDENCE OR 
IN-STATE NON-PRACTICE 
In the event:respondent should.leave California to 
reside or to practice outside t~~ State or for any reason should 
res·pondent stop· practicing medicine in California, respondent 
sh~ll notify the D~yisio~ or its designee in writing within ten 
days of the dates of departure and return or the dates of non-
practice within California .. Nc:::i-practice is defined -as any 
period of time exceeding thi~ty (30} days in which respondent is 
not engaging in any activities defined in Sectio.ns 2051 and 2052 
of.the Business and Professions Code . All time spent .in an 
.. 
int:unJ:Jive training progr~m ~pprov~d by the:! Diviuion o:t· ·ittJ 
25 designee shall be considere~ as time spent in the practice of 
26 medicine. Periods of tempora.ry or permanent residence or 
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as defined in this condition, will not apply to the reduction of 
the probationary period. 
9.· COMPLETION OF PROBATION 
Upon succes·sful completion of probation, respondent's 
certif~cate.shall be fully restored. 
1 o • YIQ"ATION OF PROBA·TION 
. . 
·rf°·respondent violates probation in any respect, the 
Division, after giving respondent notice and the opportunity to 




10 order that was stayed. If an accusation or petit;ion to revoke 
probation is filed against respondent during probation, the 
Division shall have continuing jurisdictio_n until the matter is 







matter is final. 
: 
11. COST RECOVERY 
The responden~ is hereby ordered to reimburse the 
Division the amount of $5,000.00 for its investigation and 
prosecution costs. ~Respondent shall.pay the entire.amount within 
the five year period of probation in amounts to be agreed upon 
20 between respondent and the Division. Failure to reimburse the 
21 Division's cost of its investigation and prosecution shall 
·22 constitute a violation of the prob~tion order, unless the 
23 Division agrees in writing to another payment plan because of .. 
24 f~nancial hardship. The filing of bankruptcy by the respondent 
25 shall not relieve the respondent of. his responsibility to 
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12. PROBATION MONITORING COSTS 
Respondent ihall pay the.costs associated with 
3 probation monitoring each and every year of ~robation. Such 
4 costs shall be payable to the.Division at the beginning of each 
5 calendar year. Faiiure to pay such costs shall constitute a 








13. LICENSE SURRENDER 
Foliowing the· effective date· of this decision, if 
respon~~nt ceases practicing due to retirement, health reasons or 
is otherwise unable to satisf~ the terms· and conditions of 
probation, respondent may voluntarily ·tender his qertificate to 
the Division. The Division reserves the right to evaluate the 
respondent's request and to exercise its discretion whether to 
14 grant the request, or to take any other action deemed appropriate 
15 and reasonable under the circumstanc~s·. . Upon formal a<?ceptance 
16 of the tendered license, J:esponde_nt will no longer be. ,subject to 
17 terms and conditions of probation. 











DANIELE. L~GREN, .Attorney General 
of State of California 
Steven H. gen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Complainant 
Richard K. Turn4t'r, Esq. ·. 
Attorney for Respondent 
10. 
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2 stipulation.and order set forth above. I have discussed·the 
terms and conditions set forth in the stipulation and order with 
my attorney, Richard K. Turner,· Esq.· I understand that in 
signing this stipulation.I am wa;ving my right to a hearing on 
the charges: set forth in the Accusation and First Supplemental 
7 Accusation on file in this matter. I further understand that in· 
8 signing th;7 stipulation the Division may enter the foregoing 
9 order placing certain requirements, restr~ctions and limitations 
10 on my in the State of California. 
13 
Kell J. 0' Neil, 
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' ' : ~. 
Jean R. Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-8931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
ORIGINAL 
BEFORE THE.BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE OF 
THE IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE 
In the Matter of: 
KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D., 







) ______________ ) 
Case No. tJtf--t7%3 
ORDER FOR RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE 
The Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine, hereinafter referred to as the Board, reviewed the 
Stipulation in Settlement and Decision executed by and between 
.I 
Respondent on June 22, 1998, his attorney, Richard K. Turner, on 
June 11, 1998, and Steven H. Zeigen, Deputy Attorney General, on 
behalf of the Med~cal Board of California, on June 27, 1998, and 
the Decision adopting the stipulation in Settlement and Decision 
executed by Carole Hurvitz, M.D~, Ch~ir - Panel B, of the Division 
of Medical Quality, Medical Board of California, Department of 
Consumer Affairs, on August 14, 1998, in Case No. 09-93-26899. The 
Board also took official notice of the fact that Kelly J. O'Neil, 
M. D. , holds an · active Idaho license to practice medicine and 
·surgery, License No. M-6612, issued November 8, 1994. Based upon 
the foregoing, 
ORDER FOR RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE - 1 (10/27/98) 
001314
o·RIGINAL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-
1806A(6) (i), for the purpose of reciprocal discipline, the Board 
adopts and incorporates by reference the terms and conditions of 
the Stipulation in Settlement and Decision entered in Case No. 09-
(··. 93-26899, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein as though fully set forth, and Respondent is ordered to 
comply with said terms and conditions. 
,..,. r .• 
'• ! 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-
1806A ( 6) ( i), the Respondent, Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D., shall have 
thirty (30) days within which to file with the Board an appropriate 
motion and notice to· appear and show cause why reciprocal disci-
pline should not be adopted and ordered. 
DATED This ~ day of November, 1998. 
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE 







DIVISION OF MEDICAL QU~ITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNI~ 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation 
Against: 
Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. 
Physician's and Surgeon's 












File No. Dl-1993-26899 
DECISION 
The attached Stipulated Settlement & Disciplinary Order is hereby adopted as the 
Decision and Order of the Division of Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California, 
Department of Consumer Affairs, State of California. 
This Decision shall become effective at 5:00 p.m. on September 1 O, ;2004 
IT IS SO ORDERED August 11 , 2004 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
By: y:;~ 
Ronald t. Moy, M.D., 
Chair 
Panel B 




1 BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General 
\ of the State of California 
2 HEIDI R. WEISBAUM, State Bar No. 10148.9 
, · Deputy Attorney General 
3 California Department of Justice 
110 West "A" Street, Suite 1100 
4 San Diego, CA 92101 
5 P.O. Box 85266 
San Diego, CA 92186-5266 
6 Telephone: (619) 645-2098 
Facsimile: (619) 645-2061 
7 






DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
12 In the Matter of the Accusation Against: 
13 KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D. 
Case No. 09-1993-26899 
19-2000-112061 
40971 Winchester Road 
14 Temecula, CA 92591 
15 Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate 
No. A36888 
Respondent. 




18 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties to the 




Complainant, the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California 
22 ("Board"), brought this action solely in his official c·apacity and is represented in this matter by 
23 Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, by Heidi R. Weisbaum, Deputy 
24 Attorney General. 
25 2. Respondent Kelly James O'Neil, M .. D. (respondent) is represented in this 
26 proceeding by Albert J. Garcia, Attorney at Law, 1995 University Avenue, Suite 265, Berkeley, 





1 3. On or about June 24, 1981, the Board issued Physician's and Surgeon's 
2 Certificate No. A36888 to respondent Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. The certificate was in full 
3 force and effect at all times relevant to the charges brought in the First Amended Accusation 
4 No.19-2000-112061, is currently in full force and effect, and will expire on January 31, 2005, 




On January 4, 2002, complainant Ron Joseph, in his then official capacity 
8 as the Executive Director of the Board, filed Accusation No. 19-2000-112061 against respondent. 
9 A First Amended Accusation was subsequently filed on October 16, 2002. (A copy of First 
10 Amended Accusation No. 19-2000-112061 is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein.) 
11 The Accusation and First Amended accusation, together with all other statutorily required 
12 documents, were properly served on respondent who timely filed a Notice of Defense. 
13 ADVISEMENT AND WAIVERS 
14 5. Respondent has carefully read and fully understands the charges and 
15 allegations contained in First Amended Accusation No. 19-2000-112061, and has fully reviewed 
16 and discussed the charges and allegations with his attorney, Albert J. Garcia. 
17 6. Respondent has carefully read and fully understands the contents, force 
18 and effect of this Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order, and has fully reviewed and 
19 discussed the same with his attorney, Albert J. Garcia. 
20 7. Respondent is fully aware of his legal rights in this matter, including the 
21 right to a hearing on the charges and allegations in First Amended Accusation No. 19-2000-
22 112061, the right to be represented by counsel at his own expense, the right to confront and 
23 cross-examine the witnesses against him, the right to present evidence and to testify on his own 
24 behalf, the right to the issuance of subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
25 production of documents, the right to reconsideration.and court review of an adverse decision, 
26 and all other rights accorded by the California Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable 





1 8. Respondent, having the benefit of counsel, hereby voluntarily, knowingly, 
2 and intelligently waives and gives up each and every right set forth above. 
3 CULP ABILITY 
4 9. Respondent admits that if the allegations in First Amended Accusation No. 
5 19-2000-112061 were proved they would constitute grounds for discipline of his license. 
6 10. Respondent agrees that his Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. 
7 A36888, is subject to discipline. Respondent further agrees to be bound by the Board's 
8 imposition of discipline as set forth in the Disciplinary Order below. 
9 RESERVATION 
10 11. The admissions made by Respondent herein are only for the purposes of 
11 this proceeding, or any other proceedings in which the Medical Board or other professional 
12 licensing agency is involved, and shall not be admissible in any other criminal or civil 
13 proceeding. 
14 CONTINGENCY 
15 12. The parties agree that this Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order, 
16 shall be submitted to the Division for its consideration in this matter and, further, that the 
17 Division shall have a reasonable period of time in which to consider and act on this Stipulated 
18 Settlement and Disciplinary Order after receiving it. 
19 13. The parties agree that this Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order 
20 shall be null and void and not binding on the parties unless approved and adopted by the 
21 Division, except for this paragraph, which shall remain in full force and effect. Respondent fully 
22 understands and agrees that in deciding whether to approve and adopt this Stipulated Settlement 
23 and Disciplinary Order the Division may receive oral and written communications .from its staff 
24 and/or the Attorney General's Office. Communications pursuant to this paragraph shall not 
25 disqualify the Division, any member thereof, and/or any other person from future participation in 
26 this or any other matter affecting or involving respondent. In the event that the Division, in its 
27 discretion, does not approve and adopt this Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order, with 
28 the exception of this paragraph, it shall not become effective, shall be ofno evidentiary value 
3 
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1 whatsoever, and shall not be relied upon or introduced in any disciplinary action by either party 
2 hereto. Respondent further agrees that should the Division reject this Stipulated Settlement and 
3 Disciplinary Order for any reason, respondent will assert no claim that the Division, or any 
4 member thereof was prejudiced by its/his/her review, discussion and/or consideration of this 
5 Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order or of any matter or matters related hereto. 












14. This Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order is intended by the 
parties herein to be an integrated writing representing the complete, final and exclusive 
embodiment of the agreements of the parties in this matter. 
14. The parties understand and agree that facsimile copies of this Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order, including facsimile signatures thereto, may be used in lieu of 
original documents and signatures, and shall have the same force and effect as originals. 
15. In consideration of the foregoing admissions and stipulations, the parties 
agree that the Division of Medical Quality may, without further notice or formal proceeding, 
issue and enter the following Disciplinary Order: 
DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. 
18 A36888 issued to Respondent Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. is revoked; however, the revocation is 
19 ' stayed for one (1) year pursuant to the following terms and conditions: 
20 A Public Letter of Reprimand shall issue from the Medical Board of California 
21 Division of Medical Quality to Kelly James O'Neil, M.D., upon completion of the following 
22 condition precedent: 
23 1. PHYSICIAN ASSESSMENT AND CLINICAL EDUCATION 
24 PROGRAM Within 90 days of the effective date of this decision, Dr. O'Neil, at his expense, 
25 shall enroll in The Physician Assessment and Clinical Education Program at the University of 
26 California, San Diego School of Medicine (hereinafter the "PACE Program"). The PACE 
27 Program consists of the Comprehensive Assessment Program which is comprised of two 
28 mandatory components: Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 is a two-day program which assesses 
4 
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1 physical and mental health; neuropsychological performance; basic clinical and communication 
2 skills common to all clinicians; and medical knowledge, skill and judgment pertaining to the 
3 specialty or sub-specialty of the respondent. After the results of Phase 1 are reviewed, Dr. 
4 O'Neil shall complete Phase 2. Phase 2 comprises five (5) days (40 hours) of Clinical Education 
5 in respondent's field of specialty. The specific curriculum of Phase 2 is designed by the PACE 
6 Faculty and the Department or Division of respondent's specialty, and utilizes data obtained from 
7 Phase 1. After Dr. O'Neil has completed Phase 1 and Phase 2, the PACE Evaluation Committee 
8 will review all results and make a recommendation to the Division or its designee as to whether 
9 further education, clinical training (including scope and length), treatment of any medical and/or 
10 psychological condition and any other matters affecting Dr. O'Neil's practice of medicine will be 
11 required or recommended. The Division or its designee may at any time request information 
12 from PACE regardi~g Dr. O'Neil's participation in PACE and/or information derived therefrom. 
13 The Division may order Dr. O'Neil to undergo additional education, medical and/or 
14 psychological treatment based upon the recommendations received from PACE. 
15 Upon approval of the recommendation by the Division or its designee, Dr. O'Neil 
16 shall undertake and complete the recommended and approved PACE Program. At the completion 
17 of the PACE Program, Dr. O'Neil shall submit to an examination on its contents and substance. 
18 The examination shall be designed and administered by the PACE Program faculty. Dr. O'Neil 
19 shall not be deemed to have successfully completed the program unless he passes the 
20 examination. Dr. O'Neil agrees that the determination of the PACE Program faculty as to 
21 whether or not he passed the examination and/or successfully completed the PACE Program shall 
22 be binding. 
23 If Dr. O'Neil successfully completes the PACE Program, including the 
24 examination referenced above, he agrees to cause the PACE Program representative to forward a 
25 Certification of Successful Completion of the program to the Division or its designee. If Dr. 
26 O'Neil fails to successfully complete the PACE Program as required here, it shall be considered a 





1 2. FAILURE TO COMPLETE PACE If Dr. O'Neil fails to complete the 
2 condition precedent in the one year stay period, or as extended by the Division in its discretion, 
3 the Division may, in its discretion, following notice and an opportunity to be heard, extend the 
4 stay and impose standard terms and conditions of probation, including completion of a suitable 
5 education course and probation costs or may remand to an administrative law judge for the 
6 imposition of a suitable probationary period, with similar terms and conditions. 
7 3. Upon successful completion of the condition precedent, the stayed 
8 revocation shall become permanent and the Public Letter of Reprimand shall issue. 
9 ACCEPTANCE 
10 I, Kelly James O'Neil, M.D., have carefully read this Stipulated Settlement and 
11 Disciplinary Order and enter into it freely, voluntarily, intelligently, with the benefit of counsel, 
12 and with full lmowledge of its force and effect on my Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. 
13 A36888. 
14 DATED:___,(6.-ac. .. --f+~-+-""-~/-==-o-~-r"--
15 
16 I have read and fully discussed with respondent Kelly James O'Neil, M.D., the 
17 terms and conditions and other matters contained in the above Stipulated Settlement, Decision 
18 and Disciplinary Orde/" I approve its form and content 
19 ~ATED: 7 / z /o <./. ~---










Attomey for Re 
ENDORSEMENT 
The foregoing Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order is hereby respectfully 
submitted for consideration by the Division. 
DATED:~ 'Zf;( UJOr.f BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General 





. ~.: :i ... ~-.. 
. : ·-: 
.. 




BlLL LOCKYER, Attorney General 
of the State of California · . 
···· .. STATE OF CALlfORNIA 
MEDICAL BOARD f CALifQRNIA 
") T. Douglas MacCartee, Sta~e aar No. 772'j2 
Deputy Attorney Genera.I · 
SACRAMENTO . · / 20 t' ~ 
BY . ,.: :·: NALYST 
3 Cali fo'mia Department of Justice · 
· 110 West "A" Street,'Suite 1100· . 
4 San Diego, C~ 92101 ·. . · 
P.O. Box 85266 · ···· 
5 San Diego, CA 92186-5266 . 
Telephone: (619) 645-
6 Facsimile: (619) 645-20~-~ .' 






DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY. 
. MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
· DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
..... 
In the Matter or'the Accusation Against: 
12 
Case Nos. 09-1993-26899, 
19-2000-112061 
KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D. · · · 
13 40971 Winchester Road 
Temecula, CA 92591 
14 
Physician's and Surgeon's 



















capacity as the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California~ Department of Consumer 
Affairs . 
2. On or about June 24, 1981, the Medical Board of California issued 
Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate Number A 36888 to Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. 
(Respondent). The Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate was in full force and effect at all times 
26 






























3. · This Accusation is. brought before the Division of Medical Qu_ality, .. 
~edical Board of Cali"romia (Divi~ion), under. the·authority ~f the following sections ~fthe. 
.. ••· ·= . . . . : . . • . . .·· 
Busine~s and Pr~fessio~s. ~ode (Code) and the Disciplinary Order in Case No. 09-1993-26899. 
~- · . Sectipn 2227 of the Code provides that a licensee who is found guilty 
. . 
~nder_ t~e Medical Practice· Act may have his or her license revoked, suspended for a period not 
to.exceed one year, pl~ced o~ probation and required to pay the costs of probation monitoring, or 
. . 
such other action taken ·in relatio~--t~ discipline as the Division deems proper. 
5. · Section 2234 of the Code states: 
"The Division _of fyiedical Quality shall take action against any. licensee 
. ·. ,v~o is charg~ci with ~nprofessional conduct. In addition to other provisions of 
this arti~l~. unprofessional c·onduct includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
"(a) Vi?lating or attempting to violate, directly or indirectly, or 
. assisting in or abetting the violation of, or conspiring to violate, any . 
provision of this chapter [Chapter 5, the Medical Practice Act] . 
"(b) Gross negligence. 
"(c) ·Repeate~ negligent acts. 
"(d) Incompetence. 
11 (e) The commission of any act involving dishonesty or corruption 
which is substantially related t~ the qualifications, functions, or duties of a 
physician and surgeon. 
"(f) Any action or conduct which would have warranted the denial 
of a certificate." 
6. . Section 125.3 of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that the Division 
25 may request the administrative law judge to direct a licentiate found to have committed a 
26 violation or violations of the licensing act to pay a surri not to exceed the reasonable costs of the 




7. Section 14124.12(a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides, in 
2 pertinent part, that upon receipt of written notice from the Medical Board of California that a 
. . . . 
3 licensee's license has been placed on probation as a result of a disciplinary action, the department 
4 may not reimburse any Medi-Cal ·claim for the type of surgical service or invasiv~ procedure that 
5 gave rise to the probation, including any dental surgery or invas·ive procedure, that was 
6 performed by the licensee on or after the effective date of probation and until the termination of 
. 7 all probationary terms and c~mditions or until the·probationary period has ended, whichever 
8 occurs first. This section shall apply except in any cas~ in which the relevant licensing board 
9 determines that compelling circumstances warrant the continued reimbursement during the 
IO probationary period of any Medi-Cal claim, including any claim for dental services, as so 
11 described. In such a case, the department shall continue to reimburse the licensee for all 
12 procedures, except for those invasive or surgical procedures for which the licensee was placed on 
13 probation. 
14 8. Section 227~ of the Code states: "Any advertising in violation of Section 
15 17500, relating to false or mislea~i~g advertising, constitutes unprofessional conduct." 
16 9. Section ~51 of the Code provides in part that "(a) it is unlawful f<?r'any 
17 person licensed under this division or under any initiative act referred to in this division to 
. . . 
18 disseminate or cause to be disseminated, any form of public communication containing a false, 
19 fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or claim, or image for t_he purp_ose of or likely to 
20 induce, directly or indirectly, the. rendering of professional services or furnishing of products in . '• 
21 connection with the professional -practice or business for which he or she is licensed. A 'public 
22 communication' as used in this section includes, but is not limited to, communication by means 
23 of mail, television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, book, list or directory of healing arts 
24 practitioners. Internet or other electronic communication. 




statement or claim that does any of the following: 
( 1) Contains a misrepresentation of fact. 
(2) Is likely to mislead or deceive because 




(3) (A) Is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified 
expectations of favorable results, including the use of any 
2 photograph or other image that does not accurately depict the 
results of the procedure being. advertised or that has been altered. in 
·3 ... any manner from the image of the actual subject depicted in th~ 
... pho.togt~ph or image. · 
4 
.. ·. · (B) Use of any photograph or other image·.of a model 
·.· 5 viithout clearly stating in a prominent location in easily readable .. 
. type the fact that the photograph or image is.of a model is a 
6 violation of subdivision (a). For purposes of this paragraph, a 
model is anyone other than an actual patient, who has undergone 
7 the procedure being adve~ise~; of the licensee who is advertising 
for his or her services. 
8 
(C) Use of any photograph or other image of an actual 
9 patient that depicts or purports to depict the results of any 
procedure, or presents 'before' and 'after' views of a patient, 
.10 \vithout spe.c.ifying in a prominent location in easily readable type 
· size. what procedures were performed on that patient is a violation 
11 of subdivisic;>n (a). Any 'before' and 'after' views (1) shall be 
comparable in presentation so that the results are not distorted by 
12 favorable poses, lighting, or other features of presentation, and (2) 
shall contain a statement that the same 'before' and 'aft~r· .results 
13 may not occur for all patients. 
14 (4) Relates to fees, other than a standard 
15. 
consultation fee or a range of fees for specific types of 
services, wlthout fully and specifically disclosing all 
variables and other material factors. 
16 
(5) Contains other representations or implications· 
. 17 that in reasonable probability will cause an ordinarily 
18 
prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived. 
. (6) Makes a claim either of professional superiority 
19 or of performing services in a- superior manner, unless that 
claim is relevant to the service being performed and can be 
20 substantiated with objective scientific evidence. 
21 (7) Makes a scientific claim that cannot be 
substantiated by reliable, peer reviewed, published 
· 22 scientific studies. 
23 (8) Includes any statement, endorsement, or 
24 
testimonial that is likely to mislead or deceive because of a 
failure to disclose material facts. 
25 (a-d) .... ., 
26 ( e) Any person so licensed may not use any 
professional card, professional announcement card, office 
27 sign, letterhead, telephone directory listing, medical list, 
medical directory listing, or a similar professional notice or 































fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of 
subdivision (b). 
( I) · Any person so licensed who violates an·y ·. 
provision of this section is gui!ty of a misdemeano.r. A 
bona fide mistake of fact shall be a defense to this 
subdivision ~ut only to this subdivision. · 
. . . 
(g) · Any violation of any p·rovision of this section 
by a person so licensed shall ·constitute good cause for 
revocation or suspension of his or her license o~ other 
disciplinary action." 
. . 
In acc;ordance with the public safety finding in Business & Professi~ns 
Code§ 2215, section 2216 provid~s in.pertinent part: "On or after July I, 1996, no physician 
and surgeon shall perform. procedures in an outpatient setting using anesthesia, except local 
anesthesia or peripheral nerve blocks, or both, complying \Vith the community standard of 
practice, in doses ~hat, wher:i administered, have the probability of placing a patient at risk for 
loss of the patient's life-preservin~ protective reflexes, unless the setting is specified in Section 
1248.1. 
11. Health and Safety Code § 1204(b) provides, in pertinent part that. t~e 
following shall be eligible for Iicensure as specialty clinics pursuant to this chapter: 
... 
(1) A "surgical clinic" means a clinic that is not part of a hospital and that 
provides ambulatory surgical care fo~ patients who remain less than 24 hours: A surgical clinic . 
does not include any place or establishment owned or leased and operat~d as a clinic or o_~fice_by 
one or ~ore physicians or dentists in individual or group practice, regardless of the.name used 
publicly to identify the place _or establishment, provided, however, that physic~~ns or dentist~ 
may, at their option, apply for licensure. 
12. Health and Safety Code§ 1248.1 provides," No association, corporation, 
firm, partnership, or person shall operate, manage, conduct, or maintain an outpatient setting in 
this state, unless the setting is (d) Any primary care clinic licensed under subdivision (a) and 
any surgical clinic licensed under subdilision (b) of-Section 1204; or (g) ·An outp~tient setting* 
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') 13. Health a1iJ Safety CoJc § 1148.15 provides that out patient settings shall . . 


























(a) ( 1} · . ·outpatient setting allied health staff shall be licens~d. or certified to 
the extent required_ by state or federal law. 
(2)(A) . Outpatient settings shall have a system for facility safety and 
emergency training requirements. · · · 
.... 
(B) .·. There shall be onsite equipnient, medication, and trained personnel 
to facilitate handling of s~rvices sought or-provided and to facilitate handling of any 
medical emergency that may arise in connection with services sought or provided. 
. .,,· . . . 
(C) · IIi order for procedu~es to be performed in an."outpatient setting as 
defined in Section l ~48, the outpatient setting shall do one of the following: (i) Haye a 
written transfer agreement with a local accredited or licensed· acute 'care hospital, 
approved by the facility's m~dical staff. (ii) Permit surgery only by a licensee who has 
admitting privileges at a local accredited or licensed acute care hospital, with the 
exception that licensees who may be precluded from having admitting privileges by their · 
professional classification or other administrative limitations, shall have a written transfer 
agreement with licensees who have admitting privileges at local accredited or licensed 
acute care hospitals. (iii) Submit for approval by an accrediting agency a detailed 
procedural plan for handling medical emergencies that shall be reviewed at the time 
of accreditation. No reasonable plan shall be disapproved by the accrediting agency. 
(D) All physicians and surgeons transferring patients from an 
outpatient setting shall agree to cooperate with the medical staff peer review process on 
the transferred case, the results of which shall be referred back to the outpatient setting, if 
deemed appropriate by the medical staff peer review committee. If the ,medical staff of 
the acute care facility determines that inappropriate care was delivered at the outpatiei:it 
setting, the acute care facility's peer review outcome shall be reported, as appropriate, to 
the accrediting body, the Health Care Financing Administration, the State Department of 
Health Services, and the appropriate licensing authority. 
(3) ... [Dentists and Oral Surgeons]· ... 
. . 
records. 
(4) Outpatient settings shall have a syst~m for maintaining·clin~c?l 




Outpatient settings shall have a system for quality assessment and 
(6)(B) Members of the medical staff and other practitioners who are 
granted clinical privileges shall be professionally qualified and appropriately credentialed 
for the performance of privileges granted. The outpatient setting shall grant privileges in 
accordance with recommendations from qualified health professionals, and credentialing 
standards established by the outpatient setting. 
- (6)(C) Clinical privileges shall be periodically reappraised by the 































periodically revie"Ye~ a~d. amended as appropdate. · .... 
·.· ... . . . 
. . (7) . . Outpatient settings regulated by this chapter that have m~tltiple 
.servic~ locations governed by the same standards may elect to have all service .sites 
surveyed on ahy accreditation s.urvey. Organizations that do not elect to have all sites 
surveyed shall h.i,vc a sample; not lo exceed 20 percent of all service sites, surveyed. The 
ac_tual sample size shall be determined by the division. The accreditation agency shall· · 
determine the locatio'n pf the sites to be surveyed. Outpatient settings that have five or 
' fewer sites shall have at least one site surveyed: When an organization that elects to have 
. a sample of sites surv~ye'd is approved for accreditation, all of the organizations' sites 
shall be automatically. accredited. 
(8). .Oittpatient settings shall post the certificate of accreditation in a . 
location readily visible .t~ patients and staff. · · 
.. ·· 
(9) ·· .. Outpatient settings shall post the name and telephone number of 
the accrediting ag~ncy -.yith instructions on ~he submission of complaints in a location 
readily yisible to pati_ents and staff. · .:. : .. · · : · . 
( 1.0) Outpatient settings· shall have a written discharge criteria. 
. . . 
. (b )" . Outpatient settings shall have a minimum of two staff persons on the 
premises, one of whom shall either be a licensed physician and surgeon or a licensed 
health care professional with current certification in advanced cardiac life support 
(ACLS), as long as a patient is present who has not been discharged from supervised 
care. Transfer to an unlicensed setting of a patient who does not meet the discharge 
:. · criteria adopted pursuant to paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) shall constitute 
unprofessional conduct. · . · . . ·. · 
. . . . . 
(c) An accreditation agency may include additional standards-in its. 
determination to accredit outpatient settings if these are approved by the division to 
protect the pµblic health and safety. 
(d) No accreditation standard adopted or approved by the division, and 
no standard included in any certification program of any accreditation agency approved 
by the division, shall serve to limit the ability of any allied health care practitioner to . 
provide services within his or her full scope of practice. Notwithstanding this or any other 
provision of law, each outpatient setting may limit the privileges, or determine the. 
privileges, within the appropriate scope of practice, that will be afforded to physicians 
and allied health care practitioners who practice at. the facility, in accordance with . 
credentialing standards established by the outpatient setting in compliance with this 
chapter. Privileges may not be arbitrarily restricted based on category of licensure." 
14. Health and Safety Code section 1248.65 provides, "It shall constitute 
unprofessional conduct for a physician and surgeon to willfully and knowingly violate this 
chapter." 
15. Board Disciplinary Order No. 09-93-26899 requires, as Condition # 4 of 
the Conditions of Probation ("Stipulation in Settlement and Decision, p. 7), that respondent 
" ... shall obey all federal, state and local laws governing the practice of medicine in California 
7 : 
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and remain in full compliance with any court ordered criminal probation, payments and other 
2 orders." 
. . . 
3 FIRST CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE AND REVOCATION OF PROBATION · 
·4 .. (Gross Neg_lige~ce, Incompetence, Repeated Negligent Act_s) 
5 16. 
. . •, . 
Respon~ent is subject to disciplinary action under s~~tion 2234, 
6 subdivisions (b), (c) and/or (d)·and subject to rev~catiori of probation under Disciplinary Order 
7 No. 09-93-26899 in that he was grossly negligent.and/or.(ncori;·p~tent and/or committed repeated 
. . 





















A. Oi:i or about July 18, 2000, A.H., then 70 years of age, had a 
chemical p~el (called "O'NeWs Skin Rejuvenation") of her face perfom1ed by 
respondent. During the peel, A.H. had ventricular arrhyt_hmia, which respondent treated 
. . 
with intravenous Lidocaine. Postoperatively, A.H.'s cardiac instability continued, and 
respondent treated her wi~h Inapsine. 
B. After the surgery, A.H. was discharged and driven to. the Embassy 
Suites Hotel, in Temecula by employees ofrespondent and placed under the care of 
nurses from Q.C. Enterprises, Inc., (aka "Cua! Care"), a nursing registry effecti'"'.ely 
controlled by respondent. 
C. At ahout 5:30 p.m. on Jl;llY 18, 2000, the nurse found that A.~.'s 
pulse was 124 beats per minute (bpm). Sh~ page·d respondent for orders. 
D. Another nurse came on duty at about 7:00 p.m. She found that 
A.H.'s blood pressure was still high and that A.H. was restless, anxious and 
hyperventilating. Shortly thereafter, respondent called, the nurse reported A.H.'s 
symptoms to him and asked respondent to come to the Embassy Suites Hotel. 
D. While respondent was on his way, A.H. complained of chest pain, 
. . 
and the nurse called 911. Respondent arrived at the Embassy Suites about the same time 
as the paramedics. A.H. was taken to the hospital. 
























She !)ad a chemical peel of .her (ace and liposuction of her thighs performed by 
respondent. on or about July 26, 2000. 
• I',, 
F. · : H.B. ·h~d a preoperaliv·e hist~ry and physic~I _perfonned by another· 
··' 
physician, D. W.S., M.D. Dr. S noted varicose veins, stasis demrntitis, and trace ed~ma . 
Dr. S. also noted tha~ H.B. had a history of varicose vein surgery~ A preoperative EKG . . . . 
showed PVC's, ·or" prei·nahire ventricular contractions. 
G. · . R~spondent sedated H.B. for the peel procedure, and per"rorm~d· 
that procedure. Duririg th.e procedure, H.B. twice experienced ventricula~ arrhythmias. 
Respondent then performed liposuction of H.B.'s knees. H.B. was prematurely 
discharged from the respondents clinic and driven by respondent's employees to the 
Embassy Suites Hotel, where she was cared for by nurses from Q C Enterprises, Inc., 
(aka "Qual Care") a nursing registry effectively controlled by respondent. H.B. was 
sedated to the extent that _she had to be lifted out of her wheel chair and place into _bed 
. . 
where upon she immediately went into deep sleep. She remained largely sedentary for 
two days following the procedures. 
H. On or about July 26, 2000 at 9:00 a.m., the nurse attending H.B. 
found that H.B. was in shock, and contacted respondent at that time. Respondent 
authorized the nurse to call 911 at about 9:15 that morning. H.B. was taken to the 
hospital, where she was diagnosed as having venous thrombus and pulmonary embolism.· . . . . 
17. Respond~nt is subject to disciplinary action under Code section 2234, 
subdivisions (b), (c) and/or (d) in that he was grossly i:i_~gligent and/or incompetent and/or 
. . 
committed repeated negligent acts in his care and treatment of A.H. and H.B. The circumstances 






A. Paragraph 16 of the Accusation is incorporated by reference and 
hereby formally realleged as if set forth here in full. 
.'1 
B. Respondent inappropriately discharged A.H. to the Embassy Suites 
Hotel despite having treated her for cardiac instability and hypertension during the 









C. Respondent failed to respond to the initial page to him, placed by 
t~e nursc.c<;1ring f~r A.H:postopcra~ivcly. · 
.. '• 
: D. . · . Whe~~ ·rcspor1.dent ·~va~ ~ontacted the _second tirrie by the nurs·e 
caring for A.H., ·he apparcritly failed to recognize signs and symptoms of A.H. 's severe . . ,, . 
canliµc ii1st~bility. He also impropcrly_detaxed the n_urse in calling paramedics to take 
A.H. to the hospital, instead electing to ob~ery~ A.~: in the hotel room. 
E. Respondent improp.erly performed lower extremity.liposuction on . . . . . . . 
H.B. She was not an _apprbpriate patient for this procedure in light of her low~r extremity 
. ·v~nous insuffie~cy (fo~nd· in her preoperative workup). 
F. · Respondent excessively sedated H.B.and then.prematurely 










G. Respondent improperly continued the cosmetic surgery on H.B. 
after she suffered two episodes of ventricular arrhythmia during the chemical peel portion 
of respondent's surgery.· · · 
H. Respondent failed to timely cause H.B. to be transferred to the 
hospital for treatment when H.B. suffered postoperative complications while staying at 
the Embassy Suites Hotel: 
SECOND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE AND REVOCATION OF PROBATION 
(False or Misleading Advertisement) 
18. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under section 2271 in. that he 








A. Respondent used an advertising video which creates the impression 
that he completed a post-graduate residency and to post-graduate training at the 
University of California, Davis. Respondent did not complete a residency and did not 
h_ave post-graduate training othe\ than a one-~~ar internship. 
B. Respondent uses videos, brochures, and other advertising media to 
f 
represent that his practice is safe and has low complication rates. In fact, respondent is on 













C. Pre-operative patient photographs are taken in different lighting 
. . 
.: t~at post-operafr~~c photographs. Pn:-opcrat_ivc photographs are t~ken without makeup, 
· .. \Vhil~ post,.ope·rative ph~·l(?S feature patients ·with ·rri-~k~up. · Th~ effe~t ~f these 
photographs is t~ exaggerate.tl'le benefits of respondent's treatments. 
D. ·. . Respondent has sent a letter to prospective patients falsely 
claiming that his is the only medical office in ~outhem California that specializes in 
cosmetic skin rejuvenation. 
THIRD CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE AND REVOCATION OF PROBATION 
(False and misleading advertisement) 
"19. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under section 651 of the Code 
11 . in thai ~e engaged i~ fraud1;1lent, misleading or deceptive advertising. The circum~itances are set 
. . : 
· 12 forth in ·paragraph 18 of the. Accusiition, which is incorporated by reference and hereby. fonnally 
. . 
13 realleged as i( set forth here _(n full. 
14 FIRST CAUSE FOR PROBATION REVOCATION 
· 15 (Violation of laws relating to the practice of medicine) 
16 20. Respondent is subject to probation revocation because he violated the 
17 provisions of the Board's Deci~ion in Case No. 09-93-26899, In the Matter of the Accusation 
18 A!?:ainst Kelly J. O'Neil. M.D. Paragraph 4 of the Order mandates that respondent obey a~l 










A. Paragraphs 10 through 16 and 17 of the Accusation are 
incorporated by reference and hereby formally realleged as if set forth here in full. 
B. On or about August 2, 2000, respondent and /or Qual Care Nursing 
Services, Inc. were served with two notices of violations by M.S., a Code Enforcement 
Officer for the City of Temecula. Code Enforcement Officer S. issued notices for 
violations of Temecula Municipal Code section 17.24, a zoning violation, and ordered the 
Emb_gssy Suites to immediately cease all operations of medical care in Citation No. 0484. 












. . .. . . . ... . ,. 
failure to comply could result in a citation in Citation No. 486. 
C. Paragraphs 8, 9, 18 and 19 of the Accusation are jncorporated by 
: · reference and hereby. formally rcallcgcd as if fully set forth herein. 
· · · D.. ." Rcsp_oi:ident ~as falsely advcrtizcd to potential patients; engaged in 
improper patient selection and other aci"s in violation of Business and Professions:Code 
section 2234(b) (c} and (d); used gcncral.an·~sthesia on his patients and has continued his 
operation of an uncertifie? out patient setting for the care and treatment of his post-
operative patients. 
DISCIPLINE CONS ID ERA TIONS 
21. To det~rmine the degree of discipline, if any, to be imposed on 
11 Respondent, Complainant alleges that there was a prior disciplinary action against respondent 
12 entitled In the Matter of the Accusation Against Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. before the Medical 
13 Board of California, Case Number 09-1993-26899. Respondent's license was revoked for 
14 repeated negligent acts in the care and treatment of two patients. Respondent admitted in the 
15 Stipulation in Settlement and Decision, his negligence in his use of general anesthet~cs and 50% 
16 phenol solution on a p·atient who died on the operating table of cardiac arrest; operation of an 
l 7 unlicensed health facility he us~d to house his post-operative chemical face peel patients; and, to 
18 falsely advertizing his medical credentials.[ Paragrapq ~A-I of the Accusation which is 
19 incorporated by paragraph SA (Acts of Repeated Negligence)]. He further admitted to negligent 
. . 
20 selection of an improper candidate for liposuction procedure [Paragraph 15/13A-N.of 
21 Supplemental Accusation]; and, delay in recognition of a life threatening"_infectious disease in a 
. 22 post-operative patient.[Paragraph 13A-N]. 
23 Under the Decision, Respondent was revoked and ordered to successfully complete the 
24 PACE Program; and upon successful completion of the program the revocation was stayed and 
25 respondent was placed on probation for five years on certain terms and conditions. The effective 
26 date.of that decision was August 14, 1998. That decision is now final and is incorporated by 
27 reference as if fully set forth. Respondent's conduct is a continuation of those acts ~hich 
·.· 28 precipitat~d his Stipulation for Settlement and Decision and wh=ch acts are prohibited by the ... 
12 
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,· : . 
. .. . . 
-: .- . ., 
. .. ·. 
Decision. 
2 PRAYER 
3 W~EREFORE, Complainant request~ that _a ~earing be held on the f!Ialt_e.rs"tierei~ 
: · 4 alleged~ and tha·t following the h~aring, the Division of Medical Quality issue a decision: 
·5 l. Revoking or suspending Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. 
G A 36888, issued to Kelly James O'Neil, M.D.; 
7 2. Revoking, suspending or denying approval of Kelly James O'Neil, M.D.'s 
8 authority to supervise physician's assistants, pursuant t? section 3527 of the Code; 
9 3. Ordering Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. to pay the Division of M~dical Quality 
10 the reasonable costs of the investigation and enforcement of this case, and, if placed on 


















4. Taking such other and further action as deemed necessary and proper. 
DATED: (}br' It,, 2002 
·FOR 
. Doug}MacCartee 
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COUN1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO I 
) Case No. 503614 1'· i · 
SUPERlOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Kelly O'Neil, MD, 
Petitioner, ) o!l?W fl/ r I 
) Stipulationr Continuing Setting Hearing I 
vs. 
Medical Board of California, 
Respondent. 
) Date on Petition for Writ of Mandate and 
) Extending Stiy ~ 







Hearing Date: January 29, 2004 






Petitioner and respondent, through their respective counsel, hereby I 
stipulate to a hearing date of Januazy 29, 2004 on the petition for writ of 'I 
administrative man~amus and to an extension of the stay order currently in 
effect, as follows: I 
The following probationary conditions of respondent's disciplinary order 
of August 28, 2003, in Medical Board of California Case No. D l • 1993-26899, 
are hereby stayed pending hearing on petitioner1s Petition For Writ of 
1 
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1 Adt'linistrati.ve lWtuda:mus, which will be beard on JanU4l')' 29~ 2004: 
2 Cor.dition l (p,,:>vidm.g for a suspension of petitt~er)s California Physician,s 
3 \ and Su.rgec,m1s Certificate) tnd Con~tion 9 (r~.trlcting petitioner's -practice). 
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So Sti:;mlated: ~~ '-
· ;~~~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
Dated; 
So Stipulated: 
Attorney for Petition~ 
Dated: 
. Kelly J'm:oes O'Neil, MD 
~'-~ ~.,_~_;o_:,. _________ _ 
:,' 
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~Order 
BASED ON THE STIPULATION OF COUNSEL, AND GOOD 
CAUSE APPEARTNO THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
hearing on petitioner's Petition For Writ of Administrative Mandamus will be 
conducted on January 29, 2004, and that the following probationary conditions 
of respondent's disciplinary order of August 28, 2003, in Medical Board of 
California Case No. D1·1993-26899, are hereby stayed pending hearing and 
judgment on the aforesaid petition: Condition l (providing for a suspension of 
petitionerts _Califomia Physieim's and Surgeon's Certificate) and Condition 9 
(restricting petitioner's practice). All other conditions of probation are to 
remain in effect pendixmJiearing and judgment 
d oc.r 2 3 2003 Date : --------
l<:;;:2--,., 
~le-v 
Hon. Ronald E. Quidachay 
Judge of the Superior Court 
: .' 
3 
Stipulation Re Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate and Extension of Stay 
· Order 
OCT 17 2003 J2:42 5108451875 PAGE.04 
001340
BEFORE THE 
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation Against 
KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D. 
40971 Winchester Road 
Temecula, CA 92591 
Physician's and Surgeon's 
· Certificate No. A 36888 
Respondent. 
Case No. Dl-1993-26899 
OAH No .. L2002020038 
DECISION AFTER NONADOPTION 
Administrative Law Judge Joyce A. Wharton, Office of Administrative Hearings, 
State of California, heard this matter in San Diego, California on October 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 28, 29 and 30, 2002. 
T. Douglas MacCartee, Deputy Attorney General, represented the complainant. 
Albert J. Garcia, Attorney at Law, represented respondent Kelly James O'Neill, 
M.D., who was present. 
The matter was submitted on October 30, 2002. 
The proposed decision of the administrative law judge was submitted to the Division 
of Medical Quality, Medical Board of California (hereafter "division") on March 13, 2003. 
After due consideration thereof, the division declined to adopt the proposed decision and 
thereafter on April 10, 2003 issued a Notice of Non-Adoption and subsequently issued an 
Order Fixing Date for Submission of Written Argument. On July 3, 2003, the division 
issued a Notice of Hearing for Oral Argument. Oral argument was heard on August 1, 
2003. The time for filing written argument in this matter having expired, written argument 
having been filed by both parties and such written argument, together with the entire 
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record, including the transcript of said hearing, having been read and considered, pursuant 
to Government Code Section 11517, PaJ:?.el B of the division hereby makes the following 
decision and order: 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
1. On January 4, 2002, Ron Joseph (hereinafter "complainant"), acting in his 
official capacity as the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (hereinafter 
"the Board"), filed Accusation No 1.9-2000-112061 against Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. 
(hereinafter "respondent"). Complainant charged respondent with unprofessional conduct 
in connection with his care and treatment of two patients in July 2000. Specifically, 
complainant alleged gross negligence, repeated acts of negligence and incompetence in 
violation of Business and Professions Code, 1 section 2234, subdivisions (b), (c) and (d); 
and false and misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271. Complainant 
also alleged that respondent violated a term of probation in case No. 09-93-26899 and, 
therefore, the order of probation should be revoked. Complainant filed a First Amended 
Accusation on October 16, 2002. 2 
Respondent filed a timely Notice of Defense. 
2. Respondent is 49 years old. In 1975, he graduated U.C. Davis with a 
Bachelor of Science degree in Physiology. In 1980, he obtained a medical degree from 
Tulane Medical School. In 1981, he completed a one-year rotating internship at UC Davis 
but did not perform a residency. On June 24, 1981, the Board issued physician's and 
surgeon's certificate No. A 36888. The certificate is renewed and current with an 
expiration date of January 31, 2003. 
Respondent moved to Temecula and opened a private family practice in late August 
1981. Respondent soon met a physician who specialized in chemical peels and was about 
to retire. The physician trained respondent in the peel procedure and respondent 
incorporated it into his practice. Respondent took courses and attended seminars on peel 
procedures. In 1987, he gave up his family practice to primarily devote time to the skin 
peel procedure. In about 1994, he began doing tumescent liposurgery as well. Respondent 
has continued to limit his practice to chemical peels and liposurgery. He conducts his 
practice at the O'Neil Skin Center located at 40971 Winchester Road in Temecula. 
Respondent is not board certified in any specialty. 
All statutory references are to the California Business and Professions Code unless stated otherwise. 
2 Respondent did not object to the new allegations made shortly before the date of hearing. 
2 
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3. Complainant .filed Accusation No. 09-03-26899 against respondent in 
November 1996, and a Supplemental Accusation in January 1998. The parties resolved the 
matter by a Stipulation in Settlement and Decision effective September 14, 1998. The 
stipulation contained the following pertinent language: 
"7. For the purpose of resolving Accusation and First Supplemental 
Accusation No. 09793-26899, respondent admits he committed repeated acts 
of negligence in the care and treatment of patient J. G. as alleged in 
paragraph 5 of the Accusation, and repeated acts of negligence in the care 
and treatment of patient V.F. as alleged in paragraph 15 of the First 
Supplemental Accusation. . . . . . . The remaining allegations in the 
Accusation and First Supplemental Accusation are dismissed." 3 (Emphasis 
added.) 
. J. G. was a 72-year-old patient on whom respondent performed a chemical facial 
peel in March 1993. During the procedure the patient went into respiratory arrest and 
never regained consciousness. Pursuant to the stipulation, respondent admitted the 
following: He failed to perform a complete preoperative physical; he failed to order a pre-
operative electrocardiogram or chest x-ray which would have determined the extent of the 
patient's chronic condition; he failed to detect the patient was suffering from chronic 
congestive heart failure; he failed to record the patient's peripheral edema in his history 
and physical; he proceeded with the chemical face peel without first obtaining a cardiac 
clearance from a physician; he failed to properly intubate the patient prior to arrival of 
paramedics; he failed to establish a properly operating intravenous route; he gave the 
patient multiple sedatives without a nurse anesthetist or anesthesiologist present. 
V.F. was a 37-year-old female, weighing 247 pounds, on whom respondent 
performed liposuction in September 1996. After surgery the patient developed blisters 
from the girdle prescribed by respondent. The condition worsened to a life-threatening 
soft tissue infection. Pursuant to the stipulation, respondent admitted the following: He 
failed to properly assess the patient for liposuction surgery; t~e patient was not a proper 
candidate for the surgery because of her generalized obesity; he administered an excessive 
amount of tumescent solution; he removed an excessive amount of aspirate from the 
patient. 
The Board revoked respondent's certificate and stayed the order for five years on 
probationary terms that included: completion of a Physician Assessment and Clinical 
Evaluation (PACE) program in patient assessment, plastic surgery and anesthesia at UCSD 
School of Medicine prior to the revocatlon order being stayed; a practice monitor; practice 
3 Complainant asserted respondent's stipulated admissions included admitting to placing a false 
advertisement in the Yellow Pages stating he was board certified in general practice, and admitting he operated an 
unlicensed health facility. A plain reading of the matters admitted does not support this contention. Respondent 
admitted only "repeated negligent acts" in the care and treatment of specific patients in violation of section 2234(c). 
3 
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r~strictions that preclude use of general anesthesia and limit the amount of aspirate . 
. withdrawn during certain procedures; compliance with all f~deral, state and local laws and 
rules governing the practice of medicine in California. 
4. In June and July 1998, respondent underwent a comprehensive PACE 
assessment, which included measurement of medical skills and knowledge, appraisal of 
physical health and psychological testing. Respondent was found to be in good physical 
and mental health. 
In compliance with terms of his probation, respondent submitted to a psychological 
assessment on June 1, 1998. William Perry, Ph.D. interviewed respondent and 
administered numerous tests. He found no cognitive or neurocognitive deficits, nor was 
there indication of serious psychopathology. In September 1998, respondent attended a 
weeklong clinical program iiwluding Dermatology and Anesthesiology. On September 25, 
1998, PACE issued a certificate of completion indicating that respondent successfully 
completed and met all requirements of the PACE program. The order of revocation was 
stayed on that date. 
Respondent testified that as a result of the disciplin~ry action, he has instituted 
changes in his practice. At the initial consultation he applies stricter guidelines to evaluate 
the patient for the procedure and he refuses more patients at that stage. Patients under 50 
must have blood work and patients over 50 must also have an EKG and chest x-ray. All 
patien~ must be examined by their primary care physician and provide that physician's 
authorization for the chemexfiliation and/or Iiposurgery. It is not uncommon for the 
procedure to then be cancelled because of abnormal testing, or "more often just delayed." 
In addition to his initial consultation with the patient, on the morning of the procedure 
respondent also takes a ·medical history, performs a physical examination and documents 
findings in his chart. Respondent adheres to the probationary requirement to limit the 
amount of aspirate for liposurgery and believes this was a good idea. 
As of October 29, 2001, respondent was deemed in compliance with all terms and 
conditions of his probation. Respondent's practice monitor reported he did not find any 
problems with respondent's care of patients. 
5. At all times relevant to the pending Accusation, respondent conducted his 
practice at 40971 Winchester Road in Temecula under the name "O'Neil Skin and Lipo 
Center, Kelly James O'Neil, M.D." Effective October 25, 1999, the facility became 
accredited by the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. Respondent 
lost his hospital privileges due to the 1998 disciplinary action. However, he has a standing 
transfer agreement with the local hospital allowing him to transfer patients to the hospital 
by means of a 911 call. 
4 
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As of July 2000, respondent had performed about 6,000 full phenol peels and 2,000 
more partial peels. Approximately one-third of his patients were aged 60 or older. 
6. Respondent's procedures were performed on an outpatient basis. He gave 
each patient a written set of instructions titled "O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation After Care 
Instructions for the First 48 Hours." The instructions advised the patient in pertinent part 
as follows: 
11 h. You must have a driver to take you from Dr. O'Neil's office. 
2. You must have someone help you so you can rest in bed (only getting up 
for the restroom) for the next 48 hours. 
3. . . . Diet: Full liquid diet through a straw. If nauseated have clear 
liquids through a straw. 
4. Sleep with your head elevated at 45 degrees for the first 24 hours and 
then position as you are comfortable. 
5. Apply ice packs to eyelids for 20 minutes each hour for the first 24 
hours .... 
6. Medications: Keep these at your bedside ... 
. . . Please do not take any xanax, ativan, or restoril past midnight 
on 'the second day after your treatment, because the doctor would like you to 
be more active the day your tape comes off. 
Remove the mask on the mo1:'ning of the third day and apply the 
powder that was supplied to you. . . . . 
Notify Dr. O'Neil if your: 
Blood pressure is greater than 100 diastolic 
If your blood pressure is greater then [sic] 180 systolic 
If your pulse is greater then [sic] 100 
If your tempeture [sic] is greater then [sic] 100 degrees 
If you have any questions"4 
7. Respondent believed that to achieve optimum cosmetic outcome, the 24 to 40 
hour period after the procedure was an important, integral part of the skin rejuvenation 
process. Some, but not all, of the peel procedures required application of a tape mask that 
was to remain in place for about two days. The tape mask must stay on with minimal 
movement around the mouth and eyes in order to achieve the best cosmetic outcome for 
the patient. Respondent wanted the patients to remain quiet and undisturbed for the first 
4 Additional instructions were included for liposurgery patients. 
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48 hours so they would not touch their faces or disturb the tape mask and thus risk scarring 
or a poor result. 
Respondent explained that he wanted his patients in a controlled post operative care 
environment, not necessarily for medical reasons, but for a good result of the facial peel so 
the patient would be happy and he would not have future complaints about the result. 
8. In 2000, as part of the skin rejuvenation package, respondent offered his 
patients post operative care options that included staying two nights in a nearby hotel 
where they could be monitored and assisted until they removed the mask. Once the mask 
was removed, the patients could go home or spend from 1 to 9 days at a private "retreat" 
when~ healthful meals, recreational activities and relaxation were provided by an attentive 
staff. The aftercare options were attractive to the patients, especially those who lived far 
from the clinic or had no one at home to provide care and assistance. Respondent would 
not perform the procedure on certain patients who lived far away with no one at home to 
help them unless they agreed to go to the hotel. 
Over the years respondent had used several different post operative care facilities or 
retreats including the local hospital. When his license was placed on probationary status, 
respondent lost his hospital privileges at Inland Valley Hospital and sought another 
provider of post operative care. Respondent wanted a location that was close to his office 
"for transport and to keep an eye on patients." In about 1999 he learned that QualCare, 
Inc., a nursing registry, was providing post procedure care for cosmetic surgery patients at 
an upscale hotel in Riverside. Because that location was too far from his office, he 
contacted the owner of QualCare to see if the service could be provided in Temecula. 
9. QualCare Inc., aka QC Enterprises, was a company owned and operated by 
Jo-Ann Jordan, R.N. Ms. Jordan and a friend started the business, which operated for an 
unknown period of time before it was incorporated as a closely held corporation in May 
1999. Ms. Jordan described QualCare as a nursing registry that provided care on an· as 
needed basis in various settings. The major part of QualCare's business was to provide 
care to discharged outpatients in a setting similar to that at home. 
Ms. Jordan hired registered nurses who worked for QualCare as independent 
contractors. She required that the nurses also work in hospitals so they would have the 
necessary and up-to-date skills. QualCare scheduled and paid the nurses. The nurses wore 
scrubs and used latex gloves, had a stethoscope and blood pressure measuring equipment, 
but cl.id not provide oximeters or EKG equipment. The nurses did not give injections or 
intravenous treatment, nor did they dispense drugs. They assisted with suppositories and 
the patients' regular oral medications. The patient's physician would send someone to 
administer any injection that was required. The nurse was expected to use her professional 
judgment to call 911 if an emergency arose. 
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Ms. Jordan was familiar w.ith other companies that provided aftercare to cosmetic 
surgery patients in hotel setting~ in southern California. Jordan testified that she contacted 
the appropriate state and local agencies about providing aftercare services in a hotel setting 
and was not advised of any illegality. She testified that when the city of Temecula served 
the notice of violation at the Embassy Suites Hotel, Riverside County was "in the process" 
of approving Qual Care's activities. Before Ms. Jordan met respondent, QualCare had 
provided aftercare services for a Loma Linda plastic surgeon. QualCare arranged for the 
patients to stay in rooms at the Mission Inn, a very upscale hotel in Riverside. QualCare 
provided one nurse to care for three patients. If a patient persisted in trying to remove the 
bandages, an unlicensed "sitter" would be provided for one-on-one attention to do nothing 
but watch the patient. 
10. In 1999, at least one year after QualCare started doing business, Ms. Jordan 
learned that respondent was looking for aftercare services for his skin peel patients. She 
met with respondent and he discussed his expectations for aftercare. Based on her · 
experience at the Mission Inn, she believed QualCare could fashion a program to meet 
respondent's needs. The patient was to remain quiet and recline at a 45-degree angle; ice 
was to be applied to the face and the patient must avoid smoking. The setting was to be 
upscale, with a phone available for personal calls and a microwave for heating broth. Ms. 
Jordan described the service QualCare was to provide as "a supportive environment in lieu 
of going home". 
Ms. Jordan and her partner used respondent's guidelines and incorporated what they 
felt was needed for aftercare. Ms. Jordan and respondent agreed that the Embassy Suites 
Hotel in Temecula would be an appropriate setting. Ms. Jordan approached the Embassy 
Suites and discussed with the manager. the nature of her operation, what the nurses would 
be doing and the type of rooms needed. Embassy Suites agreed to rent to QualCare a 
block of adjoining rooms. The hotel also accommodated QualCare by providing unlimited 
ice, linens and pillows. There was no evidence of any complaints by the management or 
owner of Embassy Suites nor any indication they were concerned about the legality of 
QualCare's use of the hotel property for aftercare. The panel found this to be 
unpersuasive, as a hotel would not likely be familiar with health care facility licensing 
standards. QualCare entered an arrangement with respondent to provide aftercare to all his 
facial peel patients. Qua! Care operated out of Embassy Suites for approximately 18 
months. 
The patients paid QualCare for its services. As part of the skin rejuvenation 
"package," the patient wrote a check to respondent for his services and a separate check to. 
QualCare. Both checks were delivered to respondent's office approximately a week before 
the procedure and QualCare would pick up its checks. Respondent did not receive any 
portion of the payment made to QualCare. 
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11. QualCare continued to solicit business from other physicians but was not 
successful. After 1999, respondent was its only client. There was no arrangement or 
agreement between respondent and QualCare whereby it would serve only his practice. 
12. The evidence did not establish that QualCare, a nursing registry, was 
"effectively controlled" by respondent as alleged in the First Amended Accusation. 
Respondent took no part in the fonnation or incorporation of QualCare and had no 
ownership or financial interest in it. He had no role in hiring, scheduling or paying the 
nurses. Respondent provided QualCare nurses the same instructions given to the patients 
for aftercare and his nurses demonstrated how to remove the tape mask. QualCare nurses 
called respondent, as the treating physician, if a patient was having a problem and they 
followed his instructions for aftercare. While the panel concurs with the finding of the 
administrative law judge that respondent did not control QualCare as an entity, respondent 
did control his patients receiving post procedure care from QualCare at the Embassy Suites 
Hotel. 
13. In the First Amended Accusation, complainant alleged respondent violated 
the tenns of probation because he failed to obey state and local laws. Complainant's 
counsel explained the charges were based on complainant's belief that respondent operated, 
managed, conducted or maintained an "outpatient setting" at the Embassy Suites in 
violation of Health and Safety Code section 1248.1 and Temecula Municipal Code section 
17.24. 
The evidence did not establish that use of the hotel for aftercare as provided by 
QualCare constituted an "outpatient setting." Health and Safety Code section 1248(c) 
defines outpatient setting for the purpose of section 1248.1 as follows: 
11 ••• any facility, ... center, office or other setting that is not part of 
a general acute care facility and where anesthesia5 • • • is used in compliance 
with the community standard of practice, in doses that, when administered 
have the probability of placing a patient at risk for loss of the patient's life-
preserving protective reflexes. 
"Outpatient setting" does not include, among other settings, any 
settings where anxiolytics6 and analgesics7 are administered ... in doses that 
do not have the probability of placing the patient at risk for loss of life 
preserving reflexes. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
5 "Anesthesia" is defined as "loss of feeling or sensation, especially to loss of sensation of pain as it is 
induced to permit performance of surgery or other painful procedures." (Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 
271h Ed.) 
6 "Anxiolytic" is defined as" ... reducing anxiety." Id. 
7 "Analgesic" is defined as "agent that alleviates pain without causing loss of consciousness. Id. 
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Neither respondent nor the ·QualCare nurses administered anesthesia to patients 
during their stay at the hotel. 
14. A City of Temecula code enforcement officer testified that the City received 
a call from the fire department regarding the rescue of two of respondent's patients from a 
surgery recovery facility being i:un out of the Embassy Suites Hotel. The fire department 
requested the City get on this matter quickly, due to concern that respondent would move 
his recovery facility to another location. The enforcement officer investigated the matter 
and issued a notice to the Embassy Suites Hotel, Qual Care and respondent to cease all 
operations of medical care. 
15. The parties entered the following stipulation with regard to the Temecula 
Municipal Code: 
"At all times relevant herein the city of Temecula, California had a zoning 
general plan and ordinance which precluded the Embassy Suites Hotel from 
operation of any business use other than its own operation as a hotel. Under 
the ordinance it is illegal for anyone, who has not applied for and received a 
conditional use permit, to engage [within the premises of Embassy Suites 
Hotel] in the operation of a Post Surgical Care Facility or any other health 
care operation whereby medical patients or the infirm are cared for by a 
medical professional for a fee. 11 
Upon review of the record, the panel finds that respondent's arranging for his 
patients to receive post operative care at the Embassy Suites Hotel was in violation of the 
City of Temecula zoning ordinance (which the enforcement officer testified to be 
Municipal Code section 17-01-080.) The panel found the testimony of the enforcement 
officer to be credible, and there was no evidence that respondent or Qual Care questioned 
the validity of the notice of violation, but rather, they acted in accordance with the cease 
and desist notice and immediately removed their post operative care facility from the hotel. 
16. The First Amended Accusation alleged as a violation of law that respondent 
"continued his operation of an uncertified outpatient setting. 11 
The evidence did not establish that respondent operated an "uncertified outpatient 
setting. 11 (The evidence in this case indicates that in arranging for postoperative care in a 
hotel respondent may have been operating an unlicensed health facility in violation of · 
Health and Safely Code Section 1250. However, this violation was not pied in the First 
Amended Accusation; and therefore, cannot be found in this decision.) 
17. For several years respondent has made available to prospective patients a 
video. The video at issue in this hearing is Exhibit H. Respondent testified the video was 
made as an "infomercial" to be shown on television approximately seven years ago. The 
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intent was to promote the chemical peel process that he developed over many years and 
became his special area of practice. The evidence indicated Exhibit H was made in about 
1994.8 
Respondent testified he felt Exhibit H was too commercialized to give to patients, 
so he made another similar version to distribute to patients for information. The evidence 
indicated a video was available to patients at respondent's office and was presented at 
promotional seminars. The evidence was not conclusive that Exhibit H was the same video 
presented to individual patients and at seminars. 
18. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising within the meaning of sections 651 and 2271 because he "used an 
advertising video which creates the impression that he completed a post graduate residency 
and to [sic] post-graduate training at the ·university of California, Davis/ 
In one portion of the Exhibit H video, when describing his background and 
experience, respondent stated: "I graduated from Tulane Medical School and spent my 
residency at U.C. Davis in Sacramento." Respondent goes on to say that he then made his 
specialty in non-surgical rejuvenation of the skin. The panel believes these statements 
imply respondent completed a residency in his specialty. In fact, respondent completed a 
one-year rotating internship at U.C. Davis in family practice, and did not do a residency. 
Respondent admitted his statement in the video could be construed to mean that he 
completed a residency program in his specialty, and therefore could be misleading. The 
panel did not find respondent's testimony regarding his confusion over the terms "intern" 
and "residency" credible on the issue of whether his representation on the video regarding 
his residency was misleading. 
Respondent testified that his office frequently receives inquiries from prospective 
patients inquiring about his credentials. The panel believes this fact establishes that 
representations in the video regarding his training are material. 
19. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising within the meanings of sections 651 and 2271 because he "uses 
videos, brochures, and other advertising media to represent that his practice is safe and has 
low complication rates. In fact respondent is on probation for treatment of patients 
resulting in death and serious complications." The Accusation did not specify statements· 
or language it found objectionable. As evidence of the false statements complainant 
presented the Exhibit H video, a brochure and an information sheet. 
Alice T is one of respondent's chemical peel patients who appeared in the video and stated her age as 72. She testified at the hearing 
and stated her current age as 80. This suggests the video was made 8 years ago, in about 1994. 
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Respondent made the following statements on the Exhibit H video regarding his 
skin rejuvenation procedures: 
[Regarding the aftercare program provided at the retreat facility and the 
results of the O.S.R. 9 treatment] 11 ••• I believe it is the reason my 
complication rate is so low." 
"Safety and results are my main concern." 
"There are risks involved as in any procedure but this procedure is 
inherently safer than cosmetic surgery, dermabrasion or skin peeling. I have 
performed thousands of these procedures over fourteen years and we provide 
every possible precaution at the O'Neil Skin Center to insure your success. 
The reason for our excellent safety record is simple, I provide more aftercare 
than other doctors, I've also designed a safer system for skin rejuvenation 
than other doctors, a multilayer system with a moderate strength solution. 
Some doctors use a harsh solution. I have designed a much gentler 
formula." 
The brochure contained the foll~wing statements: 
"Safety 
The O.S.R. program offers the most extensive aftercare program of any 
cosmetic treatment o_n the market today. The patients heal and recuperate in 
privacy and seclusion. This enhances the safety of the procedure and insure 
[sic] uniform results. Other doctors may try to suggest that their skin peel 
program is "easier" or "safer" because you are sent directly home after the 
procedure, but wouldnJt it be safer to have experience~ professionals 
monitoring and caring for you at this time?" 
The information sheet, titled "O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation Versus Conventional Skin 
Peels" and dated "3/00," stated in pertinent part: 
9 
"At the OJNeil Skin Rejuvenation Center we specialize in cosmetic 
treatment of the skin. Various types of skin peels are offered as well as the 
O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation program. By concentrating on one area of 
expertise, Dr. O'Neil has elevated skin rejuvenation to a different plane. 
With over 8500 cases behind him, we feel our skin treatments are second to 
none in quality, safety and results. . .. " 
"The O'Neil Skin Center stands for quality, comfort, and safety." 
· O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation. 
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The panel believes respondent's holding himself out as having an "excellent safety 
record," and "second to none in quality and safety" is misleading, within the meaning of 
sections 651 and 2271, when in fact his license to practice. medicine is revoked, with the 
revocation stayed, and placed on probation for a term of five (5) years, along with the 
requirement of a practice monitor. 
20. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271 because he took pre-operative 
photographs in different lighting than post-operative photos, and took pre-operative photos 
without makeup, but post-operative photos feature patients with makeup. 
The only evidence of photos is contained in Exhibits O and P, original brochures 
containing black and white photos, and Exhibit H, the videotape. Complainant presented 
no credible evidence about the manner in which respondent took any before and after 
photos·. Complainant's expert witnesses, Mark Krugman, M.D. and David T. Morwood, 
M.D., offered their opinions but to a great extent they were spe;!culating; they had no 
expertise in photography nor did they know the actual circ:umstances in which the photos 
were taken. · 
In most, it does not appear the lighting before and after was significantly different. 
In some, it does not appear that make-up was used at all in the after photo. In sqme 
photos, lipstick or eye makeup was used in both before and after photos. In others, it 
appears that eye make-up or lipstick was applied for the after photo, but it is also obvious 
that the improvement in facial skin is the result of something other than cosmetics and 
lighting. 
The only evidence about the manner in which the photos were taken established 
they were taken in respondent's office in ambient lighting. The before photos were taken 
shortly before the procedure. The after photos were taken when patients returned for post-
procedure checkups. Respondent explained that the lighting might appear different because 
he takes the pictures against a wall at different times of the day. Patients are more likely 
to wear makeup when they come in for a checkup but the makeup will not cover wrinkles. 
Respondent testified he never touched up photos or tried to misrepresent results; he did 
not need to use makeup to exaggerate the benefits of the O.S.R. treatment because the 
results and the patients speak for themselves. 
Five of respondent's skin rejuvenation patients, including A.H. and H.B., testified 
at the hearing. Direct observation of their skin revealed that the "after" photos very likely 
did not exaggerate the results of the O.S.R. treatment. 
The evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to establish that the 
photographs used in respondent's promotional and informational materials constituted false 
or misleading advertising. 
12 
001352
21. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271 because he sent a letter to 
prospective patients falsely claiming that his was the only medical office in southern 
California that specialized in cosmetic skin rejuvenation. The letter stated: 
"We are, to our knowledge, the only medical office in Southern California 
that specializes in cosmetic skin rejuvenation. While other physicians may 
do laser peels, TCA peels, or phenol peels, few, if any, concentrate their 
practice exclusively on skin rejuvenation." 
It is important that the statement contained the qualifying "to our knowledge." 
Complainant presented no evidence of any other medical office in Southern California that 
concentrated its practice exclusively on non surgical cosmetic skin rejuvenation. None of 
the expert witnesses called by the parties concentrated their practice on cosmetic skin 
rejuvenation to the same extent as respondent. The evidence was not sufficient to establish 
that respondent's statement constituted a violation of sections 651 and 2271. 
22. The First Amended Accusation charged respondent with gross negligence, 
incompetence and repeated negligent acts in his treatment of patient A.H. in July 2000. 
In 1998, at age 69, patient A.H. first consulted respondent. A.H. was impressed 
by the beautiful skin of her hairdresser, who had been treated by respondent. A.H. 
attended a seminar given by respondent in Escondido and watched two videos, one at the 
seminar and one given to her by a friend. The seminar video may have been identical or 
similar to Exhibit H. Respondent's statement about his medical school and residency did 
not impress her. Based on the information obtained from ·the seminar and video, A.H. felt 
respondent was highly competent in the skin rejuvenation process. 
On the intake sheet, A.H. listed previous surgeries including two face-lifts and back 
surgery: She noted her only medical problems as osteoporosis and previous morphine 
addiction related to back pain. The patient did not have a facial procedure at that time. 
She returned to respondent in 2000 and scheduled an O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation procedure, 
including aftercare by QualCare and the retreat. She agreed to the post operative care 
program because she thought it was better than going home and caring for herself or 
having a friend help her. She felt no pressure to go to the aftercare program. She was not 
aware she would spend the first two days at the hotel. She thought Qual Care was part of 
respondent's "operation but under a different arm11 for tax purposes. She thought Qual 
Care would be supervised by respondent. She does not recall being in the hotel room. 
She was too asleep to remember. 
Pursuant to respondent's routine procedure, an EKG and x-ray ~ere done on June 
15, and a complete blood count was performed on June 18, 2000. The lab results were 
normal and the x-ray found no acute cardiopulmonary disease. The EKG noted "Sinus 
13 
001353
Bradycardia, otherwise normal ECG. 11 Respondent required the patient be examined by 
her primary care physician and obtain an approval for the procedure. On July 14, 2000, 
the patient was examined by Jerome Brodkin, M.D., her primary care physician. Dr. 
Brodkin completed an authorization fonn that noted the patient's only medical problem as 
"Back, Lower." The patient's physical examination was nonnal and there were no 
abnormal findings on her EKG or chest x-ray. Dr. Brodkin approved the patient for the 
phenol peel procedure. 
23. Patient A.H. arrived at respondent's outpatient center by 7:30 a.m. on July 
18, 2000. Upon arrival, the patient signed the QualCare Patient Consent Form, which 
stated: 
"I do hereby give pennission to Qual_Care nurses and associates to render 
care as prescribed by the physician during post procedural care in a non-
hospital setting. In an emergency situation, I ·am aware that 911 will be 
called and I will be transp~rted to the nearest hospital .... 11 
24. Shortly before the procedure, respondent took a history and perfonned a 
physical exam of A.H. He noted his findings in the patient's chart: there was no history of 
heart, liver or renal problems; no history of myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, 
angina, shortness of breath, cerebral vascular accident or stroke; he found no abnonnalities 
in the physical exam. He noted "EKG - Sinus Bradycardia. 1110 
25. The patient was in the operating room at 9:30 a.m.; her blood pressure was 
noted as 140/70 and her pulse rate about 60. The first anesthesia was administered at 
9:45 a.m. At 10:30 the patient becarrie restless and experienced premature ventricular 
contractions (PVC); her blood pressure was noted as 160/90 with a pulse of about 100. 
Respondent administered Lidocaine and by 10:37 the patient was in nonnal sinus rhythm. 
At 11 :35 the patient's blood pressure rose to 182/100 with a pulse of 90. Respondent 
administered Inapsine. The blood pressure rose over the next ten minutes to 192/100. By 
11:00 the blood pressure was decreasing and the last dose of fentanyl was administered. 
At noon the last dose of Versed was administered and the procedure was finished. The 
patient's blood pressure was 170/80 and the pulse was about 80. 
Postoperatively the patient's vital signs were monitored for an hour and one-half . 
during which the blood pressure ranged from 164/70 to 170/80, with_ the pulse in the high 
80s. From 12:30 to 1 :30 the patient's level of consciousness was noted as "awake." The 
Doctor's Discharge Summary noted the patient was "oriented & ambulates, vital signs 
stable" at 1:30 p.m. Blood pressure was 172/80, pulse 88 and respiration 20. The patient 
was experiencing face pain. Respondent gave the patient Ativan for anxiety ~nd authorized 
her to be discharged from his facility. The patient was discharged wearing the tape mask. 
10 "Bradycardia" is "slowness of the heartbeat, as evidenced by slowing of the pulse rate to less than 60." 
(Dorlan<fs Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 271h Edition.) 
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26. Someone from respondent's office drove patient A.H. to the Embassy Suites 
Hotel. She arrived with the aftercare instruction sheet and her medications. The QualCare 
nurse on duty noted the patient was awake and alert, her blood pressure was 156/99 and 
pulse of 107. The nurse's notes described the patjent as restless, anxious and taking water. 
By 3:00 p.m. the patient was either awake or sleeping normally, her blood pressure was 
143/80 and pulse was 119. At 5:30 p.m. the nurse noted the patient had a fever, blood 
pressure was 131/81 and pulse had risen to 124. The nurse paged respondent for orders. 
Respondent testified he was in his office performing a procedure when the nurse 
called. He did not wear a pager while working on a patient and he did not recall staff 
notifying him of a call. 
27. Shortly before 7:00 p.m. Eliane Heller, R.N. came on for ~e next shift. 
Nurse Heller testified at the hearing. Based on her attitude, demeanor and the quality of 
her testimony, she was found to be a candid and credible witness. 
The day nurse advised Nurse Heller of the patient's elevated pulse and that 
respondent had been called. He had not yet returned the page. Nurse Heller took the 
patient's vital signs and noted the temperature was 98.2, blood pressure 130/100 and pulse 
126. The patient was awake and alert and asked the nurse to assist her into the bathroom. 
While in the bathroom, the nurse noticed the patient disimpacting herself and advised the 
patient to stop. The nurse washed the patient's hands and performed the disimpaction. 
The patient said she felt better and walked back to bed. · 
Between 7:00 - 7:30 p.m. respondent called for the first time after having been 
paged at 5:30 p.m. Respondent testified he was still in the operating room with a patient 
when he spoke to the nurse. Nurse Heller testified she told respondent the patient was in 
bed and resting, and respondent instructed her to keep watching the patient and he would 
call back in half an hour. Nurse Heller recalled that after respondent's call, the patient sat 
up, complained of back pain and said it was time for her morphine. The nurse checked the 
patient's Oramorph bottle and gave the patient the prescribed dose. The medication record 
indicated this was done at 7:30 p.m. The patient reclined again and felt calmer. Nurse 
Heller testified that respondent called again, she told him the patient was resting and he 
said to give Ativan for anxiety. She did not do so because the patient had recently taken 
Oramorph. There was no evidence to pinpoint the time of this conversation. The 
QualCare record noted at 8:00 p.m. that the nurse gave the patient MSM and Famiver per 
bottle instructions and the pulse was 124. No blood pressure was recorded. 
Respondent testified the nurse advised him the patient was restless with a rapid heart 
rate but not complaining of chest pain and not short of breath. Respondent testified he 
instructed the nurse to give pain medication and wait an hour or so to let him know how 
she was doing. Respondent explained he did not consider the rapid heart rate to require 
sending the patient to the hospital because her other vital signs were stable and pain could 
cause the rising pulse. The evidence did not establish the time of this conversation. 
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Nurse Heller testified the patient rested awhile and was "OK." She sat up again and 
became restless, requiring the nurse's full attention. Because there were two other patients 
in her care, the nurse called Jo-Ann Jordan to come and assist her. Jordan arrived, sat 
with the patient and talked to her about relaxation methods. There was no evidence of the 
time Jordan arrived. Nurse Heller returned and took the patient's pulse, which was 
elevated and too fast to count. Heller testified she looked at Jordan, shook her head to 
indicate it was not good and, at that point, Jordan said, "Now she is complaining of chest 
pains." Heller testified she went-to the next room and called 911; she then called 
respondent and told him she had called 911 because the patient had chest pains. Nurse 
Heller testified repeatedly that respondent arrived either shortly before or at the same time 
as the paramedics. She testified repeatedly that she did not tell respondent the patient had 
chest pains until after she had called 911. 
Respondent testified that after the second phone conversation with the nurse he 
decided to see the patient because her blood pressure was a bit high and she was not 
responding to the pain medication. When he arrived both Jordan and Heller were present. 
The nurse told him the patient started to complain of chest pain.. Respondent listened to 
her heart and lungs with a stethoscope and asked about the chest pain. A.H. said she had 
chest pain but did not have it at that moment. Respondent told the nurse to call 911; he 
did not. recall if she said she already had placed the call. The paramedics arrived within a 
few minutes. 
28. Both the QualCare chart notes and respondent's chart notes establish that 
respondent arrived at the Embassy Suites Hotel to examine patient A. H. at around 8:30 
p.m. 
Nurse Heller wrote the following note in the QualCare chart: 
"2130 - Guest remains restless. Dr. O'Neil here & Jo Ann RN. C/0 chest 
pain. Skin is cold & clammy. HR 140/min. Pt is transported via 
ambulance to the hospital." 
A QualCare chart entry also noted a time of 8:45 p.m., "Dr. O'Neil with 
·patient." A pulse of 140 and respiration rate of 10 was also noted at about 8:45 p.m. 
On July 19, 2000, respondent wrote a note in his chart summarizing the events and 
noted: 
"Pt noted to have elevated HB [approximately] 120-130 at [approximately] 
6:30 p.m. [illegible] 118 after straining at stool. ... Pt complained of some 
facial discomfort [secondary] peel and was given her Oramorph pain meds. 
This failed to reduce HR. She later developed some chest pain (ache, apex x 
[illegible], came and went several times, radiating to shoulder). I saw her at 
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Embassy Suite hotel [approximately] 8:30 p.m. No ch. ·Pain at that time ... 
but HR 130-140. Paramedics called and pt. transferred ... " 
The paramedic record established the 911 call as having been received at 9: 18 p.m. 
and arrival of the paramedics at 9:21 p.m. 
The panel found the chart notes of QualCare and respondent to be credible and 
dispositive as to when respondent was first called, and when he finally arrived to examine 
patient A.H. at the hotel recovery facility. There is credible evidence that the QualCare 
nurse placed a page at 5:30 p.m. to respondent for orders regarding patient A. H. 1s fever, 
high blood pressure and pulse rjsing to 124. Respondent failed to examine the patient until 
approximately 8:30 p.m., some three hours later. The panel believes failing to have the 
patient examined for three hours fell below the standard of care. 
29. The patient was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed as having 
a"non-Q wave myocardial infarction." Dr. Frederick Wood examined the patient at the 
hospital and took a medical history. His report contained the following pertinent 
infonnation: 
" She has had no previous history of coronary events. . . . Cardiac risk 
factors are negative for hypertension, diabetes mellitus, 
hypercholesterolemia, previous coronary events. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: CARDIAC: No previous history of angina, 
myocardial infarction, and not previous chest pressure, tightness or 
squeezing with exertion. Negative for a history of heart enlargement, 
history of congestive heart failure, paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, 
orthopnea, dyspnea on exertion or pedal edema. Negative history of 
abnonnal heart rhythm or palpitations. . .. 11 
The patient made a full recovery and testified at the hearing. She was satisfied with 
the cosmetic result of the O.S.R. procedure. 
30. The First Amended Accusation alleged the following conduct by respondent 
in his treatment of A. H. constituted gross negligence, incompetence and/or repeated 
negligent acts: 
A. He inappropriately discharged A.H. to the hotel despite having treated 
her for cardiac instability and hypertension during the chemical peel. 
B. He failed to respond to the initial page placed by the nurse. 
C. He failed to recognize signs and symptoms of severe cardiac instability at 
the hotel and improperly delayed the nurse in calling 911. 
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31. The First Amended Accusation charged respondent with gross negligence, 
incompetence and repeated negligent acts in his treatment of patient H.B. in July 2000. 
Patient H.B. was 72 when she consulted respondent on June 26, 2000 in response to 
a newspaper advertisement. She was interested in skin rejuvenation, spider vein therapy, 
and liposuction for her knees. H.B. was 5 feet, 4 112 inches tall and weighed 135 pounds. 
She did not list any medical problems on the intake sheet and noted she had a partial face-
lift in 1995. H.B. did not immediately decide to have the procedures. Respondent gave 
her a video. H.B. testified she was uncertain whether the video she watched was 
Exhibit H. 
H.B. decided to have the OSR procedure and liposuction on both lrnees. She 
scheduled the surgery and aftercare by QualCare followed by the retreat at Casa Royal. 
She understood she was going to the hotel first and then the retreat. She understood · 
respondent required her to go to the hotel for QualCare monitoring but she was not 
required to go to the retreat. She felt she would be watched and cared for and, if anything 
happened, she would get attention and be close to a hospital. H.B. thought QualCare was 
affiliated with respondent. She testified it had to have been associated with Dr. O'Neil. It 
had to be a part of what the ladies are subjected to in order to have the procedure done. 
She thought the nurses at the hotel worked for respondent. H. B. testified ·that she did not 
think she had a choice about whether to go to the hotel after the procedure. She would not 
have gone straight home after that, and she didn't think anybodr else could either. 
32. On about July 17, 2000, H.B. was examined by her primary care physician 
David W. Schwartz, M.D. Dr. Schwartz ordered lab tests and reviewed the patient's EKG 
taken on May 1, 2000. The EKG noted Sinus Bradycardia. Dr. Schwartz noted H.B.'s 
current medical problems included osteoarthritis of Irnees, menopause, varicose veins for 
which _she had previously had surgery, cataracts, hypothyroidism and a family history of 
heart disease. The patient's physical examination was normal but examination of the 
extremities revealed varicose veins, stasis dermatitis11 and trace edema. Dr. Schwartz 
noted the patient's EKG taken May 1, 2000 was within normal limits and her chest x-ray 
was pending. The radiology report dated July 17, 2000 noted an impression of "possible 
COPD1112 and "no evidence of active cardiopulmonary disease. 11 
On July 17, 2000, Dr. Schwartz signed the O'Neil Clinic Physical Form and cleared 
the patient for "Chemexfiliation of Face and Neck and/or Liposurgery. 11 
11 Stasis dermatitis is defined in Dorland's Medical Dictionary as, "a chronic eczematous dermatitis, which 
initially involves the inner aspect of the lower leg just above the internal malleolus and which later may entirely or 
partially involve the lower leg, marked by edema, pigmentation, and commonly ulceration; it is due to venous 
insufficiency." 
12 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. There was no evidence the patient had COPD. 
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33. Patient H.B. arrived at respondent's outpatient clinic early in the morning of 
July 24, 2000. At 7:50 a.m. she signed the patient consent form for post procedure care 
by QualCare. Respondent performed a physical examination and noted that the extremities 
were without edema or cyanosis. He noted the patient's medical history as indicated on 
Dr. Schwartz's authorization form. Respondent testified he did not see significant varicose 
veins, edema or stasis dermatitis when he examined the patient. 
The patient was taken to the surgical room at about 9:30. The Sedation Record 
form noted the patient had heart disease and fainting/dizziness. The first doses of Versed 
and Fentanyl were administered at 9:45 a.m. The patient's blood pressure was 
approximately 100/70. The chemical peel procedure began at 10:15. At 10:45 the patient 
had premature ventricular contractions and her blood pressure was 150/90. Respondent 
administered lidocaine for the PVCs. The operative notes stated that by 11: 15 "PVC's 
better." At 11:45 the patient had more PVCs and again respondent administered lidocaine. 
Respondent completed the chemica\ peel and continued on to perform the liposuction of 
the knees. The last dose of Fentanyl was given at 12:15 and the last dose of Versed at 
12:30. At 12:45 the face was taped and "supports" were put on. The operative notes 
showed the patient was monitored until 1:45 p.m.; her blood pressure remained steady at 
120-130/70. At 1:30 her level of consciousness was noted as "arousable" and at 1:45 it 
was "awake." The sedation record indicated the patient was monitored until shortly after 
1:45 p.m. 
The Doctor's Discharge Summary differs from the operative notes, stating that at 
1:30 the patient was "oriented and ambulates," vital signs stable, blood pressure 120/80 and 
pulse 76. The patient was driven to the Embassy Suites shortly before 2:00 p.m. 
34. Patient H.B. was received into the hotel by QualCare at 2:00 p.m. Sonja 
Forrest, R. N., was the nurse on duty. · At the hearing she testified she did not recall the 
patient's arrival or putting her into bed. She explained that, unless something went wrong, 
it does not stay in her mind. Nurse Forrest made the following chart entry after the patient 
arrived: 
11 1400 Elderly female admitted from Dr. O'Neil's office vial w/c. very 
sedated. Max. assist required to bed. Denied need to void. Too sleepy to 
sip H20. To sleep immediately. Ice to eyes. VS stable. BP 182/81." 
Nurse Forrest testified that had she believed H.B. was not in a condition to be 
discharged to the QualCare setting she would have informed respondent's office. H.B. 's 
recollection_ of the hotel was like in a day dream when awake, "if it can be called awake. 11 
She was just really out of it. 
The nurse's notes show that at 3:00 p.m. the patient was sleeping and difficult to 
arouse; vital signs recorded at 4:00 p.m. show blood pressure 149/83, pulse 90 and the 
patient sleeping and easily aroused; and the nurse took the patient's pulse for one minute 
and noted "No pvc's felt." 
19 
001359
By 7:00 p.m. the patient was still "mildly sedated" but she was drinking water and 
got up to go to the bathroom with maximum assistance of the nurse. Throughout the night 
the patient slept, was easily aroused, drank liquids and went to the bathroom with 
maximum assistance of the nurse. Her blood pressure remained stable at 121-132/69-72. 
At 9:00 a.m. on July 25, 2000, the patient was awake and alert, blood pressure was 
130/74, she was taking liquid nourishment and going to the bathroom with moderate 
assistance from the nurse. She became restless and anxious in the afternoon and took 1 mg 
of Ativan. At 8:00 p.m. she again became restless; her blood pressure was 153/86. She 
took 1 m.g. of Ativan. The patient slept through the night, waking to drink water or go to 
the bathroom. At 4:30 a.m. she experienced pain and was given Darvocet. 
35. The patient was awake and alert at 5:00 a.m. on July 26, 2000. At 6:00 
a.m. the night nurse removed the tape mask from the patient's face and applied the 
powder. The patient went back to sleep. At about 7:00 a.m. Nurse Forrest came on duty 
and relieved the night nurse. At 8:45 she a:wakened the patient to apply a second coat of 
powder. The patient was able to get out ·of bed by herself, and drank water and juice. At 
about 9:05 a.m. she went to the bathroom by herself. At about 9:10 a.m., upon returning 
from the bathroom, she complained of dizziness, became unsteady and "lethargic acting" 
and fell into bed assisted by the nurse. Her lips and eyelids were ashen; she was 
perspiring, skin clammy, and complained of chills. The nurse noted her blood pressure as 
"70/?" with pulse of "60-weak." The patient denied chest pain or shortness of breath. Her 
lungs were clear with a stethoscope. The nurse placed the patient in a position to elevate 
her feet above her head in order to raise the blood pressure. The nurse did not 
immediately call 911 because she did not believe the condition was life threatening. 
At the hearing H.B. testified that what she remembered about the hotel was having 
trouble breathing. She recalled having trouble breathing when the nurse first offered her 
juice. 
At 9: 15 the nurse called respondent and advised him of the patient's condition. 
Respondent instructed her to continue the position, monitor vital signs- and call him again if 
the patient did not improve. At 9:30 the nurse called respondent and informed him the 
blood pressure continued to be "60-70/? ," the pulse weak in the 70's, color ashen, and the 
patient now complained of shortness of breath. Respondent and the nurse agreed that 911 
should be called. The nurse,called 911 at 9:35 p.m. ·The EMT records show the 911 call 
was received at 9:38 a.m. and the paramedics arrived at 9:43 a.m. They administered 
oxygen and took the patient to Rancho Springs Medical Center. 
36. Respondenfs chart contained the following entry for July 26, 2000: 
"9:30 am Qualcare nurse called. Pt fainted after going to BR and standing. 
Pt alert and stable in bed. HR 60. BP unobtainable. They [illegible] called 
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back 10 minute later. Pt. Now SOB. HR 60. BP unobtainable. PT in bed 
with legs elevated, told to call 911 and pt transferred to Rancho Springs ER. JI 
37. On July 26, 2000, patient H.B. was admitted to Rancho Springs Medical 
Center. The emergency evaluation record noted the patient had difficulty breathing with 
near syncope but had no chest pain. She denied any history of pulmonary or cardiac 
problems. The physical examination ~evealed no r~shes, no numbness or weakness in the 
extremities and no peripheral ed.ema. The EKG showed a single PVC. The initial 
assessment was a post-surgical complication of pulmonary embolus. 
Anoop K. Maheshwari, M.D., examined the patient in the hospital. His history 
noted the patient took diuretics once a we~k for pedal edema. His physical examination of 
the extremities found "no cyan~sis, clubbing or edema. No calf pain tenderness is 
present. JI A venous Doppler exam of the lower extremities showed slow venus flow and no 
evidence of deep vein thrombosis. 
H.B. was discharged from the hospital on July 28, 2000, much improved and in 
stable condition. Dr. Schwartz' discharge diagnosis for H.B. was bilateral pulmonary 
emboli with respiratory distress. 
38: The First Amended Accusation alleged the following conduct by respondent 
in his treatment of H.B. constituted gross negligence, incompetence and/or repeated 
negligent acts: 
A. He improperly performed lower extremity liposuction on the patient 
because her preoperative workup showed lower extremity venous 
insufficiency making her an inappropriate patient for the procedure. 
B. He excessively sedated the patient and prematurely discharged her from 
his facility. 
C. He improperly continued the cosmetic surgery on the patient after she 
suffered two episodes of ventricular arrhythmia during the chemical peel 
procedure. 
D. He failed to timely have the patient transferred to the hospital when she 
suffered postoperative complications at the hotel. 
39. The evidence complainant presented was insufficient to establish that 
respondent used general anesthesia on his patients. 
40. Complainant called two expert witnesses to testify at the hearing and 
presented the written report of a physician consultant. Mark Krugman, M.D. and David 




Dr. Krugman obtained his medical degree from the University of Maryland Medical 
School in 1964. He completed a rotating internship at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York 
City in 1965. At the same hospital he completed a residency in General Surgery in 1966 
and a residency in Otolaryngology in 1969. After two years of service in the Air Force, 
Dr. Krugman completed a plastic surgery residency at U.C. Irvine in 1976. He became 
board certified in plastic surgery in 1977. Dr. Krugman's curriculum vitae showed that he 
is very well qualified as a plastic surgeon. His education and professional experience as a 
plastic surgeon and otolaryngologist are extensive. 
Since 1976, Dr. Krugman has maintained a private practice in southern California, 
specializing in plastic surgery and otolaryngology. He operates a licensed outpatient 
clinic. He performs laser resurfacing procedures but does not perform phenol peels of the 
face. Dr. Krugman has no objection to the skin rejuvenation procedure used by 
respondent. On his resume, Dr. Krugman listed a Chemical Peel Workshop in 1991, an 
Update on Skin Peeling in 1992, and attendance at conferences on chemical peels in 1992 
and 1993. 
Dr. Morwood obtained his medical degree from the College of Medicine, 
University of Vermont, in 1983. He performed his internship and general surgery 
residency at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York. In 1987, he completed a plastic 
surgery residency at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. In 1993, he was board certified 
in plastic surgery and received a Certification of Added Qualifications in Surgery of the 
Hand in 1994. 
Dr. Morwood maintains a private practice in plastic surgery, specializing in breast, 
hand, face and reconstructive surgery for children, face lifts, lasers, peels, fractures and 
injuries. Dr. Morwood has performed some liposuction and has done 20 phenol peels in 
his career. 
A written report by Jeannette Y. Martello, M.D., J.D. was admitted into evidence 
by stipulation in which the parties agreed it could be received ''.as if she had testified to 
these matters under oath. 11 Dr. Martello obtained her medical degree from UCLA School 
of Medicine in 1988. In 1989 she completed a surgical internship at Massachusetts 
General Hospital in Boston. She then attended two years of law school at Boalt Hall. 
While in law school she worked as an ~mergency room physician at Kaiser Santa Theresa 
in San Jose. From 1991 to 1995 she performed a Plastic Surgery Integrated Residency at 
University of Kentucky Medical Center. In 1996 she completed one year as Plastic 
Surgery Chief Resident at the same facility. During this time she moonlighted at various 
emergency rooms throughout Kentucky. She returned to law school and obtained her J.D. 
degree in 1997. In June 1998 she completed a one-year hand surgery fellowship at 
Kleinert & Kutz Institute of Hand Surgery in Lousiville, Kentucky, and in January 1999 
completed a six-month term as Hand Transplant Fellow at the same institute. Since March 
1999 Dr. Martello has engaged in the private practice of Plastic Surgery and Hand Surgery 
in Pasadena and has served as Medical Consultant for the Medical Board of California. 
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She became board certified in plastic surgery in September 2001. Dr. Martello's resume 
did not indicate that she performs phenol peels or liposuction. 
41. On June 1, 2001 Dr. Krugman issued a written report in which he stated his 
opinions about respondent's treatment of patients A. H. and H. B. He found three 
instances in which respondent's actions with regard to H. B. constituted a "departure from 
the standard of care" and one instance of a "departure from the standard of care" with A. 
H. On ~bout June 8, 2001, the Board's investigator called Dr. Krugman to clarify whether 
or not he meant simple or extreme departures. Dr. Krugman told the investigator that all 
of the departures he fo~nd were simple departures. 
42. With regard to patient A. H., it was Dr. Krugman's opinion that respondent 
departed from the standard of .care when he failed to call 911 in a timely manner. The 
testimony wherein Dr. Krugman assumed the patient had been complaining of chest pain 
for 30 to 60 minutes, with respondent present or aware of the complaint, and there was a 
50-minute delay before the 911 call, is supported by the record. Respondent's July 19, 
2000 chart note establishes that he saw patient A.H. at the Embassy Suites Hotel at 8:30 
p.m. and that he was aware patient A.H. had developed some. chest pain radiating to 
shoulder prior to his arrival at the hotel. Nurse Heller's chart note at 8:45 p.m. states 
respondent is with patient. The paramedic record established the 911 call as being 
received at 9: 18 p.m. 
43. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that respondent committed extreme departures 
from the standard of care in his treatment of patient A. H. The standard of care requires a 
physician to be familiar with possible side effects and potential complications from a 
treatment. Any side effects or complications must be treated appropriately in a timely 
manner to prevent further sequella and complication. 
Dr. Morwood believed the patient showed cardiac instability in the form of PVCs 
during the facial peel and she continued to show cardiac instability ·after the procedure. In 
spite of treatment, patient A.H. continued to be hypertensive, shortly after showing cardiac 
irritability that did respond to Lidocaine. A. H., a patient who showed cardiac arrhythmia, 
and hypertension which did not respond to treatment, .was discharged to a hotel. Upon 
discharge, the patient required a setting that had the proper monitoring equipment for 
blood pressure, oxygen saturation and cardiac condition. He felt respondent discharged 
her in spite of the continuing signs of cardiac instability. After discharge, the QualCare 
nurse notified respondent of continuing progressive cardiac instability, but he did not see 
the patient for some hours. Dr. Morwood believed respondent ignored the warning signs 
and did not take timely action to have the patient transferred to the hospital or have her 
evaluated by an int_ensive monitoring team. 
Dr. Morwood acknowledged that PVCs are common during a phenol peel and 
respondent appropriately treated patient A.H.'s episode during the procedure and she 
responded well. However, he believed that her cardiac instability was not adequately 
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addressed before she was discharged .to the hotel where she remained unstable and 
respondent delayed addressing her condition. It was his opinion that, even without chest 
pain, respondent should have transferred A.H. to the hospital immediately. 
44. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that patient H.B. was not a good candidate for 
liposuction of the knees because she was in her early seventies with a history of swelling in · 
her legs, varicose vein surgery, hypothyroid and taking female hormones, which made her 
predisposed to getting blood clots in the deep veins of her legs. Dr. Krugman admitted 
that hormone replacement and hypothyroidism were minor risk factors, but were "additive,, 
in this situation. He believed that Dr. Schwartz' findings of edema and stasis dermatitis, 
when added to the patient's age and sedentary position after surgery, created risk factors. 
He explained that edema and stasis dermatitis in a patient over 70 meant the patient's 
venous system was not good. 
Dr. Krugman believed that coupling the liposuction with the facial peel created 
competing interests; the peel procedure required the patient to be sedentary but the knee 
liposuction required the patient to ambulate to avoid an embolism. It was Dr. Krugman's 
opinion that performing knee liposuction on H.B. was a simple departure from the standard 
of care because of her predisposing risk factors. 
45. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that respondent showed poor judgment and 
departed frorri the standard of care in going forward with the knee liposuction after patient 
H.B. experienced two episodes of PVCs during the facial peel. With h~r risk factors 
described in Factual Finding 44, the PVC's made her condition more precarious. 
Dr. Krugman concluded respondent's conduct represented an extreme departure 
from the standard of care because of "the multiplicity of cognitive decisions he made that 
led to the problems with the patient.,, 
46. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that patient H.B. suffered post-surgical 
complications because respondent performed liposuction on diseased legs. He explained 
that the standard O! care requires the physician to be familiar with the criteria that would 
designate patients who are appropriate or inappropriate for a particular procedure. Dr. 
Morwood believed H.B. presented with a history and preoperative physical exam that 
made her inappropriate for lower extremity liposuction. The patient's varicose veins, stasis 
dermatitis, age and hormone replacement therapy placed her at high risk for pulmonary 
embolism. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that it was an extreme departure from the 
standard of care to perform liposuction on H.B. 's knees because of her high risk history. 
He believed a clot from the patient's leg traveled to her lungs when she got up after being 
sedentary. 
47. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that combining the facial peel and knee 
liposuction procedures did not of itself deviate from the standard of care. The standard of 
care required the patient be mobilized immediately after a surgical procedure on her legs. 
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Inactivity increased the chance for venous stasis13 and thrombus14 in the legs. However, 
because the patient required rest for the facial procedure, the standard of care required that 
something be used on her legs while in bed to minimize the chance of venous thrombosis. 
Risk can be minimized by short walks, foot pumps, heparin therapy or a sequential 
compression device. 15 
48. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that when a patient is difficult to arouse it is a 
departure from the standard of care to discharge the patient from an ambulatory facility. 
He explained that a patient can remain in an outpatient surgical clinic for up to 23 hours. 
If a sedated patient is difficult to arouse the facility should have equipment such as EKG, 
oxygen, pulse oximeter, intravenous equipment and defibulator. A patient will still be 
under some sedation when discharged, but not to the point where she cannot be aroused or 
get out of bed. A patient who cannot take fluid by mouth and is too sedated to get out of 
bed should not be discharged home. A patient who remains in that condition should be 
transferred to a hospital. Transfer of such a patient to a hotel room is a departure from the · 
standard of care. 
On cross-examination Dr. Krugman agreed that, based on respondent's chart 
documentation of patient H.B. 's condition at the time of discharge, she looked appropriate 
for discharge. However, he felt her -heavily sedated condition when she arrived at the 
hotel required explanation. (Based upon the transcript, it appears Dr. Krugman was 
reviewing respondent's discharge-summary. As is noted in Factual Finding 33, there is a 
discrepancy between respondent's operative notes and the discharge summary as to patient 
H. B.'s level of alertness. The operative note says she was "arousable" at 1:30 p.m., 
whereas the discharge summary says she was 11oriented and ambulatory" at 1:30 p.m.). 
There is no specific post procedure observation time required before discharge; it depends 
on the individual patient. 
In his written report of June 1, 2001, Dr. Krugman did not opine that respondent's 
discharge of H. B. was a departure from the standard of care. At the hearing he testified 
that it is his opinion that the discharge of patient H.B. from respondent's clinic was a 
simple departure from the standard of care because she was over-sedated when she arrived 
at the hotel. She should have been- retained at the clinic with monitoring or transferred to a 
hospital. Dr. Krugman explained that the issue here is not the amount of sedation during 
surgery, but the level of sedation at discharge. 
13 Cessation or impairment of venous flow. (Dorlancfs Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th Ed.) 
14 An aggregation of blood factors frequently causing vascular obstruction at the point of its formation. (/d.) 
IS Complainant did not allege that respondent failed to use appropriate anti-thrombosis therapy. 
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49. In his written report issued July 25, 2001, Dr. Morwood did not opine that 
respondent inappropriately discharged patient H.B. from his clinic before she was ready to 
leave. At the hearing he testified that if H.B. was very sedated when she arrived at the 
hotel and required maximum assistance to get into bed, it was below the standard of care to 
discharge her from the clinic. He believed it is extremely uncommon to have the patient 
alert and able to ambulate, but 15 minutes later appear as described by the QualCare nurse. 
Dr. Morwood explained that the standard of care required the patient to be 
monitored after surgery for at least an hour before discharge from the outpatient clinic. 
Before discharge, the patient should be able to respond to questions, breath clearly, take a 
deep breath on command, urinate, and have stable vital signs. After reviewing H.B.'s 
chart and her vital signs before discharge on cross-examination, Dr. Morwood did not see 
any evidence of an inappropriate discharge. (Based upon the transcript, it appears, 
however, Dr. Morwood was reviewing respondent's discharge summary. As is noted in 
Factual Finding 33, there is a discrepancy between respondent's operative notes and the 
discharge summary as to patient H.B.'s level of alertness. The operative note says she was 
11arousable11 at 1:30 p.m., whereas the discharge summary says she was "oriented and 
ambulatory" at 1:30 p.m.) 
50. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that it was a simple departure from the 
standard of care for respondent to delay calling 911 at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2000, because 
H.B. was 11shockf' and her blood pressure was low. Dr. Krugman's June 1, 2001 written 
report indicated that he erroneously believed the nurse called respondent at 9:00 a.m. and 
again at 9:15. The evidence is otherwise (Factual Finding 35). 
Dr. Morwood offered no opinion about the events of July 26, 2000. 
51. Dr. Morwood reviewed all of the available medical records in this case. 
Based on the records, he could not determine that respondent used Versed in an amount 
that would induce the patient to a level of general anesthesia. 
52. Dr. Morwood offered his opinion that "hotel observation" aftercare such as 
that provided by QualCare to cosmetic procedure patients is a common practice in 
California. However, it is his understanding that the nurses have formal monitoring 
equipment available, such as, a cardiac monitor, automatic blood pressure taking 
machines, a pulsoximeter, and oxygen saturation monitor. 
53. Dr. Morwood offered his opinion that respondent's video advertisement and 
his brochures seem to be similar to many other infomercials and physician's advertisements 
in the popular media in California. 
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54. Complainant presented no evidence in the form of expert testimony to 
support the charge that respondent was incompetent in his care, treatment or management 
of the patients A.H. and H.B. 
55. Respondent called two expert witnesses to testify at the hearing. Joseph C. 
Avakoff, M.D. is a board certified surgeon and plastic surgeon. Robert A. Yoho, M.D. is 
board certified in emergency medicine, dermatologic cosmetic surgery and laser surgery. 
Dr. Avakoff obtained his medical degree from the University of California School 
of Medicine in San Francisco in 1961. After his rotating internship, he completed a 
residency in General Surgery at Kaiser Hospital in San Francisco in 1966 and later a 
residency in plastic surgery at University of Texas School of Medicine. In 1985 Dr. 
Avakoff obtained a J.D. degree from Santa Clara University School of Law and was 
admitted to the California State Bar in 1987. Dr. Avakoff spent 22 years in the private 
practice of medicine in Santa Clara County. He retired in 1994. Between 1987 and 1994 
Dr. A vakoff performed approximately 100 liposuction procedures but never aspirated more 
than 1500 cc. He never performed phenol facial peels. Since retirement he has been 
doing medi-legal consultations for the Medical Board and for the Department of 
Corporations. 
Dr. Yoho received his medical degree from Case Western Reserve University 
Medical School in 1981. He completed a one-year rotating internship at th~ University of 
Cincinnati and a two-year Dermatology Residency at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 
in New Hampshire. In 1985 he completed emergency Medicine Residency Training at 
LAC/USC Medical Center in Los Angeles and Huntington Memorial Hospital in Pasadena. 
Dr. Yoho did a preceptorship with respondent, and respondent did a preceptorship in Dr. 
Yoho's office for liposuction. 
From 1984 to 1987 Dr. Yoho was employed by the Huntington Memorial Hospital 
Emergency. Medical Group. He then maintained a general medical practice in Pasadena 
until 1994. From 1992 to the present he has specialized in cosmetic surgery. His practice 
includes liposuction, hair transplantation, laser resurfacing, face lifts, laser blepharoplasty, 
breast implantation, vein treatments and fat transplantation. Dr. Yoho has published 
several articles related to cosmetic surgery procedures in peer reviewed journals. 
56. Dr. Avakoff testified that a patient is ready for discharge from an outpatient 
facility when she can get out of bed and walk, but the patient will not be as ambulatory as 
someone who has not gone through the procedure. To discharge after outpatient cosmetic 
surgery, the standard of practice required the vital signs be stable and the patient be easily 
arousable to the extent she is able to wake up though she may still be sleepy, converse a 
bit, get out of bed and go to the bathroom. If the patient experienced PVCs or 
hypertension during the procedure, she must be monitored until she becomes stable. When 
the patient is stable, she can be released to home where she would not be monitored. 
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Dr. Yoho explained the standard of practice regarding discharge of a patient is to 
observe for one to two hours to see that the vital signs are stable. A certain level of 
alertness is expected; the patient need not be as alert as before the sedation, but should 
know where she is, be able to ambulate, urinate and take fluids. 
Dr. Yoho testified that phenol peel patients are commonly discharged to home. 
However, if the patient does not do exactly the right things for the face, scarring can 
result. It meets the highest standard of care to provide a place where the patient is assisted 
for a week. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that the monitoring provided by QualCare was 
appropriate and the standard of care did not require the patients to be monitored as if in an 
acute care setting with equipment such as pulse oximeters. He noted that even when a 
patient is sent to a nursing home for aftercare, there is only one nurse to attend 20 or 30 
patients. 
57. Dr. Yoho explained that PVCs are common during a phenol peel because the 
chemical substance irritates the heart and causes arrhythmia. The phenol substance is 
irritating to the heart muscle. Although the cardiac rhythm imitates that of a heart attack, 
PVCs that occur during a phenol peel do not have the same "malignant quality" in which 
the heart is starved for blood and oxygen. The PVCs are taken seriously but sudden death 
is not a problem. Appropriate treatment is to wait a few minutes for the arrhythmia to 
subside or to administer Lidocaine .. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent properly 
managed A.H.'s PVC episode. 
Dr. Avakoff reviewed the medical records of patient A.H. It was his opinion that 
she did not suffer cardiac instability after the facial peel procedure. He explained that 
PVCs are common during a phenol peel and do not constitute "cardiac instability." Nor 
did the increased blood pressure necessarily indicate cardiac instability because it can result 
from pain during the phenol peel. It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that respondent properly 
treated the patient's PVCs during the procedure with Lidocaine and the operative notes 
show the patient returned to normal sinus rhythm. 
58. Dr. Yoho explained that elevated blood pressure is typical during a phenol 
peel because the peel is painful and pain produces hypertension. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion 
that respondent's use of Anapsine on patient A.H. was an "elegant" way to treat the 
hypertension caused by pain and the nausea that can result from the narcotic used for 
sedation. If too much hypertension medicine is used during the peel, the blood pressure 
can become too low after the procedure. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent's 
treatment of A.H.'s high blood pressure was appropriate. 
59. It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that A.H.'s vital signs were stable during the 
hour and one-half she was monitored after the procedure and before discharge. It was Dr. 
Avakoffs opinion that respondent's discharge of A.H. did not depart from the standard of 
care. Her vital signs were stable and she was released to monitoring by QualCare. 
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It was Dr. Yoho's opini.on that respondent's chart entries show that patient A.H. 
was observed for one and one-half hours and her vital signs were entirely stable before 
discharge. Based on the records she was appropriate for discharge. 
60. Dr. Yoho noted that the charts for patients A.H. and H.B. showed blood 
pressures that were not dangerous. They were blood pressures that people carry for many 
years at a time. The panel did not find this testimony persuasive with regards to patients 
A.H. and H.B. who had just undergone sedation, and a surgical procedure during which 
they experienced PVC's. · 
61. It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that respondent did not depart from the 
standard of care in his attention to patient A.H. after discharge. He explained that if 
respondent was told the patient had high blood pressure, was restless, anxious and 
hyperventilating, 16 but with no chest pain, there could be a number of c~uses for the 
symptoms and the situation did not require an immediate 911 call. It was Dr. Avakoffs 
opinion that respondent's instruction to monitor the patient was appropriate. Once the 
patient complained of chest pain, it was mandatory to call 911. If respondent learned of 
the chest pain before reaching the hotel and did not order a call to 911, it would be a 
simple departure from the standard of care because chest pain can be caused by something 
other than a heart attack. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent did not act inappropriately in the transfer 
of patient A.H. to the hospital. ~e explained if the nurse advised respondent the patient 
had high blood pressure, was restless, anxious and hyperventilating, this was a typical 
post-phenol peel set of symptoms in a patient who continued to feel some pain and 
claustrophobia in the tape mask. It would have been significant if respondent had been 
advised of chest pain. The panel did not find this testimony credible, taking· into 
consideration that Dr. Yoho also testified that the elderly population has more problems. 
"They are fragile and you've got to watch them like a hawk." 
62. Dr.·Avakoff reviewed the medical records of patient H.B. and concluded 
there was no evidence of any significant venous insufficiency of the legs. He testified that 
varicose veins ind_icate venous insufficiency only in the area of the varicose vein. He 
believed that the patient had significant varicose vein surgery in the past and had residual 
varicose veins and stasis dermatitis, which was common and did not indicate deep venous 
insufficiency. Dr. Avakoff noted that none of the physicians who examined H.B. at the 
hospital noted any profound venous insufficiency. 
(The Doppler exam of the lower extremities taken at the hospital did show slow 
venus flow.) · 
16 Respondent's counsel included these symptoms in his hypothetical question to Dr. Avakoff. The evidence 
did not establish the patient was hyperventilating or had dangerously high blood pressure. The testimony and chart 
notes indicated the blood pressure was "up a little bit" and the pulse rate was high. The pulse rate became too fast 
to count at the same time the patient started to feel chest pain. 
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Dr. A vakoff considered the hormone replacement therapy to be an added but very 
minor risk factor and not a contraindication for liposuction. He did not think 
hypothyroidism caused increased thrombolic phenomenon. 
It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that H.B. was an appropriate candidate for the planned 
knee liposuction because the risk factors were quite minor. 
63. Dr. Yoho explained that embolism is a risk for anyone who undergoes 
surgery. Embolism after hospital surgery is very common, but is quite rare after· 
outpatient procedures. In the 6,000 cases that Dr. Yolo has performed, four patients 
experienced deep vein thrombosis and none had pulmonary embolism. He discussed the 
risk factors for pulmonary embolism. The panel did not find this testimony persuasive 
given Dr. Yoho's testimony that his patient population is younger. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that superficial venous disease and hypothyroidism are· 
not risk factors. The risk factors are general anesthesia for more than half an hour; birth 
control pills but not estrogen replacement; congestive heart failure; broken extremities; 
prior history of pulmonary thrombosis/embolism; prior history of deep venous thrombosis; 
hospital bed rest where the patient does not get up; and cancer. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that varicose veins are not a risk factor and stasis 
dermatitis can be purely the result .of varicose veins. Edema is not diagnostic for deep vein 
thrombosis. He would never order a post-lipo patient to be kept sedentary for the first 48 
hours. He agreed pulmonary embolism is potentially a risk of being sedentary. He 
believed although patient H.B. was sedentary while in the hotel, she was getting up to go 
to the bathroom so she was not completely at bed rest. (The testimony of the QualCare 
nurses was that the patients were to stay in bed and be quiet.) 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that patient H.B. had none of the well known risks for 
embolism. Any patient over 65 is at increased risk for many things, but he considered 
H.B. to be a '.'class 2 anesthetic risk" because she was healthy on medications. Patient A. 
H. was also a "class 2" risk. Typically a cosmetic surgeon only does a Class 1, or Class 2 
that might be on blood pressure medication, controlling the blood pressure. He explained 
that a class 3 risk is a patient with an active medical problell,1 that is not controlled. H.B. 's 
medical conditions were controlled with medication so in his opinion she was an 
appropriate candidate for the procedures . 
. 64. It was Dr. A vakoff's opinion that respondent properly addressed the two 
episodes- of PVCs during H.B. 's phenol peel and proceeding with the knee liposuction was 
not a departure from the standard of care because the small amount of aspirate taken 
indicated it was a minor liposuction procedure. 
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It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent did not violate the standard of care by 
proceeding with the knee liposuction after H.B. experienced PVCs. He opined that for the 
reasons stated in Factual Finding 63, the PVCs and the manner respondent treated them did 
not contraindicate the knee liposuction. The amount of aspirate in the knee liposuction 
indicated a minor procedure that took about ten minutes. He explained that the cardiac 
irritation effects of·the phenol peel are gone in 15 minutes to half an hour after the peel is 
finished. The panel did not find this explanation credible. Phenol is considered 
cardiotoxic. 
65. It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that H.B.'s sedation and operative record 
showed she was appropriate for discharge at 1 :45 p.m. She had been monitored for an 
hour, her vital signs were stable and she was awake. He offered an explanation for the 
changed condition of the patient at the hotel. He believed the patient could have been 
apprehensive at the facility, awake and alert but on reaching the hotel and knowing the 
procedure is over, 11just conks out" to rest. The panel did not find this explanation 
credible. 
Dr. A vakoff acknowledged that it would be a violation of the standard of care if 
respondent discharged the patient when she was difficult to arouse and required maximum 
assistance. The patient's condition when she left the facility is the issue. The observations 
recorded in respondent's chart indicated she was appropriate for discharge even to home. 
It was quite common to use a wheelchair to discharge a patient with knee liposuction. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that patient H.B. was appropriately discharged from 
respondent's facility. She was monitored for an hour after the procedure with vital signs 
tak_en every 15 minutes. In his opinion, the patient record showed that her vital signs were 
stable. Use of a wheelchair for a post procedure patient is routine. 
Dr. Yoho noted that the patien~'s level of consciousness on arrival at the hotel was 
described as "very sedated." He explained that the narcotics used during the procedures 
cover the pain and are stressful and fatiguing for the patient. After surgery it is not 
unusual for the patient to have a waxing and waning level of consciousness. 
66. It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that respondent did not unreasonably delay 
calling 911 for patient H.B. When respondent was notified of the patient's condition at 
9: 15 it was reasonable to have the patient watched carefully for a short time. Her 
symptoms, including blood pressure and respiration, were consistent with a fainting 
episode and the standard of care did not require an emergency call to 911 when a patient 
initially appears "woozy." When the patient did not improve and then developed shortness 
ofbreath, it was time to call 911. 
Dr. Yoho reviewed the sequence of events for patient H.B. on the morning of July 
26, 2000. It was his opinion that respondent's response to the patient's condition as relayed 
to him at 9:15 a.m. was appropriate. Dr. Yoho explained the "medical reasoning" process 
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commonly used by physicians. The physician first thinks of common causes for the 
patient's symptoms and later considers the rarer causes. The physician could first think 
that H.B.'s condition was a vaso-vagal episode - a faint brought on by a bowel movement 
or pain - in which case the patient would recover after a few minutes. Dr. Yoho explained 
that a vaso-vagal episode typically includes low heart rate and blood pressure goes down. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that an experienced physician would first consider a vaso-vagal 
episode, especially with a patient who had just risen from bed and gone to the bathroom, 
and an immediate call to 911 was not required. Observation for a few minutes and 
rechecking vitals signs was an imminently reasonable way to handle the ·situation. It was 
Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent's decision to closely monitor the patient and call him 
again if she did not improve was within the standard of care. Respondent properly ordered 
the 911 call when the nurse called him at 9:30 a.m. to say the patient had not improved 
and had begun to complain of shortness of breath. The panel did not find this testimony 
persuasive because it only refers to· a decrease in blood pressure, not the nurse reporting an 
unobtainable blood pressure as the nurse reported regarding patient H.B. (see Factual 
Finding 35.) 
67. Based on his review of the medical records, Dr. Yoho determined that 
respondent used monitored anesthesia, which he described as twilight sleep or moderate 
sedation. It was not general anesthesia. A.H. and H.B. did not need to be ventilated for 
respiration, nor did they require cardiac support. They were both arousable from the 
sedation. 
68. The testimony of each of the expert witnesses was weighed and evaluated, 
taking into consideration their qualifications and experience, attitude and demeanor whJle 
testifying, the quality of their answers, and the accuracy and reliability of the information 
on which they based their opinions. Each was qualified to testify and offer an opinion;. 
none had any apparent bias. 
Upon review of the record, the panel found Dr. Morwood to be the most credible, 
persuasive witness in this case. His testimony was the most evaluative of the medical 
records in the context of the standard of practice for the treatment and care at issue. His 
testimony provided a medical based rational for his opinions. 
Dr. Yoho testified that the patient population of patients A.H. and H.B. 'sage "is 
tougher in general." They have more problems. His cosmetic surgery patient population 
is younger. The panel found this testimony to discredit the credibility of Dr. Yoho's 
expert testimony that respondent met the standard of care in treating patient H.B., age 72, 
and patient A.H., age 69. 
69. Dr. Martello issued a "Memorandum" to the Board's investigator on 
February 22, 2001. The statement and opinions in her written report are given little 
weight against the testimony of the expert witnesses who appeared and testified under oath. 
Dr. Martello's pervasive use of exclamation marks in her comments and opinions raised a 
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concern about her detachment and objectivity. Her opinions were based on facts not 
established by the evidence at hearing. 
70. Dr. Krugman's written report indicated he assumed all of the allegations 
were true in the 1996 Accusation and 1998 Supplemental Accusation. By his testimony 
and statements in his written report, it was clear Dr. Krugman did not understand that 
respondent stipulated to only a portion of the allegations and charges in the prior 
disciplinary action. His interpretation of the facts and violations established by the 
stipulated decision and order was not accurate. Dr. Krugman also considered information 
in Dr. Martelle's report that was either not admissible or not established by the evidence. 
Dr. Krugman did not apply an objective standard. He candidly admitted that, in 
evaluating respondent's conduct as an 11extreme departure from the standard of care," he 
was influenced by the prior discipline imposed on respondent. This was inappropriate for 
two reasons: Dr. Krugman's interpretation of the nature and effect of the prior discipline 
was not accurate and he was unduly influenced by an irrelevant factor. The prior 
discipline should not be a factor in his professional opinion. The conduct at issue must be 
evaluated of itself in the context of the situation as it occurred. The conduct is either 
below an existing standard of care as gross or simple negligence or it is not. Respondent's 
prior actions and the existence of prior discipline are not relevant to the measure. The 
prior discipline is relevant only for the purpose of determining the appropriate discipline, if 
any, to impose in the pending case. Dr. Krugman also erroneously believed that several 
acts of simple negligence, or repeated negligent acts, equate to an extreme departure from 
the standard of care. 
71. In his written report, Dr. Morwood stated he could not determine respondent 
used general anesthesia. At the hearing, based on the same documentation he used for his 
written report, he inexplicably changed his mind and opined that patient H.B. was under 
general anesthesia. This weakens the reliability of that testimony. 
72. With regard to the charges relating to patient A.H. as set forth in Factual 
Finding 30, the evidence was clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent inappropriately discharged the patient from his facility to the QualCare 
aftercare, failed to timely respond to the initial page to him placed by the nurse caring for 
A. H. postoperatively, when he did respond he failed to recognize signs and symptoms of 
the patient's severe cardiac instability, and failed to timely transfer patient to a facility 
where she could receive appropriate care. 
Patient A. H. experienced cardiac instability during the phenol peel procedure. She 
did n(?t fully respond to treatment, and continued to experience hypertension during the 
hour and a half period of monitored post operative recovery at respondent's ambulatory 
surgery center. She was then discharged, while still experiencing hypertension and a rising 
pulse, to a hotel without adequate monitoring equipment for her condition. 
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The panel believes the minimum monitoring equipment required for monitoring · 
patient A. H. would have been a cardiac monitor, frequent blood pressure monitoring by a 
mach~e, and an oxygen saturation machine to show the level of oxygen saturation in her 
blood and her pulse. 
When the nurse called at 5:30 p.m. to inform respondent of patient A. H.'s 
worsening condition and seek orders, he failed .to respond to the call for some two hours, 
and failed to see to it that the patient received appropriate emergency care. Appropriate 
care would have been an emergency consultation with a cardiologist, evaluation by an 
intensive monitoring team, or immediate transport to a hospital emergency room. 
The testimony of this case established that each of these departures is an extreme 
departure from the standard of care. 
The panel did not find persuasive the testimony of Dr. Yoho and Dr. A vakoff who 
testified that continued monitoring with specialized equipment such as would be provided 
in an accredited or licensed healthcare facility, w~s not required because PVC's and 
hypertension are common in phenol peel patients. 
· The evidence was clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent was, grossly negligent or repeatedly negligent in his treatment of patient A.H. 
The evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish respondent 
was incompetent. 
73. With regard to the charges relating to patient H.B. as set forth in Factual 
Finding 38, the evidence was clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent performed knee liposuction on an inappropriate patient, improperly continued 
cosmetic surgery after the patient suffered two episodes of ventricular arrhythmia during 
the chemical peel segment of the surgery, then prematurely discharged her to a hotel 
without medical monitoring equipment, and failed to timely transfer patient H. B. to a 
hospital for treatment when H.B. fainted and the nurse at the hotel recovery facility was 
unable to obtain a blood pressure. 
The evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent excessively sedated patient H.B. 
The evidence established that patient H.B. was at high risk for suffering pulmonary 
embolism due to her history of venous disease, stasis dermatitis, her age and taking female 
hormones. The risk was further increased by the sedentary recovery period required for 
the phenol peel procedure. The standard of care requires a physician to screen out patients 
that have increased risk factors that would make an elective procedure unsafe for them. 
The evidence established that it was an extreme departure from the standard of care for 
respondent to perform liposurgery on patient H.B.'s legs. 
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The evidence established that given patient H.B.'s increased risk factors, and then 
experiencing two episodes of PVC's during the first procedure, it was an extreme departure 
from the standard of care to continue on to do the lipo surgery procedure. The evidence 
established that patient H. B. was discharged from respondent's surgery center while she 
was still in a state of sedation that did not meet the standard of practice. She was still too 
sedated. On this issue, the panel notes the discrepancy in respondent's chart notes 
regarding patient H.B. 's level of consciousness. The operative notes state that patient was 
"arousable" at 1:30 p.m., whereas, the discharge summary states that at 1:30 p.m. patient 
was "oriented and ambulates. 11 The nurses notes state that upon being .admitted to the hotel 
patient was very sedated. Too sleepy to sip water. The panel found the nurse notes to be 
the more credible evidence as to the patient's state of consciousness upon discharge. Based 
upon the expert testimony at the hearing regarding the standard of care for discharge from 
an outpatient surgery center, the panel finds this to be a simple departure. · 
The evidence established that approximately 20 minutes elapsed before patient H.B. 
was transferred from the hotel to a hospital when H.B. fainted and the nurse noted she was 
unable to obtain a blood pressure. Respondent testified that fainting and the nurse being 
unable to get a blood pressure reading is not an emergency to him because these symptoms 
are fairly common in his patients. He sees it may be once a month. Given the advanced 
age of many of respondent's patients, the panel found this explanation disturbing. The 
panel believes waiting 20. minutes to seek emergency treatment for patient H.B. was a 
departure from the standard of care. Patient H.B. was 72 years old, with venous disease 
and had been sedentary following a surgical procedure to her lower extremities which is 
known to create an increased risk for pulmonary embolism. She had experienced two 
episodes of PVC's during her surgical procedure. Given this history, the panel believes it 
was an extreme departure from the standard of care to wait 20 minutes to seek an 
emergency transfer to a hospital after patient H. B. fainted and the nurse was unable to get 
a blood pressure reading. 
The evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent was incompetent in his treatment of patient H.B. 
74. Except as set forth in the Factual Findings above, the factual allegations of 
the First Amended Accusation were not established by evidence that was clear and 
convincing to a reasonable certainty and are deemed surplusage. Expert opinions elicited 
at the hearing on matters not. alleged in the First Amended Accusation are not relevant and 
cannot support a finding of unprofessional conduct. 
75. Complainant requested costs of investigation and prosecution of the case 
pursuant to section 125.3. Deputy Attorney Douglas MacCartee presented a written 
declaration that the Attorney General's charges were $19,740.00. Felix S. Rodriguez, 
Supervising Investigator for the Medical Board, present~d a written declaration that the 
costs of investigation were $7,363.53 and the costs of expert reviewer services were 
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$2,285. 17 Respondent did not object to the amount of attorney fees charged. He did object 
to the hourly rate charged by the investigators as unreasonable and noted the investigator's 
hourly rate of approximately $110 was higher than the $100 hourly rate of the medical 
experts. The Deputy Attorney General billed at only $112 per hour.· 
The Administrative Law Judge did not award cost~, and the panel is not authorized 
under the law to award costs on its own. 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Business and Professions Code section 2234 provides, in pertinent part, that 
the Board shall take action against any licensee who is charged with unprofessional 
conduct. 
Under section 2234 "unprofessional conduct" is defined to include repeated 
negligent acts, gross negligence, and incompetence. 
"Repeated negligent acts" constituting unprofessional conduct under Business and 
Professions Code section 2234(c) consists of two or more negligent acts. See, Zabetian v. 
Medical Board of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 46~. 
"Gross negligence" is a professional error or omission that is egregious. It is 
defined as the want of even scant care, or an extreme deviation from the standard of 
practice in the medical community. Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 
110 Cal.App.3d 184; Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 124. 
"Incompetence" generally is defined as a lack of knowledge or ability in the 
discharging of professional obligations. See, James v. Board of Dental Examiners (1985) 
172 Cal.App.3d 1096. 
2. The standard of proof in a disciplinary action seeking the suspension or 
revocation of a physician and surgeon's certificate is clear and convincing evidence." 
Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 583. 
"Clear and convincing evidence" means evidence of such convincing force that it 
demonstrates, in contrast to the opposing evidence, a high probability of the truth of the 
facts for which it is offered as proof. "Clear and convincing evidence" is a higher 
standard of proof than proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." See, BAJ! 2.62. 
17 Mr. Rodriquez declaration erroneously listed the total expert reviewer services as $525.00. The error 




"Clear and convincing evidence" requires a finding of high probability and must be 
so clear as to leave no substantial doubt and to command the unhesitating assent of every 
reasonable mind. See, In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700. 
As a First Cause for Discipline and Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged 
gross negligence, repeated negligent acts and incompetence in respondent's care, treatment 
and management of patients A.H. and H.B. in violation of section 2234, subdivisions (b), 
(c) and (d). As a Second Cause for Discipline and R~vocation of Probation, complainant 
alleged false or misleading advertising in violation of section 2271. As a Third Cause for 
Discipline and Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged false or misleading 
advertising in violation of section 651. As a separate Cause for Revocation of Probation, · 
comp~ainant alleged respondent, (1) operated an outpatient setting using anesthesia in 
violation of sections 2215 and 2216, and Health and Safety Code sections 1248.1, 1248.15 
and 1248 .. 65; (2) violated Temecula Municipal Code; violated sections 651 and 2271 by 
false and misleading advertising; and (3) violated section 2234 as set forth above. 
3. Cause was established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation 
pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision (b), for unprofessional conduct consisting 
of gross negligence. 
Factual Findings 1 through 12 and 22 through 38 inclusive, 40 through 50 
inclusive, 52, 68, 72, 73 and Legal Conclusions 1 and 2 support this conclusion. 
4. Cause was established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation 
pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision (c), for unprofessional conduct consisting · 
of repeated negligent acts. 
Factual Findings 1 through 12 and 22 through 38 inclusive, 40-42, 44-45, 48 
and 49, and Legal Conclusions 1 and 2 support this conclusion . 
. 5. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision (d), for unprofessional conduct 
consisting of incompetence. 
Factual Findings 1 through 12 and 22 through 75 inclusive, and Legal 
Conclusions 1 and 2 support this conclusion . 
. 6. Section 2271 provides that any advertising in violation of Section 17500 
constitutes unprofessional conduct. Section 17500 defines· false advertising and provides in 
pertinent part: 
"It is unlawful for any person ... with intent ... to perform 
services, professional or otherwise, ... or to induce the public to enter into 
any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made 
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or disseminated before the public in this state . . . any statement, concerning 
. . . those services . . . or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact 
connected with the proposed performance . . . which is untrue or misleading, 
and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be 
known, to be untrue or misleading .... Any violation of ... this section is 
a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail and not 
exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding ... ($2,500) or by both 
that imprisonment and fine." · 
Respondent's statement that he spent his residency at U.C. Davis was misleading 
about the extent of his post-graduate education. Respondent's statement was not "false 
advertising" within section 17500 and does not warrant the criminal sanctions of that 
section. 
Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation 
pursuant to section 2271. 
Factual Findings 1 through 5 and 17 through 21 inclusive, and Legal 
Conclusions 1 and 2 support this conclusion. 
7. The Third Cause for Discipline alleged false and misleading advertising 
under section 651, which sets forth truth in advertising requirements for health care 
professionals. The section contains subsections (a) through.(k), each containing its own 
subparagraphs. The First Amended Accusation referenced subsections (a), (b), (e), (f) and 
(g). Those subsections contain a total of 11 types of statements considered false or 
misleading under the statute. Complainant did not specify in the charging allegations the 
particular subsection(s) that applied to each alleged misleading statement contained in 
paragraph 18 of the First Amended Accusation. Guidan~e came from complainant's 
counsel in his closing argument when he referred to subsections (b)(2), (b)(5) and (b)(8) of 
section 651. Those subsections define false or misleading advertising as follows: 
"(b) A false ... misleading, or deceptive statement, claim or image 
includes a statement or claim that does any of the following: 
(1) ... 
(2) Is likely to mislead or deceive because of a failure to disclose 
material facts. 
(3) ... (4) ... 
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(5) Contains other representations or implications that in reasonable 
probability will cause an ordinarily prudent person to misunderstand 
or be deceived. 
(6) ... (7) ... 
(8) Includes any statement, endorsement, or testimonial that is likely 
to mislead or deceive because of a failure to disclose material facts." 
The totality of the evidence established that respondent's statement about his 
residency was misleading or deceptive under those subsections. Respondent testified that 
prospective patients frequently call his office to ascertain his credentials and inquire 
whether he is board certified. This establishes that such information is material to 
prospective patients, and that had respondent stated he did a one year rotating internship in 
family practice, rather than saying he did a residency, ordinarily-prudent patients would 
have been dissuaded from having respondent do their OSR treatment. The context in 
which the residency statement is made establishes an intent to mislead prospective patients 
into believing he did a residency which trained hini in cosmetic surgery. 
Cause was established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation for 
violation of section 651. 
Factual Findings 1 through 5 and 17 through 19 inclusive, and Legal 
Conclusions 1, 2 and 7 support this conclusion. 
8. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation for unprofessional conduct within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 
1248.65 for operation of an "outpatient setting" in violation of Health and Safety Code 
section 1248.1. 
Factual Findings 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 39 and 51, and Legal 
Conclusions 1 and 2 support this conclusion. 
9. Cause was established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation 
for unprofessional conduct pursuant to section 2234 or the terms of probation, consisting of 
violation of laws related to the practice of medicine, to wit, the City of Temecula zoning 
laws. 
Factual Findings 1, 2, 3, and 5 through 15 inclusive, and Legal Conclusions 1 
and 2 support this conclusion. 
10. Except as set forth in the Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions of this 
Proposed Decision, the allegations and charges of the First Amended 
Accusation were not proven and are deemed surplusage. 
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Factual Findings 1 through 75 inclusive, and Legal Conclusions 1 through 9 
inclusive support this conclusion. 
Respondent has a history of prior discipline. His license to practice medicine is 
currently revoked, with the revocation stayed, and he has been placed on probation for five 
years with terms and conditions. The prior discipline is also a result of his failure to meet 
the standards of practice in performing cosmetic surgery procedures on his patients. The 
panel finds this to be a significant factor in aggravation. 
While respondent has made some improvements, he continues to conduct his 
cosmetic surgery practice· in a manner that puts patients at risk. He has not learned from 
his mistakes. He has not demonstrated he is willing and able to conform to professional 
standards of practice in patient selection and discharge from his outpatient surgery center. 
For these reasons the panel believes a period of suspension is warranted, as well as a 
restriction on practice, and a practice monitor. An ethics course is also warranted in this 
case. 
WHEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ORDER is hereby made: 
Certificate No. A 36888 issued to Respondent, Kelly James O'Neil, M.D., is 
revoked. However, the revocation is stayed and Respondent is pla.ced on probation for 
seven (7) years upon the following terms and conditions. 
1. As part of probation, respondent is suspended from the practice of medicine for 
six (6) months beginning the 16th day after the effective date of this decision. 
2. Within 15 days after the effective date of this decision Respondent shall provide 
the Division, or its designee, proof of service that Respondent has served a true copy of 
this decision on the Chief of Staff or the Chief Executive Officer at every hospital where 
privileges or membership are extended to Respondent or at any other facility where 
Respondent engages in the practice of medicine and on the Chief Executive Officer at 
every insurance carrier where malpractice insurance coverage is extended to Respondent. 
3. Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local laws, all rules governing the 
practice of medicine in California, and remain in full compliance with any court ordered 
criminal probation, payments and other orders. 
4. Respondent shall submit quarterly declarations under penalty of perjury on 
forms provided by the Division, stating whether there has been compliance with all the 
conditions of probation. 
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5. Respondent shall comply with the Division's probation surveillance program. 
Respondent shall, at all times, keep the Division informed of his addresses of busi1;1ess and 
residence which shall both serve as addresses of record: Changes of such addresses shall 
be immediately communicated in writing to the Division. Under no circumstances shall a 
post office box serve as an address of record, except as: allowed by Business and 
Professions Code Section 202l(b). 1 
6. Respondent shall, at all times, maintain a cJrrent and renewed physician and 
surgeon license. · 
1 
7. Respondent shall also immediately inform the Division, in writing, of any travel 
to any areas outside the jurisdiction of California whictj lasts, or is contemplated to last, 
more than thirty (30) days. 
1 
1 
8. Respondent shall appear in person for interv;iews with the Division, its designee 
or its designated physician(s) upon request at various intervals and with reasonable notice. 
l 
I 
9. During probation, respondent is prohibited from practicing surgery, cosmetic 
procedures or treatments, and administering or ordering the administration of any 
anesthetic agents. At the earliest opportunity, respondent shall inform applicable patients 
that respondent is unable to perform a treatment or procedure . . 
' 
10. At least thirty (30) days before the end of the period of suspension imposed 
I 
by this Order, respondent shall submit to the Division or its designee for its prior approval 
a plan of practice in which respondent's practice shall be monitored by another physician in 
j 
respondent's field of practice, who shall provide periodic reports to the Division or its 
designee. 
11. Within 60 days of the effective date of this decision, respondent shall enroll 
in a course in Ethics approved in advance by the Division or its designee, and shall 
successfully complete the course during the first year of probation. 
12. In the event Respondent should leave California to reside or to practice 
outside the State or for any reason should Respondent stop practicing medicine in 
California, Respondent shall notify the Division or its designee in writing within ten days 
of the dates of departure and return or the dates of non-practice within California. Non-
practice is defined as any period of time exceeding thirty days in which Respondent is not 
engaging in any activities defined in Sections 2051 and 2052 of the Business and 
Professions Code. All time spent in an intensive training program approved by the 
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Division or its designee shall be considered as time spent in the practice of medicine. A 
Board ordered suspension of practice shall not be considered as a period of non-practice. 
Periods of temporary or permanent residence or practice outside California or of non-
practice within California, as defined in this condition, will not apply to the reduction of 
the probationary order. 
13. If Respondent violates probation in any respect, the Division, after giving 
Respondent notice and the opportunity to be heard, may· revoke probation and carry out the 
disciplinary order that was stayed. If an accusation or petition to revoke probation is filed 
against Respondent during probation, the Division shall have continuing jurisdiction until 
the matter is final, and the period of probation shall be extended until the matter i.s final. 
14. Respondent shall pay the costs associated with probation monitoring each and 
every year of probation. Such costs shall be payable to the Division of Medical Quality 
and delivered to the designated probation surveillance monitor no later than January 31 of 
each calendar year. Failure to pay such costs within 30 days of the due date shall be 
considered a violation of probation. 
15. Following the effective date of this decision, if Respondent ceases practicing 
due to retirement, health reasons or is otherwise unable to satisfy the terms and conditions 
of probation, Respondent may voluntarily tender his certificate to the Board. The Division 
reserves the right to evaluate Respondent's request and to exercise its discretion whether to 
grant the request, or to take any other action deemed appropriate and reasonable under the 
circumstances. Upon formal acceptance of the tendered license, Respondent will no longer 
be subject to the terms and conditions of probations. 
16. Upon successful completion of probation, Respondent's certificate shall be 
fully restored. 
Respondent's medical record from the PACE evaluation contained in pages AGO 
591 through 599 inclusive in Exhibit 23 shall be sealed and not available for public view; 
however, those pages shall be available for review by the Medical Board, its authorized 
designees and by any reviewing court. It shall be available to a member of the public upon 
court order. 
This decision shall become effective on at 5:00 p.m. on 4-tt C. 2 f , 2003 
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 2 f DAY OF /kt,ttf·r , 2003. 
dt:5~o 





DIVISION QF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 







Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. 
Physician's & Surgeon's 
Certificate No.: A 36888 
Case No.: Dl-1993-26899 
OAR No.: L-2002020038 
Respondent 
NOTICE OF NON-ADOPTION 
OF PROPOSED DECISION 
The Proposed Decision of the Administrative Law Judge in the above-entitled matter has 
been non-adopted. The Medical Board of California, Division of Medical Quality, will decide the 
case upon the record, including the transcript and exhibits of the hearing, and upon such written 
argument as the parties may wish to submit, including in particular, argument directed to the 
question of whether the proposed penalty should be modified. The parties will be notified of the date 
for submission of such argument when the transcript of the above-mentioned hearing becomes 
available. 
To order a copy of the transcript, please contact the Transcript Clerk, Office of 
Administrative Hearings, 320 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90013. The telephone 
numberis (213) 576-7211. 
In addition to written argument, oral argument will be scheduled if any party files with the 
Division within 20 days from the date of this notice a written request for oral argument. If a timely 
request is filed, the Division will serve all parti·es with written notice of the time, date and place for 
oral argument. Oral argument shall be directed only to the question of whether the proposed penalty 
should be modified. Please do not attach to your written argument any documents that are not part 
of the record as they cannot be considered by the Panel. 
Please remember to serve the opposing party with a copy of your written argument and any 
other papers you might file with the Division. The mailing address of the Division is as follows: 
Nonndpt.frm 
Division of Medical Quality 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
1426 Howe Avenue 
Sacramento, CA 95825-3236 
(916) 263-2624 
Dated: _ __.._A=p=ri ..... l "'"'1 O'""", =20"""0=3 ____ _ 
Brenda Allen, Analyst 




DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation Against 
.. .... ---- -KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D. 
40971 Winchester Road 
Temecula, CA 92591 OAH No. L2002020038 
Physician's and Surgeon's 
Certificate No. GA 36888 
Respondent. 
PROPOSED DECISION 
Administrative Law Judge Joyce A. Wharton, Office of Administrative Hearings, 
State of California, heard this matter in San Diego, California on October 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
28, 29 and 30, 2002. 
T. Douglas MacCartee, Deputy Attorney General, represented the complainant. 
Albert J. Garcia, Attorney at Law, represented respondent Kelly James O'Neill, M.D., 
who was present. 
The matter was submitted on October 30, 2002. 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
1. On January 4, 2002, Ron Joseph (hereinafter "complainant"), acting in his 
official capacity as the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (hereinafter 
"the Board"), filed Accusation No 19-2000-112061 against Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. 
(hereinafter "respondent"). Complainant charged respondent with unprofessional conduct in 
connection with his care and treatment of two patients in July 2000. Specifically, 




violation of Business and Professions Code,1 section 2234, subdivisions (b), (c) and (d); and 
false and misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271. Complainant also 
alleged that respondent violated a term of probation in case No. 09-93-26899 and, therefore, 
the order of probation should be revoked. ·complainant filed a First Amended Accusation on 
October 16, 2002. 2 
Respondent filed a timely Notice of Defense. 
2. Respondent is 49 years old. In 1975, he graduated U.C. Davis with a Bachelor 
of Science degree in Physiology. In 1980, he obtained a medical degree from Tulane 
Medical School. In 1981, he completed a one-year rotating internship at UC Davis but did 
not perform a residency. On June 24, 1981, the Board issued physician's and surgeon's 
certificate No. A 36888. The certificate is renewed and current with an expiration date of 
January 31, 2003. 
Respondent moved to Temecula and opened a private family practice in late August 
1981. Respondent soon met a physician who specialized in chemical peels and was about to 
retire. The physician trained respondent in the peel procedure and respondent incorporated it 
into his practice. Respondent took courses and attended seminars on peel procedures. In 
1987, he gave up his family practice to primarily devote time to the skin peel procedure. In 
about 1994, he began doing tumescent liposurgery as well. Respondent has continued to 
limit his practice to chemical peels and liposurgery. He conducts his practice at the O'Neil 
Skin Center located at 40971 Winchester Road in Temecula. Respondent is not board 
certified in any specialty. 
3. Complainant filed Accusation No. 09-03-26899 against respondent in 
November 1996, and a Supplemental Accusation in January 1998. The parties resolved the 
matter by a Stipulation in Settlement and Decision effective September 14, 1998. The 
stipulation contained the following pertinent language: 
2 
"7. For the purpose of resolving Accusation and First Supplemental 
Accusation No. 09-93-26899, respondent admits he committed repeated acts 
of negligence in the care and treatment of patient J.G. as alleged in paragraph 
5 of the Accusation, and repeated acts of negligence in the care and treatment 
of patient V.F._as alleged in paragraph 15 of the First Supplemental 
Accusation. . . . . .. The remaining allegations in the Accusation and First 
Supplemental Accusation are dismissed." 3 (Emphasis added.) 
All statutory references are to the California Business and Professions Code unless stated otherwise. 
Respondent did not object to the new allegations made shortly before the date of hearing. 
Complainant asserted respondent's stipulated admissions included admitting to placing a false 
advertisement in the Yellow Pages stating he was board certified in general practice, and admitting he operated an 
unlicensed health facility. A plain reading of the matters admitted does not support this contention. Respondent 
admitted only "repeated negligent acts" in the care and treatment of specific patients in violation of section 2234( c ). 
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J.G. was a 72-year-old patient on whom respondent performed a chemical facial peel 
in March 1993. During the procedure the patient went into respiratory arrest and never 
regained consciousness. Pursuant to the stipulation, respondent admitted the following: He 
failed to perform a complete preoperative physical; he failed to order a pre-operative 
electrocardiogram or chest x-ray which would have determined the extent of the patient's 
chronic condition; he failed to detect the patient was suffering :from.chronic congestive heart 
failure; he failed to record the patient's peripheral edema in his history and physical; he 
proceeded with the chemical face peel without first obtaining a cardiac clearance from a 
physician; he failed to properly intubate the patient prior to arrival of paramedics; he failed to 
establish a properly operating intravenous route; he gave the patient multiple sedatives 
without a nurse anesthetist or anesthesiologist present. 
V.F. was a 37-year-old female, weighing 247 pounds, on whom respondent 
performed liposuction in September 1996. After surgery the patient developed blisters from 
the girdle prescribed by respondent. The condition worsened to a life-threatening soft tissue 
infection. Pursuant to the stipulation, respondent admitted the following: He failed to 
properly assess the patient for liposuction surgery; the patient was not a proper candidate for 
the surgery because of her generalized obesity; he administered an excessive amount of 
tumescent solution; he removed an excessive amount of aspirate from the patient. 
The Board revoked respondent's certificate and stayed the order for five years on 
probationary terms that included: completion of a Physician Assessment and Clinical 
Evaluation (PACE) program in patient assessment, plastic surgery and anesthesia at UCSD 
School of Medicine prior to the revocation order being stayed; a practice monitor; practice 
restrictions that preclude use of general anesthesia and limit the amount of aspirate 
withdrawn during certain procedures; compliance with all federal, state and local laws and 
rules governing the practice of medicine in California. 
4. In June and July 1998, respondent underwent a comprehensive PACE 
assessment, which included measurement of medical skills and knowledge, appraisal of 
physical health and psychological testing. Respondent was found to be in good physical and 
mental health. · 
In compliance with terms of his probation, respondent submitted to a psychological 
assessment on June 1, 1998. William Perry, Ph.D. interviewed respondent and administered 
numerous tests. He found no cognitive or neurocognitive deficits, nor was there indication of 
serious psychopathology. In September 1998, respondent attended a weeklong clinical 
program including Dermatology and Anesthesiology. On September 25, 1998, PACE issued 
a certificate of completion indicating that respondent successfully completed and met all 
requirements of the PACE program. The order of revocation was stayed on that date. 
As a result of the disciplinary action, respondent instituted changes in his practice. At 
the initial consultation he applies stricter guidelines to evaluate the patient for the procedure 
and he refuses more patients at that stage. Patients under 50 must have blood work and 
patients over 50 must also have an EKG and chest x-ray. All patients must be examined by 
their primary care physician and provide that physician's authorization for the 
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chemexfiliation and/or liposurgery. In addition to his initial consultation with the patient, on 
the morning of the procedure respondent also takes a medical history, performs a physical 
examination and documents findings in his chart. Respondent adheres to the probationary 
requirement to limit the amount of aspirate for liposurgery and believes this was a good idea. 
As of October 29, 2001, respondent was deemed in compliance with all terms and 
conditions of his probation. Respondent's practice monitor reported he did not find any 
problems with respondent's care of patients. 
5. At all times relevant to the pending Accusation, respondent conducted his 
practice at 40971 Winchester Road in Temecula under the name "O'Neil Skin and Lipo 
Center, Kelly James O'Neil, M.D." Effective October 25, 1999, the facility became 
accredited by the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. Respondent 
lost his hospital privileges due to the 1998 disciplinary action. However, he has a standing 
transfer agreement with the local hospital allowing him to transfer patients to the hospital by 
means of a 911 call. 
As of July 2000, respondent had performed about 6,000 full phenol peels and 2,000 
more partial peels. Approximately one-third of his patients were aged 60 or older. 
6. Respondent's procedures were performed on an outpatient basis. He gave 
each patient a written set of instructions titled "9'Neil Skin Rejuvenation After Care 
Instructions for the First 48 Hours." The instructions advised the patient in pertinent part as 
follows: 
"I. You must have a driver to take you from Dr. O'Neil's office. 
2. You must have someone help you so you can rest in bed ( only getting up 
for the restroom) for the next 48 hours. 
3 .... Diet: Full liquid diet through a straw. If nauseated have clear liquids 
through a straw. 
4. Sleep with your head elevated at 45 degrees for the first 24 hours and then 
position as you are comfortable. 
5. Apply ice packs to eyelids for 20 minutes each hour for the first 24 hours. 
6. Medications: Keep these at your bedside ... 
. . . Please do not take any xanax, ativan, or restoril past midnight on 
the second day after your treatment, because the doctor would like you to be 
more active the day your tape comes off. 
Remove the mask on the morning of the third day and apply the 
powder that was supplied to you. . .. 
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Notify Dr. O'Neil if your: 
Blood pressure is greater than 100 diastolic 
If your blood pressure is greater then [sic] 180 systolic 
If your pulse is greater then [sic] 100 
If your tempeture [sic] is greater then [sic] 100 degrees 
If you have any questions"4 
7. Respondent believed that to achieve optimum cosmetic outcome, the 24 to 40 
hour period after the procedure was an important, integral part of the skin rejuvenation 
process. Some, _but not all, of the peel procedures required application of a tape mask that 
was to remain in place for about two days. The tape mask must stay on with minimal 
movement around the mouth and eyes in order to achieve the best cosmetic outcome for the 
patient. Respondent wanted the patients to remain quiet and undisturbed for the first 48 
hours so they would not touch their faces or disturb the tape mask and thus risk scarring or a 
poor result. The mask could be removed easily in an emergency. 
Respondent explained that he wanted his patients in a controlled aftercare 
environment, not necessarily for medical reasons, but for a good result of the facial peel so 
the patient would be happy and he would not have future complaints about the result. 
8. In 2000, as part of the skin rejuvenation package, respondent offered his 
patients aftercare options that.included staying two nights in a nearby hotel where they could 
be monitored and assisted until they removed the mask. Once the mask was removed, the 
patients could go home or spend from 1 to 9 days at a private "retreat" where healthful 
meals, recreational activities and relaxation were provided by an attentive staff. The 
aftercare options were attractive to the patients, especially those who lived far from the clinic 
or had no one at home to provide care and assistance. Respondent would not perform the 
procedure on certain patients who lived far away with no one at home to help them unless 
they agreed to go to the immediate aftercare facility. 
Over the years respondent had used several different aftercare facilities or retreats 
including the local hospital. When his license was placed on probationary status, respondent 
lost his hospital privileges at Inland Valley Hospital and sought another provider of 
immediate aftercare. Respondent wanted a location that was close to his office "for transport 
and to keep an eye on patients." In about 1999 he learned that QualCare, Inc., a nursing 
registry, was providing post procedure care for cosmetic surgery patients at an upscale hotel 
in Riverside. Because that location was too far from his office, he contacted the owner of 
QualCare to see if the service could be provided in Temecula. 
9. QualCare Inc., aka QC Enterprises, was a company owned and operated by Jo-
Ann Jordan, R.N. Ms. Jordan and a friend started the business, which operated for an 
unknown period of time before it was incorporated as a closely held corporation in May 
1999. Ms. Jordan described QualCare as a nursing registry that provided care on an as 
4 Additional instructions were included for liposurgery patients. 
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needed basis in various settings. The major part of Qual Care's business was to provide care 
to discharged outpatients in a setting similar to that at home. 
Ms. Jordan hired registered nurses who worked for QualCare as independent 
contractors. She required that the nurses also work in hospitals so they would have the 
necessary and up-to-date skills. QualCare scheduled and paid the nurses. The nurses wore 
scrubs and used latex gloves, had a stethoscope and blood pressure measuring equipment, but 
did not provide oximeters or EKG equipment. The nurses did not give injections or 
intravenous treatment, nor did they dispense drugs. They assisted with suppositories and the 
patients' regular oral medications. The patient's physician would send someone to 
administer any injection that was required. The nurse was expected to use her professional 
judgment to call 911 if an emergency arose. 
Ms. Jordan was familiar with other companies that provided aftercare to cosmetic 
surgery patients in hotel settings in southern California. Jordan testified that she contacted 
the appropriate state and local agencies about providing aftercare services in a hotel setting 
and was not advised of any illegality. Ms. Jordan testified that, before she met respondent, 
QualCare had provided aftercare services for a Loma Linda plastic surgeon. QualCare 
arranged for the patients to stay in rooms at the Mission Inn, a very upscale hotel in 
Riverside. QualCare provided one nurse to care for three patients. If a patient persisted in 
trying to remove the bandages, an unlicensed "sitter" would be provided for one-on-one 
attention to do nothing but watch the patient. 
10. In 1999, at least one year after QualCare started doing business, Ms. Jordan 
learned that respondent was looking for aftercare services for his skin peel patients. She met 
with respondent and he discussed his expectations for aftercare. Based on her experience at 
the Mission Inn, she believed QualCare could fashion a program tp meet respondent's needs. 
The patient was to remain quiet and recline at a 45-degree angle; ice was to be applied to the 
face and the patient must avoid smoking. The setting was to be upscale, with a phone 
available for personal calls and a microwave for heating broth. Ms. Jordan described the 
service QualCare was to provide as "a supportive environment in lieu of going home". 
Ms. Jordan and her partner used respondent's guidelines and incorporated what they 
felt was needed for aftercare. Ms. Jordan and respondent agreed that the Embassy Suites 
Hotel in Temecula would be an appropriate setting. Ms. Jordan approached the Embassy 
Suites and discussed with the manager the nature of her operation, what the nurses would be 
doing and the type of rooms needed. Embassy Suites agreed to rent to QualCare a block of 
adjoining rooms. The hotel also accommodated QualCare by providing unlimited ice, linens 
and pillows. There was no evidence of any complaints by the management or owner of 
Embassy Suites nor any indication they were concerned about the legality of QualCare's use 
of the hotel property for aftercare. QualCare entered an arrangement with respondent to 
provide aftercare to his facial peel patients. QualCare operated out of Embassy Suites for 
approximately 18 months. 
The patients paid QualCare for its services. As part of the skin rejuvenation 
"package," the patient wrote a check to respondent for his services and a separate check to 
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QualCare. Both checks were delivered to respondent's office approximately a week before 
the procedure and QualCare would pick up its checks. Respondent did not receive any 
portion of the payment made to.QualCare. 
11. QualCare continued to solicit business from other physicians but was not 
successful. After 1999, respondent was its only client. There was no arrangement or 
agreement between respondent and QualCare whereby it would serve only his practice. 
12. The evidence did not establish that respondent "effectively controlled" 
QualCare as alleged in the First Amended Accusation. Respondent took no part in the 
formation or incorporation of QualCare and had no ownership or financial interest in it. He 
had no rol~ in hiring, scheduling or paying the nurses. Respondent provided QualCare 
nurses the same instructions given to the patients for aftercare and his nurses demonstrated 
how to remove the tape mask. QualCare nurses called respondent, as the treating physician, 
if a patient was having a problem and they followed his instructions for aftercare. None of 
this equates to "effective control" over QualCare and its business. 
13. In the First Amended Accusation, complainant alleged respondent violated the 
terms of probation because he failed to obey state and local laws. The pleading itself is 
ambiguous. Complainant's counsel explained the charges were based on complainant's 
belief that respondent operated, managed, conducted or maintained an "outpatient setting" at 
the Embassy Suites in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1248.1 and Temecula 
Municipal Code section 17.24. 
The evidence did not establish that use of the hotel for limited aftercare as provided 
by QualCare constituted an "outpatient setting." Health and Safety Code section 1248(c) 
defines outpatient setting for the purpose of section 1248.1 as follows: 
" ... any facility, ... center, office or other setting that is not part of a 
general acute care facility and where anesthesia5 ••• is used in compliance 
with the community standard of practice, in doses that, when administered 
have the probability of placing a patient at risk for loss of the patient's life-
preserving protective reflexes. 
"Outpatient setting" does not include, among other settings, any 
settings where anxiolytics6 and analgesics7 are administered ... in doses that 
do not have the probability of placing the patient at risk for loss of life 
preserving reflexes." (Emphasis added.) 
s "Anesthesia" is defined as "loss of feeling or sensation, especially to loss of sensation of pain as it is 
induced to pennit perfonnance of surgery or other painful procedures." (Dor/ands Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 
27th Ed.) 
6 "Anxiolytic" is defined as " ... reducing anxiety." Id. 
7 "Analgesic" is defined as "agent that alleviates pain without causing loss of consciousness. Id. 
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Neither respondent nor the QualCare nurses administered anesthesia to patients 
during their stay at the hotel. 
14. A city of Temecula code enforcement officer issued a ''Notice of Violation 
Correction Notice," described on its face as a "warning," to "Dr. O'Neil Qual Care." The 
notice cited a violation of Temecula Municipal Code section 17.24, which dealt with parking 
violations. The notice was not accurate and no citation was ever issued against respondent. 
Thus, the issuance of the notice did not establish that respondent violated any zoning law. 
15. The parties entered the following stipulation with regard to the Temecula 
Municipal Code: 
"At all times relevant herein the city of Temecula, California had a zoning 
general plan and ordinance which precluded the Embassy Suites Hotel from 
operation of any business use other than its own operation as a hotel. Under 
the ordinance it is illegal for anyone, who has not applied for and received a 
conditional use permit, to engage [ within the premises of Embassy Suites 
Hotel] in the operation of a Post Surgical Care Facility or any other health care 
operation whereby medical patients or the infirm are cared for by a medical 
professional for a fee." 
The evidence established there was no violation of Temecula Municipal Code section 
17.24 because that section related to parking violations. Rather than present the actual 
ordinance for the administrative law judge's review, the parties entered the above stipulation. 
The administrative law judge is not bound by parties' incorrect interpretation of the meaning 
and effect of an ordinance. 
Even if the parties' stipulation is accurate, the evidence did not establish a violation of 
any Temecula zoning ordinance by respondent. Respondent did not own or control the 
Embassy Suites property, nor did he own or control QualCare, which was operating its 
business on the property. The primary responsibility for the proper use of the hotel rooms 
rested with the management and owners of the hotel, who are bound to know the applicable 
zoning law as much, if not more than a customer. Assuming, arguendo, and based solely on 
the parties' stipulation, that patient aftercare violated an ordinance, the party liable for 
sanctions would be either the hotel or QualCare, the entity operating the business and making 
the arrangements to use the hotel. Embassy Suites was fully aware of the intended use of its 
hotel rooms and consented to it. There was no reason for respondent to suspect QualCare or 
Embassy Suites would operate in contravention of a zoning law. 
16. The First Amended Accusation alleged as a violation of law that respondent 
"continued his operation of an uncertified outpatient setting." Complainant presented no 
evidence that respondent ever operated an uncertified outpatient setting or that he did so after 
the stipulated decision in 1998. Complainant argued that the following allegation in the 1996 
Accusation was admitted by respondent's stipulation and was proof of his past operation of 
an uncertified setting: 
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"On or about May 19, 1993, respondent received a cease and desist order from 
the San Bernardino District Office of the State Department of Health Services 
as concerned his operating an unlicensed health facility ... where he would 
house post chemical peel patients for further recuperation." (Emphasis added.) 
The issuance and receipt of a cease and desist order does not establish that the 
underlying ground for the order was true or was in fact a violation oflaw. In light of 
complainant's erroneous application of Health and Safety Code section 1248.1 in this 
proceeding, it is not reasonable to assume a correct interpretation of the law was made in the 
prior Accusation. Further, respondent admitted only "repeated acts of negligence in the care 
and treatment of patient J.G., as alleged in paragraph 5 of the Accusation." There was 
nothing in the above-cited allegation o~ the admission to suggest the above allegation 
involved the care and treatment of patient J.G. in March 1993. 
The evidence did not establish that respondent operated an uncertified outpatient 
setting in violation of any law. 
17. For several years respondent has made available to prospective patients a 
video. The video at issue in this hearing is Exhibit H. Respondent testified the video was 
made as an "infomercial" to be shown on television approximately seven years ago. The 
intent was to promote the chemical peel process that he developed over many years and 
became his special area of practice. The evidence indicated Exhibit H was made in about 
1994.8 There was no evidence the video was, in fact, broadcast on television. 
Respondent testified he felt Exhibit H was too commercialized to give to patients, so 
he made another similar version to distribute to patients for information. The evidence 
indicated a video was available to patients at respondent's office and was presented at 
promotional seminars but that video was not presented as evidence at the hearing. The 
evidence was not conclusive that Exhibit H was the same video presented to individual 
patients and at seminars. Respondent testified that Exhibit H was given to the Medical Board 
during its investigation in the prior disciplinary action and no objection was made at that 
time to its content. 
The Exhibit H video contained approximately 22 before and after photos of patients 
who underwent the O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation procedure. Approximately 22 patients gave 
testimonials about their reasons for having the procedure and their satisfaction with the 
results. The video clearly stated the O'Neil Skin Center was not a dermatology clinic, it was 
a center specializing in non-surgical skin rejuvenation techniques that removed wrinkles and 
improved skin complexion. Contrary to complainant's contention at the hearing, none of the 
statements in the video implied that respondent performed a residency in plastic surgery or 
any other particular specialty. None of the statements suggested that respondent specialized 
in plastic surgery. The statements on the video clearly informed the viewer that respondent 
8 Alice Tis one of respondent's chemical peel patients who appeared in the video and stated her age as 72. 




limited his practice to non-surgical cosmetic treatment of the skin and patients wanting to 
improve sagging neck or eye areas were referred to Dr. Richard Amonic, a plastic and 
reconstructive surgeon in Santa Monica. 
18. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising within the meaning of sections 651 and 2271 because he "used an 
advertising video which creates the impression that he completed a post graduate residency 
and to [sic] post-graduate training at the University of California, Davis.,, 
In one portion of the Exhibit H video, when describing his background and 
experience, respondent stated: "I graduated from Tulane Medical School and spent my 
residency at U.C. Davis in Sacramento." This statement implied respondent either 
completed or performed part of a residency. Respondent completed a one-year rotating 
internship at U.C. Davis but did not perform a residency. 
Respondent admitted his statement in the video could be misleading about his 
participation in a "residency" program. It was clear from respondent's testimony that he 
does not make a clear distinction between the terms "residency" and "internship. ''9 His 
current resume listed "rotating internship 1981," yet he testified he did a first year of 
"residency" in a family practice program. Respondent believed an internship was the first 
year of a residency program and a first year resident was called an intern. It could not be 
determined whether respondent's use of the word "residency" in the video was the product of 
intent or ignorance. Neither party presented expert testimony about the common use and 
meaning of "residency" in the medical community or whether its meaning in the context of 
post graduate training has changed in recent years. 
Although respondent's statement about his "residency" was not true, in the context of 
the entire video it was not a material statement or one that would.induce a person to undergo 
the skin rejuvenation process. The evidence did not establish respondent made the Exhibit H 
video available to the public after September 15, 1998, the effective date of the Stipulated 
Decision. 
19. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising within the meanings of sections 651 and 2271 because he ''uses 
videos, brochures, and other advertising media to represent that his practice is safe and has 
low complication rates. In fact respondent is on probation for treatment of patients resulting 
in death and serious complications.,, The Accusation did not specify statements or language 
it found objectionable. As evidence of the false statements complainant presented the 
Exhibit H video, a brochure and an information sheet. 
9 Dorland's Medical Dictionary defines intern, "a medical graduate seiving and residing in a hospital 
preparatory to being licensed to practice medicine;" a resident is defmed as, "a graduate and licensed physician 
receiving training in a specialty in a hospital." 
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Respondent made the following statements on the Exhibit H video regarding his skin 
rejuvenation procedures: 
[Regarding the aftercare program provided at the retreat facility and the results 
of the O.S.R. 10 treatment] " ... I believe it is the reason my complication rate 
is so low." 
"Safety and results are my main concern." 
''There are risks involved as in any procedure but this procedure is 
inherently safer than cosmetic surgery, dermabrasion or skin peeling. I have 
performed thousands of these procedures over fourteen years and we provide 
every possible precaution at the O'Neil Skin Center to insure your success. 
The reason for our excellent safety record is simple, I provide more aftercare 
than other doctors, I've also designed a safer system for skin rejuvenation than 
other doctors, a multilayer system with a moderate strength solution. Some 
doctors use a harsh solution. I have designed a much gentler formula." 
The brochure contained the following statements: 
"Safety 
The O.S.R. program offers the most extensive aftercare program of any 
cosmetic treatment on the market today. The patients heal and recuperate in 
privacy and seclusion. This enhances the safety of the procedure and insure 
[sic] uniform results. Other doctors may try to suggest that their skin peel 
program is "easier" or "safer" because you are sent directly home after the 
procedure, but wouldn't it be safer to have experienced professionals 
monitoring and caring for you at this time?" 
The information sheet, titled "O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation Versus Conventional Skin 
Peels" and dated "3/00," stated in pertinent part: 
"At the O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation Center we specialize in cosmetic 
treatment of the skin. Various types of skin peels are offered as well as the 
O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation program. By concentrating on one area of 
expertise, Dr. O'Neil has elevated skin rejuvenation to a different plane. With 
over 8500 cases behind him, we feel our skin treatments are second to none in 
quality, safety and results .... 
The O'Neil Skin Center stands for quality, comfort, and safety." 
20. The references to safety in the brochure, information sheet and video were 
made only in regard to respondent's skin rejuvenation procedure. Over the past 15 years, 
respondent has performed thousands of face peel procedures. Respondent is on probation for 
10 O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation. 
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one death that occurred during a chemical peel and one instance of a serious skin infection 
that developed after liposurgery. In addition, there has been one instance of post-procedure 
heart attack in a patient with no cardiac history and one instance of post-procedure 
pulmonary embolism. The evidence in the pending case did not establish that the latter two 
resulted from respondent's negligence or lack of safety measures. 
Neither the brochure or information sheet made any representation about 
complication rates. Complainant presented no evidence about complication rates for the 
types of procedures performed by respondent. Respondent testified he keeps a record of the 
statistics and his complication rates are below the published statistics. Neither party 
presented evidence of published statistics. Complainant presented no evidence to establish 
respondent's actual complication rate was higher than the acceptable complication rates 
within the medical community. 
Complainant presented no law or standard of practice that required respondent to 
disclose prior discipline in his advertising or informational materials. Complainant presented 
no law or standard of practice that required respondent, absent inquiry, to inform his patients 
of adverse incidents that occurred during or after procedures. Upon inquiry by patients, 
respondent tells them he had one patient death in the office in 1993 and one patient had a 
heart attack. There was no evidence respondent ever misrepresented his probationary status. 
The fact that respondent's license is on probation does not of itself establish that his current 
practice is unsafe. 
Respondent made the Exhibit H video before the prior disciplinary action was filed 
and before he treated one of the patients whose treatment was at issue. The evidence did not 
establish that the statements from the video referenced in Factual Finding 19 constituted false 
or misleading advertising within the meaning sections 651 or 2271. 
The evidence established that after the 1998 Stipulation in Settlement, respondent 
changed his pre-operative evaluation procedures and he successfully completed the PACE 
program in Dermatology and Anesthesiology. There was no evidence respondent was not 
competent to safely perform the limited procedures of his practice since 1998, nor was there 
evidence that the O'Neil Skin Center outpatient facility lacked any required safety features. 
21. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271 because he took pre-operative 
photographs in different lighting than post-operative photos, and took pre-operative photos 
without makeup, but post-operative photos feature patients with makeup. 
The only evidence of photos is contained in Exhibits O and P, original brochures 
containing black and white photos, and Exhibit H, the videotape. Complainant presented no 
credible evidence about the manner in which respondent took any before and after photos. 
Complainant's expert witnesses, Mark Krugman, M.D. and David T. Morwood, M.D., 
offered their opinions but to a great extent they were speculating; they had no expertise in 
photography nor did they know the actual circumstances in which the photos were taken. 
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In most, it does not appear the lighting before and after was significantly different. In 
some, it does not appear that make-up was used at all in the after photo, In some photos, 
lipstick or eye makeup was used in both before and after photos. In others, it appears that 
eye make-up or lipstick was applied for the after photo, but it is also obvious that the 
improvement in facial skin is the result of something other than cosmetics and lighting. 
The only evidence about the manner in which the p~otos were taken established they 
were taken in respondent's office in ambient lighting. The before photos were taken shortly 
before the procedure. The after photos were taken when patients returned for post-procedure 
checkups. Respondent explained that the lighting might appear different because he takes 
the pictures against a wall at different times of the day. Patients are more likely to wear 
plakeup when they come in for a checkup but the makeup will not cover wrinkles. 
Respondent testified he never touched up photos or tried to misrepresent results; he did not 
need to use makeup to exaggerate the benefits of the O.S.R. treatment because the results and 
the patients speak for themselves. 
Five of respondent's skin rejuvenation patients, including A.H. and H.B., testified at 
the hearing. Direct observation of their skin revealed that the "after" photos very likely did 
not exaggerate the results of the 0.S.R. treatment. 
The evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to establish that the 
photographs used in respondent's promotional and informational materials constituted false 
or misleading advertising. 
22. The First Amended Accusation alleged respondent engaged in false or 
misleading advertising in violation of sections 651 and 2271 because he sent a letter to 
prospective patients falsely claiming that his was the only medical office in southern 
California that specialized in cosmetic skin rejuvenation. The letter stated: 
''We are, to our knowledge, the only medical office in Southern California that 
specializes in cosmetic skin rejuvenation. While other physicians may do laser 
peels, TCA peels, or phenol peels, few, if any, concentrate their practice 
exclusively on skin rejuvenation." 
It is important that the statement contained the qualifying "to our knowl~dge." 
Complainant presented no evidence of any other medical office in Southern California that 
concentrated its practice exclusively on non surgical cosmetic skin rejuvenation. It is notable 
that none of the expert witnesses called by the parties concentrated their practice on cosmetic 
skin rejuvenation to the same extent as respondent. The evidence was not sufficient to 
establish that respondent's statement constituted a violation of sections 651 and 2271. 
23. The First Amended Accusation charged respondent with gross negligence, 
incompetence and repeated negligent acts in his treatment of patient A.H. in July 2000. 
In 1998, at age 69, patient A.H. first consulted respondent. A.H. was impressed by 
the beautiful skin of her hairdresser, who had been treated by respondent. A.H. attended a 
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seminar given by respondent in Escondido and watched two videos, one at the seminar and 
one given to her by a friend. The seminar video may have been identical or similar to 
Exhibit H. Respondent's statement about his medical school and residency did not impress 
her. Based on the information obtained from the seminar and video, A.H. felt respondent 
was highly competent in the skin rejuvenation process. 
On the intake sheet, A.H. listed previous surgeries including two face-lifts and back 
surgery. She noted her only medical problems as osteoporosis and previous morphine 
addiction related to back pain. The patient did not have a facial procedure at that time. She 
returned to respondent in 2000 and scheduled an O'Neil Skin Rejuvenation procedure, 
including aftercare by QualCare and the retreat. She agreed to the aftercare program because 
she thought it was better than going home and caring for herself or having a friend help her. 
She felt no pressure to go to the aftercare program. She was not aware she would spend the 
first two days at the hotel. 
Pursuant to respondent's routine procedure, an EKG and x-ray were done on June 15, 
and a complete blood count was performed on June 18, 2000. The lab results were normal 
and the x-ray found no acute cardiopulmonary disease. The EKG noted "Sinus Bradycardia, 
otherwise normal ECG." Respondent required the patient be examined by her primary care 
physician and obtain an approval for the procedure. On July 14, 2000, the patient was 
examined by Jerome Brodkin, M.D., her primary care physician. Dr. Brodkin completed an 
authorization form that noted the patient's only medical problem as "Back, Lower." The 
patient's physical examination was normal and there were no abnormal findings on her EKG 
or chest x-ray. Dr. Brodkin approved the patient for the phenol peel procedure. 
24. Patient A.H. arrived at respondent's outpatient center by 7:30 a.m. on July 18, 
2000. Upon arrival, the patient signed the QualCare Patient Consent Form, which stated: 
"I do hereby give permission to QualCare nurses and associates to render care 
as prescribed by the physician during post procedural care in a non-hospital 
setting. In an emergency situation, I am aware that 911 will be called and I 
will be transported to the nearest hospital. ... " 
25. Shortly before the procedure, respondent took a history and performed a 
physical exam of A.H. He noted his findings in the patient's chart: there was no history of 
heart, liver or renal problems; no history of myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, 
angina, shortness of breath, cerebral vascular accident or stroke; he found no abnormalities in 
the physical exam. He noted "EKG- Sinus Bradycardia."11 
26. The patient was in the operating room at 9:30 a.m.; her blood pressure was 
noted as 140/70 and her pulse rate about 60. The first anesthesia was administered at 
9:45 a.m. At 10:30 the patient became restless and experienced premature ventricular 
contractions (PVC); her blood pressure was noted as 160/90 with a pulse of about 100. 
11 "Bradycardia" is "slowness of the heartbeat, as evidenced by slowing of the pulse rate to less than 60." 
(Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th Edition.) 
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Respondent administered Lidocaine and by 10:3 7 the patient was in normal sinus rhythm. At 
11:35 the patient's blood pressure rose to 182/100 with a pulse of 90. Respondent 
administered Inapsine. The blood pressure rose over the next ten minutes to 192/100. By 
11 :00 the blood pressure was decreasing and the last dose of fentanyl was administered. At 
noon the last dose of Versed was administered and the procedure was finished. The patient's 
blood pressure was 170/80 and the pulse was about 80. 
Postoperatively the patient's vital signs were monitored for an hour and one-half 
during which the blood pressure ranged from 164/70 to 170/80, with the pulse in the high 
80s. From 12:30 to 1 :30 the patient's level of consciousness was noted as "awake." The 
Doctor's Discharge Summary noted the patient was "oriented & ambulates, vital signs 
stable" at 1 :30 p.m. Blood pressure was 172/80, pulse 88 and respiration 20. The patient 
was experiencing face pain. Respondent gave the patient Ativan for anxiety and authorized 
her to be discharged from his facility. The patient was discharged wearing the tape mask. 
27. There was no evidence that any of the information in respondent's chart, as 
noted in Factual Findings 23 through 26, was false or inaccurate. 
28. Someone from respondent's office drove patient A. H. to the Embassy Suites 
Hotel. She arrived with the aftercare instruction sheet and her medications. The QualCare 
nurse on duty noted the patient was awake and alert, her blood pressure was 156/99 and 
pulse of 107. The nurse's notes described the patient as restless, anxious and taking water. 
By 3:00 p.m. the patient was either awake or sleeping normally, her blood pressure was 
143/80 and pulse was 119. At 5:30 p.m. the nurse noted the patient had a fever, blood 
pressure was 131/81 and pulse had risen to 124. The nurse paged respondent for orders. 
Respondent testified he was in his office performing a procedure when the nurse 
called. He did not wear a pager while working on a patient and he did not recall staff 
notifying him of a call. Complainant presented no evidence to establish the time respondent 
received the page or was informed of the nurse's call. 
29. Shortly before 7:00 p.m. Eliane Heller, RN. came on for the next shift. Nurse 
Heller testified at the hearing. Based on her attitude, demeanor and the quality of her 
testimony, she was found to be a candid and credible witness. 
The day nurse advised Nurse Heller of the patient's elevated pulse and that 
respondent had been called. He had not yet returned the page. Nurse Heller took the 
patient's vital signs and noted the temperature was 98.2, blood pressure 130/100 and pulse 
126. The patient was awake and alert and asked the nurse to assist her into the bathroom. 
While in the bathroom, the nurse noticed the patient disimpacting herself and advised the 
patient to stop. The nurse washed the patient's hands and performed the disimpaction. The 
patient said she felt better and walked back to bed. 
Between 7:00 - 7:30 p.m. respondent called for the first time after having been paged 
at 5:30 p.m. Respondent testified he was still in the operating room with a patient when he 
spoke to the nurse. Nurse Heller testified she told respondent the patient was in bed and 
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resting, and respondent instructed her to keep watching the patient and he would call back in 
half an hour. Nurse Heller recalled that after respondent's call, the patient sat up, 
complained of back pain and said it was time for her morphine. The nurse checked the 
patient's Oramorph bottle and gave the patient the prescribed dose. The medication record 
indicated this was done at 7:30 p.m. The patient reclined again and felt calmer. Nurse Heller 
testified that respondent called again, she told him the patient was resting and he said to give 
Ativan for anxiety. She did not do so because the patient had recently taken Oramorph. 
There was no evidence to pinpoint the time of this conversation. The QualCare record noted 
at 8:00 p.m. that the nurse gave the patient MSM and Famiver per bottle instructions and the 
pulse was 124. No blood pressure was recorded. 
Respondent testified the nurse advised him the patient was restless with a rapid heart 
rate but not complaining of chest pain and not short of breath. Respondent testified he 
instructed the nurse to give pain medication and wait an hour or so to let him know how she 
was doing. Respondent explained he did not consider the rapid heart rate to require sending 
the patient to the hospital because her other vital signs were stable and pain could cause the 
rising pulse. The evidence did not establish the time of this conversation. 
Nurse Heller testified the patient rested awhile and was "OK." She sat up again and 
became restless, requiring the nurse's full attention. Because there were two other patients in 
her care, the nurse called Jo-Ann Jordan to come and assist her. Jordan arrived, sat with the 
patient and talked to her about relaxation methods. There was no evidence of the time 
Jordan arrived. Nurse Heller returned and took the patient's pulse, which was elevated and 
too fast to count. Heller testified she looked at Jordan, shook her head to indicate it was not 
good and, at that point, Jordan said, ''Now she is complaining of chest pains." Heller 
testified she went to the next room and called 911; she then called respondent and told him 
she had called 911 because the patient had chest pains. Nurse Heller testified repeatedly that 
respondent arrived either shortly before or at the same time as the paramedics. She testified 
repeatedly that she did not tell respondent the patient had chest pains until after she had 
called 911. 
Respondent testified that after the second phone conversation with the nurse he 
decided to see the patient because her blood pressure was a bit high and she was not 
responding to the pain medication. When he arrived both Jordan and Heller were present. 
The nurse told him the patient started to complain of chest pain. Respondent listened to her 
heart and lungs with a stethoscope and asked about the chest pain. A.H. said she had had 
chest pain but did not have it at that moment. Respondent told the nurse to call 911; he did 
not recall if she said she already had placed the call. The paramedics arrived within a few 
minutes. 
30. The totality of the evidence about the events in Factual Finding 29 was 
inconsistent and confusing; it failed to establish the exact timing of the sequence of events. 
The QualCare chart entry showed a pulse of 140 and respiration rate of 10 at about 
8:45 p.m. But Nurse Heller wrote the following ambiguous note in the QualCare chart: 
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"2130-Guest remains restless. Dr. O'Neil here & Jo Ann RN. C/0 chest 
pain. Skin is cold & clammy. HR 140/min. Pt is transported via ambulance 
to the hospital." 
On July 19, 2000, respondent wrote a note in his chart summarizing the events and 
noted: 
"Pt noted to have elevated HB [approximately] 120-130 at [approximately] 
6:30 pm [illegible] 118 after straining at stool. ... Pt complained of some 
facial discomfort [secondary] peel and was given her Oramorph pain meds. 
This failed to reduce HR. She later developed some chest pain ( ache, apex x 
[illegible], came and went several times, radiating to shoulder). I saw her at 
Embassy Suite hotel [approximately] 8:30 pm. No ch. Pain at that time ... but 
HR 130-140. Paramedics called and pt. transferred ... " 
On August 31, 2000, Nurse Heller was interviewed by a Medical Board investigator. 
In her report dated October 25, 2001, the investigator related the nurse's statement as 
follows: 
"Ms. Heller took Ms. [H"s] blood pressure and it was high, also Ms. [H.] was 
restless, anxious, and hyperventilating. Very shortly after this, Dr. O'Neil 
called Ms. Heller and she informed him of Ms. [H's] current status and asked 
him to come over and see the patient. Dr. O'Neil agreed to come over. While 
waiting for Dr. O'Neil, Ms. [H.] complained to Ms. Heller of chest pain, so 
Ms. Heller called 9-1-1. Dr. O'Neil arrived at the same time as the fire 
Department and within (30) minutes of the request for him to come." 
On about September 21, 2000, respondent sent the Medical Board a summary of the 
\ A.H. treatment in which he stated, "The nurses called me the next morning: ... She later 
began complaining of chest pain and I saw her at about 8:30 p.m. and had her transferred to 
Inland Valley Medical Center ... " 12 
On December 12, 2000, respondent was interviewed at his office by a Board 
investigator. The investigator's report, dated October 25, 2001, contained the following: 
"Dr. O'Neill stated that in the case of Ms. [HJ, he didn't know she was 
experiencing chest pain until he arrived at the hotel and that as soon as he 
learned she was having chest pain, he immediately called 911. Dr. 0 'Neil said 
that he was performing surgery when he was initially called by the nurses 
regarding Ms. Huter." 
12 This note indicates respondent is not an accurate or reliable historian. There was no basis for his statement, 




The First Amended Accusation alleged, "While respondent was on his way, A.H. 
complained of chest pain and the nurse called 911. Respondent arrived at the Embassy 
Suites about the same time as the paramedics." 
Nurses Heller and Jordan were present during the critical time period before the 911 
call. Both testified at the hearing and were available to complainant for a full inquiry about 
the timing of events. They were credible witnesses with no apparent reason to lie under oath. 
Neither testified that respondent was actually present and observing the patient before the 
911 was made. Both testified convincingly that respondent arrived either shortly before or at 
the same time as the paramedics. The only piece of uncontradicted evidence was the 
paramedic record establishing the 911 call received at 9:18 p.m. and arrival of the 
paramedics at 9:21 p.m. Thus, respondent must have arrived at the hotel about 9: 18, not at 
"approximately 8:30." 
31. The patient was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed as having a 
"non-Q wave myocardial infarction." Dr. Frederick Wood examined the patient at the 
hospital and took a medical history. His report contained the following pertinent 
information: 
" She has had no previous history of coronary events. . .. Cardiac risk 
factors are negative for hypertension, diabetes mellitus, hypercholesterolemia, 
previous coronary events. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: CARDIAC: No previous history of angina, 
myocardial infarction, and not previous chest pressure, tightness or squeezing 
with exertion. Negative for a history of heart enlargement, history of 
congestive heart failure, paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, orthopnea, dyspnea on 
exertion or pedal edema. Negative history of abnormal heart rhythm or 
palpitations. . .. " 
The patient made a full recovery and testified at the hearing. She was satisfied with 
the cosmetic result of the O.S.R. procedure. 
32. The First Amended Accusation alleged the following conduct by respondent in 
his treatment of A.H. constituted gross negligence, incompetence and/or repeated negligent 
acts: 
A. He inappropriately discharged A.H. to the hotel despite having treated her 
for cardiac instability and hypertension during the chemical peel. 
B. He failed to respond to the initial page placed by the nurse. 
C. He failed to recognize signs and symptoms of severe cardiac instability at 
the hotel and improperly delayed the nurse in calling 911. 
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33. The First Amended Accusation charged respondent with gross negligence, 
incompetence and repeated negligent acts in his treatment of patient H.B. in July 2000. 
Patient H.B. was 72 when she consulted respondent on June 26, 2000 in response to a 
newspaper advertisement. She was interested in skin rejuvenation, spider vein therapy, and 
liposuction for her lmees. H.B. was 5 feet, 4 Yi inches tall and weighed 135 pounds. She did 
not list any medical problems on the intake sheet and noted she had a partial face-lift in 1995. 
H.B. did not immediately decide to have the procedures. Respondent gave her a video. H.B. 
testified the video she watched was not Exhibit H. 
H.B decided to have the OSR procedure and liposuction on both knees. She 
scheduled the surgery and aftercare by QualCare followed by the retreat at Casa Royal. She 
understood she was going to the hotel first and then the retreat. She understood respondent 
required her to go to the hotel for QualCare monitoring but she was not required to go to the 
retreat. She felt she would be watched and cared for and, if anything happened, she would 
get attention and be close to a hospital. 
34. On about July 17, 2000, H.B. was examined by her primary care physician 
David W. Schwartz, M.D. Dr. Schwartz ordered lab tests and reviewed the patient's EKG 
taken on May 1, 2000. The EKG noted Sinus Bradycardia. Dr. Schwartz noted H.B.'s 
current medical problems included osteoarthritis of knees, menopause, varicose veins for 
which she had previously had surgery, cataracts, hypothyroidism and a family history of 
heart disease. The patient's physical examination was normal but examination of the 
extremities revealed varicose veins, stasis dermatitis13 and trace edema. Dr. Schwartz noted 
the patient's EKG taken May 1, 2000 was within normal limits and her chest x-ray was 
pending. The radiology report dated July 17, 2000 noted an impression of"possible 
COPD"14 and "no evidence of active cardiopulmonary disease." 
On July 17, 2000, Dr. Schwartz signed the O'Neil Clinic Physical Form and cleared 
the patient for "Chemexfiliation of Face and Neck and/or Liposurgery." 
35. Patient H.B. arrived at respondent's outpatient clinic early in the morning of 
July 24, 2000. At 7:50 a.m. she signed the patient consent form for aftercare by QualCare. 
Respondent performed a physical examination and noted that the extremities were without 
edema or cyanosis. He noted the patient's medical history as indicated on Dr. Schwartz's 
authorization form. Respondent testified he did not see significant varicose veins, edema or 
stasis dermatitis when he examined the patient. 
The patient was taken to the surgical room at about 9:30. The Sedation Record form 
noted the patient had heart disease and fainting/dizziness. The first doses of Versed and 
13 Stasis dermatitis is defined in Dorland's Medical Dictionary as, "a chronic eczematous dermatitis, which 
initially involves the inner aspect of the lower leg just above the internal malleolus and which later may entirely or 
partially involve the lower leg, marked by edema, pigmentation, and commonly ulceration; it is due to venous 
insufficiency." 
14 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. There was no evidence the patient had COPD. 
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Fentanyl were administered at 9:45 a.m. The patient's blood pressure was approximately 
100/70. The chemical peel procedure began at 10: 15. At 10:45 the patient had premature 
ventricular contractions and her blood pressure was 150/90. Respondent administered 
lidocaine for the PVCs. The operative notes stated that by 11:15 "J>VC's better." At 11:45 
the patient had more PVCs and again respondent administered lidocaine. Respondent 
completed the chemical peel and performed the liposuction of the knees. The last dose of 
Fentanyl was given at 12:15 and the last dose of Versed at 12:30. At 12:45 the face was 
taped and "supports" were put on .. The operative notes showed the patient was monitored 
until I :45 p.m.; her blood pressure remained steady at 120-130/70. At 1 :30 her level of 
consciousness was noted as "arousable" and at I :45 it was "awake." The sedation record 
indicated the patient was monitored until shortly after I :45 p.m. 
The Doctor's Discharge Summary stated that at I :30 the patient was "oriented and 
ambulates," vital signs stable, blood pressure 120/80 and pulse 76. The patient was driven to 
the Embassy Suites shortly before 2:00 p.m. 
36. There was no evidence that any information in respondent's chart, as noted in 
Factual Findings 33 through 35, was false or inaccurate. 
37. Patient H.B. was received into the hotel by QualCare at 2:00 p.m. Sonja 
Forrest, R.N., was the nurse on duty. At the hearing she testified she did not recall the 
patient's arrival or putting her into bed. She explained that, unless something went wrong, it 
does not stay in her mind. Nurse Forrest made the following chart entry after the patient 
arrived: 
"1400 Elderly female admitted from Dr. Oneil's office vial w/c. very sedated. 
Max. assist required to bed. Denied need to void. Too sleepy to sip H20. To 
sleep immediately. Ice to eyes. VS stable. BP 182/81." 
Nurse Forrest testified that had she believed H.B. was not in a condition to be 
discharged to the QualCare setting she would have informed respondent's office. 
Respondent testified that QualCare could determine a patient was not ready for hotel care 
and send them back to respondent's facility for further monitoring. Nurse Forrest felt it was 
appropriate to discharge H.B. to a setting where a nurse could monitor her vital signs, assist 
her to the bathroom and assist with medications if the patient requested them. 
The nurse's notes show that at 3:00 p.m. the patient was sleeping and difficult to 
arouse; vital signs recorded at 4:00 p.m. show blood pressure 149/83, pulse 90 and the 
patient sleeping and easily aroused; and the nurse took the patient's pulse for one minute and 
noted ''No pvc's felt." 
By 7:00 p.m. the patient was still "mildly sedated" but she was drinking water and got 
up to go to the bathroom with maximum assistance15 of the nurse. Throughout the night the 
Neither party addressed the question of whether it was common for a knee liposuction patient to require 
extra assistance when walking within 24 hours of the procedure. 
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patient slept, was easily aroused, drank liquids and went to the bathroom with maximum 
assistance of the nurse. Her blood pressure remained stable at 121-132/69-72. 
At 9:00 a.m. on July 25, 2000, the patient was awake and alert, blood pressure was 
130/74, she was taking liquid nourishment and going to the bathroom with moderate 
assistance from the nurse. She became restless and anxious in the afternoon and took 1 mg 
of Ativan. At 8:00 p.m. she again became restless; her blood pressure was 153/86. She took 
1 m.g. of Ativan. The patient slept through the night, waking to drink water or go to the 
bathroom. At 4:30 a.m. she experienced pain and was given Darvocet. 
Nurse Forrest testified she did not recall the patient was sleeping a lot. The patient 
was supposed to stay in bed and be quiet. 
38. The patient was awake and alert at 5:00 a.m. on July 26, 2000. At 6:00 a.m. 
the night nurse removed the tape mask from the patient's face and applied the powder. The 
patient went back to sleep. At about 7:00 a.m. Nurse Forrest came on duty and relieved the 
night nurse. At 8:45 she awakened the patient to apply a second coat of powder. The patient 
was able to get out of bed by herself, and drank water and juice. At about 9:05 a.m. she went 
to the bathroom by herself. At about 9: 10 a.m., upon returning from the bathroom, she 
complained of dizziness, became unsteady and "lethargic acting" and fell into bed assisted by 
the nurse. Her lips and eyelids were ashen; she was perspiring, skin clammy, and 
complained of chills. The nurse noted her blood pressure as "70/?,, with pulse of"60-weak." 
The patient denied chest pain or shortness of breath. Her lungs were clear with a 
stethoscope. The nurse placed the patient in a position to elevate her feet above her head in 
order to raise the blood pressure. The nurse did not immediately call 911 because she did not 
believe the condition was life threatening. 
At 9:15 the nurse called respondent and advised him of the patient's condition. 
Respondent instructed her to continue the position, monitor vital signs and call him again if 
the patient did not improve. At 9:30 the nurse called respondent and informed him the blood 
pressure continued to be "60-70/?," the pulse weak in the 70's, color ashen, and the patient 
now complained of shortness of breath. Respondent and the nurse agreed that 911 should be 
called. The nurse called 911 at 9:35 p.m. The EMT records show the 911 call was received 
at 9:38 a.m. and the paramedics arrived at 9:43 a.m. They administered oxygen and took the 
patient to Rancho Springs Medical Center. 
39. Respondent's chart contained the following entry for July 26, 2000: 
"9:30 am Qualcare nurse called. Pt fainted after going to BR and standing. Pt 
alert and stable in bed. HR 60. BP unobtainable. They [illegible] called back 
10 minute later. Pt. Now SOB. HR 60. BP unobtainable. PT in bed with legs 
elevated, told to call 911 and pt transferred to Rancho Springs ER." 
40. On July 26, 2000, patient H.B. was admitted to Rancho Springs Medical 
Center. The emergency evaluation record noted the patient had difficulty breathing with near 
syncope but had no chest pain. She denied any history of pulmonary or cardiac problems. 
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The physical examination revealed no rashes, no numbness or weakness in the extremities 
and no peripheral edema. The EKG showed a single PVC. The initial assessment was a 
post-surgical complication of pulmonary embolus. 
Anoop K. Maheshwari, M.D., examined the patient in the hospital. His history noted 
the patient took diuretics once a week for pedal edema. His physical examination of the 
extremities found "no cyanosis, clubbing or edema. No calf pain tenderness is present." A 
venous Doppler exam of the lower extremities showed slow venus flow and no evidence of 
deep vein thrombosis. 
H.B. was discharged from the hospital on July 28, 2000, much improved and in stable 
condition. Dr. Schwartz' discharge diagnosis for H.B. was bilateral pulmonary emboli with 
respiratory distress. 
41. The First Amended Accusation alleged the following conduct by respondent in 
his treatment of H.B. constituted gross negligence, incompetence and/or repeated negligent 
acts: 
A. He improperly performed lower extremity liposuction on the patient 
because her preoperative workup showed lower extremity venous 
insufficiency making her an inappropriate patient for the procedure. 
B. He excessively sedated the patient and prematurely discharged her from his 
facility. 
C. He improperly continued the cosmetic surgery on the patient after she 
suffered two episodes of ventricular arrhythmia during the chemical peel 
procedure. 
D. He failed to timely have the patient transferred to the hospital when she 
suffered postoperative complications at the hotel. 
42. Complainant presented no credible evidence to support the allegation that 
respondent used general anesthesia on his patients. 
43. Complainant called two expert witnesses to testify at the hearing and presented 
the written report of a physician consultant. Mark Krugman, M.D. and David T. Morwood, 
M.D. are both board certified plastic surgeons. 
Dr. Krugman obtained his medical degree from the University of Maryland Medical 
School in 1964. He completed a rotating internship at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York 
City in 1965. At the same hospital he completed a residency in General Surgery in 1966 and 
a residency in Otolaryngology in 1969. After two years of service in the Air Force, Dr. 
Krugman completed a plastic surgery residency at U.C. Irvine in 1976. He became board 
certified in plastic surgery in 1977. Dr. Krugman' s curriculum vitae showed that he is very 
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well qualified as a plastic surgeon. His education and professional experience as a plastic 
surgeon and otolaryngologist are extensive. 
Since 1976, Dr. Krugman has maintained a private practice in southern California, 
specializing in plastic surgery and otolaryngology. He operates a licensed outpatient clinic. 
He performs laser resurfacing procedures but does not perform phenol peels of the face. Dr. 
Krugman has no objection to the skin rejuvenation procedure used by respondent. On his 
resume, Dr. Krugman listed a Chemical Peel Workshop in 1991, an Update on Skin Peeling 
in 1992, and attendance at conferences on chemical peels in 1992 and 1993. 
Dr. Morwood obtained his medical degree from the College of Medicine, University 
of Vermont, in 1983. He performed his internship and general surgery residency at Beth 
Israel Medical Center in New York. In 1987, he completed a plastic surgery residency at 
Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. In 1993, he was board certified in plastic surgery and 
received a Certification of Added Qualifications in Surgery of the Hand in 1994. 
Dr. Morwood maintains a private practice in plastic surgery, specializing in breast, 
hand, face and reconstructive surgery for children, face lifts, lasers, peels, fractures and 
injuries. Dr. Morwood has performed some liposuction and has done 20 phenol peels in his 
career. 
A written report by Jeannette Y. Martello, M.D., J.D. was admitted into evidence by 
stipulation in which the parties agreed it could be received "as if she had testified to these 
matters under oath." Dr. Martello obtained her medical degree from UCLA School of 
Medicine in 1988. In 1989 she completed a surgical internship at Massachusetts General 
Hospital in Boston. She then attended two years oflaw school at Boalt Hall. While in law 
school she worked as an emergency room physician at Kaiser Santa Theresa in San Jose. 
From 1991 to 1995 she performed a Plastic Surgery Integrated Residency at University of 
Kentucky Medical Center. In 1996 she completed one year as Plastic Surgery Chief 
Resident at the same facility. During this time she moonlighted at various emergency rooms 
throughout Kentucky. She returned to law school and obtained her J.D. degree in 1997. In 
June 1998 she completed a one-year hand surgery fellowship at Kleinert & Kutz Institute of 
Hand Surgery in Lousiville, Kentucky, and in January 1999 completed a six-month term as 
Hand Transplant Fellow at the same institute. Since March 1999 Dr. Martello has engaged 
in the private practice of Plastic Surgery and Hand Surgery in Pasadena and has served as 
Medical Consultant for the Medical Board of California. She became board certified in 
plastic surgery in September 2001. Dr. Martello's resume did not indicate that she performs 
phenol peels or liposuction. 
44. On June 1, 2001 Dr. Krugman issued a written report in which he stated his 
opinions about respondent's treatment of patients A.H. and H.B. He found three instances in 
which respondent's actions with regard to H.B. constituted a "departure from the standard of 
care" and one instance of a "departure from the standard of care" with A.H. On about 
June 8, 2001 the Board's investigator called Dr. Krugman to clarify whether or not he meant 
simple or extreme departures. Dr. Krugman told the investigator that all of the departures he 
found were simple departures. 
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Dr. Krugman testified that he found repeated "simple departures" from the standard 
of care but, after speaking with the board's investigator and the Deputy Attorney General, he 
believed that a number of simple departures aggregate to an "extreme departure" from the 
standard. Dr. Krugman testified that his opinions, including his conclusion of an extreme 
departure, were influenced by the fact respondent had been disciplined in the past and was on 
probation. He believed that while on probation respondent should have been on his best 
behavior. 
45. With regard to patient A. H., it was Dr. Krugman's opinion that respondent 
departed from the standard of care when he failed to call 911 in a timely manner. Dr. 
Krugman assumed the patient had been complaining of chest pain for 30 to 60 minutes, with 
respondent present or aware of the complaint, and there was a SO-minute delay before the 
911 call. The evidence did not establish those facts. 
Dr. Krugman testified that respondent's delay in calling 911 was the only fault he 
found in the treatment of patient A.H. He would change his opinion if the 911 call was made 
while respondent was en route to the hotel and not told of the chest pain until he arrived. 
Knowledge of the chest pain complaint was the crucial issue and respondent could not be 
faulted if he was not aware. 
46. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that respondent committed extreme departures 
from the standard of care in his treatment of patient A.H. The standard of care requires a 
physician to be familiar with possible side effects and potential complications from a 
treatment. Any side effects or complications must be treated appropriately in a timely 
manner to prevent further sequela and complication. 
Dr. Morwood believed the patient showed cardiac instability in the form of PVCs 
during the facial peel and she continued to show cardiac instability after the procedure with 
ongoing PVCs and high blood pressure. The patient required a setting that had the proper 
monitoring equipment for blood pressure, oxygen saturation and cardiac condition. He felt 
respondent discharged her in spite of the continuing signs of cardiac instability. After 
discharge, the QualCare nurse notified respondent of continuing progr~ssive cardiac 
instability, but he did not see the patient for several hours. Dr. Morwood believed 
respondent ignored the warning signs and did not take timely action to have the patient 
transferred to the hospital or have her evaluated by an intensive monitoring team. Dr. 
Morwood's opinion was based on his belief the patient had a history of cardiac problems; 
had experienced shortness of breath at the hotel; the nurse could not obtain a blood pressure; 
and, after being informed of unstable vital signs at 5:30 p.m., respondent delayed calling 911 
for several hours. The evidence established none of these facts. 
47. On cross-examination, Dr. Morwood admitted it was not unusual for a patient 
to experience high blood pressure during and after a phenol peel. He also acknowledged the 
medical records do not show the patient had any PVCs after the procedure. 
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Dr. Morwood acknowledged that PVCs are common during a phenol peel and 
respondent appropriately treated patient A.H. 's episode during the procedure and she 
responded well. However, he believed that her cardiac instability was not adequately 
addressed before she was discharged to the hotel where she remained unstable and 
respondent delayed addressing her condition. It was his opinion that, even without chest 
pain, respondent should have transferred A.H. to the hospital immediately. 
Dr. Morwood based his opinion on his mistaken belief that A.H had postoperative 
PVCs, had a history of cardiac problems, and was experiencing shortness of breath. The 
evidence did not establish these facts. 
48. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that patient H.B. was not a good candidate for 
liposuction of the knees because she was in her early seventies with a history of swelling in 
her legs, varicose vein surgery, hypothyroid and taking female hormones, which made her 
predisposed to getting blood clots in the deep veins of her legs. Dr. Krugman admitted that 
hormone replacement and hypothyroidism were minor risk factors, but were "additive" in 
this situation. He believed that Dr. Schwartz' findings of edema and stasis dermatitis, when 
added to the patient's age and sedentary position after surgery, created risk factors. He 
explained that edema and stasis dermatitis in a patient over 70 meant the patient's venous 
system was not good. 
Dr. Krugman believed that coupling the liposuction with the facial peel created 
competing interests; the peel procedure required the patient to be sedentary but the knee 
liposuction required the patient to ambulate to avoid an embolism. It was Dr. Krugman's 
opinion that performing knee liposuction on H.B. was a simple departure from the standard 
of care because of her predisposing risk factors. 
49. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that respondent showed poor judgment and 
departed from the standard of care in going forward with the knee liposuction after patient 
H.B. experienced two episodes of PVCs during the facial peel. With her risk factors 
described in Factual Finding 48, the PVC's made her condition more precarious. Dr. 
Krugman explained that PVCs are a normal occurrence during facial peels but the patient 
was an "old lady" without a good cardiovascular system. 
Dr. Krugman concluded respondent's conduct represented an extreme departure from 
the standard of care because of "the multiplicity of cognitive decisions he made that led to 
the problems with the patient." 
50. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that patient H.B. suffered post-surgical 
complications because respondent performed liposuction on diseased legs. He explained that 
the standard of care requires the physician to be familiar with the criteria that would 
designate patients who are appropriate or inappropriate for a particular procedure. Dr. 
Morwood believed H.B. presented with a history and preoperative physical exam that made 
her inappropriate for lower extremity liposuction. The patient's varicose veins, stasis 
dermatitis, age and hormone replacement therapy placed her at high risk for pulmonary 
embolism. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that it was an extreme departure from the standard 
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of care to perform liposuction on H.B. 's knees because of her high risk history. He believed 
a clot from the patient's leg trayeled to her lungs when she got up after being sedentary. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Morwood acknowledged that varicose veins do not 
necessarily indicate deep vein insufficiency and edema has many causes. 
51. It was Dr. Morwood's opinion that combining the facial peel and knee 
liposuction procedures did not of itself deviate from the standard of care. The standard of 
care required the patient be mobilized immediately after a surgical procedure on her legs. 
Inactivity increased the chance for venous stasis16 and thrombus 17 in the legs. However, 
because the patient required rest for the facial procedure, the standard of care required that 
something be used on her legs while in bed to minimize the chance of venous thrombosis. 
Risk can be minimized by short walks, foot pumps, heparin therapy or a sequential 
compression device. 18 
52. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that when a patient is difficult to arouse it is a 
departure from the standard of care to discharge the patient from an ambulatory facility. He 
explained that a patient can remain in an outpatient surgical clinic for up to 23 hours. If a 
sedated patient is difficult to arouse the facility should have equipment such as EKG, 
oxygen, pulse oximeter, intravenous equipment and defibulator. A patient will still be under 
some sedation when discharged, but not to the point where she cannot be aroused or get out 
of bed. A patient who cannot take fluid by mouth and is too sedated to get out of bed should 
not be discharged home. A patient who remains in that condition should be transferred to a 
hospital. Transfer of such a patient to a hotel room is a departure from the standard of care. 
On cross-examination Dr. Krugman agreed that, based on respondent's chart 
documentation of patient H.B. 's condition at the time of discharge, she looked appropriate 
for discharge. However, he felt her heavily sedated condition when she arrived at the hotel 
required explanation. In his experience, elderly patients may not continue to improve after 
sedation. They have ups and downs after sedation and may initially look fine but can quickly 
deteriorate. There is no specific post procedure observation time required before discharge; 
it depends on the individual patient. 
It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that the discharge of patient H.B. from respondent's 
clinic was a simple departure from the standard of care because she was over-sedated when 
she arrived at the hotel. She should have been retained at the clinic with monitoring or 
transferred to a hospital. Dr. Krugman explained that the issue here is not the amount of 
sedation during surgery, but the level of sedation at discharge. In his written report of 
June 1, 2001, Dr. Krugman did not opine that respondenfs discharge of H.B. was a departure 




Cessation or impairment of venous flow. (Dor/and's iuustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th Ed.) 
An aggregation of blood factors frequently causing vascular obstruction at the point of its formation. (Id.) 
Complainant did not allege that respondent failed to use appropriate anti-thrombosis therapy. 
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53. In his written report issued July 25, 2001, Dr. Morwood did not opine that 
respondent inappropriately discharged patient H.B. from his clinic before she was ready to 
leave. At the hearing he testified that if H.B. was very sedated when she arrived at the hotel 
and required maximum assistance to get into bed, it was below the standard of care to 
discharge her from the clinic. He believed it is extremely uncommon to have the patient alert 
and able to ambulate, but 15 minutes later appear as described by the QualCare nurse. 
Dr. Morwood explained that the standard of care required the patient to be monitored 
after s~rgery for at least an hour before discharge from the outpatient clinic. Before 
discharge, the patient should be able to respond to questions, breath clearly, take a deep 
breath on command, urinate, and have stable vital signs. After reviewing H.B. 's chart and 
her vital signs before discharge, Dr. Morwood did not see any evidence of an inappropriate 
discharge. 
54. It was Dr. Krugman's opinion that it was a simple departure from the standard 
· of care for respondent to delay calling 911 at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2000, because H.B. was 
"shocky" and her blood pressure was low. Dr. Krugman's June 1, 2001 written report 
indicated that he erroneously believed the nurse called respondent at 9:00 a.m. and again at 
9:15. The evidence is otherwise (Factual Finding 38). 
Dr. Morwood offered no opinion about the events of July 26, 2000. 
55. Dr. Morwood reviewed all of the available medical records in this case. Based 
on the records, he could not determine that respondent used Versed in an amount that would 
induce the patient to a level of general anesthesia. 
56. Dr. Morwood offered his opinion that "hotel observation" aftercare such as 
that provided by QualCare to cosmetic procedure patients is a common practice in California. 
However, it is his understanding that the nurses have formal monitoring equipment available. 
57. Dr. Morwood offered his opinion that respondent's video advertisement and 
his brochures seem to be similar to many other infomercials and physician's advertisements 
in the popular media in California. 
58. Complainant presented no evidence in the form of expert testimony to support 
the charge that respondent was incompetent in his care, treatment or management of the 
patients A.H. and H.B. 
59. Respondent called two expert witnesses to testify at the hearing. Joseph C. 
Avakoff, M.D. is a board certified surgeon and plastic surgeon. Robert A. Yoho, M.D. is 
board certified in emergency medicine, dermatologic cosmetic surgery and laser surgery. 
Dr. A vakoff obtained his medical degree from the University of California School of 
Medicine in San Francisco in 1961. After his rotating internship, he completed a residency 
in General Surgery at Kaiser Hospital in San Francisco in 1966 and later a residency in 
plastic surgery at University of Texas School of Medicine. In 1985 Dr. Avakoff obtained a 
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J.D. degree from Santa Clara University School of Law and was admitted to the California 
State Bar in 1987. Dr. Avakoff spent 22 years in the private practice of medicine in Santa 
Clara County. He retired in 1994. Between 1987 and 1994 Dr. Avakoff performed 
approximately 100 liposuction procedures but never aspirated more than 1500 cc. He never 
performed phenol facial peels. Since retirement he has been doing medi-legal consultations 
for the Medical Board and for the Department of Corporations. 
Dr. Yoho received his medical degree from Case Western Reserve University 
Medical School in 1981. He completed a one-year rotating internship at the University of 
Cincinnati and a two-year Dermatology Residency at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 
in New Hampshire. In 1985 he completed emergency Medicine Residency Training at 
LAC/USC Medical Center in Los Angeles and Huntington Memorial Hospital in Pasadena. 
From 1984 to 1987 Dr. Yoho was employed by the Huntington Memorial Hospital 
Emergency Medical Group. He then maintained a general medical practice in Pasadena until 
1994. From 1992 to the present he has specialized in cosmetic surgery. His practice 
includes liposuction, hair transplantation, laser resurfacing, face lifts, laser blepharoplasty, 
breast implantation, vein treatments and fat transplantation. Dr. Yoho has published several 
articles ~elated to cosmetic surgery procedures in peer reviewed journals. 
60. Dr. Avakofftestified that a patient is ready for discharge from an outpatient 
facility when she can get out of bed and walk, but the patient will not be as ambulatory as 
someone who has not gone through the procedure. To discharge after outpatient cosmetic 
surgery, the standard of practice required the vital signs be stable and the patient be easily 
arousable to the extent she is able to wake up though she may still be sleepy, converse a bit, 
get out of bed and go to the bathroom. If the patient experienced PVCs or hypertension 
during the procedure, she must be monitored until she becomes stable. When the patient is 
stable, she can be released to home where she would not be monitored. 
Dr. Yoho explained the standard of practice regarding discharge of a patient is to 
observe for one to two hours to see that the vital signs are stable. A certain level of alertness 
is expected; the patient need not be as alert as before the sedation, but should know where 
she is, be able to ambulate, urinate and take fluids. 
Dr. Yoho testified that phenol peel patients are commonly discharged to home. 
However, if the patient does not do exactly the right things for the face, scarring can result. 
It meets the highest standard of care to provide a place where the patient is assisted for a 
week. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that the monitoring provided by QualCare was appropriate 
and the standard of care did not require the patients to be monitored as if in an acute care 
setting with equipment such as pulse oximeters. He noted that even when a patient is sent to 
a nursing home for aftercare, there is only one nurse to attend 20 or 30 patients. 
61. Dr. Yoho explained that PVCs are common during a phenol peel because the 
chemical substance irritates the heart and causes arrhythmia. Although the cardiac rhythm 
imitates that of a heart attack, PVCs that occur during a phenol peel do not have the same 
"malignant quality" in which the heart is starved for blood and oxygen. The PVCs are taken 
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seriously but sudden death is not a problem. Appropriate treatment is to wait a few minutes 
for the arrhythmia to subside or to administer Lidocaine. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that 
respondent properly managed A.H. 's PVC episode. 
Dr. Avakoffreviewed the medical records of patient A.H. It was his opinion that she 
did not suffer cardiac instability after the facial peel procedure. He explained that PVCs are 
common during a phenol peel and do not constitute "cardiac instability." Nor did the 
increased blood pressure necessarily indicate cardiac instability because it can result-from 
pain during the phenol peel. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that respondent properly treated 
the patient's PVCs during the procedure with Lidocaine and the operative notes show the 
patient returned to normal sinus rhythm. 
62. Dr. Yoho explained that elevated blood pressure is typical during a phenol 
peel because the peel is painful and pain produces hypertension. It was Dr. Yoho' s opinion 
that respondent's use of Anapsine on patient A.H. was an "elegant" way to treat the 
hypertension caused by pain and the nausea that can result from the narcotic used for 
sedation. If too much hypertension medicine is used during the peel, the blood pressure can 
become too low after the procedure. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent's treatment 
of A.H.' s high blood pressure was appropriate. 
63. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that A.H.'s vital signs were stable during the 
hour and one-half she was monitored after the procedure and before discharge. It was Dr. 
Avakoff's opinion that respondent's discharge of A.H. did not depart from the standard of 
care. Her vital signs were stable and she was released to monitoring by QualCare. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent's chart entries show that patient A.H. was 
observed for one and one-half hours and her vital signs were entirely stable before discharge. 
Based on the records she was appropriate for discharge. 
64. Dr. Yoho noted that the charts for patients A.H. and H.B. showed blood 
pressures that were not dangerous. They were blood pressures that people carry for many 
years at a time. 
65. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that respondent did not depart from the standard 
of care in his attention to patient A.H. after discharge. He explained that if respondent was 
told the patient had high blood pressure, was restless, anxious and hyperventilating, 19 but 
with no chest pain, there could be a number of causes for the symptoms and the situation did 
not require an immediate 911 call. It was Dr. A vakoff' s opinion that respondent's instruction 
to monitor the patient was appropriate. Once the patient complained of chest pain, it was 
mandatory to call 911. If respondent learned of the chest pain before reaching the hotel and 
19 Respondent's counsel included these symptoms in his hypothetical question to Dr. Avakoff. The evidence 
did not establish the patient was hyperventilating or had dangerously high blood pressure. The testimony and chart 
notes indicated the blood pressure was "up a little bit" and the pulse rate was high. The pulse rate became too fast to 
count at the same time the patient started to feel chest pain. 
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did not order a call to 911, it would be a simple departure from the standard of care because 
chest pain can be caused by something other than a heart attack. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent did not act inappropriately in the transfer 
of patient A.H. to the hospital. He explained if the nurse advised respondent the patient had 
high blood pressure, was restless, anxious and hyperventilating, this was a typical post-
phenol peel set of symptoms in a patient who continued to feel some pain and claustrophobia 
in the tape mask. It would have been significant if respondent had been advised of chest 
pam. 
66. Dr. Avakoffr~viewed the medical records of patient H.B. and concluded there 
was no evidence of any significant venous insufficiency of the legs. He testified that 
varicose veins indicate venous insufficiency only in the area of the varicose vein. He 
believed that the patient had significant varicose vein surgery in the past and had residual 
varicose veins and stasis dermatitis, which was common and did not indicate deep venous 
insufficiency. Dr. A vakoff noted that none of the physicians who examined H.B. at the 
hospital noted any profound venous insufficiency. 
Dr. Avakoff considered the hormone replacement therapy to be an added but very 
minor risk factor and not a contraindication for liposuction. He did not think hypothyroidism 
caused increased thrombolic phenomenon. 
It was Dr. Avakoffs opinion that H.B. was an appropriate candidate for the planned 
knee liposuction because the risk factors were quite minor. 
67. Dr. Yoho explained that embolism is a risk for anyone who undergoes surgery. 
Embolism after hospital surgery is very common, but is quite rare after outpatient 
procedures. In the 6,000 cases that Dr. Yolo has performed, four patients experienced deep 
vein thrombosis and none had pulmonary embolism. He discussed th~ risk factors for 
pulmonary embolism. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that superficial venous disease and hypothyroidism are not 
risk factors. The risk factors are general anesthesia for more than half an hour; birth control 
pills but not estrogen replacement; congestive heart failure; broken extremities; prior history 
of pulmonary thrombosis/embolism; prior history of deep venous thrombosis; hospital bed 
rest where the patient does not get up; and cancer. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that varicose veins are not a risk factor and stasis dermatitis 
can be purely the result of varicose veins. Edema is not diagnostic for deep vein thrombosis. 
Although patient H.B. was sedentary while in the hotel, she was getting up to go to the 
bathroom so she was not completely at bed rest. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that patient H.B. had none of the well known risks for 
embolism. Any patient over 65 is at increased risk for many things, but he considered H.B. 
to be a "class 2 risk" because she was healthy on medications. He explained that a class 3 
risk is a patient with an active medical problem that is not controlled. H.B. 's medical 
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conditions were controlled with medication so she was an appropriate candidate for the 
procedures. 
68. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that respondent properly addressed the two 
episodes of PVCs during H.B. 's phenol peel and proceeding with the knee liposuction was 
not a departure from the standard of care because the small amount of aspirate taken 
indicated it was a minor liposuction procedure. 
It was Dr. Yoho's opinion that respondent did not violate the standard of care by 
proceeding with the knee liposuction after H.B. experienced PVCs. For the reasons stated in 
Factual Finding 66, the PVCs and the manner respondent treated them did not contraindicate 
the knee liposuction. He explained that the cardiac irritation effects of the phenol peel are 
gone in 15 minutes to half an hour after the peel is finished. The amount of aspirate in the 
knee liposuction indicated a minor procedure that took about ten minutes. 
69. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that H.B. 's sedation and operative record showed 
she was appropriate for discharge at 1 :45 p.m. She had been monitored for an hour, her vital 
signs were stable and she was awake. He offered an explanation for the changed condition 
of the patient at the hotel. He believed the patient could have been apprehensive at the 
facility, awake and alert but on reaching the hotel and knowing the procedure is over, 'just 
conks out" to rest. 
Dr. Avakoff acknowledged that it would be a violation of the standard of care if 
respondent discharged the patient when she was difficult to arouse and required maximum 
assistance. The patient's condition when she left the facility is the issue. The observations 
recorded in respondent's chart indicated she was appropriate for discharge even to home. It 
was quite common to use a wheelchair to discharge a patient with knee liposuction. 
It was Dr. Yoho' s opinion that patient H.B. was appropriately discharged from 
respondent's facility. She was monitored for an hour after the procedure with vital signs 
taken every 15 minutes. The patient record showed that her vital signs were stable. Use of a 
wheelchair for a post procedure patient is routine. 
Dr. Yoho noted that the patient's level of consciousness on arrival at the hotel was 
described as "very sedated." He explained that the narcotics used during the procedures 
cover the pain and.are stressful and fatiguing for the patient. After surgery it is not unusual 
for the patient to have a waxing and waning level of consciousness. 
70. It was Dr. Avakoff's opinion that respondent did not unreasonably delay 
calling 911 for patient H.B. When respondent was notified of the patient's condition at 9:15 
it was reasonable to have the patient watched carefully for a short time. Her symptoms, 
including blood pressure and respiration, were consistent with a fainting episode and the 
standard of care did not require an emergency call to 911 when a patient initially appears 
"woozy." When the patient did not improve and then developed shortness of breath, it was 
time to call 911. 
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Dr. Yoho reviewed the sequence of events for patient H:B. on the morning of July 26, 
2000. It was his opinion that respondent's response to the patient's condition as relayed to 
him at 9: 15 a.m. was appropriate. Dr. Yoho explained the "medical reasoning" process 
commonly used by physicians. The physician first thinks of common causes for the patient's 
symptoms and later considers the rarer causes. The physician could first think that H.B.' s 
condition was a vaso-vagal episode - a faint brought on by a bowel movement or pain - in 
which case the patient would recover after a few minutes. Dr. Yoho explained that a vaso-
vagal episode typically includes low heart rate and blood pressure goes down. It was Dr. 
Yoho's opinion that an experienced physician would first consider a vaso-vagal episode, 
especially with a patient who had just risen from bed and gone to the bathroom, and an 
immediate call to 911 was not required. Observation for a few minutes and rechecking vitals 
signs was an imminently reasonable way to handle the situation. It was Dr. Yoho's opinion 
that respondent's decision to closely monitor the patient and call him again if she did not 
improve was within the standard of care. Respondent properly ordered the 911 call when the 
nurse called him at 9:30 a.m. to say the patient had not improved and had begun to complain 
of shortness of breath. · 
71. Based on his review of the medical records, Dr. Yoho determined that 
respondent used monitored anesthesia, which he described as twilight sleep or moderate 
sedation. It was not general anesthesia. A.H. and H.B. did not need to be ventilated for 
respiration, nor did they require cardiac support. They were both arousable from the 
sedation. 
72. The testimony of each of the expert witnesses was weighed and evaluated, 
taking into consideration their qualifications and experience, attitude and demeanor while 
testifying, the quality of their answers, and the accuracy and reliability of the information on 
which they based their opinions. Each was qualified to testify and offer an opinion; none had 
any apparent bias. 
Dr. Martello issued a "Memorandum" to the Board's investigator on February 22, 
2001. The statement and opinions in her written report are given little weight against the 
testimony of the expert witnesses who appeared and testified under oath. Dr. Martello's 
pervasive use of exclamation marks in her comments and opinions raised a concern about her 
detachment and objectivity. Her opinions were based on facts not established by the 
evidence at hearing. Dr. Martello's comments and opinions were not deemed conclusive 
because her final recommendation was to send the A.H. and H.B. cases to an expert plastic 
surgery reviewer. 
Dr. Krugman's written report indicated he assumed all of the allegations were true in 
the 1996 Accusation and 1998 Supplemental Accusation. By his testimony and statements in 
his written report, it was clear Dr. Krugman did not understand that respondent stipulated to 
only a portion of the allegations and charges in the prior disciplinary action. His 
interpretation of the facts and violations established by the stipulated decision and order was 
not accurate. Dr. Krugman also considered information in Dr. Martello's report that was 
either not admissible or not established by the evidence. 
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Dr. Krugman did not apply an objective standard. He candidly admitted that, in 
evaluating respondent's conduct as an "extreme departure from the standard of care," he was 
influenced by the prior discipline imposed on respondent. This was inappropriate for two 
reasons: Dr. Krugman's interpretation of the nature and effect of the prior discipline was not 
accurate and he was unduly influenced by an irrelevant factor. The prior discipline should 
not be a factor in his professional opinion. The conduct at issue must be evaluated of itself in 
the context of the situation as it occurred. The conduct is either below an existing standard 
.of care as gross or simple negligence or it is not. Respondent's prior actions and the 
existence of prior discipline are not relevant to the measure. The prior discipline is relevant 
only for the purpose of determining the appropriate discipline, if any, to impose in the 
pending case. Dr. Krugman also erroneously believed that several acts of simple negligence, 
or repeated negligent acts, equate to an extreme departure from the standard of care. 
In his written report, Dr. Morwood stated he could not determine respondent used 
general anesthesia. At the hearing, based on the same documentation :µe used for his written 
report, he inexplicably changed his mind and opined that patient H.B. was under general 
anesthesia. This weakens the reliability of his testimony. 
The opinions of Dr. Krugman and Dr. Morwood regarding respondent's treatment of 
A.H. were not consistent. Dr. Krugman faulted respondent only for a delay in calling 911 
and found this to be a simple departure from the standard of care. Dr. Krugman did not 
opine that A.H. was inappropriately discharged from respondent's facility. Dr. Morwood 
found the patient's discharge and the purported delay in calling 911 to constitute extreme 
departures from the standard of care. Both Dr. Krugman and Dr. Morwood based their 
opinions on assumed crucial facts that were not established by the evidence. 
Their opinions regarding respondent's treatment of H.B. were not consistent. Dr. 
Krugman found it a simple departure to combine the knee liposuction and the facial peel. Dr. 
Morwood found that combining the procedures did not of itself depart from the standard of 
care, but he faulted respondent for not taking sufficient steps to minimize the chance of 
venous thrombosis, even though this was not alleged as a basis for discipline. Dr. Krugman 
found respondent's discharge of patient H.B. from his outpatient clinic to be a simple 
departure from the standard of care. In his written report, Dr. Morwood did not criticize the ' 
discharge; on direct examination he found it to be an extreme departure from the standard of 
care; but on cross-examination, after reviewing H.B. 's chart and her vital signs before 
discharge, testified that he did not see evidence of an inappropriate discharge. 
It is complainant's burden to present evidence that is clear and convincing to a 
reasonable certainty. That standard is not met when the expert witnesses rely on facts not 
proven and matters not relevant; nor is it met if complainant's own experts reach different 
conclusions on most of the major charges after reviewing the same material. 
The testimony of Dr. Yoho was more persuasive and outweighed the inconsistent 
opinions presented by complainant. He had substantial experience as both cosmetic surgeon 
and a physician handling emergency situations; his answers were responsive, clear, candid, 
logical and comprehensible. His opinions and explanations seemed to be formulated in the 
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context of the real world of practice. The opinions and testimony of Dr. Avakoff and Dr. 
Yoho were complementary and not inconsistent. 
73. With regard to the charges relating to patient A.H. as set forth in Factual 
Fjnding 32, the evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent inappropriately discharged the patient from his facility to the QualCare aftercare, 
failed to recognize the sign and symptoms of severe cardiac instability or improperly delayed 
the nurse in calling 911. 
Complainant did not present sufficient evidence to establish that respondent's delay 
of almost two hours in responding to the nurse's page constituted negligence or an extreme 
departure from the standard of care. The only evidence on the issue was respondent's 
testimony that he was performing a procedure on a patient at the time of the page, he was not 
wearing the pager and did not recall how he was informed of the nurse's call or the time he 
first returned the call. He was still in the middle of a procedure when he spoke to the 
QualCare nurse. No expert testimony was presented to establish the response the standard of 
care required of a physician in such a situation. 
The evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent was incompetent, grossly negligent or repeatedly negligent in his treatment of 
patient A.H. 
74. With regard to the charges relating to patient H.B. as set forth in Factual 
Finding 41, the evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent performed knee liposuction on an inappropriate patient, excessively sedated H.B., 
improperly continued the surgery after PVC episodes, or failed to timely call 911 on July 26, 
2000. 
The evidence raised a question about whether H.B. was discharged from respondent's 
facility before she was ready. Complainant relied on the nurse's note describing the patient 
when she arrived at the hotel. However, the nurse did not recall the patient's arrival or that 
there was a problem with her condition. She did not contact respondent's office to advise 
that the patient was not ready for the aftercare setting, which she had the authority to do. 
Neither party contradicted the accuracy of respondent's chart notes documenting the 
patient's postoperative condition. The nurses in respondent's outpatient clinic who 
monitored the patient after the procedures were the most relevant witnesses to the patient's 
actual condition at discharge; however, the Board's investigators did not interview them nor 
did complainant present them as witnesses at the hearing. The testimony of complainant's 
experts established that, based on respondent's chart, the patient seemed appropriate for 
discharge but her arrival condition as described by the QualCare notes required some 
explanation. It is complainant's burden to establish the necessary facts on which to base an 
expert opinion; a questionable circumstance is not enough to establish unprofessional 
conduct by incompetence, gross negligence or negligence. 
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The evidence was not clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty to establish 
respondent was incompetent, grossly negligent or repeatedly negligent in his treatment of 
patient H.B. 
75. Except as set forth in the Factual Findings above, the factual allegations of the 
First Amended Accusation were not established by evidence that was clear and convincing to 
a reasonable certainty and are deemed surplusage. Expert opinions elicited at the hearing on 
matters not alleged in the First Amended Accusation are not relevant and cannot support a 
finding of unprofessional conduct. 
76. Complainant requested costs of investigation and prosecution of the case 
pursuant to section 125.3. Deputy Attorney Douglas MacCartee presented a written 
declaration that the Attorney General's charges were $19,740.00. Felix S. Rodriguez, 
Supervising Investigator for the Medical Board, presented a written declaration that the costs 
of investigation were $7,363.53 and the costs of expert reviewer services were $2,285.20 
Respondent did not object to the amount of attorney fees charged. He did object to the 
hourly rate charged by the investigators as unreasonable and noted the investigator's hourly 
rate of approximately $110 was higher than the $100 hourly rate of the medical experts. The 
Deputy Attorney General billed at only $112 per hour. 
Complainant's proof of costs did not constitute prima facie evidence of the reasonable 
costs within the meaning of section 125.3(c) because the declarations are not "a certified 
copy of the actual costs" nor do they purport to give an estimate because actual costs are not 
available. 
Pursuant to the Legal Conclusions below, complainant did not establish that 
respondent violated the Medical Practice Act. There is no cause to award costs pursuant to 
section 125.3. 
77. Zeal to revoke respondent's probation and thereby his license caused a loss of 
focus on the real issue in this case - whether respondent takes adequate steps to assure 
patients are in a condition to be discharged from his outpatient facility to home or some other 
non-acute setting. The quality of the evidence was not sufficient to support any of the 
numerous charges, at least two of which were frivolous. Nevertheless, the concern for 
respondent's discharge practices remains viable. Respondent continues subject to the 
Division's scrutiny while on probation and any ongoing concerns about his practice can be 
addressed by the probationary terms regarding annual pre-approved educational programs, 
monitoring of his practice and interviews with the Division. 
20 Mr. Rodriquez declaration erroneously listed the total expert reviewer services as $525.00. The error and 




1. Business and Professions Code section 2234 provides, in pertinent part, that 
the Board shall take action against any licensee who is charged with unprofessional conduct. 
Unprofessional conduct is that which breaches the rules or ethical code of the medical 
profession and which demonstrates an unfitness to practice medicine. Shea v. Board of 
Medical Examiners, (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 654. 
The standard ofproofin an administrative hearing to revoke or suspend a doctor's 
license is clear and convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and not a mere preponderance 
ofthe evidence. Ettingerv. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 
853. The burden rests with complainant to offer proof that is clear, explicit and unequivocal 
- so clear as to leave no substantial doubt and sufficiently strong to command the 
unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. In re Marriage of Weaver (1990) 224 
Cal.App.3d 478; In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700. The standard is not met if the 
totality of the evidence serves only to raise concern, conjecture or speculation. The 
complainant bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to, first, establish the relevant 
standard of care and, second, prove respondent's conduct that fell below that standard. 
When the complainant fails to meet this initial burden, the respondent need not present 
evidence to refute the unproven charges. 
An error in the exercise of professional medical judgment or an unsuccessful result of 
treatment does not necessarily constitute negligence. Negligence may be found only if the 
error in judgment or lack of success is due to a failure to perform any of the duties required 
of reputable members of the profession practicing in similar circumstances. Norden v. 
Hartman (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 333,337; Black v. Caruso (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 195. 
"Repeated negligent acts" within the meaning of section 2234(c) consists of two or more 
negligent acts. See, Zabetian v. Medical Board of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 462. 
"Gross negligence" is a professional error or omission that is egregious. It is defined as the 
want of even scant care, or an extreme deviation from the standard of practice in the medical 
community. Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184; 
Franz v. Board of MedicalQuality Assurance(l982) 31 Cal. 3d 124. 
"Incompetence" is defined as lack of knowledge or skills in discharging professional 
obligations. It is distinguished from negligence in that one may be competent or capable of 
performing a given duty, but negligent in performing that duty. A single act of negligence is 
not equivalent to incompetence. While a single negligent act under certain circumstances 
may reveal a general lack of ability to perform licensed duties, thereby supporting a finding 
of incompetence, a single honest failing in performing those duties, without more, does not 
constitute incompetence justifying statutory sanctions. See, Kearl v. Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040. 
As a First Cause for Discipline and Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged 
gross negligence, repeated negligent acts and incompetence in respondent's care, treatment 
and management of patients A.H. and H.B. in violation of section 2234, subdivisions (b), (c) 
and ( d). As a Second Cause for Discipline and Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged 
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false or misleading advertising in violation of section 2271. As a Third Cause for Discipline 
and Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged false or misleading advertising in violation 
of section 651. As a separate Cause for Revocation of Probation, complainant alleged 
respondent, (1) operated an outpatient setting using anesthesia in violation of sections 2215 
and 2216, and Health and Safety Code sections 1248.1, 1248.15 and 1248.65; (2) violated 
Temecula Municipal Code; violated sections 651 and 2271 by false and misleading 
advertising; and (3) violated section 2234 as set forth above. 
2. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision (b ), for unprofessional conduct 
consisting of gross negligence. 
Factual Findings 1 through 9 and 23 through 75 inclusive, and Legal Conclusion 1 
support this conclusion. 
3. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision (c), for unprofessional conduct 
consisting of repeated negligent acts. 
Factual Findings 1 through 9 and 23 through 75 inclusive, and Legal Conclusion 1 
support this conclusion. 
4. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation pursuant to sections 2227 and 2234, subdivision ( d), for unprofessional conduct 
consisting of incompetence. 
Factual Findings 1 through 9 and 23 through 75 inclusive, and Legal Conclusion 1 
support .this conclusion. 
5. Section 2271 provides that any advertising in violation of Section 17500 
constitutes unprofessional conduct. Section 17500 defines false advertising and provides in 
pertinent part: 
"It is unlawful for any person ... with intent ... to perform services, 
professional or otherwise, ... or to induce the public to enter into any 
obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or 
disseminated before the public in this state ... any statement, concerning ... 
those services ... or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact connected 
with the proposed performance ... which is untrue or misleading, and which is 
known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be 
untrue or misleading. . . . Any violation of ... this section is a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail and not exceeding six months, 




Respondent's statement that he spent his residency at U.C. Davis was misleading 
about the extent of his post-graduate education, but the evidence did not establish whether it 
resulted from intent to mislead or from respondent's ignorance of the difference between an 
internship and a residency. In any event, it was not a statement concerning the 0.S.R 
procedure or the type of statement that would induce a patient to undergo the advertised 
services. The evidence indicated respondent's patients gave much thought and consideration 
to having the procedure and were persuaded by his reputation in the community, his 
experience with the procedure and results they observed. Respondent's statement was not 
"false advertising'' within section 17500 and certainly does not warrant the criminal 
sanctions of that section. 
. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation 
pursuant to section 2271. 
Factual Findings I through 5 and_ 17 through 21 inclusive, and Legal Conclusion I 
support this conclusion. 
6. The Third Cause for Discipline alleged false and misleading advertising under 
section 651, which sets forth truth in advertising requirements for health care professionals. 
The section contains subsections (a) through (k), each containing its own subparagraphs. 
The First Amended Accusation referenced subsections (a), (b), (e), (t) and (g). Those 
subsections contain a total of 11 types of statements considered false or misleading under the 
statute. Complainant did not specify in the charging allegations the particular subsection(s) 
that applied to each alleged misleading statement contained in paragraph 18 of the First 
Amended Accusation. It is not the role of the administrative law judge to guess 
complainant's intent or to define the charges after the hearing; this would not allow 
respondent opportunity to address or defend the specific charges. The only guidance came 
from complainant's counsel in his closing argument when he referred to subsections (b)(2), 
(b)(5) and (b)(8) of section 651. Those subsections define false or misleading advertising as 
follows: 
"(b) A false ... misleading, or deceptive statement, claim or image includes 
a statement or claim that does any of the following: 
(I) ... 
(2) Is likely to mislead or deceive because of a failure to disclose 
material facts. 
(3) ... (4) ... 
(5) Contains other representations or implications that in reasonable 
probability will cause an ordinarily prudent person to misunderstand or 
be deceived. 
(6) ... (7) ... 
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(8) Includes any statement, endorsement, or testimonial that is likely to 
mislead or deceive because of a failure to disclose material facts." 
The totality of the evidence did not establish that respondent's statement about his 
residency was misleading or deceptive under those subsections. There was no indication 
that, had.respondent stated he did a one year rotating internship rather than a residency, 
ordinarily prudent patients would have been dissuaded from having the OSR treatment. 
Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke probation for 
violation of section 651. 
Factual Findings 1 through 5 and 17 through 21 inclusive, and Legal Conclusions 1 
and 5 support this conclusion. · 
7. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation for unprofessional conduct within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 
1248.65 for operation of an "outpatient setting" in violation of Health and Safety Code 
section 1248.1. 
Factual Findings 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 42 and 55, and Legal Conclusion 1 
support this conclusion. 
8. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's license or revoke 
probation for unprofessional conduct pursuant to section 2234 or the terms of probation, 
consisting of violation of laws related to the practice of medicine, to wit, the City of 
Temecula zoning laws. 
Factual Findings 1, 2, 5 through 15 inclusive, and Legal Conclusion 1 support this 
conclusion. 
9. Except as set forth in the Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions of this 
Proposed Decision, the allegations and charges of the First Amended Accusation were not 
proven and are deemed surplusage. 
Factual Findings 1 through 75 inclusive, and Legal Conclusions 1 through 9 inclusive 
support this conclusion. 
10. Cause was not established to award costs to complainant pursuant to section 
123.5. 
Factual Findings 1 through 76 inclusive and Legal Conclusions 1 through 9 inclusive 




The Accusation and First Amended Accusation are dismissed. 
Respondent's medical record from the PACE evaluation contained in pages AGO 591 
through 599 inclusive in Exhibit 23 shall be sealed and not available for public view; 
however, those pages shall be available for review by the Medical Board, its authorized 
designees and by any reviewing court. It shall be available to a member of the public upon 
court order: 
ministrative Law Judge 













June 15, 2005 
Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. 
40971 Winchester Boulevard 
Temecula, CA 92591 
1434 Howe Avenue, Suite 92 
Sacramento, CA 95825-3236 
(9161 263-2389 Fax: (9161 263-2387 
www.caldocinfo.ca.gov 
Re: Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate Number A-36888 
Case Number Dl-1993-26899 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
In July 2000, you performed cosmetic surgery on two female patients. Both patients developed 
postoperative complications after being transferred pursuant to your arrangements to a hotel for a 
two-day recovery stay and both patients required emergency hospitalization. This conduct 
constitutes grounds for discipline for which you were required to take and successfully pass the 
Physician Assessment and Clinical Education Program. 
Pursuant to the authority contained in Business and Professions Code sections 495 and 2227, the 
Division of Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California issues this Public Reprimand with 
the expectation that you have addressed the causes for the violation and that the conduct underlying 
the violation will not be repeated. 
~7PP 
Ronald L. Morton, M.D. 
President 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
.In the Matter of the Accusation 
Against: 
Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D. 
Physician's and Surgeon's 












File No. 19-2003-147439 
DECISION 
The attached Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order is hereby adopted as the 
I?ecision and Order of the Division of Medical Quality of the ·Medica+.Board of California, 
Department of Consumer Affairs, State of California. 
This Decisi~n shall become effective at 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2007. 
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1 EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Attorney General 
of the State of California 
2 THOMAS S. LAZAR 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
3 BARRY D. LADENDORF, State Bar No. 052548 
Deputy Attorney General 
4 California Department of Justice 
110 West "A" Street, Suite 1100 
5 San Diego, CA 92101 
6 P.O. Box 85266 
San Diego, CA 92186-5266 
7 Telephone: (619) 645-2092 
Facsimile: (619) 645-2061 
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DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
13 In the Matter of the Accusation Against: 
14 KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. 
Case No. 19-2003-147439 
OAHNo. 
40971 Winchester Road 
15 Temecula, CA 922591 






STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AND 
DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
20 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties to the 
21 above-entitled proceedings that the following matters are true: 
22 PARTIES· 
23 1. David T. Thornton (Complainant) is the Executive Director of the Medical 
24 Board of California. He brought this action solely in his official capacity and is represented in 
25 this matter by Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General of the State of California, by Barry D. 
26 Ladendorf, Deputy Attorney General. 
27 2. Respondent KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. (Respondent) is represented in this 
28 proceeding by attorney Albert J. Garcia, Esq., whose address is 1995 University Avenue, Suite 
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1 265, Berkeley, CA 94704. 
2 3. On or about June 24, 1981, the Medical Board of California issued 
3 Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. A 36888 to KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. (Respondent). 
4 The Certificate was in full force and effect at all times relevant to the charges brought in 
5 Accusation No. 19-2003-147439 and will expire on January 31, 2007, unless renewed. 
6 JURISDICTION 
7 4. Accusation No. 19-2003-147439 was filed before the Division of Medical 
8 Quality (Division) for the Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs, and is 
9 currently pending against Respondent. The Accusation and all other statutorily required 
10 documents were properly served on Respondent on June 9, 2006. Respondent timely filed his 
11 Notice of Defense contestin~ the Accusation. A copy of Accusation No. 19-2003-147439 is 
12 attached as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 
















5. Respondent has carefully read, discussed with counsel, and fully 
understands the charges and allegations in Accusation No. 19-2003-147439. Respondent has 
also carefully read, discussed with counsel, and fully understands the effects of this Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order. 
6. ~espondent is fully aware of his legal rights in_ thi"s matter, including the 
right to a hearing on the charges and allegations in the Accusation; the right to be represented by 
counsel at his own expense; the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; 
the right to present evidence and to testify on his own behalf; the right to the issuance of 
subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents; the right to 
reconsideration and court review of an adverse decision; and all other rights accorded by the 
California Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable laws. 
7. Respondent voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives and gives up 






2 8. Respondent neither admits nor ·denies he violated Business and 
3 · Professions Code!' section 2234, subdivision (c) in his care and treatment of patient, M.Q., in 
4 that, he did not explain to M.G. 's treating physician that he was going to use phenol in the 
5 chemical exfoliation procedure, and respondent neither admits nor denies he violated section 
6 2266 in that his medical records were not adequate or accurate. All other charges in the 
7 accusation not specifically admitted .to are hereby dismissed. 
8 9. For the purpose of resolving this accusation and to avoid the uncertainty qf 
9 further proceedings, respondent agrees that his Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate may be 















10. This stipulation shall be subject to approval by the Division of Medical 
Quality. Respondent understands and agrees that counsel for Complainant and the staff of the 
Medical Board of California may communicate directly with the Division regarding this 
stipulation and settlement, without notice to or participation by Respondent or his counsel. By 
signing the stipulation, Respondent understands and agrees that he may not withdraw his 
agreem·ent or seek to rescind the stipulation prior· to the time the Division considers arid acts upon 
it. If the Division fails to adopt this stipulation as its Decision and Order, the Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order shall be of no force or effect, except for this paragraph, it shall 
be inadmissible in any legal action between the parties, and the Division shall not be disqualified 




26 OTHER MATTERS 
27 
28 




















11. The parties understand and agree that facsimile copies of t~s Stipulated 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order, including facsimile signatures thereto, ~hall have the same 
force and effect as the originals. 
DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
In consideration of the foregoing admissions and stipulations, the parties agree 
that the Division may, without fi:irther notice or formal proceeding, issue and enter the following 
Disciplinary Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. A 
36888 issued to Respondent KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D. (Respondent) is revoked. However, the 
revocation is stayed and Respondent is placed on probation_for 35 months on the following terms 
and conditions. 
1. EDUCATION COURSE Within 60 calendar days of the effective. date of 
this Decision, and on an annual basis thereafter, respondent shall submit to the I;>ivisi~n or its 
des~gnee for its prior approval educational program(s) or course(s) which shall not be less than 
40 hours per year, for each year of probation. The educational program(s) or course(s) shall be 
aimed at correcting any areas of deficient practice or knowledge and shall include Category I 
certified, limited to classroom, conference or seminar settings. Respondent may, however, meet 
18 · this ·educational requir~merit by successfully completing course work that includes self-study ·. 
19 videos, audios or on-line courses. The self-study courses shall not exceed 30 hours toward the 
20 satisfaction of the r~quirements set forth in this paragraph. The educational progi:~(s) or 
21 course(s) shall be at respondent's expense and shall be in addition to the Continuing Medical 
22 Education (CME) requirements for renewal oflicensure. Following the completion of each 
23 course, the Division or its designee may administer an examination to test respondent's 
24 knowledge of the course. Respondent shall provide proof of attendance for 65 hours of 
25 continuing medical education of which 40 hours were in satisfaction of this condition. 
26 2. MEDICAL RECORD KEEPI1'_1G COURSE Within 60 calendar days of 
27 the effective date of this decision, respondent shall enroll in a course in medical record keeping, 
28 at respondent's expense, approved in advance by the Division or its designee. Failure to 
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1 successfully complete the course during the first 6 months of probation is a violatioIJ. of 
2 probation. 
3 A medical record keeping course taken after the acts that gave rise to the charges 
4 in the Accusation, but prior to the effective date.of the Decision may; in the sole discretion of the 
5 Division or its designee, be accepted towards the fulfillment of this condition if the course would 
6 have been approved by the Division or its designee had the course been taken after the effective 
7 date of this Decision. . 
8 Respondent shall submit a certification of successful completion to the Division 
9 or its designee not later than 15 calendar days after successfully completing the course, or not 
10 later than 15 calendar ~ays after the effective date of the Decision, whichever is l~t~. 
11 3. ·CLINICAL TRAINING PROGRAM Within 60 calendar days of the 
12 effective date of this Decision, respondent shall enroll in a clinical training or educa~ional 
13 program equivalent to the Physician Assessment and Clinical Education Program (PACE) 
14 offered at the University of California- San Diego School of Medicine ("Program"). 
15 The Program shall consist of a Comprehensive Assessment program comprised of 
16 a two-day assessment of respondent's physical and mental health; basic clinical and 
17 communication skills common to all clinicians; and medical knowledge, skill and judgment 
18 pertaining fo respondent's specialty or sub-specialty, and at minimum, a 40 hour program of · · · 
19 clinicai education in the area of practice in which respondent was alleged to be deficient and 
20 which takes into account data obtained from the assessment, Decision(s), Accus·ation(s), and any 
21 other information that the Division or its designee deems relevant. Respondent shall pay all 
22 expenses associated with the clinical training program. 
23 Based on respondent's performance and test results in the assessment and clinical 
24 education, the Program will advise the Division or its designee of its recommendation(s) for the 
25 scope and length of any additional educational or clinical 'training, treat1nent for any medical 
. . 
26 condition, treatment for any psychological condition, or anything else affecting respondent's 
27 practice of medicine. Respondent shall comply with Program recommendations. 
28 At the completion of any additional educational or clinical training, respondent 
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1 shall submit to and pass an examination. The Program's determination whether or not 
2 respondent passed the examination or successfully completed the Program sh~ll be binding. 
3 Respondent shall complete the Program not later than six ~onths after 
4 respondent's initial enrollment unless the Division or its designee agrees in writing to a later time 
5 for completion. 
6 Failure to participate·in and complete successfully all phases of the clinical 
7 training program outlined above is a violation of probation .. 
8 If respondent fails to complete the clinical training program within the design~ted 
. . 
9 time period, respondent shall cease the practice of medicine within 72 hours after being notified 
10 by the Division or its designee that respondent fail~d to complete the clinical training program. 
11 4. MONITORING - PRACTICE Within 30 calendar days of the effective 
12 date of this Decision, respondent shall submit to the Division or its designee for prior approval as 
· l3 a practice monitor, the name and qualifications of one or more licensed physicians and surgeons 
14 whose licenses are valid and in good standing, and who are preferably American Board of 
15 Medical Specialties (ABMS) certified. A monitor shall have no prior or current business or· 
16 personal relationship with respondent, or o_ther relationship that could reasonably be expected tq 
17 compromise the ability of the monitor to render fair and u·nbiased reports to the Division, 
18 including, but not limit~d"t6, anyJorm of bartering, shall be in respondent's field of practi~e;·and 
19 must agree to serve as respondent's monitor. Respondent shall pay all monitoring costs. 
20 The Division or its designee shall provide the approved monitor with copies of the 
21 Decision(s) and Accusation(s), and a proposed monitoring plan. Within 15 calendar days of 
22 receipt of the Decision(s), Accusation(s), and proposed monitoring plan, the monitor shall submit 
23 a signe~ statement that the monitor has_ read the Decision(s) and Accusation(s), fully understands 
24 the role of a monitor, and agrees or disagrees with the proposed monitoring plan. If the monitor 
25 disagrees with the proposed monitoring plan, the monitor shall submit a revised monitoring plan 
26 with the signed statement. 
27 Within 60 calendar days of the effective date of this Decision, and continuing 
28 throughout pro"?ation, respondent's practice shall be monitored by the approved monitor. 
6 
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1 Respondent shall make all records available for immediate inspection and copying on the 



























entire term of probation. 
The ~onitor(s) shall submit a quarterly written report to the Division or its 
designee which includes an evaluation ofrespondent's performance, indicating whether · 
respondent's practices are within the standards of practice of medicine or billing, or both, and 
whether respondent is practicing medicine safely, billing appropriately or both. 
It shall be the sole responsibility of respondent to ensure that the monitor submits 
the quarterly written reports to the Division or its designee within 10 calendar days after the end 
of the preceding quarter. 
If the monitor resigns or is no longer available, respondent shall, within 5 calendar 
days of such resignation or unavai_lability, submit to the Division or its designee, for prior 
approval, the name and qualifications of a replacement monitor who will be assuming that 
responsibility within 15 calendar days. If respondent fails to obtain approval of a replacement 
monitor within 60 days_ of the resignation or unavailability of the monitor, respondent shall be 
suspended from the practice of medicine until a replacement monitor is approved and prepared t~ 
assume immediate.monitoring responsibility. Respondent shall cease the practice of medicine 
within 3 calendar days after being so notified by the Division or designee. · · 
In lieu of a monitor, respondent may participate in a professional enhancement 
program equivalent to the one offered by the Physician Assessment and Clinical Education 
Program at the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine, that includes, at 
minimum, quarterly chart review, semi-annual practice assessment, and semi-annual review of 
professional growth and education. Respondent shall participate in the professional enhancement 
program at respondent's expense during the term of probation. 
Failure to maintain all records, or to make all appropriate records available for 
immediate inspection and copying on the premises, or to comply with this condition as outlined 
above is a violation of probation. 
5. INFORMATION LEITER Respondent agrees that prior to performing 
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1 any medical ·procedure, that requires IV sedation or general anesthesia, he shall obtain written 
2 clearance and approval for the procedure from the patient's personal physician or another 
3 examining physician. The request for clearance and approval shaII include the following: 
4 A. The complete name of the medical procedure to be performed and the 
5 · known risks, if any, that are unique to the procedure. 
6 B. Any and alJ medications to be used and the potential side effects of the 
7 medications that may occur for the ~ven procedure. This does not include the anesthetic agents. 
8 C. If phenol is to be used in the procedure, the letter must clearly state the 
9 potential side effects of said chemical, and in particular that it is cardiotoxic and can cause 
· 10 cardiac arrhythmias. 
11 D. A list of any _laboratory tests, radiological studies, EKG tests, respondent 
,.12 believes should be performed to insure the patient's safety. The letter shall also state that the 
13 tests must be preformed and evaluated by the examining physician prior to clearing the patient 
14 for the procedure. 
15 E. Respondent's contact telephone number.will be set forth in bold in the 
16 letter with directions that the examining physician call respondent if there are. any questions 
17 regarding the information requested· or the medical procedure (s) to be performed or the potential 
18 ·side effects and risks as described above. 
19 6. NOTIFICATION Prior to engaging in the practice of medicine, the 
20 respondent shall provide a true copy of the Decision(s) and Accusation(s) to the Chief of Staff or 
21 the Chief Executive Officer at every hospital where privileges or membership are extended to 
22 respondent, at any other facility where respondent engages in the practice of medicine, including 
23 all physician and locum tenens registries or other similar agencies, and to the Chief Executive 
24 Officer at every insurance carrier which extends malpractice insurance coverage to respondent 
25 Respondent shall submit proof of compliance to the Division or its designee within 15 calendar 
26 days. 
27 This condition shall apply to any change(s) in hospitals, other facilities or 

























7. SUPERVISION OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS During probation, 
respondent is prohibited from supervising physician assistants. 
8. OBEY ALL LAWS Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local 
laws, all rules governing the practice of medicine in California, and remain in full compliance 
with any court ordered criminal probation, payments and other orders. 
9. . QUARTERLY DECLARATIONS Respondent shall submit quarterly 
declarations under penalty of perjury on forms·provided by the Division, stating whether there 
has been compliance with all the conditions of probation. Respondent shall submit quarterly 
declarations not later than 10 calendar days after the end of the preceding quarter. 
10. PROBATION UNIT COMPLIANCE Respon~ent shall comply with the 
Division's probation unit. Respondent shall, at all times, keep the Division informed of 
respondent's business and residence addresses. Changes of such addresses shall be immediately 
communicated in writing to the Division or its designee. Under no circumstances shall a post 
office box serve as an address of record, except as allowed by Business and Professions Code 
section 2021· subdivision (b ). 
Respondent shall not engage in the practice of medicine in respondent's place of 
residence. Respondent shall maintain a current and ren~wed California physician's and 
surgeon's license. 
Respondent shall immediately inform the Division, or its designee, in writing, of 
travel to any areas outside the jurisdiction of California which lasts, or is contemplated to last, 
more than 30 calendar days. 
11. INTERVIEW WITH THE DIVISION. OR ITS DESIGNEE Respondent 
23 shall be available in person for interviews either at respondent's place of business or at the 
24 probation unit office, with the Division or its designee, upon request at various intervals, and 
25 either with or without prior notice throughout the term of probation. 
· 26 12. RESIDING OR PRACTICING OUT-OF-STATE In the event respondent 
27 should leave the State of California to reside or to practice, respondent shall notify the Division 
28 or its designee in writing 30 calendar days prior to the dates of departure and return. Non-
9 
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1 practice is defined as any period of time exceeding 30 calendar days in whi~h respondent is not 
2 engaging in any activities defined in Sections 2051 and 2052. 
3 All time spent in an intensive training program outside the State of California 
4 which has been approved by the Division or its designee shall be considered as time spent in the 
5 _practice of medicine within the State. A Board-ordere_d ~uspension of practice shall not be 
6 considered as a period of non-practice. Periods of temporary or perman~nt residence or practice 
7 outside California will not apply to the-reduction of the probationary term. Periods of temporary 
·g or permanent residence or practice outside California will relieve respondent of the responsibility 
9 to comply with the probationary terms and conditions with the exception of this condition and 
· 10 the following terms and conditions of probation: Obey All Laws; Probation Unit Compliance; 
11 . and Cost Recovery. 
12 Respondent's license shall be automaticaily cancelled ifrespondent's periods of 
13 te~poraiy or permanent residence or practice outside California total two years. However, 
14 respondent's license shall not be cancelled as long as respondent is residing and practicing 
15 medicine in another state of the United States and is on active probation with the medical . 
16 licensing authority of that state, in which case the two year period shall begin on the date . 
17 probation is completed or terminated in that state. 
18 13. FAILURE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE - C.AUFORNIA RESIDENT· 
. 19 In the event respondent resides in the State of California and for any reason 
20 respondent stops practicing medicine in California, respondent shall notify the Division or its 
21 designee in writing within 30 calendar days prior to the dates of non-practice and return to 
22 practice. Any period of non-practice within California, as defined Jn this condition, will not 
23 apply to the reduction of the probationary term and does not relieve respondent of the 
24 responsibility to comply with the terms and conditions of probation. Non-practice is defined as 
25 any period of time exceeding 30 calendar days in which respondent is not engaging in any 
26 activities defined in sections 2051 and 2052. 
27 All time spent in an intensive training program which has been approved by the 
28 Division or its designee shall be considered time spent in the practice of medicine. For purposes 
10 
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1 of this condition, non-practice due to a Board-ordered suspension or in compliance with any 
2 0th.er condition of probation, shall not be considered a period of non-practice. 
3 Respondent's license shall be automatically cancelled ifrespondent resides in 
4 California and for a total of two years, fails to engage in.California in any of the activities 
5 descril?ed.in Business and Professions Code sections 2051 and 2052. 
6 14. COM·PLE7'ION OF PROBATION Respondent shall comply with all 
7 financial obligations (e.g., cost recovery, restitution, probation costs) not later than 120 calendar 
8 days prior to the completion of probation. Upon successful completion of probation, 
9 respondent's certificate shall be fully restored. 
10 15. VIOLATION OF PROBATION Failure to fully comply with any term or 
11 condition of probation is a violation of probation. If respondent violates probation in any respect, 
12 the Division, afi:er giving respondent notice and the opportunity to be heard, may revoke 
13 probation and carry out the disciplinary order that .was stayed. If an Accusation, Petition to 
.14 Revoke Probation, or an Interim Suspension Order is filed against respondent during probation, 
. . 
15 . the Division shall have continuing jurisdiction until the matter is final, and the period of 
16 probation shall be extended until the matter is final. 
17 16. LICENSE SURRENDE~ Following the effective date of this Decision, if 
· ·1 s te-spondent ceases practicing due to retirement, health reasons· or is otherwise unable to satisfy 
19 the terms and conditions of probation, respondent:may request the voluntary surrender of 
20 respondent's _license. The Division reserves the right to evaluate respondent's request and to 
21 exercise its discretion whether. or not to grant the request, or to take any other action deemed 
22 appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances. Upon formal acceptance of the surrender, 
23 respondent shall within 15 calendar days deliver respondent's wallet and·wall certificate to the 
~4 Division or its designee and respondent shall no longer practice medicine. Respondent will no 
.. 
25 longer be subject to the terms and conditions of probation and the surrender of resp·ondent's 
26 license shall be deemed disciplinary action. If respondent re-applies for a medical license, the 
27 application shall be treated as a petition for reinstatement of a revo~ed certificate. 
28 17. PROBATION MONITORING COSTS Respondent shall pay the costs 
11 
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1 associated with probation monitoring each and every year of probation, as designated by the 
2 Division, which may be adjusted on an annual basis. Such costs shall be paya~le to the Medical 
3 Board of California and delivered to the Division or its designee no later than January 31 of each 
4 calendar year. Failure to pay costs within 30 calendar days of the due date. is a violation of 
5 probation. 
ACCEPTANCE 
I have carefully read the ·above Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order and 
8 have fully discussed it with my attorney, Albert J. Garcia, Esq .. I understand the stipulation and 
9 the effect it will have on my Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate. I enter into this Stipulated 
10 Settlement and Disciplinary Order voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and agree to be 
11 bound by the Decision and Order of the Division of Medical Quality, Medical Board of 
12 California. 






18 ·· -·-·· ··· · ·· -· - -rhaVe read··and fully discussed with Respondent KELL Y-J: O'NEIL; M.D. the 
19 · terms and conditions and other·matters contained in the above Stipulated Settlement and 
20 Disciplinary Orde/' I appr7e its form and content. 













2 The foregoing Stipulate~ Settlement and Disciplinary Order is hereby respectfully 
3 submitted for consideration by the Division of Medical Quality, Medical Board of California of 
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DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD O.F CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
11 In the Matter of the Accusation Against: 
12 KELLY JAMES O'NEIL,M.D. 
Case No. 19-2003-147439 
ACCUSATION 40971 Winchester Boulevard 
13 Temecula, CA 92591 
.14 Physicians's.and Surgeon's 
Certificate No. A 36888, 
15 
. Re~pondent. 






1. David T. Thornton (Complainant) brings this Accusation solely in his 
20 official capacity as the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California, Department-of 
21 Consumer Affairs and riot otherwise. 
22 2. On or about June 24, 1981, the Medical Board of California issued 
23 .Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate No. A 36888 to KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D,. (Respondent). 
· 24 The Physician's and ·Surgeon's Certificate was in full force and effect at all times relevant to the 




This Accusation is brought before the Division of Medical Quali~y 
28 (Division) for the Med,ical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs, under the 
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1 authority of the follow1ng laws. All section references are to the Business and Professions Code 























4. Section 2227 of the Code states: 
"(a) A licensee whose matter has been heard by an administrative law judge of 
the Medical ,Quality Hearing Panel as designated in Section 113 71 of the Government 
Code, or whose default has been entered, and who is found guilty, or who has entered into 
a stipulation for disciplinary action with the division, may, in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter: 
11 (1) Have his or her license revoked upon order of the division. 
. . 
"(2) ijave his or her right to practice suspended for a period not to exceed 
one year upon order of the division. 
11(3) Be placed on probation and be required to pay the costs of probation 
monitoring upon order of the division. 
"(4) Be publicly reprimanded by the div1sion. 
11(5) Have any other action taken in relation to disciplin.e as part of an order 
of probation, as the division or an administrative law judge may deem proper .. 
"(b) Any matter heard pursuant to subdivision ( a), except for warning 
letters, medical review or advisory conferences, professional competency 
examinations, continuing education activities, and cost reimbursement _associated 
therewith that are agreed to with the division and successfully completed by the 
.licensee, or other matters made confidential or privileged by existing law,.is 
deemed public, and shall be made available to the public by the board pursuant to 
Section 803.1." 
5. · Section 2234 of the Code states: 
25 "The Division of Medical Quality shall take action against any licensee who 
26 is charged with unprofessional conduct. In addition to other provisions of this 




1 "(a) Violating or attempting to violate, directly or indirectly, assisting in or 
2 abetting the violation of, or conspiring to violate any provision of this chapter 
3 [Chapter 5, the Medical Practice Act]. 
4 11.(b) Gross neg1igence. 
5 "(c) Repeate_d negligent acts. To be repeated, there must be two or more 
6 negligent acts or omissions. An initial negligent act or omission followed by a 
7 separate and distinct departure from the applicable standard of care shall constitute 
8 repeated negligent acts. 
9 11(1) An ini~ial m;gligent diagnosis followed by an act or omission 
10 medically appropri~te for that negligent diagnosis of the patient shall constitute a 
11 single negligent act. 
12 "(2) When tp.e standard of care requires a change in the diagnosis, act, or 
13 omission that constitutes the negligent act described in paragraph (1), including, 
-14 but not limited to, a reevaluation of the di~gnosi~·or a change in treatment, and the 
15 licensee's conduct departs fro:i:n the ?J.pplicable standard of care, each departure 
· 16 constitutes-a separate .. and distinct.breach of the standard of care. 
17 "(d) Incompetence .. 
18 "(e) The commission of any act involving dishonesty or corruption which 
19 _is substantially related to the q11:alifications, functions, or duti~s of a physician and 
20 surgeon. 
21 11 (f) A11y action or conduct which would have warranted the denial of a 
22 certificate. 
23 "(g) .... " 
24 6. Section 2266 of the Code states: "The failure of a physician and surgeon to 
25 maintain adequate and accurate records relating to the provisio11 of services to their patients 





1 FIRST CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE 
2 (Gross Negligence)" 
3 Patient M.G. 
4 7. Respondent is subject to disciplinary acti.on under Code sections 2220, 
5 2227, and 2234 as defined ·by 2234 (b) in that he was grossly negligent in connection with his 
6 care, treatment and management of patient M.G. 
7 8. On or about, January 13, 2003, MG had a consultation in respondent's 
8 medical offices regarding a chemoexfoliation of her face and neck. Her procedure was scheduled 
9 to be perfC?:rmed by respondent on February 11, 2003. She paid -a deposit of $1,500.00. She was. 
10 cleared for surgery by her primary physician. 
11 9. · On or about February 11, 2003, respondent performed a chemical 
12 peel/exfoliation, under sedation, on patient M.G., using a phenol peel and trichloracetic acid 
13 · solution. According to the respondent the procedure went forw~d without any apparent 
14 · complications. Following the chemoexfoliation, M.G. completed her recovery at Glen Oaks 
15 Resort;, a nearby spa .. Respondent was aware there were no attending medical personnel at the 
1.6 · . ·resort to .provide medical care to M. G. 
17 10. At the time of the procedure, M.G. was a 71 year old white female. 
18 Ac~ording to the medical recor:ds, her medical problems included hypertension, bro11,chial 
19 asthma, COPD, depression and osteoporosis, and she was talcing the·following medications: 
20 Lotensin, verapamil, albuterol, accolade, Flovent, Plavix, Celebrex, Paxal and Protonix. 
21 Respondent's physical examination has no vital signs listed but shows the patient's head, eyes, 
22 ears, nose, throat, heart and extremities as nonnal. The examination of her lungs revealed some 
2·3 expiratory wheezes. A pre-operative EKG perfonned on January 31, 2003, showed a borderline 
24 sinus bradycardia, first-degree AV block, and non-specific ST-T wave changes.· Other pre-
25 · operative laboratory studies showed the following abnormalities: low sodium, chloride and 
26 hemoglobin; and high creatinine, calcium and triglycerides. 
27 11. On or about February 14, 2003, respondent recejved a call from the Glen 
28 Oaks Resort stating that M. G. was weak, had low blood pressure and a low or weak pulse. 
4 
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1 Respondent did not visit the patient but told the resmi personnel to transfer her to an emergency 
2 room for evaluation. Respondent later learned M.G. had been transpmted to Rancho Springs 
3 Medical Center . 
4 . 12. On or about February 15, 2003, M.G. was seen in the emergency room of 
5 Rancho Springs Medical Center. Her chief complaints were shortness of breath, wheezing, 
. . 
6 dyspnea on exertion, indigestion and heartburn. A chest x-ray revealed a small right pleura] 
7 effusion. The EKG showed sinus bradycardia and a left bundle branch block. She was admitted 
8 to the hospjtal and treated for electrolyte imbalance, adrenal co1ticoid insufficiency and chemical 
9 burn. M.G. initially improved, but on February 16, 2003, she suffered a left middle cerebral 
10 . artery occlusion (stroke).. She d~veloped further complications including aspiration pneumonia 
11 and died on February 24, 200~. Respondent, who does not have privileges at any hospital ·or 
12 medical facility, was not involved in treating M.G. after she left his medical office. 
















A . Respondent did not critically assess the patient'~ numerous risk · 
factors, including the patient's abnormal laboratory and physical findings, .prior to this 
elective procedure. 
B. ·Respondent's own physical examination failed to. confinn and/ or 
missed entirely the physical findings that were documented with respect to her heart and 
lungs. This calls into question the thoroughness of his pre-operative phy~ica1 
examination. 
C. Respondent failed to explain to M.G .. 's personal physician, who 
cleared her for surgery, the nature of phenol used in a chemical exfoliation procedure to 
assist in the physicia11'~ determination ofM.G. 's suitability for the procedure. 
D. Respondent failed to understand the risk of using ph~no1, a 


















·. E. Respondent knew or should.h11ve known ofM.G. 's long term use 
of corticosteroid~ and that she would likely suffer adrena1 suppression and would need 
supplemental steroids during and after her phenol peel. 
F. Respondent failed to see M.G. twenty-four to forty-eight hours 
after her procedure so that he could evaluate her cardio-puln1onary status and ass.es~ her 
chemical burns, caused by the phenol peel, to determine whether additional treatment or 
therapy would be required. 
G. Respondent's medical records, includi.n,g his operative report, are 
neither accurate nor adequate, in that, the operative report fails, among other things, to 
identify tµe patient, details of the procedure performed, the findings, and the results of the 
procedure. 
SECOND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE 
(Repeated Negligent Acts) 
14. Respondent is subject to flllther disciplinary action under code sections 
2220, .2227 and 2234 as defined by Code section 2234 ( c) in that he engaged in -repeated 
1~-· ·.negligent acts in bis care, treatment an,d management of patient M.G. as set forth pi pa~~~apl?,s 7-
17- 13 (and sub-parts A through G) above which are incorporated herein by reference as though fully 
18 set forth. 
19 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
20 (Incompetence) 
21 15. Respondent is subject. to further disciplinary action under code sections 
22 2220, 2227 and 2234 as defined by Code section 2234 ( d) in that he was incompetent in his care, 
23 treatment and management of patient M.G. as set forth in paragraphs 7-13 (and sub-pa11s A 
24 through G) above which are incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
25 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
26 (Failure to Maintain Accurate and Adequate Medical Records) 
27 16. Respondent is subject to further disciplinary action under Code section 2220, 
28 ~227 and 2234 as defined by Code section 2266, il1 that, he failed to maintain adequate and 
6 
001447
1 accurate medical records in connection with his care, treatment and management of pati~nt M.G. 
2 as set forth in paragraph 13 ( G) above which is incorporated herein by reference .as though folly 
3 set forth. 
4 FIFTH. CAUSE OF ACTION 
5 (Failure to Maintain Accurate and Adequate Medical Records) 
6 Patient S.E. 
7 17. Respondent is subject to further disciplinary action under Code section 
8 2220, 2227 and 2234 as defined ·by .Code section 2266, in that, he failed to maintain accurate and 
. 9 adequat~ medical records regarding the care and treatment of patient, S.E. The circumstances 
10 are set forth below: 
11 18. On or about July 2, 2002, respondenf performed a chemical peel on 
12 patient S.E. There were 110 apparent complications during the procedure. She later developed 
13 multiple small areas of hypertrophic scarring that were treated by respondent. 
14 19. On or about June 24, 2004, respondent performed a platysmaplasty/sling 
15 operation on patient S.E. There were no apparent complications during the procedure. There are 
16.. . no.-subsequent post-operative notes until the patient returned on or about July 12, 200~ 
17 compl~ning of "new scars" coming back. . 
18 20. Respondent's medical records, when handwritten, are illegible and fail to 
19 identify who ·authored the notes. Respondent's typewritten or preprinted records are not 
20 individualized as to specific content (i.e., the operative report of the chemic~_peel, performed on 
21 July 2, 2002, does not adequately describe the procedure performed.) 
22 DISCIPLINE CONSIDERATIONS 
23 21. To detei·mine the degree of discipline, if any, to be imposed on 
. . 
24 Respondent, Complainant alleges that on or about November 8, 1996, an Accusation was filed 
25 against respondent and on or about January 6, 1998, a Supplemental Accusation was filed. On or 
26 about September 14, 1998, a Decision became effective which read, in part: Revoked, Stayed, 
27 Prior Condition, five Years Probation with Tem1s and Conditions. 
28 . /// 
7 
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1 · 22. On ?r about January 4, 2002, another accusation was filed against 
2 respondent and on or about October 16, 2002 a First Amended Accusation was filed. Qn or 
3 about September 29, 2003, a Decision became effective which read, in part: Revoked, Stayed, 
4 Seven Years Probation with Terms and Conditions; including Six Months of Actual Suspension 
·5 Beginning the Sixteenth Day Af~er the Effective Date of this Decision. On or about September 
6 25, 2003, a Petition for Writ ofMc3:11date was filed, and on or about February 6, 2004 a fodicia1 
7 Stay Order qn Conditions One and Nine was issued by the Superior Court. On or about April 29, 
8 2004, the Stay Order was vacated. On or about September 10, 2004, a Decision became effective . 
9 which read, in part: Revoked, Stayed One Year, with Precedent Condition. Upon successful 
1 O completion of the .condition precedent, the stayed revocation shall be~ome permanent and a 
. . 
· 11 Public Letter of Reprimand wil~ be issued. The aforementioned decisions are now final and are 
12 incorporated by reference as if fully set ~orth. 
13 PRAYER 
14 WHEREFORE, Complainant requests that a hearing be held on the matters herein 







.1. Revoking or suspending Physician's and Surgeon's Certifi.cate "N,o, 
A 36888, issued to KELLY j_ O'NEIL, M.D.; 
2. Revoking, suspending or denying approval of KELLY J. O'NEIL, 
M.D.'s authority to supervise physician's assistants, pursuant to section 3527 of 
the Code; 
3. If placed on probation, KELLY J. 0 'NEIL be ordered to pay the 









1 4. Taking such other and further action as dee:rµed necessary and proper. 
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P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-8931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
Idaho state Bar No. 1763 
Attorneys for the Board 
[g1[g©[§0\Y/~LQJ 
APR 2 8 2008 
IDAHO STATE BOARD 
OF MED1Gll\1E 
BEFORE THE IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE 
In the Matter of: 






) _______________ ) 
Case No. 6101 
STIPULATXON AND ORDER 
COMES NOW the Idaho state Board of Medicine, hereinafter 
referred to as the Board, and Kelly J. O'Neil, M.D., hereinafter 
referred to as Applicant, and stipulate and agree as follows: 
I 
Applicant has applied for an Idaho license to practice 
medicine and surgery to be issued by the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine, which application was received by the Board on December 
21, 2007. Said application is subject to the provisions of Title 
54, Chapter 18, Idaho Code, commonly known as the Medical Practice 
Act. 
II 
· The Board has received information that Applicant has several 
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malpractice cases and the California State Board issued a 
disciplinary Order against Applicant. In addition, Applicant 
incorrectly answered various questions on the application. 
III 
The acts and practices of Applicant, as alleged in Paragraph 
II above, would provide grounds to deny the application pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§54-1808, 54-1814 and 54-1811. 
IV 
The Board believes it has sufficient evidence to deny 
Applicant's application based upon these allegations, ~ut rather 
than pursuing a formal investigation and hearing, the parties are 
voluntarily entering into this Stipulation and Order for the 
purpose of informally responding to the concerns of the Board and 
for the purpose of providing an acceptable procedure for dealing 
with the alleged problems. 
V 
Applicant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to a 
formal hearing, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to 
reconsideration and appeal, .and to other rights accorded him 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and the Medical 
Practice Act which he might otherwise possess with respect to this 
Stipulation. 
VI 
In order to respond to these allegations, Applicant hereby 
stipulates and agrees that: 
STIPULATION AND ORDER - 2 
001453
(a) Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Stipulation 
and Order, Applicant shall reimburse the Board $100.00 
for its investigative costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
(b) Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Stipulation 
and Order, Applicant shall pay a $1,000 fine. 
(c) Applicant shall be issued a restricted license to 
practice medicine in the State of Idaho which shall be 
subject to and conditioned by full compliance with the 
terms and conditions set forth in this stipulation and 
Order. Failure to comply with any of the terms and 
conditions set forth in this Stipulation and Order shall 
result in immediate suspension of Applicant's license 
pending further proceedings. 
(d) Applicant shall only perform chemical peels and liposuc-
tion in the State of Idaho. 
(e) Applicant shall notify the Board prior to any practice in 
the State of Idaho. 
(f) If Applicant changes employment or applies for or obtains 
privileges at any hospital, Applicant shall provide all 
employers and partners and the Administrator and Chief of 
Staff at each future hospital where he applies for or 
obtains privileges with a copy of this Stipulation and 
Order at the time of the application for employment or 
privileges, or within ten (10) days of the application. 
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Applicant shall provide the Board with written proof of 
compliance with this paragraph by providing the Board 
with a carbon copy of the notice or letter when it is 
provided to any employer or hospital. 
(g) Applicant shall obey all federal, state and local laws, 
and all rules governing the practice of medicine in 
Idaho. 
(h) In the event that Applicant should leave Idaho for three 
(3) continuous months, or reside or practice outside the 
state, Applicant must notify the Board in writing of the 
dates of departure and return. Periods of time spent 
outside of Idaho will not apply to the reduction of this 
period under the Stipulation and Order, unless Applicant, 
during such period of practice outside the State of 
Idaho, in addition to informing the Idaho Board of 
Medicine of Applicant's absence from the State and 
location of work, also makes the Board of Medicine in the 
State in which he is practicing aware of this Order, and 
Applicant continues to meet all other terms of this Order 
during the time spent practicing out of the state. 
VII 
The above described terms, limitations and conditions may be 
amended or terminated in writing at any time upon the agreement of 
both parties. However, this Stipulation and Order shall remain in 
force for a minimum of five (5) years prior to any request for 
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termination of this Stipulation and Order. 
VIII 
If Applicant fails to comply with the terms and conditions of 
the restricted license, Applicant's restricted license shall 
immediately be suspended pending further proceedings. Any such 
further enforcement proceedings for noncompliance will be conducted 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, Title 67, Chapter 52, 
Idaho Code, the Idaho Medical Practice Act and the Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the Board. 
IX 
Applicant agrees to execute the Release, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, releasing the Idaho State Board of Medicine, the 
Committee on Professional Discipline, their members, employees, 
agents, officers, representatives, attorneys, consultants and 
witnesses, jointly and severally, from any and all liability 
arising from their participation or involvement in the Board's 
investigation of Applicant and in the prosecution of this disci-
plinary proceeding. 
X 
This Stipulation and Order shall be considered a public record 
as that term is used in the Idaho Code. This Stipulation and order 
shall become effective upon the last date of signature below. 
XI 
Applicant further agrees to execute the Release, attached 
hereto as Exhibit B, authorizing any person or entity having 
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information relevant to Applicant's compliance with the provisions 
of this Stipulation and Order to release such information to the 
Board. 
DATED This __/_1_ day of ____,~.........,,l)E,,o<''r'--1._,· ,,__! _ , 2 0 0 8 • 
BOARD OF MEDICINE 
STEP MARANO, M.D. 
Chairman 
DATED This _l± day of ~;,--, / I 2008. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§54-1808, 54-1811 and 54-1814, the 
Board hereby accepts the terms and conditions of the foregoing 
Stipulation and it is hereby ordered that Applicant comply with 
said terms and conditions. Based upon the foregoing, further 
formal proceedings will be waived. 
n_ r '!l 
DATED This -1.!:{_ day of~~~~·-'----'-"""-~~' 2008. 
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In consideration of the informal resolution of the pending 
disciplinary action by the Idaho State Board of Medicine, which is 
hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, KELLY J. O'NEIL, M.D., being 
of lawful age, does hereby release, acquit and forever discharge 
the Idaho State Board of Medicine, the Committee on Professional 
Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, and their members, 
employees, agents, officers, representatives, attorneys, consul-
tants and witnesses, jointly and severally, from any and all known 
and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen, claims, actions, causes of 
action, demands, rights, injuries, damages, costs, loss of service, 
expense and compensation whatsoever which the undersigned now has 
or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing 
out of or resulting or which may result from the Board's investiga-
tion and disciplinary proceedings regarding Dr. O'Neil. 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the 
compromise of a disputed claim, and that the settlement made is not 
to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the 
parties hereby released, and that said releasees deny liability 
therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that in making 
this release it is understood and agreed that the undersigned 
relies wholly upon undersigned's judgment, belief and knowledge of 
the nature, extent, effect and duration of any damages and 
liability therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement 
or representation of the parties released or their representatives 
or by anyone employed by them. 
The undersigned further declares and represents that no 
promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made 
to the undersigned, and that this release and the stipulation and 
Order contain the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and 
that the terms of this release are contractual and not a mere 
recital. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY 
UNDERSTANDS IT. 
RELEASE AGREEMENT - 1 t:XrllBrr A 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
:ss 
County of /-Jiil#Js,·4 ) 
On this / <J.. day of & '/ , 2008, before me, the 
undersigned, ---~tary Public~-d for said State, personally 
appeared KELLY . ' EIL, M.D. known r identified to me to be the 
person whose name is cri d the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he ex ed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereun~-J.l!Y hand and affixed my 
official seal the day and year in this certi~-J..eate first above 
written. '~ 
See Attached California 
Afl-Puroooe ".ckn0w!adgment 
RELEASE AGREEMENT - 2 
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State of California } 
County of 1'·,ve(:>~L 
On~""\ "-\-,;loo") before me, :se \'\~~:t~cJ>vek .J. @"'-bL<. 
Date Hare Insert NamelaJ Trtfe of the Officer 
A )o/qq 
L- ~\ \ --- 0 J 'J 
personauy appeared _1"4~=-'-...... _,'-/'-----~-----· -=--1-=-J.....;~,.,....a~--(,...,.s)....,.of=sklr---8...,.,r{s),.....· .... D"--·--------
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to 
be the personw whose nam~@a;e subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged to me that 
~prettp'ey executed the same i~rtt9"r authorized 
capacity~, and that by~r~ir signatur~ on the 
instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of 
P!aca Notary Seal Above 
which the persoJJ,($) acted, executed the instrument. 
I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws 
of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is 
true and correct. · 
------~------------~OPTIONAL---...'--------....---,&,"-------~ 
Though the information below is not required by law, it may prove valuable to persons relying on the document 
and could prevent fraudulent removal and reattachment of this form to another document. 
Description of Attached Document 
Title or Type of Document:------------------------------
Document Date:------------------Number of Pages:---------
Signer(s) Other Than Named Above: 
Capacity(les) Claimed by SJgner(s) 
Signer's Name:-------------
:] Individual 
0 Corporate Officer - Title(s): 
0 Partner - D Limited O General 
0 Attorney in Fact 
;:J Trustee 
0 Guardian or Conservator 
'.J Other: ________ _ 
Signer Is Representing: ___ _ 
RIGHT THUMBPRINT 
OF SIGNER 
Top of thumb here 
Signer's Name: _____________ _ 
O Individual 
D Corporate Officer - Title(s): ---------
D Partner - 0 Limited O General 
C Attorney in Fact 
CJ Trustee 
0 Guardian or Conservator 
C Other: _________ _ 
Signer Is Representing: ____ _ 
RIGHTTHUMBPRINT 
OF SIGNER 
Top of thumb here 
~-iJ(,ic;;,,.,'"'<X,'!iX,"{i;(,~~~~~'<J(.-rn-«,~tj,.~v,.i,1(..g;.~"9,.~"P<Xl<,¥.(..-g,._~iw'!?.<,.'"Y(,-'Y<,~~ 
C>2007 Naf>oMt Notary Association• 9350 De Soto Avo., P.O. Box 240:? • Chat,,worth, CA 91313-2402• www.Na1lona1Notary.o,g Item ,5907 Reorder: CaffToU-Free 1-800-876-6827 
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AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize and direct any hospital, physician or other 
person who has any information regarding my compliance with the 
Stipulation and Order of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, at any 
time to release any and all medical records, reports and/or 
information to the Idaho State Board of Medicine, to Jean R. 
Uranga, attorney for the Idaho State Board of Medicine, or to such 
other representative of the Idaho state Board of Medicine as may be 
designated, for examination and for copying thereof, upon request 
for such records, reports or information. 
I further authorize any hospital, physician or other person 
who has such information to consult with or discuss such informa-
tion with any of the above entities or persons. 
I further consent that a photocopy of this Authorization may 
be used in lieu of the original hereof. 
DATED This --1-5b. day of 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA) 
:ss 
County of P>:.,;e,.,;:4 ) 
---la,a-Hr'"'""n..,__,_/ ___ , 2 o o a . 
On this ~ day of J8P,1:::::, ( , 2008, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary Publ~'c · d for said state, personally 
appeared KELLY J·;·-~-~EIL, M. . , known identified to me to be the 
person whose name i~ 1 ·- he within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he exec the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set and and affixed my 
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. 
See Attached California 
An .. Purpc~~ .1\.r,know!adgment 
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE or INFORMATION~ 1 
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
~4'f&'~~..c@'~--<%'¢..cf.cy.¢<'..g'~~~,&Q-<:)f..cy,«.c<;,c<'..cyv¢('.cf&("~g~.,ey 
State of California 
County of ~·u/ ~() ; clR. } 
On ~-\Q-.J<XJ~ before me, 3Qr'1~:w £,\1\Sk"' Pt11b ll 0¢krv 
Date I Here Insert Name tnJnue OI the Officer I 
personally appeared --K-..a.__._\ \-0_0_._o_'~AJ~e.-'-,'/-::---...,...,--....,,,..-..,..,.....----------7 Name(s) of Slgner(s) 
who proved to. rpe on the basis of satisfactory evidence to 
be the person~) whose name~re subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged to me that 
~~/thw executed the same in~r~ir authorized 
capacity(~, and that by ~/th~ signatur~ on the 
instrument the perso!l(sr, or the entity upon behalf of 
which the persgo(B') acted, executed the instrument. 
I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws 
of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph Is 
true and correct. 
Place Notary Seat Above 
---------------~-----oPnONAL--~-----lo.'--~--+"'!:.,l-~-----
Though the information below is- not required by law. it may prove valuable to persons relying on the d<>cument 
and could prevent fraUdulent removal and reattachment of this form to another document. 
Description of Attached Document 
Title or Type of Document: ____________________________ _ 
Document Date:------------------ Number of Pages:--------
Signer(s) Other Than Named Above: 
Capacity(ies) Claimed by Slgner(s) 
Signer's Name: ___________ _ 
D Individual 
O Corporate Officer - Title(s): 
0 Partner - 0 Limited C General 
0 Attorney in Fact 
Ci Trustee 
:! Guardian or Conservator 
0 Other: ________ _ 
Signer Is Representing: ___ _ 
R\GHT THUMBPR\NT 
OF SIGNER 
Top of thumb here 
Signer's Name: _____________ _ 
D Individual 
0 Corporate Officer - Tltle(s): ---------
0 Partner - 0 Limited O General 
CJ Attorney in Fact 
0 Trustee 
0 Guardian or Conservator 
0 Other: _________ _ 
Signer Is Representing: ____ _ 
RIGHT THUMBPRINT 
OF SIGNER 
Top of thumb here 
WWW™~~'iii<,..™v.<:,«,g,~~W~Y:.~™1<..'Y<;,.-w<,.-,;;t 





MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation 
Against: 
KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D. 
Physician's and Surgeon's 












File No. 16-2008-191964 
DECISION 
The attached Proposed Decision is hereby adopted as the Decision and Order of the 
Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs, State of California. 
This Decision shall become effective at 5:00 p.m. on June 4, 2009. 
IT IS SO ORDERED May 5, 2009. 
By:------------
Barbara Y aroslavsk ·. 
Chair, Panel B 
001464
BEFORE THE 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALfFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAfRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[n the Matter of the Accusation against: 
KELLY JAMES O'NEIL, M.D., 




Case No. 16-2008-191964 
OAH No. 2008120029 
PROPOSED DECISION 
Administrative Law Judge Greer D. Knopf, State of California, Office of 
Administrative Hearings, heard this matter in San Diego, California, on February 23, 2009. 
Susan Fitzgerald, Deputy Attorney General, represented complainant Barbara 
Johnston, Executive Director, Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer 
Affairs. 
Albert J. Garcia, Attorney at Law, represented respondent Kelly James O'Neill, M.D. 
who was present at the hearing. 
The record remained open to enable respondent to submit an additional exhibit to be 
received as part of the procedural history of the case. The record was closed and the matter 
was submitted on March 6, 2009. 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
.1. Accusation number 16-2008-191964, dated November 13, 2008, was filed by 
complainant, Barbara Johnston ( complainant), in her official capacity as Executive Director, 
Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer.Affairs·, State of California against 
respondent Kelly James O'Neil, M.D. (respondent). Thereafter, complainant filed the First 
Amended Accusation dated February 9, 2009. Respondent filed a Notice of Defense dated 
November 17, 2008 requesting a hearing in this matter. The proceeding herein followed. 
I 
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2. Respondent holds Physician and Surgeon's Certificate number A 36888 issued 
by the Medical Board of California (the California Board) initially on June 24, l 98 l. 
Respondent's license is due to expire on January 31, 2011, unless renewed. Respondent has 
a license disciplinary history as follows: 
A. In September 1998, respondent \\'as disciplined by the California Board 
(the 1998 discipline) for repeated acts of negligence in the care of two patients. He 
was placed on five years probation with standard terms and conditions arid also 
ordered to restrict his practice, take educational courses, and be monitored by a 
practice monitor for the duration of his probation. At that time, respondent also held 
a license to practice medicine in the state of Idaho, and in November 1998, the 
medical board in Idaho (the Idaho Board) took action to impose discipline on 
respondent in Idaho based on the 1998 California discipline. Eventually, respondent 
allowed the Idaho medical license he held in 1998 to lapse. 
B. In late 2002, the California Board began another disciplinary action 
. against respondent. This disciplinary action filed by the California Board proceeded 
to hearing and an Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposed Decision. The 
California Board did not adopt the Proposed Decision and issued a Decision after 
Non-Adoption effective September 29, 2003 (September 2003 Decision after Non-
Adoption). Respondent appealed the September 2003 Decision after Non-Adoption 
and during the appeal process the parties entered into a Stipulated Settlement and 
Disciplinary Order dated July 20, 2004, adopted and ordered on August l l, 2004, and 
made effective on September 10, 2004 (the September 2004 Decision). As a result, 
the California Board ordered respondent to complete the Physician Assessment and 
Clinical Education Program (PAC~) at the University of California, San Diego 
School of Medicine and issued respondent a letter of reprimand. 
C. In 2007, the California Board began its third disciplinary action against 
respondent. The Board's allegations against respondent included gross negligence 
(Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 2234, subd. (b)), repeated acts of negligence (Bus. & Prof. 
·Code,§ 2234, subd. (c)), incompetence, and failure to maintain adequate medical 
records (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2266) concerning the care and treatment of two 
patients. The parties ultimately entered into a Stipulated Settlement and Decision, 
effective September 2007 (the 2007 Decision), revoking respondent's license, staying 
the revocation and placing respondent on probation for 35 months. As part of the 
settlement agreement, the parties agreed that: "Respondent neither admits nor denies 
he violated Business ·and Professions Code section 2234 subdivision (c) in his care 
and treatment of patient M.G . ... and respondent neither admits nor denies he 
violated section 2266 .... All other charges in the accusation not specifically 
admitted are hereby dismissed." Respondent remains on probation until August 2010. 
3. Sometime in late 2006, respondent decided he wanted to apply for licensure to 
practice medicine in Idaho, Washington, and Indiana. He was considering retiring in one of 
these states and wanted to pursue licensure so he could continue with some sort of a medical 
practice after retirement ·Respondent was raised in Idaho and his extended family still lives 
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there so he ultimately decided he wanted to focus on moving to Idaho. Respondent asked his 
office manager to start the application process for him. Respondent's office manager, 
Valerie Arnaiv (Arnaiv), knew that there would be a great deal of paperwork involved in 
making these. various applications out of state and she researched and found a service named 
. Physician's Licensing Service (PLS) operating in Utah. PLS prepares and submits all the 
paperwork for busy practitioners to the various jurisdictions for medical licensure across the 
country. Amaiv retained PLS on respondent's behalf to prepare and submit respondent's 
applications to the three medical boards in Idaho, Washington, and Indiana. 
4. Ultimately, PLS prepared the Idaho, Washington, and Indiana applications for 
respondent. In order to prepare the three applications, PLS first had respondent fill out a 
questionnaire (PLS questionnaire) providing the information needed to initiate the process in 
each state. The PLS questionnaire asked for a variety of professional background 
information and specifically asked the following questions, among others: "I. Have you 
been n.amed in a malpractice case regardless of the outcome? .... 3. Have you had any 
licenses disciplined? .... " The PLS questionnaire instructed respondent to answer the 
questi~ns "yes" or "no" and to provide an explanation for any answer in the affirmative. 
Respondent answered "yes" to both questions number 1 and number 3. For question number 
l, respondent answered that yes he had been named in a malpractice case and then wrote in 
that he had been named in six such cases. Respondent also answered "yes" to question 
number 3 indicating that he had licenses disciplined in the past. He did not provide any 
explanation of that affirmative answer, but assumed that his office manager would attach a 
copy of the previous disciplinary actions to the PLS questionnaire. There is no evidence that 
respondent signed any portion of the PLS questionnaire under penalty of perjury or 
otherwise. Respondent did sign an Authorization and Release so that PLS could obtain any 
records deemed necessary for "evaluating his professional, ethical and physical qualifications 
for medical licensure." 
5. • PLS took the information submitted by respondent and completed each of the 
three applications to be submitted to Idaho, Washington, and Indiana for licensure. The 
Idaho application was not available to download online so it could not be filled out on a 
computer. As a result, the individ~l on staff at PLS who filled out the Idaho application for 
respondent did so by hand. Whichever PLS staff member that filled out the Idaho 
application for respondent made a mistake in answering questions 3 and 5 on that 
application. -Question 3 asked: 
"Have you ever been investigated by any licensing board, agency, or 
professional association in connection with medical incompetency, practice act 
violations, unprofessional conduct or unethical conduct?" 
Question 5 further asked: 
"Have you ever been subject to informal or formal proceeding by any 
licensing board, agency or professional association to revoke, suspend, restrict or 
limit a professional license?" 
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Both questions were answered ;;No" on respondent's application. These answers were 
untrue and '"-'ere contrary to the information that respondent supplied to PLS during the 
application process. On December 9, 2006, resp_ondent signed the Idaho application and 
returned it to PLS for submission to the Idaho State Board of Medicine (the Idaho Board). 
6. PLS also completed the applications that respondent was to submit to 
Washington for medical licensure. The same mistake was made by PLS on the Washington 
application as the mistake made on the Idaho application in answering questions about prior 
discipline. The Washington application asked in question 8: 
··Have you ever had any license, certificate, registration or other privilege to 
practice a health care profession denied, revoked, suspended, or restricted by a state, 
federal, or foreign authority, or have you ever surrendered such credential to avoid or 
in connectio.n with action by such authority?" 
The Washington application question l l asked: 
· "Have you ever been the subject of any informal or formal disciplinary action 
related to the practice of medicine?" 
Both questions were answered "No" on respondent's Washington application. These 
answers were untrue and were contrary to information that respondent supplied to PLS 
during the application process. On December 6, 2006, respondent signed the Washington 
application and returned it to PLS for submission to the Washington State Department of 
Health, Medical Quality Assurance Commission (the Washington Commission). 
7. PLS also completed the application that respondent was to submit to Indiana 
for medical licensure. The same mistake was made by PL~ on the Indiana application as the 
mistak~ made on the Idaho and Washington applications in answering questions about prior 
discipline. The Indiana application asked in question I: 
"Has disciplinary action ever been taken regarding any health license, 
certificate, registration or permit you hold or have held?" 
The Indiana application further asked in question 4: 
"Have you ever been the subject of an inve~tigation by a regulatory agency 
concerning your license?" 
Both questions were answered "No" on respondent's Indiana application. These 
answers were untrue and were contrary to the information that respondent supplied to PLS 
during the application process. On December 7, 2006, respondent signed the Indiana 
application and returned it to PLS for submission to the Medical Licer:ising Board of Indiana 
(the Indiana Board). 
4 
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8. On November 20, 2006, PLS sent the completed [daho and [ndiana 
applications to respondent with two separate cover letters instructing respondent to "review 
the application for accuracy" and return it with additional items and fees to PLS. On 
November 28, 2006, PLS sent respondent the completed Washington application with the 
same cover letter instructing respondent to "review the application for accuracy" and then 
return it to PLS with the necessary supporting documentation and fees. Respondent therefore 
had a stack of these applications and the accompanying paperwork to review and sign in 
early December 2006. He testified that ~e tried to get to this paperwork whenever he could 
in between a busy schedule of appointments. Ultimately, respondent behaved carelessly and 
neglected to read the applications but he went ahead and signed each of the Idaho, 
Washington, and Indiana applications under penalty of perjury wherein he certified the 
applications as true and correct. The information in all three applications was, in fact, untrue 
since they each failed to disclose that respondent had previously been disciplined by the 
California Board. 
9. Respondent's behavior in failing to read and carefully review his applications 
was C<!reless and arrogant. Respondent's attitude about the applications seems to be that he· 
should not have to be bothered with the unimportant details of this trivial process: Given the 
fact that respondent has been the subject of three prior disciplinary actions by the California 
Board and one by the Idaho Board, he should have been all the more alert to any potential 
problems in his practice. He certainly should have been exercising reasonable care to avoid 
supplying incorrect information on medical board applications. It is clear from his attitude 
that respondent does not appreciate the importance of ensuring accuracy on all such 
documentation. Nevertheless, the evidence presented at the hearing did establish that 
respondent's failure to report his prior discipline on the medical board applications was a 
result of carelessness on his part rather than an attempt to be deceptive. Respondent did have 
the responsibility to accurately disclose all prior discipline on his applications under penalty 
of perjury, but his actions do not rise to the level of dishonesty. He should learn from this 
episode to be far more careful with important paperwork, and he certainly should not r.ely on 
others when he is the one attesting under oath to the truth of its contents. 
10. . The Idaho Board acted on respondent's Idaho application by giving respondent 
a hearing oefore the entire board wherein the parties appear to have entered into a stipulation 
allowing respondent to be issued a restricted Idaho medical license. A Stipulation and Order 
dated April 14, 2008 (the Idaho Order) between respondent and the Idaho Board found that 
respondent had been previously disciplined by the California Board and that respondent had 
"incorrectly answered various questions on the application." The Idaho Order further found 
that the actions of respondent would provide grounds to deny his appJication for licensure 
under Idaho law. The Idaho Board ordered respondent to pay investigative costs and 
attorney fees as well as a fine. The Idaho Board further granted respondent a restricted 
medical license subject to certain terms and conditions including, among others, that: 
"Applicant [respondent] shall only perform chemical peels and liposuction in the State of 
Idaho." The Idaho Order remains in effect for five years and constitutes a disciplinary order 
of the Idaho Board due to respondent's incorrect answers on his Iqaho application. This 
discipline was not based on the fact that respondent had been disciplined in California, but on 
the fact that respondent ·had failed to disclose that prior discipline. 
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. l l. Respondent submitted identical letters of explanation dated December 3, 2007 
to Idaho, Washington, and Indiana (the December 2007 letter). Respondent sent the 
December 2007 letter to those state medical licensing authorities to explain his 2007 
discipline that had been imposed by the California Board. In the letter, respondent provided 
his version of the incidents leading to the 2007 California disciplinary action. Respondent's 
version of events was somewhat self-serving and failed to acknowledge full responsibility for 
all of the actions for which respondent was charged. 
However, the 2007 disciplinary action was imposed on respondent as the result of a 
settlement stipulation that was left vague when it came to what, if any, admissions 
respondent was making in this stipulation. The only references to specific charges made in 
the stipulation are to the charge of repeated acts of negligence (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2234, 
subd. (c)), and the charge of inadequate medical record keeping (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 2266). 
However, ~nlike in the prior stipulations, the parties had entered into, this time respond~nt 
did not specifically admit these charges. The stipulation states that respondent did not admit 
or deny that he violated Business and Professions Code section 2234, subdivision (c) 
concerning the care and treatment of patient M.G. and he did not admit or deny that he· 
violated Business and Professions Code section 2266 concerning the adequacy of medical 
records. This was the only culpability statement made in the stipulated settlement regarding 
any of the specific charges and this was the basis for the agreed to disciplinary order. This 
lack of admission or denial of specific charges may have been deemed sufficient by the 
parties to support the stipulated discipline, but it is not sufficient to expect respondent to later 
describe the factual basis of his discipline as the actual charges that were alleged in the 
accusation. Respondent never actually admitted those charges. Sometimes that is the nature 
of a settlement. Based on what the parties agreed to in the stipulated settlement, respondent 
never admitted or denied the charges. He was therefore justified in giving his version of the 
facts when he reported the episode to the other medical boards. Respondent did not 
misrepresent the 2007 .disciplinary action of the California Board in his December- 2007 letter 
since there is no official version on record of what actually happened. 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
l. Cause exists to discipline respondent's physician's and surgeon's certificate 
pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 2305 in that respondent is guilty of 
unprofessional conduct in that he was disciplined by the Idaho Board when he was issued a 
restricted medical license in the State of Idaho due to his failure to correctly disclose 
information 0!1 his Idaho application, as set forth in Findings 2-5and 8-10 . 
. 2. Cause exists to discipline respondent's physician's and surgeon's certificate 
pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 141 in that respondent was disciplined by 
the Idaho Board for acts that are substantially related to the practice of medicin~. The Idaho 
Board disciplined respondent when he was issued a restricted medical license in the State of 
Idaho due to his failure to correctly disclose information on his Idaho application, as set forth 
in Findings 2-5 and 8-10. 
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3. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's physician's and surgeon's 
certificate pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 2234 in that complainant failed 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed an act of dishonesty 
when he sent the December 2007 letters of explanation to the Idaho, Washington and Indiana 
licensing boards, as set forth in Findings 2-11. 
4. Cause was not established to discipline respondent's physician's and surgeon's 
certificate pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 2234 in that complainant failed 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed an act of dishonesty 
when he submitted applications to the Idaho, Washington, and Indiana licensing boards that 
carelessly failed to disclose respondent's prior discipline, as set forth in Findings 2-10. 
5. Respondent submitted sufficient evidence of mitigating and extenuating 
circumstances surrounding his failure to accurately disclose his prior discipline in his 
applications he submitted to Idaho and his discipline in the State of Idaho. Therefore, it 
wouldnot be against the public interest to allow respondent to continue to practice medicine 
under strict terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER 
Respondent Kelly James O'Neil's physician's and surgeon's certificate number A 
36888, issued by the Medical Board of California, that is already revoked with said 
revocation stayed shall be revoked, with said revocation stayed. Respondent is placed on a 
separate term of probation, based on the action herein, for three years upon the following 
terms and conditions: 
I. Notification · 
Prior to engaging in the practice of medicine the respondent shall provide a true copy of the 
Decision(s) and Accusation(s) to the Chief of Staff or the Chief Executive Officer at every 
hospital where privileges or membership are extended to respondent, at any other facility 
where responde~t engages in the practice of medicine, including all physician and locum 
tenens registries or other similar agencies, and to the Chief Executive Officer at every 
insurance carrier which extends malpractice insurance coverage to respondent. Respondent 
shall submit proof of compliance to the Board or its designee within 15 calendar days. 
This. condit.ion shall apply to any change(s) in hospitals, other facilities or insurance carrier. 
2. Supervision of Physician Assistants 
During probation, respondent is prohibited from supervising physician assistants. 
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3. Obey All Laws 
Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local laws, all rules governing the practice of 
medicine in California and remain in full compliance with any court ordered criminal 
probation, payments, and other orders. 
4. Quarterly Declarations 
Respondent shall submit quarterly declarations under penalty of perjury on· forms provided 
by the Board, stating whether there has been compliance with all the conditions of probation. 
Respondent shall submit quarterly declarations not later than IO calendar days after the end 
of the preceding quarter. 
5. Probation Unit Compliance 
Respondent shall comply with the Board's probation unit. Respondent shall, at all times, 
keep the Boa;fd informed of respondent's business and residence addresses. Changes of such 
addresses shall be immediately communicated in writing to the Board or its designee. 
Under no circumstances shall a post office box serve as an address of record, except as 
allowed by 'Business and Professions· Code section 2021 (b ). 
Respondent shall not engage in the practice of medicine in respondent's place of residence. 
Respondent shall maintain a current and renewed California physician's and surgeon's 
license. 
Respondent shall immediately inform the Board or its designee, in writing, of travel to any 
areas outside the jurisdiction of California which lasts, or is contemplated to l!ist, more than 
thirty (30) calendar days. 
6. · Int~rview with the Board or its Designee 
Respondent shall be available in person for interviews either at respondent's place of 
business or at the probation unit office, ""'.ith the Board or its designee upon request at various 
intervals and either with or without prior notice throughout the term of probation. 
7. Residing or Practicing Out-of-State 
In the event respondent should leave the State of California to reside or to practice 
respondent shall notify the Board or its designee in writing 30 calendar days prior to the 
dates of departure ru:id return. Non-practice is defined as any period of time exceeding thirty 
calendar days in which respondent is not engaging in any activities defined in sections 2051 
and 2052 of the Business and Professions Code. 
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All time spent in an intensive training program outside the State of California which has been 
approved by the Board or its designee shall be considered as time spent in the practice of 
medicine within the State. A Board-ordered suspension of practice shall not be considered as 
a period of non-practice. Periods of temporary or permanent residence or practice outside 
California will not apply to the reduction of the probationary term. Periods of temporary or 
permanent residence or practice outside California will relieve respondent of the 
responsibility to comply with the probationary tenns and conditions with the exception of 
this condition and the following terms and conditions of probation: Obey All Laws; 
Probation Unit Compliance; and Cost Recovery._ 
Respondent's license shall be automatically cancelled if respondent's periods of temporary 
or permanent residence or practice outside California totals two years. However, 
respondent's license shall not be cancelled as long as respondent is residing and practicing 
medicine in another state of the United States and is on active probation with the medical 
licens!ng authority of that state, in which case the two year period shall begin on the date 
probation is completed or terminated in that state. 
8. ·Failure to Practice Medicine - California Resident 
In the event respondent resides in the State of California and for any reason respondent stops 
practicing medicine in California, respondent shall notify the Board or its designee in writing 
within 30 calendar days prior to the dates of non-practice and return to practice. Any period 
of non-practice within California, as defined in this condition, will not apply to the reduction 
of the probationary tenn and does not relieve respondent of the responsibility to comply with 
the terms and conditions of probation. Non-practice is defined as any period of time 
exceeding thirty calendar days in which respondent is not engaging in any activities defined 
in sections 2051 and 2052 of the Business and Professions Code. 
All time spent in an intensive training program which qas been approved by the Board or its 
d_esignee shall be considered time spent in the practice of medicine. For purposes of this 
condition, no_n-practice due to a Board-ordered suspension or in compliance with any other 
condition of probation, shall not be considered a period of non-practice. 
Respondent's license shall be automatically cancelled if respondent resides in California and 
for a total of two years, fails to engage in California in any of the activities described in 
Business and Professions Code sections 2051 and 2052. 
9. Completion of Probation 
Respondent shall comply with all financial obligations ( e.g., cost recovery, restitution, 
probation costs) not later than 120 calendar days prior to the completion of probation. Upon 




10. Violation of Probation 
Failure to fully comply with any term or condition of probation is a violation of probation. lf 
respondent violates probation in any respect, the Board, after giving respondent notice and 
the opportunity to be heard, may revoke probation and carry out the disciplinary order that 
was stayed. lf an Accusation, or Petition to Revoke Probation, or an lnterim Suspension 
Order is filed against respondent during probation, the Board shall have continuing 
jurisdiction until the matter is final, and the period of probation shall be extended until the 
matter is final. 
11. License Surrender 
Following the effective date of this Decision, if respondent ceases practicing due to 
retirement, health reasons or is otherwise unable to satisfy the· terms and conditions of 
probation, respondent may request the voluntary surrender of respondent's license. The 
Board reserves the right to evaluate respondent's request and to exercise its discretion· 
whether or not to grant the request, or to take any other action deemed appropriate and 
reasonable under the circumstances. Upon formal acceptance of the surrender, respondent 
shall within 15 calendar days deliver respondent's wallet and wall certificate to the Board or 
its designee and respondent shall no longer practice medicine. Respondent will no longer be 
subject to the terms and conditions of probation and the surrender of respondent's license 
shall be deemed disciplinary action. If respondent re-applies for a medical license, the 
application shall be treated as a petition for reinstatement of a revoked certificate. 
12. Probation Monitoring Costs 
Respondent shall pay the costs associated with probation monitoring each and every year of 
probation, as designated by the Board, which may be adjusted on an annual basis. Such costs 
shall b~ payable to the Medical Board of California and delivered to the Board or its designee 
no later than January 31 of each calendar year. Failure to pay costs within 30 calendar days 
of the due date is a violation of probation. 
GREER D. KNOPF 
Administrative Law Judge 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
. . 
Criminal Case No. 13-cr-00-193 JLK 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
1. EVA MELISSA SUGAR, 
2. JERRY LYNN ROBERTS, and 
3. GREGORY NATHAN LAURENCE 
Defendants. 
The Grand Jury charges: 
INDICTMENT 
18 U.S.C. § 371 
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) 
18 U.S.C. § 2 
26 U.S.C. § 7203 
·18 U.S.C. § 1503 
COUNT 1 
EVA MELISSSA SUGAR 
(18 U.S.C. § 371 - Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) 
THE CONSPIRACY 
1. From on or about sometime in 1999, the exact date being unknown to the 
Grand Jury, and continuing through on or about April 2008, in the State and District of 
Colorado, defendant SUGAR did unlawfully, voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly 
' 
conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together and with J.L., M.D.B., J.D., and 
1 
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other individuals both known and unknown to the Grand Jury to defraud the United 
States for'the purpose of impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful 
Government functions of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") of the Treasury 
Department in the ascertainment, comp~tation, assessment, and collection of the 
revenue, namely income, employment, and other federal taxes. 
THE PERSONS 
At various times relevant to this Indictment: 
2. J.L. was a resident of Georgia who operated Flnancial Fortress 
Associates, or a variation of that name (hereinafter "FFA"), an organization that 
promoted and advised its clients on schemes to avoid the payment of income and other 
federal taxes. 
3. Defendant EVA MELISSA SUGAR, also known as Melissa Sugar, was a 
resident of Aurora, Colorado, and was self-employed as an attorney specializing in tax 
and other legal matters in Denver, Colorado. SUGAR worked with FFA clients to 
execute the schemes FFA promoted. 
4. M.D.B. was a resident of Florida and worked as a promoter for FFA. 
5. J.D. was a resident of Georgia and worked with FFA to execute the FFA 
schemes. 
MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY 
6. The conspiracy was carried out using the following manner and means, 
which created interdependency among the conspirators: 
2 
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a. J.L. and M.D.B, with others, operated FFA. FFA promoted Pure 
Trust Organizations ("PTO") and "private banking" using so-called Banking 
Unincorporated Business Organizations ("BUBO") as vehicles to conceal business and 
personal income and asset ownership and, thereby, to avoid paying income, 
employment, and other federal taxes to the IRS. FFA held seminars and workshops 
around the country to promote its schemes, which individuals paid to attend. SUGAR 
occasionally attended and spoke at FFA seminars. At those seminars, FFA's promoters 
explained the schemes and provided referrals to·their co-conspirators, including 
SUGAR, who charged fees to execute the schemes for FFA clients. 
b. As part of the FFA schemes, SUGAR or others established one or 
more Unincorporated Business Organization(s) ("USO") for each client and applied for 
an IRS-issued Employee Identification Number ("EIN") for those UBOs. Each USO was 
named as a "management" company, i.e. "X Management." For each USO, SUGAR 
opened a corresponding bank account for a "BUBO" with the same name as the USO. 
The bank account for each BUBO was set up to accept deposits by at least one named 
fictitious entity, which the co-conspirators generally.described as a "trust" or PTO. FFA 
conspirators, including J.D., set up these trusts for the FFA clients. 
c. FFA clients used the fictitious trust entities as companies "doing 
business as" the management company for which the BUBO bank account was 
established. The entities, however, existed in name only. Generally, the FFA client 
either (1) caused receipts from a legitimate business to be paid to one of the fictitious 
3 
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entities, diverting the income to the BUBO bank account and thereby understating the 
business's gross receipts, or (2) made payments to one of the fictitious entities and 
deducted the payments as expenses for the FFA client's legitimate business, thereby 
decreasing the business's income. 
d. SUGAR and the FFA client then caused funds from the BUBO 
account to be (1) paid directly back to the FFA client, (2) used to pay the FFA clients' 
personal expenses, (3) used for personal purchases, such as for cars or vacation 
homes, or (4) transferred offshore or to a warehouse bank set up to disguise the 
ownership and source of the funds. 
e. Another variation of FFA's program involved placing assets into the 
names of the fictitious entities that used the bank account to conceal the proceeds of 
the sale of those assets. As noted, conspirators frequently established the entities as 
"tru~ts;" with one of the promoters, such as J.L.. or M.D.B., named as trustee. When the 
FFA client sold the assets, the buyer would issue a check to the trust, which then 
deposited the check into the BUBO bank account. The FFA client would then use the 
funds as discussed in subparagraph 6(d) above. 
f. SUGAR provided various services to her clients, which as 
described, included establishing UBOs, applying for EINs for the UBOs, and opening 
associated BUBO bank accounts that her clients used to conceal assets and income 
and to avoid paying taxes to the IRS. SUGAR generally was the trustee for the UBOs 
and had signatory authority for the bank accounts. If her client also wanted signatory 
4 
001479
Case 1:13-cr-00193-J Document 2 Filed 05/08/13 US ::olorado Page 5 of 16 
authority for the BUBO bank accounts, SUGAR would list the client as an 
"administrative assistant," "Managing Director," or some other officer or employee of the 
fictitious trust entity or UBO/BUBO. 
g. Often, however, to prevent the client's name from association with 
the BUBO account, SUGAR and the client would identify a third party, such as a family 
member, as the administrative assistant or other position for the fictitious trust entity or 
UBO/BUBO. That person would be given signatory authority for the BUBO bank 
account. These individuals exercised no a~thority or control over the UBO/BUBO, the 
fictitiOLJS trust entity, or the assets thereof. So that_they could use the BUBO bank 
account without involvement by the third party, SUGAR and her clients had signature 
stamps created for these individuals. 
h. With the BUBO bank accounts established, SUGAR then 
conducted transactions for her clients using those accounts, including for example, 
signing blank checks or authorizing wire transactions for her clients' use as described in 
subparagraph 6(d), endorsing checks for deposit, and withdrawing cash. 
i. SUGAR charged her clients fees for her services, including annual 
maintenance fees and fees on a per-service basis, such as for signing checks or 
authorizing a wire transfer. 
j. The FFA client and owner of the UBO/BUBO would not file federal 
tax returns for the UBO/BUBO or the fictitious entities, despite legal filing requirements. 
Indeed, because the UBOs did not file federal income tax returns and all of the bank 
5 
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accounts established for the BUBOs were non-interest-bearing accounts, the IRS was 
unaware of the use and operation of the BUBO accounts and entities. Only the request 
and receipt of the EIN would indicate to the Governm_ent that the UBO/BUBO ever 
existed. 
OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY 
7. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the 
following overt acts were committed in the District of Colorado and elsewhere: 
a. On or about November 23, 1999, SUGAR applied to the IRS for 
EINs in the names of Streamside Management, Northside Management, Maple Leaf 
Management, Oxford Management, Cascade Management, Management Unlimited, 
Eastside Management, and Avon Management. 
b. On or about on February 9, 2001, SUGAR opened a bank ·account 
at Compass Bank, formerly known as FirsTier Bank, in the name of Streamside 
Management, with SUGAR and ROBERTS'S then minor son as signatories. 
c. On or about August 15, 2002, at the request of her client, LS., 
SUGAR wrote out and signed a check from a Bani< of Denver account for Garnet 
Management to Bexar Technologies in the amount of $21,000. 
d. On or about September 23, 2002, SUGAR sent an e-mail to her 
client, Gregory Laurence, instructing him that SUGAR alone must sign all endorsements 
on checks deposited into and all checks written from Laurence's BUBO bank accounts, 
unless Laurence or his wife were willing to provide their identification and social security 
6 
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numbers to the bank. 
e. · On or about March 26, 2004, SUGAR transferred the bank account 
for Triumph Management from Liberty Savings Bank to Compass Bank. 
f. On or about between June 16, 2006, and June 23, 2006, SUGAR 
signed 504 blank checks for Best for Hearing Limited Partnership, an UBO she 
established for client E.B. 
g. On or about May 14, 2007, SUGAR.authorized the wire transfer of 
$213,500 from the Compass Bank account for Aquarius Management for her client J.K. 
h. On or about May 25, 2007, SUGAR caused $1,091,348.48 to be 
wired from Northside Management's Compass Bank account to Surety Title Agency for 
her client J.S.'s purchase of a vacation home. 
L On or about July 5, 2007, SUGAR transferred $200 from Best for 
Hearing Limited's Compass Bank account to her own bank account as payment for 
services rendered in relation to that entity for her client E.B. 
j. On or about January 15, 2008, SUGAR deposited or caused to be 
deposited into her personal account a Postal Money Order for $457 from Reef 
Management. 
k. On or about November 7, 2007, SUGAR wrote and cashed seven 
checks from the BUBO accounts at Compass Bank for her client Gregory Laurence. 
I. On or about April 24, 2008, SUGAR cashed a negotiable 
instrument for $13,776 from the Compass Bank account for Palm Tree Management. 
7 
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The foregoing was in violation of Title 18, United State Code, Section 371. 
COUNT2 
EVA MELISSA SUGAR AND JERRY ROBERTS 
(26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 - Gorrupt Endeavor to Obstruct or Impede 
Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws and Aiding and Abetting) 
8. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates paragraph three herein. 
9. At all times relevant to the indictment, ROBERTS was a resident of 
Florida. ROBERTS worked for Roberts Enterprises, a family-owned fundraising 
business. 
10. Beginning on o~ aboµt November 23,_1999, and continujng through on or 
about April 2008, in the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, the defendants 
SUGAR and ROBERTS, aiding and abetting each other, did cofruptly endeavor to 
obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenu_e laws by the 
following means, among others: 
a. ROBERTS paid SUGAR to set up UBOs, associated BUBO bank 
accounts, and nominee fictitious trust accounts as depositors for the bank accounts. 
Specifically, SUGAR established Streamside Management, Triumph Management, and 
Universal Management, each with an associated ban_k account and several associated 
fictitious trust entities. 
b. SUGAR and ROBERTS identified other individuals, including 
ROBERTS'S family members, as "managers," "administrative assistants," or other 
positions for the various management companies and trust entities. These individuals 
exercised no control over the entities or the assets held in the associated bank 
8 
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accounts. For example, when SUGAR and ROBERTS first opened the BUBO bank 
accounts, ROBERTS caused his then minor son to be identified as the Administrative 
Assistant for the fictitious trust entities associated with each management company. 
ROBERTS'S son a,lso had signatory authority at various times fe>r each of the three 
management companies. ROBERTS used his son to cash checks drawn from the 
BUBO bank accounts. 
c. SUGAR and ROBERTS caused signature stamps to be created for 
the· third-party signatories on the BUBO b?tnk accounts and authorized facsimile 
signatures for those individuals. 
d. SUGAR also identified herself as the "Managing Directo"r'' for the 
fictitious trust entities with signatory authority for each of the BUBO bank accounts. 
SUGAR and the third parties were the only individuals with signatory authority for the 
bank accounts ROBERTS ultimately control_led. 
e. ROBERTS used the fictitious trust entities and management 
companies, along with SUGAR's services, to disguise income paid to him by Roberts 
. . 
Enterprises. 
f. ROBERTS used the funds in the BU~O bank accounts to pay for 
personal expenses, such as credit card payments, mortgage payments, utility and 
telephone bills, and for cash. 
g. During the time period at issue, from November 1999 through April 
2008: (i) ROBERTS did not file individual federal income tax returns for calendar years 
9 
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2000 through 2007; (ii) neither ROBERTS nor SUGAR filed Forms 1065 for Streamside 
~anaijement, Triumph Management, or Universal _Management; anq (iii) ROBERTS 
and SUGAR did not file federal tax returns for any of the fictitious entities. 
The foregoing was in violation of Title 26, United State Code, Section 7212(a). 
COUNT3 
EVA MELISSA SUGAR 
(26 U.S.C. § 7203 - Failure to File Tax Return) 
11. During the calendar year 2007, defendant SUGAR, who was a resident of 
Aurora, Colorado, was self-employed as an attorney in Denver, Colorado. During that 
year, SUGAR earned income in excess of $8,750, yvhich income required that SUGAR 
file a federal income tax return on or before April 15, 2008, to any proper officer of the 
. . 
Internal Revenue Service. Defendant SUGAR, well knowing and believing all of the 
foregoing, knowingly failed to file any return on that income. 
The foregoing was in violation of 26, United States Code, Section 7203. 
COUNT4 
JERRY ROBERTS 
(18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Obstruction of Justice) 
12. . Beginning on or about May 2, 2008, and continuing thereafter up to and 
including on or about July 22, 2008, in the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, 
ROBERTS corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede the due 
administration of justice, in that, after contact by Internal Revenue Service criminal 
investigators and the service of Grand Jury subpoenas relating to Streamside 
Management, Triumph Management, Universal Management, and Roberts Enterprises, 
10 
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ROBERTS committed the following acts. 
a. ROBERTS signed and sent or caused to be sent to one or more 
Special Agents of the IRS a·letter that stated "COMPLIANCE HEREWITH IS 
MANDATORY." 1he letter enclosed a "Public Service Questionnaire," which 
demanded the Special Agent's personal information. The questionnaire stated that 
. . . . 
failure to advise ROBERTS before releasing information regarding him to any person · 
may subject the Special Agents to civil or criminal action. 
b. ROBERTS signed and sent or caused to be sent to one or more 
. . 
IRS Special Agents a "Notice·of Default" claiming the Special Agent had failed to 
complete the "Public Service Questionnaire" and asserting, among other things, that 
that failure to respond wili result in the Special Agent's agreement to "Commercial 
Dishonor," that "a Default'' be entered against the Special Agent, and to "being a 
participant in Fraud." The letter also asserted that failure of a foreign agent to mail a 
certified copy of a "Foreign Agents Registration Statement" with photo identification to 
ROBERTS "may result in a claim not to exceed One Million Dollars." 
c. ROBERTS signed an "Affidavit of Public Notice" and recorded or 
caused to be recorded with the Polk County Clerk of the Court documents including 
(i) copies of the "Public Service Questionnaire" and "Notice of Default" mentioned in 
subparagraphs 12(a) and (b), and (ii) "Disclosure Statements" for IR$ Special Agents . -
stating that failure to complete a "Public Servant's Questionnaire" and provide "verified 
Proof of Claim" would be accepted as the Special Agents' "agreement that a Default be 
11 
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entered against you for Two Hundred Thousands [sic] Dollar and no cent[USD]." 
d. ROBERTS mailed or caused to be mailed to one or more IRS 
Special Agents the recorded docur!}ents identified in subparagraph 12(c). 
Th~ foregoing ~as in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503. 
COUNTS 
EVA MELISSA SUGAR AND GREGORY LAURENCE 
(26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 - Corrupt l;ndeavor to Obstruct or Impede 
Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws and Aiding and Abetting) 
13. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates p~ragraph three herein. 
14. At all times relevant to the indictment, Gregory LAURENCE was· a resident 
.. · . 
of Tennessee. LAURENCE was a doctor who operated two businesses, Germ·antown 
Aesthetics, LP ("GA") an°d Germantown Family Care & Obstetrics, LP ("GFCO"). 
15. Beginning on or about January 4, 2002, and continuing ·through on or 
about October 2008, in the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, the 
defendants SUGAR and LAURENCE, aiding and abetting each other, did corruptly 
endeavor to obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws 
by the following means, among others: 
a. LAURENCE paid SUGAR to set up UBOs, associated BUBO bank 
accounts, and nominee fictitious trust accounts as depositors for the bank accounts. 
Specifically, SUGAR established Jasper Management, Amethyst Management, 
Capricorn Management, Diamond Management, Emerald Management, Moonstone 
Management, Pearl Management, Sagittarius Management, and Sapphire 
Management, each associated with its own fictitious trust entity. 
12 
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b. LAURENCE caused his wife to be identified as "Assistant 
Administrator" with signatory authority for the Jasper Management, Emerald 
. . 
Management, Moonstone Management, and Pearl Management bank accounts with 
authority to use a facsimile signature. SUGAR identified herself as the "Managing 
Director" for the fictitious trust entities with signatory authority for each of the BUBO 
bank accounts. 
c. SUGAR and LAURENCE'S wife were the only individuals ~ith 
signatory authority for the bank accounts LAURENCE ultimately controlled. 
LAURENCE himself was not named in any position for the numerous entities SUGAR 
and LAURENCE established. 
d. SUGAR and LAURENCE caused signature stamps to be created 
fqr LAl)RENCE'S wife and authorized facsimile ~ignatures for the BUBO bank accounts 
for which she had signatory authority. 
e. LAURENCE caused GFCO to issue checks payable to the fictitious 
trust entities associated with his BUBO bank accounts to make a portion of GFCO's 
business income appear as legitimate deductions and costs of goods sold, thereby 
reducing GFCO's taxable income. LAURENCE also caused the GFCO partnership 
federal income tax returns prepared for calendar years 2002 through 2007 to report 
those sums as deductions. 
f. LAURENCE used the management companies, fictitious trust 
entities, and SUGAR's services to disguise the existence of GA. LAURENCE did not 
13 
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file federal income tax returns for GA for calendar years 2002 through 2007. 
g. LAURENCE used fictitious trust entity Dynamic Health Care 
Staffing and Jasper Management, along with SUGAR's services, to pay himself and 
employees of GA and GFCO as "independent contractors" and to avoid paying fede~al 
employment taxes. LAURENCE did not issue those employees IRS Forms 1099. 
h. Laurence used the funds in the BUBO bank accounts to pay for_ 
items including expenses associated with his businesses, school tuition for his children, 
cars, and credit card payments. 
i. During the time period at issue; from January 2002 through April 
2008, neither SUGAR nor LAURENCE fi!ed For~s 1065 for the UBO management 
companies or federal tax returns for any of the fictitious entities .. 
The foregoing was in violation of Title 26, United State Code, Section 7212(a). 
COUNTS · 
GREGORY LAURENCE 
(18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Obstruction of justice) 
16. Beginning on or about March 5, 2008, and continuing thereafter up to and 
including on or about January 22, 2009, in the State and District of Colorado and 
elsewhere, LAURENCE corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede the 
due administration of justice, in that, after contact by Internal Revenue Service criminal 
. . 
investigators and the service of Grand Jury subpoenas relating to GA and GFCO, 
LAURENCE committed the following acts. 
a. LAURENCE signed and sent or caused to be sent to one or more 
14 
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IRS Special Agents, through the United States Attorney's Office, documents including: 
(1) "Public Servant's Questionnaires" requesting the Special Agents to provide personal 
information, and (2) "Disclosure Statements" asserting that failure to respond to the 
questionnaire and failure to answer questions in the statement will result in the Special 
Agents' agreement-to "Commercial Dishonor," that. "a Default be entered against you for 
Two Hundred Thousands [sic] Dollar [USD]," and to "being a participant in Fraud." 
b. LAURENCE signed and sent or caused to be sent to one or more 
IRS Special Agents a "Notice of Default and Dishonor of a Lawful Public Servant 
Questionnaire." 
c. LAURENCE failed to comply with Orders to Compel production of 
the subpoenaed records issued by the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado on November 17 and December 8, 2008. 
The foregoing was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503. 
A TRUE BILL-
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JOHN WALSH 
United- States Attorney 
By: sf Anna K. Edgar 
Matthew Kirsch 
Anna K. Edgar· 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
United States Attorney's Office 
1225 17th Street, Suite 700 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Telephone: (303) 454-0100 
Fax: (303) 454-0409 
E-mail: Matthew.Kirsch@usdoj.gov 
Anna.Edgar@usdoj.gov 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
for the 
District of Colorado 







Case No. t ~ -ar-19 B-~.LK 
ORDER SETTING CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's release is subject to these conditions: 
(I) The defendant must not violate federal, state, or local law while on release. 
(2) The defendant must cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample if it is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 14135a. 
(3) The defendant must advise the court or the pretrial services office or supervising officer in writing before making 
any change of residence or telephone number. ·· 
( 4) The defendant must appear in court as required and, if convicted, must surrender as directed to serve a sentence 
that the court may impose. 
The defendant must appear at: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
on AS DIRECTED 
Date and Time 
If blank, defendant will be notified of next appearance. 
(5) The defendant must sign an Appearance Bond, if ordered. 
Place 
(&l ~ po..-sspqJ--/e ~ o/!Jt~ W(~ ON~-
001493
AO J 99C (Rev. 09/08) Advice of Penalties 
ADVICE OF PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
YOU ARE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING PENAL TIES AND SANCTIONS: 
Page of Pages 
Violating any of the foregoing conditions of release may result in the immediate issuance of a warrant for your arrest, a 
revocation of your release, an order of detention, a forfeiture of any bond, and a prosecution for contempt of court and could result in 
imprisonment, a fine, or both. 
While on release, if you commit a federal felony offense the punishment is an additional prison term of not more than ten years 
and for a federal misdemeanor offense the punishment is an additional prison term of not more than one year. This sentence will be 
consecutive (i.e., in addition to) to any other sentence you receive. 
It is a crime punishable by up to ten years in prison, and a $250,000 fine, or both, to: obstruct a criminal investigation; 
tamper with a witness, victim, or informant; retaliate or attempt to retaliate against a witness, victim, or informant; or intimidate or attempt 
to intimidate a witness, victim, juror, informant, or officer of the court. The penalties for tampering, retaliation, or intimidation are 
significantly more serious if they involve a killing or attempted killing. 
If, after release, you knowingly fail to appear as the conditions of release require, or to surrender to serve a sentence, 
you may be prosecuted for failing to appear or surrender and additional punishment may be imposed. If you are convicted of: 
(I) an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of fifteen years or more -you will be fined 
not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than IO years, or both; 
(2) an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or more, but less than fifteen years - you will be fined not 
more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both; 
(3) any other felony- you will be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; 
(4) a misdemeanor- you will be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
A term of imprisonment imposed for failure to appear or surrender will be consecutive to any other sentence you receive. In 
addition, a failure to appear or surrender may result in the forfeiture of any bond posted. 
Acknowledgment of the Defendant 
l acknowledge that I am the defendant in this case and that I am aware of the conditions of release. I romise to obey all conditions 




Defendanl 's Signature 
/V}f V'-p h ~·-( I +J>I 
Cuy and State 
Directions to the United States Marshal 
( X,) The defendant is ORDERED released after processing. 
( ) The United States marshal is ORDERED to keep the defendant in custody until notified by the clerk or judge that the defendant 
has posted bond and/or complied with all other conditions for release. If still in custody, the defendant must be produced before 
the appropriate judge at the time and place specified. 
Date: ~ ~ 1 '2.-o I"? 
\ 
~p~ f:f:<~~- -- Judicial Officer's Signa111re 
Printed name and title 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
for the 
District of Colorado 
NOTICE REGARDING UNITED STA TES PASSPORT FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 
TO: United States Department of State 
Office of Passport Services 
Legal Affairs Division 
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 3rd Floor 
Washington, DC 20037 
0 Original Notice 
Date: 06/04/2013 
By: s/ A. Garcia 
Defendant: Gregory N. Laurence 
Date of Birt --------
S SN: 
FROM: United States District Court 
District of Colorado 
901 19th Street, Room A 105 
Denver, CO 80294 
D Notice of Disposition 
Date: 
By: 
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depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of the 
Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. Dr. Kerr has 
not testified in any matter in the last four years. He is not a retained expert. His 
curriculum vitae was previously produced and is incorporated by this reference. 
Gregory Laurence, M.D. 
Germantown Aesthetics 
7475 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, Tennessee 38138 
(901) 624-5605 
Subject Matter: Facts of case, applicable standards of health care practice, 
causation, damages and the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
Substance of facts and opinions held: Dr. Laurence is a physician licensed 
in the state of Tennessee to practice medicine and surgery. Dr. Laurence is board 
certified in both family practice and laser surgery and has engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery at all times relevant herein. Dr. Laurence will testify as a 
retained expert witness at the trial. Dr. Laurence will testify that he has actual knowledge 
of the standard of health care practice applicable to physicians engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010 and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr met 
such standard taking into account Dr. Kerr's background, training, experience and field of 
medical specialization with respect to any and all medical services rendered to the 
patient. 
Dr. Laurence will explain the process he undertook in order to familiarize 
himself with the standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding area for the types 
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of procedures and treatment performed by Dr. Kerr in this case. Part of the basis for Dr. 
Laurence's opinions include: his background, training, research, practice and experience 
in performing cosmetic procedures as a licensed physician, his experiences in the peer 
review process associated with his hospital staff privileges at Baptist Memorial Hospital 
and St. Francis Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, his experience of having performed 
hundreds of cosmetic surgical procedures, his knowledge of how cosmetic procedures 
like liposuction and fat transfers were performed in Boise in 2010, his experience in 
performing a large volume of liposuction and fat transfer procedures, his knowledge of 
how the Vaser ultrasonic liposuction procedure is performed, how fat transfers/grafting 
procedures are performed, his knowledge of the types of equipment and instruments 
needed to perform the nature and types of cosmetic procedures at issue in this case, his 
knowledge of the scope of practice of cosmetic providers like Dr. Kerr in Boise, Idaho and 
elsewhere, his knowledge of the types of medical providers who perform cosmetic 
procedures like the ones at issue in this case and his knowledge of the manner and 
method by which surgical equipment and surgical procedure facilities are maintained in a 
sterile fashion. As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also explain his training and 
experience at the University of Tennessee during his residency in family practice in 
1992-95 as it relates to sterile operating conditions for the procedures he performed, was 
taught and observed. He will explain the same matters for his experience in his own 
aesthetics surgical center which he operates in Germantown, Tennessee from 2003 to 
the present. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the standard of health care practice employed at 
his own surgical facility in Tennessee for achieving sterile operating conditions and the 
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disinfection of instruments and equipment ·and maintaining a sterile operative field and 
that the similar actions and efforts undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been described for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard in this case were used and exceeded in his opinion. Dr. 
Laurence will testify that the infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his deposition and 
discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic facility and are essentially 
zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated successfully 
with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how this is evidence that the 
sterility procedures employed by the Defendants in this case were appropriate and 
working properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that during his professional career he has been 
acquainted with numerous physicians who perform cosmetic procedures that are not 
plastic surgeons, but rather come from a number of different medical backgrounds 
including: family practice, anesthesia, general surgery, dermatology and obstetrics and 
. gynecology. He will discuss the training he has been provided in cosmetic surgery by 
various physicians who are not plastic surgeons. Dr. Laurence has become acquainted 
with the nature and scope of the practice of these other cosmetic procedure providers and 
the procedures utilized by them in this specialty, including the procedures utilized for 
maintaining a sterile field and how to properly clean and maintain the surgical equipment 
and instruments utilized for cosmetic procedures including the procedures at issue in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health care practice for plastic 
surgeons is not the standard of health care practice in the same medical specialty as his 
and Dr. Kerr. 
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Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr had proper training and 
experience in order to perform the procedures at issue on Krystal Ballard. As part of his 
testimony, he is expected to refer to the publications, data and documents that have been 
produced in discovery on this subject and explain the numbers of similar procedures he 
has performed. Dr. Laurence will explain that there was no requirement, per the standard 
of health care practice or otherwise, for Dr. Kerr's facility to be certified, inspected or 
approved by any organization or government agency, which included his autoclave, his 
clinic and the instruments he used for surgery and that his medical license allowed him to 
conduct his medical practice and the procedures he performed on Krystal Ballard. He will 
testify that he was not required to test for spores or mold and that these issues have 
nothing to do with the case. 
During Dr. Laurence's professional career he has received specific training 
in various lipolysis procedures including traditional, laser assisted and ultrasonic assisted 
lipolysis. He will testify that he has reviewed the nature and degree of training obtained 
by Dr. Kerr and that in his opinion Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to 
perform the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on the patient at issue. Dr. Laurence 
will testify regarding the significant experience he has in performing these types of 
procedures as part of his cosmetic practice. He will testify that it was appropriate for the 
procedures at issue to be performed on patients like Krystal Ballard in an office based 
setting without general anesthesia and that Dr. Kerr had proper facilities, equipment and 
personnel to do these procedures safely and within the applicable local standard of health 
care practice. Dr. Laurence will testify that he possesses the professional knowledge 
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and experience that allows him to express the opinion and testimony described in this 
document. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the fact this patient experienced a 
post-operative complication like the one alleged in this case which resulted in a patient 
death does not establish that the standard of practice was violated by Dr. Kerr. He will 
testify that postoperative infections are not proof of a violation. He will render the opinion 
that the patient's death was not due to any error or omission on Dr. Kerr's part or the part 
of anyone associated with his practice. He will discuss his own sterilization techniques, 
training and experience in this area which will help support his opinion that Dr. Kerr 
employed the use of proper cleaning and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and supplies. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard and 
there were no infections or infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the equipment in question that 
evidence of that should have shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent patients which did not occur in this 
case. Dr. Laurence will similarly discuss the significance of these same matters in 
regards to the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the procedures 
performed on Krystal Ballard. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the 
surgical technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his liposuction and fat transfer 
procedures did not cause or result in the introduction of any bacteria to the patient. Dr. 
Laurence actually holds the opinions expressed in this document and will express all 
opinions stated herein on a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty. 
Dr. Laurence will testify regarding the specific issues set forth in this 
disclosure, but he will also testify globally that nothing Dr. Kerr elected to do or not do with 
respect to the medical services provided to Krystal Ballard in Boise in 2010 violated the 
applicable local standard of health care practice which in turn caused or contributed to 
any damages or injuries to the patient. Dr. Laurence will testify that the unfortunate death 
of Krystal Ballard was not and cannot be assumed to be the result of violations of the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the standard of health care practice applicable 
to physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise in 2010 is 
established by the local community of physicians engaged in this specialty and the way 
they typically practice in the community and not by any organization, academic center, 
publication, foreign physician, or by virtue of any specialty board certification. In this 
regard, Dr. Laurence will testify regarding his various publications, honors and university 
appointments as set forth in his curriculum vitae which is hereby incorporated as if set 
forth in full. He will also discuss his various society memberships which provide him with 
opportunities to expand his knowledge and networking base in the field of cosmetic 
surgery including his affiliations with the American Institute of Ultrasound Medicine, the 
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Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the American Society of Cosmetic 
Breast Surgeons, and the National Society of Cosmetic Physicians. 
Dr. Laurence will opine that the standard of health care practice is the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by Boise physicians engaged in the 
medical specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. As part of his testimony, 
Dr. Laurence will express and define the local standard of practice as it existed in Boise in 
2010 with respect to the medical issues in this case consistent with this disclosure and 
any deposition which may subsequently be taken and which is hereby incorporated as if 
set forth in full. Dr. Laurence holds the opinion and will discuss how compliance with the 
standard of practice does not guarantee a perfect result and its application and 
compliance is intended to minimize and hopefully largely reduce undesirable and 
unintended results. He will explain that the standard of hea'lthcare practice for 
physicians engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery is not perfect and the 
records and deposition testimony demonstrate and confirm that no perfect outcome was 
ever warranted or represented to this patient. 
Dr. Laurence will explain how the standard of practice applicable includes, 
as a major element, aspects of provider judgment as opposed to the application of 
science which may vary depending on the patient and care circumstances. He will 
render the opinion that Dr. Kerr provided appropriate post-operative instructions and 
properly followed the patient and communicated with her and her family. Dr. Laurence 
will be prepared to testify about his experiences in this regard at trial and why Dr. Kerr's 
care in this case was consistent with the standards of practice he is held to. As with all 
operative procedures, the risk of infection is always a possibility and Dr. Laurence will 
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· explain that post-operative infection, if it should develop, is an accepted and recognized 
risk factor that is not due to inappropriate care or violations of the standard of health care 
practice by the physician and that under the best of circumstances and medical care, 
infections can and do occur. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr gave appropriate advice 
and information to Krystal Ballard in regard to the risk, benefits and options prior to the 
procedure on July 21, 2010 which is documented in Dr. Kerr's medical records. Dr. 
Laurence will explain that everything undertaken by Dr. Kerr in his care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard is illustrative of, and in compliance with, the standard of health care 
practice, based on the class of health care provider to which Dr. Kerr belonged and in 
which capacity he was functioning. Dr. Laurence will explain that the standard of health 
care practice provides that Dr. Kerr must be judged and evaluated in comparison with 
similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same class as himself, taking into account 
his training, experience and field of medical specialization and not by a plastic surgeon 
which Plaintiff is unfairly trying to do in this case. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss his training and the 
certifications he obtained in order to become a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery as well as the adequacy and nature of those obtained by Dr. 
Kerr. He will discuss the care and treatment of the patient as outlined in the patient's 
medical records and he will discuss the appropriate nature, timing and content of Dr. 
Kerr's documented conversations and interactions with the patient and her husband. 
With respect to the fat injection procedure at issue, Dr. Laurence will 
discuss and explain to the jury the medical basis upon which a person's own fat may be 
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used to improve the appearance of the body by moving it from an area where it is less 
needed (usually the thighs or abdomen) to an area that has less tissue volume. He will 
explain how typically, the transferred fat results in an increase in volume of the body site 
being treated. He will explain how before the removal procedure begins the areas from 
where the fat is being removed are injected with a tumescent fluid which helps to minimize 
bruising and discomfort to the patient. He will explain how and why the adipose tissue or 
fat is freed and ultimately removed from the body via a cannula placed through a small 
incision in the patient's skin. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss and describe how the adipose tissue is then 
prepared to be re-injected back into the patient's body and strategically placed into the 
desired area using either a smaller cannula, or as was done in this case, a needle. He 
will render the opinion that the manner, method and volume by which Dr. Kerr re-injected 
the adipose tissue back into the patient was appropriate in all respects. He will explain 
how some of the fat that is transferred often does not maintain its volume over time, which 
is often addressed by the physician having to re-inject more adipose tissue into a specific 
location to achieve the desired end aesthetic result. He will explain how the fat transfer 
procedure was done using a local anesthetic and that this was consistent with the local 
standard of practice given the nature and extent of the procedure. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the entries in Dr. Kerr's 
records including the first encounter with the patient on July 13, 2010, what treatment she 
desired, the fact that this was an elective procedure, that it was a purely cosmetic 
procedure, he will discuss the entries in patient's health history form, the general state of 
the patient's health and the absence of risk factors for infection preoperatively, the fact 
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that she had previously had a liposuction procedure and desired further treatment of this 
type. To the extent it is relevant to his opinions, Dr. Laurence will also discuss Dr. Kerr's 
operative report as well as an explanation of how the procedure was performed, the 
patient's vital signs and her clinical condition before and after the surgery as well as at the 
post-operative visit with the patient. He will discuss the adequacy of the Dr. Kerr's 
post-operative discu~sions, instructions and directions shared with the patient and then 
ultimately the discussions he had with patient's husband and aunt. Dr. Laurence will 
explain that Krystal Ballard appeared to be in good health and without a urinary tract 
infection before the procedure on July 21, 2010 and there is no evidence that she had a 
urinary tract infection and that the pre-operative work up of Dr. Kerr was within the 
standard of health care practice. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the technical aspects of the Vaser liposuction 
procedure including how the local anesthetic is given, how the tumescent anesthetic is 
prepared and injected, what it does to the adipose tissue, how the Vaser device operates 
to liquefy the adipose tissue, how and where the cannulas are placed, the amount of 
energy applied to the device to effectuate the desired impact on the adipose tissue, and 
the amount of traction applied to free the adipose tissue. From his unique perspective as 
a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Laurence will explain the artistic nature of the liposuction 
procedure and the laborious aspect of moving the cannula back and forth in order to 
feather the tissue and achieve the desired aesthetic result which varies depending on the 
location of the procedure and the body habitus and surgical goals of each patient. 
In the process of providing his opinions that the care by Dr. Kerr was 
appropriate, Dr. Laurence will also explain the manner and method by which the adipose 
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tissue harvested was then drained and prepared for reinjection. He will also discuss how 
the instruments and equipment are routinely cleaned and sterilized for each procedure, 
he will discuss these pieces of equipment as well as their various attachments as well as 
describing the medical equipment which is new versus that which must be re-sterilized for 
reuse between patients and/or procedures. Dr. Laurence will discuss the pre and 
post-operative antibiotics administered by Dr. Kerr to the patient and explain why they 
were appropriate medications to give to the patient as a prophylaxis against infection. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss how the patient never appeared infected or septic 
per the medical records and deposition testimony. He will discuss the expected 
localized pain patients can expect to experience following a fat transfer procedure. To 
the extent it becomes relevant to aid in expressing his favorable opinions, Dr. Laurence 
may also discuss the cardinal signs of infection and how the patient did not have any fever 
or warmth to the surgical area, there was no oozing of pus or other signs of active 
drainage from the operative sites, and there was no swelling or signs of a rash or change 
in condition of the skin surrounding the area or abnormal odor. 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the appropriate manner in which Dr. Kerr looked 
for and then properly documented the absence of signs and symptoms of infection during 
his postoperative visit on July 23 and in his subsequent discussions with the patient and 
her family prior to her death. He will testify that he concurs with Dr. Kerr that at no point 
did the patient present to Dr. Kerr as having an infection, nor did the standard of practice 
applicable to Dr. Kerr require him to refer the patient, prescribe a different course of 
medical care or obtain any further diagnostic testing than was done. 
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Consistent with his background and experience in medicine and surgery, 
Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge ·of gram negative rods and the fact that such 
organisms do not exist on or in the skin, nor would they be found on surgical instruments. 
Instead, they represent a class of bacteria which reside in the urinary tract and bowels of 
a patient. He will testify that Dr. Kerr had adequate training and experience to perform 
the surgeries in question, that Dr. Kerr's medical records contain an adequate description 
of the care rendered and the discussions with the patient, that Dr. Kerr implemented 
appropriate sterility techniques and conditions for surgery and that he used correct 
solutions for cleaning and disinfecting instruments and assuring that operative conditions 
were adequately sterile to guard against the risk of infection. He will testify that 
postoperative infections can and do occur even under ideal conditions which are not the 
subject malpractice, but rather as accepted complications which are impossible to 
prevent. 
To the extent the surgical selection is questioned or needs further 
explanation at trial, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to discuss why the Vaser procedure is 
an appropriate method of removing unwanted adipose tissue in a patient like Krystal 
Ballard. As part of his testimony and in order to expand upon his background and 
experience in cosmetic surgery, Dr. Laurence may offer testimony explaining how the 
field of laser lipolysis with the use of tumescent anesthesia has developed in recent years. 
This may include testimony addressing that when considering different types of the body 
for lipolysis that each area has its own unique geography and involves a degree of 
physician judgment as to how much material to remove and/or re-inject into each location. 
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As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will be prepared to explain the positioning of the 
patient, · incision sites, pre and post-operative photos, patient · behavior, choice of 
instruments, his artistic eye and attention to detail, management of patient expectations, 
and patient education and counseling from the intormed consent phase through the 
postoperative follow up period. He is expected to utilize at trial various anatomical 
illustrations as well as various cannulas and related instrumentation for the procedures at 
issue including those depicted in the discovery photos of instruments and supplies 
produced to date. 
As part of his testimony, he will explain how Vaser Lipa involves a minimally 
invasive technique to selectively break apart and gently remove unwanted fat. He will 
explain how the targeted area is injected with a special saline solution known as 
tumescent fluid which numbs the target area and shrinks local blood vessels. This also 
temporarily expands the volume of the targeted area, making fat cells easier to remove. 
With the use of exemplars, he will demonstrate how small-diameter probes are then 
inserted into the body through small incisions. He will explain how by way of using a 
resonating high ultrasonic frequency, the probes literally shake loose fat cells - while 
leaving blood vessels, nerves and connective tissues unharmed. The loose fat cells mix 
with the tumescent fluid, which is then removed from the body using gentle suction. After 
the surgery, patients are prescribed a recovery regimen to promote maximum skin 
retraction, smoother results with minimal recovery time compared to traditional 
liposuction. 
Dr. Laurence may also discuss his knowledge of the history of tumescent 
technique liposuction which was started by dermatologists, not plastic surgeons. As part 
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of his explanation of the surgery at issue, he will describe how the affected area is 
expected to drain postoperatively, the types of dressings placed on the affected area, the 
instructions given to the patient, he will discuss the cardinal signs of an infection and how 
Dr. Kerr's records and deposition evidence that he specifically and appropriately 
evaluated and questioned the patient and then documented in his records regarding 
these issues on each encounter he had with the patient. He will discuss the amount of 
time it takes to perform the procedures in question and that there was nothing usual or out 
of character regarding the amount of time it took Dr. Kerr to perform the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. 
As outlined above, Dr. Laurence will discuss his knowledge of the various 
cosmetic organizations to which he belongs and/or has knowledge of, what they offer 
their members and the opportunities to associate with colleagues and obtain continuing 
education in this emerging field. Dr. Laurence will explain the adequacy of the 
postoperative evaluation Dr. Kerr undertook on July 23, 2010 for evaluating Krystal 
Ballard and assessing whether there was any clinical evidence of infection of the surgical 
sites, including absence of any abnormal odor or other evidence or suggestion of 
infection of any of the surgical sites. 
He will discuss his review and comments of the autopsy record and the 
patient's subsequent treatment records. By way of example, Dr. Laurence is expected to 
discuss the hospital records from Elmore Medical Center and Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, including the laboratory reports showing the patient had 3+ bacteria in 
her urine. Based on his experience in family practice, he will render the opinion that this 
laboratory finding is consistent with, and provides strong evidence of, an infectious 
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process located within the patient's bladder. He will explain how the bladder is also an 
area wherein gram negative rod bacteria are known to populate and exist in the face of an 
infection. 
Dr. Laurence will also comment upon the significance from his perspective 
regarding how the patient did not present with any fever, but had a WBC count of 14.7. 
He will discuss causes for an elevated WBC count including surgery, stress and 
dehydration. He will comment upon the fact that the autopsy failed to address the 
patient's bladder or urinary tract (aside from the kidneys) or perform any microscopic 
examination of that organ to address the nature of the bacteria identified in the positive 
UA performed at Elmore Medical Center on July 25, 2010. He is also expected to 
discuss the patient's elevated creatinine and how this can be signs of dehydration as well 
as the evidence that the patient's kidneys were not functioning properly. 
Dr. Laurence will address the vague and confusing nature of the autopsy 
report wherein the pathologist at autopsy referred to an increase in the amount of acute 
inflammatory cells within tissue from the surgical sites, and how it is not clear which 
surgical.sites he is referring to in his report. He will discuss how it is not clear where the 
tissue sections where harvested from on the patient. Dr. Laurence will render the 
opinion, more likely than not, that the gram negative bacterial rods were introduced into 
the patient's surgical site sometime after Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure rather than being 
introduced during the procedure. 
He will comment upon the significance of the finding by Dr. Kerr that when 
he saw the patient on July 23, two days post operatively, he did not observe any evidence 
of cellulitis or redness in the surgical site. He will discuss what it means to him as a 
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physician that the patient repeatedly concealed this procedure from her husband, her 
employer and that she engaged in noncompliant behavior despite what she had been told 
both in writing and verbally about how to care for herself and what she agreed to do. He 
will discuss the challenging position the patient elected to place herself and her health 
care provider in by erroneously reporting to her husband that she had simply fallen and 
injured her back and falsely claimed this was the source of her pain rather than admit she 
had cosmetic surgery performed. 
In this regard, he will discuss how the patient admitted she was not taking 
her medications because she did not want proof of them to show up in any drug screen 
she might take with the military. He will discuss that when a patient elects to disobey her 
health care provider that there is only so much the physician can do and that the patient is 
essentially interfering with and limiting the physician's ability to provide her with care and 
to make decisions which may have made a difference in her overall outcome. He will 
discuss concerns regarding whether the patient was properly changing her bandages and 
caring for herself as instructed and how during any of these times would have been an 
opportunity for the bacteria in question to be introduced into her system. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that Dr. Kerr and his employees followed the 
appropriate sterile technique in regards to the procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
He will explain that there are no absolutes with a sterile technique and that one can do 
everything right and still have situations where unwanted bacteria can become introduced 
into the surgical site, but that given the gram negative rods claimed to have been 
identified at autopsy, this is not what occurred in this case. He will discuss the patient's 
admission that she was not taking the narcotic pain medication Norco and was instead 
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taking the non-narcotic drug Motrin which did not appear to be providing the patient with 
adequate pain control. 
Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that the minimal amount of bruising and 
edema observed on July 23 was consistent with wh~t he would expect to see at that point 
postoperatively. He will testify that the standard of practice did not require Dr. Kerr to 
obtain a complete blood count on the patient on July 23 in order to determine what her 
white count was at that time. He will discuss his background, training and experience in 
the use and regular implementation of the sterile technique in his practice in order to lay a 
foundation for his opinions as to the adequacy of Dr. Kerr's sterile technique. Dr. 
Laurence will discuss how liposuction and fat transfers are office based procedures which 
are not required to be performed in a hospital setting, nor are hospital privileges required 
in order to perform such procedures. Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr 
was not required, nor does the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, require that his 
facility be certified or approved by any accreditation facility such as the MACH or 
AAAASF or any governmental agency. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will render the opinion that Dr. Kerr's 
procedure room was properly prepared for surgery and to protect and preserve an 
appropriate sterile field. He will discuss the autoclave at issue, how it operates and how 
it helps Dr. Kerr maintain a sterile field for his procedures. He will discuss the areas 
around the patient which are considered part of the sterile field depending on the nature 
and type of procedure at issue. He will discuss the operation and use of the Vaser 
ultrasonic lipolysis machine utilized for the procedure in this case. He will explain how 
the tumescent lidocaine is mixed, prepared and injected into the patient. He will explain 
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how the Vaser procedure is done with the device in place under the skin without direct 
visualization. He will discuss how Dr. Kerr documented having harvested 400 cc of fat 
from the patient's anterior abdomen, 200 cc of fat from her right lateral waist flank and 200 
cc of fat from the patient's left lateral waist flank. He will discuss how the Vaser in this 
case was utilized for less than eleven minutes and that this time was appropriate for the 
nature of the procedure. 
As it relates to rebutting the testimony of the Plaintiffs experts, Dr. Laurence 
will explain how the fat was injected into the patient using only a needle and syringe and 
that there were no incisions made into the patient during the injection phase of the 
procedure. He will testify that it was proper and acceptable technique for the same 
needles to be used to inject the fat into both the left and right buttocks of the patient. He 
will discuss the adequacy of the informed consent discussion Dr. Kerr had with the patient 
including the content of the informed consent document signed by the patient in this case. 
He will discuss the risk of infection as being a specifically consented risk of the lipolysis 
and fat injection procedure. He will discuss how the consent form discusses with the 
patient both pre and post treatment instructions and how it warns the patient that if they 
fail to comply with these instructions may increase the possibility that the patient will 
develop complications. 
Dr. Laurence will challenge the foundation as well as rebut the opinions of 
the expert witnesses listed by the Plaintiff. Regarding the issue of consent, he will testify 
that Dr. Kerr discussed with the patient the nature and the extent of the risks normally 
attendant to the procedure in question such that the giving of consent by the patient was 
valid in all respects. As part of his testimony, he may also discuss the adequacy of Dr. 
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Kerr's preoperative clinical examination including evaluation of the regions to be 
lipo-contoured including review for hernias, scars, asymmetries, cellulite, stretch marks, 
the quality of the skin and its elasticity, the presence of stria and dimpling and the location 
of fat deposits. He will rebut any testimony by Plaintiff's experts that Dr. Kerr improperly 
performed the lipolysis procedure, the fat injection procedure, that Dr. Kerr improperly 
sterilized his equipment or that Dr. Kerr did anything to cause the patient's death. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence may also address and explain the 
weight changes of Krystal Ballard. On July 23, 2010 she weighed 135 pounds. On July 
25, 2010 at Elmore Medical Center she weighed 130 pounds. At autopsy on July 26, 2010 
she weighed 180 pounds. He will explain the medical reasons and significance of these 
changes in weight. He may also comment upon the entries in the records from Elmore 
Medical Center for July 25, 2010, wherein the treating physician evaluated the buttocks 
and abdomen of Krystal Ballard and noted little induration of the skin and no redness, 
warmth or skin sensitivity and delayed the administration of IV antibiotics until 4 % hours 
after admission. At Elmore, cardiac ejection fraction was only 17% and at Saint 
Alphonsus on July 25, 2010, central venous pressure was measured at 20 which is very 
high and proof of fluid overload. To the extent it relates to his opinions on causation, Dr. 
Laurence will explain these factors and their relative significance in terms of the possible 
reasons for the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Laurence will testify that the laboratory data of Elmore Medical Center 
and the clinical findings are indicative of urinary tract infection the developed after his 
procedure of July 21, 2010 and if gram negative rods were in fact present at autopsy in 
certain locations, they came from the urinary tract of Krystal Ballard or her intestinal tract 
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and were not introduced during his surgical procedure. As part of his testimony, it is 
expected that Dr. Laurence will explain pertinent anatomy, infectious processes, 
pathophysiology of infections, treatment for infections, gram negative rods, types of 
bacteria, reasons why the blood cultures and urine cultures were negative for growth, 
antibiotics used for the care and the comments of Krystal Ballard regarding that drugs 
would show up on drug test by the Air Force. 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Laurence will discuss the patient's anatomy 
including the location of nerves, blood supply, adipose tissue, organs as well as the 
body's response to surgery, infection, pain medication and antibiotics. This may 
include extensive testimony by way of demonstrative exhibits depicting general anatomy 
and/or pictures of the patient and/or of the surgical equipment itself. Dr. Laurence will 
testify that even in hindsight the patient in this case did not present with any increased risk 
for infection that would have raised any concern about her undergoing the procedures on 
July 21, 2010. He will testify that at the time of Dr. Kerr's procedure on July 21, 2010, 
there was no evidence of a urinary tract infection of Krystal Ballard. 
Data and other information considered and summary of qualifications: In 
forming his opinions, Dr. Laurence has relied upon his own unique training and 
experience as a licensed physician engaged in the medical specialty of cosmetic surgery 
in Tennessee in treating, diagnosing, managing and caring for patients like Krystal 
Ballard, his observations of the habits and practices of other cosmetic surgeons and care 
providers, his knowledge of the Boise, Idaho standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 
201 O and his knowledge that it is within Dr. Kerr's specialty and capability to perform the 
procedures in question as part of his practice of medicine, and his membership and 
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participation in various medical associations and organizations as set forth herein. The 
data upon which his opinions are based include his medical education, training, skill, 
experience, his experience practicing cosmetic surgery, his review of the care and 
treatment experiences with similar lipolysis and fat injection cases over the course of his 
career in medicine. 
Dr. Laurence's opinions are also based upon the findings of various other 
health care providers for the patient, the results and values of various laboratory studies 
and other testing and observation, treatment plans, consultations, referrals and 
recommendations for treatment for the patient derived from such medical services and 
interactions before, during and after the care rendered by Dr. Kerr as described in all 
medical records, discovery responses and depositions taken. Dr. Laurence's 
professional background and qualifications are set forth in his attached curriculum vitae 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
As part of his review of this case, and for purposes of forming his opinions, 
he has considered and reviewed the depositions taken to date including Dr. Kerr's, 
employees of Silk Touch, and the Plaintiff's. He has also reviewed and considered Dr. 
Kerr's medical records, the records of Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance 
Service, Life Flight, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, the Ada County Coroner's 
Office and the Plaintiff's expert witness disclosure. In the event further depositions or 
medical records are produced, they will also be considered. The data and information 
considered by Dr. Laurence in forming his opinions consist of the medical records of Dr. 
Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, Elmore Medical Center, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, Ada County Coroner, Autopsy Report of Dr. Graben, documents previously 
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produced for the training, received by Dr. Kerr, including seminars attended, photographs 
of the equipment used by Dr. Kerr in his operation, photographs of Krystal Ballard taken 
by Dr. Kerr, autoclave of Dr. Kerr, curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr, records of Silk Touch 
regarding procedures that involved no infections, anatomical illustrations, all the 
documents and material described and noted in this disclosure. The exhibits to be used 
for support of his opinions included the items and documents described above, his 
curriculum vitae, and his qualifications are set forth in his curriculum vitae. His 
publications are listed in his curriculum vitae. His fees for testifying are $500 per hour for 
deposition and $4,000 per day for trial plus travel expenses. In the last four (4) years, he 
has testified at trial in the case of Chopra v. Medi-Spa of Memphis, Shelby County, TN. 
Dr. Laurence reserves the right to rely as further support for his opinions on 
medical literature related to any of the subjects set forth in this disclosure as discovery 
continues. Dr. Laurence reserves the right not to offer all or any of the opinions set forth 
in this disclosure as it as an attorney prepared document and is intentionally worded 
broadly in order to comply with rule 26(b)(4). The ultimate testimony to be offered at trial 
will depend to an extent on what testimony is deemed necessary to refute the testimony of 
the Plaintiff and his experts consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1012. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof and it is only after that burden has been met can the 
defense determine what evidence and testimony will be needed to respond. 
Alan W. Frankie, Ph.D. 
1491 Lewis Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Subject Matter: Damages and economic analysis. 
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reviewed, considered and/or relied upon in some fashion by one or more of the defense 
experts to support, address and explain their opinions and rebut the opinions of Plaintiff's 
experts. All of the exhibits referred to in the Answer to Plaintiff's Third Set of Discovery 
Requests have been produced to Plaintiff or are in the possession of the Plaintiff and his 
counsel. The same is true as respects the material and items referred to in the Answers to 
the Interrogatory No. 1. It is unreasonable and unduly burdensome to reproduce this 
material in response to this Request. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jere ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
.PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104 
Telephone (334) 262-6485 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand Delivered, w/ attachments 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, w/o attachments 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, w/o attachments 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (334) 262-0657 
U!LA~ 
~ Jeremiah A. Quane 
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7485 Poplar Pike 
Gennantown, TN 38138 
(901) 752-4999 
Gregory N. Laur~nce, M.D .. 
Professional Experience 
Medical Director, Complete Medical Care Germantown & Germantown Aesthetics Surgery Center 
Hospital Laparotomy privileges 
Qualified in laparoscopic procedures 
Obstetrical Family-centered care 
Capable abdominal and vascular ultrasound 
Training, experience, and proven ability in office cosmetic surgery, facial and body 
Diplomat 1995-2000 
Board American Academy of Family Fellow 2000-present 
Certification Physicians 
8880 Ward Parkway 
Kansas City, Missouri 64114-2797 
September 1995-present 
American Board of Laser Surgery 
Diplomat · · 
2009 - present 
Medical Tennessee #25017-lssued 10/26/93 
Licensure State of Tennessee Division of Health 
Related Boards. Expires·B/30/2013 
Idaho, pending licensure 
Utah, pending licensure 
Fellow 
Medical May 2008 American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Education Surgery 
July 1995-June 1996 The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
Fellowship in Advanced Women's Health 
Director, Charles E. C.ouch, M.D., 
FACOG 
July 1992-:June 1995 The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
UT/Saint Francis Family Practice 
Residencv Protiram. Memphis, TN 
August 1988-June 1992 University of Texas at Houston Medical 
School, Houston, Texas-M.D. Degree 
June 1992 
Previous January 1987-May 1987 University of Houston, Houston, Texas 
Education Graduate Studies 
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September 1981-May 1986 Baylor University 
Waco.Texas 
B.S. Dei;iree in Biology 
American Institute of Ultrasound in 
Society Medicine (AIUM) 1994-present 
Memberships 
Association of American Physicians 
and Surgery 1999-present 
American Academy of Family 
Physicians (MFP) 1992-present 
American Society of Cosmetic Breast 
Surgeons 2003-present 
National Society of Cosmetic 
Physicians 2011-present 
American.Congress of Phlebology 
2009-present 
Hospital Baptist Memorial Hospital - East, 
Appointments Department of Family Medicine 
Chairman October 1999 - 2000 
Baptist Memorial Hospital - East. 
Medical Executive Committee, 2000 
Tenet/SL Francis Hospital, 
Maternal/Fetal Well-Being Committee 
1998-2000 
Methodist Hospital, FP/08 Joint 
Practice Committee 1998 - 2000 
University The University of Tennessee, 
App_ointments Memphis 
Department of Family Medicine 
Clinical Instructor July 1, 1995-June 
30, 1996 
Associate Clinical Professor July 1, 
1996-present 
Hospital Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Appointments Saint Francis Hospital Methodist Hospital 
5959 Park Avenue 1265 Union Avenue 
Memphis, TN 38119 Memphis, TN 38104 
August 7, 1995-present December 1~ 1996-2003 
Active Staff Courtesy Staff 
Baptist Memorial Hospital Delta Medical Center 
899 Madison Avenue 3000 Getwell Road 
Memphis, TN 38146 Memphis, TN 38118 
October 1996-present September 12, 1996-present 
(901) 369-8517; fax 369-8503 






Private Practice (August 1996-1999) 
Peabody Healthcare 
6005 Park Avenue Suite 4248 
Memphis, TN 38119 
Private Practice (August 1999-2002) 
Laurence Family Practice & Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2002-:-2008) 
Germantown Family Practice & 
Obstetrics 
2195 West Street 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (2003-present) 
Germantown Aesthetics, LP 
7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August ~008-
present) 
Complete Medical Care Germantown 
7485 Poplar Pike 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Private Practice (August 2009-
present) 
The Vein Institute 
7 485 Poplar Pike · 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Laurence, Gregory; Orientale, 
Eugene, Jr., "Colorectal Cancer: 
Screening Diagnosis and 
Management," Manual of Family 
Practice; ed.: Robert B. Taylor, 
publish~r: Little Brown. 1996. 
Laurence, Gregory, ~obstetrical 
Privileging in Memphis," Tennessee 
Family Physician; ed.: J. Lou Manning, 
pg 8-9, wint~r 1999. 
Laurence, Gregory, "MemoryGel TM 
Breast Implant Post-Approval Study," 
IRB Company, Inc; ed.: Clinical Study. 
5271 Mentor PAS 
June 30 - July 3, 2001 
July10 -July 12, 2002 
June 2003 
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Subfascial Breast Augmentation 
Internal Mastopexy 
J. Dan Metcalf, MD (Oklahoma City, OK) 
Transumbilical Breast Augmentaion 
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June 2004 Robert Shumway, rylD (LaJolla, CA) 
June2003 Biplanar Breast Augment~tion 
( 
June2004 Chip Splinter, MD (San Diego, CA) 
June2004 Transumbilical Breast Augmentation 
June 2005 Peter Cheski, MO (Beverley Hills, _CA) 
Adam Baker, M.D. 
References 2120 Merchants Row Ste 2 
Germantown, TN 38138 
Ph: (901) 362-7170 
Susan Nelson, M.D. 
2032 Satinwood 
M~mphis, TN 38119 
(901) 758-8287 
William Macmillan Rodney, M.D. 
Chairman University of Tennessee 
Department of Family Medicine, 1989-
1997 
6575 Black Thorn Cove 
Memphis, TN 38119 
(901) 753-0423 
Malpractice State Volunteer Mutual Insurance 
Insurance Company 
Carrier 
1 M/3M coverage 8/5/96 to present 
101 Westpark Drive, Suite 300, P.O. 
Box 1065 
Brentwood, Tennessee 37024-1065 
(615) 377-1999 or (800) 342-2239; fax 
{615) 377-9192 
DEA Certificate BL3847083, exp 3/31/2014 
University of Tennessee Community 
Honors Physicians Award for teaching medical 
students 2003 · 
"Physician Champion" for Baptist 
Memorial Hospital Celebrate Nursing 
Germantown News Reader's Choice 
Award "Best Physician• - 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009 2010.2011 
Plastic Surgery. Practice 
Best of 2011 
Named 'One of the Top Cosmetic 
Suraeons in the Nation' 
The Aesthetic Awards 2011-2012 
Awarded 'Best Non-Surgical Facial 
Reiuvenation' 
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7 485 Poplar Pike, Germantown, TN 38138 
901-752-4999 
SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS 
Medical Director, Complete Medical Care Germantown and Germantown Aesthetics Skin Center 
Hospital surgical privileges, Level Ill 
Qualified in laparoscopic procedures 
Qualified ultrasound imaging 
Surgical qualifications: 
• Multi-modality surgical and nonsurgical facial aesthetics 
• Surgical body contouring 
• Primary breast augmentation and augmentation-mastopexy 
FAMILY 
• Elizabeth, wife • William, son 
• Jacob, son • Andrew, son 
BOARD CERTIFICATION 
September 1995-Present I American Academy of Family Physicians 
8880 Ward Parkway 
Kansas City, MO 64144-2797 
BOARD STATUS 
2009 (eligible) I American Board of Laser Surgery 
Diplomat 1995 -1999 I American Board of Family Practice 
Fellow2000-Present I Ameri_can Board of Family Practice 
MEDICAL LICENSURE 
October 26, 1993 I State of Tennessee Division of Health Related Boards 
Expires June 30, 2013 - #25017 
MEDICAL EDUCATION 
May 2008 I American Society of Cosmetic Breast Surgery - Fellow 
July 1995-June 1996 I The University of Tennessee 
Memphis Fellowship in Advanced Women's Health, Charles E. Couch, M.D., FACOG 
July 1992-June 1995 I The University of Tennessee 
Memphis UT /Saint Francis Family Practice Residency Program, Memphis, TN 
PREVIOUS EDUCATION 
August2008-June 1992 I University of Texas at Houston Medical School 
M.D. Degree, Houston, TX 
January 1987-May 1987 I University of Houston 
Graduate Studies, Houston, TX 
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PREViOlJS EDUCATION (CONT'D.) 
January 1981 -May 1986 I Baylor University 
Bachelor of Science in Biology, Waco, TX 
HONORS AND AWARDS 
2012 I The Aesthetic Show, Las Vegas, NV 
"Best Non-Surgical Facial Rejuvenation Enhancement" 
2012 I Germantown Chamber of Commerce 
"Small Business of the Year" 
2012 I Germantown Chamber of Commerce 
"Small Business of the Year" 
2012 I Best Plastic and Cosmetic Surgeons 
"The Personal Touch" 
2011 I Best Plastic and Cosmetic Surgeons 
"Putting Patients First" 
.2001-2009 I Germantown News Reader's Choice Award 
2003 I Community Physicians Award 
Community Physicians Award for teaching medical students 
2003 I Baptist Memorial Hospital 
Celebrate Nursing - "Physician Champion" 
SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS 
2013 I Tennessee Society of Laser Medicine and Surgery 
2011-Present I American Academy of Cosmetic Surgery (AACS) 
2003-Present I American Society of Cosmetic Breast Surgeons 
1994-Present I American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine (AIUM) 
1 999 - Present I A s s o ci at i o n o f A mer i ca n P h y s i ci a n s a n d Su r g er y 
1992-Present I American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) 
2011-Present I American College of Phlebology, Aesthetic Faculty 
HOSPITAL APPOINTMENTS 
August7, 1995-Present I Tenet/Saint Francis Hospital, Memphis, TN 
Active Staff 
October 1996-Present I Baptist Memorial Hospital, Memphis, TN 
Active Staff 
December 1, 1996-Present I Methodist Hospital, Memphis, TN 
Courtesy Staff 
September 12, 1996-Present I Delta Medical Center, Memphis, TN 
Courtesy Staff 
2000 I Ba pt i st Me m or i a I H o spit a I , Me m phi s, TN 
Medical Executive Committee. 
2000 I Methodist Hospital, Memphis, TN 
FP /OB Joint Practice Committee 
1 999 - 2000 I Ba pt is t Me m o r i a I Ho s pit a I , Me mp h i s, TN 
Chairman, Department of Family Medicine 
1998-2000 I Tenet/Saint Francis Hospital, Memphis, TN 
Maternal/Fetal Well-Being Committee 
·-------------··----·-------------· ----- . ------·------------------
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UNIVERSITY APPOINTMENTS 
July 1, 1996-present I The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
Associate Clinical Professor, Department of Family Medicine 
July 1, 1995-June 30, 1996 I The University of Tennessee, Memphis 
Clinical Instructor, Department of Family Medicine 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
2012 I Product Launch of New Medical Device 
Kuwait 
1 996 - 1 999 I Pe a b o d y He a Ith ca re, Me m phis, TN 
Private Practice 
1999-2002 I Laurence Family Practice & Obstetrics, Germantown, TN 
Private Practice 
2002-2008 .1 Germantown Family Practice & Obstetrics, Germantown, TN 
Private Practice 
2008- Present I Complete Medical Care of Germantown, Germantown, TN 
Private Practice 
2009-Present I The Vein Institute, Germantown, TN 
Private Practice 
October 2012 I Tennessee Academy of Family Physicians 
Alternate Delegate from District l 0, Memphis Chapter 
Shelby County President 
October 2013 I Tennessee Academy of Family Physicians 
Alternate Delegate from District l 0, Memphis Chapter 
Shelby County President 
PUBLICATIONS 
Laurence, Gregory; Orientale, Eugene, Jr., "Colorectal Cancer: Screening Diagnosis and Management," Manual of 
Family Practice; ed.: Robert B. Taylor, publisher: Little Brown. 1996. 
Laurence, Gregory, "Obstetrical Privileging in Memphis," Tennessee Family Physician; ed.: J. Lou Manning, pg 8-9, 
winter 1999. 
Laurence, Gregory, "MemoryGel TM Breast Implant Post-Approval Study" IRB Company, Inc; ed.: Clinical Study. 5271 
Mentor PAS 
Lourence, Gregory, "Implant Rippling and Polpobility" Mugea T. Shiffmon MA (ed), New Frontiers in Aesthetic Surgery 
of the Breast; 2013 
PRECEPTORSHIPS 
June 2005 I Peter Cheski, M.O., Beverly Hills, CA 
June 2004 I Chip Splinter, M.D., San Diego, CA 
June 2004 I Robert Sumway, M.O., LaJolla, CA 
June 2004 I Transumbilical Breast Augmentation 
June 2003 I Transumbilical Breast Augmentation 
June 2003 I Biplanar Breast Augmentation 
June 10,2001 -July 12, 2002 I J. Dan Metcalf, M.D., Oklahoma City, OK 
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Been arrested, dted, cllarged.with'or ·convicted· of a felony·or misdemeanor other than minor traffic violations, 
·regardlessofthe·outcoriie? , ., : ' . ··;, : , ., ,. · .. : ;:., I '·'>· .. 
I. [ ] [ ] Had any sen9w physical or m~ntal ~onditionw~ch in any~y impairs.odimits your ability to-practice yow:: 
medical ptofessfon·with reasonable skill and safety? · 
J. [ ] [ ] Had issues·wi'th.ihe ~~ ~falcohol; stimulants, habit forming and/ or illegal drugs which in any way impairs or 
limits your abi)ity to practice yom meqig,a1 pr~f~$iqn -~th re~nable skill, ilqc;l)afety1 (V o,~titj PRN 9r ,PHP 
participants may answer NO) · ' • · 
K. [ ] [ ] IDA CARE: Ensured'that your IDA CARE profile is current in accordance with Idaho Code Section ·54-460 I? 
L. [ ] [ ] AJTESTATION: I atte~ that i hav.e·coinpletcd 40 hours ofCateg<>iy I Continuing Medical EducatiOll,in the last 2 
yelµ'S •. (20 hours· of Category 1 CME:every 1 year) · :·, N • 
M. [ ] { ] ATTESTATION: l attest that,. as a licensee, I will serve as. a physician panelist for prelitigation screening panels 
when called u~on to do so, as REQUIRED pursuant to IDAPA 22.01,.01.081. 
AFFIDAVIT: I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that my responses to the above are true and.correct, and that I 
am lawfully entitled to renew the license noted above. 
Signature ot·A~plicant · . Date 
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INFORMATION SHEET 
DEFENDANT: GREGORY N. LAURENCE 
YEAR OF BIRTH: 1942 
ADDRESS: Germantown, TN 
COMPLAINT FILED? YES _x NO 
IF YES, PROIVDE MAGISTRATE CASE NUMBER. ______ _ 
HAS DEFENDANT BEEN ARRESTED ON COMPLAINT? __ YES __ NO 
OFFENSE: COUNT 5: 
COUNT 6: 
LOCATION OF OFFENSE: 
PENAL TY: COUNT 5: 
COUNT 6: 
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), Corrupt Endeavor to Obstruct or 
Impede Due Administration of IRS Laws, and Aiding 
and Abetting 
18 U.S.C. § 1503, Obstruction of Justice 
County of Denver, CO 
NMT 3 years' imprisonment, a fine of NMT the greater 
of $250,000 or 2x the gain/loss from the offense, or 
both; 3 years' supervised release; $100 special 
assessment. 
NMT 10 years' imprisonment, a fine of NMT the 
greater of $250,000 or 2x the gain/loss from the 
offense, or both; 3 years' supervised release; $100 
special assessment. 
AGENT: Special Agents Michelle Hagemann & Richard Ptak, IRS-CID 
AUTHORIZED BY: Matthew T. Kirsch & Anna Edgar, Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
ESTIMATED TIME OF TRIAL: Over five days 
THE GOVERNMENT will not seek detention in this case. 
OCDETF case: NA 
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0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE 
COUNSELPER~HEAMENDED 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 
Undersigned counsel for the Defendants hereby certifies that the Court 
ordered exchange of information conference with counsel for the Plaintiff was conducted 
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SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 1 
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October 22, 2013 and that a discussion was held on matters specified by Rules 16(a) and 
16(b), I.R.C.P. and the attorneys for the parties engaged in an exchange of information. 
The subject of settlement or alternate dispute resolution was brought up by Defense 
counsel and discussed. For the first time in the history of the case, counsel for the Plaintiff 
said that his client would agree to mediation, even though the trial is scheduled to start 
November 5, 2013. Defense counsel had to decline the untimely suggestion of mediation 
due to the date the trial was to start, the impossibility of arranging mediation on such short 
notice and the fact that the bulk of the trial preparations had been completed and that 
defense counsel would be completely occupied with continued trial preparations. 
Persons disclosed as possible witnesses for the Defendants 




Dr. Thomas Coffman 
Dr. Charles Garrison 
Dr. Gregory Laurence 
Dr. Alan Frankie 
Dr. John Lundeby 
Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
Stephanie Miller 
Dr. Karl Olson 
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Dr. Matthew Campbell 
Dr. Glen Graben 
Dr. Billy Morgan 
Dr. Howard Schaff 




Dr. Tisha Fujii 
Charles Ballard 
Descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence by 
the Defendants 
1. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr; 
2. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Laurence; 
3. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison; 
4. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman; 
5. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Frankie; 
6. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby; 
7. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller. 
8. Medical records of Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Laser. 
9. Records of Elmore Medical Center for treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
10. Records of Elmore Ambulance Service for care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard. 
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11. Records of Life Flight for care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
12. Records of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of 
Krystal Ballard. 
13. Records of Ada County Coroner. 
14. Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard. 
15. 21 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken by Dr. Kerr for his operative 
procedure. 
16. 43 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken at autopsy. 
17. 6 photographs of Susan Kerr that depict the positions of Krystal 
Ballard for the operative procedure of Dr. Kerr. 
18. Photographs of brain and kidney tissue from the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard prepared by Dr. Garrison that show the presence of fat emboli. 
19. Autopsy tissue slides. 
20. 4 photographs of Krystal Ballard that depict the entry sites by 
markings for liposuction and fat transfer. 
21. Report of Dr. Morgan. 
22. CT study of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010. 
23. Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010. 
24. Report of Dr. Schaff for chest x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010. 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 4 
001537
25. Visible glass container that shows the quantity of fluid measured in 
milliliters or the equivalent in cubic centimeters. 
26. Medical devices, equipment, supplies, packaged material, autoclave 
and instruments used by Dr. Kerr for his procedures with photographs of the same. 
27. Compilation of data and database for operative procedures of Dr. 
Kerr by date, procedure and patient's first name from December of 2007 through 
December 23, 2010, with Krystal Ballard identified on July 21, 2010 and the number of 
liposuction procedures, consisting of a total of 338 procedures. 
28. Documents, records, material, data and calendars produced with 
Defendants responses to Plaintiff's First Requests for Production of Documents dated 
June 29, 2012. 
29. For illustrative purposes, the following medical artist illustrations: 
a. 18 depicting liposuction of anatomy with and without the 
cannula. 
b. 1 depicting anatomy for fat transfer in the bilateral buttocks. 
c. 1 depicting various tissue layers. 
d. 1 depicting the content of the abdomen. 
e. 1 depicting the urinary system. 
f. 1 depicting gram negative and gram positive bacteria or rods. 
Exhibits counsel have agreed may be received in evidence without 
objection: 
Defense exhibits to which this section applies are numbers 1 through 16, 
19, 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
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The rest of defense exhibits are objected to by the Plaintiff on all grounds 
allowed by law. 
Plaintiff's exhibits to which this section applies are numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24 and 25. 
The rest of Plaintiff's exhibits are objected to by the defense on all grounds 
allowed by law except that no objections will be asserted to the following exhibits on the 
basis of authenticity - numbers 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
The Plaintiff disclosed the following exhibits at the exchange of information 
conference that undersigned counsel has numbered 1 through 37. 
1. Medical records - charts for Silk Touch, Elmore Ambulance, Elmore 
Medical Center, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ada County Coroner including 
Autopsy Report; 
2. Cell phone record of Silk Touch; 
3. Curriculum Vitaes of Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Nichols, Dr. Armitage and 
Cornelius Hofman; 
4. Funeral placard; 
5. Funeral placard; 
6. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
7. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
8. Framed photos of Charles and Krystal; 
9. Photo of Krystal tubing; 
10. Marriage License; 
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11. Death Certificate; 
12. Tillman Funeral Home invoice; 
13. Artistic Flowers invoice; 
14. Memorial program; 
15. Bill from St. Alphonsus; 
16. Bill from Elmore Medical Center; 
17. Bill from Rost Funeral Home; 
18. Bill from Lifeflight; 
19. Memorandum - Extension of Enlistment for PCS (Elmendorf); 
20. USAF Records Certification; 
21. Line of Duty Determination; 
22. Awards and Decorations info; 
23. Air Force Achievement Medal; 
24. Air Force Commendation Medal; 
25. DJMS LES - Krystal; 
26. DJMS LES - Charles; 
27. Letter from Major Thomas Brown to Charles expressing sympathies; 
28. Statement of Service; 
29. Enlisted Performance Review 201 O; 
30. EPR 2009; 
31. EPR 2008; 
32. EPR 2007; 
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33. Reenlistment Eligibility Annex; 
34. Air University CCAF Transcript; 
35. BSU Transcript; 
36. Embry-Riddle Transcript; and 
37. University of Maryland Transcript. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jer miah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of October, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETIING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS DATED SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Y S'eremiah A. Quane 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
( ) 
NO. FILCD 023 2,L' 
A.M. ____ P.M .. ----
OCT 2 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF 
BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
This Memorandum is submitted in opposition to Plaintiff's fifteen Motions 
in Limine filed on October 22, 2013. For ease of organization, this Memorandum tracks 
the order of Motions filed by the Plaintiff. 
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I. The possibility that the Plaintiff may remarry 
Plaintiff contends that the defense should be precluded from offering any 
argument, testimony or evidence pertaining to the issue of whether he will ever remarry 
claiming that it is irrelevant and improper speculation. However, to the extent the 
Plaintiff and his experts seeks damages from the Defendants for increased costs 
associated with caring for a home, the defense should be entitled to ask questions to 
both the Plaintiff and his experts how the damages picture would change if the plaintiff 
remarried. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 821 
P.2d 973 (1991) in support of his claim that the defense should be precluded from 
offering any evidence at trial regarding the probability that Charles Ballard may remarry. 
Westfall dealt with the death of a log skidder operator and a products liability case 
involving a metal brush guard on a piece of Caterpillar equipment. Of the many issues 
on appeal, one dealt with whether the district court properly granted the Plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine precluding the defendant from offering evidence that the plaintiff had 
remarried since the death of her husband. Id. at 922. The appellate court agreed that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the admission of such 
evidence at trial. 
While the Westfall case can be interpreted to stand for the proposition 
that it is not proper to argue that the jury should consider the fact that the decedent's 
surviving spouse had a possibility of remarrying, this is not the purpose for which such 
testimony or evidence would be offered by the defense. Instead, the defense contends 
that in a wrongful death action, it is proper to impeach an expert witness who is 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 2 
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testifying on the alleged amount of economic damages by reviewing the assumptions 
that underlie expert's opinion. This would include asking whether the expert was 
assuming that the surviving spouse would or would not remarry. 
The defense should be allowed to cross examine the Plaintiff's damage 
expert regarding the fact that in his loss of consortium claim he is assuming Charles 
Ballard does not get remarried. This was the very issue addressed by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in the case of Schaible v. Myers, 411 Mich. 704, 311 NW2d 297 (Mich. 
1981 ). See Schaible Decision attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motions in Limine as Exhibit A. 
Schaible involved a motor vehicle accident where liability was admitted. 
During the trial, the plaintiff called a damages expert and on cross examination defense 
counsel questioned the assumptions underlying the expert's opinions and conclusions. 
Id. at 299. One of the assumptions the expert was asked related to whether or not the 
plaintiff would remarry or things would stay the way they were until his death. Id. 
Reversing the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, the court stated: 
The jury was not told to take into account the possibility that 
the plaintiff might remarry. Rather it listened to an exposition 
of the many assumptions upon which the expert witness 
relied in making his calculations of the plaintiff's economic 
loss. Such an exposition is necessary to an intelligent 
understanding and evaluation of the worth of the expert's 
opinion. 
Unlike the situation in Wood, this expert's assumption 
concerning remarriage was of interest to the defendants 
solely because of its effect on the expert's opinion as to the 
amount of economic damages. It was proper for defendant 
to examine fully the assumptions which underlay the expert's 
opinion. By calling into question the worth of an expert's 
many assumptions, defense counsel can seek to show 
that what appears to be the opinion of an expert is no 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 3 
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more than conjecture which the jury can then be urged 
to ignore. 
Schaible, 311 N.W.2d at 299-300 (emphasis added). 
Because this issue was never before the court in Westfall, Plaintiff cannot 
fairly interpret that decision so broadly as to preclude the defense from doing precisely 
what was approved by the court in Schaible. In this case, the Plaintiff's expert 
Cornelius Hofman, has included predicted losses for financial support and household 
services based on the assumption that the plaintiff will never remarry. See assessment 
of economic loss report of the GEC Group attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition as Exhibit B. Regardless of whether or not the Plaintiff does remarry, the 
defense should be entitled for purposes of cross examination to address the 
assumptions Mr. Hofman made to show, just like the court in Schaible discussed as to 
whether "what appears to be the opinion of an expert is no more than conjecture which 
the jury can then be urged to ignore." Id. For this reason, to the extent the Plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine is overbroad and seeks to preclude any such reference regarding the 
probability of remarriage, it should be denied. 
II. Krystal Ballard's purported noncompliance 
This entire section of Plaintiff's brief raises complaints related to factual 
issues which go to the weight the jury should give to the evidence as opposed to the 
legal question of whether it should be admissible. The defense contends this is not the 
proper subject of a motion in limine. Plaintiff's brief identifies numerous instances of 
noncompliance by the decedent as identified in both the medical records and by 
communications with Dr. Kerr, but then claims that the evidence is not sufficient to allow 
any of it to be presented to a jury. Instead, Plaintiff takes the position that the defense 






should be precluded from presenting any evidence whatsoever of patient 
noncompliance. 
The jury is entitled to hear issues which related to the patient care 
involved in this case which include repeated acts of noncompliance. For example, the 
evidence in this case will show that the patient failed to present at Dr. Kerr's office with 
someone to drive her home following the procedure as she had been told, she failed to 
take her narcotic pain medications, she failed to tell her husband she had the procedure 
so he could help care for her at home, she did not refrain from physical activities as she 
was told to do after surgery, she misrepresented to her husband that she had fallen 
down stairs causing her to be sore rather than telling him the truth about her procedure 
and why she was in pain, she did not want to take any medications that may show up 
on a drug test by the military, in part, because she failed to inform anyone at the 
military as she was required to do that she was going to have the surgery performed to 
begin with, she failed to return or follow up with Dr. Kerr when her condition worsened, 
she never told her husband about her prior liposuction procedure and she failed to 
present to the hospital in Mountain Home until her condition had massively deteriorated. 
All of these issues the jury should be entitled to hear about when presented properly. It 
is not each of these events in isolation that makes them nearly as relevant as when they 
are all combined, at which point they aptly illustrate a pattern of behavior on behalf of 
the patient to conceal her condition and to prevent others from being able to assist her. 
Plaintiff argues the fact the patient was initially prescribed narcotic pain 
medication by Dr. Kerr to be taken every four hours or as needed for pain, but then 
asked for a non-narcotic pain medication is wholly irrelevant and therefore inadmissible 
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at trial. Plaintiff seeks to look at this issue standing alone as opposed to taking it in 
conjunction with all the other issues outlined above. It is not disputed that the patient 
was within her right to take something for pain other than the prescribed narcotic pain 
medication. Physicians do not force patients to take any medication, but rather they 
prescribe them for a condition and expect the patient will comply with the physician 
orders. The fact that the patient elected to take the nonnarcotic pain medication 
because she was concerned about a narcotic drug showing up on a drug screen makes 
it relevant because it is proof that she did not inform her employer that she was having 
this procedure done. This means that the patient had not told her employer that she 
would need to be on light duty and not be able to participate in routine physical training 
exercises which the patient later admitted she had overdone her physical activities 
contrary to the instructions given to her by Dr. Kerr. All of these actions are not 
irrelevant as Plaintiff so desperately argues, but rather, taken together they establish 
this pattern of patient noncompliance by the patient. 
The defense does not have the burden of proof and is entitled to present 
evidence of noncompliance by the patient as a basis for why the standard of practice 
was not violated in this case. Plaintiff's assertion that the defense "noncompliance 
theory rests upon irrelevant, highly prejudicial, factually unsupported, speculative and 
casually disconnected information" is simply not true. The medical records document 
issues of noncompliance that the jury should be allowed to consider. This is particularly 
true considering the records themselves will be in evidence and explained to the jury. 
The jury should be allowed to hear Dr. Kerr and his experts testify that they had never 
before had a patient following a liposuction procedure ask what medications a patient 
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001548
() ( , 
could take that would not show up on a drug test. The Plaintiff himself admits he did not 
know the patient was having the procedure done. 
Why all of these actions were taken or not taken by the patient and 
whether she put her vanity and secrecy above her recovery will be up to the jury to 
conclude. In this regard, Plaintiff's brief on this issue does nothing more than to point 
out areas of perceived factual weakness that can easily be advanced at trial. Plaintiff's 
counsel will be free to bring up on cross examination with each witness the very issues 
raised in his brief as to why the jury should give certain evidence regarding 
noncompliance and/or concealment little or no weight. Furthermore, where the proper 
support for some aspect of patient noncompliance is deemed speculative, the court is 
well capable of ruling upon an appropriate objection at that time. Contrary to the 
Plaintiff's contention, the defendants are not limited to only being able to advance 
evidence of patient noncompliance solely for the purpose of establishing a comparative 
fault defense at trial, nor is such evidence only admissible if it directly caused the 
patient's death. Plaintiff cites no controlling case authority for such a proposition. 
Rather, the jury is entitled to consider this evidence in connection with 
evaluating whether or not the Defendants violated the standard of health care practice 
and whether the actions of the patient impacted the medical care she received and the 
decisions by her health care providers. In this regard, the physicians, as expert 
witnesses, are entitled to discuss their habit, custom and experience in treating patients 
following cosmetic surgery and how issues of noncompliance both generally and 
specifically in this case, impact their practice decisions and compliance with the 
standard of practice. It would therefore be improper to invoke a wholesale prohibition, 
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at the outset of the trial, as to any evidence of patient noncompliance. As a result, the 
plaintiff's motion on this issue should be denied. 
Ill. Absence of infections involving other patients of Dr. Kerr 
Plaintiff seeks an order precluding the defense from being able to advance 
as proof in this case that the patient did not suffer from an infection caused by a breach 
in sterility associated with cleaning the reusable surgical equipment since there have 
been no other such cases in the years of Dr. Kerr's practice. In support of his Motion in 
Limine, Plaintiff advances two arguments: 1) that opinions involving Dr. Kerr's lack of 
infections were not timely disclosed by the defense and that should therefore be 
precluded; and 2) that evidence of Dr. Kerr's infection rates are irrelevant and should 
therefore be excluded. As outlined below, Plaintiff's motion fails on both counts. 
Many of the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint and expert witness 
disclosures relate to the cleaning, disinfecting and sterilization of reusable medical 
equipment. See Plaintiff's Complaint and Expert Disclosures attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition as Exhibits C and D. On this issue, the defense has consistently 
brought up throughout this litigation that Dr. Kerr has never had any issues with breach 
of sterility or equipment failures causing post-operative infections regarding any of his 
liposuction patients. Indeed, Plaintiff's brief at page 13 acknowledges this very issue 
was addressed during the deposition of Dr. Kerr taken all the way back in January of 
this year. More to the point, however, this information and the expert opinions related to 
this issue were timely set forth in the defense expert witness disclosures. For example, 
the defense expert witness disclosure served on Plaintiff's counsel on June 3, 2013, 
contained multiple opinions regarding the lack of postoperative infection rates to be 
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addressed by the defense experts. 
Dr. Kerr's expert disclosure at page 6 of exhibit O attached to the Affidavit 
of Plaintiff's Counsel Motion in Limine: 
He will testify that he employed the use of proper cleaning 
and sterilization techniques for his equipment and 
instruments and that he utilized proper procedures and 
supplies. Dr. Kerr will explain the procedures he performed 
on patients the days following his procedure on Krystal 
Ballard, starting on July 23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in 
which he utilized the same sterile and disinfection 
procedures he employed in his procedure on Krystal Ballard 
and there were no infections or infectious conditions with any 
of the patients. He will explain the same matters in regard to 
the multitude of procedures her performed before the 
procedure he performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Kerr's Expert Disclosure at page 14 of exhibit O attached to the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel Motion in Limine: 
Dr. Kerr will render the opinion, more likely than not, that the 
gram negative bacterial rods, if they existed, were introduced 
into the patient's surgical site sometime after the procedure 
rather than being introduced during the procedure. He has 
never had a patient experience such an infection in all his 
years. Dr. Kerr will testify that few of his patients who have 
undergone a lipolysis procedure have ever experienced any 
kind of post-operative infection and none of those patients 
died and all of them were diagnosed based on clinical 
observation. These were limited cellulitis based on clinical 
suspicion and not based on a culture result. Dr. Kerr will 
explain that if the opinions of Dr. Dean Sorensen are valid, 
there should have been other infections of patients before 
and after the procedure on Krystal Ballard, and there were 
not. 
Dr. Laurence's expert. disclosure at page 24 of exhibit O attached to the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel Motion in Limine: 
Dr. Laurence will discuss the standard of health care 
practice employed at his own surgical facility in Tennessee 
for achieving sterile operating conditions and the disinfection 
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of instruments and equipment and maintaining a sterile 
operative field and that the similar actions and efforts 
undertaken by Dr. Kerr as have been described for the 
procedure on Krystal Ballard in this case were used and 
exceeded in his opinion. Dr. Laurence will testify that the 
infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his deposition and 
discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic 
facility and are essentially zero, with possibly one or two 
minor cellulitis cases that were easily treated successfully 
with no adverse consequences. He will comment upon how 
this is evidence that the sterility procedures employed by the 
Defendants in this case were appropriate and working 
properly at the time of the surgery at issue in this case. 
Dr. Laurence's expert disclosure at page 27, Dr. Lundeby's expert 
disclosure at page 67, and Dr. Stiller's expert disclosure at page 90 of exhibit 0 
attached to the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel Motion in Limine: 
[He] will testify regarding the significance of the fact that the 
procedures Dr. Kerr performed on patients the days 
following his procedure on Krystal Ballard, starting on July 
23, 2010 through July 31, 2010 in which he utilized the same 
sterile and disinfection procedures he employed in his 
procedure on Krystal Ballard and there were no infections or 
infectious conditions with any of the patients. He will discuss 
how if there had been a failure to adequately sterilize the 
equipment in question that evidence of that should have 
shown up not only in all of the operative sites on this patient, 
but also in all of the operative sites of the subsequent 
patients which did not occur in this case. [He] will similarly 
discuss the significance of these same matters in regards to 
the multitude of procedures Dr. Kerr performed before the 
procedures performed on Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Lundeby's expert disclosure at page 64 of exhibit O attached to the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel Motion in Limine: 
Dr. Lundeby will testify that the infection rates described by 
Dr. Kerr in his deposition and discovery responses are well 
below average for a cosmetic facility and are essentially 
zero, with possibly one or two minor cellulitis cases that were 
easily treated successfully with no adverse consequences. 
He will comment upon how this is evidence that the sterility 
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procedures employed by the Defendants in this case were 
adequate and working properly at the time of the surgery at 
issue in this case. 
Although he certainly could have asked each of the defense experts about 
this issue during depositions (since he deposed all of them), the only defense expert 
that Plaintiff's counsel elected to question regarding infection rates was Dr. Lundeby: 
Q. Okay. It says, "Dr. Lundeby will testify that the 
infection rates described by Dr. Kerr in his deposition and 
discovery responses are well below average for a cosmetic 
facility and are essentially zero" and it talks about some 
other things. But as far as your knowledge of infection rates, 
have you been provided -- Well, first of all, do you have an 
understanding whether or not Dr. Kerr tracks his patient 
complications in some type of written documentation? 
A. I'm thinking back to his deposition, and without 
reviewing it, I think that he said that they tracked it but not in 
written form. 
Q. Okay. I mean have you been -- I mean I know you 
brought everything that you've seen. You've not seen Dr. 
Kerr's patient charts from other patients before or after 
Krystal Ballard's procedure, correct? 
A. No. 
See Depo. of Dr. Lundeby, p. 58, II 1-18 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine as Ex. 0. 
The above disclosure and deposition excerpts totally rebut Plaintiff's false 
claims that this issue was somehow not timely disclosed in discovery in this case. The 
fact that the defense experts have not reviewed all of the other individual patient charts 
for Dr. Kerr's other liposuction patients does not impact the admissibility of the infection 
rates issue before the jury. Instead, as with much of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine, this 
simply goes to the weight the Plaintiff can argue the jury should assign it. The fact that 
Plaintiff does not like the trial exhibit which the defense prepared and produced early 
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which merely demonstrates the number of patients and the area of the body where the 
liposuction was performed, does not change the fact that the defense opinions on this 
issue were timely disclosed. 
This leaves the second argument advanced by Plaintiff regarding whether 
data relating to the absence of infections is relevant to the issues in this case involving 
the death of Krystal Ballard. In this regard, the court need look no farther than the 
testimony of Plaintiff's own expert, Dr. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen is a plastic surgeon 
practicing medicine in Boise. During his August 21, 2013 deposition he gave the 
following testimony: 
Q. Okay. Have you formed an opinion as to what is the 
best evidence that a doctor utilizes appropriate sterile 
conditions during surgery, disinfectant procedures with 
equipment, operating room, and the entire area where the 
procedure is done, cleansing of instruments -- what's the 
best proof that that is being done appropriately? What would 
be the best proof? 
A. I think lack of complications would be the best 
answer. 
See Sorensen depo p. 152, II 6-16. (emphasis added), attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition as Ex. E. 
Per the expert testimony of Dr. Sorensen, he has made it clear that the 
best evidence of whether a physician is using appropriate sterile technique and 
engaging in proper cleaning, disinfecting and sterilization of his instruments is by 
looking at his rate of complications - the very evidence that Plaintiff is arguing is 
irrelevant. Due in part to the above testimony by Dr. Sorensen, the defense prepared a 
trial exhibit which simply summarizes records in order to demonstrate the lack of 
complications by the Defendants for any patients following liposuction and/or fat transfer 
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procedures. This exhibit simply summarizes for the jury the timely disclosed expert 
opinions of both Dr. Kerr and the defense experts which Dr. Sorensen's own testimony 
vouches for in terms of its key importance to the standard of practice issues in this case. 
The ancillary arguments advanced by Plaintiff's counsel that he has not 
been provided with the medical records for all of Dr. Kerr's other liposuction patients or 
that he desires to challenge and/or further depose Dr. Kerr's wife regarding her ability to 
assist with compiling any prior surgical data does not impact the admissibility of this 
issue.1 Again, it goes to the weight the evidence should be given by a jury and the 
arguments Plaintiff's counsel can advance as to why such evidence should not be 
credible as he has argued in his brief. Plaintiff should not be allowed to get around the 
fact that his own expert clearly states that the infection rates by Dr. Kerr are the "best 
evidence" of whether they are properly cleaning their equipment. 
This is precisely how hospitals and clinics review their sterility protocols 
and whether they are being followed is by looking at infection rates of not one, but large 
groupings of patients to look for trends and patterns. This is powerful testimony which 
directly contradicts and belies Plaintiff's argument that other patients' alleged lack of 
infections is somehow irrelevant for purposes of establishing whether Defendants 
satisfied the standard of practice as to Krystal Ballard. Indeed, this was discussed by 
Plaintiff's counsel with the defense infectious disease expert, Dr. Thomas Coffman, 
during his deposition when he stated: 
Q. So to compare infection rates at a hospital that might 
Federal HIPAA rules as well as the State of Idaho Board of Medicine rules governing patient 
privacy preclude the defense from disclosing the charts of the patients not related to this case. Plaintiff 
never filed any motion to compel these voluminous patient charts and it is improper for him to claim on 
the eve of trial that this issue should be off limits at trial when he took no action to timely address it with 
this court prior to trial. 
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have orthopedic procedures, abdominal procedures, bowel 
procedures and comparing it to a facility like Silk Touch that 
may do liposuction and fat transfer is kind of like comparing 
apples and oranges in a sense; correct? 
A. Yeah. We would only -- we don't really try to compare 
hospital-wide stuff. We look at specific surgery types. So 
we'd look at joint replacements. We look at spine fusions 
versus simple laminectomies, mastectomies, breast 
reconstructions, intra-abdominal cases. And we look at those 
separately. We don't try and group everything together 
because the rates are so variable. 
See Depa. of Dr. Thomas Coffman, at p. 97, lls 6 to 21 attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions in Limine as Ex. F. 
All of the defense experts, as well as the Plaintiff's lone standard of 
practice expert will testify that if Dr. Kerr and his staff were engaging in improper 
cleaning, disinfecting and sterilization techniques of medical equipment that they should 
have a clear history of other patients suffering from post-operative infections related to 
any alleged breach in sterility. The failure to properly clean and sterilize medical 
equipment does not present itself as an isolated problem that occurs only one time. 
This is exactly why one would expect to see a breach of sterility involving at least 
several procedures right before and/or right after the one at issue. 
The fact that there were no other cases of any alleged breach in sterility or post-
operative infection is strong evidence that the defendants were acting in compliance 
with the standard of practice associated with the cleaning, disinfecting and sterility of the 
medical equipment at issue in this case. Plaintiff provides no case authorities from any 
jurisdiction wherein infection rates were deemed irrelevant and therefore inadmissible 
for the purpose advanced in this case. 
Also noticeably absent from Plaintiff's argument on this issue is what more 
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he would have asked at a further deposition of Ms. Kerr. Furthermore, when the 
defense refused to produce Susie Kerr for a second deposition, Plaintiff was informed 
he was welcome to take this issue before the court, but failed to do so. Now, he 
complains that the defense is somehow unfairly "ambushing" him when the reality is that 
he seeks to have the infection rates excluded at trial simply because he does not like 
the fact that the information identified as . the "best evidence" by his own expert 
substantially hurts his case. Furthermore, Plaintiff's counsel had every opportunity to 
question Susie Kerr about this issue during her deposition. 
Q. Okay. Yesterday there was a discussion -- Mr. Quane 
had represented that you had compiled data on the number 
of liposuctions that had been performed, I think, through July 
20 of 2010 as well as the number of fat transfers that had 
been performed by Dr. Kerr through July 20, 2010. Did you 
compile that data? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Where did those numbers come from? I know 
one was 199, I think, liposuctions 25 and 33 fat transfers 
Q. Where did that information come from? 
A. Just from our database. 
Q. What kind of database do you maintain that would 
compile that information? 
A. The database that we run our transactions through. 
Q. Kind of explain that to me. How would you know -- If 
you've got this database and you're trying to find out how 
many liposuctions, how do you make a query into your 
database to identify which procedures were liposuction 
procedures? 
A. So they would be named "liposuction" or "fat transfer." 
So we would be able to pretty much -- pretty accurately be 
able to figure out a number of lipos, number of fat transfers. 
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Q. Do you keep some kind of running total as part of 
your business operations? 
A. No, we don't keep a running total. 
Q. Okay. Did you have to look-
A I would have to go back and look. 
Q. Okay. I mean, are these within the data for each 
patient and you'd have to look at each patient and say, 
"What did we do for them," or is it a separate database that 
would only reflect on a given day, like a calendar, what was 
done? 
A. Okay. You'll have to break that one up because that 
was a little bit too much. 
Q. When you look at this database, is it a database that 
you had to retrieve information like a liposuction procedure 
by looking at each patient's medical chart? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it a database where you would look at some type of 
scheduling calendar that you might have had to see what 
procedures were scheduled for a given day? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to think of where-- How do you 
input information into your database such that you can 
retrieve the number of liposuctions? 
A. So there's a category, "lipo." There's a category, "fat 
transfer." And so when we run a transaction through it, it will 
keep track of the number of fat transfers and the number of 
lipos. 
Q. Okay. What's the purpose of keeping that data? 
A. Well, you'd want to know so that if you needed to go 
back and figure out what you did that day, then you'd be able 
to figure that out. 
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See Depa. of Susie Kerr at p. 144, II 14 to p. 147, II 5 attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition as Ex. G. 
For the Plaintiff to suggest that evidence of other infections or lack thereof 
is irrelevant to this case is simply incorrect. Throughout discovery Plaintiff has claimed 
that the cleaning, disinfecting and sterilization techniques of the defendant facility were 
improper. He will argue to the jury that the staff at Silk Touch were poorly trained, that 
the facility was improperly set up, that Dr. Kerr was not properly trained or experienced 
to perform a surgery of this type in an office based setting, that proper cleaning 
materials were not used and that proper records of cleaning were not kept. Plaintiff's 
counsel seeks to broadly comment upon all of these issues at trial, but conversely 
wants to take the position that the defense cannot raise the obvious fact that if the 
cleaning, disinfecting and sterilization techniques were so deficient as alleged - then 
why weren't there rampant or at least multiple problems with postoperative infections 
involving any other patients. Plaintiff's Disclosures for his experts demonstrate his plan 
of attack and open the door for the defense to advance the lack of infections as a 
defense to any claim that the facility did not know what they were doing. Plaintiff's 
motion in limine on this issue is without merit and should be denied. 
IV. Life Insurance and other collateral sources 
The defense agrees that life insurance is a collateral source and does not 
oppose Plaintiff's motion on this issue. The defense will not seek to introduce evidence 
during the trial that Plaintiff received life insurance benefits following the death of Krystal 
Ballard. The jury will be free to draw whatever inferences they seek to form their own 
personal knowledge of what happens following the death of an active duty service 
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person. Health insurance payments for services for Krystal Ballard are not collateral 
sources for the Plaintiff, but rather Krystal Ballard or her Estate. They were paid or 
generated by the Air Force for Krystal Ballard and a recovery for then by the Plaintiff 
could constitute an unjustified windfall, since he did not pay them or incur a debt for 
them. The Plaintiff has no obligation to repay the Air Force or the insurer. 
V. Whether Dr. Garrison's' Fat Embolism Opinions Were Timely 
Disclosed. 
After learning additional opinions from the defense experts during their 
respective depositions, Plaintiff claims the defense did not timely disclose these 
opinions and now seeks to exclude them, particularly Dr. Garrison on the issue of fat 
embolism. In support, Plaintiff directs the court to the defense disclosure served on 
June 3, 2013, and points out that the opinions of Dr. Garrison in that disclosure did not 
include that the patient's death was due to fat embolism syndrome. On this basis, 
Plaintiff argues that such an opinion is untimely and should therefore be excluded at 
trial. 
Plaintiff's argument fails to consider and comply with the requirements of 
Rule 26(b)(4) and should therefore be denied. This rule states in pertinent part: 
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts 
expected to testify, otherwise discoverable under the 
provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or 
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be 
obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition, including: 
(A)(i) A complete statement of all opinions to 
be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefore; the data or other information 
considered by the witness in forming the 
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or support for the opinions; any 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of 
all publications authored by the witness within 
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the preceding ten years; the compensation to 
be paid for the testimony; and a listing of any 
other cases in which the witness has testified 
as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. See Rule 26(b)(4) 
(emphasis added). 
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel took not one, but two depositions of 
Dr. Garrison and despite the fact that he has supplemented all of the Plaintiff expert 
witness opinions on the issue of fat embolism, he nevertheless seeks to have this court 
preclude seasonably supplemented expert opinions on the manufactured basis that they 
were somehow untimely. Plaintiff maintains this position despite the fact that Rule 
26(b)(4) specifically states that a party may discover facts and opinions of experts 
acquired or developed in anticipation of trial by interrogatory or deposition. Here 
Plaintiff was allowed the opportunity to receive expert witness information from the 
defense by both means. Plaintiff could have relied wholly on the written interrogatory 
responses setting forth the opinions for the defense experts, however, he elected to 
also take the depositions of each and every defense expert. It was counsel for the 
Plaintiff who caused the opinions of Dr. Garrison on fat embolism to be disclosed and 
supplemented, not defense counsel. Had Plaintiff's counsel not brought up the subject 
at the deposition of Dr. Garrison, it would never have been disclosed or discussed. 
Plaintiff's counsel concedes that Dr. Garrison only developed the opinions 
at issue days before his deposition was taken, but yet he perplexingly maintains that the 
additional disclosures in response to his own questioning about "other" opinions were 
somehow untimely. Plaintiff cites to no case authority in Idaho or anywhere else 
standing for the proposition that when you elect to take an expert's deposition and you 
ask him questions about his opinions that you can simply move the court to have them 
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excluded on such a basis. Counsel for the Defendants elected to depose only one of 
Plaintiff's experts and will otherwise rely on the written disclosures of Plaintiff's counsel 
for the substance of their opinions. Because Rule 26(b)(4) allows two options for 
acquiring the opinions of experts and because the Plaintiff elected to utilize both 
options, he is not entitled to exclude additional opinions learned at a deposition in direct 
response to his own questions. 
Plaintiff rehashes much of the case authority cited elsewhere in his memo 
regarding the supplemental opinions of Dr. Garrison. The reality is that defense counsel 
provided numerous dates for Plaintiff to conduct the deposition of Dr. Garrison 
throughout the months of August and September, far in advance of the trial. Due solely 
to the unavailability of Plaintiff's counsel, this deposition was pushed off until late 
September. As explained by Dr. Garrison, during the preparation for his deposition, he 
re-reviewed the medical records and tissue slides and it became apparent to him that 
the cause of death was directly related to the patient having suffered from a fat 
embolism syndrome which he properly shared in response to questioning by Plaintiff's 
counsel. 
Furthermore, in terms of fat embolism being an issue in the case, 
Plaintiff's brief does not relay to the Court the multiple direct references to the patient 
having suffered a fat embolism which were contained directly within the decedent's own 
medical records. The records from both Elmore Medical Center and St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center which have been in the possession of Plaintiff's counsel for 
years reflect the fat embolism issue See Records of Betram Stemmler, M.D, attached 
to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Ex. H, records of Billy Morgan, M.D. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 20 
001562
( ) ( 
attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Ex. I, records of Howard Schaff, 
M.D. attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition as Ex. J. 
Despite the fact that defense counsel provided a substantial over one 
hundred page long expert witness disclosure setting forth the opinions of the defense 
experts, during the deposition of Dr. Garrison, Plaintiff's counsel specifically asked him if 
he had any opinions regarding the issue of fat embolism - a topic not specifically 
mentioned in his disclosure. This was not a question that Plaintiff's counsel had any 
reason to explore unless he was looking for new opinions. Dr. Garrison provided him 
with a response to his own question addressing fat embolism, thereby supplementing 
his prior disclosure. This was discussed by Dr. Garrison during his deposition as 
follows: 
Q. First of all, Doctor, do you hold some opinion that 
Crystal Ballard had a fat embolism? 
A. I do. 
Q. Did Dr. Graben refer to a fat embolism in his autopsy? 
A. No, sir, he did not. 
Q. So you think he's wrong by not including fat embolism 
as a pathological diagnosis? 
A. Retrospectively, perhaps; but at the time, I don't think 
so. 
Q. Yeah. Mr. Quane has filed a disclosure that identifies 
each of his experts and the subject matter upon which those 
experts are to testify. Have you seen that document? 
A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. Okay. And maybe I'm missing it, Doctor, does it talk 
about fat embolism as a diagnosis? 
A. No, it does not. 
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Q. When did you come up with a theory that Miss Ballard 
experienced a fat embolism? 
A. After looking at this case and going over it since the 
disclosure was made, it was my opinion that there had to be 
more going on, so I went through the medical record again in 
detail and reread what all the notes were, reviewed the CT's 
and the X-rays that were done, both at Elmore and in Saint 
Al's. And the opinion that I came up with, or the thought that I 
came up with was based upon the fact that the clinical 
symptomatology was also clinical symptomatology that was 
looked at by the physicians of fat embolism syndrome, then I 
felt it was worth doing another search to look for it; and in 
doing so, I reviewed all the slides again, which have been 
reviewed several times by myself, as well as Dr. Graben, 
and whomever else has reviewed these slides, and I came 
to the opinion, after having reviewed the slides again, that 
this lady has fat emboli. 
Q. Okay. My question was, Doctor: When did you come 
to that con -- when did you come to that conclusion? 
A. Since this last disclosure was made. 
Q. When? When was that, Doctor? You tell me when 
that last disclosure was made. 
A. When was the last disclosure made? I can't give you 
a date. It's been in the last week or so. 
See Depa. of Dr. Garrison at p. 29, lls. 6 to p.31, lls 11 attached to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Opposition as Ex. K. 
Q. (BY MR. QUANE:) Isn't it true that yesterday, the 
22nd day of September of this year, is the first time you've 
brought up to my attention and discussed the situation 
involving the fat embolism? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And isn't it true that my disclosure that I sent to you 
the second time you approved didn't mention fat embolism, 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
See Depa. of Dr. Garrison at p. 66, lls 3 to 12 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
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Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine as Ex. K. 
Unhappy with the answer he received to his questions about fat embolism, 
Plaintiff's counsel demanded a second opportunity to depose Dr. Garrison regarding his 
opinions relating to fat embolism. Specifically to resolve Plaintiff's counsel's concerns 
about getting an adequate opportunity to depose Dr. Garrison on this issue, counsel for 
the defense allowed a second deposition to occur during which even more information 
and opinions relating to fat embolism was expressed. After taking two depositions of 
Dr. Garrison, Plaintiff's counsel then prepared and served supplemental expert opinions 
for all of his experts specifically rebutting any opinions advanced by Dr. Garrison on the 
issue of fat embolism syndrome. See Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental Answers to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories served on October 18, 2013, attached to the 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition at Ex. L. On this basis alone, Plaintiff has had the 
opportunity to fully explore each of the defense experts and in some instances taking 
multiple depositions and having the opportunity to submit rebuttal expert disclosures. 
The defense disputes that the Plaintiff has been placed at any disadvantage for 
purposes of trial and maintains that the pending motion is without merit and should be 
denied. 
VI. Defense Experts Knowledge of the Local Standard of Practice 
Plaintiff contends that Ors. Stiller and Laurence failed to properly 
familiarize themselves with the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr. Plaintiff's 
counsel appears to have confused the foundational issues requirements with Rule 
56( e), Idaho Code §6-1012 and the case authority interpreting these rules at the 
summary judgment stage as opposed to the adequacy of an expert disclosure for 
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purposes of trial. It is without question that both Ors. Stiller and Laurence are out of 
area physicians within the meaning of Idaho Code §6-1012. In order for their testimony 
to be admissible at trial, they must be able to demonstrate that they have taken 
appropriate steps to familiarize themselves with the local standard of practice. 
It is well settled in Idaho that to avoid summary judgment for the defendant 
in a medical malpractice context, "the plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that 
the defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 
45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). In order for expert testimony to be admissible in a plaintiff's 
opposition to summary judgment, "the plaintiff must lay the foundation required by Idaho 
Code§ 6-1013." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820. The statute requires the 
expert witness to, among other things, establish that "he or she is familiar with the 
standard of care for the particular health care professional for the relevant community 
and time." Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533, 538 (2007). "Statements 
that are conclusory or speculative do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility 
or competency under Rule 56(e)." Id. (quoting Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 
820. Idaho Code § 6-1012 defines the relevant community as "both site and time 
specific." Id. (quoting Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 296, 815 P.2d 1034, 1036 
(1991 )). 
The statute "precludes assuming that the standard of care is uniform 
throughout Idaho." Id. The statute requires actual knowledge of the standard in the 
community in which the alleged malpractice occurred. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 
138, 146, 937 P.2d 1212, 1220 (1997) (citing Dekker v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 24 
001566
115 Idaho 332, 766 P.2d 1213 (1988)). According to the Idaho Supreme Court, an out-
of-area expert can meet the foundational requirement of personal knowledge by 
inquiring of a local specialist regarding the standard of care. Id. (citing Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)). Additionally, 
when consulting with a local specialist, that specialist need not have practiced in the 
same field as the defendant, so long as the consulting specialist is sufficiently familiar 
with the defendant's specialty. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 127 P.3d 
187, 195 (2005). The plaintiff's expert can also make inquiries to another out-of-area 
specialist, so long as that specialist has had sufficient contacts with the area in question 
to demonstrate personal knowledge of the local standard. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 
126, 130, 75 P.3d 180, 184 (2003); see also Suhadolnik v. Pressman. 151 Idaho 110, 
254 P.3d 11 (2011). 
An expert may also become familiar with the local standard by reviewing 
the defendant health care provider's deposition, provided the standard is discussed in 
the deposition. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P.3d 11 (2011) citing 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994). "When 
consulting with a local specialist, that specialist need not have practiced in the same 
field as the defendant, so long as the consulting specialist is sufficiently familiar with the 
defendant's specialty." Suhado/nik, 151 Idaho at 116, 254 P.3d at 17. "Health care 
providers are to be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of 
the same class in the same community." Dekker v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 115 
Idaho 332, 334, 766 P.2d 1213, 1215 (1988). 
With this background, most of which relates to the summary judgment 
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stage, all of the defense experts, at the request and direction of defense counsel, have 
taken affirmative steps to communicate with a cosmetic surgeon, Dr. Kelly O'Neil, who 
was practicing in Boise at the time in question. As a cosmetic surgeon who performed 
liposuction in Boise in 2010, Dr. O'Neil has actual knowledge of the local standard of 
practice for cosmetic surgeons like Dr. Kerr which he conveyed and confirmed with the 
defense experts. Contrary to the arguments advanced by Plaintiff, there is nothing in 
the Dulaney, nor any other case in Idaho, which requires an out of area expert to ask 
each any every question the Plaintiff's counsel may deem relevant from a foundational 
standpoint. None of the defense experts have submitted any affidavit testimony in 
regards to any motion for summary judgment. 
All that is before the court are the expert disclosures of the defense and 
excerpts of the deposition testimony reflecting the limited questions posed by Plaintiff's 
counsel. Based solely upon these documents, Plaintiff contends he should be entitled 
to preclude Ors. Stiller and Laurence from testifying at trial. Such a contention is wholly 
inconsistent with the above case authorities and the language of Idaho Code §6-1012 
and 1013. As out of area experts, even if Ors. Stiller and Laurence had not discussed 
this case with anyone thus far, it would still be premature to exclude their testimony from 
the trial by way of a motion in limine as the perceived foundational defect could still be 
cured prior to trial. 
Regardless, the deposition testimony of each of these experts aptly 
demonstrates that they have adequately familiarized themselves with the standard of 
practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in Boise in 2010. To the extent Plaintiff's counsel is 
dissatisfied with the scope of knowledge or the level of detail discussed between the 
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defense experts and Dr. O'Neil, this again goes to the weight the jury should give their 
opinions and not their admissibility, particularly considering the limited nature of 
questions posed during their respective depositions.2 For example, during Dr. Stiller's 
deposition he gave the following answers to Plaintiff counsel's questions: 
Q. When you were talking to him [Dr. O'Neil], did you ask 
him how he was trained, both in - - through medical school, 
residency and in cosmetic procedures? 
A. No, I asked him about the standard of practice in 
Boise at that point in time. 
Deposition of Dr. Stiller at p. 70, lls 17 to 21 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition as Ex. M. 
Q. All right. What were the general topics, and then we 
might get into specifics, that you discussed with Dr. O'Neil? 
A. We discussed the care of the patient. 
Q. Okay. I'll stop you there. Did - did Dr. O'Neil have the 
medical records of Krystal Ballard, to your knowledge? 
A. I believe he said he reviewed them. I don't -- I don't 
know what in total he had. 
Q. Okay. So he had -- at least based on your 
conversation with him, he had been supplied with medical 
records? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Concerning Krystal Ballard? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. So when you discussed the care of the patient, 
tell me what it is you and Dr. O'Neil discussed. 
A. The -- the procedure, itself. We discussed the follow-
up of the patient. 
2 Interestingly, Plaintiffs counsel has known about the role played by Dr. Kelly O'Neil for months 
and despite the fact he now challenges the basis for his knowledge of the local standard of practice, he 
never sought to take his deposition. Instead, he waits until the eve of trial to try and sandbag the defense 
with his meritless foundational challenges. 
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Q. What else? 
A. We also discussed what it was like practicing in Boise 
at that point in time, how many cosmetic physicians were 
there. And we discussed the sterilization that was -- the 
deposition of the sterilization by Dr. Kerr on what his 
opinions regarding the adequacy of that, of sterilization. 
Id. at p. 72, 1124-25, p. 73,111-25. 
Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not he used an 
alcohol-Hibiclens solution, mixture, to clean medical 
equipment and supplies? 
A. I asked him whether that was an adequate cleaning at 
that point in time in Boise with Dr. Kerr. And he agreed that 
he didn't see any issues with that. 
Id. at p. 80, II 25, p. 81, 111-5. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Dr. O'Neil's cosmetic 
practice is accredited? 
A. I don't believe it was. 
Q. Did you ask him, or are you just --
. A. I believe it came up in conversation. 
Q. Okay. Do you know whether other physicians in 
Boise, how many of those that practice cosmetic surgery and 
have their own surgery centers, have accredited versus non-
accredited centers? 
A. As far as at that time, I don't believe any of the 
cosmetic physicians had it. And we did discuss that, that 
being said. 
Id. at p. 83 II 12 to 23. Similarly during the deposition of Dr. Laurence, he was asked 
the following questions: 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. And Dr. O'Neil is a 
physician that you were referred to by Mr. Quane to contact 
in order to avail yourself of what the standard of practice was 
in Boise in in 2010, correct? 
A. Yeah, correct. I did not know him before. 
Q. Okay. Basically, counsel for Dr. Kerr told you, "You 
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need to learn what the standard of practice was in 2010, and 
here's the guy that can tell you what the standard of practice 
is," and they named Dr. O'Neil, correct? 
THE WITNESS: So, yes, I spoke to him after they 
referred me to him as someone who was reliable. 
Deposition of Dr. Laurence at p. 56, II. 9 to 24 attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition as Ex. N. 
Q. And it looks like the letter that was sent from Mr. 
Quane's office indicates that Dr. O'Neil was actually 
practicing in California at the time he wanted you to contact 
him but had practiced in Boise in 2010. Is that your 
understanding? 
A. It's my understanding that he relocated his practice, 
correct. 
Q. Did you do anything independently to determine 
whether, in fact, Dr. O'Neil practiced cosmetic surgery in 
2010 in Boise other than based on the representation of 
counsel for Dr. Kerr? 
A. Correct. I just -- I asked him if that was the time that 
he practiced, and he said yes, he was practicing at that time. 
Id. at p. 60, 1118 to 25; p. 61,111 to 12. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Well, let me ask you this: 
Tell me everything, and I mean everything, you remember 
about your conversation with Dr. O'Neil, the longer call. 
A. The main thing that was memorable about the 
conversation -- Again, I regret that I don't have any notes 
with this. But it was clear after this 30- to 45-minute 
conversation that I had with · Dr. O'Neil that he knew how 
other physicians in Boise practiced, that there were a 
combination of physicians with different backgrounds that 
performed similar procedures, and that the way -- And I don't 
remember whether he had independent knowledge or if I dis 
-- if I had to tell him, you know, what Dr. Kerr did in the 
process of performing liposuction. But I was -- the 
impression that I had after that 30- to 45-minute 
conversation is the way that liposuction is performed in 
Boise is very similar to how it's practiced in my area. That's 
not true with several other procedures in which I've been 
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involved in. Boise is much different than where I'm from. But 
in the area of liposuction, my practice mirrors that of Dr. 
Kerr's substantially. 
Q. You said that's the main thing, and I don't want to 
know just the main thing. I want to know everything that you 
recall, and then we'll try to put a little more substance behind 
the things that you mentioned just now. What other things 
did you and Dr. O'Neil discuss about the standard of practice 
in Idaho? 
A. One issue would be do doctors in this area of Idaho 
practice in the hospital primarily or in an office-based 
situation. And as in the area where I practice, there's a really 
good combination. There's a lot of physicians that take their 
patients into a non-office base that is an ambulatory or 
hospital situation, and then there's a portion of physicians of 
many different specialties who perform these procedures in 
their office. 
Q. Okay. What did he tell you about Boise, Idaho, 
physicians in 2010 in terms of where they carried out their 
cosmetic procedures? 
A. Well, I would have -- I would have not have bee·n 
surprised if he had said, you know, there's a lot of 
reconstruction-trained doctors who have started to do 
liposuction and some of them are using some of the new 
techniques and Dr. Kerr is the only non-reconstruction doctor 
who performs liposuction because there are some areas of 
the country in which that dynamic is somewhat true. So I 
was surprised to hear a substantial number -- and I don't 
remember the number -- and he may have even given me 
names. But apparently over -- during that time period, there 
were several physicians of multiple specialties, both in the 
immediate Boise area and in the state, that perform 
liposuction procedures. 
Q. Okay. I think the question that prompted -- or your 
statement that prompted my last question was: Did doctors 
in Boise, Idaho, as you understood it, practice in primarily a 
hospital setting or ambulatory care center associated with a 
hospital in carrying out liposuction or did they practice in 
their private office settings to do that? 
A. Dr. O'Neil related to me that both situations were fairly 
common. 
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Q. What else did you discuss -- First of all, did he tell you 
the names of any of the physicians in Boise, Idaho, that 
practiced cosmetic surgery? 
A. He did. 
Q. What are the names? 
A. I don't recall those names, but he -- he mentioned the 
names specifically and what their specialty had been. 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you what each of those physicians --
in terms of their specialty, their name, whether they practiced 
in a hospital setting, an ambulatory care setting, or an office-
based setting to practice liposuction? 
A. He, you know, voluntarily gave me a pretty good 
description of the landscape, and then I asked him a lot of 
specific questions about, you know, the -- "That particular 
doctor that you mentioned, does he continue to be in 
practice to this day? Does he have a fairly high-volume 
practice? How does he compare to, you know, the busiest 
hospital-based physician?" I don't remember all those 
details, but I do remember I was impressed that it was a little 
bit more robust community. Boise is a fairly small area, and I 
guess it just has a draw. But there was a fairly robust 
spectrum of different specialties that perform liposuction in 
both hospital and office-based situations. 
Q. In terms of fat transfer -- because that's part of what 
was done on Krystal Ballard, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Did Dr. O'Neil talk to you about -- Well, first of 
all, does he practice -- Was he, Dr. O'Neil, actually doing 
liposuction himself in July of 201 O? 
A. Yes, he was. Are you talking about here? Yes, he 
was. 
Q. I mean other than saying, "I had an office practice that 
did cosmetic procedures in 201 O," did he actually specifically 
tell you he did liposuction in 201 O? 
A. I don't -- I don't recall whether he said in any particular 
month or any year whether his case list had been up or 
down. But he -- he -- this was a procedure that he 
performed, and he was in Boise and -- And so I think he 
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meets the criteria for being able to tell me the standard of 
practice. 
See Depo. of Dr. Laurence at p. 64 II 5 to p. 69 II 3 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine as Ex. N. 
Q. Okay. In terms of fat transfer, did you talk to Dr. O'Neil 
at all about fat transfer? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you that he performed fat transfers 
in 2010? 
A. We talked about fat transfer specifically. Fat transfers 
are an area of liposuction where some doctors really, really 
are excited about it, and some do very little fat transfer. And I 
don't recall whether I asked him if fat transfer was something 
that he did routinely with every one of his liposuctions or with 
1 O percent. But he certainly was familiar with that aspect. 
We talked very specifically about the -- the different options 
that the physician had with regard to the addition of PRP, the 
addition of -- whether the fat was spun down or just gravity 
was5 used to separate out. And so he -- he was clearly 
knowledgeable about fat transfer, but I don't know how much 
he did it. 
Id. at p. 70, II 7 to p. 71, II 3. 
Despite all of this background and detailed data regarding Ors. Stiller and 
Laurence's conversations with Dr. O'Neil, Plaintiff maintains that these conversations 
were somehow not adequate. Plaintiff provides the court with limited excerpts about 
specific questions, but fails to present the court with a fair picture of the majority of the 
discussion wherein these experts explained that they discussed the types of 
procedures, various facts of the case, the types of specialists performing the procedures 
at issue, the Boise area in question and the timeframe in question in order to learn 
about the local standard of practice. Furthermore, what is contained within the 
depositions of the defense experts is not the totality of the evidence, but rather only 
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responses to the limited questions asked. 
Plaintiff's counsel is free to try and criticize the defense experts at trial by 
arguing as to the amount of weight the jury should give to their testimony. However, the 
fact remains that the defense counsel has yet to question its own experts on the stand 
and lay the proper foundation necessary at trial. Only then will the court be in a position 
to rule upon any foundational objections. Plaintiff's motion on this issue therefore fails 
not only because the above deposition testimony establishes an adequate foundation, 
but his objection is premature and his motion should therefore be denied. 
Finally, Plaintiff should be more concerned about the lack of foundation for 
his own expert, Dr. Sorensen. During his deposition he was asked about what 
knowledge he has about the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, who is of a 
different medical specialty than Dr. Sorensen. He provided the following information: 
Q. Okay. But you didn't learn that by any other· ·means, 
other than what you read in the newspaper? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever spoken with any physician in 
Idaho or in the world about the nature of Dr. Kerr's practice? 
A. Not that I can recall. I mean, if it came up in casual 
conversation with another person, I don't recall it. 
See Depa. of Dr. Sorensen at p. 64, II 15 to 23 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition as Ex. E. 
Q. Okay. That was the whole question. Do you have any 
real knowledge of what Dr. Kerr's practice is? 
A. Only what I read in the newspaper. 
Q. That's your source of information? 
A. Well, I don't touch bases with him on a daily basis, so 
I don't know what he does. I know -
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Q. Well, my question is, is that your source of information 
on his type of practice? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The newspaper; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Is that the Idaho Statesman? 
A. I'm sad to say it is. 
Q. Okay. You have never seen him perform a cosmetic 
procedure; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You have never talked to anyone who has ever seen 
him do a cosmetic procedure; correct? 
A. Correct. 
See Depa. of Dr. Sorensen at p. 78, II 2-21 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine as Ex. E. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard the term the "standard of 
health care practice" in Idaho means how a particular doctor 
in a particular specialty typically practices medicine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you hear that? 
A. I have no idea, but it's one of those common 
knowledge things, I would guess. 
Q. Were there any other doctors in Idaho, to your 
knowledge, in July of 2010 who had practices similar to Dr. 
Kerr? 
A. I would have no idea. 
Q. When you talked to Dr. Wigod, did you ever bring up 
the type of practice of Dr. Kerr with him? 
A. No. 
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Q. When you talked to Dr. McKim back in 2007, did you 
ever discuss with him the type of practice of Dr. Kerr? 
A. No. 
See Deposition of Dr. Sorensen at p. 115, II. 3 to 20, attached to the Affidavit of Counsel 
in Opposition as Ex. E. 
These deposition excerpts show that Dr. Sorensen, who is a plastic 
surgeon and not a cosmetic surgeon, has done absolutely nothing to learn the standard 
of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr. Thus, it is unclear how Plaintiffs can credibly argue 
about the foundation of the defense cosmetic surgeons, when the Plaintiff's lone expert, 
on his deposition testimony alone, would not be capable of rendering an admissible 
opinion at trial if limited to his deposition testimony. 
VII. Admissibility of Dr. Kerr's Communications with Krystal 
Ballard's Aunt 
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Kerr's communications with Angela Neil as well 
as his records of those communications are inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff provides no 
case authorities to support his proposition. During the deposition of Dr. Kerr, Plaintiffs 
counsel framed many of his questions to suggest that Dr. Kerr and his staff did not 
respond in a caring manner when Krystal Ballard died. The conversation that Dr. Kerr 
had with the decedent's relative directly contradicts such a claim and may therefore be 
relevant for that purpose depending on the question asked and what proof is submitted 
at the trial. Furthermore, the simple fact that Dr. Kerr called Ms. Neil is not hearsay and 
would be admissible to show that Dr. Kerr did care about the patient and that he did 
communicate with the family after her death. As a result, Plaintiff's motion on this issue 
is not a proper subject for a motion in limine as it cannot be addressed until the specific 
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question can be evaluated during the trial and should therefore be denied. 
VIII. Whether Dr. Lundeby can Testify as to Krystal Ballard's Cause 
of Death 
Plaintiff argues that since Dr. Lundeby testified in his deposition that it was 
difficult to determine the patient's cause of death that he should somehow be precluded 
from offering any causation opinions at trial. Plaintiff has elected to present the court 
with an extremely narrow representation of Dr. Lundeby's opinions. The actual 
exchange in the deposition unfolded as follows: 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Let me rephrase the question. 
They list, "Sepsis with probable toxic shock syndrome" as 
Cause A, which you understand to mean Cause A for the 
cause of death? 
A. Well, one of the causes of death, but that's - I guess 
Cause A means to me their principal cause. 
Q. We'll have to ask them. At least that's listed as a 
cause of death, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you agree with that diagnosis, or do you agree 
with that cause, meaning "Sepsis with probable toxic shock 
syndrome"? 
A. I re.viewed this case and looked at it and -- well, I -- I 
guess that's a very broad question and I'm trying to figure 
out the best way to answer it for you. I think the clinical 
picture that she presented would be consistent with sepsis. 
The toxic shock syndrome, from my medical recollection and 
training, is probably not used accurately here in that my 
understanding of toxic shock syndrome is not a gram 
negative sepsis, which seems to be the question in the 
medical record. But when I looked at this entire record, I was 
very -- it was difficult to figure out exactly why this patient 
died. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Like I say, the clinical picture would be most 
consistent with sepsis. I can see why the coroner's office and 
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the medical examiner put that. 
Q. You just haven't -- Let me see if I can rephrase what 
you said, and if I mess it up, you let me know. At this point in 
time, you don't know whether or not you have enough 
information to form an opinion as to the cause of this 
patient's death; is that fair? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
THE WITNESS: I think forming an opinion as to the exact 
cause and having -- Yeah, I think -- I think that's fair. 
See Deposition of Dr. Lundeby, at p. 82, II 16 to p. 84, II 3. (emphasis added) attached 
to the affidavit of counsel in opposition as Ex. 0. In addition, the following information 
was also set forth in Dr. Lundeby's expert witness disclosure timely served upon the 
Plaintiff on June 3, 2013: 
As part of his testimony, Dr. Lundeby will render the opinion 
that the surgical technique employed by Dr. Kerr during his 
liposuction and fat transfer procedures would not have 
caused or resulted in the introduction of any bacteria to the 
patient. Dr. Lundeby actually holds the opinions expressed in 
this document and will express all opinions stated herein on 
a more probable than not basis and/or to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty. 
See Dr. Lundeby's expert disclosure at p. 68 attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine as Ex. 0. 
Id. at p. 76. 
He will render the opinion that in order for Dr. Kerr to have 
infected the patient in some manner at the time the surgery 
was performed on July 21, that there would have to have 
been evidence of infection at the location of the surgery by 
the time of the autopsy or at Elmore Medical Center. He will 
testify that the absence of any evidence of infection at the 
injection or liposuction sites is proof to Dr. Lundeby that the 
patient was not infected during the surgery and that her 
death is due to some other cause. 
He will discuss the normal wound biology is to see evidence 
of bacteria on the surface. Dr. Lundeby will render the 
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Id. at p. 78. 
opinion, more likely than not, that the gram negative 
bacterial rods were introduced into the patient's surgical site 
sometime after Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure rather than 
being introduced during the procedure. Dr. Lundeby will 
render the opinion that based on his experience that gram 
negative rods do not result in the sudden and unexpected 
patient death such as occurred in this case. 
These disclosed opinions demonstrate that Dr. Lundeby has produced 
opinions regarding various aspects of causation which he should be entitled to render at 
trial. There can be more than one cause of death and the fact that Dr. Lundeby stated 
he could not identify precisely which condition actually caused the patient's death does 
not preclude him from rendering opinions as to the most likely causes. Plaintiff is free to 
challenge the weight the jury should give those opinions and he can also try to impeach 
Dr. Lundeby with the deposition testimony he points out in his brief, but he cannot, 
based on the limited showing made establish a basis for this court to exclude him from 
rendering any opinions as to cause of death. For example, at no point during his 
deposition did Plaintiffs' counsel ever ask Dr. Lundeby whether he rejected any of the 
above opinions set forth in his expert disclosure. Plaintiff's motion on this issue is 
premature and addresses only a fraction of the testimony rendered by Dr. Lundeby 
during his deposition. This is not the proper subject for a motion in limine and it should 
therefore be denied. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Sorensen, a plastic surgeon, renders the 
opinion on the cause of death and he is no more qualified than Dr. Lundeby. If Dr. 
Sorensen can give his opinion on the cause of death, so can Dr. Lundeby. 
IX. Admissibility of Evidence Regarding Third Party Liability 
Plaintiff argues that the defense should be precluded from presenting any 
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evidence regarding third party liability simply because the defense did: not assert third 
party liability as an affirmative defense at trial. This is not the test nor does it serve as a 
basis for precluding such evidence at trial. Plaintiff claims that the record "in this matter 
' ' 
is wholly undeveloped as to third party liability." See Plaintiff's Memo at p. 27. Such a 
position is not supported by the record in this case or the expected evidence to be 
submitted at trial. 
Plaintiff claims the patient died as a result of an infection caused by some 
act or omission by Dr. Kerr during his surgery. Thus, in order to prove causation, 
Plaintiff must prove that the gram negative bacteria at issue were introduced during Dr. .. •,,.., 
Kerr's surgery as opposed to the bacteria being introduced somewhere else or by 
someone else after the surgery. The medical records in this case document the timing 
of medical care, the observations of the providers and their decisions. The defense is 
free to have its experts render their disclosed opinions which bear on the care and 
treatment decisions of third parties without necessarily asserting a third party is liable. 
The jury is free to draw whatever permissible inferences are allowed in order to arrive at 
a conclusion as to whether or not the standard of practice was violated - which is the 
key issue in the case. 
The medical decisions, observations and treatment by the other providers 
have a direct bearing on the patient's outcome and the defense is entitled to advance 
disclosed expert opinions on these issues at trial. For example, the jury is entitled to 
know that the patient's subsequent providers waited hours before administering any 
antibiotics and that none of the subsequent providers ever saw any evidence of an 
infection. Whether the defense pied third party liability as an affirmative defense and 
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whether or not a jury would deem said evidence sufficient to assign third party liability to 
such evidence is not the deciding factor as to whether or not such testimony would be 
admissible. 
The trial has not started and no proof has been submitted to the jury. 
Thus, Plaintiff's second argument on this topic regarding who can be named on the 
special verdict form is therefore simply premature and cannot be fairly addressed at this 
juncture. The issue is not whether the Plaintiff was allowed to engage in discovery 
regarding third party liability, but whether opinions regarding the care and treatment 
provided by others have been identified in the expert witness disclosures such that 
opposing counsel was put on notice. The defense does not have to "blame" another 
party before evidence of the actions or inactions of other healthcare providers can be 
presented to the jury. Plaintiff's motion is not the proper subject of a motion in limine 
and should be denied. 
X. Testimony From Dr. Kerr Involving Dr. Sorensen's Prior 
Malpractice Actions 
Although not for the various reasons stated, the defense does not oppose 
this motion and agrees that Dr. Kerr will not be called upon to testify regarding Dr. 
Sorensen's prior malpractice actions. 
XI. Speaking Objections, Testimony of Counsel and References to 
Motion Practice in Front of the Jury 
Plaintiff argues that the defense should be broadly precluded from making 
all manner of references and statements during the trial. Such an overly broad sought 
prohibition is unnecessary. Defense counsel have tried cases before this court in the 
past and were quite capable of staying within the rules of this court. If granted, such a 
broadly worded motion on such an unknown grouping of topics is sure to do nothing but 
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generate allegations that it is, was or may have been violated in any number of 
circumstances. Plaintiff's counsel seems to be trying to prevent defense counsel from 
"sharing" inappropriately with the jury. Plaintiff cites to no case authority to support such 
a proposition as framed in his motion. Defense counsel is comfortable that this Court is 
fully capable of determining whether any lines are about to be crossed during the trial 
before it occurs. For that reason, the defense contends this is not a proper motion in 
limine and should be denied with the understanding that the court is always aware of 
these issues and expects the same of counsel. 
XII. Ad Hominem comments 
Lead counsel for the Plaintiff has requested that the defense be prohibited 
from commenting upon the fact that he is not an Idaho attorney. The fact that he is not 
an Idaho attorney will be blatantly obvious to the jury without any comment by defense 
counsel. The jury will be free to draw any conclusions they choose without defense 
counsel pointing out the obvious. This too is not a proper motion in limine, is overly 
broad and should be denied. 
XIII. Settlement Negotiations 
Counsel for the defense does not oppose this Motion and agrees that 
evidence relating to settlement negotiations should not be admitted in any form. 
XIV. Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Ultimate Issue 
Plaintiff contends that the defense experts should not be allowed to render 
opinions to the extent they go to an ultimate issue to be decided in the case by the jury. 
Plaintiff makes this argument despite citing directly to IRE 704 which is on point and 
states that an expert's testimony is not inadmissible merely because it embraces an 
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ultimate issue to be decided in the case. Plaintiff argues that where expert testimony on 
an ultimate issue concerns opinions or conclusions which an average juror should be 
allowed to draw that such testimony should be inadmissible. Plaintiff cites no medical 
malpractice authorities in Idaho in support of such a proposition, but rather a host of 
criminal cases which are inapplicable to the case at bar. 
Indeed, pursuant to Idaho Code §6-1013, Plaintiff and other lay witnesses 
are prohibited from testifying in regards to causation, the patient's diagnosis and/or 
future prognosis. Idaho Code §6-1013 provides: 
Testimony of expert witness on community standard. The 
applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's 
failure to meet said standard must be established in 
such cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of one (1) or 
more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, and 
such expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if 
the foundation therefor is first laid, establishing (a) that such 
an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the 
said opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical 
certainty, and (c) that such expert witness possesses 
professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual 
knowledge of the applicable said community standard to 
which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed; 
provided, this section shall not be construed to prohibit or 
otherwise preclude a competent expert witness who resides 
elsewhere from adequately familiarizing himself with the 
standards and practices of (a particular) such area and 
thereafter giving opinion testimony in such a trial. 
This statute makes it clear that in the medical malpractice context the 
propriety of such testimony lies solely within the realm of expert testimony and may not 
be presented by any lay witnesses. It is well-settled in Idaho that a lay person is not 
qualified to give an opinion about the cause of a medical condition or disease. Lay 
persons, such as the Plaintiff, do not possess the knowledge, training, or experience to 
render an opinion on such matters. See I.R.E. 701 and 702. 
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In this regard the Idaho Supreme Court stated that Courts should 
disregard lay opinion testimony relating to the cause of a medical condition. See, i.e., 
Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 934 P.2d 17 (1997) (lay person was not 
qualified to testify that the seizure he suffered immediately after using a blend of pork 
and beef insulin was caused by the insulin); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 
210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) (husband was not qualified to testify that conduct by sheriff's 
deputies on April 15, 1987 in grabbing and shaking his wife was a cause of her cardiac 
arrest and death over eleven months later); Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 409 
P.2d 110 (1965) (patient was not qualified to testify that his injury was caused by 
physician's treatment). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 has not altered the requirement that medical 
causation be proved by expert testimony. In Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 13 
P.3d 857 (2000), the Court held that physical manifestations of emotional distress were 
medical conditions which required expert testimony. The Court stated: 
I.RE. 701 affords the district court discretion to determine 
whether a lay witness may testify as to his or her opinion 
regarding certain matters but testimony offered by a lay 
person relating to the cause of a medical condition should be 
disregarded. 
Cook, 135 Idaho at 35, 13 P.3d at 866 (emphasis added), citing Evans v. Twin Falls 
County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) (wherein the Court held the plaintiff's 
opinions as to the cause of his high blood pressure would be inadmissible under I.R.E. 
701.) In support of the Court's holding in Evans v. Twin Falls County, the Court 
quoted from 31A Am.Jur.2d, Expert & Opinion Evidence§ 207 as follows: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, 
injury, or death of a person is wholly scientific or so far 
removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the 
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average person that expert knowledge is essential to the 
formation of an intelligent opinion, only an expert can 
competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of death, 
disease or physical condition. 
Id., 118 Idaho at 214, 796 P.2d at 91 (emphasis added). 
This result was re-affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Swallow v. 
Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68, 76-77 (2003) . In 
Swallow, the district court granted a physician's motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs could not or did not produce admissible evidence regarding 
any correlation between plaintiff David Swallow's heart attack and the ingestion of an 
overdose of the antibiotic Cipro. Id. at 138 Idaho at 596, 67 P.3d at 75. In granting the 
motion, the court noted that "without some reliable expert testimony relating Cipro to a 
myocardial infarction, there is no chain of circumstances from which causation 
reasonably could be inferred." Id. 
The same considerations that disqualified the lay testimony in the above 
cases apply in the instant action. Neither the Plaintiff nor any of his proposed lay 
witnesses are competent to testify as to the cause of death or the patient's prognosis at 
any point in time prior to her death. Such testimony can only come from a properly 
qualified expert witness. As a result, it is not the defense experts, but rather the Plaintiff 
and any of his lay witnesses who should be precluded from offering any such improper 
opinion testimony at trial. 
Other Courts have held similarly. For example, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals has stated: 
A lay witness generally may testify to something he knows 
and that does not require expert testimony to establish, such 
as the existence of a physical injury. Where, however, the 
contested issue involves medical questions beyond the 
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scope of lay knowledge, such as the existence vel non of an 
injury, the scope of injury or the causal link between an 
alleged accident and an injury, testimony by the lay witness 
may be improper. 
See Howard v. Feld, 298 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Mich. App. 1980). Similarly, the Court in 
Morphew v. Morphew, 419 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. App. 1981), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, stated: 
These cases illustrate that although a lay witness may testify 
about his or her illness, lay testimony or opinion must be 
limited to or based upon facts of which the witness has 
knowledge. However, "[w]ith regard to diagnosis, causes 
and effects of disease, and other matters of medical science, 
skill, and practice, knowledge of which is confined to those 
trained for the profession, opinions of lay or nonexpert 
witnesses are not competent. ... 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and 
Opinion Evidence§ 95 (1967). 
Id. at 777. One of the cases referred to by Morphew concerned the inadmissibility of a 
plaintiff's testimony regarding the permanence of his condition of impairment "because 
this was a medical question upon which only expert testimony was competent." See 
Kenwood Erection Co. v. Cowsert, 115 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. App. 1953). See also 
Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 228 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1976) ("The diagnosis and potential 
continuance of a disease are medical questions to be established by physicians as 
expert witnesses and not by lay-persons."); Gerland's Food Fair, Inc. v. Hare, 611 
S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (plaintiff held not qualified to state an opinion that she 
had permanent brain damage). 
Whether or not the care and treatment provided by the Defendants caused 
or contributed to Krystal Ballard's death represents "a matter of science that is far 
removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the average person." See Swallow 
v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68, 76-77. Such 
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testimony can therefore only be offered by an appropriately qualified expert witness. 
Absent such testimony, any findings by the jury regarding such issues would be based 
upon sheer speculation. Consistent with Idaho Code §6-1013, the jury is required to 
make their decision based on the opinions of the experts alone. In light of the foregoing, 
the Court should deny the Plaintiff's motion in limine on this issue as it is clear that 
Plaintiff is precluded from offering any evidence by way of lay witnesses regarding the 
diagnosis, prognosis, or causation for damages. Rule of Evidence 704 allows opinion 
testimony on the ultimate issue of the case. 
XV. Issue of Cumulative Expert Testimony 
Plaintiff basically rehashes arguments that were advanced and rejected by 
this court months ago at the hearing on July 10 regarding the number of defense 
experts. Plaintiff offers no authority for the position that because the defense out-of-
area experts spoke with the same physician for purposes of confirming they were 
familiar with the local standard of practice that it somehow makes the testimony 
needlessly cumulative per IRE 403. Plaintiff totally misses the purpose of the 
familiarizing physician. 
The purpose of the inquiry between the out of area expert and the 
familiarizing physician is to confirm that the out of area expert has basic knowledge 
about the local standard such that he would have a foundational basis for his opinions. 
The expert's opinions he advances at trial are his own. Again, Plaintiff's arguments go 
to the weight a jury should give to the evidence as opposed to its admissibility. If 
Plaintiff wants to try and discredit the testimony of the defense experts based on the fact 
they all talked to Dr. O'Neil he is welcome to do so, but this does not add to his claim 
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that the presentation of their testimony would be needlessly cumulative. 
Plaintiff seeks to unfairly contrast the foundational requirements of 
admissibility under Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code §6-1012 with the needlessly cumulative 
standard set forth under IRE 403. These are two totally separate and distinct 
requirements which each stand alone. The fact that the out-of-town experts for the 
defense discussed local standard of practice issues with the same physician does not 
render their testimony to be at any more risk of being needlessly cumulative had they 
each spoke with different providers. There is no requirement under Idaho Code §6-
1012 that a different familiarizing physician be employed by each expert nor has Plaintiff 
identified any case authority so stating. Indeed, under many circumstances that option 
would simply not exist due to the limited number of providers in a given community. 
The defense contends it is inappropriate for the Plaintiff to even bring such 
a motion prior to trial which is based solely on a rule of evidence when no evidence has 
been submitted to the jury. Expert witness disclosures are not evidence, nor are they 
admissible as evidence, but rather they are a discovery tool utilized to prepare for trial. 
As argued back in July, the defense contends that Rule 403 has no application 
whatsoever at this pretrial stage and that this rule of evidence does not provide the 
Plaintiff with a vehicle or mechanism by which the number of defense experts can be 
limited in advance of a trial. 
In terms of addressing the application of Rule 403 during the trial in this 
matter, the court is well aware there are multiple Defendants in this case including Dr. 
Kerr and Silk Touch Laser and Med Spa. The complex medical issues in this case 
cover a large number of areas including the performance of multiple cosmetic 
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procedures and the equipment involved therein, the proper sterilization of surgical 
equipment and maintaining a proper sterile surgical field, the identification and 
treatment of a septic infectious process, the origin of different types of bacteria, the 
effectiveness of various antibiotics, the cause and effect of multi-system organ failure, 
the treatment provided by a number of different specialties in medicine and competing 
theories as to the cause of death for Krystal Ballard. 
Due to the number of medical issues in this case, Plaintiff has listed the 
opinions of not less than three retained experts to address both standard of practice and 
causation issues including: Dean Sorensen, M.D., George Nichols, M.D. and Keith 
Armitage, M.D. Plaintiff has disclosed multiple supplemental expert witness disclosures 
for these witnesses, including his third one last week well after the deadline for 
discovery had expired. These individuals are disclosed as experts in various areas of 
medicine including plastic surgery, anatomical, clinical and forensic pathology and 
infectious disease. 
In order to oppose these three experts, the defense has disclosed five 
retained experts who have all been deposed including: Gregory Laurence, M.D., a 
cosmetic surgeon from Tennessee with his background and training in family practice 
medicine in which he is boarded; Charles Garrison, M.D., forensic pathology from 
Idaho; Thomas Coffman, M.D., infectious disease from Idaho; John Lundeby, M.D., a 
cosmetic surgeon with his background and training in general surgery in which he is 
boarded from Idaho; and Geoffrey Stiller, M.D., who completed a fellowship in cosmetic 
surgery Idaho. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In terms of interpreting and applying Rule 403, Idaho courts have 
consistently determined that "the language of I.R.E. 403 tilts in favor of admissibility." 
State v. McGuire, 135 Idaho 535, 540 20 P.3d 719 (Ct. App. 2001). Only if the 
probative value of the testimony is "substantially outweighed by danger of needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence," may a trial court exclude relevant evidence. See 
State v. Knight, 120 Idaho 862, 865, 920 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). 
In addition, "statements by witnesses which corroborate the facts, to which another has 
already testified, are not necessarily inadmissible because they are cumulative." State 
v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 22, 878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994). Instead, "Rule of 
Evidence 403, prohibits the introduction of needlessly cumulative evidence." Id. 
Under the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 403, in order for the 
relevant testimony of any of the defense experts to be limited in any way, the Plaintiff 
must show that the presentation of such testimony from the Defense experts would 
amount to the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The fact that evidence 
to be provided by an expert witness may be similar or even cumulative to that of another 
witness does not, standing alone, meet the threshold test for exclusion under the Rule 
upon which the Plaintiff's motion is solely based. Rather, the evidence must be 
"needlessly" cumulative before the Court can even consider whether to limit it. The 
defense contends that such a determination cannot be made prior to trial before the 
parties have presented any evidence. For this reason, and the wealth of supporting 
case authority on this issue submitted back in July, the defense contends the Plaintiff's 
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Motion in Limine regarding perceived cumulative evidence should be denied. 
XVI. Conclusion 
Based on the forgoing, the defense requests that the court deny Plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine on all counts except for Motions No. IV and XIII to which the defense 
does not oppose as stated herein. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Bt::::::::::H-:-t-7:--=:~~=:::-::-:-:------=-:-----
er ia A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Atto neys for Defendants 
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Schaible v. Myers, 411 Mich. 704 (1981) 
311 N.W.2d 297 
411 Mich. 704 
Supreme Court of Michigan. 
Dennis L. SCHAIBLE, Administrator of the 
Estate of Kathleen A. Schaible, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
V. 
Kevin J. MYERS and Carleton N. 
Myers, Defendants-Appellants. 
Docket No. 64809. Nov. 2, 1981. 
Jury returned verdict for surviving spouse in wrongful 
death action arising out of automobile accident. Appeal was 
taken, and the Court of Appeals, Bashara, P.J., reversed and 
remanded for new trial. The Supreme Court, held that cross-
examination of expert witness, who offered his opinion as 
to amount of damages suffered by surviving spouse, as to 
whether he was assuming that surviving spouse would not 
remarry was not error since jury was not told to take into 
account possibility that spouse might remarry but listened to 
exposition of many assumptions upon which expert witness 
relied, necessary to intelligent understanding and evaluation 
of worth of expert's opinion. 
Court of Appeals reversed;judgment of trial court reinstated. 
Moody, J., filed dissenting opinion in which Levin and 
Kavanagh, JJ., concurred. 
West Headnotes (3) 
(11 Evidence 
~ Facts Fonning Basis of Opinion 
Cross-examination of expert witness, who 
offered his opinion as to amount of damages 
suffered by surviving spouse, as to whether 
he was assuming that surviving spouse would 
not remarry was not error since jury was not 
told to take into account possibility that spouse 
might remarry but listened to exposition of 
many assumptions upon which expert witness 
relied, necessary to intelligent understanding and 
evaluation of worth of expert's opinion. 




~ Admissibility of Evidence 
It is improper to introduce evidence of possibility 
of remarriage to prove that there had been no loss 
of consortium to surviving spouse for purpose of 
wrongful death action damages award. 
Evidence 
~ Contradiction and Impeachment 
Expert witness, who offers his opinion m 
wrongful death action as to amount of damages 
suffered by surviving spouse, may be impeached 
by reviewing assumptions which underlie 
expert's opinion and by arguing that expert's 
opinion is mere conjecture based upon erroneous 
assumptions. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**298 *705 McIntosh, Mugan, Cummings & McColl by 
John B. McNamee, Port Huron, for plaintiff-appellee. 




In Wood v. The Detroit Edison Co., 409 Mich. 279, 288, 
294 N.W.2d 571 (1980), a majority of this Court agreed that 
evidence of a plaintiff surviving spouse's remarriage was not 
to be used to determine damages in a wrongful death action. 1 
We now must consider whether error occurred in this case 
when an expert witness, who offered his opinion as to the 
amount of damages suffered by the surviving spouse, was 
asked whether he was assuming that the surviving spouse 
would not remarry. 
I 
Plaintiffs decedent died in an automobile accident. Liability 
was admitted; the parties tried the issue of damages. A jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $30,000. 
WesttawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Schaible v. Myers, 411 Mich. 704 (1981) 
311 N.W.2d 297 
The Court of *706 Appeals reversed that judgment and 
remanded the case for a new trial. 2 
II 
To establish the amount of his damages, the plaintiff called 
to the stand a witness who expressed the opinion that 
the plaintiff had been damaged by as much as $528,000. 
On cross-examination, the defendants undertook a detailed 
and comprehensive examination of the assumptions which 
underlay this opinion. A portion of this examination is 
recounted here: 
"Q. One of your assumptions, I assume, is that Mrs. 
Schaible would continue to want to work during all of those 
years as opposed to being a housewife and mother? 
"A. Yes, for the years after she would be age 42. 
"Q. And, of course, if for one reason or another she decided 
she didn't want to work that would affect your calculations, 
would it not? 
"A. )'hat's correct. 
"Q. One of your assumptions was that she would, if she 
continued working, that she would turn over all of her 
earnings, over and above the cost of her own maintenance, 
to her husband or at least he would receive the economic 
benefit of it? 
"A. Based on the information I have this is what's been 
happening in the family. 
"Q. That is one of your assumptions? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. It is one of your assumptions that would continue 
throughout her working life? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Even after they got in their forties and fifties, your 
assumption was that would still continue? 
**299 *707 "A. That's correct. 
"Q. She wouldn't keep any of her own earnings for herself 
or whatever purpose, they would all go other than the 30 
percent that you subtracted for the cost of her maintenance, 
one of your assumptions was that all of it would go to Mr. 
Schaible or at least he would receive the economic benefit 
of that? 
"A. I assumed beyond the 30 percent, right. 
"Q. One of your assumptions, I assume, was that the 
marriage would continue during that period? 
"A. Yes. All the indications I had it was a happy marriage. 
"Q. But that was one of your assumptions? 
"A. Based on the information I have. 
"Q. And one of your assumptions, I assume, also, was 
that Mr. Schaible would not remarry and everything would 
remain the same up to his own death ? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Another one of your assumptions was that Mrs. 
Schaible would continue in good health and be able to 
work? 
"A. That's correct. 
"Q. Will you agree, Mr. Tansky, there is really no way you 
can say for sure any of the assumptions you made and upon 
which your opinions were based are valid with reference to 
this particular individual other than your opinion? 
"A. Could you restate that question? 
"Q. Okay, I can try, anyway. Would you agree there's really 
no way you can say, talking about you, now, for sure, that 
any or all of the assumptions that you have made and upon 
which your opinions are based, are valid, or would turn out 
to be valid with reference to this particular individual? 
"A. In my opinion? 
"Q. No, I'm not asking for your opinion, I'm asking whether 
there's any way you can say they will be valid. 
"A. No, things might have been better or worse 
economically. 
"Q. So, what we are saying, again, you don't have a crystal 
ball, you don't know what is going to happen in *708 
the future or what would happen with reference to any one 
specific individual? 
"A. That's correct." (Emphasis supplied.) 
WestlaiNNext' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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The defendants had earlier received permission from the 
trial court to ask the emphasized question. That question 
and its answer were discussed by defendants during closing 
argument. 
The Court of Appeals described the question and answer as an 
"erroneous suggestion that the possibility ofremarriage could 
be considered to mitigate damages". The Court reversed, 
stating: 
"Although the defendants' cross-
examination and argument did not 
explicitly state that the possibility of 
remarriage should be considered to 
mitigate damages, the facts actually 
elicited serve no purpose other than 
to infer (sic) that the expert's estimate 
of economic loss was not accurate 
because it did not reflect a possibility 
that the plaintiff would remarry." 
III 
[1] We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred. The jury 
was not told to take into account the possibility that the 
plaintiff might remarry. Rather it listened to an exposition of 
the many assumptions upon which the expert witness relied in 
making his calculations of the plaintiffs economic loss. Such 
an exposition is necessary to an intelligent understanding and 
evaluation of the worth of the expert's opinion. 
Unlike the situation in Wood, 3 this expert's assumption 
concerning remarriage was of interest to *709 the 
defendants solely because of its effect on the expert's opinion 
**300 as to the amount of economic damages. It was 
proper for defendant to examine fully the assumptions which 
underlay the expert's opinion. By calling into question the 
worth of an expert's many assumptions, defense counsel can 
seek to show that what appears to be the opinion of an expert 
is no more than conjecture which the jury can then be urged 
to ignore. 
(2] (3] It remains improper to introduce evidence of the 
possibility of remarriage to prove that there has been no loss 
of consortium. It is proper, though, to impeach an expert 
witness by reviewing the assumptions which underlie the 
expert's opinion and by arguing that the expert's opinion is 
mere conjecture based upon erroneous assumptions. 
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial 
court. GCR 1963, 853.2(4). 
Costs to defendants. 
COLEMAN, C. J., and WILLIAMS, FITZGERALD and 
RY AN, JJ., concur. 
MOODY, Justice {dissenting). 
Less than two years ago, in Wood v. The Detroit Edison Co., 
409 Mich. 279, 286-287, 294 N.W.2d 571 (1980), a majority 
of this Court reaffirmed Michigan's rule that 
" 'evidence of plaintiffs remarriage or the probability of 
her remarriage is irrelevant and, therefore, was properly 
excluded, in determining the damages she suffered upon 
the death of her spouse'". 1 
*710 Describing the reasons for the rule, the Court noted: 
"(E)vidence of the effects ofa subsequent marriage should 
have no bearing on the amount due a plaintiff following 
a wrongful death. Compensation received from another 
source should not affect the responsibility owed to the 
injured party by the tortfeasor." Wood, 287, 294 N.W.2d 
571. 
Because the majority decision today not only undercuts the 
rule so recently restated in Wood, but also conflicts with its 
underlying rationale, we respectfully dissent. 
As stated by the Court of Appeals in the instant case: 
"The defendants argue that the 
possible remarriage of the plaintiff 
in this case was not argued as a 
possible mitigating factor but that it 
was only mentioned to inform the 
jury that the plaintiffs expert witness 
based his calculation of damages 
upon the assumption that the plaintiff 
would not remarry. The defendants 
contend that their right to cross-
examine the plaintiffs expert witness 
to determine the assumptions which he 
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made in calculating damages extends 
to asking whether or not the expert 
assumed that the plaintiff would not 
remarry. Although the defendants' 
cross-examination and argument did 
not explicitly state that the possibility 
of remarriage should be considered to 
mitigate damages, the facts actually 
elicited serve no purpose other than 
to infer (sic) that the expert's estimate 
of economic loss was not accurate 
because it did not reflect a possibility 
that the plaintiff would remarry. The 
assumption implicit within the expert's 
conclusion was, however, a proper 
application of the cases cited above 
(Bunda v. Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 
138 N.W.2d 305 (1965); and Bradfield 
v. Estate of Burgess, 62 Mich.App. 
345,233 N.W.2d 541 (1975), Iv. den., 
395 Mich. 803 ( 1975)) to the estimate 
of damages in this case." 
Thus, in effect, defendants were permitted to *711 bring 
an irrelevant and improper consideration, the possibility of 
plaintiffs remarriage, to the attention of the jury. 2 **301 
Under the rationale stated in Wood, it should make no 
difference whether the jury is specifically told to take account 
of the factor of remarriage in assessing damages, as occurred 
in Wood, or whether that factor is used to evaluate an expert's 
testimony regarding damages, as occurred in the instant case. 
In either case, such evidence is irrelevant and should be 
excluded. 
Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. 
LEVIN and KAVANAGH, JJ., concur. 
Parallel Citations 
311 N.W.2d 297 
1 See also Bunda v. Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965). 
2 Schaible v. Myers, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals of January 10, 1980, Docket No. 78-323. 
3 In Wood the plaintiff had remarried prior to trial. The trial court permitted testimony concerning the remarriage on the ground that 
if loss of society and companionship were claimed as damages, all facts pertaining to such loss, including remarriage, should be 
considered. Wood, 409 Mich. 284,294 N.W.2d 571. 
1 The Wood Court quoted Bunda v. Hardwick, 3 76 Mich. 640, 656, 138 N .W .2d 305 (1965). In Bunda, as in the instant case, the Court 
focused upon the issue of economic loss, as opposed to loss of consortium. 
2 In the instant case, not only did defendants' attorney raise the question of Mr. Schaible's remarriage during cross-examination of the 
expert witness, but he also discussed the question and its answer during his closing argument. Such repetition may have served to 
exaggerate the improper effect upon the jury. 
End of Document ~ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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1'his repottassesses tJ1e presi!trl vain~ of etonotni¢ loss resti\ting from the deat.11 qf;l{ry$tal 
Melissa: Ball~rc! .0n: folY: 26, :20 m The ecQ.noriiic 161>~ c..1k;ttlat.ed in this ai_1a1.y~is ~onsists of 
• .. JQ'st finttn¢liif support ~'Qd lbst non-Jfoa,ncfal snppo.tL 
Th1s .<lP.!\!ys(s cEJ°ic\11\1.te~ .J O$t 11n anci.m .s t(pp0rt and f osMo~fmaucigl s11m'>9Jt: !l,gross, two 
scenari$$: Scenario I projects Ms. Qalii:frcPs,carccr- across· th,~ enfi*d ranW qt'thc tf .-t Ai.f 
l~brtc for a total of20 years of military ~er.vice a.nd then irta<kordance willtlhc,'<;i\!1lfa.ti 
earnings ofihe average fomafo \\iitlt acollcgo degree. Sccnp:rio 2 assum~~ M;i;-;J3a'J1M<l wou.lti . 
hrlve become. a i::omin.issioned officer ~J J~ni1aty l, 20 l G ana.proje¢ts hef.cai¢t:i ft~n1'tlJat·tl1rr¢ 
. forward' ,:i.cross tiic offic~r ranks Ol-03 9fihe U.S. Afr Fdt<:<C for a totrd pf40j¢9J'!i of mllitaiy . 
[· s~rvfoe ah1i'1:fieu fn ace:ort(il.!](Je w{ththe ciyilian ean:iii1g.<; of the .ave~age,female ~·ifb a co,ilei¥) .. 
. !lei#~- . 
, 'ffi/.4~(eo.icfr$Ci!Uarfo, Jost finaucfaJ support is projected (a)fo accordance wfth'-a rititnlfil 
·wl:iikiife expe91a:ii.cy .ind .(lj) assuming n foJJ worklifo t0 age 67 ( soda I secn\'ity; 'fuil n::tir.crncnt 
>age} . . . . . 
Whai follows is a summary of the econo1]lic loss to be ttSsqci:a-t:ed wi:h ihe<leath ofM.s·: BaUarcL 
J'hi::-tofal p.resent :value dfl ost foiancial .. ,up port rau ges from $ I ;52.5 ,392 t_o $1 ;$ l 2,04 S µpoe·r 
. ~¢!!Pilriq land fr9m $'1_;872~0>8-to.$2,191,079 u1ider-Sceni.1rio2 ('Table J); 
.; A#w~il.1g {bat Ms. Ha,lfarq. typl&fi.lly .prQV ided- het\V.iet123' .. 7'ea,rid 24'.:2 lioµrt,. ofil'o(ls~hqW 
,:.ffe#yi~~P:-Mr i,yeek (to., fhe:averagc•-for· female:s ·With·Ms. Ba;tia.r.d's· socioet6r:icimic ' · 
~hat~9fe1)~\Jqs); \b:e P1'es'¢nt Va.lueof.ilos(i1on~ffonr1ci:it S'Uppott rnngcs from;$5'.7),i2'J 3: .1ci 
ssi4,,!lr5:(ra_ble l). 
11:ie-l:otal present ;value of economic loss to be.associated with the denrh 11fMs. [?i.i:ltai:d ranges 
froin $2, I 09,677 10 $2;384,258 umje1' Scenario 1 and. fro111 $2,456,343 to s2;769,292 'Under 
Scenario 2 (Table l ) . 
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UL SOCIQECONOJYl[C t>ATA 
Age· 
Ktystal Melissa Ball.atd was barn on April 19, 1983 and was 27 years old at the time of her 
death. 
Ed uca tirm 
M.s. Hai!a.rd gradua.ted fro!\t Ad11Ja.Se1ii'or Sei;:ontla:i-y Schooi iJJ 200 I. A~ the fane oftwr deiitl1, 
Ms: B_aJlard \yas. atten'(jing ~Cll!e:ge iirid WilS we]). ulo the gr.;,pess of obtaJning.it bachehJ(S 
.d~gtce; sfieliadp.CC\li)i.Ul~ttd1,.QCJ't\dil<i and Wil:S.-ea't'ningaJ1ptu>.imirtcly lQ credits per·ca.lei1dar 
year, tfi1iat1;,:lysis ~~).im¢S-l\tlsd~allar.,L\VOLild i~a\'6 contihued beJ unive,s:t1); $l'udks ~d th.at 
sn~·,\1tiuid h11v¢c0Jti'pletetl}1et b.acb~i~1}.is:dc_gre¢ io 2015. · Additi\:i;1aJJy; Scenario 2 nssumes 
ihil.t Ms-. B~llard ~YoiJJd h<ive.-co11111)~~c.cJ .o:ffic6r tr.aini1)g sc.:hool by Jtinuary 2016. 
Lifo E::q>edanc:y 
fn determining M:;_ Balla1·d's lifo expect<1ncy, tlris analysis,tcHes on Ille 1if¢ trtbl~s asscnibled 
by the V,S .. N'ation:il Ceni:erfor .H~~l.th:SJatistws·HJ.. TJJ~se t~b!cs show thtf no:rm{f.f life 
expecll'lli.cy for women wh(rnre M~. •3:il!iml1S ago. 
As ·ofthe date ofhcr cleat!;:; Ms. Haftal'd vva.<i' 27.27years old ~nd had a lifo expectarrny of 54. JJ 
n10.rc y:eats{i,ci,; ta age- ·81 in t'.hc;ye~·20'~4). · 
Au1.her1nore~ accon:ling to t[ie Jn<itlality and ororb:idlW data'.ofi.he Un ired S.tar.es .Deparhnenl of 
· HeallharidHumfa Set.vices [2J;a$ ofJttly26, 2010 aUtge 27.17, /Vls. Ballar.<l had a heal~hy 
llfe C.1\p¢c:tancy of 43.07 irtotc '):cars. 
Houscholtl Dafa 
Ms. Ba.llard was married to Charles·!(, BallarJ. Mr. Balfor.d was born i;m September 30, 19S2 
and as of the date of this repoit (May S, 20.13), he is JO years old. 
As of the da1e of.this report {M.ay a; 20 13), Mr. Ballard ha~ ·a. life expectancy of 46.38 m.orc 
ycars-(i.e., tu age 76 .iti the year 2059) (1 ]. 




Mi; BaHardw~ a sfa:ffsetgeant{gtade E~S):iti theIJnited Srates Air Fotce anbe:itiine ofl.1tr 
dea1lt. S.h~joJned' the.Air Fo'fcc: as. au A frm;iti Bask 01.l April J 3, 2004. 
Jrr-a~dHi9~ to·h~s_icpay, e11H~te•,Ln1emhers of-the United States Air Force :also receive~-, 
; subsfsJeti.ce allowMce (fop<l mo.ney),,·cloiliing allowance, hou~ing ullowancc, a station 
:ailhw@ce &is-!!(fo11 loeation, hardship duty pay, combat .tone tax exciusion benefits, tnivel 
·. enfitJ~menfs{tefoca.tiPn ¢xpei1Se. co,;!erilges), tbriff savings b<:11e fits (4 0 l k-type ), 
¢orilprehensive medical, dcntftl. and vis16n bencfi1s, and rcttremt::nt pay. . 
Purjng her caree( as an Air:.r'orce pctso1rnel, Ms. Ballard's personal cons1.1mp:tion w~,M liaV6 
beeu mi11imlz-ed by her ditfotent a.!lo'w.ani,::es and. benefits, This nnr-t,lysis off(>ct.s the i:lontial 
lewJ ofperstir;atcQ.risliJtiption,durh1g Ms, Ball~rd's miiirnry c<1recr to ac~o\,i~Uo.r-the. . 
exp¢ndib.1re arlo,van~s pro,,ideci to her-by tho us Air Force. 
, Aff~l)·,h,~t i:niJit$.1)1·~reer (20 years-o_f~ervke),. this analysis profcct, 1\tls. Balfardis cai~~r in ljne 
· \ViU_l,t{,¢\eiii(irn._g$of'.Ch~a,:erag~fe;11Jirl.ewim a college clegte£:,. · Du'th1g her d:vHi411 l'ie..reer, this 
\,'tialyst$,X\~\1!ila:tes benefits rd be JO perceilt of money eamings·;to account for 'add:it:io.iml · 
r~titcrh~iit)ncqn~e:(il}g~lly, r~quirec! :retir~rncot ben_efit~ and 401K-type bene:ftls), 
· ·Th.i~·repQrtpfoJ~~ti M.$ . .8aJlar<l's militaty ~·age.,; across tw9 scenar[os. At the;·iiin_e.o'fti~:i' 
· deaj;h, lS,1s;-Ballard \Vas a staffscrge;mt at gra<le £-5. Scenario 1 assi:tmc-sMs, Bal}-ar,,d:,\!pu1d 
·, l11'LY.-~i:'p1~r.iI~tel:loh_etli.iChelot}degtee. l\s she cont)nuep io ;ulya11ce at the normal t.at(l l)f~u-
' C!ill$1e~ l!")einJi¢.cof"the US. Air Force (Table2). Scenario 2 assti1i1cs i.hat M$; Ba1li!rd wotild. 
Ji~\,ije(;i,l'JKk!)for haab.t!J9t's' ,kgree,.compfoted i;3fficer \ra.iniog school, t111d been promoted to 0-
1 ra11kby Janllazy t 2()1 (.i , .Aller ol1tain1ng the 0-1 rank, tL1is analysis <lSSlll))e,; that lv,\s. 
Ballard ~vouid have conti1111e<,J-to progress al the normal pace lo rank 0-2 and 0<3 (Table 3). 
Ms, D.illard planned on retiring from ihe milirary after 20ycars of service and expected lo 
enter ll-ie civiJia.n labor force :it that lime. Scenario I and 2 projects Ms. T3ailard's aivili()n 
.wages based 011 tbe average money earnings of females with a b?..chelor\ degree who ure Ms. 
8 '.allard's age (Table 4). 
Ms. Batlnrd's dvilan earnings estimates arc ,H.ljustcd each year in line with U1e earnings life 
tycLc or individutil productivity of 1he .:iverage female with a bachelor';; degree wbo is Ms. 
Ballard's age (Table 5). 
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f~turc 1.ost :firranci~i support hfis been 1:ecluced to presnrit yalu~ .according to the1nethodology 
oescrib'ed in SectionlV. 
Wage Grm,'th 
Table 6 presents sotne empirical ev1denc.e showing that workers may expect their wages to 
grow over,timc ih line: ,vith.tbc growir1ge¢ono;i1.y. 
There arc ihr~c key ccouomic factors that drive wag~ grow1b: (I) inffrtt1?n, (2) 
inacrqec:onomic p(oductivitY~ \illQ (3) iudiyrdtraJ prod_tictivify; 
l ftbe pfifos of goods i!i&case,\>tiijle \v:=(g~s, i:enfairi fi~ed, th,e:pl1rchasing power· of worker$ 
. QCCt'G?SeS,(i.~ •• v;;ork~r~ geq,ooNr} tibriceffl1tflil1iOI,i fa .J.'O 'percent, wages ml.)si also i11cre11se 
hy 3;0. perte11t in order for workers,.to remain as wet! off. 
Anotlier n:ason for wag<;\ gro.wih is fo~rea'sed macroeconontic ·productivity,. In olber words, 
when workcn; have bcttrr capital .goods t0 work \'vith (e.g., compu.ters in!;tead o.rtype\vritci:s or 
bulldozers instead ofshovcls), ptoducflvity and wages increase. 
llrns as·1cchnology and tbe efficiency of capital !,ioods inan,,ise; the eeo1101liy 1?,tows:and wages 
hicre;i~c. {[SJ, [9J} 
Tile thlrd key ecouomfo factor tl)<1t Mves ,va:gc grdt\flb is th.e -productivity of iu<l'iviou;il 
Workers, Woi:ket::; \•lith ri1orefaunan capital (e;g., informal :a1)d·fort,1al ltaining,,_g.eneral arid 
s.reciftc \\'btk el(pe'dPtlt.e, edtrcatior;J, ft~,} ;c~:nd lo be more proditctiv.c. · 
Wage l!if.ferentia:ls due tiulifJtlteac~s ii:i fri~l:lvidua1 prnducti\iii;y lcveli\ are qap~uretl th1'ough an 
aha!ysiscif the agcacamings profiles (or cainirtgs life ecyoles}l.).f dii'fcr'enl ,agec,etlut~tion peer 
gtOl'l)S. {[8}, '[91, (10), [l rJ} 
The annual eamings estimates in thi~ analysis .are.adjusted ea,ch yc.ar in lin.e with the carnitigs 
fife cycle ofthc average worker in M.s. BaJlar.d!s peer.group'. 
for further qj·sc:;ussion regardit1g w.ige growJh .due to indiv/qµµi produc:tivfty (level ofhuma:n 
capital) vis-.IHlis cconorny 0 wide productM:ty (efficiency of capital goods)see Economics (8] 
or k1odem Labor Econorn1cs (9]. · 
J~ctircmcut :ind \'Vorklifo Expecta11cy 
While the average retfrernent age is 63.7 for males 1md 63.6 for !'emales [ 12 ), U1ere are period'.< 
in the (lverage worker's life during which heishc is not worki:rig (e.g., due to iliness, job loss, 
volun.tary retirement, etc.). 
Given ,l person's gender, age ,ind education level , wo.rklifri e.xpectancy tables calculate the 
probabilities that periods of J3bor fore:: separntion wiil exist dnring the work inf life of an 
individual. 
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The expected working Hfe is an cs1imatc of the nLnnber of years, expressed as a functiou-of 
constant employment, that the:,i;verngc pers6r1in a gender and age-cdl1cation peer group is 
expected to cootiriuc to paliici.pate in the.labor force. 
Chart 1. ut'thl~ r.epon illui;irates the p(ocess by which the wol'klife expectancy ta1J!es caiculri:te 
-a;ild c.xpfcss an iiidividt1iWs i1oniialexpccted ,vorking life. · 
Accoiqfrig-to 11:iP 1'9:86'U,S.,tiep;u-bntii.t' tif Lab.or worklifo tables (which rely 01.1 cmplby11ient 
' ~~fu.·frq_hl 19).C:ho }9~0,) tiJJ,, as/o'f)1Hy ·26, '20J O ur age 27.27, Ms._ Ball3.rd had a Ji~Ji'lili).1 
eijlec1ed'ivorktng ,]j'fe (>f27.Ql llibre years. - . -
To: re:fiect the_socioeconon\ic changes,tlfat have occlltTed over t.hc last ,several decades, Cieoka, 
Ep~tcin and Goldman [1,4], l{fohatdsand Abc;le [ !5); Skoog and Ci ec.ka [ 16J J1t1d Skoog, 
Ciecka and Krneg~r [17].\lSed the \J.S,, D~ga:rtment of Lr1bor's mct,nc1dologie~ to .cr1lculatc 
updi'ltcd wo:rkflfc ~stj1uafi;:jl,' us.fog tnore Ctrrreht employmc11t da:ta . 
. -More:}p~fJJJc;a.ll?/ t!t¢ :C:foyki:Bpst.e,m,-and Go! dil1an 1J.pdat;e,s are b,ise.:l o:n {994•lii:b,or'cla\<t' th~ 
' RfcJ1¢'~s an.<;l A,&e1:e::i,1pdlitt1~ a;re be1sGd .on (iibbr a~t<!- fl'.on.1 l 9}}$' to 1998, ~h~ S~;ppg:apd Ci~ck11 
· {1p4,~lei. ilf:c li~s~cfoif]ah~)t .{;laffd\i>.in:1997' fojcfJ.998; and the Skoog; Ciecka arid Kr,Lleger 
;updii.~s" are based-0:0 ·1ab,ot data:ft'om 20Q5 to :2U09., 
' 
Tbese updr{teq cafcul.ations- pf-the· U.S. Department of Labor workl.ife tables indicate thar given 
h:er gender; heredncat1on, and.her age as of July 26, 2010, Ms. I3allord had a normai expected 
working fife of32.5.8 mort. years (Ciecka, EpH!cin und Goldimtn), 29 .68 more years (Richards 
and Abele), 30.02 m0te years (Skoog and Ciecb~), and 3 l .42 more yea.i's {Skoog; Cieckaand 
Krueger). 
G'iCdt!, rtt~lcln .•uod:Crof,h:-,:?r.. 
i{W·i) . 
Rk-h:h1fa: nr'ui Ahcl:-; 
' ({<;%-9~). 
~:r~ottr. an.:! Ci::~~ 
( t99i-9?,} 
SkOili!. bi'O-:·.kn: J!Au:ae~ 
{i (r.).)'-<,9) . 
This anaJ5,sis projecls losJJinancial support in ,tecordancc wHli a norJnal work.life expectancy --
rc1ire111eni a1 age 6J .6, the average retircrnl!nt 3gc of all females, and a nonl1i:il work life 
expectancy ofJ0.9J mo.re ye·ars. 
Furthermore, in accordance wiih the. Social Security 1\clmi.nistra1ion's increasing full 
retirement age, 1his ,mnfysis also pro jeers lost !inanci;i l support as:;uming a fu.ll workli fe to age 
67 (social security nonnaJ ret irement age for people born in 1960 or later) . 
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HoOseJ1.did Sc:{•yicesor N.o.n-;finnncfal $uppott 
· fti ihetJnii:ed;states, time d!!\iofod to. work is usually compensated in dol hirs and cents. A 
.. rn~Jp{ex.CeP,tfoirfsthe J\Qos~hi)lq Wo!'k perforined by 1.vo111en, children and !U~fl in oi.1r :S<;>'ciety 
that ls not. s0:14 irt :for;i1al tnarkets. . 
While household setv!ces. may frequenlly .be performed oufoid): fonirnl la.bormar~e'ts, it ls 
dear these services do have a monetary value. {[8], r9J, poJ,{2.IJ, [22J, [2'.,J, [241 [25], [26], 
[27] , [28], [29]} 
The ;'Dollar Value··ofaDay'' sunimarizes .tb.e lJ.S. Oepartni.ent of tabors American Time Use 
Survey dot.a teportiii'g lhe tim~ ~pentby 124,517 pe(wns across the country-. 
· using the ·~oxir;ly compensa~ipn ai;ttially paid to females whMe employmenJ ,in.valves rhe:same 
activilf ~ . that pe9p!e:·WiH\ Mf '13a!!h:rdls .sodoeconornk characteristics iyplqally provide ti:r 
·r:tj~ir 9\'\'tJ 'hc,i1sehofo, 'th~ nati~ntil n,vcragehousehold sctvi2e. ~platcrm:nt cost is $.l 3A6per 
1101fr. ri9J · · · · · 
ln this analysis, lfouschold service titn(} is value<l using a market alternative cost, or a 20l 3- base 
re:placcment cost of$ I 3 .46 per hour. 
Thi;; analy;;is calcul;:ircs 1Jm present value of household seryjqes on a one hourperweek b<1,~i.., .. 
Tlij_s aQalysi:,: . vafrles hpµsehoi,cl se(vi:c:es usfogmarkdr al!eit/ative cpsts , .. cifth.e nia(~<:.! '\'i'ijge: 
fates ;acJua1l)fpai.6l;to wotke}s }btpeffofiltfo.ghousebold seryi~es i,tftha rnarkitii'ljl~e; . 
't!i~'premise Jhhis1i.1e1hod 1s fhat ho.usehold 1~'01:k shoutd .be valned attlis:\rnte: one ,voufd 
ha vi-to payi<mteqn\::' to <l~ t\:im wort.s1nd as suc11, it is mt ,acQouniing bas~d Jrteasnrc rl'lthI:t 
ihan an opµortWJity cost based. n1easure. 
Fu1tbermore, as this is ;m ecx.moii1ic·a11aly;i,.is, 110 altcrqpl has been made to quantify the 
individualistic valn¢ ;1;,sociated with !ost household services. In other words,. w1iile one person 
1)1ay var·ue doing yard work more than another, while a persQn may value a: spottse's or a 
µ;;rent's cooking more. thM a ~!ranger's., or while the time a parent spends caring for <} child 
may be pricelcss,.this a,rmlysis l1niits !he valuation of household sc.tvrcc titue: to niarktt 
alt~l'na.live costs. 
Future household :;ervi<.;cs were projected through age. 75.34 and reduced to present valµCJ 
.according to the rne1l1od1.1logy described in Section rv. 
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Personal Consumj,'t1on und .Fitiancial Support Fa.ctor 
Jr a realistic estimate of lost financial support ls to emerge from this analy:;is, consideration 
mus! be given to the portion of Ms. Ballard's c·,1li1ings that would have been used for pui:chases 
exdusivcly for her own pe,~onal benefit ifnot for her pren1ature death. The flnaudalsupport. 
·· .facton1ec~S$a:t1 tµ maintaiq t)\e Uving s~ndar<l for survlvin&'famiJy members i~ a function of 
.the .dece$¢d ))$l'.SOU1S pcrsQ'O:a[ ClOllSUIT!ption. (JO} 
'Jiii,~ ,analysis ace-0.w1tf for Mi. B~llai:d\:peys6l)<1l cons.µmptio11, an~ the es(j1nares of econo111k 
loss tn tni~ iln~!Y:iis .oavf•be.~:n; reduced liy tlie portion of Ms. Ballard's earnings that she ·Wol!M 
have im~urred ibiher :oirt. personal nrnilllenance. 
Each yeat since l980, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS}has conducted a snrveyc stLtdy ['.HJ 
of consumer expenditures by querying independerit smnpies oflhousands oF hovseholds in 
areas rcpresc.ntatiyc 9f the, total U.S. civilian populntion. 
The BLS sur:vey study(Con:wnte,· fapenditure Survey) is designed to obtain detacls regarding 
'iryi}.p.eitd.l11¥ pattertis;0f i'ndivlduals and hqusobo ldswi!h varying charac1ofi.sti~s-
j:: l ~, . 
· }\Ii a1'ialy:;is,-0fthe J:31;S COJ'ISlilnpr:ron cfa(a reveals mat the finan,cial suppolt i}1ctor is highly 
· \!:Prrel;itcdwlth fncome aiid household structure (Le., age and1iumbe"r ofmeinbe.t.s). (3J 1 
This a;nnlysis uses data from the. U.S. D¢parfrnent of Labor'~ annual surveysiudies of 
· consumer expenditures· to estfrnatc Ms. Ballard's personai consmnption and coirespon<lirig 
financial suppprt factor Basc.d on her age, level ofinco1ne ant:1 houseJ1olif size .. [~· (] 
· 'Fo(!vts', ~alwci, pel'.S1maJ consumption as. i percentage of eamlngs rnnge~ from 24 perc6riHµ 
. 44 PctC~)lt. The~e coniiu,itptitm pcrce111ag1!S bavl! been <1p.pJJed i.o expccied eai·tiings; 
I.~a,sed 011 Ms .. Balfard's exp!:!cted level of pay d,n'il'lg her n)i.litary career, norroal person<!.! 
· consumption would be 36 percent: or money earnings. However, Ms. Ballard's co;1sumptfo11 
would have been off.set l;>y the foHowing military h.cnefits: subsisience pay ($352/mooth), 
dotl1ing allowance ($342/ye,ir), and housing a!!.owance for her and her. husoand less norm;'\l 
rent ($632 x 2 - $890). Afte.r accouniing for 01esc expenditure beoefil~. Ms. Ballard's personal 
coilsumptio.n dtlTing her military career is estimated to be 24 percent. 
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During her ci:vif ian. worklifo (post military 11nd before final i'ttircmeni), Ms . .Ballard's personal 
. consumpJion is estimated Jo be26,2S rercen.t (S·cenario l}and. 25~26 percent (Scenario 2). 
After firfalrel1reinci~t;:1ieYpcrsonai:G6nsumpti.oi:1 is estimated to be 44 percent (Scenario 1) and 
Jo percent (Scenario 2). 
Ur.ider SceJlario 1, the pr.esent vaht(! of Ms. Ballard's personal,consumptlon of money earnings 
rang~s from $365.,4&7 {ili)rmal worklife)tQ $491;695 (full worklifc to age 67). Under Scemfrio 
2, tho -present value of Ms. Uailar<l's personal consunipti01i ofmoney eam111gs ranges from 
$389,136 (Mrrrtal worklife) to $:SOS,432 (ful I worklife to -age 67). · 
·rv. · PRES&N>r V'. ·:Lu·r,, :r _,,.H";-::"t.s· i~. .. • . .> . i'\.: , Ji.t.i ?l! l.l'.~ :,I · ._ .. ...:; 
The easi'esl-,fnd pe.rbaJjS the:best.way ti;> est1i:lla,te tbidost fqii.1r¢ fi11::inci~ · s u1jport wquld be. to 
\V.ait and see)wfiat tfle a•;,eiagc, vy.orke;r ~hli Jv,:s.· BalJar.d's S{2cio-ticcinomic tharacteristics earns 
each year in the futl.lre. Unfortt1ruitely, tn~.cantiot be done. 
Pecuniaf)' tlamage.s must be ·cst:lmat~d:a.s-0f today. '111is 1ucans tbat the expected futtire 
earnings orM·s, Ballard mus,t ~ e~tiinat~p 111 ii teaso.mible i\1a,y anC:hhcn ~xpressc<l iu 20 l J 
tfollars o.r prc$e1ir.va:i°'u!,'l, · · · · · 
Empl.i:icat e·vi.,fonte:froin the. past s1 years incticatts tba1 the.time value ofmon,ey anct 'the 
.,,,orkeri' W;g<: gro\vifi :t,}ife covaty so as:to establish a·di.fferen.tial {d\;;cOliiit nrte mlnu:; ,vage 
g;ro\vt:b (?le) ofzexo .. ro.oni:::' percent. 
More sJ:icd-fic;illy, s-incc 1)>5$ tlt<.>-eti1iipoiiud annual fotcrc!itrce-oivcd fromfovest111~nis in US, 
Treasury securi.fic5,wfih 1.:.mo11th, $~year and·20-yeat maturitfos has exceeded the anmlal 
increase in ,,;vagcs <ma year-by-year basis at u median rate of 0.4, I .0 and l.6 perccnr per year, 
n:spwively. {fSJ, l32]) 
Fun;Jwnnore, since .1956 !he avcr.ctgc annual gro'\-Vth .iti total co·nl'pe11sation (i.e., wages and 
benefits) 'has been ~pproximatc ly pne)JcrcenLhigher than th~ avenigc annual inci·~ase in wa_gcs 
alp!)e {JS], [3_3j,'[34],J35.J}. Sinetl956thc-ci,mipouod am:ioal inte:rest received ffoi:n · 
iiwestrnents Jri iJ.S. Treasury sccuriffe~ wi1h 1-mbnrh, 5-y~ar ~ml 20-year rn/l!Urifics hils 
.e.xceedcd !.he annual incfcase in con1pcnsaiion cin a ye;;r-by,year basis al a median rate of-0.4, 
0:2 and 1.1 percent veryeanespectivcly. {l3:2], [33]. [34], (~5)} 
Further i1isights regarding futon; expected wage-interest di-ffore.nti11ls can be gleaned through 
nn examination of the interest rnte and ·wage rate expectations or some ,)f' the largest U.S . 
companies. 
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He.witt Associates, a JHotnincnt rrntiotial acn:iarial and bcn~(it constflting firm. oonducttia im 
.t1J1ntlal·s11rv:cy sllldy [36J of the postfptin~rpi;;:ntben~rn liabilities oftJieFol;ILme 50.0 ans:i ·s~p 
500 companies. This study analyzes dfoclosµres under the FiJ1zncial ;\ccou.nliilgStaridar~fa 
Board's-(PA$:B) St.,,:icrn#1tt 87 (accounting for pensions) and Statement l 06 (a¢countiriff6r 
postr(iti~m:~,otli1mefits oU1cro rhan J)ensions). The key economic as$nmptions-th;iuie}entdric tI 
fi~1'i:i'.s· (lbffg~tfon ·fiir pens16n bc_nefits [o ]ts employie:S are tl:\e. \vage gro\,,th r-aff 'and the · 
!'::':t,!:':Cfed iOi1fr"lCJiU .i'ate Of:rellJTrl' 011 pian <1$St:ls. fach )'CJ)' ·this Stlld)' lnqJ~iq_eS ilppt'<:i.)('.irrtatd)1 
. 400 i:;(:)1iJp.ar.1fos-thi'\thaye, reported inf ornralion on defined benefit pc-nsioll'plansdn lh_eir 
fft;tnhcihl'.stht~ebts (FAS 87). The li1Sfotie:aL average wage growih rate lised 6y these · 
-C~Inpaf)ieS llti$ been. 4§1)t'.fCCi1t and the avct·ag,e langcCCnTl rate of return on plan ilS:SetS U:Se-d 
hasheen 9.i) percehL 
'Watson Wynn Worldwide, another prominent national RC!UfirirJ amt bene-Jlt consulHng firm, 
has conducted an aunual survey study of pension plan~ in the United.States coverj/)g f,000 or 
1riore active participMts. The 2006 survey study 1.37] l()oksat the acnia,ial asSlJ.iJiptfo'iis of 478 
larg~ pl}J1~iQ1, ·J?W-I1~ ci;rvedpgJ,0()0 Qrmore active parlicipants. For the220 pensfon·plans-iir 
fhfs ~·tu'dyth11tb~'s-i?-r:eilren:1enfbene'tits ub final av.crnge pay, the average viage gr(fr,i\h it1te 
:qsed:\v.is:~;6p,ere~nt ai1.d \he av.erage rate cif.tcl'urn Oli plan assets used was:RJ{pej:b~rit: f-r.0131 . 
}99't}'i<;i::zoQ6,.,tbh~vet-<Jg~•"v.rige :g1·.0,~~lr rate used for pci1sio.i1 plans tJ1at basc:rct:ire,m~tit · 
;blnefits:on°fi~iil fiVti'~ge:p~y i;5,'2 ·percent ~;)i:1 Lhe avcragd ·iong-tcrrn ra:tt·oftciturn-011'plan 
. t~ssefs: ror;tlic'sqlll~--p]ij11~-:i';; ~t2, pei'cent . . 
. . 
t11 anothcrstocty {40); .fowcrs Wat~on Mal_yzes. !hti fi'uanci'aLdisclosures· of 6T5 <;:ompµtjie's,on 
the F ortnoe l.ist of i ,000 companies. T!\c repc>rt summarizes lh_e assumptions ll'scd-hy-{):fose 
cbmpani'e,5 iil the calculation ;:~f.penSion expense and obligations. TJli$ Stiniinru'.y 1'6jiot:tistfre: - . . . .. ~ 
twenty-fom1h. in i;i s.e,i~ .of annual an!ll yses ofptnsi o:ns The average M(ge. gri:i\\1h ·l'a'! ~ tJSM 
by-tb:t(::Otl)par:i_jes-i:iJ.the:ZOTJ sl\1dy is 3.9 perc~nt :ind the average long-terrti rat-eofreimfl-q~ 
pfan usse~ is J;!i) .. percctil.~ From 1990 lO 2010, the wag.:. growth rate used by C(lll.lpiliile.s'bas 
-· aveni.gpd 4:,6 percerit and the long-term rare bf re tum on p.lan as:;et:s for the sam.e period bl:!s 
averaged S:s i1erctmt. · · 
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T!ie expected lmig·1e1m-rate o'fret(u11 on plan ilSS<;'.ts is the actuaii~l discoun.t rate used to 
·estimate the.,unount of n10neytl1at must he inv,c-sted lo rne_et th~ futllre h.enent lihl\-gations of :i . 
defined benefit pcllsion plan . Th.us the 'J ,9 t<;> 9Jl percent expected rates ofrettm, .on plan 
assets nofod ·in the pehsioh piai1 stmffos cited above aie the · discount mies .used to -reflect the 
car,nings ,m\jcipared OD tbeinvestn)Cl'ltS made by the Jund in ordet to provide the projeC1!!d 
benefit o51igations. As such, these rates.repre;;'ent thp avei:age expecwd l~_1um,0J1 inv~tments 
iha variety of r-isky assets. V{hcn adjuste(I Fortis~ ihe ttu:.c~~h,-.foi,ipercoiin!iffonmtfol (us~d 
by corporate defined benefit pension pf!l,ns) which is based·on the expected -return frpm 
investments in risJ,.,--y assets and expected wage gro_wtll rates is equiva1cnt tq a zero p.er~cpt 
differential. wl1ich is based onthe-yi<;,lds ofU.$, 1,\cgsµry sec-urittep anq c~pec;ted ·W~ge.~rowlh 
rates . 
This risk adjQ~ted equivalence caTJ; tie easily d~mbnstni.1ed1n either one oftwo w:;;ys: (I) by 
pkitting in~forig-tcnn expected ;ra:te rjf return on p[an a.sse:ts::agaiost the conte1i1poranceius iong-
1e1111 risk·frec r.ate (i.e., the curtent§iiTd on 2.0:year U.S. Treasury bonds adju~ied for expected 
horiz:oll premium); or (2) by talcuhtting the ewecl.ed risk pn;i'.JliLUn that c-orporaie defined 
benefit pension plans anticipate from t.heir risky investrnerit portfolio mfportiolio risk 
preriliurn) = il.(E(J'e1urn on a:;seti). E(risk free rate)) * [port;folio weight of asseli:l). 
Chart 8 i I lustnites !he first method: and sugg«sls-that' corpor~fo dc.fi:r:ied bene.fit pl.a,1i: sponsors 
. would use a differential rate:(j~1tercs.Uateminµs ,waie_growtfrr-ate) of <_1pproxiqin:te)j:zcfo if 
pension ilssc.Cs were.restricted lb lJ .S'. Trea~w:y ,secmdjfos, 'fabJi; 7-iUustrates -lh-~ s~(mn.d 
ni'eihod and .also suggests ihatco1;p:orat¢<lef.rned,.benefit plan/i;ponsors \'iolll<l use a}i(fereniial 
(ate (i~ierest i·ate :wJnus :wage gi~\{1h;tatc)6f a1wro;<imatdy:zero ff pension issets- wpre 
7 restricico -to U.S. Treasni.v $
0
l':Ci)J't(fos. • . .· ·. . . .. 
The anmmi report of'the board of trustees ofthe·Pederal Oldi-Age mid Survi.yars bisunmce and 
Disability Insurance Trust-Funds [42J reports the fina11ci;:tl and act~arial .statusoJtiw-OlfAgc: 
a/ld Survivors Insurance (OAS1) and Disability Tnsurm1ce (Pf) Trust Funds, TfIC.O!d~Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Jnstirnnce (DASDJ) pxogra1n in the,t.lnited S1~ll<eS provides protedion 
against the Joss of earn ings due to rctiremen.t, deinll or 9isabi.1.lty. Tbe- to4!1 asse1s of the OASJ 
and 01 Trnst Funds at the beginning of the eakndar year 20l2amounted to $2.6'8 trlllion. 
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Unlike the ln:v6.tment portfolios ofc-0rporute pension plans, by luw the investments of the 
OASI and DI Trust Funds must be made irt ii\terest-bearing securities of the U.S. Go:v~mmerit 
or in securities guaranteed hy the United States. BecaLisc of this, Lhe invested assets pfth~ 
t1ust funds are backed by the full faith and c1·edH of the U.S. Govemmcot in the same way as 
othey public-d.ebt obligatip11s oft be· Uh.ited Sliites. The OASJ and QI Tnist ~·untls employ ·~ 
long."tehn expected: a.im11tl retuin on':a.$~ets (i.e., a U.S. TreastH)' bond yidd asslimptkrn) 
m11_gfngfio.m5.2, to 6.i:j)trcent and~ longcform ar:muaJ wage:_growth assumption rai1girig:frotn 
3,S1!~·4~)2Ji¢'l't.~ii.t The;ntii:t!lftty pr:.,mfom irriplicit jn the yie]d ¢urve of.U,S.T1-easuJygo11ds 
· li~s a'ihta~{l 0..9 pe~!lent~fdr jJ1t¢t:tn:edJafo~~erm boti<ls and 1 ;7 percent for long:t~rrn Qdnds -
. i:h;tjh&tlYi ,192s~iOlJ:pc;rioti}J~J; Theiefoni, the wage-int~ri,:st drf'forential used hy tliu 
Q/,\.$!_)\p,rog,r?m is equivalent Uni net discount rate ranging frrn n 0.0 to 1.9 percent. 
Oi'ven ihe ihitl!il Level ofirtconie (tlatnings. bl!~e) and the fongih. .of .the time; p¢rjod (expe6t~d 
working life), al I tlrat ls·necesst451 in or,de.r to cstfmatc-thc present vaT ue ot" a work~ir$ 
'3,Tiflcjpa(~;f [llt11te itwo~(;;.Stct;~nd~ ~n:0_1.vledg1fof:.1l1e wag~\nterestdi ffor,eiiliaL hJ otge.r 
' w~rqs~ h'rsithe s)t~,tjf tl\e.:4iffer!!ritlal,}ibelhe "e:qi.ected levels df wage t.ates. br Uil¢'i'.~si rlit¢s,. 
:cthit-<1~te.tu1Irtis athe;p~~seht vahie of,;i Juthre sfrea'ti1 of earnings. Table SJ.! tuirratcs tl,iJs'.jiofot 
·· r-M tl,;\t/dti_ :t1;e'. ittbl¢;11J;Jcd.i1,:Ql~atthti.t:;t~garctte.ss qf what th¢ at,tm(l iotur~sJ::ra~~r>mid,:wµge 
gr~v;i'(ln:atis art:iii tb~?tfoor.c,,. tbepresentv.alu~; for n, given-diffore.ntiai are .i dentic;:iL 
Henc~v;rhiie: eypnqrni~t&fczj,notpredic::twhat .(tctual interest(4iscoupt) rates and qctua1 wa_ge 
g;rd(vth:rafos:~'illbe ov~,afl extended pedodin the tutu re, the 'present value p_fftittire 
¢(;{?DOtnktos$es can bo 90UJ1ded\vith ;i reasonable degree of cc;.onomic certainty when _ti zero . 
to one petce1i.l dif(~rcntJal (disco um rate mii1t1sthe wnge growth rate) is uJill'zed ro. convert 
c:1qiected fciturecamouritsto !heir preserit vallles. This anal/sis calcu!t1tes tireseni·.values usfug 
a net cffscou!:it rate of05 per,:;ent. 
Jt shoµlct ):)e Mtc<l thl\f sC>rnetlrocs the pct discoi:mt rate is confused with the gross clhcount 
')'ajce. thls~1(s:tike lia\;l~ fo the' erroneous concl11sion that the net discount rate 1n.ethod .iss(unes 
ti sever~ly.: lii.nited,'iJ:iiHty, ot n.o-aBifrty atalJ1 10 e!lrn)ntere~t in the foturc, For example, with 
fftis frtistlllde!'S(lll!Oi,ng, itjs: OftCltiarg)Jed tbafat.let disboUnf rate of zero pe_rcenl mearn; that X 
do]fors is-requirndroday t.ocoverx dqJlars of lost wages in the future. m)·viously this is not 
the •cas(:!, Chatt 4.thropghC.hart 7 U !,istrate the proper intcrpreia1 ion of lhe 11et dfacouni rate 
method. 
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'V. . CQN~J:i)$J:(:)N 
IhiJQt(IJ (:l[g$~llt V(l!U~-O:f" ec;_.o]JO_mlP, )0$.!i;tQ ~)9,~ScSOC)ilteo. ',)/jfhthe dct1!h9f:~i$; Oa;flar,ciJlin_gei;; 
fl~oiiJ :$2;t09:~&n t<r$2J3 S4,23'S 'ur1def''St¢hat,lo· 1 and from·$2',4S6,343 fo·f~76~ ,292 nM~r · 
-Scru}irdo,2-0,<e~Ti\bk l). . 
Thi5aM!ysis doe$-P6t include any aUowuriee for incentive qr speckd pat(fa11tlly sepi:iratioi1 
a110-.va1iec; hawr<lous di.11y in.ceoave pct,', h1m1inenJ:. danger pay/hostile fin: pi}\ ·comfoi.t zon~ 
ta){ @xclusion. drill pay, travel cnritlemeni.s, ralocntion expe1)se cnveragtiS, t1lt'ii't: s<tvings 
bencfits)tlmt Ms . .lJ:ailanl n1ay iwve re.eeNcd ii~ -u.member ofth:e U.S. A.ir for®, 
Consequently, ccunoniic damages in H11s :iri~ilysis .are biased <lo.wn~vard, 
11ilsanaJysfan1t1y bet1.pdated ,.-if,addfiio11ii'.l.:reJev<'i1lt info11iiatioi1 be~(ime:sa,1i!fo1,1¢c11S::H1is ._ 
Jit\i5~litil:li11r~g:retMs·.. · 




Post .lv!om:y Earnings (n~t of consumption) 
Future Mon~y Earn ings (n~l ~1f cc,nsurnplion) 
Future r-·ringe B.:.nt fits (nd of con.sumptinn) 
h!urc Los11vrilitury Re1irerni:nt ln:-0rnc 
/nc.l of con:;umpti()J1). 
To:,·,J Lost Fin:rnci:,I Support 
NO N'-:FlNA NC JAL :S9l' t'ORT 
(U01JSEHOLlJ SERV'.ICES) 
Total l're,<!nt Vafuc pllr Hour of Service 
Time That l-las Bccr1 Lost p~r \\'e~~ 
(n~t nf rnnsumr,li<,n) 
Assumed I lours Lost per Wed: 
c~,·crngc for t'crnalcs) 
Total H.,L,stho]d Strvkc, 
(net <lf ctm~:Jrnp!ii)n) 
T(HAL 
TablcJ~ Pr~Sl;ijl Yalli;il '!ifrc.i~1ii~tj· L¢~ to tic 
A.m,ciated' with the De.,t~ ~f.11.':~f~~l~t~lis~a Ballard 
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1 5% .. 'fonc.i Yt:.<tn. 
.;1(Scr'¥1t t. 
MOO 
1\ Yi:t.!i~C n:f. l;()l')iel:f: 
3tf M01ith.s;o{.U:a1C.· ~:1ontl.,lt .~d.1Tu:1:i!n~ A't1ri1ml 1ttfiremcrt: 






TI.V . TIS ,:-\.p,c· 
J\.~'l.:t\"l"~t= 
i1,·orn ·ttJ ·rJG .:.r·lS'. !'£,t> 
Kcyr,,\ 
2004. .t· I 
;!tl l (I E-5 1.9 4.5 25 
(l,JJJ.'O~ EW!/04 '.(f:7 1):'7. :u.1 
01 /0 )/10 12/j Ji[() .l;O q.,7 Xi:7 
201 .l E-~ ill,\) I I 11 l~/31/JJ :2;0 7.1 2S.7 
2012 (c.5 01//j l /J.2 12r§lli7. to E,7 'J.9.7 
2013 E-5 Oli(ll/13 1U3l/JJ ,rn 9:.7 3-0.7 
2014 t -5 IHi/!i./14 121) 1114 5;0 10.'7 3 1,7 
2015 E-6 5 4 10.6 } I Ol!Ol/lS 1W 1/15' l.0 l].7 32:7 
2016 ().,J 01 /0l/ i(i 12-131/16 !.O ID 33.7 
~017 0-1 !il/0 Lip J';.131/11 :rn Jj,'1 ,,4.7 
2018 Ow2 
2()19 0 -2 
ii'l illl/13 12i3 ltlS t.rJ 1~.7 JS,? 
Ol /Ol/l9 1:1:iJ 1/19 2':IJ \5.7 36.7 
202(1 O·J Ol /0li::!ll 12/31/20 1,0 16.7 17,7 
202! 0-3 (1\/01/21 ll/Jl/21 ·~;(I 11:; J.~.7 
2022 (:>-3 UIIOIF2 'l i?.i31Jn 3,(r rU 39.7 
2tl2., 0-3 01;0!/B '\2}3 l,13' 4.0 19.7 40.7 
2(124 0-J f!l /OJ I?•\ O-\i'J3/24 5;() 2n .o •fl ,\) 
~~1,,;;~ .. c; \; ~ ()cp,:.it:,'1·:~·r.: i;f bhor Hrir:..a~ 1)1·1...~b.ir Sf,)1•,-snr.~ p; 
~(iJ .~ ,\i, h,:G: Pt:l 1l1M:m1 ,cv,:: :,;!c5 r.~~ 4,: Fcr,c:-: i"r-''l':!'1~1c.l (.el'll::-n! ,_.•,,·.,· aJj:t .. t1,r:mif 
I 
{oni.iloif'"'1'01 io 
, frl\:~~D ~Qlle)' 
l\ty Gmdl: AA~ · JJ1rrith:JY~\uih. At1n~~(~~i\i·;, 11~'nmKt f~ :w·i j 
rmttt ·r~r-. . 7•'t bolh>rd 
,.;,, 
U--S .c,;. Vr, 
~·:S·?Yl!i 
,:;.s. a,:,,. 
E-5 · '1 v,, 
s:.-s .. HIYtii 
£.(, .. 11 Yi;s 
Q..\ .. 12-,:i,; · 
!).J . i, ,;,,,. , 
0-1. - IJ'I' ri 
o.:. a~'h,; 
r.:ki ~ l~Ytt 
o-~-1n·1, 
OcJ · Iii 'i'rl 






















' S~l ;16'G 
· ~6}',7~4 
jr,'3734 




















.\o~i\1:,11} ;1,1~· !,.,; ~. ,:~~·J")e.s .]i} ! ().1(l : l (i; l/,'J.'/.',,~ ... ~ - ,,f,'1.1 .1>rf!1,nil1/;>rym~'t11b~rJt'j.¥1.1~11!till!/f10ll..~rmfifrt1')'}1J.',>-kJb!1t.r i,tm,1) 
f.l ·J,: .. · ,l,n· f1i1:,1 ') fl!,: r~,·,~~:·:\ i :· ;, ·r;:,c:.r:d 1:: )·.!J .\ ,i 1~ \li11''1 (,. t.. f:im1 lhc 20D llll~ ·;d1r.1.h1::~l 



















A.·~1?, .. ~l!e 0£. Hlyfo1-1 
·i· s~.;,. Ti1ric~ \'~na. · :r(l ·M.m,,h~ ijf hM;c. M~.!h1;: R<it1.~~C.nt,.' · i\t'~~~1t~b1Jt~·t:~t 
-\~r.S'e.rv;~~ .· · ·ro_y fr:c(,NIC°·it,W}!f~ · t,~ri,r;·1nl.QJ:fS· 
0.500 S6.6l4 '.IJ,3()7 ·$39,liil<l 
GEC000366 
001619
AvcriLg,c A./\lltlal W,aMO.toWlhF·<1ctor le.> 
8hrning~ fur a'P.ema(~ itc,te~!} t'l{9i1cy 
Year l)c.scri pt!qn with a Bm:h~lpr'sl:>e,grcc i;ttming$ tD 20}3',Dollars 
------·----- ---·~----··"-''-· -------'-· ·- ---·------- -----'-----,---
1999 
20[ l 
US C!.!i1KU$,, 1000' (1'il<!:I}(;ttl) 
CPS Ann~a'!81.1rvey/rrieq1u 
S:ijurccs· LIS. Ilcpsnm,~ot ar L.ob.><. J\urca\i,;,t' L.-tl;ar,'it:iii.,'!k,;. 1'71 
llurc;,u o[tllc Cc111;t1, fli<ff/1 11@~ WOcc1ir~tio:i,111({:E<lcc~lit'.ln 
$:3(i,267 
S&,229 
!iurc«u ,)f 1h1: Ccn,u; t),nw,i Populmii;i.i Sl!l\"e)'; "6 1:l /1r,/\1J.'ll ·$od;:l /inJ l~oaomic$1lppt~,,,~·nr. 





































Gross Dol'nc.~tic Hchlf!y Wagu:of 
Product (GD!') All Pe1vn(~ .. 
\'eur per Capita' Wmkcrt · 
i 955 $2,509 Sl.~3 
l9SS 2.,61\.] 2;()9 
1960 2,912 224 
19&1 \4.13 2.\l 
1965 3,700 2.63-
1970 5,06) J.40 
l\li,5 7,583 .\.73 
19&0 12, ]A.J ~.S5· 
1%5 17,(,~ J N.'.74 
1990 2\1.8~ 10.2cr 
19 1)1 23,635 10.52 
1992 2A:6S.6 1077 
191)] 25 ,616 ! !JiS 
1994 26,S93 11.34 
1995 2 7 ,s L1 1 l.65 
19% .29,062 12.04 
1.997 3tU26 12.~J 
J99S .ll,~4J !J.01 
1999 3),4~(, 13.49 
2000 35,23\1 1•1..02, 
20()\ 36,063 l4.S:4 
2002 36;958 1<1.97 
.2003 38,339 15.37 
?.004 ,:0,419 15 .69 
2005 H.,646 16.)J 
20(1(> •14,767 16.76 
2007 ~6,4!)1) 17J3 
ioor. ,f6,il1S 1;;.ps 
2009 .is;,1s1 11\,63 
201(1 46\$0~ 19.0i 
20 11 4,,37} 19.47 
A ycrngc Annual 
5.5%~ ~.3'?1" Rate ol' GrnwtJ, 
H6t.1;,ly_\Vugi, -of 





































































































~mt:C<!:!: \. U.S , lnt>Mtrner.t,.,:,f (;011w1~rc~',; Buf'l:::1u pf:EC(l:"to;nlo" ;,fiill}~is· . ..ui~'. ~~tircn\1 (1T\lic Ce11.;u~ (f,i! 'J 
,1 "'"l'.C Dp:.; frurn !'he \Y.S Oop:utmemnfL<rbo;.,, .in;0ti of,l.ll~ot.,Sioits,iille, lS J 
J C1trr9m !'opuhilion Rcp,:tn:,: s~-ric~l'60~ U'.!t ·Oc1~;uH.1JenL.q·r.c~rnmctc:.. 8u(t:n.i oi"-tfit.CtJ~ilL."> (6J 

































ln~omc ofAll .tJ:S; · 
\\'or\:~r~ ·1:5 :vcar.i' 














































































I. 0tecr;wic~ ,",sso<,jSf~{ [4n 
i 'J'tie Eederill m,;ervn l-lo3r~l {(12.l 
Expectco Return 
oi1 A~sei;.Ovf.r 






























:i: J:i.:<}Jutw ll,isKi.'re.mitir,J,.;. ,[EJCpe{clcd ,){¢1.\lrr\'Oll ,\~':lil; ~Y~l,J .;,1, 5~Yi.:!irfJ.S-. T,ta,;,rflk f'crcerll MP6i'Cf<;1((, 











1't/e:3-,9%,;rj_iKrrcl1;iiHirl i_1f,irn11ye.t'4_go;do_rp6tal6p~n!iid11 ,[#Ui1f>Jtfnlio i.~ jlt~l 0.1!7,o less than iitc avern·ge ifil~l-WJi;.e 
,Uf(~i(ri1i(i]:d1~ci1 '1,iy lhc pM~ion. pJ~O$ iiiclµ;l<ed il1 tlW newitt.~~:;ocfat,)S SIIJd}' p!i) illJQ ihe Towcrs:Wats,JIJ swdies 
{I.'.f?}.[\HlhJM)]},-i.uggesiing t!t;,1 (;OrpOr'die-dcfiiicd,~ei1efit.:p;,:risior. rlans wouid use" iliffore11,id fdi~coulif Jflll! minus 
Wage g.r.o~v!lJ.rµt",) <l.f,7,ct1l ifj)lllJSi()l) "S5¢!J \1tcre.(t!$~}ctc(l l~ t),S. Tr<'.i;ISl.>f)' ,.:curjties. !Jc1aiJ5 rcg;;rdii1g th~ Hcwil1 /\!JU 
n,wcr,~ Wat:<o11 st{J.£4Cll' ~1fi!i:Sc:u~sed fo lhG l'r.;,$1:l1t V~luc- .'\n11lysh ~e<;tiun o fthis rtplJtl. 
111,:, (jrccnwi<;h A!;:sl)l:i.:iu:s su(vey study IJl J is based mi the review of 1,022 corporarn pension plans nnd in-pcrson 
i,1,L·rvicws with Ii IO corpora le fo1id offici,tl!rbctwci;n At,gusl and ()dob"r of2()0,1. 





rhc L1it i~I crunil'l[;S of 
s l 0.000 g-, 0,~·5 10 1l"'j5 
a.'lio,:n! in yc1u 30: 
.. . :i.1d rho JU yeC!IT. of 
oJirointss w,~1.s: 
.'(lt1% 













T:ilile'8A:-. Fulur_e Yalu~ ofEnrningsper S1ll,000.1iflni1Jal f;;frriings 
Period= 36 Yeafs of Earnings 
Assun;iing,AlicrnalivtEan1ings GrowltfRaw:; 
LO% 2_0% 3.0% 4CY, 5_1)% 
'.\14_33} S29J47 S42,207 
$435,50() s5_;2,506 S82!,)tS 
T~blo SR-: Prcscnt\';1)uc ofEa_niings per SlU,1J00-0fI11ifo1I Earnings 
Pcrfod=36 Year, ofEamings 




254,0!:!l 300,S:TS S36f1.GOO 
1 16.S.19 .2~1,,05(i 300,81 5 s~Go .. ono 
)86.978 .2!'6:M9 254,f.16'6 J\HJ,81S $)6<},(}(10 
162,SO I JH/i,Q78 :2 15,3-19 Jflfl,6!5 S3o<i-;O{)H 
I 43.(167 \61.!iOl 18·,,.97F; 2 \6.3'19 300,8"15 
I 26,8 l9 143,067 162,WI '.i5-t,01;r, 
7,0-),; li .0% 
Sln.H3 
's l ,69G;4(:ii 
7 .. 0% 
JII0.81 s 
The :fat3 in 1hc table make it clea r that th~ rrrscnt v;iiuc, far a given clilli:.rcn1:iJ I are idc:r,tic-al even thn,igh the w1al ~;,111inr,, o,,cr the ~I) y,,irs vnr; 
frvm $]60.000 Jc,r u zcrq pcrcc111 w.igc grnwlh r,11c up 11> s-2, I %,976 for 1111 cigh1 pc rccnl growth ri!.JC. it for cx:1mpk, a 1.0 pcrccm <li(forc11;i:1I (d1sc<rnnl 
nJJ.; mirn:s gr0wtl: .r:ite) were approp, i;Hc:_. 11 mJkts no dlfl:.:rcncc wh~th~, the act:1al dj1'~oum .. g.nnVth cmnb1tE~tion :~ I .0 pc-rccnl "\'i:rsus 0.0 pcrcc11t, 
M 8.0 pen:cnt vcr.:u£ 7.0 pcrccr.L Fur1li.:nnore, it inakcs no differ.-:n,c whether 1he diffr:rc!ltial is crc;:tcd by;; -on,t:un dis<:oun1-gr.-",1h coinhin:uion 
lhMu!?,h time (c·.g., tlle discoui1t ra lc is always j_() percent ;uid the growth rntc is J!ways 2.0 pcrccntj, or,vhctJ,cr the dil'ferc11ii" I erncrr;es by virt11c 
of a j UCccs~ ion of diffi;;cnt discOi;nJ#growlh cYmbinations (~g.: the disc<lLrn! rm~ char;g.~~ from 3.0 pcrccm 10 4.0 pcrccn! lO 5.0 pi; ic.;..: nt ilnd Ilic 
wr,ge growtJ1 rat,:: cirnngcs from 2.0 pcr~ctn 10 3. 0 pcr;;cnl :,, Hl p.:rctn1). 




Table 9: Ms. '13allard's :ras:t iv.font~· Eiltrii.Jtg~ fi'.om LO$t Ei:np)oym,eu{- S~c:mi:do 1 & ~ (O:or.rnal wo:rkiifll) 






/viii itary l?.arntng,s 
13.1$(!- .. 
W,~rklifa;\djlfslmc11t Prcsent\l~l;ii¢.b{:(~t)~t: 
Faci·or Mon'1..-y _E'ari\iiig;: 































Table 10: Ms . .Uaillird's Past Money E11r4l.P,glfi'lltif Lpst':ltm._pjpym1.1nt- S'ci:.nuril1 i; 'o&.1!s(f(ill ,yqrldi.fcto age 67) · 
















,. , · ,_ . 




















T:ihlc 11: Ms. Bn11,i;rd's F4h1t'e.i\lotrlittaii:1frig.~ fronl LMt E.mployirici;ot -.Sct.mufo i (oO.rillB.i wo.rklifej 






'2013 30.1 31);7 
2.014 30.7 :n.7 
2015 31.7 32_.7 
2011.i. 32) J3.7 
2017 35.7 34.7 
2018 3.4:'7 3.5;.7 
20!9 J?7 36,7 
.202\l 36',7 37.7 
2021 37.'] 3B.7 
202'2 3S.7 J9.7 
2023 J<J.7 .i0.7 
2024- 40.7 ~1.7 
2025 •\ l.7 42.7 
2.0:w 42.7 113.7 
2027 4·· rl ~ - I 44 :i 
2028 H .7 ~151 7 
2029 45.7 ,t6.7 
203{1 ~ci. 7 -\7. 7 
2031 ,,7.7 4-8.7 
'20:12 ,1~.7 4'17 
2(m ,J9.7 50 7 
2034 50.7 51.7 
2(JJ5 51.7 5°7.,7 
2(136 52.i 5:3.7 
2037 53 .7 5,t7 
203S 54 .7 )j.7 
103~ :55.7 56.7 
204U 5.6.1 577 
2041 51.7 58. 7 
2042 zg.1 59.7 
2lH3 59.7 60.7 
2044, 60,7 61.7 
2045 (il.7 67..i 
2046 62.7 63.6 
· Civilian 
Pcrccm Mi1it4fy .9ivl1~: ,. Ea.niing:s 
ol' Eai:niJJg~ ·-:~gµ~g'f 'Ufe Cyc!e 
Y cur 'B~sr . :)?,i~ Factor 
.'.'C,::C·:: .. ,, 











10()% 56,.o.46 , 
l00% 16,"2,56 . t6',il!;$', I.JlJ4-48 
100% s-, og9' 1.10411 
100% s2'~i9' 1.10374 .. a, l •, .· 
!DO% 52,9S9 i. l.0338 
10Ci% 52,9~9 l.10301 
\()0% 52,9~'9 J. l0J64 
IOO'fo 52.,989 LJ()228 
1.00.% S?,9!W 1.101,9\ 
100% 52,989 1.10.154 
.100%, 52,9~9 I.\ OOS3 
100% 52,9.&9 1.09$72 
!00%, 51;n9 1.\19661 
10'0% 52,~89 .l .094_5 I 
lll0% 52.,989 1(192,10 
100% ,s2)s2 1.09029 
1()0% :si;il;~9 \.08819 
JOO% 52;9SJ l,0860S 
100% :52939 1.0.8397 .. r,f, 
l00%,. 5'2~9~? 1.081S7 
100% s2,QM' l .(i76i5 
100% il~°lJW, J;OiS6~7 
10()%, -52'·9)!}): l.OJ.690 













































































































































tali le .l,:2: , ~s. U11U:ird'-s Futur-c Mort<iy 1$ai'1fo,gli;_t~ii_iir;Li~(t/t\pJoyntcnr • S1::cn:1rio 1; (fililwgtl!il~iifa~'.6'1'J , 







20!3 JO . .r 3.(J.7 65% 
2[Jl4 :W.7 J.t.:i: WO% 
?..(JJ'-5 31.7' '3 2.7 l(.iiJ';,t, 
2oiC, :,2. . .7 '.<3.7 !00% 
2.017 J'U 34:i LOO% 
2018 34,,7 :.S.7 I.QO% 
201.9 35.7 J/jJ 100% 
'2020 367 '37':7 1()0% 
202] 31.7 38,7 100% 
2022 38.7 39.7 WO% 
2023 39.,7 4/),7 f.QQ% 
?.02-i 4().7 41,1 100% 
2025 •H.7 42,7 100% 
2026 -1.2,7 .4·3._7 f()Q%. 
}027 43.7 44.7 ioiJo/o 
2023 44.) ~;\.7 100% 
2029 'f5.7 4('/.7 !00% 
2030 ,!6.7 4'7,7 11)0% 
203 1 47.7 4S.7 1()1)% 
2.032 48.7 49.7 l01J% 
.2033 . 49.7 .50.7 100% 
203~ 50.7 51,1 ·mo% 
20~5 -~L1 ·¥:1· fo1'i% 
20-36 5:1.7' 53;7 100% 
~a:11 53.7 54.7 10(1%. 
2038 34.7 55.7 lQO% 
2039 55:7 5,(,,7 ltJO% 
2040 $(:i,i ~1:7. l{j0% 
2(),11 57.7 5ST '10.0% 
'2tH2 5S.7 59,7 100% 
2043 59.7 6fJ.7• IQ{)% 
2044 . 60J 61.7: .100% . 
20·15 61.?°, (,2:? iuo?i. 
2046 <i2.7 ' oJ·.7 l00'% 
7.0~7 .63.7 64,7 · .10~% 
204S 64.7 65.7 l00% 
2049 65.7 66. '7 100% 































































































































































































T31Jlc 13: M.S'. 'B~Jhrd',s FtJtu'r·c !'},:o.ncy B;~r·nings l'rur.n Lc,st £ni'p(<1ymc11(.::Si:cm1rio 2 (ilorm ul wor~lifc) 
(fro'm;'M~y. 0'8, 10!3 !hr<>URh norm;i,1 reti:re111i:nt) 
Civi!lan . U1'c-Cy1rl~ Pre~etJt Vilhtc. · 
.Percr.11\ Militarv CJ"fli~n pamings Adj_ils_ti:9: Wo.rR11fo (>fLust .. "·· 
From r(.I ol' Ba,,,it:igs: .!3~-qi/rib>;; Lirt Cycle Mon~<;1 )'11iiis'tmcnt U.nempioy- Money 
Y~ar Age ;\ge Yca,r 03.$C '. .!;>Mo Factor f:;ami!ig'.i; , Pact_.br men( 'F :tcl.:>r Earnings ------
2013 3(U 30.7 65% $,M,7'.22 $34;72:'2. Q.$~J36 $19,152 2014 30.7 ] l.i JI}()% 36.547 36J41 ·,9:?5}j'6 , 30;86:0 2015 31.7 ...... ~ 10011-f, 3{582 39;$8'i 0:S}l~ti· J3,25.6 .).£,,( 
2016 ' 32.7 33.7 100% :51;566 5_1,)6~ ,()';~51)6 43,l;J 0 
20[7 33.7 14.7 100% 51/5.$6' 5[.'5/i~ ·M~t~li -42)9-:5 
2018 311 ,7 35.7 l00% 6J;7$1t 63,13+ 'tt~?l36 n;JS;J· 
20[9, 35.7 36.7 !00% 63.,7.3v1' 6~;7i4 · 0:;&5J36. 52.491 , 
2020 36.7 37.7 JOO% 77,MS 77,613 (\;8,S:i:iQ 63,;632 
2021 37.7 3-8.7 10()% 79;/ii/& 77,6.4:S, '(tli5l3'6. 63,3.16 
2022 38.1 39.7 10()%; 79,9J3 7~/}13. O:il:513.6 64;838 
2023 JY.7 40.7 JOO% 79,9la ,79/>i~;a · 0:S5J36 64j15'. 
2024 40.7 4\.7 100'}'~ 22,3)2 i(\49~ l. lQ+I& ':Si_.~94: ' t\.-85,:f3.Q 0.970S9 .,iJ,1c,:r 
2025' 4 l.7 4·,,, 1()0% 52,9:{9 l.l0'411 · 58/06:. .6.;~$,i".l6 0,91089 45;~0J ~.' 
2026 42.7 43.7 100% 52,9~9 L.1037,i 5M~o . 0,8}1}<, <\97089 4j,l62 
2027 •13.7 44.7 100% 52,9&9 1.1dm S8,4Q7 a:};_Sl3.6 0.97089 ,i~.922 
2028 44.7 ,~s. 7 100% 52,989 l.103tH 58,447 &:~51% 0;97128 ,\4,702 
2029 45.7 46.7 100% 52,98~ l.1(\2(,4 5S.428 · Q:S·SJ36 0.97128 4'1,465' 
2030 46.7 4 7.7 100% 52,939 I.I 022S 5S,409 O.SS 136 0.97128 ,1,1,229 
20.Jl .. n,7 48. 7 I q().'),'o ~2,989 lJOl91 ~.B.)89 0.$513"6 /l..971}8 43,994. 
2032 ,IS.7 49.7 ioo•x, 52,939 f.10154 5&,370. l\85}36 0 97.1)3 ,l'J,761 
2033 <19.7 50.7 )00% 52,98() l.lOO&J 58,332 D.851jG 0:97 12S 43,515 
203,l 50.7 51( 7 100% 52,989 l .09372 58,420 Cl.851J6 0.97128 43, 215 
2(13 5 Sl:i 52.7 I OO'Yo 52,989 1.09661 5~ , 1()9 0.85136 1) .97 128 4.2 ,918 
2036 52.7 53 .7 100% 52,9S9 1,09451 57,997 o.~5136. 0.97J2S 42,622 
2037 <;' .., 5A .'7 l00% 52;989 LQ9240 57,SS5 o:s5'n6 tl.97128 42.329 _ . .),/ 
2038 5,1,7 5.5.7 100% 52;989 l ;l)9Q29 57,174 0.85!36, 0.96&67 4 l ,92•f 
2039 55.7 56.7 !00% :i2;9S9 1.088 (9 57,64.2 O:S5]3Q 0:96K67 4J,G.'Y5 
2040 S6.7 ~7 .i 1()0% 52,?89 l,OSI/OS 57,5:Sf) 0:$5f'36 0,%~67 41,347 
2041 5.7.7 5~.7 100% $;!,.989 !.0);39.7 · .57,43-9 .0.~5JJ6 0.96867 41,0(i2 
2.042 58 .7 59.7 100% ·52 989 I.OSIM 57,327 . o:s,s.1:iu; D,96867 ,w;ns . f ·, ... , 
2043 59.7 60:7 100% ~2.989. r:6162,5 57,02~ 0.85'1.36 Oi~p/l(,7 40;364 
2044 60.7 61.7 10()% 5Z,QS9 · I.D5.6S.'7 55/9:&7 Q.35:]J.6 0.'.96867 J9,4'29 
2045 61 .7 62.i JOO% 5°t9Sf l.OJ690 54,9,M (t~~.13'6 0;96'.$();7 3S;503 
2046 62 .7 63.6 89~1~ 52,98~; 1.0JS-11 53,954 Q;RSiJ$ 0..95867 33,50'1 
St.501,360 
.Krystal Mclis:sit Bnllard; ·Page 25' 
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001629
Tobi~ .1~: i\h, Bailaril's Fuf~.rc i\fo11ey ~at*i~~;.ti;ii{t.-0st '.!!mp!uymcnt ~ Sccn~'rio z (r1111 ,v,otkliito agr: G7} 
(f.rom:M'iiJ,;Olri 2li{J.)frrougli age 6'7) · · 
Cfvifoia· Lifi:-CycJc ·p~,,unt Vilfuc 
Pcrct:nt tvlifa~, Ci~ili_an . Earnings Adjusted of'~sl 
Fro.m To of E~IITJi.rjgs $1lt .Li&; Cyck f,1o,ney Unempl,;,y- .Mont)'. y~j[ Age. Art<e Year Bus~ .. J"iictor Enrnings mcnl Fn.i:tpr· .Eumin.gs ---- -- -------· 
:201;; .30.l 30,7 65.% $311,72,'..l S.34 ,722 $22;49i.i 
1014 3P,7 3.1.7 100% J6,:H'7; 36,5~-? 3ti,24S 
201.5 . 31. 7 '32,7 1!)0% '39,532 39,582 1'1,062 
10 16 32.7 .33.7 !{)Oqti) s1)6G 51.S(,6 50/i36 
2017 33.'7 30 100% S1,56t~- 51.566 5ll;3E1 
20[8 34,t 3$,7 100% 63.731\ 63;7:l4 (ii ;9(,3 
'20i9 35:? '.l6'.'l .!\ii)% 63,734 6J,7Ja ol,~55. 
.2020 .36.7 .37:7 WO% --~'1..6~,s· 77.,648 '7,fi'li12 
2021 J? .7 3S.1 · ]!)0% 17;648 77/i4S 71}3~8 2022 38 7- 39;7 11JrJ% 79;9.IJ 79,913 '.l<t;~:)\> 
202.3 ~9? 40.7 ·rm,% n.~iiJ . 79,9i;; 75,779 
202,1 ,1(),7 41.7 100~. . J.~J32 26/1,~5. l. I0<\'18 5!.:i94 0.970S9 4'1,&78 
2025 ;1 1.7 4'2.1 JOQ% .52t989 UOii.11' SS;506 0,97bt9 5J,3?.9 
202~ -12.7 43,7 100% 51:$¥8~ L\03?4 5S,~8G 0.97QS9 53/J47 
2(127 43.7 AU [(II)~,;; 52,989' 1.103}8 58/1.67 0.97089 52;765 
2.02.S ,J,J.7 45.7 JOO% ·~i~s,9 U0~61 · 58,447 0,971.28 52;5116 
2029 45.7 46.7 )00% $2;9,8!/- 1.1026.4: ss,,m Q.9712S 51,228" 
2030 46.7 47.7 !00% s2.;9s9 L 10228 5M09 0.97'1.28 51 ,950 
20]1 47.7 ,tR.7 tQO% 5?,i9~~ ).10191 5'S~3S:9 0.9712S 51,675 
2ll}2. •1/),? 49.7 16Q% .'i2,989 UOL'P· 5SJ70 0.97128 5:I,401 
2033 49.7 50.7 1.00% 52;9~9 1,10083 58,332 0.97128 Sl, 11,1 
2()31 50.7 51;7 100% •.112,9.'$9.· 1 (J'9'872 ss,.1;;1.n U.97!:ZS 50,790 
2035 51.i SJ/7 roo% ·s2;9s9 1:09(Joi :58,It19 0.971'28 · 50A),I 
20J6 52. 7 53.1 Hl0% 52.,969 109451. S7;997 0.97128 50.0:i:i 
2037 ;i3.7" 54,7 100% ~2,9S~ Hl924(l 57,,8S5 0,971:i?S ,19,719 
20.38 ,, , S5) '10()% .52.,939 l.fi.9029 57.774 0.96867 49,243 ..,"'I',; 
l\j39 j5 ,7 56-.7 i~O% 5:i,9.S? !.0S'Sl9 :lt.(,{,;i 0.9(iS6? 48,9()3 
20~.o 56./ '57.7 .10()% 52,9S9 r.os~6& .s?;S'50 0.96867 ·48.;5'66 
1041 57.7 5.'i . .!7 {00% 12,,989' 1,.08~9'7 57;!3!1 0,9<,S67 4S,~l 
'21),12 '58.7 59,7 '100% ,52)~89 l.08)·87 5?'.;327 O.%S67 . 47;89i 
2043 5'J."J 60.1 J()Q% S2,9~9 l .0.76i.s . 57,0'29 0.968/i? 47',41 l 
lfJ,j,t. $0,'7 6\;:r {oi'i% · ~?.;9&9 J.C,5657 SS,987 0.96867 4~;313 . 
20,15 61-7 62;7 IPO~'<i ;;2;9,89 1.Q369P 54;9;"1' 0.96S67 4-~~2~ · 
:>.lM6 02·.7 63.7 100% 52,9S~. !.Op~: 53,90i 0.96%7 44\146 
20.;7 (/3.} 64,T JM% oi·,9s9 0.991,5'6 52;SS9. 0.96867 43,077 
'2.0-IS 64,7 6S.7 .1.odr. $2,9.119 ().Q7188 51 ;817 o.96s-n 4.i;8S9 
20 .. 19 65,7 96:i J q/\0,1 52$,9 D..9~S2J. 50,77.S 0.96571 -10;&42 
2050 66.7 67.0 30%'. s2.n'9 0.9,1542 50,097 0.96.572 12,07! 
$1,90(%,152 
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:lhtoJj]¢.fJ/l;Sc;jn 
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42.7 Hi9% $!5,705 $3_1),'}!;G SJ~}ilii· 
'il7 . \-OQ~ S:!6;1Q5' s.~.6;%~ $36}).66 . 
-14.7 1tin~.t -s25,10~ ~36,966 ,s.16;9~, 
45.7' lO(ioi, S26,70S S:16,9.66 ' $16:9~ 
-isJ .1Q(/% }2G;ii)S .S36;9@ sis)~s -· 
47.7 \Q9.~j, S2G,10S' S36,966 S'3&9&,, 
4,s'.°r LOO% '$~~7{)::i £16;9fu'i Sl.6;9~ 
49.7 i<J!Ji-i !:>'?.ti,vos S36,96~ ~(>;966: 
.SI) 7. 190'% ~,705 S3d;9&6 S3(,/ii;G 
5-L7 l(J()'j,1, ~6;7ll,5 53_'(,.9~6 $~t966 
Yl..7 f<lil% 5%(!,7(}5 $)6,96(, .$3.f,,9(,6 
51) · 1(11J'i,, $;<PO;i SJti,966 $36',?66 
F.1 l\'!()% .~\\7()5 136,?i'i6 i:rq:,1ic~-
55.i 100% $26,70, S36,966 S36 9~· 
5o.7 100% ~,.;;,10.s :.,c,;9(,(; m'.!i&; · 




















100% $'26,70~ $3(,,96(! $3(,,9% 
100~·/, $26.705 i:1656<> B6.9p6 
I 00% ~6 .. 705 $3G,9o6 $3t\9Mi· 
!001H, S16,}q5 $.1l:,96tl SJt\966 
10!)% ~26)7{)5 $36,966 ~36,9.66 
I O(i% ~26)05 $36 .9ii6 $36 966' 
1,'il% s:ii,\,1il~ :s,•,,966 $3~:96/; · 
1\)0% ~6,nl; i36,%!3 S'.\6,11$& 
100% S2o,.70S $36.96:i $30,966· 
I 00% S2li,7oJ.'i i%,966 S)li,%6 
IIJO'l>'., ~26',705 :$36.:>66 SJ6,~6<i 
. 1qo~ -~z(1os s!6.966 $36,966 · 
100% :j;,;,5 iD:i S:i6,%6 S::\15;~66 
io6% 11{:iq~ S36,966 SS6,'l~~ 
I 0'0% 52/i;'ib':; $J6,9tY.i S36;Di36 
!00% ·1(2(1;7Q5 £36,\l6'j SS6,'l,6/; 
10()% tw,1.0.s $36,')66 s3'6:~~6· 
(00% $)6;10$ S3G,966 ,~;6'.~4·~ 





































JoJa1 jn 2024$ 
J>,\' i~Cl/l/ l1) COHl'Ctr IO 2()i :1$:-otll/l r,fl~~,li~L\ n,;t;di~cptlnl' l'at'e O,fQS% 
, PV -0flosi·inili1'11)'.,r.~.ii;e.n1cntfocq1rfu. in. 2() I J:Jl 
r.~.;-11c,soM! ""OS'll<l'pfijirt_ 06% ptiqr to rc.tircm~)lt nt;"ge G3.<i nn<1-il.:\~l1i(t,!;r.rt;trem.~n~'ot ngc 6MJ 















































Table 16: Preseu( Villuc or Ms. Biillurd'! Losi MilHarrRcti~Cl\)CQ~,Tric?ni~ Cl~t:<i~~i 'ri:1t. ·.i1:11l~rd', llf'c CXl)CCfoa111:y) 'Sccnnfiii 1.'(fuliworklife lo uge 67) 



























































































































































































































































































f'\I fucfor l,, (nr,i•crt lo·::!013$111 ~1\ cffoGtiVe n<t diSCOUrl) ,O,t.c.il)5'Y, 
rv 0Tlo~1 mil,,a,y re1i·ri,ment:iiica.mo..iry' ZO I J'i 
Lc~s p::r:-ono l consurt1Dtir,11 ('] ~%.prici r tt, ·rciirc:meryl <lt "~-e67 i111'd 44o/.-. of1ct rctircml!n~· at ilgc-()7) 
PV of ~e, lost rnt1,omr.n1 ,ni1\1ary rctir~,n~nf inc.on.ic· 














































h-nm ..\gc to 1\gc 
l\nnual R,ctircnicnt 
1ncom~ Base in · 
201Jt 
Annm\[ .l~~lit-cin~rlt 
Tnco11J1fU;ii;i:' i1/ ; .. ~ct~cffr~m~nt 
7.(/?:,{$ ·... (;i'::·qrqeBastr m PV FMmr 
ndr -~ I:s% 
r.:t):,r],ost . 
-------- ·---······--··-- .·--- ' .:,'-.--~-'---.--------- .-·--· .. -~--























(3% grti\,·1~) · i02A.S 



























































. IOP~- .i39;6M S5!1-,lh:i S'34.?B 
\~~f,· $~9,684 £}\.Ji'3 · $54,93:3 
raw.; ,$;aQ;6~+ ss(9}'3 · ~4}.m 
,JOO.%- S~\l.~M . S54S.3) :s~4-;9J3 
. 100{1, S39,1iS4 i~~33 . ·S5'i-im 
iDP:% $~9.$11-i $54,?}3 . ~q.;9J3 
l 00% . :S-19(,8:1- S;i4,9~(l . is4,9~3· 
1.0.ir M9;a$4 S'.l4,953: -~4;9n 
"1,Q¢} 'S·39,((84- s~-1,9i3;. . :S54,91;J 
· lOO,% $39.,S~ti S~').?;13. S"S4,933 
··1 . t .•C'O!oo•.·.·._:t .. 1..r .· ,'S39J$-1 · $%~~ · S54;~3~ ,. $S?;"6s:1 $:\4,933 Sf1;933 
i00'/1, _S:i9,6S4 ss'4;9a:, s.5.:a;9::\J 
· lr;,.J~~ 839/18/\ $54,~~-~ $54,933 
I 00% . S,39;6S~ SS4;l)33 '.;.5•1.91'3 
100% ~39;6S4 'S5'1}'.l-.1. S:-4,933 
ioo% sjt,,6-84 S54.9J3 SS4,93J 
i(J()•t., B9/,S.·1 5'54, \'lJ:1 S54,':(;J 
r.o~~:i $,l9,98.. ~s4,93J ss~ .C/3; 
[(:<)1·~ 'SJ9,6~~ $5:1/ H3 -S.5ti-,9>:~ 
lO,~\;{ $Ji>.6S4 *54,.9.B $5~, 933 
l.OO'V, S'39,68,1 li~~. 933 SS4, 933 
iOO% S39,68~ ~5-1 ,93J £54,933 
i('A)o/,, B9,6P.4 k•4,\i33 )}54,93,; 
JOO% ~39,(,$~ $54,.\l'.iJ $51,9}3 
100% \39,6/IJ S,\93'.i S54,9D 
100% S39;oS4 i54,9'.13 :.SJ,933 
1 l?Q% $3.9,61:4 S54,,9l:l $54 ,~31 
100% SJ9,@4 S54.93T S5A',9JJ 
l<li.:tv, '£3~,r,s~, s,4,93:l S-$4 .933 
i <Xl'Y, S~9}S4 S54, 93) $5(.,)13 
100% S3!t,6S4 S-54,9]3 564,933 
too~. S3!J,cit4 s,·4,93i s:,>1,91) 
1/x)r,. S,9,6'84 SS4,9)'.I 554,9..13 





































Totill in ·20;?4$ 
.PV focton9 ~:mvcr; (o;?,(ll 3$ •. ~·a1.1-cfi'cctj,•c ,,c.t disco.1111r roi·I< ufO,Woi 
. . Pi/ or11)t:1,11:10Tracy_n:tireri1.em inci,riic,io :ioqs · 
Ll1S~ ,;,,;;c,rr,1:I t<1ils.tmp'iion 05%..p,i,,r lq rctir~r.,crrt ucni;cJ53.6. ·.,,a )6% ;,nor reiiiemcn\.al::ige 63,.<i) 
. . ,. . . l'V or11c't'los·1 re1irem~nt.militar.' rctirernen\ lncomo 



































































1:iicomc 13:iso. in 
20,~s 
. (3% ~rnwtl;) 
Net Rc'ti"r:i:m~n~ 
tnoorn~ 'Bas~ in 
2Q'.'4$ . 


































































































































































































1\,ro;t i'n ;2024$ 
P\I Jac1or 10 c,irtvcmo ;1(J1:~$ -ai~n ~m;,tive 11 ~ldi~<;oµ~1' ,:,,t,<~{9.5':lo 
PV of.1ost,;t1ilitary rr,1.iicmontinco.m,i;,i_n,2613$ 
Lesr. pcJ~'\nnu.\ ·c1..1.~l:tun1p,tic.ih (.~6111~ prmr 10 .re\ircnv!nl ar. ugc 67 und ·$6'A> aftor relir(;mc.nl-u,t .of!'.~67) 















































Cha rt 1: Wo.rklife Expectimcy vis;~sv1s Rctireme·ot 
Workli fc tables isolate the prol:Jnbiiitie.s that the boxed areas ivi;Il CXJ-'l):. 
The ti,ne line below represents a person's age throug'fio1Jt:her:';\'O.rking,4fe. 
Frorn Age 27.27 
Oil Jlli 26, 2010 
worki.n_g; uof 
,1c:ort~tt'g,o, 
iVorkli i'c labl.c~ rcn1ovc \he boxed a,ea.s ~nd ex pres~ W(ir~life e;-.:pecl*),11CY,l\'S l! 'fiiµciion o.f'ii,Oi1~t'1J\( c'n1p,loy_nl(:)Ot~ 
The l'in1c line below rcprc,-cn'i:; rhe mtmbe.r of years n r crson ,i:; expected to \\iorkwiJhon\' int¢hupiion, 
Frum Age '27.~.7 




P.cr.i1rn Works .('or 
30,9} Ycuri; 
.Pct'SOlJ Retires 
at Age 6'3,6 
Th('. nonnai retirement ~nd work life sccn.:i.rio~ of thi; aituly.-ls. u~;;111.M th~:iI M~, .8aU~r1f.W?U)d (law reifr¢t( ilL a~:e63.6. th~,U\1~rage.retire:01ent age of ;\U female~ (f 2), 
,~ norinal work Ii(,: e::xpcclar\,Y for sc,111cQnc-witb Ms. U-,11.hir<l's· ~-,,cioccon~ihlc,clriJ'ract~ristlcs is 30.9".J .years.·.fl4J. 
The W(Hklifo ,1dj'u,uncnl foctor, npr,,licd {(1 c.ach year ofptoJccteclcari11.t1&,~is '.P$SJ3o, 
I( 30.93 yc,1r work life expectancy)= (O.S5 l.-36) x. (3G.3.'l year p6rlod:Trorn ·M:s, 'Bs'l!ilrd's-ag_c·.a,s ot'Julj1"26', 2/HO l<): ag;c:6'.t6}) 
GEC000382 
001635
Chart 2: Future Yalu.es of a $10,000 Salary Over 36 Years 
$J 8(J,OOO · 
-Sl60;0,QO :, . 







0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Salary Growth 
Note: lfwagcs increase 5 percent each yeJr, the annual salary at the end of36 years is $60,496. 
Krystal Melissa Ballard: Page 32 
GEC000383 
001636
Chart 3: Future Vi°focs of a SX0,000 Salary Increased 5 Percent Each Year Over :3(,Years 
$70,000 -.----------------------,-..,.,.,,_.;.,,.-c--.;,...._--,------, 
$60,496 
$60,000 ·!- --.--.... _ _______ _ -----,--~.,---------
S50,000 · ------ ·--·--·"·----· .. -·-·-- -~~--------------- -c-------==1 
$40,000 · ···· ·- ·--·- ··------·----~ . -- ·. - - . - .";· 
$30,000 · - - - -------· .. ·-----
S l0,000 · 
SO .L . .J,_,!.-J~-l.,...J,_~~::..+---J...:.+4~~~+-J~""'+--±,-~....+-l'-'+-+""'-'!~~4=+-4-+:-!-~ 
Now 4 8 12 16 20 24 2$. J2 36 
Yea.tis from Now · 
Note: If wages increa:;'e 5 percent each year,· the· animal salary at the end of 3? years is $6.0,496. 
Krystal M¢li$sa Ballard: Page 33 
O'Fuwrc Annunl Snlarv If 
\v~·gc·Gr<J,v(n ls 5 • 
Pcrccni J)Cr Year 
GEC000384 
001637
Chart 4:: ~l>'¢monstratio0: of Prcs.ent V~lue 










Now 4 8 12 
} $6,977 
i,6 20 24 28 32 :i6 
Note: If wages incr ease 5 percent e.ach year, a11 annual salary of$ l O,OOQ·today Yi.ill :b.e $60,496 i·n 36 years. However, with 6 percent a111wal 
interest, it Only takes $6,977 today to exactly COVer the $60,496 ofat1nual ·wages 3!J'yeilfS from 110\V, 
Krystal Melissa Ballard: Page 34 
a l_ntcrcsi E,1mcd at·6 l'c=ntpor 
Year 
&Present Value: T:heAi:.:.ountof 
Money YouMuslJn;cst T<~~y to 





Cha.rt 5:. Pr:e~i,nt Value lJsillg. theNetl;lis~o_unt Rate Method 
Dccteasct:I for NetTnterest .a:t 1°/o 






S20,000 · ·-··-······ ·····-·-·-······-·········---·-·······-· -- ---· I 
$] 0,000 
4 8 .. ·1e · ·.20 24 32 
· ¥.:eai-sJrom Nov,, 
Note: The prc~cnt value is the same whether you calculate it in fv.,o steps '(?,d<l.gro.;vth an·d subtract inter.est) or in one step (subn'act th.e net interest); 



















f.nterest Rate= 3% 
Growth Rate= 2% 
Net Discount Rate= 1 % 
. f ntercst Rate = Qo/o 
Growth Rate= 5% 
N~t Discount Rate= 1% 
Jntere.~t RaW= 9% 
oro ..... 1h Rate= ~% 
Net Discount Rate·= 1 o/o 
Krystanv!.e liSS<\ Ballard: Page 36 
·CIWnat.a Sl Q,000.Sulury Today Will Bc36 Ycnr.;. 
fron, ·NO_\V 
• 36 Years of fntcrcst · 






















Growth Rate= 3% 
r nterest Rate= 3% 
Net Discount Rate=· 0% 
$5,438 
GrowtW~te = 6% 
It)ter~~tRate = 6% 
Net Dis.count Rate= 0% 
Sll>,000 
Gro~h Rate= 9% 
Ir.iterqst:~f.\le = 9% 
Nee Disgoti;pfRate = 0% 
Krystal 'M.elissa Ballard: Pa~ 3 7 · 
O'l11c Money You Need 10 Years From .Now 
• 10 Years oflnter<.st 
l!I Th< Money It Takes Today !o M2ke Sure You Have 














l.oug~Tcrn, [tisk Free Rate 
(lhbo1son A:;sodatcs \22]) 
·111e _pr.~nturn (shadedarca) ha.~ an 2vcra~c of 3.8% ~nd suggests that 
coi-pllrate dcfmtd benefit pcit.~iori plnns 1,'0ufd use a di fforcntial {discount 
t"'iift inint!S'\\i3gc growth rntc) Oftcro ifpt~nslon~scts were rcstric.tcd to 
U.S. Trcn~ury securities., 
·tnc 3,~% hisrorical 3\"cr~gc. risk prcmiu1ry .is ju,1t -:-.O, I% lcss·t!1ori the 
l1lstoricaUi1tcrc,1.wagc differentials. used liyihe corpprutepe~sion plans 
iriclude~Jn the Hcwiil· Asse>tiates ·,1,1d)· [26) tind 1h~ To,..-i:rsaWatson 
studies {l27}; f2S1; [19\}, 
1987 1988 1989 1990 l991 1992 1993 1994 .1995 i9-96 l 997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Krystal ~v!el.issa Ballard; P-age 38 
GEC000389 
001642
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Ne\v-York, :f.:Tctrpcr fon ins/ 19,94. 
[H)J Murphy;XevinaM.. ~i1dF1nis \Ye.Tch. "Empirical Agc-Eatni1,g$· Profiles." Joiinidlpflabor 
Ecorro»tfcs. Vol K April l-990. 
[l lJ MW']Jhy, Kevin M. and Fihis Welch. "The Stnicnirc of W~ges." Quarrrtdj> JQ1il'i/artif 
Ec_oiu:m1ics, Fobruaiy 1992, 
I) 2] Sgcial ~ee~1ril:>tAdniipistr~lio)1. Socftif~ecudty BulletitLArmual 'Stati.stfca}Sippfe>1(fp1t. 
2012. 'Tnpic'.1ta,5. · · 
[l:JJ LJ.S. Dt:!partnwntofLabor. Bureau of Labor Stati.st ics. Woi'k!~fe Estima.re...c Bffect,1' of 
Race Wid E.di1catlo1L Bt1lletin'2254. February 19l::6. 
[14'j Ciccka, James, Sdh Ep~ti::in and Jetty Gcil.drnan. "Upd::i.ted Estimates of Work-Life 
Exp·ect~ncies Based upon the Iricrement-D,}creme-nt Model." Journal uj'Legai Economics. 
Spring/Summer 1995. 
[ l 51 Richards, Hugh and .Ion R. Abele. Life and Work!i(e Expectancies . Tucson: Lawyers & 
.fudges Publishing Company, 1999. 
[ 161 Skoog, Gary R. and James E. Ciccka. ''The Markov (lncrement-Decrement) Model of 
Labor Force Ac1ivity: Extended Tables of Central Tendcnc.y, Vari,rtion. und Probability 
Intervals.'' .!021rw1/ of.l.i;gal Economics Spring/Summer 2001. 
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_[] 7) Skoog, Gat:y It, jiJ.tnes 'E .. Ciecka and Kt1rt V. Kn.ieger. l!'fhe Markov-P'r.oceSs Mode1 o( 
Labor Forte. Activity: E~tr;ndGd Ttorcs-of:Centrat Tendency, Sh.ape, Pef~i;tlJ~ Points, and 
B6otstrap-Sta1Jdrirtf Error.,." Jof,Y;wto/Fo,:entic Edonori1ics: Vol 22 N()±_: 2011 , 
[1 Sl · !Jnp.ublishcd data fromth~Dureau of Labor Statistics. ;,:table JO . fanpJoyrnerit status of 
the dv.iJiwi rioninstitutfona1 .populati0~ by ed\lt'atiohal $1Uihirnent, age,'~ex-,race, and 
Hispanic orig:1n,Anht1alA:ver;igc.Jcir the yenrs l994s20 ll >= (based on CPS), '' 
0 9] . 0 :$. Dcpintnr~ntofLahor. 13ureat1 •ofLabcir Statis1ic.,. Employer Gos ts.for-Employee 
Compe11sation c-l..farch.J0/2. June 7, 2012 . 
.(20) Bryun1, W, Keith and Cathleen D. Zick. "lnccrne Pistribµtion fmplications. .()f Rora I 
Household Production:' A111eriem1 Journal ofAgricullitralEcondmics. Vnl•67 (5), 1985 
(21] Ganger, WiUianJ H. andKathrynE. Walker. The Dollar T1iliie ofH011sehald fVqi"k; New 
Yoi'k Staie Cc:ilfoge: ofHtiti1~n gc;qlo~'Jtlforma'lid'n Bullet.in 60 (revised)~ fthaca: .:Ci.lrii.l}Jl 
University Medi,1_1 1980. · 
[~2] Mur:phy, M . . "Cornpanit1~ EstJniates;ofllie'Value of l-10Qsehold Wm~ in tile United Sra(es 
·r~t 19.7.(5"," '"f(evl'e1i> qfJi1c1».11e. tirJd>J,freahii .. Voi 2S: 19.82. 
(:23J 'P.e~Jd11,;Jiirt1ce. ''.M~asµriJlK·HO.l(~e!i!:itd Pi·od.u~tronfot· .thd,i,NP-·" FamT{y :f!cimom1cs 
R<wiew . V<;>J 3. 1982: ·U.S~' Di;:p~'r.tii:icnt ofAgfrciihurc, 
{24] Zick,.Catblccn,b, and \V. Kertld3ryant. "Ah~mat1ve 8t@~gies'forJ'ticiogHo.iiJe Work 
Time." Home Econamic.1· Researc.h Jow-iui,/. VoH2 (2)~ '1"9:33. 
[25) Zick, Cathlc0110. and W, Keith f3ryant 0S!:iadow Wnge,'.A:$S,css1!tents ofibe Valtfe <;)f 
HOlllC Producti911: Pa(tcnis from-the 19'ltl::t. Ii l![?slyfe.Y'.' FamilY-and Eci/noiri1cJss/ie.S· -
Vol U {Z). 1990. 
· {26] Gi:omn1, 0,Rcuoej1. ''lfc;m1e l'roducti9n - A Foi-g9ti,;p lmlui;fry,.'' l<eview ofE.c010mft~~-and 
·siati.it[¢i. Vot 62. August ·19.so. . 
[27) Chiswick, Carnie! Ull'man. "TheVa!Ue of ,1Houscwife1s Time.'' Jour1tal of lrwiu:m 
Resoto-1:~.\· . Vbl "t6. Summer 1982. 
(28] Bryant, W. Keith, Cathl~tm p , Zick ~nd Hyoshin Kim. Thi: Dollar Value o/Ho11seho{d 
WoFk, Revised Edition. lthaca: 0.)rue)l University Media, 1993. 
[29] Bxpcciancy Daia. The Dolhv Value of(/ Day: 201 i Dollar Valuation . Shawnee Mi:s$io11 . 
Kansas, 2 0 12 . 
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Thi~-a"na.Jysis uses tile ATOS tinie.-di;u-y da1a to dctennine ihe average i:iumbcr of'nousehold 
service hours provided-P,ct week and the hourly matket vaJue of those services. Daia is 
extractedfromlp2 tables (Tabk,s 1-24; J6sS:7, 99-140, l4S'-l 65, l 73-182, 1$4· l 91, and 
19:3.:200} to nJn a tnuJtip!e. line11negression analysis predicting total weekly household 
setyicc h_po.r-s- based on.gender, ert1pldyemcnt status. marital stutus, employment sta1us of 
~pou-se, age of person, tlie numher ofhousetipld m~1nbers, and ttw number .of chil.dien in tfle 
hou'Schoid, where total. \.Veekly housefioJd service hours are defined as the sum of weekly 
housch~ld pro4°uetio11 .hours and \\<Cekly oaring ruid he.lping hotirs provided toJhe 
household; Du.mtiiy vatiahl,~s ar<i'"usedto fodicategende~{female = 0 ot l),:.empipJr_nct1t 
status (fuU;cti_ine ·= (> 6:ti},pat:t .. tim.t""' o: or 1; Jiomen'iaker ""o or 1.), marital sratus (ni~rifod:: 
:O'J)f i),'.@i 'spou:s~·~i'tiploymylJJfrtaM; (~mpioyed =a (l o~ If Transf orrna:ltor_is-on,th:e' otJret 
:vJltfa\Jl~~-.in ilieanaf,,;sis\vcr¢;-perfpro1·ea to-make ti.ie datamorc linear. 
. . ~ - . . . ;. . . . . . 
The 'f~gfes.1>imUina}yJ;~ nftBe. totai: Weekly bousebold service hoots was nm on gender 
(.Femali): employrrierj,stah1s(Ftilltitne,.Pa,rttime, Homemaker), marital status (Married), 
~11J)Jlo_ytneritSll!-iUS ofspo"i:is~ (.SE), the natural Jog of age (In-age), (he nott.iral log of 
-house-holdmcrnber (fn~hfon), square root ofthe number of children (sr-kids) and the square 
root ottlm futat weekly hou.sehoid service !fours (st'-hhshours). 
'the resulting Tegtession equation for weekly household servic-e. time ls s.r-:--li.oslioursP 2.69 
+ 0.809 Female- 0,784 f'uiJtiine - 0,369 PattHme + 0.761 Hotiiemaket+(L95! Married* 
0;2:02B£-+ Q/~:70 ln.age =' 0.$24 Jn~hhm + l. 104 sr~kids, with an R-squflr¢<l vallleo-6f92.2'. · 
percent;; AllptMi'.otot.cqc.fti~~nJS"f.or t&e· incl.epcndent varliiblcs are signtfidmt at less than-
the l p.eicenrle\>-elj-~uid,f4fthem:iorc1 tl:ie f''-test (a measurement of \he o"'.etail 'fit _o'f.ffi~ · 
rel,rrj:lssfon futrdeJ or a:Jeiorthe hypoth~sis ·that.a.Ji regression coefficieofs .. c.xce:ptirig th.a1 
,:oftge¢9nstarit,l\!\!,Zer6)~~ls'o,si&ttlficant at less than the I percent level. 
TiJe·av:efa&~:hptl_dyf.n.arket-:vitue·ofh.0tisehoM sen!kes across all 200 tables is$1JA I for 
m~ies.-an.&S.)2~93''.fori'.ewAfc.s, 
[JO] · Maritn, G~rli,19 I.f Def(;)·mini:ltg. Econdmic Danrr.iges . Costa Mesa, CA: Jal}i~'.'i i?ubJisfiiug, -
2008. 
[31] -0.S.D¢parthle.otof:Labqt, Bureau.of Labor Siatistics, Coi1si1m#r &:pc-;1di11,(}"e ~91.Q.11e)' 
(_199_7-98~ 1998"99~ l929"9Q;_2.{)GQ~Ol_, 200 i-02; 2002-03; 2003-04, 2004-b5.;:200.S~Q6, 290·<5~ 
07, 2qo1~ot2ooi~o\);'2P09i LO) .. Published at \-1,'WiV.bls .. i;ov. . < 
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Thes~ surveys are used to c .. alculate 'the personal consumption associated wilh lost earnings. 
Consumption data for households wi.th over$ l 0,000 in annual income was exfracted from 
Tables 2544; 3600, 36l0, 36.20,.3630, 3640 and 3.650 in each of the thirteen sllrv~ys to,r.u.n 
~ mu,ltiplt Ii near. regressiqn ;malysis estir.na_tit1gthe person~L cotrsumptiqn. ofan in~ividuatfs 
e.ai:Mngs based Oil age; incor1Je alld' the nt.ini.'befofhbusehold member.s/ Ttansfottnaiiohs.of 
l be: data were perform~c:! i.o inaket lid data nrorc \irtear. In pa.rt icufot, tl:le rcgrt;SsiPiumalysis 
was rull on 2~259 se~ cifeonsurnptiori data each induding}he 11citural log·°-ffibusehold 
income (lnf:l Hl), the nahtral log bf household n1e11ibcrs {lhHH M), the square root ctf age 
(srAge) and the natural log ofpersona:J consllmp1ron (JnPG),where personal consumption is 
defined as (a)+ (b ), \'.·lwre (a) i$ defined as the sum of tile eJ!:pe-nditutes allocated to 
house-hol(l members l & ilhd oJqer dividcd·by household members .18 .and older _ano where 
(b) is defined as the sum. ofiill other h.ousc:hold pcrsonai, consumption ex~~nditure~ c#vlc;ied 
by the number ofhoUschold meri'ibers. 
The e>.:pendH ures a!J o.cat(.ld 1o ho us'ef:ioJcl .n\enibers 18 and -o lde.r uilde~ (~).ilr¢1µde(-a.lc9holfo 
. beverages), (tfal1Sport:itjt'in{~thtr veni~l~-!-)~p~tiSGS~yehi cl~.: rnsut~i~ ); (friin~pniJa:rio11i6ih.tr 
,vefrit;k, cxpcnscs:vch iclq rcht.'11; fe'as~J/li~oi:ls~s;,!:lthct ¢li.\riii:S);{tobact9,prQ~UAfa,attd . 
smokiiig sUpplfes) and'(pcr:ional ins°i:1pince- and p:cnsions:li~ and other. pe~sop~(i!1/;urance). 
i~he-:expe1iditurcs allocated to aJLI:touschoJd IT).Cmhers urt~e~.(b} irwlude. (.food); 
(liousing:shcltcr:ofher lodging); 010usi:ngmtilitfos, fuels, ~nctpublk services), 
(housing:household opera ti oils); (h0ttsirig;liousekceping sttpplies ), (h011siug:bousehold 
fornishings and equipmci1f), (apparel and services), (trai~portati.on:vehfo.l~_J:iur.c.ba:ses nel 
~ut.lay), (transpurtation:gasoline .ind motor oil), (tri!nsportatiomother vebiilc 
cxpenses:vebkle finance cJ1arges), (transportation:01hcr vebkle ~xpetises:m:nin.tenancc aed. 
repairs), (transportation:puhlic transportation), Qiealth care); (entertai'QJ11e.iil),; (p~lti;maf 
care-products. and sen,icc~}, (rea~li1jg), (ediitatiou), (r:nis~e1iaueoris} ~n(l{cas.b •· · · 
The ii:lc{)h1e ano el,:pcirdhu.res fo C:ach:sarw)' w~¢ ~jus~ .fo equlval.eht~~JHfrs; l?hsea. -011 . 
th~ .at;;tuaUo.tlati1)n, (~ :repor:tcclby t\1t>;'.$Utc~_u.,6f 'La.boF Stu:tis'!ics h:i .. its ce:r:~u,11:1d¢i<) Hiat 
_h::i,s: ocu !T.ec:I since t)i.e ~!PP~r-,y.eac afen:~h !:;~r;xic.y, ft>r GXlil}Jple, the 2oos,09 survey d,ita was· 
increased to current dolfars brrsea u~6fi a~ttialinflaiiorrsrace 2dM. . 
Alter the .data xvas convetted to ·c~rr¢otrlollars and transformed f,or J in~!itlty iis noted 
above, the cegressiOli analys1~ was rtrn .. Tbe 'resulting regression equaW.m ·ji; lnPC = 
4 .6J+(0.49"' In HB 1 )+(.,0.72 *'lo t{HM)+(O .04.17*-sr l'i.gc ), With ~D R'-'sqµa1:cct·v.ah1e ,qf 95:3 
percent. AU predictor coefficients Jor tlic ·i11dependeJ1i varia1Jles are si.gnifitJApta.t less than 
the I percent level, and, fi.!rthermote, th¢ F-t~i (a measureHientofthe overaiJdit oflb!:', 
regressloil modd Qr a .rest of the bypothesjs that al.I regression Co!,:lffiCi~1:((s, ex~¢ptiugthat 
of the constant, are ze.ro) is also s\g1irfiL'.arrt ~i less ilian the l pe:rcertt leveL ' 
[32] Ibbotson Associates. 2012 Jhhors~n Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SJfB[) Valuation 
Yearbook. Chicago: !bbotson Associates, 2012, 
[33] U.S, Department of Labor. Burc<1u of I ,abor Statistics. T;;.ble. B-47 (Productiviiy and 
Relaied Data, Business Sector. 1947-93) in the Economic Repori o..f the President. 1994. 
[34J U.S. Depamncnt of Labor. Bureau of Lnbor Statistics . Table B-47 (Productivity and 
Related Daca, Business s~ctor, 1950-94) in the Economic Report r;,fthe Presideni, .1995. 
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[3.'.ll {J;$-..-Dfp~rim:entdfl;:a\:i6r. ,aureai.J <5nabor Statistjc.s. T,1ble B-49 (P!'odudiv\t.y and 
R~fated Data, Busin~ss ·Sector, 1962-2011) in the Ecorwmic Report of the Pre_si'ilerlt. 2012. 
[36] Hewitt As~ociates. Pensitm P{CinD{sr;:losure Under FASB .Stµiement Nambrtr 87 (I 987-
J 992); Ben,eji.t l'la,1 Disclo.mr(! Under SF.AS 87, SFAS I 06; and 8FAS l 12 (1993); Bene/ii 
Plan Disclosure Uiul.er SFAS 87 ,Itrd SFAS /06 (1994-2007) . 
[37] W~tson Wyatt Wodd'>vi~e. 199lSiit.-vey ofAc!ua1·ia! Assump1io1is & Fta1di11g: &rision 
Pf ans -:with l . oov or N.fore;1 ¢five Pcirtici'ptpitS. 2001 S wvey o.(A C/1.IQl'iol)lssumptions &. 
Fwzdlii.i;: Pensidn 1'/a/zs w(!l(T, UQO. or irore Active P 11r.11:cipants'. 1006 Siirvey ,;f 
Acluar(ti/.A~1i1i1J!fid)'1tiff}.i'.'/.tf1if/1ig/ J>i!.n'sioit Pla11s Mlh I. O(J(J 01· ,\lore Active ParticJpa1t1.8. 
\-v~tso:n,Wy~u .}Vpffd~ i~e,. )9~5; :tooi~ JJJ07. · 
[38j \Vatson W_ylilt'\Yorlch,Vide" it/;c.m)rilihg)or Pensions and Orher Po.11ref.iremen11Je1114/11s 
1998: Reportfog.unde1<FA8'8tandFASUJ6 among the Nation'.\' Largest Compm1ies. 
Watson WyattWorldwid¢, 1998: 
[39} Towers· WatsOl:lc Acceztntingfor Pensions and'Other Pos1re1iremenl Benefits 2010: 
Reporttngunder- US. f)A:AP)J.111011gthi· Fottu11e l UOO . '.Fowers Watson, 2019, 
-l 40] 1\)Wet-s:W::tts:or.i, .A,cq_9~1t!iiiJ;for-if&hs.W-tJS and Other Posm;./ti·en1q1t .IJ.e1ii:!}ils lO}l; 
/?epo1,ifhg,!1!14.er(f.S, ;(/44.f-/11n'f>1Jff.}lieFol't1i11e 1()00 . Towers WatsQ1i; 20 H. 
f41J Grs-:~l'1Wjt;&,iss6dfa1'e.S.i .. ;Ftl]jc(Sl{e:/l!lan the.;-A.~set JI-fix, wid Op1)1ioriS 0.1i Pensi'em• 
"1t}tbzlnli;1z,.;. TJdtiii;iibl:e~, :ai~<!ri~*):ch,,ct, Grctnwich:Associates', 2005. 
,fif4r B9a)"{~,t)f-<:itiPim'6~toftMJf,~Mi~U'~i~~tve Sy.stem. Federal Reserve $Ip1.isticalReiease: 
Sdledt11dJntei;es(R_b.te.r,. ·"i'tea$urj.i coni;lapt ma_turitics: 5ayear." Published at 
h itp:/!ww}vfi?.'d,er.i1lre~·izrve;l)QV, ·. · 
14-3.J 201 l A111waLRepo,,t ojthe Bocxr.d ofitt1:iiees of f/ie Federal OidsAge and S11tJivors 
.!nsui-ance atui J)/sabilit;-· lrlsw®ctf Trust Funds. Publis.bed ?.t 
ht1p."//1i1Ww.ssa.gov!OACTITRl20)21indexhlml. 
[44] Complaiptani:l 'Qemano :for Jt:!;(:)t'rrlriL 
{45) · . No\foe of'f:riai'$~tti.i)g·.ahi:1 'Qrdei'Goven1ing Pur:ther Proccedillgs. 
[46J GEC Chedqisf 
[47) Milirnry ·,pay.Sapcdules·fh:>i:11 tl'lc Oefc115t Finance and t.\ccoun!ing Service. 
[ 48.J U.S. Air.force Benc!Tfs-fact She~t. 
[,19] l\·lilitary Personnel Records for Krystal M. BaJlard. 
1.50] Deposilion Testimony of Charles Kellen Ballard. Fehruary I. 2013. 
[51 J College Trnnsc ipts for Krystal Bullard. 
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(53 J 2012 Air Force Promotion averages per Air Force Personnel Cemcr. P~1i.lll$hed at 
}uip://www.afpc.a/mil. 
'(54) Milltary pay.sched'ules 2,01Q'-.ZOl3. Published at 
http.:ll1vi1'iH,dfli-s.mf/lm11itar)i'i.1Jemhcr'.Vpayen1tr{emeri1slmfiftaryp,zy1<1bles,h{t!1/. 
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DEC-24-2011 16:00 From: To:34 i0 
COMES NOW Plainiil'f, through J,js attorneys, and for causes ol'action against the 
obove-.named Defendants, states and alleges as follows: 
I. P ARTffiS A.Nl> JURISDICTION 
I . Charles Ballan\ is a former resident of Idaho and a current resident of Florida as an 
active-duly n1ember of the United Slates Air Force. He is the surviving spouse of Krystal 
Melissa Ballard, deceased, who up until the time of her death was also an active-duty member of 
the United States Air Force. 
2. Defendant Brian Crtlder Kerr, M.D. ("Defendant Kerr") is a licensed medical doctor 
who resides in Idaho and who practiced medicine in the City of Eagle, County of Ada, State of 
ldaho, at all relevant times in the Complaint, including on and after July 21, 2010. 
3. Defendant Kerr was and is a partner in Defe1.1dant Silk Touch Laser, LLP at all 
relevant times in the Complaint. 
4. Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership with its 
registered address as 252 W. Meadows Ridge Lane, Eagle, Idaho 83616, in the Cou,lty of Ada} 
State ofldaho. 
5. At allrelevanl times in the Complaint, Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP, has opetated 
an outpatient clinic where ii provides cosmetic and plastic surgery services at 3210 E. Chinden 
Blvd., Suite 113, Boise, Idaho 83616 ("the Silk Touch clinic"). 111is Defendant has operated its 
business under its own name and imder the trnde names, or doing-business-as names, of Silk 
Touch Med Spa, Silk Toud1 Med Spa and Lase,'I' Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and 
Lipo of Boise. AH of these Defendants, trade names, and doing-business-as names, me 
collectively rcforred to herein as the ''Silk Touch Defendants.'-' 
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6. At all material times herein, Defendant Kerr was an employee of the Silk Touch 
Defendm1ts acting withi11 the course and scope of his employment. 
7. Plaintiff has complied with Idaho Code§ 6ul001, et s~q, by filing an application for a 
Prelitigation Screening Panel with the Idaho State Board or Medicine which has returned its 
Reporl and Rccomrnendation. 
8. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, thereby meeting the minimum 
jurisdictjonal limits for filing with this Court. 
H. FACTS 
9. Plaintiff Charles Ballard is a Sta.ff Sergeant in the United States Air Force and is now 
stationed in Florida. He was a Staff Sergeant at all times relevant to thi.s Complain(. Prior to 
being stationed in Florida, Plaintiff was stationed and resided in Idaho with his wife, Krystal 
Ballard, up until the time of her de~th, 
10. At the time of her death, Krystal Ballard was also a Staff Sergeant in the United 
States Air Force. 
11. At the time ofK.tystaPs death, Charles and Kcystal Ballard were married and living 
together in Mountain Home, Idaho, while both were stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force 
Base in Mountain Home, Idaho. 
12. Leading u.P to, and on July 21, 2010, Krystal Ballard was 27 years old and in good 
health. 
13. At all times material herein, Defendant Kerr and the Silk Touch Defendants held 
themselves out to the public as individually and collectively competent providers of cosmetic and 
plastic surgery services. 
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14. Prior to the time he began providing cosmetic and plm;Li1,; surge1y services, Defendant 
Kerr was primarily engaged in providing anesthesiology services to the public. 
15. On July 21, 2010, Defendants Kerr and Lhe Silk Touch Defendants, and upon 
information and belief, other agents, employees, and servants of Lhese DcfctJdants, performed 
cosmetic surgery on Krystal Ballard at the Silk Touch clinic. 
16. The medical care provided by, including but not limited Lo the sterilization 
pl.'ocedures and techniques implemented, used, and perfom1ed by. Defendant Kerr and the Silk 
Touch Defondants, and upon information and belief, other agenls, employees, and servants of 
these Defendants, while providing cosmetic surgery services to Krystal Ballard, fell below the 
standards of care owed to the patient by physicians and facilities providing cosmetic and plastic 
surgery services. 
17. As a direct and proximate result of this care by ih?SC Defendants, including 
sterilization procedures and techniques falling below applicable standards of care, Krystal 
Ballard suftbrcd during surgery, and/or developed and continued to suffer ·from aflctward, a 
lite-threatening infection and/or condition, and died. 
18. Toe surgery and postusurgcry care and monitoring procedures and tech"niques 
implemented, used, and performed by Defendant Ken: and the Silk Touch Defendants, and upon 
. 
information and belief, other agents, employees, and servants of lhe~e Defemlants, while 
providing cosmetic surgery services to Krystal Halla.rd and monitoring and/or caring for her 
afterward~ fc)l below the applicable standards of care owed lo the patient by physicians and 
facilities providing surgery and post-surgery cosmetic and plastic surgery services. 
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19. As a direct and proximate result of these surgery and post-surgery procedures and 
techniques falling below the applicable standards of cal'e, Krystal Ballard 13uffored during surgery, 
and/or developed and continued to surf et from afterward, a life-threatening infection ancl/or 
condition, and died. 
20. In the eru:ly morning hours of July 26,2010, Krystal Ballard died at St. Alphonsus 
Regi.onal Medical Center in Boise, ldaho, as a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or 
omissions of Defendant Kerr and the Silk Tonch Delendants, and upon infommtjon a.ud belief, 
other agents, employees, and servants of these Defendants, in }Jroviding cosmetic surgery services, 
surgical mcmhoring services, and/or post-surgical monitoring services. 
J.J.l. ME.DlCAL CA'O'SATlON 
21. Plaintiff rcalleges the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent p~graphs 
of this Complaint. 
22. The negligence and other wronbTf'ul conduct of the Defendants as alleged in this 
Complaint were a direct and proximate cause of Krystal Ballard's death. 
23. The damages Plaintiff suffered and will suffer arc a direct and proximate result of 
each of the Defendants' negligence and otb.er wrongful conduct. 
IV. CLAIMS 
24. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent pn.ragruphs 
of thls Complaint. 
25. Each oftl1e Defendants were negligent in the manner in which they treated Krystal 
Ballard. To a rensonable medical certuinty, t11e care rendered by the Defendants foll below the 
applicable standard of care in the community in which it was provided. 
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26. Each of the De.f endants were negligent in providing Krystal I3allard medical and 
cosmetic surgery ca(c and services, surgical care lm<l monitoring services, and/or post-surgicul 
care and monitoring services (including up to the time of her death) that fell below the applicable 
standard of care in the commllnity in which it was provided. 
27. These acts of negligence were a direct and proximate cause of the special and general 
damages sustained by Plaintiff, which dan.1ages are described in Lhe "Damages" tiection below. 
28. Defendant Silk Touch Laser, LLP is responsible uoder the docn:ine ohespondeat 
superior for the acts and omissions of its employeeti, inclucling Defendant Kecr and its nursing 
staff and/or others for whom i.t may be legally liable a.nd for the acts :'ltid omissions of the same 
performed under the trade names, or doing-business-as names, of Silk Touch Med Spa, Sllk 
Tonch Med Spa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipo of Boise. 
29. '!'he Defendants' misconduct was willful or reckless pur.suant to Idaho Code § 
6-1603(4)(a). 
V. :DAMAG'Ji;S 
30. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in all the prior and subsequent paragraphs 
of th.is Complaint. 
31. As a di.rcct and proximate result of Defendants' ocg.li.gcncc, Plaintiff has sustained 
both economic and non-economic losses, which include but are not limited to, damages in the 
fmm of: 
(a) The decedent's funeral expenses; 
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(b) Loss of wage8 and other benefits of employment which would have been ean1ed by 
.K.ryst.ul Ballard and shared with her husband, Pl~tinli rr, during Lhe coun;e of her normal 
work life expecltmcy; 
(c) The reasonable value attributable to the loss of service, care~ comfort and society of 
Krystal Ballard; and 
(d) As a result of Defendants' negligence and other wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has 
been forced to employ attorneys for th~ prosecution of lhis action and Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121, and Ru.le 
54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judb'UJ.ent against the Defendants as 
follows: 
l . l<'or the recovery of all special and general compensatory damages su.-;ta.ined as a direct 
and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants, all in u precise amount to be proven at 
the time and place of trial of this action, but which in any event exceed the jurisdictional limits of 
$10,000; 
2. For the recovery of all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho law; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the CourL deems just and equitable. 
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DEMAND FOR .JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a llial by jury on all issues in accordance with Ruic 38(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
rt,-, 
DATED this the I & . day of March, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVfN, BENJAMIN, MC.KAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By ___ ~~ 
David Z. Nevin . 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gtegory Haddad 
Jam.cs B. Perrine 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 




David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF . 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff Charles Ballard ("Plaintiff'), in accordance with Rule 33 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits the following Supplemental Responses to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories. 
General Statements and Objections 
A. Representations of fact and law herein are made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These responses represent Plaintiff's best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-work product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it calls for information 
subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for critical self-
examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information arguably 
subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are not waived beyond 
the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in that no 
disclosure of anything which is actually privileged is intended. 
C. Plaintiff objects to each and every request to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those commonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does not exist. 
E. No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is waived by the 
provision of any response herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 
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RESPONSES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please set forth the name and address of each and every 
individual known to you or your counsel who has knowledge or who purports to have knowledge 
of any of the facts of this case. By this Interrogatory we seek the names and addresses of all 
individuals who have knowledge or purport to have knowledge of the facts of this case which 
pertain to your claim for damages as well as matters pertaining to liability. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: 
New Address: Charles Ballard, 2590 Hidden Estates Circle, Navarre, FL 32566. 
Persons with knowledge of the marriage between Plaintiff and Krystal Ballard and 
Plaintiffs loss of comfort and support from the untimely death of Krystal Ballard and Krystal 
Ballard's service to the United States as an enlisted member of the United States Air Force and 
her career plans, include but are not limited to: 
Tearie Wilkins, 2275 Lexington Drive, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana 71110; and 
Jonelle Cadiz, 1500 Sheridan Drive, Jacksonville, Arkansas 72076. 
Persons with knowledge of Krystal Ballard's service to the United States and 
performance while an enlisted member of the United States Air Force include, but are not limited 
to: 
MSgt. Rachel L. Tower, United States Air Force (currently deployed); and 
Lt. Col. Michael R. Auel, United States Air Force. 
The following individuals were involved in the care and treatment of Krystal Ballard 
beginning on July 25, 2010, until her death just after midnight on July 26, 2010. The knowledge 
and information possessed by each of these individuals, including opinions held, are set forth in 
the previously produced records associated with these individuals and referenced again below. 
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Elmore Ambulance Service, 895 N. 6th East, Mountain Home, Idaho 83647. (See Bates 
EASOOOOOl - EAS000034, previously produced.) 
Cody Murphy, EMT; and 
Wendy Vanderburgh, EMT - Paramedic. 
Elmore Medical Center, 895 N. 6th Street, Mountain Home, Idaho 83647. (See Bates 
EMCOOOOOl -EMC000029, previously produced.) 
Karl Olson, MD - Emergency Department; 
Bertrem Stemmler, MD - Medical Imaging; and 
Edward Kim, MD - Laboratory, Pathologist. 
Life Flight Network, 2779 S Liberty St, Boise, Idaho 83709 (See Bates LFNOOOOOl -
LFN000005, previously produced.) 
Beth Studebaker, RN; and 
Steve Mozingo, PM. 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 1055 North Curtis Road, Boise, Idaho 83706 (See 
Bates SAMC000001-SAMC000192, previously produced.) 
Matthew Campbell, MD - Emergency Department; 
Tisha Fujii, DO - Critical Care; 
Billy Mrogan, MD - Surgical Consult; 
Jeffrey Symmonds, MD - Vascular Examination; 
Michael Kenner, MD - Heart & Vascular Center; and 
Howard Schaff, MD - Gem State Radiology. 
See also records for attending nursing and other staff to include David Atkinson, RN; 
Rob Hart, RN; Debra Servatius, RN; Kristin Prescott, RN: Tensie Tobenas, RN; Benjamin 
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Gagnebin, RN; Shirley Phillips, DTR (diet/nutrition); Ann Schaffer, CRT; and Wynne Proctor, 
RN. 
The following individuals who participated or contributed to the autopsy and death 
investigation of Krystal Ballard conducted by the Ada County Coroner's office, 5550 Morris Hill 
Road, Boise, Idaho 83706. The knowledge and information possessed by each of these 
individuals, including opinions held, are set forth in the previously produced records associated 
with these individuals and the Coroner's office. (See Bates ADAOOOOOl - ADAOOOOll, 
previously produced.) 
Erwin L. Sonnenberg, Coroner; 
Glen R. Groben, M.D., Forensic Pathologist - in particular see Autopsy Report authored 
by Dr. Groben, dated September 24, 2010 (Bates ADA000004 - ADAOOOOll), previously 
produced); 
Robert Karinen, Forensic Lab Supervisor; 
Barton L. Kline, Forensic Lab Technician; and 
Kelly Cole, Coroner's Investigator - in particular see Investigative Report and 
Investigative/Narrative Report (Bates ADAOOOOOl -ADA000003, previously produced.) 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person 
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, and for each such person set forth a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data 
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used 
as a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years, the compensation to be paid for the testimony and a listing of any 
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other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: 
Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
Sorensen Cosmetic Surgery Center 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 120 
Boise, ID 83 706 
Dean Sorensen, M.D. is a physician who has practiced cosmetic medicine including 
plastic surgery in Ada County for over 20 years. He owns and operates the Sorensen Cosmetic 
Surgery Center of Idaho. Dr. Sorensen's facility serves the Boise and Eagle, Idaho areas. Dr. 
Sorensen also has staff privileges at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center in Boise. Dr. Sorensen 
is familiar with the standard of care applicable to defendants at the time Krystal Ballard was 
treated by Dr. Kerr at his clinic, Silk Touch MedSpa and Laser Center. He is familiar with the 
standard of care applicable to physicians such as Defendant Brian Kerr, M.D. practicing 
cosmetic medicine including cosmetic and aesthetic procedures and surgery in Ada County 
including Boise and Eagle at the time Krystal Ballard was treated by Dr. Kerr at his clinic in July 
2010. 
Dr. Sorensen's Curriculum Vitae is attached in supplemental response to Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 6. By way of background, he received his degree in medicine from Loyola 
University in Chicago. Upon completion of his medical school training, Dr. Sorensen underwent 
an internship followed by a residency in general surgery at Highland Hospital in Oakland, 
California and the U.S. Naval Hospital in Portsmouth, Virginia. Subsequently, he undertook a 
two-year fellowship in plastic surgery at the University of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake 
City. Following a facelift fellowship, Dr. Sorensen returned to Boise where his practice includes 
plastic, aesthetic and reconstructive procedures and services. Dr. Sorensen is board-certified by 
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the American Board of Surgery and the American Board of Plastic Surgery. He is a Fellow of 
the American College of Surgeons, a member of the American Society of Plastic Surgeons and 
the Aesthetic Society. He is a member of the AMA and Idaho Medical Association. He is past 
President of the Ada County Medical Society. He has served on the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine and the Idaho State Board of Medical Discipline. Dr. Sorensen is an inspector for 
AAAASF, which certifies ambulatory surgical facilities similar to that of the defendants for 
compliance with local and national standards of care, including the sterilization policies, 
procedures and protocols employed by such facilities. By virtue of his education, training and 
experience as described above, Dr. Sorensen is familiar with the standard of care for physicians 
and surgical facilities offering cosmetic and aesthetic services such as those performed by the 
defendants and which were performed on Krystal Ballard by the defendants, including the 
appropriate sterilization policies, procedure and protocols required by the standard of care in 
both the Boise, Eagle, Ada County and surrounding areas. Dr. Sorensen is familiar with the 
applicable standard of health care practice in the areas served by St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, to include Ada County, Idaho and the cities 
of Boise and Eagle, which existed at the time and place of the treatment of Krystal Ballard on or 
about July 21, 2010 in Eagle, Idaho, and which was applicable to the class of health care 
providers to which the defendants Dr. Kerr and his clinic, Silk Touch Med Spa & Laser Center, 
belong, and in which he and the clinic were functioning, and which applied to similarly trained 
and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account their 
training, experience, and fields of medical specialization (hereafter "the applicable standard of 
care"). 
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Dr. Sorensen has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, including the 
report of the post-mortem examination of Krystal Ballard. He has also reviewed the deposition 
transcripts of Dr. Kerr, Ms. Kerr and Donna Berg as part of his review in this case. As discovery 
proceeds, Dr. Sorensen will receive additional discovery materials as they become available and, 
therefore, his anticipated opinions are subject to modification arid supplementation. All of Dr. 
Sorensen's anticipated opinions will be to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
It is expected that Dr. Sorensen will testify that Krystal Ballard died as a direct and 
proximate result of conduct of the defendants that was not only negligent, but rose to the level of 
reckless misconduct, and which grossly violated the applicable standard of care. A review of the 
depositions reveal that Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff lacked adequate training in appropriate 
sterilization of a facility, its equipment and instruments. Further, Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff 
failed to properly avail themselves of information readily available to provide for appropriate 
sterility in carrying out their cosmetic and aesthetic practice. These standards are readily 
available from organizations that certify ambulatory and surgical facilities, the Center for 
Disease Control, the medical literature, and references within the user's manual of the machinery 
used during Krystal Ballard's surgery and medical treatment. 
Specifically, but without limitation, it is expected that Dr. Sorensen will testify as 
follows: 
1. Krystal Ballard died from septic shock as a result of bacteria which entered her body 
during the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010 at the defendants' facility. 
2. The infection was introduced into Ms. Ballard's buttocks during the procedure and 
was determined to be gram negative rods which are commonly found in stool. While a failure to 
appropriately prepare the patient for the fat transfer could have been the cause of the bacteria 
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being introduced into Krystal Ballard's body, most likely it occurred because the material 
obtained from the abdomen was contaminated because of the wholly inadequate, negligent, and 
reckless misconduct of the defendants in failing to sterilize the instruments and equipment used 
during the procedure. 
3. The procedure room used for the liposuction on Ms. Ballard was not a clean 
environment by any reasonable surgical standards. It was used for other, non-surgical 
procedures and as a storage area for supplies and contaminated instruments used during 
procedures. 
4. The instruments used in the liposuction and fat transfer procedures on Ms. Ballard 
were initially put in a basin in the procedure room and "washed" with Hibiclens and alcohol. 
Alcohol is not approved as a sterilization solution, nor is Hibiclens approved for sterilization of 
medical instruments, supplies or equipment. 
5. The dirty instruments were taken from the procedure room not to an area designated 
for dirty equipment, but rather to a room where the autoclave was kept for allegedly sterilizing 
the equipmen~. 
6. The defendants broke almost every rule of safe care of surgical instruments as 
measured by any reasonable standard in their treatment of Ms. Ballard. There were no protocols 
or procedures for cleaning of instruments, nor housekeeping and cleaning of the procedure room 
or the clean room. After the initial gross cleaning in the procedure room the instruments were 
placed in a Hibiclens/alcohol mixture not an approved proteolytic enzyme solution wash and 
were then transferred to the room where the autoclave was, which should have been but was not 
a clean room. 
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7. The autoclave used depends on the mechanical monitoring of sterilization. Gauges on 
the autoclave do not ensure sterilization. The defendants admit there was no maintenance and 
service checks of the autoclave, nor were any logs kept of any inspection of the autoclave. 
8. Allegedly chemical indicators were used, but Dr. Kerr and his clinic staff do not wrap 
the cassettes and there are no records of what the chemical indicators revealed. There should be 
documentation of internal as well as external use of chemical indicators because chemical 
indicators cannot be used as means of ensuring sterility. Biological indicators must be used 
(spore tests) but were not. The failure to use biological indicators and spore counts is egregious. 
9. The autoclave used by the defendants in their treatment of Ms. Ballard as an alleged 
means of sterilizing hollow chambers and cannulas must have both a negative or vacuum 
pressure as well as a gravity cycle. The former forces steam through the cannula for appropriate 
sterilization of the instruments. 
10. The employees handling the instruments used to treat Ms. Ballard and responsible for 
cleaning and sterilization do not have an adequate medical background, nor adequate training in 
the safe handling, cleaning and sterilization of equipment, nor were there any protocols in place 
to provide that guidance, and Dr. Kerr himself lacks fundamental knowledge of appropriate 
cleaning and sterilization to provide the training and guidance to other staff. 
Dr. Sorensen will testify that defendants including specifically Dr. Kerr violated the 
applicable standard of care by virtue of the above described treatment of Krystal Ballard. Dr. 
Kerr and defendants breached the applicable standard of care in the way in which they operated 
the facility at the time Ms. Ballard was treated, including through the complete neglect and 
failure to adhere to even the most basic standards required in the Boise, Eagle and Ada County 
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areas, and defendants' conduct was negligent, reckless and demonstrated a willful disregard for 
patient safety which lead directly to and proximately caused the death of Krystal Ballard. 
Dr. Sorensen charges $500.00 per hour in connection with his consultation and services 
as an expert witness in this matter. He has not authored any publications within the preceding 
ten years and has not testified as an expert at trial or deposition within the preceding four years. 
George Nichols, M.D. 
73 9 Middle Way 
Louisville, KY 40206 
Dr. Nichols is a medical doctor who specializes in anatomical, clinical, and forensic 
pathology. A copy of Dr. Nichols' Curriculum Vitae, which outlines his education, training, and 
experience in his medical specialty is provided as part of Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses to 
Interrogatory No. 6. Dr. Nichols has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, 
including the autopsy report prepared in conjunction with the post-mortem examination, as well 
as recuts of the pathology slides from the post-mortem examination. As discovery proceeds, Dr. 
Nichols will receive additional discovery materials and, therefore, his anticipated opinions are 
subject to modification and supplementation. All of Dr. Nichols' opinions are expected to be to 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
It is expected that Dr. Nichols will testify that the bacterial infection from which Krystal 
Ballard died was a direct result of bacteria being introduced into her body during the procedure 
performed by Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010, and as a result of a breach in sterility, as gram negative 
rods are proof to a reasonable degree of certainty that a breach in sterility occurred. As a result 
of bacteria being introduced into her body, Krystal Ballard was exposed to an exotoxin, which 
causes an inflammatory response (toxic shock) and blood vessels to dilate. As a result of the 
sepsis, Krystal Ballard's organs were underperfused, ischemia to the organs ensued, and Krystal 
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Ballard succumbed to multisystem organ failure. Dr. Nichols will testify that there is no other 
reason for Krystal Ballard's death other than as a direct result of bacteria introduced intra-
operatively during the procedure, most likely as a result of contaminated equipment. 
Dr. Nichols charges $400.00 per hour in connection with his consultation and services as 
an expert witness in this matter, with a minimum charge of $2,500.00, and a flat fee of $4,000.00 
where an out-of-state appearance necessitates his missing an entire day's work. 
A listing of any other cases in which Dr. Nichols has testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition within the preceding four years 1s attached hereto1, bates numbered 
BALLARD000200 - BALLARD000207. 
Keith Barclay Armitage, M.D. 
12600 Cedar Road 
Cleveland Heights, OH 44106 
Dr. Armitage is a medical doctor, who specializes in infectious disease. A copy of Dr. 
Armitage's Curriculum Vitae, which outlines his education, training, and experience in that 
medical specialty, is provided as part of Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' 
Interrogatory No. 6. Dr. Armitage has reviewed the pertinent medical records of Krystal Ballard, 
including the autopsy report prepared in conjunction with the post-mortem examination. As 
discovery proceeds, Dr. Armitage will receive additional discovery materials and, therefore his 
anticipated opinions are subject to modification and supplementation. All of Dr. Armitage's 
opinions are expected to be to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
It is expected that Dr. Armitage will testify that the bacterial infection from which 
Krystal Ballard died was a direct result of bacteria being introduced into her body during the 
procedure performed by Defendant Dr. Kerr on July 21, 2010, which occurred as a result of a 
1 All documents referenced in this Supplemental Response are contained on a compact disc attached hereto. 
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breach in sterility. The gram negative rod bacteria discovered at autopsy are proof to a 
reasonable degree of certainty that they resulted from operative sterility issues from instruments 
used during the procedure and introduced intra-operatively. As a result of the bacteria being 
introduced into Krystal Ballard's body during the procedure performed by Defendant Dr. Kerr, 
Krystal Ballard became septic and died. 
A listing of all publications authored by Dr. Armitage within the preceding ten years is 
attached hereto, bates numbered BALLARD000254 - BALLARD000260. 
Dr. Armitage, in connection with his consultation and services as an expert witness in this 
matter, charges $300.00 per hour to review records, discuss the case, and prepare any reports, 
$400.00 per hour to attend any deposition, and $1,500.00 per half day to testify at trial. 
Cornelius A. Hofman 
The GEC Group 
5555 N. Star Ridge Way 
Star, ID 83669 
Cornelius A. Hofman is an economist. A copy of Mr. Hofman's Curriculum Vitae, 
which outlines his qualifications, professional experience, and background is provided as part of 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 6. Mr. Hofman will 
present testimony on his opinions of net present value of lost financial support and lost non-
financial support to Plaintiff, which is attributed to the untimely death of Krystal Ballard. Mr. 
Hofman has been provided information concerning the educational background, employment 
history, and wage earning and benefits history of Krystal Ballard, as well as the services Mrs. 
Ballard provided to her husband. Please refer to the materials attached hereto and bates 
numbered GECOOOOOl - GEC000347. 
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As discovery proceeds, Mr. H~fman will receive additional discovery materials, expected 
to include, but not be limited to, the tax return information for Mrs. Ballard and Plaintiff, 
economic and financial literature, college transcripts, and military benefits. Accordingly, his 
anticipated opinions are subject to modification and supplementation. 
Mr. Hofman, in connection with his consultation and services as an expert witness in this 
matter, charges $3,900.00 for analysis and report preparation and $490.00 per hour to testify at 
any deposition or trial. 
A listing of any other cases in which Mr. Hofman has testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition within the preceding four years is attached hereto, bates numbered 
BALLARD000224 - BALLARD000231. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: For each and every person you have identified in 
answer to Interrogatory No. 5, set forth the qualifications, professional experience and 
background of the individual. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE:2 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
are set forth at BALLARD000233 - BALLARD000235, attached hereto. 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of George Nichols, M.D. are 
set forth at BALLARD000190-BALLARD000199, attached hereto. 
The qualifications, professional experience and background of Keith Barclay Armitage, 
M.D. are set forth at BALLARD000236- BALLARD000253, attached hereto. 
2 As previously noted, the documents referenced in this Supplemental Response are contained on a compact disc 
attached hereto 
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The qualifications, professional experience and background of Cornelius A. Hofman are 
set forth at BALLARD000208 - BALLARD000223, attached hereto. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By:~~~~ 
David Z. Nevin U 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
201 Monroe Street, Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
T: (334) 262-6485; F: (334) 262-0657 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
' / 
liability partnership; and SILK T~CH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited llability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
1 - PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
001674
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard ("Plaintiff'), in accordance with Rule 33 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits the following Second Supplemental Answers to 
Defendants' First Set oflnterrogatories. 
General Statements and Objections 
A. Representations of fact and law herein arc made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These answers represent Plaintiffs best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-work product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogatory to the extent that it calls for 
information subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for 
critical self-examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information 
arguably subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are not waived 
beyond the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in 
that no disclosure of anything which is actually privileged is intended. 
C. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogatory to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those commonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does not exist. 
E. No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is waived by the 
provision of any answer herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 




INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person 
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, and for each such person set forth a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data 
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used 
as a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years, the compensation to be paid for the testimony and a listing of any 
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: 
Plaintiff previously disclosed Cornelius A Hofman with the GEC Group in response to 
this interrogatory. Mr. Hofman is an economist. Plaintiff supplements his prior response to this 
interrogatory concerning Mr. Hofman and produces herewith Mr. Hofman's report dated May 8, 
2013, styled "Assessment of Economic Loss" prepared in connection with this case and the death 
of Krystal Melissa Ballard, bates numbered GEC000351 - GEC000395. 
Additionally, we provided Mr. Hofman with Krystal's transcript from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University and her transcript from University of Maryland University College . 
. Those documents are bates numbered GEC000348-GEC000349 and GEC000350, respectively, 
and are attached hereto. 
Plaintiff previously disclosed Keith Armitage, M.D., in response to this interrogatory. 
Dr. Armitage specializes in infectious disease medicine. In addition to the previously disclosed 
opinions of Dr. Armitage, which are incorporated by reference herein, it is expected that Dr. 
Armitage will testify concerning the lack of effect the antibiotic prescribed by Dr. Kerr would 
have on the gram negative bacteria cultured at autopsy. Dr. Armitage is expected to testify that 




the antibiotic prescribed by Dr. Kerr in follow up to the procedure he performed on Krystal 
Ballard would not be effective in treating gram negative bacteria. Further, the prescribing of a 
Medrol Dosepak by Dr. Kerr would suppress the body's own immune system and have a 
deleterious effect on a patient with an infection. Further, Dr. Armitage will testify that the time 
interval between the cosmetic procedure and Krystal Ballard's death is such that the introduction 
of the fatal bacteria occurred intraoperatively. Had the infection occurred post-operatively, 
Krystal Ballard would not have exhibited signs of sepsis until much later. Additionally, the 
bacteria responsible for post-operative infections are gram positive bacteria, usually from skin 
flora, not gram negative bacteria. As such, the gram negative bacteria is not a typical post-
operative infection but rather one coming from peritoneal cavity flora which must have been 
transferred to the buttocks during the fat transfer. 
Further, Plaintiff saith not. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP <e~~0 By: ~-~ . 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I 
2 
Q. Anyway, the point is, it's in the Disclosure --
A. Okay. 
3 Q. -- those terms. 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. Now, my next question to you is, what does 
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6 "standard of care" mean to you -- if it means anything? 
7 A. Well, let me paraphrase that by saying that 
8 for 40 years I have been operating in an outpatient 
9 surgery center; in Hawaii for two years we had our own 
Io outpatient surgery center; and I have spent the last 
11 eight years inspecting surgery centers around the 
12 Northwest which were owned by combinations ofOB/GYNs, 
13 neurosurgeons, cosmetic surgeons of all types. 
14 So my impression of standard of care is 
15 probably greatly influenced by my facility inspection of 
16 different facilities around the Northwest -- including 
17 Spokane, and Reno, and various sites. 
18 That's where my basis of my standard of care 
19 comes from -- what I see other people doing in other 
20 places, including Boise. 
21 Q. Well, is that your definition of "standard 
22 of care," what others do? 
23 A. My definition of "standard of care" is what 
24 would be in the realm of patient safety, as I see it, 
25 from my experiences as a facility inspector. 
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I Q. Do you have an opinion as to what "standard of 
2 health care practice" means? 
3 A. It means to me, my own personal definition is 
4 that it's the standard of practice of what cosmetic surgeons 
5 would do in my community -- not so much in other 
6 communities. 
7 Q. So that's your definition of "standard of 
8 health care practice"? 
9 A. For cosmetic surgeons. 
10 Q. Right. That's what I mean. 
II A. Um-hmm. (Nodding head.) Yes. 
12 Q. Well, you have told me previously you have 
13 never spoken with any of the cosmetic surgeons or 
14 plastic surgeons doing surgeries in Boise and Eagle in 
15 the year 2010. You have told me that in this deposition 
16 already; correct? 
17 MR. HADDAD: Object to form. That was not 
18 what you asked him. 
19 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Go ahead and answer. 
20 A. No, that's not correct. 
21 Q. Well, did you talk to them about what was 
22 going on in July of2007? 
23 A. About standard of care, you mean? 
24 Q. Yes. 
25 A. Oh, absolutely. 
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I Q. Who did you talk to in July of2007 -- who did 
2 you talk to who knew what was going on in July of20IO? 
3 Name me names. 
4 A. Dr. McKim, Dr. Wigod -- two local people here 
5 because I inspected their facilities in that time frame. 
6 Q. Anyone else? 
7 A. Well, there's Dell Smith down in Twin Falls --
8 who I inspected his facility, so I talked to him about it. 
9 Q. Well, but that's -- I'm talking about knowing 
t O what's going on in Boise. 
11 A. Yes. Those are the only two that I can recall. 
12 Q. Okay. When did you talk to them about what 
13 was the standard going on in July of20IO in Boise? 
14 When did you talk to them about that. 
15 A. Well, the first time was probably in 2006 and 
16 2007, which you have to realize I have inspected their 
17 facilities twice, so the dates are -- I couldn't give 
t 8 you the dates. 
19 Q. Well, did you talk to them subsequent to 
20 having reviewed this case about that subject? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. So your discussion with them about what was 
23 going on in Boise with those two doctors related to what 
24 was going on in 2007; correct? 
25 MR. HADDAD: Objection; mischaracterizes --
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I Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Isn't that true? 
2 A. And later. 
3 Q. Well, how could it be later? When did you 
4 talk to them later? 
5 A. Well, because I inspected, for example, Dr. Wigod's 
6 office twice -- probably in 2007 and again in 2011. 
7 Every four years is the cycle that they have to be 
8 re-inspected, so that's what happens is every four years 
9 I go back and see them. 
10 Q. Are you telling me then under oath that you 
II talked to that doctor about what was going on in July of 
12 2007 and the year 2011? 
13 MR. HADDAD: Objection; confusing --
14 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Are you telling me that? 
15 MR. HADDAD: I don't think that even makes sense, 
16 but you can answer if you understand. 
17 MR. QUANE: Well,just answer my question. 
18 THE WITNESS: There's two doctors. Okay? 
19 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Okay. 
20 A. Dr. McKim, only once in 2007 or that area in 
21 there. Dr. Wigod, twice, 2007 and probably in 2011 or 
22 something like that. 
23 Q. Okay. When you talked to Wigod in 2011, did 
24 you ask him about what the standard was in July of2010? 
25 A. I didn't talk about 2010, no. 
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1 Q. Okay. So those are the only two doctors you 
2 talked to? 
3 A. Locally, yes. 
4 Q. And when you talked to -- Wigod? How do you 
5 say his name? 
6 A. Wigod, W-i-g-o-d. 
7 Q. Wigod. Is h~ a plastic surgeon? 
8 A. Yes. I reviewed his office records every 
9 six months -- he's required to do that -- random choices 
1 o of office records every six months. 
11 Q. Who establishes the standard of care or 
12 standard health care practice? Who decides what it is? 
13 A. Well, there are different groups. 
14 I happen to work with one, the American 
15 Association of Ambulatory Surgery Centers -- the 
16 American Association of Accreditation of Ambulatory 
t 7 Surgery Centers, AAAASF. 
18 Q. You say they set these standards? 
t 9 A. They have their set of standards, yes. I 
20 think they're based on -- a lot of it is based on 
21 development through the years. I couldn't tell you how 
22 they developed their standards. 
23 Q. Well, don't the local doctors set the standards? 
24 A. Not for accrediting organizations, no. 
25 Q. But do they for other types of organizations 
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I that are non-accredited? 
2 A. I have no idea. 
3 Q. Okay. Have you ever heard the term the 
4 "standard of health care practice" in Idaho means how a 
5 particular doctor in a particular specialty typically 
6 practices medicine? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Where did you hear that? 
9 A. I have no idea, but it's one of those common 
10 knowledge things, I would guess. 
11 Q. Were there any other doctors in Idaho, to your 
12 knowledge, in July of20IO who had practices similar to 
13 Dr. Kerr? 
14 A. I would have no idea. 
15 Q. When you talked to Dr. Wigod, did you ever 
16 bring up the type of practice of Dr. Kerr with him? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. When you talked to Dr. McKim back in 2007, did 
19 you ever discuss with him the type of practice of Dr. Kerr? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. You mentioned a California organization that 
22 asked you to review the case; correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. I got a professional statement concerning 




A. Um-hmm. (Nodding head.) Yes. 
Q. -- that directed me to pay them a fee of$750 
3 an hour to pay -- to pay them, not you. 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. Okay. Is that your fee or is that the fee 
6 they decided on? 
7 A. That's the fee they decided on. 
8 Q. It is not your fee? 
9 A. No, no. 
IO Q. Well, how much is your fee? 
11 A. $500 an hour for a deposition. 
12 Q. Okay. Well, do they then take a cut out of 
13 the $750 that -- I had to send them $1,500. Do they 
14 take a cut out of that? 
15 A. Yes -- a third, apparently. 
16 Q. Okay. But that's not your fee? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. And yours is $500 an hour for deposition testimony? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, did Mr. Haddad 
21 arrange for that organization to contact you? Did he 
22 work with them to get you involved through them? 
23 A. He did not. 
24 Q. Who did? 
25 A. You would have to ask Counsel. I don't know 
Page 
I how -- I can give you my assumption, but I don't -- not 
2 as a basis of fact, but this is what I think happened: 
3 He contacted them. He didn't know who I was 
4 from "Adam." They contacted me. I have no idea why. 
5 Q. Okay. But you don't know for a fact that's 
6 how it came about? 
7 A. No. 
117 
8 Q. Okay. In that communication you got from them by 
9 telephone initially we've discussed, it is my understanding 
10 that they never mentioned to you that Mr. Haddad would 
11 be contacting you. 
12 A. In the initial consultation, no, they said 
13 nothing about that. 
14 Q. Okay. So out of the blue one day you got a 
15 call from Mr. Haddad -- his office? 
16 A. Yes. Not Mr. Haddad, but his office. 
17 Q. Okay. Now, we've discussed the fact that in 
18 your liposuction procedures you have never experienced, 
19 to your knowledge, a postoperative infection; correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. Okay. Have you ever experienced a postoperative 
22 infection in other kinds of surgeries you've performed? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. And would that vary from the type of 
25 procedure to the type of procedure, the infection rates? 
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Q. Okay. Do you keep tabs on the infection rates? 
A. Ido. 
4 Q. Okay. Why don't you tell me what you know on 
5 the infection rates for various procedures of yours 
6 since you became a plastic surgeon. 
7 A. It's very easy because I've only had one 
8 infection with breast surgery. 
9 No infections with liposuction. 
10 No infection with facelifts or any facial surgeries. 
11 One minor infection with a tummy tuck, and 
12 that's about it. 
13 Q. So, according to your data that you recall, 
14 you have had two? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And one was with the tummy tuck? 
17 A. That was very minor. It was a stitch that was 
18 infected that came out. 
19 Q. Well, it was an infection? 
20 A. Sure. 
21 Q. Okay. Then the other one you mentioned with 
22 the breast procedure? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. Was the tummy tuck thing that you call 
25 an "infection" an infection or a cellulitis? 
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I A. Well, let me tell you about that. I can 
2 remember the case clearly. 
3 It was a patient from Sun Valley who was a 
4 diabetic who had drains in. The material in the drains 
5 became cloudy, and I cultured it. It cultured out some 
6 bacteria, so I put her on antibiotics. 
7 I never really saw redness of the skin, or 
8 fever, or anything. I was treating what I thought was 
9 turbid looking fluid coming out the drains. 
10 So it wasn't the kind of infection where you 
11 saw much, let's put it that way. 
12 Q. Well, would you characterize it as a cellulitis? 
13 A. No. It didn't rise to that. 
14 Q. Okay. While we're on the subject of cellulitis --
15 what is "cellulitis"? 
16 A. It's usually an inflammatory tissue -- soft 
17 tissue event. 
18 Q. Okay. Absent infection? 
19 A. There's got to be some inflammatory reaction 
20 to cause the cellulitis. 
21 Q. True, but it's an inflammatory process? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. In your practice do you have patients 
24 sign Consent For Procedure documents that specify the 
25 potential complications and risks associated with the 
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I procedure? 
2 A. Absolutely. 
3 Q. Why do you do that? 
4 A. Because I think patients need to be informed 
5 of any adverse effect up to and including death that 
6 could occur from any procedure. 
7 Q. Do you use a standard form for that purpose? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. Where did you get the form -- or did 
IO you invent it yourself? 
11 A. No. I used to. I used to get them from other 
12 people, but now I get them from the American Society of 
13 Plastic Surgeons. They're much better than the one I 
14 had before. They're more detailed. 
15 Q. But during the last ten years, let's say, have 
16 you been using that form? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. Does that form include infection as a 
19 potential complication and risk factor? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And you have your patients sign that form? 
22 A. It's not just a form. It's pages of material. 
23 Yes. 
24 Q. And why do you use that form and have the 
25 patient sign it? 
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I A. So that they are well aware of the risks, and 
2 they're informed about what could happen during the 
3 procedure. 
4 Q. ls infection a potential complication, a risk 
5 factor associated with all surgery? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You probably never thought of this before --
8 but maybe you have -- but let me explain it as a part of 
9 my question: 
10 In that form when infection is listed as a 
11 possible complication or risk factor associated with the 
12 surgery, do you interpret that to mean that that can 
13 happen in the absence of malpractice? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 MR. HADDAD: Object to form. 
16 THE WITNESS: Certainly. 
17 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) What? I didn't hear you. 
18 He butted in. 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you subscribe to the view that if an 
21 infection does develop after a surgical procedure, the 
22 surgeon or operator must have committed malpractice? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Do you subscribe to the view that under the 
25 best of circumstances and the highest degree of the 
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I is, but answer the question. 
2 THE WITNESS: The question is two-part: 
3 She had an elevated BUN and creatine, which 
4 would indicate renal failure -- or, you know, progressing 
5 renal failure. 
6 Then she had a gross examination, a microscopic 
7 examination of the kidneys themselves which were negative, 
8 as I re cal I. 
9 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) To the extent the exam permitted, 
JO that's your conclusion? 
11 A. Yes. I mean, there was no evidence of 
12 pyelonephritis or any huge infectious disease in the 
13 kidneys, as I understand. 
14 Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion as to why kidney 
15 function was substandard or impaired? 
16 A. I think she was in Septic Shock and there was 
17 organ failure, and that was the first system to go. 
18 Q. What caused creatine to rise? 
19 A. Well, when the kidneys start to fail, your 
20 creatine rises because the blood --
21 Q. Well, what makes the kidneys fail? 
22 MR. HADDAD: Wait a minute. He's not finished 
23 with his answer. You're interrupting him before he's 
24 finished. 
25 Please read the last question as posed to him. 
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I (Record read by the Reporter.) 
2 THE WITNESS: Well, the BUN and the creatine 
3 were both elevated, and they're blood exams that indicate 
4 impaired renal function. That's as far as I can say, 
5 I guess. 
6 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Creatine and BUN are the 
7 consequences of renal failure. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. I didn't ask that. 
10 I asked you what causes the renal failure in 
II the first place? 
12 A. You know, in Septic Shock it's not well understood. 
13 Q. But you attribute it to the condition known as 
14 "Septic Shock"? 
15 A. Absolutely. 
16 Q. Okay. But that's about the extent of what you 
17 can tell me as to the cause in her case of the renal failure? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. If a physician experiences no postsurgical 
20 infections whatsoever over a four-year period --
21 A. A patient has no surgical infections, you say? 
22 What did you say --
23 Q. I'll start over again. 
24 If a doctor who performs surgical procedures 
25 has no postoperative patient infections over a four-year 
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1 period, what does that say about his sterile technique, 
2 procedures, disinfection procedures, et cetera? 
3 A. I don't think it says anything about any of 
4 those things. I think it says --
5 Q. It doesn't? 
6 A. No, not in my mind. 
7 Q. It doesn't have anything to do with the quality 
8 of his sterile procedures? 
9 A. They're not directly related. 
10 Q. In this case you claim that -- in the first 
11 paragraph of your Disclosure -- do you still have that 
12 with you? 




Q. The one I handed you. Didn't I hand you one? 
A. Yes, you did. 
MR. HADDAD: I don't think that's the one he 
17 handed you. (Indicating document.) 
18 THE WITNESS: Maybe I put it in this pile. 
19 (Indicating Exhibit 1.) 
20 MR. QUANE: I handed him mine. 
21 MR. HADDAD: I know what he's looking for. 
22 I just don't --
23 MR. QUANE: Did you give it back to me? 
24 THE WITNESS: I might have put it in that pile. 
25 MR. QUANE: I don't have it. 
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I MR.HADDAD: I know what you're looking for. 
2 MR. QUANE: It includes all of your experts, 
3 not just Dr. Sorensen. 
4 THE WITNESS: I don't have it. I pretty much 
5 put everything in that pile. 
6 MR. QUANE: Well, I handed it to you. 
7 MR. HADDAD: But I don't know if it went back 
8 or what happened to it, Jerry. 
9 (Discussion held off the record.) 
10 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Before I read from this 
II Disclosure --
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. -- which is the one that Mr. Haddad sent to me --
14 A. Okay. 
15 Q. -- and that you looked at and approved it. 
16 A. Okay. 
17 Q. It is the court document, is what it is. 
18 Have you had any experience whatsoever in trying 
19 to decide the cause of death of patients? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Okay. You state here under what is enumerated 
22 as "Paragraph 1," "Krystal Ballard died from Septic Shock 
23 as a result of bacteria which entered her body during 
24 the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr on July 21, 
25 2010, at the Defendant's facility." You say that. 
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Q. What do you base that on? 
A. Two things -- maybe three. 
4 The first is that she was a 27-year-old active 
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5 duty healthy person. We know that she was healthy when 
6 she went to see Dr. Kerr. 
7 The second thing is the only thing that happened 
8 between then and the time she died was the intervention 
9 with the liposuction and the fat transfer. So it had 
IO to be the proximate cause of what happened after that. 
11 The third thing is the reports with my decision 
12 about Septic Shock from Elmore, and Saint Al's, and the 
13 Autopsy Report. l mean, anybody can read those and make 
14 those conclusions. 
15 Q. That's what it's based on, that bacteria got 
16 into her body during the procedure? 
17 A. What other cause could it be? 
18 Q. Well, there's lots of them. 
19 A. l don't think so. 
20 Q. Well, that's your opinion, but you're not an 
21 expert on causes of death, are you? 
22 THE WJTNESS: No. 
23 MR. HADDAD: Object to the form. 
24 Q. (BY MR. QUANE) Who is the best expert, a 
25 pathologist? 
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I A. Somebody that probably deals with it a lot. 
2 A pathologist would certainly be one of them. 
3 Q. Do you know Dr. Groben? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. You have no idea how many times he does autopsies 
6 to determine causes of death? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Do you know Dr. Chuck Garrison from Pocatello? 
9 A. No. 
IO Q. Do you have any idea how many times he does 
I I autopsies to determine causes of death? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. So you have told me the basis for your conclusion 
14 that I just read to you from your Disclosure -- you have 
15 told me what it's based on; right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. So you're assuming, aren't you, that 
18 bacteria did enter her body during the proceeding? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What kind of bacteria? 
21 A. Gram-negative rods. 
22 Q. Oh. 
23 A. That's what it looks like. 
24 Q. That's just an assumption on your part, isn't it? 
25 A. It's an assumption based on the findings at 
I autopsy, in part, because that's what they saw. 
2 
3 
Q. But it's an assumption, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
4 Q. There's no proof by any means of the fact 
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5 at the time of the surgery these gram-negative bacteria 
6 went into her body, is there? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Okay. Have you formed an opinion as to what 
9 is the best evidence that a doctor utilizes appropriate 
IO sterile conditions during surgery, disinfectant procedures 
11 with equipment, operating room, and the entire area where 
12 the procedure is done, cleansing of instruments --what's 
13 the best proof that that is being done appropriately? 
14 What would be the best proof? 
15 A. I think lack of complications would be the 
16 best answer. 
17 Q. Right. Did you ever hold any committee 
18 assignments or positions at St. Luke's -- or ever? 
19 A. You know, yes, but it's been so long ago, 
20 I can't remember. You know, I did a lot stuff I just 
21 don't remember. 
22 Q. Okay. Let's say the last five years. Have 
23 you held any --
24 A. Do you mean chairmanships or just being on 





Q. No. Chairmanships. 
A. No. I have one coming up, though. 
Q. What? 
A. I'm Chairman Elect of the Plastic Surgery 
5 Department at St. Luke's. 
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6 Q. You're on a number of committees, though --
7 A. Just--
8 Q. -- surgery? 
9 A. Just the Plastic Surgery Committee. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. And the next -- I'm due to rotate on the 
12 Surgical Supervisory Committee next year. I believe 
13 that's it. 
14 Q. Do you have to take call? 
15 A. No, I do not --
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. -- thank God. 
18 Q. Do you have any knowledge of the antibiotic 
19 most effective against gram-negative rods? 
20 A. Well, there's -- yes. Tobramycin, for one; 
21 Gentamicin, another; third-generation Cephalosporins 
22 which I use like Cephaloridine. Those are the main ones. 
23 Q. Okay. What does "prophylaxis" mean in medicine? 
24 A. Basically, it means if you give something to 
25 prevent something, in my view, or you do something to 
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prevent something. 1 opportunity at one point -- before he retired -- of 
Q. Not knowing what might happen, in other words? 2 Dr. Bass practiced with you? 
A. To try and prevent an occurrence. 3 A. Yes. 
Q. Prevent something? 4 Q. You had some kind of loose partnership, I think, 
A. Yes. 5 is the way you explained it? 
Q. Okay. It isn't a -- it doesn't mean, "I know 6 A. Yes. 
this is going on, and this is why I'm doing it"? 7 Q. I take it during that time frame of July 2010 
A. Correct. 8 was Dr. Bass practicing here in Ada County, as well? 
Q. Have you ever treated a patient for a urinary 9 A. Yes. 
tract infection? 10 Q. And did you have opportunity to observe him in 
A. I'm sure I have, but I can't remember. It 11 terms of how he provided care and treatment to patients 
hasn't been in the last 20 years. 12 in Ada County by virtue of you being in this association 
Q. Okay. Do you have any reason to -- as you try 13 with him? 
to recall things -- whether a female who has a backache 14 A. Yes. 
is compatible with a urinary tract infection? 15 Q. In addition, Doctor, is it fair to say that 
A. I have no knowledge of that. 16 while you might not have any formal -- strike that. 
Q. Okay. You will admit that Dr. Kerr knew more 17 Would you oftentimes go to local Ada County 
about Krystal Ballard's condition when he saw her than 18 Medical Association meetings? 
you do? 19 A. Yes. 
A. Absolutely. 20 Q. And I take it that some of those physicians 
MR. QUANE: I know you're going to be 21 that were part of the Ada County meetings are physicians 
disappointed -- (Laughter.) Why are you smiling? 22 that practiced aesthetic and cosmetic medicine? 
THE WITNESS: Because I think it's going to be 23 MR. QUANE: Objection; leading. 
good, you know? 24 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Well, it is leading, but 
MR.QUANE: Let me talk to my folks a second, 25 go ahead. 
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Greg. I may be done. 1 A. Yes. 
MR.HADDAD: Sure. 2 Q. Would you have discussions with those doctors 
(Discussion held off the record.) 3 at these Ada County meetings about the way medicine, and 
(Recess taken.) 4 cosmetic surgery, and aesthetic medicine is practiced? 
MR. HADDAD: We can go back on the record if 5 MR. QUANE: Objection; leading. 
everybody is ready. 6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Are you finished? 7 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Doctor, you have been asked 
MR. QUANE: Yes. 8 questions -- sometimes very general questions, sometimes 
9 very specific questions -- on topics related or believed 
EXAMINATION 10 to be related in some fashion to this case by Mr. Quane. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. HADDAD: 11 In terms of the Disclosure that's identified 
Q. Just a couple of things -- just really kind of 12 in Plaintiffs Supplemental Response to Defendants' 
more of a clean-up. 13 First Set oflnterrogatories, this is the document that 
You were asked a lot of questions by Mr. Quane 14 identifies your education, training, and experience as 
dealing with the issue of what facilities you may have 15 well as the opinions that are set forth and attributed 
inspected as part of your role as an inspector before or 16 to you about this case; is that right? 
after 2010. 17 A. Yes. 
Do you remember those general questions? 18 Q. Is there anything that has been asked today 
A. Yes. 19 that changes those opinions? 
Q. Okay. Beyond when you might have inspected a 20 A. No. 
particular facility in Ada County, beyond that, were you 21 MR. HADDAD: That's all I have. 
actually involved in the practice of aesthetic and 22 MR. QUANE: You're going to be disappointed, 
cosmetic surgery in Ada County in July 201 O? 23 Dr. Sorensen, when I tell you I don't have anymore 
A. Yes. 24 questions. 
Q. I think you had mentioned that you had the 25 (Discussion held off the record 
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1 s~ 1 
2 MR. QUANE: Tisha may not have been there 2 
3 either. 3 
nothing grew. 
Q. On autopsy? 
A. Yeah. 
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4 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry? 4 Q. It's not unusual given the 
circumstances, the antibiotics that were given? 5 MR. QUANE: When that document -- she's a 5 
6 transient. 6 A. The antibiotics I think probably 
contributed, yes. 7 MR. HADDAD: I don't know where she is know, 7 
8 Colorado or something. 8 Q. I mean, that's not a criticism in the 
way the autopsy was performed? 9 MR. QUANE: She's in Colorado now. 9 
1 O THE WITNESS: Is she? 1 0 A. No. 
11 MR. QUANE: But she's locum tenens. She 11 Q. This was a rather broad statement in 
disclosure. I don't know how to get through it 12 moves around. 12 
13 THEWITNESS: Yeah. 13 but to ask it. There was a section of the 
14 Q. BY MR. HADDAD: In the cellulitis, do 14 disclosure that said you may testify as to how 
different bacteria are susceptible to different 
cleaning techniques. Help me out. What are you 
going to testify to on other than different 
15 you necessarily see pockets of pus? 15 
16 A. Well, there's separative cellulitis 16 
1 7 where there is pockets of pus, and then there's 1 7 
18 non-suppurative or nonpurulent I guess is the 18 bacteria are susceptible to different cleaning 
techniques? I mean, are you going to get any more 
specific as to what bacteria may be susceptible to 
these type of products that are used in the 
19 phrase for it. And most cases are nonpurulent, 1 9 
2 0 and they're usually due to beta-hemolytic strep. 2 0 
21 And you won't find pockets of pus. And then 21 
2 2 cellulitis is caused by other organisms, usually 2 2 cleaning and disinfecting of reusable medical 
equipment? And I'm just trying to figure out how 
far you're going to go so I can figure out if I 
2 3 staph. There usually are pockets of pus. 2 3 
24 Q. Okay. 24 
2 5 A. And so that's due to purulent/ 2 5 need to follow up on it. 
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1 nonpurulent. 
2 Q. And non-suppurative is s-u-p-p? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. I mean, when we touched upon this in 
5 terms of Dr. Nichols' opinions that you reference 
6 as disagreeing with, what specifically do you 
7 disagree with in terms of Dr. Nichols' opinions? 
8 A. Well, let's look at them again. 
9 MR. QUANE: Here's that. That's their 
1 O disclosure, Nichols. 
11 THE WITNESS: Well, I guess I'm not certain 
12 how he knows there was a breach in sterility that 
13 Gram-negative rods were introduced into the wound. 
14 Again, they mention toxic shock, but 
15 it's septic shock. But it's a fine point. 
16 So I guess that's the main -- it's a 
1 7 fairly brief thing, so. 
18 Q. BY MR. HADDAD: I just wanted to make 
1 9 sure based on what you were given what you might 
2 0 disagree with. 
21 There's a reference in the disclosure 
2 2 that the autopsy failed to identify specific 
2 3 organisms. And while there's -- because no 
2 4 cultures were done? 
2 5 A. Well, the cultures were done but 
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1 A. I guess what question -- I'm not sure 
2 what questions will be asked regarding that. But 
3 you know, some bacteria are susceptible to 
4 different kinds of agents, and some aren't. 
5 Bacitracin, for instance, kills lots of bacteria. 
6 It doesn't kill staph, so. 
7 Q. I guess that's -- again, it's in the 
8 disclosure, so I didn't know what you were 
9 anticipated to say about Gram-negative rods, for 
10 instance, since that was obviously something that 
11 was found at the time of autopsy, how Gram-
12 negative rods, their susceptibility to different 
13 cleaning techniques. 
14 A. Usually very broad. There typically is 
15 not a lot of resistance in Gram negatives to 
16 topical cleansing agents. 
1 7 Q. Like what topical cleansing agents? 
18 A Name one. Ivory soap. I mean, they're 
19 very sensitive to all kinds of cleaning agents. 
2 O Q. I mean, does -- is there -- for 
21 instance, the CDC has guidelines on sterilization 
2 2 and cleaning of equipment. Have you seen those 
23 before? 
2 4 A For sterilization of equipment? Yeah. 
2 5 For autoclaving, um-hmm. 
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Q. And what solutions are appropriate or 1 
approved, that kind of thing? 2 
A. Um-hmm. 3 
Q. Is that a yes? 4 
A. Yes. 5 
Q. Okay. Is that something you 6 
familiarized yourself with because of your being 7 
an infectious disease specialist and that being at 8 
least an authority you go to to try to figure out 9 
how to appropriately manage infection control 10 
within a hospital? 11 
A. Yeah. Primarily it comes from the 12 
different divisions of the hospital, either 13 
housekeeping that goes to clean hospital rooms in 14 
the OR, things like that, the different products 15 
they can use. It's kind of an alphabet soup of 16 
different products that we have available. There 1 7 
are a lot of different manufacturers. And they 18 
have to do with, you know, the time of how long 19 
you leave the material on the surface to sterilize 2 0 
it. Is it caustic to the people using it? You 21 
know, we can't use too high of a concentration of 2 2 
bleach, for instance, because the chlorine 2 3 
irritates everyone, and also it's hard on the 2 4 
equipment. So there are a whole different bunch 2 5 
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of parameters that we follow depending on what 





So we review those products usually 4 
twice a year. And there's a laundry list of 5 
things that they use at both hospitals. 6 
Q. When you review them, I mean, are you 7 
able to tell me what they were using in 2010 for 8 
various -- 9 
A. No, not that long ago. 10 
Q. When you did review them, I take it you 11 
would have confirmed that the solutions that they 12 
used in the cleaning and disinfecting process were 13 
solutions that were approved by the CDC? 1 4 
A. Well, by the FDA, yeah. 15 
Q. What -- I mean, there's a reference to 16 
the fact that -- and I've written it down, so I'm 1 7 
hoping it's actually in your disclosure, and since 18 
you've looked at it this morning, you might have a 19 
better memory of it -- that you may testify as to 2 0 
the differing infection rates at the hospitals 21 
that you've had privileges. 2 2 
A. Okay. 23 
Q. I mean, is that something you 2 4 
anticipate testifying on? 2 5 
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A. I don't know. Ifl get asked it, I 
1 can. 
Q. I mean, it's obviously infection rates ; 
are going to be dependent on exactly what is going 
on in the hospital. For instance, what kind of 
surgeries they may carry out. 
A. Mostly what kind of surgery. 
Q. Okay. I mean, obviously if you're 
doing open heart surgeries, you're going to have 
higher infection rates than if you're doing just 
minor procedures; correct? 
A. Actually, our open heart cases are 
incredibly good now. 
Q. How about orthopedic cases? 
A. Orthopedic cases are not quite so good. 
Q. You know, this has nothing to do with 
this case, but they're one of the worst infection 
rates; aren't they? 
A. Yeah. 
MR. QUANE: Well, dirty surgeries are 
like --
MR. HADDAD: Bowel and all that kind of 
stuff. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I mean, bowel 
surgeries, that's all over the place. But you 
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know, you can talk to Dean Sorensen about it. We 
used to have -- Dean and I used to see a lot of 
patients together back in the day for serotomy 
infections. And we go years and years and years 
now without any. It's amazing. 
Q. So to compare infection rates at a 
hospital that might have orthopedic procedures, 
abdominal procedures, bowel procedures and 
comparing it to a facility like Silk Touch that 
may do liposuction and fat transfer is kind of 
like comparing apples and oranges in a sense; 
correct? 
A. Yeah. We would only -- we don't really 
try to compare hospital-wide stuff. We look at 
specific surgery types. So we'd look at joint 
replacements. We look at spine fusions versus 
simple larninectomies, mastectomies, breast 
reconstructions, intra-abdominal cases. And we 
look at those separately. We don't try and group 
everything together because the rates are so 
variable. 
Q. Have you -- do you have some memory or 
do you have a -- about infection rates at any of 
the facilities where liposuction or fat transfer 
may have been done? 
25 (Pages 94 to 97) 
ad517a85-aa3e-470a-9bf8-5c4508098aed 
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A Well, again, I don't know that they do 1 saying that this liposuction and fat transfer 
procedure were superficial skin procedures; 
correct? 
it at either hospital I'm at. I wouldn't be 2 
surprised if they do, but I don't know about it 3 
for sure. I've not seen any infections related to 4 A Well, essentially they are. They're in 
the skin and subcutaneous tissue, so I guess skin it. But that doesn't mean that it's because they 5 
don't do them or do do them. I just don't know. 6 dash subcutaneous because they don't go down below 
the fascia. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Excuse me. I need to 7 
change tape right now. Okay. We are off the 8 Q. Okay. Would you consider this to be 

















(Recess.) 10 A Yeah. They're not going into an organ 
space. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: So the camera is rolling, 11 
and we are back on the record. 12 Q. Okay. Have you seen where this type of 
procedure or a liposuction procedure and a fat 
transfer is described as superficial or is that 
MR. HADDAD: I think we just want to clarify 13 
something as to what exhibits we have. 14 
Dr. Coffman's file materials -- which would 15 just your--
include correspondence, e-mails, medical 
records -- are going to be cumulatively marked as 
Exhibit No. 1. 
MR. QUANE: Okay. 
MR. HADDAD: The notes, the one-page notes 
that he made that we've referenced is going to be 
Exhibit No. 2. 
We are going to mark the pages of the 
disclosure that Dr. Coffman made corrections to, 
just those pages as Exhibit No. 3. 
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1 And then the one page from Saint 
2 Alphonsus which was labeled as, quote, "Abstract" 
3 as Exhibit No. 4. 
4 Q. BY MR. HADDAD: Doctor, would you --
5 you ready to go? 
6 A I am. 
7 Q. Okay. I just didn't want to put you to 
8 sleep during the housecleaning part of this 
9 process. 
10 Would you agree that based upon looking 
11 at the autopsy report, that where the Gram-
12 negative rods were found in Krystal Ballard was 
13 where the fat had been injected into her buttocks? 
14 A On the right side, correct. 
15 Q. Do you know how deep into the tissue 
16 that those Gram-negative rods were? 
1 7 A. No. 
18 Q. You'd agree with me it wasn't a 
1 9 superficial injection of fat; it was a deep 
2 O injection of fat? 
21 A. Well, I'm not sure. Deep would imply 
2 2 below the muscle. I don't think they go below the 
2 3 muscle for this. 
2 4 Q. When you say superficial, when you talk 











A It's my perspective. 
Q. -- perspective? 
A It's my perspective. 
Q. If -- I mean, how deep -- if you're 
talking about a three-and-a-half-inch needle, 
which is what that 18-gauge was, is that your 
understanding that's the needle that was used to 
inject the fat into Krystal Ballard's buttocks? 
A Correct. 
Q. Okay. Is three and a half inches below 
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1 the -- from the surface of the skin into the 
2 tissue into the muscle? 
3 A It would -- well, I don't know how big 
4 a woman she was. It would probably be through the 
5 muscle. But I don't think it is inserted 
6 perpendicular to the skin. It's done in a 
7 tangential fashion. Because I do this in HIV 
8 patients. 
9 Q. You do what? 
10 A I do injections in HIV patients like 
11 this with a product known as -- it's polylactic 
12 acid. The patients with HIV have this terrible 
13 problem of lipodystrophy where they lose their 
14 buccal fat pads and look like they just came out 
15 of a concentration camp. They won't go in public. 
16 And so we inject their faces with this product, 
1 7 and you numb up the skin laterally, and then you 
18 go in like spokes of a bicycle tire, back and 
19 forth like this (indicating) and this and this and 
2 0 this and this and fill their face back up with 
21 tissue. 
2 2 And so I use a two-inch needle, but I 
2 3 don't go two inches like this (indicating). I go 
2 4 two inches like this (indicating) just under the 
2 5 skin, which is what he describes as a -- he 
' 
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I the one doctor that wanted to start this business. I 1 Q. Okay. The certifications for the 
2 Initially, I wasn't going to be that involved in it 2 procedures you performed, is there any -- do you 
3 but got more involved in it down the road. Really 3 have to be licensed in any particular -- or get 
4 enjoyed it, loved -- 4 licensure from the State to do any of those 
5 I love learning, and so started to go to 5 procedures? 
6 all the CME courses with my husband, gained more 6 A. No. 
7 education through that, a lot of reading on my own, 7 Q. Between yourself --
8 my own interest in cosmetic stuff. I was getting 8 Are you a co-owner of Silk Touch? 
9 older, so I was interested in it as well. 9 A. Yes. 
10 And then just over time, just going to 10 Q. Is there a --
11 those courses, just being in the room with Dr. Kerr 11 What's the percentage? ls it a 50/50, 
12 and hearing and reading all the materials that he 12 or is it spelled out? 
13 had, so -- 13 A. It's 50/50. 
14 Q. Okay. So really from '99 to the 14 Q. Okay. Do you handle primarily the 
15 present-- 115 back-office functions? 
16 A. Uh-huh. 16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. -- your employment has surrounded 17 Q. All right. I'm going to go through --
18 Silk Touch in some respect? 18 we're going to continue on here in a minute. But 
19 A. Yes. 19 l've got my notes, and ['II lose them. 
20 Q. Okay. No employment outside of 20 Just kind of going through those areac; 
21 Silk Touch from '99 to the present? 21 that I think during Dr. Kerr's deposition today, he 
22 A. No, I had a-- 22 thought you might have some information about and 
23 Well, let's see. Did I? I had a swim 23 then some areas that he didn't say that, but I 
24 school that I created for -- in the summers for, 24 thought maybe you did. 
25 like, '97, '98, and I think I did it a little bit 25 First of all, he mentioned some aseptic 
[Page 140) [Page 142) 
--
1 in '99. Because our business was so small at the 1 wipes that he uses to clean off the handpiece to 
2 beginning, so 1 was able to do both. 2 the Vaser, and he couldn't remember either the 
3 But then I stopped doing that, I think, 3 brand or the main active ingredient of that aseptic 
4 after three or four years. So that's about it. 4 wipe. 
5 Q. Do you have any type of certification or I 5 Do you know what either the brand name 
6 licensure in any health-related field? ,6 is or what the primary active ingredient in that 
7 A. No. 17 aseptic wipe is? 
8 Q. Do you personally perform any type of ! 8 A. No. 
9 procedures at Silk Touch? : 9 Q. Where do you order your materials from? 
10 A. Now? po Or at least in 2010, where did you order your --
11 Q. From the inception of Silk Touch in '99 11 If you had to order aseptic wipes, where 
12 to July of 2010. 12 did you get them? 
13 A. Yes, I have. 13 A. I don't remember the exact -- it's been 
14 Q. Okay. What procedures do you perform? 14 a number of companies over the years, so I wouldn't 
15 A. I did perform. I don't now. 15 know for sure right offhand. 
16 I did perform laser hair removal. I was 16 I know what I order from now today, but 
17 certified in that. Microdermabrasion, IPLs, which 17 I don't recall. 
18 is intense pulsed light lasers. So all the lasers 18 Q. Okay. And within the documents that 
19 that were non-ablative, I was certified and was 19 were produced --
20 able to do; under Dr. Kerr's direction, I can do 20 And first of all, we got 700-plus pages 
21 those. 21 of documents that were produced already. There 
22 Peels, chemical peels. That's 22 appears to be some order forms from a company 
23 probably -- that's -- 23 called OBGYN Direct. 
24 Those are the basics of what I knew how 24 A. Uh-huh. 
25 to do, yeah. 25 Q. Did you help compile those documents 
[Page 141) [Page 143) 
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that were produced to us as part of this discovery? 1 
A. No, I did not compile them. 2 
Q. Okay. Do you know who it was that 3 
pulled those order forms concerning various medical 4 
equipment and supplies? 5 
A. Those, I believe, came from the Keller 6 
instruction that we got. They were in a binder 7 
that we got from him as a suggestion of a company 8 
you could use. 9 
I don't remember -- I think we did order 1 O 
from them initially and found other companies that 11 
were better, that we found were better over time. 12 
So I'm not sure we ordered from them very long. 13 
Q. Okay. Yesterday there was a 14 
discussion -- Mr. Quane had represented that you 15 
had compiled data on the number of liposuctions 16 
that had been performed, I think, through July 20 17 
of 2010 as well as the number of fat transfers that 18 
had been performed by Dr. Kerr through July 20, 19 
2010. lw 
Did you compile that data? 21 
A. Yes. 22 
Q. Okay. Where did those numbers come 23 
from? 1 know one was 199, I think, liposuctions 24 
and 33 fat transfers -- 25 
[Page 144) 
for each patient and you'd have to look at each 
patient and say, "What did we do for them," or is 
it a separate database that would only reflect on a 
given day, like a calendar, what was done? 
A. Okay. You'll have to break that one up 
because that was a little bit too much. 
Q. When you look at this database, is it a 
database that you had to retrieve information like 
a liposuction procedure by looking at each 
patient's medical chart? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it a database where you would look at 
some type of scheduling calendar that you might 
have had to see what procedures were scheduled for 
a given day? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to think of 
where --
How do you input information into your 
database such that you can retrieve the number of 
liposuctions? 
A. So there's a category, "lipo." There's 
a category, "fat transfer." And so when we run a 
transaction through it, it will keep track of the 




























A. Yes. 1 
Q. -- if my memory serves. 2 
A. Uh-huh. 3 
Q. Where did that information come from? 4 
A. Just from our database. 5 
Q. What kind of database do you maintain 6 
that would compile that information? 7 
A. The database that we run our 8 
transactions through. 9 
Q. Kind of explain that to me. How would 10 
you know -- 11 
If you've got this database and you're 12 
trying to find out how many liposuctions, how do 13 
you make a query into your database to identify 14 
which procedures were liposuction procedures? 15 
A. So they would be named "liposuction" or 16 
"fat transfer." So we would be able to pretty 17 
much -- pretty accurately be able to figure out a 18 
number oflipos, number of fat transfers. 19 
Q. Do you keep some kind ofrunning total 20 
as part of your business operations? 21 
A. No, we don't keep a running total. 22 
Q. Okay. Did you have to look -- 23 
A. I would have to go back and look. 24 
Q. Okay. I mean, are these within the data 25 
[Page 145] 
Q. Okay. What's the purpose of keeping 
that data? 
A. Well, you'd want to know so that if you 
needed to go back and figure out what you did that 
day, then you'd be able to figure that out. 
Q. Do you do any type of advertising such 
that you want to demonstrate the number of 
procedures Dr. Kerr has performed? 
A. I don't know that we've ever put a 
number out there of number of procedures, like an 
exact number. I don't recall ever doing that. In 
fact, I don't think we've ever done that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Because I -- yeah. 
Q. Within the documents that have been 
produced, there were a number of certificates that 
would indicate your attendance at certain seminars. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Have you seen those? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Are all the seminars that you 
personally would have attended --
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. -- contained within Exhibit No. 1? 
A. Is this --
[Page 147] 
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1 Q. Meaning would it identify not only 1 dealt with infection control in healthcare 
2 Dr. Kerr went, but it might also identify when you 2 facilities such as Silk Touch? 
3 went to the seminar as opposed to simply 3 A. In a general way, yes. 
4 accompanying him to the location? 4 Q. Okay. Without saying, "This is the one 
5 A. Which one is -- 5 that might have touched upon it," I understand you 
6 Is this Exhibit No. I? 6 may be talking about laser hair removal and there 
7 Q. I'm sorry. Yes, that is Exhibit No. I 7 may be some aspect of making sure -- how to make 
8 that we used for Dr. Kerr's deposition today. 8 sure you don't cause injury or cause an infection. 
9 A. Okay. This one does not have -- 9 But is there anything specific that you 
10 I -- l broke mine out separate than his 10 remember about infection control that may have been 
11 because he did some that were different than mine. 11 involved in any of the seminars you attended? 
12 Q. Okay. Do you have a separate document 12 A. Not under that category. 
13 that reflects your seminars that you've attended? 13 Q. Okay. How about--
14 A. Yes, I do. I think it -- 14 And "not under that category," I 
15 MR. HADDAD: Do you have that, Mr. Quane? 15 appreciate that distinction. 
16 THE WITNESS: And it would be exactly the 16 Let me ask you this: At any of the 
17 same as this other than I wouldn't have done ACLS. 17 seminars you've personally attended, has a topic 
18 I wouldn't have done -- 18 discussed been how to, for instance, clean, 
19 MR. HADDAD: Well, we're going to make it 19 disinfect, and sterilize reusable medical 
20 simple because I think he has it, and then you 20 instruments? 
21 won't have to -- 21 A. No. That's not my -- my area that I 
22 MR. QUANE: Hand that to him. 22 would--
23 THE WITNESS: There you go. 23 No, not that I recall. 
24 MR. QUANE: That's the only one I have, but 24 Q. All right. There was some discussion 
25 you can use it. 25 about accreditation, and I think Dr. Kerr earlier 
[Page 148] [Page 150] 
I Are you going to mark it as an exhibit? 1 today said that he does not believe that there was 
2 MR. HADDAD: I am. 2 any efforts to become accredited prior to July of ., 
MR. QUANE: Okay . 3 2010. .) 
4 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Mrs. Kerr, Mr. Quane has 4 Do you have any knowledge that you or 
5 handed me a four-page document that appears to be 5 anybody else on behalf of Silk Touch made any 
6 in the same tabular format as Exhibit No. 1, which 6 efforts to get accreditation for Silk Touch at any 
7 identified seminars and training that Dr. Kerr had, 7 point prior to July 20, 201 O? 
8 except it's got your name at the top. 8 A. I did not try to get it. I looked into 
9 A. Correct. 9 getting it. 
IO Q. Did you prepare this document? 10 Q. All right. You obviously --
1 I A. I did, yeah. 11 Am I correct that Silk Touch was not an 
12 Q. Why don't we go ahead, and since this is 12 accredited center as of July 20, 2010? 
13 somewhat ofa continuation ofa 30(b)(6) 13 A. Correct. 
14 deposition, we'll mark that as 2 as a continuation. 14 Q. Okay. When you looked into it, was 
15 (Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked.) 15 there a reason why you elected not to pursue 
16 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Is there any of the 16 accreditation? 
17 seminars that you attended that are reflected -- 17 A. Yes. 
18 First of all, is this a reflection of 18 Q. What was it? 
19 all seminars you've attended current back to 1999? 19 A. Our limits of our physical facility. 
20 A. Uh-huh. 20 You can't--
21 Q. ls that a "yes"? 21 You have to be able to adapt your 
22 A. Yes. 22 facility a certain way to accreditation, so we 
23 Q. ls there any of the seminars that are 23 couldn't do it in the location that we were at. 
24 reflected in Exhibit No. 2 which is the seminars 24 Q. Okay. Explain that to me. 
25 you attended where the scope of those seminars 25 A. So with accreditation, they require you 
[Page 149] [Page 151] 
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Poribilar opllcities including bronchial wall thiclconing. Mditional bibasil.ar heterogeneous 
r>pacities. 
Normal size cardiac silhouette. 
Normal. 
Nanni.I. 
Nonna! for age. 
Bilateral nippfo piercln~. 
Bronchitis and bibosilnr subsegruental atelect11sis or scaning. Minimal superimposed 
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settbag of fat emboli~m. 
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@ Saint Alphonsus I Health Information Management 
1055 N. Curtis Rd. • Boise. ID 83706 • 208-367-2121 
PATIENT: BALLARD. KRYS'l'AI. 
MR#: 000807064 Hosp. Serv: ER - IPA 
3104-01 
07,'25/2010 
Diet. Prov: RII.I.Y R. MORGA~. MD• 0 
VISIT#: Room/Bed: 
Date or Birth: Admlr: 
EMPI: Dischfframrer: 
Job Number: 684099 
CQNSJJLTATIQN 
SURGLCAL CONSULT 
CONSUL TING FOR: 
Dr. Fujii, critical care. 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: 
Att. MD: TISHA K FUJll no•• 
DOS: 07/15/2010 
Version: I 
Sepsis, ARDS, hypotension, status post liposuction and transplant of fat to the buttocks..-.,..,.,. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
This is a 27-year-old black tcmale who apparently underwent liposuction with transplantation of the fat 
from the anterior abdominal wall to the buttocks on both sides. This apparently occurred on 07/21/2010. 
She apparently had it done at a MediSpa somewhere. Apparently they contacted a physician several times 
and subsequently she became increasingly ill on Friday, complaining of increasing pain in the 
transplantation site on her buttocks. She had no drainage from any of the wounds. She did not have a fever, 
no chills and apparently yesterday apparently passed out and early this morning was taken to the Elmore 
Emergency Room where she was seen and evaluated and subsequently transferred here. She arrived here at 
approximately 7 :20 this morning and after av igorous resuscitation she barely had a blood pressure, had 
significant findings on her chest x-ray and her CT is consistent with significant RDS in both lower lobes 
posteriorly. The patient had marked hypoxemia with a p02 in the 40s and was admitted to the Coronary 
Care Unit by Dr. Fujii and she asked me ifl would evaluate the patient. CT also showed that she has son-c 
stranding in the anterior abdominal wall anterior to the fascia consistent with her liposuction. She also has 
some subcutaneous air in the Jell posterior buttocks area in the soft tissues, but not in the muscle itself and 
not associated with the fascia according to my review of films. 
LABORATORY VALUES: 
1n Elmore. showt!d a WBC of 14.7. Her hemoglobin was 10.3 and her hematocrit was 32.0. She had 
189,000 platelets. She had 92 segs, 5 lymphs and 3 monos. Her CK-MB was 3.2. I lcr myoglobin wns 277 
and her T and I was 0.079 and her CK was 51. Again inconsistent with a necrotizing fasciitis. I Ier sodium 
is 142, potassium is 3.4, chloride is 102, her CO2 was 13, glucose was 93, BUN W.tS 31, creatinine was 3.2. 
Her albumin was low at 2.4, total bilirubin was I. Her total protein is 6.2 and her globulin was 3.8. Her alk 
phos was 73, AST v.as 19, ALT was 24. Her blood gas from the Elmore Emergency Room showed a pH of 
6. 99. Her pC02 was 36. l ler p02 was 21 and her base excess wa,;; -22 and her bicarbonate was 8. 7. Her 
02 saturation, and her 02 saturation was minimal. She was seen in the Intensive Care Unit. 








Chest x-ray from Elmore County shows bronchitis and bibasilar subsegmental atelectasis or scarring, 
minimal superimposed pneumonitis, aspiration of bronchiolitis not excluded and findings possibly a similar 
fat emboli syndrome. The patient is on a ventilator in the Intensive Care Unit. 
OBJECTIVE: 
VITAL SIGNS: Blood pressure at the time of my arrival is I 05/60, heart rate in lhe 120s. Her 02 sat is not 
reading. CVP is 18. She does have a left femoral arterial line in. 
HEENT: Shows that her pupils are sluggish and equal. She has bilateral mild proptosis and her sclerac arc 
unremarkable. I see no petechial hemorrhages in and around the area of the sclerae or the upper and lower 
lids. 
NECK: Supple, nontendcr, no step-offs ordefonnities. She has no jugular venous distension. 
LUNGS: Clear to auscultation and percussion. Breath sounds arc bilateral and equal in the upper lobes and 
marked mies in both bases. The cardiac exam shows a rapid rate and rhythm without murmurs or gallops. 
CARDIAC: Echocardiogram done at the time of my evaluation shows that she has markedly hypo kinetic 
segments in the apex and in both ventricles with an ejection fraction estimated by the tache at around 17-
20%. 
ABDOMEN: She has 4 Steri-Strips wounds in the antetior abdomen, 2 on each side with no subcutaneous 
emphysema or crepitance or redness or any sign of infection. 
EXTREMITlES: Her extremities show I+ edema times all four extremities. 
BUITOCKS: The patient's buttocks show 2 wounds I on the posterior superior iliac crest on each side with 
no crepitance to the subcutaneous tissue. No evidence of redness or inflammation and no drainage from the 
insertion sites for the fat transplants. The patient's current blood gas shows a pH of 6.84. Her pC02 is 42. 
Her pC02 is 38 and she has a bicarbonate of7.2. Her calcium is 0.77 in ionized perfonned. Her 02 sat is 
30%. The patient's EKGs are essentially show slight ST elevation in all leads. 
IMPRESSION: 
This most likely represents an unfortunate young black female who underwent liposuction with subsequent 
transplant of the fat into the buttocks on both sides 4 days ago. She now has what appears to be a probable 
fat emboli s;ndrome with significant ARDS. massive hypoxemia, unresponsive to ventilator modes from a 
surgical standpoint, l ieel in light of the ejection fraction of 17% and a marked hypoxemia and a marginal 
cardiac output that she would not tolerate a trip to the Operating Room. I doubt very seriously that this 
represents necrotizing fasciitis in light of the CT scan, which only shows a small amount of air and no fluid 
anterior and/or posterior to the fascia in the buttocks. I have discussed these findings with Dr. Fujii, and 
will be available to continue to follow the patient and should there be any surgical needs. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Dictation electronically signed by 
BILLY R MORGAN, MD*** 
on 07/26/2010 02:41: 18 
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CHIBTRADJOGRAPH. I-VIEW FRONTAL PORTABLE 
Abdominal pain and shonness of breath. 
Elmore Medical Center, XR. XR CHEST 2 VIEWS PA AND LAT, 7125/2010, 3:09. 
Bilateral diffuse patchy airspace disease significantly progressed since the prior study. 
Normal size cardiac silhouette. 
Normal. 
Nonna!. 
Nonna! for age. 
Negative. 
Significant interval development or bilateral diffuse patchy air space disease. Given the 
patient's history or recent liposuction and rapid interval development of pulmonary airspace 
disease, findings may represent fat embolism, pulmonary edema. and/or adult respiratory 
distress synd roane. 
Dictated hy: Ho"ard Scharr. M.D. on 7/25/2010 at 8:24 
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l A. The most common -- the most common that l A. That's correct. 
2 one would expect under those circumstances would be 2 Q. And we know that her urinalysis at 
3 escherichia coli, but that's based on commonality. 3 Elmore's was nitrite negative? 
4 Q. Why do you think she had SIRS? 4 A. That's correct. 
5 A. I think she had SIRS because she fits 5 Q. And we know she had a negative leukocyte 
6 the classification of SIRS. When I -- when I look 6 esterase test at the urinalysis at Elmore? 
7 at the whole case -- 7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. Why do you think she fits the 8 Q. Do you know what the significance of a 
9 classification of SIRS? 9 negative nitrite and a negative leukocyte esterase 
10 A. If you look at fat embolism syndrome and 10 test is with respect to ruling out a urinary tract 
11 you look at SIRS, they -- there's a gray crossover 11 infection? 
12 between the two. And if you look at symptomatology 12 A. It would imply that there is no urinary 
13 that she had in terms of Systemic Inflammatory 13 tract infection. 
14 Response Syndrome, the criteria that are set out for 14 Q. Okay. If you have a negative nitrite 
15 that with tachypnea, with the heart rate, the CO2, 15 and a negative leukocyte esterase test and a fifteen 
16 the -- probably ought to get my notes out and look 16 to twenty epithelial cells on urinalysis, would you 
17 at some of those. 17 agree with me that more likely than not, a patient 
18 But the primary things would be the CO2, 18 does not have a urinary tract infection? 
19 the heart rate, the respiratory rate, the white 19 A. I would. 
20 count, and the platelet counts, and things of that 20 Q. Doctor, do you have available to you 
21 sort. 21 E-mails by and between yourself and Mr. Quane 
22 Q. Can sepsis cause SIRS? 22 regarding this matter? 
23 A. Sepsis was originally associated with 23 A. The E-mails that I have primarily are 
24 SIRS through basically -- 24 just regarding the appointments and whether I 
25 Q. My question is: Can sepsis cause 25 want -- when I can give a deposition. 
Page 50 Page 52 
l SIRS? l Q. Did you E-mail him substantively about 
2 A. I just said that it did, that it was 2 your opinions in this case? 
3 originally associated with that. 3 A. No, sir, I did not. 
4 Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion as to 4 Q. Did you E-mail him concerning your 
5 where the bacteria found in her buttocks came 5 belief that Miss Ballard had a fat emboli? 
6 from? 6 A. I did not. I confine those things to 
7 A. The only opinion I can give is that it 7 confron -- personal discussions rather than 
8 was secondarily placed there either through 8 E-mail. 
9 bacteriuria, because we know she had bacteria in her 9 Q. And when is it, Doctor, that you told 
10 urine, then developing a bacteriemia and subsequent 10 mister -- Mr. Quane that you thought she had a fat 
11 sepsis, and the sepsis was the cause of the bacteria 11 embolism? 
12 in the buttocks. 12 A. It was yesterday when I saw him that I 
13 Q. The bacteria in her urine, Doctor, have 13 told him that I thought she had a fat -- not that I 
14 you done any research regarding the validity of the 14 thought, that I know she had a fat embolism. 
15 urinalysis done at Elmore? 15 Q. The article that Mr. Quane had printed 
16 A. On the validity of the urinalysis, no, 16 out with him, is that an article you E-mailed him or 
17 sir, I have not looked at research in that regard. 17 handed to him in a hard copy today? 
18 Q. You agree, don't you, Doctor, that the 18 A. Yesterday. 
19 presence of epithelial cells on urinalysis would 19 Q. Do you agree that sepsis was a 
20 reflect a contaminated specimen? 20 contributing factor to Miss Ballard's death? 
21 A. Potentially, yes. 21 A. I think sepsis probably contributed. I 
22 Q. You would agree that ifE. coli is the 22 certainly cannot exclude it. 
23 most primary cause of gram negative bacteria, gram 23 Q. Now, you had asked Dr. Groben a question 
24 negative rods most prevalent, that is a 24 about whether or not he saw anything relevant to an 
25 nitrite-producing bacteria? 25 infection, and I think you said during what part of 
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1 the autopsy? 1 A. No, sir. 
2 A. The question that I had revolved around 2 Q. Have you told Mr. Quane that any of the 
3 the wound itself. Did it look infected, or was 3 disclosure of opinions that reflect opinions you 
4 there infection grossly evident when the wound was 4 were supposedly going to give was inaccurate? 
5 opened? 5 A. Repeat that one more time, please. 
6 Q. What wound are you talking about? 6 Q. You have reviewed at least two 
7 A. Either one, right or left, for the 7 disclosures that Mr. Quane made reflecting what your 
8 abdomen. 8 opinions are, correct? 
9 Q. Right or left what? Flank? 9 A. That's correct. 
10 A. Buttocks. 10 Q. Did you ever tell or E-mail Mr. Quane 
11 Q. Were you aware that Ms. Ballard had been 11 that any representation he made in that disclosure 
12 prescribed a corticosteroid by Dr. Kerr? 12 was inaccurate? 
13 A. Medrol dose pack, yes, sir. 13 A. I did on the first one. 
14 Q. Okay. And Medrol dose pack will not 14 Q. What did you tell him? 
15 fight an infection, you'll agree with that? 15 A. Without looking it up, the things that I 
16 A. That's correct. 16 underlined were that I had not seen a circumstance 
17 Q. But it would limit the body's 17 wherein a gram negative rod resulted in sepsis 
18 inflammatory response to an infection; would you 18 followed by death of the patient. Certainly I have. 
19 agree? 19 I've seen that. That was incorrect. 
20 A. Potentially, yes. 20 He will discuss the autopsy report 
21 Q. And it will immunosuppress a patient, 21 including the fact the tissue samples do not 
22 won't it? 22 identify with any degree of specificity where they 
23 A. Potentially, yes. 23 were taken from, which further compounds the 
24 Q. And when we talk about 24 relevance findings of gram negative rods. That 
25 immunosuppression, that means they have an 25 sentence was removed. 
Page 54 Page 56 
1 infection, their body's ability to fight that 1 Let's see, comments that I made was 
2 infection will be diminished, correct? 2 relative to things about bacteria, where they 
3 A. As potential, yes. 3 reside, things of that sort, but as far as I know, 
4 Q. Have you spoken to any other expert in 4 they were left in there. I just felt --
5 this case? 5 Q. Doctor, I apologize, but you talked 
6 A. No, sir. 6 about where -- were all the changes that you made 
7 Q. Do you know Dr. Thomas Kaufman, who's an 7 reflected on the sheets of paper that you have in 
8 infectious disease expert? 8 front of you? 
9 A. No, sir, I do not. 9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. Have you been told what he testified to 10 Q. And the last thing you referenced, what 
11 with respect to his review of this case? 11 change do you think was left in that you told him 
12 A. Say that one more time, please. 12 was inaccurate or needed to be corrected? 
13 Q. Have you been told what Dr. Kaufman 13 A. There were -- I don't -- without looking 
14 testified to? 14 at my original E-mail, I would have to go back and 
15 A. Not specifically, no. 15 review that, ifI could. 
16 Q. Well, what general discussions have you 16 Q. Certainly. Let's go off the record, and 
17 had? 17 you can do that. I 
18 A. I'm sorry? 18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. What general discussions have you had 19 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're now off the 
20 concerning Dr. Kaufman's testimony? 20 record. 
21 A. None. 21 (Discussion off the record.) 
22 Q. And the reason I ask that, when I asked 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're now on the 
23 what were you told you said nothing specific, so I 23 record. We're now on the record. 
24 didn't know if there were general discussions you 24 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD:) I want to make sure 
25 might have had about his testimony? 25 I'm clear as to what you advised Mr. Quane may be 
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1 inaccurate in the disclosure that was made. 1 articles that he has on his home computer to us? 
2 A. The two sentences that -- 2 MR. QUANE: No, ifhe can find them. 
3 Q. The first thing dealt with the fact that 3 Q. {BY MR. HADDAD:) Doctor, where --
4 you had seen a gram negative rod causing sepsis 4 Doctor, if you would, as soon as you can, get those 
5 death, correct? 5 articles to Mr. Quane. 
6 A. That's correct, I have. 6 And, Mr. Quane, I believe that if he 
7 Q. Now, what else did you advise Mr. Quane 7 can't find them, just simply let him know, he can't 
8 may need to be changed either in an E-mail or 8 find them, and he doesn't intend on relying on 
9 verbally? 9 anything other than the ones he referenced. 
10 A. That I won't -- that discussing the 10 A. I will make every effort to find them. 
11 autopsy report, including the fact that tissue 11 Q. Have you been given any materials by 
12 samples do not identify with any degree of 12 Mr. Quane that you have not reviewed? 
13 specificity et cetera, et cetera. 13 A. No, sir, not to the best ofmy 
14 Q. Is there anything else that you looked 14 knowledge. 
15 at in that disclosure that you thought needed to be 15 Q. Give me a second, Doctor. I'm just 
16 changed or corrected? 16 looking at my notes to make sure I don't miss 
17 A. Not to the best ofmy knowledge, no, 17 anything. 
18 sir. 18 Doctor, did you bring with you that 
19 Q. And just so I'm clear, Doctor, the 19 summary or compilation of cases that you were 
20 presence of a negative nitrite, negative leukocyte 20 provided by Mr. Quane regarding the surgeries 
21 esterase, and the presence of the fifteen to twenty 21 performed at Silk Touch? 
22 epithelial cells, in your experience, would make 22 A. I did -- Well, it would be on my 
23 the - would make a urinary tract infection 23 computer in my E-mail. 
24 nonexistent to a reasonable degree of medical 24 Is it in here? 
25 probability? 25 MR. QUANE: Yeah. 
Page 58 Page 60 
1 A. It would not likely be there. 1 THE WITNESS: I don't know where it is. 
2 Q. Okay. So you said that much better than 2 If I have it here, I'm not sure where it is. 
3 I did. 3 Q. {BY MR. HADDAD:) Is there anything else 
4 In terms of the computer that you have 4 you're leafing through that is not medical records 
5 at home, Doctor, does it have additional articles on 5 in this case? 
6 it that you have not referenced here today? 6 A. No, sir. Everything is just a stack 
7 A. I believe there are on Systemic 7 that was given to me. 
8 Inflammatory Response Syndrome. 8 Now, the only things that I have here 
9 Q. Did you -- in terms of journals from 9 from Dr. Kerr's office are the records on Crystal 
10 which those articles came from, do you have a 10 Ballard. I don't have those others with me. 
11 recollection of where those articles came from? 11 Q. {BY MR. HADDAD:) Okay. Is there any 
12 A. Not right offhand. The one major 12 investigation that you've done concerning this case 
13 article is the one in which SIRS was originally 13 that you have not testified about? 
14 defined because I went to the original article and I 14 A. Other than the reviewing of the slides 
15 went from there. So I do have that original 15 looking for fat emboli, I think I mentioned that not 
16 article. I can't tell you which journal it was 16 specifically, but I did. 
17 m. 17 MR. HADDAD: Let's take a short break. 
18 Q. And the original article -- okay. 18 I might be done. 
19 And that SIRS, the original article 19 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're now off the 
20 regarding SIRS, did that relate to SIRS to a septic 20 record. 
21 etiology? 21 (Discussion off the record.) 
22 A. SIRS was originally defined with sepsis, 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're now on the 
23 but subsequently defined without sepsis as well. 23 record. We're now on the record. 
24 MR. HADDAD: Mr. Quane, do you have any 24 Q. {BY MR. HADDAD:) Doctor, can you hear 
25 problems of doctor -- Dr. Garrison, producing those 25 me? 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard {"Plaintiff'), in accordance with Rule 33 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits the following Second Supplemental Answers to 
Defendants' First Set of lnt~rrogatories. 
General Statements and Objections 
A. Representations of fact and law herein are made in good faith without the benefit 
of complete discovery. These answers represent Plaintiff's best efforts at this stage of the 
litigation and are based on currently available, non-privileged, and non-V,'.ork product 
information and documents. 
B. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogatory to the extent that it calls for 
infonnati~n subject to the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, the privilege for 
critical self-examination, or any other privilege. To the extent that documents or information 
arguably subject to such privileges may be provided by Plaintiff, such privileges are _not waived 
beyond the precise extent of the disclosure made, and no waiver of privilege may be implied in 
that no disclosure of anything which is actually privileged is intended. 
C. Plaintiff objects to each and every interrogator:y to the extent that it may be vague, 
ambiguous, confusing, nonsensical, incomprehensible, or involves usage of words other than 
those commonly and customarily used, or assumes matters contrary to fact. 
D. Plaintiff objects to providing information not within its knowledge, custody, 
possession, or control, or which does· not exist. 
E. No objection, general or specific, which has been raised herein is waived by the 
provision of any answer herein unless specifically stated to be waived by such answer. 
2 
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ANSWERS 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state the name and address of each person 
whom you intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, and for each such person set forth a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore, the data 
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used 
as a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of all publi~ations authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years, the compensation to be paid for the testimony and a listing of any 
other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
Supplemental Answer: Without waiving the objections to the late disclosure of 
opinions of Dr. Garrison regarding fat embolism syndrome, the plaintiff supplements his expert 
witness disclosures to meet this untimely disclosed opinion to the extent that the Court permits 
that opinion to be rendered at the trial of this action. 
Dean Sorensen, M.D. Dr. Sorensen will testify that the patient clinically did not have fat 
embolism syndrome. Further, all of the signs, symptoms and other diagnostic tests, including the 
autopsy, support that Krystal Ballard did not die as a direct or indirect consequence of fat 
embolism syndrome. To the contrary, Dr. Sorensen will testify that the patient had the signs and 
symptoms of sepsis, which was confirmed pathologically by Dr-. Groben at autopsy. Dr. 
Sorensen will testify that the only bacterial source causing the sepsis was from the fat injected 
into her buttocks, which bacteria entered her body because of the breach in the standard of care 
by Dr. Kerr at Silk Touch as outlined in his original disclosure of opinions. Further, to the extent 
that there were fat emboli found on the pathology slides as testified to by Dr. Garrison, these are 
incidental findings at the time of autopsy and are not the cause or a contributing factor to Krystal 
3 
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Ballard's death. Fat emboli from lipolysis are an extraordinarily rare occurrence and typically 
only manifests when the liposuction is combined with another procedure, such as an 
abdominoplasty. To the extent that there are small fat emboli that entered the circulatory system 
through lipolysis, they do not clinically create any issues for the patient. Further, to the extent 
that the defendants plan on asserting that fat emboli caused or contributed to Krystal Ballard's 
death, Dr. Kerr did not discuss this risk with Krystal Ballard as evidenced by the documents of 
Silk Touch regarding the informed consent. Dr. Sorensen will challenge and rebut any opinions 
rendered by any of the defondants' experts to the extent that they were not set forth in their 
written answers to interrogatories or supplements thereto outlining their opinions. 
Dr. Keith Armitage will testify, consistent with his initial disclosure, that the patient died 
from sepsis as a result of bacteria which was introduced into her body during the liposuction 
procedure. Dr. Armitage will testify that the signs and symptoms that the patient, Krystal 
Ballard, presented with are all consistent with sepsis from a bacterial source. There were no 
other bacterial sources for the infection identified clinically or pathologically other than the gram 
negative rods found at the time of autopsy at the fat injection sites in the buttocks. Dr. Annitage 
will rebut any opinions from any other expert, to the extent that those opinions are within his 
expertise as an infectious disease specialist. 
Dr. George Nichols will testify concerning Dr. Garrison's opinions about fat embolism 
syndrome. Dr. Nichols has reviewed the pathology slides of Krystal Ballard and will testify that 
the patient did not have fat embolism syndrome at the time of autopsy. As a board-certified 
forensic pathologist, Dr. Nichols examines the clinical record as part of his overall review in 
determining cause of death. Dr. Nichols will testify that the patient did not clinically present 
4 
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with fat embolism syndrome, but to the contrary, the signs and symptoms and diagnostic tests 
performed support that the patient had sepsis from a b~cterial source. Dr. Nichols will testify 
that th.e only bacterial source was from the bacteria introduced into her body during the fat 
transfer and ultimately found at the injection site of the fat and nowhere else. Dr. Nichols will 
also testify, consistent with hls education, training, experience and research into the issue of fat 
emboli as identified in his curriculum vitae, that the patient did not have fat embolism syndrome. 
However, fat emboli do manifest themselves as part of the resuscitation efforts on patients. 
Krystal Ballard was resuscitated numerous times and, therefore, to the extent that there are 
arguably fat emboli found on certain tissue samples taken at the time of the autopsy, these are a 
consequence of the resuscitation efforts at or near the time of her death and not present earlier. 
In patients that are resuscitated, there is a high likelihood of fat emboli found at the time of 
autopsy as a result of the resuscitation efforts, which do not clinically cause the patient's death, 
but rather are incidental to the resuscitation efforts. Dr. Nichols will rebut the opinions of any of 
the defendants' experts to the extent that they are contrary to his theories as expressed in his 
original disclosure and any supplemental thereto. 
Dated this 18th day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
By:· ~pf~ 
~~ P. Gregory Haddad 
T - James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Scott McKay (1SB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTIETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
J.B. Perrine, jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (208) ~88-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to the Court 
and the Defendants that a copy of Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental Answers to Defendants' First 
Set of Interrogatories, together with a copy of this Notice of Service of Discovery, has been · 
served upon counsel indicated on the certificate of service below. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~~~~~~~~---25~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P.Gregoryl1addad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 - NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 18, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice 
of Service of Discovery was served upon the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE JONES McCOLL PLLC 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boi~, Idaho 83701-1576 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
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1 Q. Well, let's go -- has it changed since you've 
2 started Linea? 




A. lt has not changed, to answer that question. As 
6 far as the machine, I don't know what the machine name 
7 is. I think it's a -- I believe it is -- I'm blanking. 
8 I apologize. The liposuction machine, I don't know what 
9 its name is. 
10 Q. Okay. What type of machine? I mean, how does 
11 it -- I know there's different types. There's an 
12 ultrasound. 
13 A. Well, that's not -- they're not liposuction 
14 machines. They're just an energy source to do an aspect 
15 ofliposuction. 
16 Q. Okay. What kind of-- what liposuction 
1 7 procedures do you perform? 
18 A. I do laser-assisted liposuction and traditional 
19 or Tumescent liposuction. 
20 Q. Okay. And what type of procedure did Dr. Kerr 
21 perform on Krystal Ballard? 
Page 68-l 
1 Q. In terms of the machine that you all have used 
2 since March of 2012, you don't know who the manufacturer 
3 is? 
4 A. I don't remember. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you know what the manufacturer 
6 recommends in terms of how to clean and disinfect and 
7 sterilize that equipment? 
8 A. The equipment, itself, is just an engine to pull 






A. So everything going to it is disposable. 
Q. What about the hand piece? 
A. The hand piece is my liposuction cannulas. 
14 Q. Okay. Okay. The hand piece, as you understand 
15 it, that Dr. Kerr used was because he used ultrasound? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. Okay. Have you been provided the manual from the 
18 manufacturer of the machine Dr. -- the vaser machine 
19 Dr. Kerr used on Krystal Ballard? 
20 A. I have not. 
21 Q. Okay. Now, at some point in time, Doctor, during 
22 A. From what I understand, he used ultrasound or the 22 the -- when you were asked to -- to review this case, l 
23 know there was some correspondence from Mr. Jones' 23 vaser, and then did a liposuction, and then did a fat 
2 4 grafting. 2 4 office about contacting Dr. O'Neil so that you could 
25 Q. Okay. Do you use ultrasound? 25 talk to him, Dr. O'Neil, about the standard of practice 
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1 A. I do not use the vaser. I have tried the vaser, 1 as it exists in Boise, correct? 
2 but I do not use the vaser. 2 A. At the time of this incident, correct. 
3 Q. Okay. Where have you tried it? 3 Q. Okay. Because you had not practiced in Boise or 
4 A. I believe it was in Charlotte, in North Carolina. 4 the sounding area, correct? 
5 We had them come in. The rep brought it in, and we 5 A. I had practiced in Boise and the surrounding area 
6 tried it, but I don't use it. 6 up until 2005. 
7 Q. Okay. So your only experience is a rep tried to 7 Q. As a general surgeon? 
8 sell the machine, he came in to do a presentation. 8 A. Correct. 
9 You-- 9 Q. Okay. But they wanted you, as I understand it, 
10 A. My only experience of hands-on use, correct. 10 to talk to Dr. O'Neil about the standard of practice 
11 Q. Okay. Did you ever actually use it on a patient? 11 during the time that Krystal Ballard had her procedure 
12 A. Wedid. 12 for cosmetic procedures? 
13 Q. Okay. Did you ever read the manual? 13 A. Correct. 
14 A. I don't remember. Probably did. 14 Q. All right. Do you know when you spoke to 
15 Q. Now, explain the difference. I mean, when you're 15 Dr. O'Neil? 
16 talking about ultrasound, that's to break up the fat, 16 A. End ofMay, beginning of June. 
17 correct? 17 Q. I mean, do you have any -- first of all, do you 
18 A. Loosen the fat off the stroma or the surrounding 18 have any notes that you've made in your review of any 
19 tissue. 19 materials? 
20 Q. The liposuction part is actually the -- 20 A. I do not. 
21 A. Harvesting. 21 Q. Do you have anything that you've kept in any type 
22 Q. -- aspirating offat or harvesting it from -- 22 of electronic format concerning notes about your case 
23 taking it out of the body into some type of collection 23 review? 
24 tube? 24 A. I have not. 
25 A. Correct. 25 Q. What type of-- what type of practice does 
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I 
1 Dr. O'Neil have? 1 Q. (Indicating). I 
2 A. A cosmetic physician, I believe. 2 A. Twenty to 40 minutes. I 
3 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry? 3 Q. Twenty to 40 minutes. All right. I want you to 
4 THE WITNESS: A cosmetic physician, I 4 recount for me everything you discussed with 
5 believe. 5 Dr. O'Neil. 
6 BY MR. HADDAD: 6 A. That will be a very -- a 20-minute to 40-minute 
7 Q. What type of background does he have? 7 conversation to discuss that. Do you want me to go 
8 A. I don't know offhand. 8 through every aspect of it? 
9 Q. Okay. Do you know whether he had any kind of 9 Q. Well, let me break it down. Then I'll ask you 
10 surgical residency? 10 kind of a catchall question. And if it takes time, it 
11 A. I do not know offhand. 11 takes time. 
12 Q. Okay. I mean, when you say you don't know 12 A. Sounds good. 
13 offhand, did you ever -- before you spoke to him, did 13 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil does cosmetic 
14 you ever try to find out what type of background 14 procedures in his own office? 
15 Dr. O'Neil had in terms of his practice? 15 A. Yes. 
16 A. No. 16 Q. All right. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil has 
17 Q. When you were talking to him, did you ask him how 17 specifically dedicated staff who do the cleaning, 
18 he was trained, both in -- through medical school, 18 disinfecting and sterilizing? 
19 residency and in cosmetic procedures? 19 A. I don't know. 
20 A. No. I asked him about the standard of practice 20 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil has written 
21 in Boise at that point in time. 21 policies and procedures in his office dealing with 
22 Q. Okay. We'll get to that. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil 22 cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing equipment? 
23 what type of machine he used at his office? For 23 A. I do not. I did not ask. 
24 instance, do you know whether he used the vaser? 24 Q. All right. What were the general topics, and 
25 A. I did not ask him, and I do not know. 25 then we might get into soecifics. that vou discussed 
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1 Q. Do you know if Dr. O'Neil's practice is such that 1 with Dr. O'Neil? 
2 he has -- strike that. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil 2 A. We discussed the care of the patient. 
3 personally performs the cleaning, disinfecting and 3 Q. Okay. I'll stop you there. Did -- did 
4 sterilizing of equipment and supplies that are reusable 4 Dr. O'Neil have the medical records of Krystal Ballard, 
5 at his office? 5 to your knowledge? 
6 A. I don't know. 6 A. I believe he said he reviewed them. I don't -- I 
7 Q. Do you know what type of cleaners Dr. O'Neil 7 don't know what in total he had. 
8 uses? 8 Q. Okay. So he had -- at least based on your 
9 A. I do not know. 9 conversation with him, he had been supplied with medical 
10 Q. Do you know what type of disinfectants Dr. O'Neil 10 records? 
11 uses? 11 A. I believe so. 
12 A. No. 12 Q. Concerning Krystal Ballard? 
13 Q. Do you know if Dr. O'Neil uses an autoclave? 13 A. Correct. 
14 A. No. 14 Q. Okay. So when you discussed the care of the 
15 Q. Do you know whether Dr. O'Neil takes spore 15 patient, tell me what it is you and Dr. O'Neil 
16 counts? 16 discussed. 
17 A. I do not. 17 A. The -- the procedure, itself. We discussed the 
18 Q. Did you ever ask him any of those questions? 18 follow-up of the patient. 
19 A. I did not. 19 Q. What else? 
20 Q. I mean, how long was your conversation with 20 A. We also discussed what it was like practicing in 
21 Dr. O'Neil that you utilized to gain an understanding as 21 Boise at that point in time, how many cosmetic 
22 to the standard of practice for a cosmetic physician at 22 physicians were there. And we discussed the 
23 the time Krystal Ballard had her procedure? How long 23 sterilization that was -- the deposition of the 
24 was your call? 24 sterilization by Dr. Kerr on what his opinions regarding 
25 A. About 20 to 40 minutes. 25 the adequacy of that, of sterilization. 
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1 Q. Okay. How many -- I mean, what was it like 1 the name of. 
2 practicing in Boise, was that just kind of a general 2 Q. Okay. Now, how is -- okay. I'm sorry, I I 
I 
3 conversation, or what -- 3 interrupted you -- I 
' 4 A. Absolutely. 4 A. No worries. I 5 Q. Then what was the point of -- I mean -- 5 Q. -- and I shouldn't do that. : 
6 A. How many physicians there were -- 6 A. No worries. i 
7 Q. -- it may not have any relevance, but I just want 7 Q. You said alcohol, Hibiclens -- I 
8 to know, does asking him, gee, what was it like 8 A. Uh-huh. I 
9 practicing? How many cosmetic physicians in Boise? Hov. 9 Q. -- and some unknown chemical Dr. Kerr couldn't 
I 10 did that lead you to have an understanding as to the 10 remember the name of? 
11 standard of practice in Boise? 11 A. Correct. I 12 A. As far as the standard of practice in Boise, 12 Q. Okay. Anything else dealing with the cleaning of I 13 which physicians, what kind of physicians perform -- 13 instruments that you all talked about, other than the 
14 were performing and where they were performing their 14 types of solutions Dr. Kerr described he used? 
15 procedures. 15 A. Not that I can tell you right now, no. 
16 Q. Okay. What type of physicians in Boise were 16 Q. Okay. Do you know in your practice whether you 
17 performing cosmetic procedures? 17 use alcohol to clean instruments? 
18 A. As -- Dr. Kerr was doing it, as well as 18 A. Do we use alcohol to clean instruments? I will 
19 Dr. O'Neil was doing it. And I think he said there was 19 use alcohol to clean instruments on the field if I need 
20 an -- not an ophthalmologist, but an ER doc. Again, 20 to, yes. 
21 these were all non-plastics people and who was doing it. 21 Q. When you say "on the field," what does that mean? 
22 And there was five in total. There might have been an 22 A. My surgical field. 
23 OB that was doing it as well, as far as I remember. 23 Q. Okay. But as far as once they go back with 
24 Q. Okay. To your recollection, there were only five 24 Ms. Blake, do you know what she uses? 
25 physicians in Boise doing cosmetic procedures? 25 A. She uses a -- a -- a hospital-grade cleaner, as 
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1 A. No. There were five cosmetic physicians doing 1 well as the -- the disinfectant. 
2 procedures. 2 Q. Okay. I mean, saying a hospital-grade cleaner, 
3 Q. Okay. To your knowledge, all five were 3 what's--
4 nonsurgical trained? 4 A. There's -- well --
5 A. I don't know if they were surgical trained. 5 Q. -- what's the active ingredient? 
6 Q. Now, when you say you discussed the sterilization 6 A. An acetylene, something, something something. I 
7 and the adequacy of the sterilization as described, are 7 don't know. 
8 you talking about as Dr. Kerr described in his 8 Q. All right. Okay. Let me ask you this. You 
9 deposition? 9 talked about alcohol, Hibiclens; and, obviously, you 
10 A. Yes. 10 couldn't have much discussion about the appropriateness 
11 Q. Okay. Tell me specifically what it was you and 11 of some unknown cleaner, correct? 
12 Dr. O'Neil talked about in terms of the adequacy of the 12 A. Correct. 
13 sterilization as described in Dr. Kerr's deposition. 13 Q. All right. 
14 A. Sure. We talked about his cleaning of the 14 A. Well, we also talked about his autoclave, the 
15 instruments. We talked about the sterilization of his 15 steam autoclave, and the fact that he did use a chemical 
16 instruments. 16 marker. 
17 Q. Okay. Is that it? I mean, can you be any more 17 Q. All right. That's more the sterilization side. 
18 specific? When you say you talked about the cleaning, 18 A. Correct. 
19 what did you all talk about in terms of cleaning the 19 Q. I look at it differently, but --
20 instruments? 20 A. Well, the sterilization side is important. 
21 A. We discussed what Dr. Kerr had said he did. 21 Q. Okay. It is. We were going to get to that, but 
22 Q. Okay. What did Dr. Kerr say he did? 22 I was breaking them down. But we can deal with them all 
23 A. Well, he mentioned, at some point in time, that 23 together --
24 he did both the Hibiclens and the alcohol, as well as he 24 A. No worries. 
25 also talked about using a chemical, which he didn't know 25 Q. -- if it's easier for you. Do you know whether ~ . 
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1 or not alcohol has been proven to be an appropriate 1 whether Hibiclens is an appropriate solution to use? 
2 solution, 70 percent isopropyl, because that's what 2 A. I have not researched it. 
3 Dr. Kerr used, right? 3 Q. What concentration -- I mean, what is the active 
4 A. Mixed with Hibiclens. 4 ingredient --
I 5 Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not isopropyl 5 THE WITNESS: Just a moment. 
6 alcohol is an appropriate solution to use in the 6 MR. HADDAD: Sure. 
7 cleaning and disinfecting and sterilization of medical 7 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
8 equipment and supplies? 8 MR. HADDAD: We're still good? 
9 MR. JONES: Object to form. 9 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
10 THE WITNESS: You -- again, you're 10 MR. HADDAD: All right. 
11 masking -- or you're putting all three together. And 11 BY MR. HADDAD: 
12 Hibiclens isn't a sterilization. It's not a 12 Q. What is the active ingredient ofHibiclens? 
13 disinfectant. It's a cleaner. 13 A. I don't know. 
14 BY MR. HADDAD: 14 Q. Do you know what -- now, did Dr. O'Neil tell you 
15 Q. Okay. 15 he uses alcohol? 
16 A. And so is alcohol. 16 A. As far as him using alcohol? 
17 Q. All right. Do you know whether or not it's 17 Q. To clean medical equipment or supplies. 
18 approved, whether alcohol is -- first of all, do you 18 A. To clean medical equipment, again, it's not the 
19 know -- when I say the Centers for Disease Control, are 19 mixture -- it's not alcohol. It's the mixture of 
20 you familiar with that organization? 20 alcohol and Hibiclens. And alcohol and Hibiciens is 
21 A. I am familiar with that organization. 21 what I use to cleanse patients as far as a cleaner and 
22 Q. Have you ever read any of their publications 22 disinfectant. That being said, again, it's not a 
23 dealing with the appropriate cleaning, disinfecting and 23 disinfectant. It's to sterilize the -- it's used to 
24 sterilizing of medical equipment and supplies? 24 clean the tissue. So ... 
25 A. At some time -- at some point in my training, I'm 25 Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not he used a 
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1 sure I have. 1 alcohol-Hibiclens solution, mixture, to clean medical 
2 Q. Do you know what they said about alcohol being 2 equipment and supplies? 
3 used, 70 percent isopropyl alcohol being used to clean 3 A. I asked him whether that was an adequate cleaning 
4 or disinfect medical equipment and supplies? 4 at that point in time in Boise with Dr. Kerr. And he 
5 A. Again, it's not a disinfectant. It's a cleaner. 5 agreed that he didn't see any issues with that. 
6 Q. Do you know what they say about it being used as 6 Q. Did he say he did it? He used -- that Dr. O'Neil 
7 a cleaner? 7 specifically said, I used alcohol and Hibiclens in a 
8 MR. JONES: Object to form. Assumes facts. 8 mixture to clean medical equipment and supplies? Did 
9 And lack of foundation. You haven't established that 9 you ask him that? 
10 the CDC sets any standards in Boise, Idaho. 10 A. I did -- I don't remember. 
11 BY MR. HADDAD: 11 Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not he took 
12 Q. Go ahead. 12 spore counts? 
13 A. Again, going back, it's not just using alcohol. 13 A. I did not ask him. 
14 It's using alcohol and Hibiclens, is what he used. So 14 Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you that other physicians in 
15 it's not just selecting one. 15 Boise that do cosmetic procedures did or did not do 
16 Q. Do you know whether Hibiclens is approved by the 16 spore counts? Or did that not come up? 
17 FDA to clean or disinfect, one or the other, medical 17 A. It did not come up. 
18 equipment and supplies? 18 Q. Again--
19 A. I don't know if the FDA actually approves 19 THE WITNESS: No. Just my wife. 
20 anything for cleaning. The FDA doesn't have to do with 20 MR. HADDAD: Sometimes that can be more 
21 that. It's the CDC. And the CDC, again, as we said, 21 important than any other call you get. 
22 doesn't have the -- doesn't -- or doesn't tell us what 22 BY MR. HADDAD: 
23 the standard of practice is. 23 Q. The various places that you practice -- or have 
24 Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not the CDC has 24 practiced -- I'm going to back up so I can kind of get 
25 published information for physicians to use that says 25 them here. And we'll go in most recent. In March, 2012 
www.mmcourt.com GEOFFREY STILLER, M.D. 





1 to the present, do you have a -- is there a dedicated 1 
Page 84 
Q. -- physicians that he mentioned that did cosmetic 
2 clean room where instruments are taken to be sterilized? 2 procedures in Boise? 
3 A. It's a clean-dirty room. 3 A. Correct. 










A. There's a wall -- there's a wall on the counter 
separating the clean supplies from the dirty supplies, 
but it's in the same room. 
Q. How is it separated? 
A. There's a wall. 
Q. I mean, other than a wall. I mean --
A. That's it. 
Q. Okay. When you say "there's a wall," is it --
14 A. It's a partition, I should say, rather than a 





Q. And this is the ambulatory surgical --
A. No. This is my office. 
Q. Okay. So your office uses a clean-dirty room? 
A. Correct. 
20 Q. Do you put -- are the instruments, the dirty 
21 instruments, left in a sink adjacent to where the 
22 autoclave is located? 
23 A. It's a couple feet away, but yes. 
2 4 Q. Have you ever had -- first of all, is your -- is 















Q. Is the ambulatory surgical center accredited? 
A. It is. 
Q. Who accredits that? 
A. AAAHC. 
Q. At Shape, was it accredited? 
A. Initially, no, but it became accredited. 
Q. Uplift, was it accredited? 
A. It was not. 
Q. Genesis? 
A. It was. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Dr. O'Neil's cosmetic 




A. I don't believe it was. 
Q. Did you ask him, or are you just --







Q. Okay. You said one was an ER doctor? 
A. I believe it was. 
Q. One was an OB? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. What were the others? 
A. I think it was Dr. O'Neil and Dr. Kerr. And I 
10 don't remember what the last one was. Again, but they 
11 were all outside of the main surgical specialties. 
12 
13 
MR. JONES: Dermatology was one. 
THE WITNESS: Dermatology. There you go. I 
14 BY MR. HADDAD: l 
15 Q. All right. Just so that I'm clear, is it your , 
16 understanding, in speaking with Dr. O'Neil, that during I 
1 7 the time in July of20IO that Krystal Ballard had her 
18 procedure --
A. Uh-huh. 19 
20 Q. -- there were a total of five physicians in 
21 Boise, Idaho, doing cosmetic procedures? 






A. Not what I said. 
Q. What did you say? 
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A. I said there were four -- five -- there were five 
2 cosmetic physicians that were doing cosmetic procedures, 
3 not including the surgical subspecialties. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, do you know how many surgical 
5 specialists were doing cosmetic procedures? 
6 A. As far as the plastic surgeons versus the ENTs 
7 versus the ophthalmologists that all do cosmetics, I do 
8 notknow. 
9 Q. Okay. Did Dr. O'Neil discuss with you what the 
10 nonsurgical-trained cosmetic physicians -- strike that. 
11 Did Dr. O'Neil discuss with you what the surgically 
12 trained cosmetic physicians did or did not do with 
13 respect to cleaning, disinfecting, sterilizing 
14 equipment? 
15 A. No. 
16 
1 7 Q. Okay. Do you know whether other physicians in 17 
18 Boise, how many of those that practice cosmetic surgery 18 
Q. Before you go in to do a procedure in your --
inhouse, your own office, the liposuction, do you do fat 
transfers in your own office? 
19 and have their own surgery centers, have accredited 
2 0 versus non-accredited centers? 
21 A. As far as at that time, I don't believe any of 
2 2 the cosmetic physicians had it. And we did discuss 
2 3 that, that being said. 
24 
25 
Q. And you're talking the five --
A. Correct. 
19 A. I do. 
20 Q. Okay. How do you go about cleaning your hands? 




Q. A vagard? What is the active ingredient? 
24 A. I don't know what it is. It's what I use in the 
2 5 hospitals. 
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Q. Okay. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not 
using alcohol to clean your hands before a procedure was 
or was not something that other Boise nonsurgically 
trained physicians did? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Do you do regular maintenance, or have somebody 
do regular maintenance, on your autoclave? 
A. I do. 
Q. Okay. How often do they come and check the 
autoclave to make sure it was working appropriately? 
A. I think it's once a year they come by. 
Q. The other facilities that you worked in, or were 
involved with, do you have an understanding that they, 
likewise, had routine maintenance and upkeep of their 
autoclaves? 
A. I don't know. 
MR.JONES: Object to form. Vague. 
BY MR. HADDAD: 
Q. I mean, do you know if at any other place, when 
you were at Palouse back in '05 to '08, do you know 
whether the -- somebody came and checked the autoclave 
to make sure it was functioning properly? 
A. They were the hospital's, so I did not check. 
Q. All right. Were you trained at Southeast -- or 



























it out? Have you --
A. They put a sticker on it. That's all I know. 
Q. They come and say, I've inspected it? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. All right. When instruments are taken from the 
procedure room that you use at Linea, and then you go in 
and you put them in a basin to soak; is that correct? 
Do you do that process? 
A. I don't do that process. 
Q. Okay. Do you know how it's done? 
A. I know they're put in a basin to soak. 
Q. Do you know what kind of solution is used? 
A. Again, it's a cleaning solution. 
Q. Okay. When you were talking to Dr. O'Neil, did 
you ask him whether or not instruments taken from the 
procedure room are put in -- in a basin to soak? 
A. I did not ask him that, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ask him -- we'll leave it at that. 
In looking at the medical records, is it -- do you have 
the general opinion that Krystal Ballard died as a 
result of sepsis? 
A. Krystal Ballard died as a result of shock. I 
don't know if it was sepsis. 
Q. Okay. If you were to give a differential 
diagnosis as to what caused the shock in Krystal 
Page 87 Page 89 
they have an autoclave? 1 Ballard, would sepsis be on the differential? 
A. Yes. 2 A. It would be low. 
Q. Do you know if somebody did routine servicing and 3 Q. What would be on the differential? 
maintenance of the autoclave? 4 A. What would be on the differential? Completely? 
A. I don't know. 5 Q. Well, I'm -- I'in -- you're -- well, first of all, 
Q. At Genesis, do you know whether they had somebody 6 are you going to render the opinion as to the cause of 
to come in and do routine servicing and maintenance? 7 Krystal Ballard's shock? 
A. I don't know. 8 A. Am I going to render an opinion regarding the --
Q. At Uplift, that's yours, did you have somebody 9 if I'm asked for an opinion, I guess I can give an 
come in and do routine servicing? 10 opinion. That being said, (indicating). 
A. I did not. 11 Q. I don't know what that means. 
Q. Of course, you weren't there for a year, correct? 12 A. If -- ifl'm asked an opinion, I can render an 
A. Correct. 13 opinion regarding what I think happened. And with that, 
Q. All right. At Shape, do you know if they had 14 sepsis is low on that opinion. 
somebody come in to do routine maintenance and servicing 15 Q. Okay. Have you looked at the areas that you were 
of the autoclave? 16 anticipated to give expert testimony on? 
A. I know the autoclave broke twice while I was 17 A. That list, yes. 
there, so it was fixed from that standpoint. Whether 18 Q. Okay. Is it going to be -- have you formed an 
they did any other servicing, I don't know. 19 opinion in your mind, as you sit here today, that you 
Q. Fair. And at your place, every year somebody -- 20 believe you can testify to a reasonable degree of 
at Linea, somebody comes in every year and makes sure 21 medical probability as to why Krystal Ballard went into 
it's operating -- the autoclave's operating 22 shock? 
appropriately? 23 A. Is there -- again, ask your question. I 
A. Correct. 24 apologize. 
Q. Do you know what they do when they come and check 25 Q. Sure. Have you formed an opinion, to a 
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Page 50 Page 52 1 
of those days. 1 A. No, he did not. I think I would have 
I don't remember if liposuction was 2 remembered that. 
involved, but I believe that during that procedure, 3 Q. All right. In te,ms of the practices 
she was with my administrative staff just talking 4 that you have --
about administrative issues. 5 And I'm going to, I guess, focus on 
I 
Q. Okay. Did Ms. Kerr, to your knowledge, 6 Germantown Aesthetics because that's the only 
ask or inquire or observe the manner in which your 7 practice that does liposuction as part of the 
practice cleaned, disinfected, or sterilized any of 8 services provided, correct? I 
the medical equipment and supplies? 9 A. Correct. 
I A. I don't remember -- 10 Q. Now, the Vaser was used by Dr. Kerr in 
Can you ask that question again? 11 the procedure done on Krystal Ballard. I 
Q. Yeah. I didn't know whether you are 12 Are you aware of that? I 
aware whether or not Ms. Kerr, when she was at your 13 A. lam. I 
facility, you know, observed or asked about any 14 Q. Do you use the type of equipment that I 
aspect of the cleaning, disinfecting, and 15 Dr. Kerr used in your practice? l 
sterilizing of reusable medical equipment and 16 A. I've used Vaser before, but I've never I supplies. 17 purchased Vaser. And so it's not something that I 
MR. JONES: I'm going to object to form to 18 use regularly. I'm familiar with its use. 
the extent it lacks foundation. You haven't 19 Q. Okay. When you said you've used it 
established he was with her during that time. 20 before, in what circumstance have you used a Vaser 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I was just going to say 21 machine? 
I wasn't with her the majority of the time. 22 A. In rotating with other physicians --
She certainly could have observed my 23 spending time, I guess I should say, in other 
staff were using our disinfecting, sterilizing, you 24 physicians' offices that use Vaser. 
know, procedures every day practically. So she 25 Q. Okay. So you've never used a Vaser 
Page 51 Page 53 
could have observed that. 1 machine in your practice, correct? 
I don't recall if she asked me any 2 A. That's correct. 
particulars about how we did what we did. 3 Q. There may be occasions where you may 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. So your not being 4 have visited other physicians that practice 
personally involved, you don't know one way or the 5 cosmetic surgery that use a Vaser and you've seen 
other whether or not Ms. Kerr asked or obtained any 6 that machine in use, correct? 
information concerning how your offices go about 7 A. Correct. 
cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing medical 8 Q. Okay. Do you know how many occasions 
equipment and supplies. 9 you have observed in this part of visiting these 
Is that fair? 10 other physicians a Vaser liposuction machine? 
A. That's correct. 11 A. Yes. Three physicians' practices. 
Q. All right. Now, when Dr. Kerr 12 Q. First of all, are any of those physician 
approached you at this national society of cosmetic 13 practices in Boise? 
physicians meeting, what did he tell you about the 14 A. No, they're not. 
lawsuit? 15 Q. Okay. Any of those physician practices 
A. I don't recall how much detail he gave 16 in Idaho? 
me. I -- I would have just told you after that 17 A. No. 
meeting that I knew he was involved in a lawsuit 18 Q. When you observed these three offices 
that pertained to liposuction and a patient death, 19 use the Vaser liposuction, did you actually use it 
but that's all that I can remember that we talked 20 yourself meaning place the handpiece in your hand 
about. 21 and do any type of contouring of any patient at 
Q. Did Dr. Kerr ask you at that time when 22 these offices? 
you were at this meeting whether or not you would 23 A. I wouldn't say to the extent that I did 
review the case and render an opinion on his 24 contouring, but I did have the instrument in my 
behalf? 25 hand to do several oasses to 2et a feel for what it 
14 (Pages 50 to 53) 
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felt like. I was considering purchasing the -- the 1 the standard of practice was in Boise, Idaho, in 
unit. 2 2010 in performing similar procedures and services 
Q. Okay. In terms of fat transfers, is 3 to patients in --
that a procedure that you perform? 4 MR. JONES: Object to form; vague. 
A. That's correct. 5 THE WITNESS: There were no other physicians 
I 
Q. Okay. When did you start doing fat 6 that I spoke to who practiced in Boise, Idaho, 
transfers? 7 around that time to whom I spoke or communicated in 
A. I'd say about two and a half years ago. 8 any way. 
Q. I'm trying to do the math. So it's 9 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. And Dr. O'Neil is 
sometime after 2011? 10 a physician that you were referred to by Mr. Quane 
A. Yeah, yeah around 2011 or -- 11 to contact in order to avail yourself of what the 
Yes. 12 standard of practice was in Boise in in 2010, 
Q. All right. When you do liposuction in 13 correct? 
your office -- 14 A. Yeah, correct. I did not know him 
And maybe we established approximately 15 before. 
when that was. I think it might have been '04/'05. 16 Q. Okay. Basically, counsel for Dr. Kerr 
Does that sound about right? 17 told you, "You need to learn what the standard of 
A. That's correct. 18 practice was in 2010, and here's the guy that can 
Q. Okay. What type of machinery do you use 19 tell you what the standard of practice is," and 
to perform the liposuction in your office? 20 they named Dr. O'Neil, correct? 
A. Well, I've used just about every popular 21 MR. JONES: Object to form. 
modality on the market that's used with tumescent 22 THE WITNESS: So, yes, I spoke to him after 
liposuction. 23 they referred me to him as someone who was 
So in terms of what that equipment is, 24 reliable. 
you know, the idea is you apply some kind of 25 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Did you know 
Page 55 Page 57 
vibration or energy or heat to the tissue to help 1 Dr. O'Neil from any other circumstance other than 
process the fat or help with the contouring before 2 the fact that counsel for Dr. Kerr told you to 
you actually do the removal of the fat. 3 contact him about understanding the standard of 
I've used just about everything that's 4 practice? 
out there. 5 A. I'd never run into him at a meeting or 
Q. Okay. In terms of a cosmetic practice, 6 anything like that, correct. 
have you spoken to any physicians that practiced in 7 MR. JONES: Counsel, we don't have the 
Boise, Idaho, in 2010 which is the time period that 8 benefit of coffee or water or anything in this room 
Krystal Ballard had a procedure about the standard 9 like you do, so I'd like to take a break when you 
of practice in Boise in 2010? 10 get to a point --
A. Yes, I did. 11 MR. HADDAD: Okay. It will be just --
Q. Who did you speak with? 12 Well, let's do it now. Let's go off the 
A. Dr. Kelly O'Neil who practiced in this 13 record. 
area around that time. 14 (Break taken from 10: 11 a.m. to 10:21 a.m.) 
Q. And I think within the materials that 15 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Doctor, in terms of your 
are either part of Exhibit 1 or Exhibit 2, 16 conversations --
whichever is the stack of your file -- 17 First of all, have you had more than one 
A. Yeah, it's 2. 18 conversation with --
Q. -- there's reference to Dr. O'Neil. 19 A. I'm sorry. The video skipped. 
And you remember speaking with him? 20 Q. I'm sorry. I was looking down, so that 
A. That's correct. 21 probably had something to do with it. 
Q. All right. Is your discussions with 22 Dr. Kelly O'Neil, have you spoken to him 
Dr. O'Neil -- 23 on more than one occasion? 
Well, first of all, did you rely upon 24 A. Two occasions. 
Dr. O'Neil exclusivelv in order to understand what 25 o. All right. What I see Doctor. within 
15 (Pages 54 to 57) 
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' 
the stack of materials that comprise your file is 1 First of all, you said you spoke with i 
i 
an e-mail from SuperDocG to Corina Ferris and a cc 2 him on two occasions. Would you have taken notes i 
to Terry Jones. 3 concerning your conversations with Dr. O'Neil on i 
I'm taking it SuperDocG is your e-mail 4 each of those two occasions? 
address? 5 A. Well, with the shorter call, he was 
A. It is. 6 pressed for time. I remember just having an 
I Q. And this e-mail is dated July 11th, 7 abbreviated conversation, and we made an agreement 
2013, that says, "I wanted to make sure everyone 8 to try to get back in touch with each other in some I 
was aware that I have discussed standard of 9 form at whatever phone number he was going to be 
practice with Dr. Kelly O'Brian." 10 available. 
A. That's correct. 11 I remember that it ended up being 
Q. First of all, is it Kelly O'Brian or 12 several days to a couple weeks before that 
Kelly O'Neil that you spoke with? 13 follow-up finally occurred. 
A. Oh, O'Neil. 14 And then the second conversation was the 
Q. Your e-mail says O'Brian, and I wanted 15 longer of the conversations, and that's the one 
to make sure that wasn't somebody else I wasn't 16 that I know I took notes on but which I could not I I aware of. 17 put my hand on those notes. 
A. No, that's correct. 18 Q. And it looks like the letter that was 
MR. JONES: There's a lot of Irish people 19 sent from Mr. Quane's office indicates that 
running around we like to talk to up here. 20 Dr. O'Neil was actually practicing in California at 
MR. HADDAD: Haven't met any of them, but -- 21 the time he wanted you to contact him but had 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) This e-mail was sent 22 practiced in Boise in 2010. 
July 11th, 2013. 23 Is that your understanding? 
First of all, do you have any notes 24 A. It's my understanding that he relocated 
concerning your conversation with Dr. O'Neil? 25 his practice, correct. 
Page 59 Page 61 
A. I -- I do take a lot of notes, and as 1 Q. Did you do anything independently to 
you know, I handed over my notes that I took. And 2 determine whether, in fact, Dr. O'Neil practiced 
I -- 3 cosmetic surgery in 2010 in Boise other than based 
I did take notes when I spoke with him, 4 on the representation of counsel for Dr. Kerr? 
but at some point I misplaced them, either 5 A. Correct. I just -- I asked him if that 
physically or electronically. I have not been able 6 was the time that he practiced, and he said yes, he 
to find those notes, but I do recall the 7 was practicing at that time. 
conversation. 8 Q. Okay. And you said that there was a 
Q. Okay. This e-mail dated July 11th, 9 shorter call, that Dr. O'Neil might have been 
2013, would that have been at or near the time that 10 pressed for time. 
you spoke with Dr. O'Neil? 11 Is that correct? 
A. I -- I don't remember ifl recalled a 12 A. Correct. 
week later or so that I needed to -- to tell 13 Q. Do you have any recollection of what you 
Mr. Quane that I had -- had spoken with the doctor. 14 and he discussed during that initial call? 
But it may have been a day after; could 15 A. I do not remember. It was mostly the 
have been a week or more after. I'm not sure. 16 case very superficially and just who he was and 
Q. July 11, 2013, because that's the date 17 what his background was and how he came to, you 
of the e-mail that you were advising Mr. Jones and 18 know, transition from his surgical background to 
the people at his office you spoke with Dr. O'Neil, 19 performing cosmetic procedures. 
is it fair to say that you would have spoken with 20 Q. Okay. I want you to tell me everything 
Dr. O'Neil within a week of that e-mail being sent 21 you can remember about this initial call with 
to let them know that? 22 Dr. O'Neil, what you asked him, familiarize 
A. It's -- it could -- it could have been 23 yourself with the standard of practice or what he 
two weeks. I don't know. 24 told you in terms of his practice and how it 
0. Okav. Well, what-- 25 evolved. 
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I 
A. You know, I'll be able to give you a lot 1 MR.JONES: Object to fo1m; misstates his ' I
more details about the longer conversation on that 2 testimony, counsel. He said he relied on both his i i 
3 conversations and his review of the records in the ' one. 
i 
It really was a fairly abbreviated 4 case. I 
telephone conversation. It was just enough for me 5 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Well, let me ask 
to conclude that this was a guy that liked what he 6 you this: Tell me everything, and I mean 
was doing, and I understood it made sense to me why 7 everything, you remember about your conversation 
they asked me to touch bases with him. He was 8 with Dr. O'Neil, the longer call. 
obviously somebody that was familiar with these 9 A. The main thing that was memorable about 
procedures. 10 the conversation --
But that's all that I can tell you with 11 Again, I regret that I don't have any 
any detail. 12 notes with this. 
Q. Okay. During the conversation -- the 13 But it was clear after this 30- to 
first or the subsequent conversation with 14 45-minute conversation that I had with Dr. O'Neil 
Dr. O'Neil where you discussed this case, did 15 that he knew how other physicians in Boise I Dr. O'Neil tell you that he had the medical records 16 practiced, that there were a combination of 
from Silk Touch? 17 physicians with different backgrounds that l 
A. He did not. I don't recall whether he 18 performed similar procedures, and that the way --
I 
told me he had actually reviewed medical records or 19 And I don't remember whether he had 
not. 20 independent knowledge or if I dis -- if I had to 
I had reviewed records at the time that 21 tell him, you know, what Dr. Kerr did in the 
I had talked with Dr. O'Neil. 22 process of performing liposuction. 
Q. Okay. Was there anything Dr. O'Neil 23 But I was -- the impression that I had 
said during your conversation that led you to 24 after that 30- to 45-minute conversation is the way 
believe that he had reviewed any of Krystal 25 that liposuction is performed in Boise is very 
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Ballard's medical records? 1 similar to how it's practiced in my area. That's 
A. Again, I don't know whether he had 2 not true with several other procedures in which 
reviewed them or not, and I -- and I don't recall 3 I've been involved in. Boise is much different 
if there was anything in particular that he said 4 than where I'm from. 
that would have, by inference, made me be able to 5 But in the area of liposuction, my 
say that he had or had not. 6 practice mirrors that of Dr. Kerr's substantially. 
Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that it was -- 7 Q. You said that's the main thing, and I 
the longer telephone call is the one that you used 8 don't want to know just the main thing. I want to 
as the basis by which you came to learn what the 9 know everything that you recall, and then we'll try 
standard of practice was in Idaho in 201 O? 10 to put a little more substance behind the things 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 11 that you mentioned just now. 
THE WITNESS: I think that a combination of 12 What other things did you and Dr. O'Neil 
the review of all the records and in combination 13 discuss about the standard of practice in Idaho? 
with the conversation with him was what I relied 14 A. One issue would be do doctors in this 
upon to be able to say that Dr. Kerr was within the 15 area ofldaho practice in the hospital primarily or 
standard of practice for the area. 16 in an office-based situation. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Well, we'll get 17 And as in the area where I practice, 
to that. 18 there's a really good combination. There's a lot 
I understand you reviewed the medical 19 of physicians that take their patients into a 
records, but in terms of familiarizing yourself 20 non-office base that is an ambulatory or hospital 
with the standard of practice in Idaho, is it fair 21 situation, and then there's a portion of physicians 
to say that familiarizing yourself with what the 22 of many different specialties who perform these 
standard of practice was in Boise, Idaho, in 2010 23 procedures in their office. 
was really based upon the longer call with 24 Q. Okay. What did he tell you about Boise, 
Dr. O'Neil? 25 Idaho, ohvsicians in 2010 in terms of where thev 
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carried out their cosmetic procedures? 1 bit more robust community. Boise is a fairly small 
A. Well, I would have -- I would have not 2 area, and I guess it just has a draw. 
have been surp1ised if he had said, you know, 3 But there was a fairly robust spectrum 
there's a lot of reconstruction-trained doctors who 4 of different specialties that pe1form liposuction 
have started to do liposuction and some of them are 5 in both hospital and office-based situations. 
using some of the new techniques and Dr. Kerr is 6 Q. In terms of fat transfer -- because 
the only non-reconstruction doctor who performs 7 that's part of what was done on Krystal Ballard, 
liposuction because there are some areas of the 8 correct? 
country in which that dynamic is somewhat true. 9 A. Correct. 
So I was surprised to hear a substantial 10 Q. Okay. Did Dr. O'Neil talk to you 
number -- and I don't remember the number -- and he 11 about --
may have even given me names. 12 Well, first of all, does he practice --
But apparently over -- during that time 13 Was he, Dr. O'Neil, actually doing 
period, there were several physicians of multiple 14 liposuction himself in July of 2010? 
specialties, both in the immediate Boise area and 15 A. Yes, he was. I in the state, that perform liposuction procedures. 16 Are you talking about here? Yes, he 
Q. Okay. I think the question that 17 was. ! 
prompted -- or your statement that prompted my last 18 Q. I mean other than saying, "I had an 
question was: Did doctors in Boise, Idaho, as you 19 office practice that did cosmetic procedures in 
understood it, practice in primarily a hospital 20 2010," did he actually specifically tell you he did 
setting or ambulatory care center associated with a 21 liposuction in 2010? 
hospital in carrying out liposuction or did they 22 A. I don't -- I don't recall whether he 
practice in their private office settings to do 23 said in any particular month or any year whether 
that? 24 his case list had been up or down. But he -- he --
A. Dr. O'Neil related to me that both 25 this was a procedure that he performed, and he was 
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situations were fairly common. 1 in Boise and --
Q. What else did you discuss -- 2 And so I think he meets the criteria for 
First of all, did he tell you the names 3 being able to tell me the standard of practice. 
of any of the physicians in Boise, Idaho, that 4 Q. Okay. You're presuming but you don't 
practiced cosmetic surgery? 5 know whether or not Dr. O'Neil was actually 
A. He did. 6 performing liposuction in 2010. 
Q. What are the names? 7 A. I have--
A. I don't recall those names, but he -- he 8 Q. Fair? 
mentioned the names specifically and what their 9 A. I have some months and some years in 
specialty had been. 10 which, you know, there's a bump of me doing five or 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you what each of 11 ten procedures in a month and then the next month I 
those physicians -- in terms of their specialty, 12 do zero. And there's bumps in years, too. 
their name, whether they practiced in a hospital 13 So I didn't get an idea with Dr. O'Neil 
setting, an ambulatory care setting, or an 14 whether he was passionate about his liposuction; it 
office-based setting to practice liposuction? 15 was the key part of his practice or not. He was 
A. He, you know, voluntarily gave me a 16 just somebody who was competent to relate to me 
pretty good description of the landscape, and then 17 what he related about the standard of practice. 
I asked him a lot of specific questions about, you 18 Q. Again, going back to my question -- and 
know, the -- "That particular doctor that you 19 I know you sort of answered it and maybe you 
mentioned, does he continue to be in practice to 20 completely answered it-- but as you sit here 
this day? Does he have a fairly high-volume 21 today, you don't know one way or the other whether 
practice? How does he compare to, you know, the 22 or not Dr. O'Neil, in the calendar year 2010, 
busiest hospital-based physician?" 23 actually performed any liposuction, correct? 
I don't remember all those details, but 24 :tv:IR. JONES: Object to form; misstates his 
I do remember I was imoressed that it was a little 25 testimonv. 
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Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) I mean, I think you 1 did in their office practice as it relates to the 
presumed it, but you didn't specifically ask him, 2 fat transfer procedure? 
"During the calendar year 20 I 0, did you do 3 A. Yes, we did. 
liposuction?" 4 Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you how he came to 
A. I did not ask the number of cases he had 5 leam how other physicians in Boise might either do 
done in any particular month or year, correct. 6 liposuction or fat transfer? 
Q. Okay. In terms of fat transfer, did you 7 A. You know, no, he did not tell me how he 
talk to Dr. O'Neil at all about fat transfer? 8 knew other physicians did one thing or another. 
A. Idid. 9 Q. Okay. In your discussions with 
Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you that he 10 Dr. O'Neil, did he tell you that his facility was 
performed fat transfers in 201 O? 11 an accredited facility in 2010? 
A. We talked about fat transfer 12 A. You're talking about Dr. O'Neil --
specifically. 13 Q. Yes. 
Fat transfers are an area of liposuction 14 A. -- and whether his facility was or was 
where some doctors really, really are excited about 15 not accredited? 
it, and some do very little fat transfer. And I 16 We certainly did talk about the 
don't recall whether I asked him if fat transfer 17 accreditation issue, and he related to me that --
was something that he did routinely with every one 18 that there were a variety of practice situations in 
of his liposuctions or with 10 percent. But he 19 Boise where these type of procedures were performed 
certainly was familiar with that aspect. 20 in both accredited and facilities that were not 
We talked very specifically about the-- 21 accredited. He did not --
the different options that the physician had with 22 He could have told me whether his 
regard to the addition of PRP, the addition of-- 23 facility currently or in Boise was or was not, but 
whether the fat was spun down or just gravity was 24 I don't recall. 
used to separate out. 25 Q. Did Dr. O'Neil tell you how he came to 
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And so he -- he was clearly 1 learn whether other facilities were accredited or 
knowledgeable about fat transfer, but I don't know 2 non-accredited that did these type of procedures in 
how much he did it. 3 an outpatient setting? 
Q. Based upon your discussions with 4 A. He did not. 
Dr. O'Neil, was it your understanding that during 5 Q. Doctor.just so I don't forget, I wanted 
the calendar year 2010, he had done any fat 6 to revisit one issue, so we're going to kind of 
transfer procedures? 7 digress into something that we plowed through a 
A. Would you ask that question again? 8 little bit earlier. 
Q. Yes. 9 In terms of your associations, do you 
A. It sounded -- I'm sorry. It sounds like 10 have -- what is your relationship or association 
something that you had already asked, but maybe 11 with Financial Fortress Associates? 
it's a little bit different. 12 A. They were financial advisers to me at 
Q. Maybe a little bit different. 13 one point. 
Do you know one way or the other whether 14 Q. Are you still associated or acquainted 
or not, during the calendar year 2010, Dr. O'Neil 15 with them? 
had performed any fat transfer procedures based 16 A. I'm not. 
upon your discussions with him? 17 Q. Okay. When did that end? 
A. Okay. So you're asking the same 18 A. Just guessing, somewhere around two to 
question about fat transfer that you were about 19 three years ago; maybe four years ago. 
liposuction. I understand. 20 Q. Okay. Are you a member of the Patriot 
The same answer. I'm not -- I did not 21 Movement? 
ask him specifically what his caseload looked like. 22 A. I'm not. 
Q. Okay. When Dr. O'Neil was talking about 23 Q. Any militia groups? 
other physicians in Boise, did he tell you -- did 24 A. No. 
vou have a discussion about what other ohvsicians 25 o. Anv sovereiim citizens ~rouos or similar 
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l 
organizations? 1 A. He does. 
A. No, I'm not. 2 Q. Okay. In terms of the administrative 
Q. Tea Party? 3 staff, what functions do they carry out that you 
A. No. 4 would characterize them as administrative? 
Q. Do you have a constitutionally based 5 A. You know, I would say everything from 
opposition to the income tax laws of the U.S. or 6 taking care of payroll issues, scheduling, 
the IRS? 7 strategic planning. You know, we don't advertise 
A. I do not. 8 with any kind of traditional advertising, but, of 
Q. In your practice, Doctor, when you are 9 course, we do promotions and have a website 
practicing at Germantown Aesthetics -- 10 presence. I And that would be exclusively where you 11 So I think handling all of those type of 
do liposuctions, correct? 12 issues. 
A. That's correct. 13 Q. Okay. So the surgical people that 
Q. What type of machinery -- what kind of 14 worked with you in 2010, what type of surgical team 
liposuction machine do you use in your office? 15 did you have with you in 2010? 
A. We touched on this earlier. 16 A. Well, unlike Dr. Kerr, consistent with 
I told you that I was acquainted with -- 17 what our rules are in our state, we utilize the 
had either used in somebody else's office or demoed 18 services of a physician or -- or a nurse 
in my office just about everything that was out 19 anesthetist or a nurse to provide conscious 
there. 20 sedation to our patients during the liposuction 
I use a very -- I have a laser in which 21 procedure, which is actually somewhat rare. 
I can do laser lipolysis; in other words, laser 22 Most practices tend to go more of a 
followed by the suctioning. And I do that very 23 general anesthesia hospital route or a -- sort of a 
rarely, even though I have the equipment. 24 completely-awake, office-based route, and we're 
I mostly rely upon a -- a tumescent 25 sort of a hybrid. 
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saline assisted -- I shouldn't say saline assisted. 1 So my staff has to include anesthesia 
I should say tumescent liposuction. 2 personnel, always a circulator, and unlike other 
Q. Okay. First of all, do you have, in 3 procedures that we do, I generally do not need a 
your practice -- and let's go to -- use 2010. 4 first assist during the liposuction procedure; 
Did you have other staff in your office 5 however, about 50 percent of the time, I only 
at Germantown Aesthetics? 6 perform about half of the liposuction because it's 
A. Did I have other staff in my office? 7 physically demanding. 
Q. Yes. 8 Q. Okay. As far as the circulating nurse, 
MR. JONES: You mean people that worked with 9 when you would do a liposuction procedure in 2010, 
him or other people that did liposuction? 10 did you utilize a circulating nurse to assist you 
MR. HADDAD: Good point. 11 in someway? 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Did you have other 12 A. Well, you said "circulating nurse." 
people that worked with you in your office in 2010 13 Generally, we think of the circulator as being a 
at Germantown Aesthetics? 14 technical person, not a nurse. 
A. What I would call my administrative and 15 I probably had some occasions in which I 
surgical team, yeah, both. 16 had a -- a nurse or a physician providing the 
Q. Okay. Were there any-- 17 anesthesia, and then the circulator was a nurse. 
And I may have asked you this. 18 But in general terms, our circulator would be 
Were there any physicians other than 19 somebody who knew how to set up the equipment, knew 
yourself working at Germantown Aesthetics in 2010? 20 how to go get something if we needed to, you know, 
A. Yes. Again, on a part-time basis, we 21 do -- do something a little bit different in the 
had mentioned Dr. Joe Hernandez earlier, and he has 22 procedure; change the -- the cannula or something 
been in my office at least on a part-time basis for 23 like that. 
about five years. 24 So the circulating person would 
o. Does he do lioosuctions in vour office? 25 generally not be a nurse. 
20 (Pages 74 to 77) 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. A Gregory Laurence, L-A-U-R-E-N-C-E I think. He's out 
3 of Germantown, Tennessee, I believe. Do you know 
4 Dr. Laurence? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. As part of your practice, do you do any preoperative 
7 testing of patients? 
8 MR. JONES: Object to form. Vague. 
9 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) If you were doing a liposuction 
10 procedure on a patient, do you do preoperative 
11 testing? Specifically, do you do a preoperative CBC? 
12 A. We do on some patients but not every patient. 
13 Q. How about a preoperative urinalysis? 
14 A. I do not do urinalysis on patients unless they have 
15 complaints or symptoms or if they've had a recent 
16 course of treatment. So not a routine test, but one 
17 rather in response to a condition or a history. 
18 Q. Okay. That's fair. What patients of yours -- you 
19 said some patients you might do a preoperative CBC 
20 that are going to undergo liposuction -- what's -- how 
21 do you -- what criteria do you use to decide whether 
22 or not you're going to do a CBC on a patient? 
23 A. For the most part, an entirely healthy patient under 
24 the age of 30 with no history of anemia or other 
25 concomitant medical problems who was going to have a 
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1 relatively small volume procedure, I probably would 
2 not do a CBC on that person. 
3 Q. What do you characterize as a small volume procedure? 
4 A. Less than two liters of suction removed. 
5 Q. And a urinalysis, you said you wouldn't do it unless 
6 there was some specific reason, in terms of their 
7 history, that you might get that; correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. Doctor, in terms of some of the opinions that 
10 were identified as areas you may cover in your 
11 testimony, one of the things -- well, first of all, it 
12 says, "Dr. Lundeby will explain the process he 
13 undertook in order to familiarize himself with the 
14 standards and practices in Boise and the surrounding 
15 area for the types of procedures and treatments 
16 performed by Dr. Kerr in this case." 
17 Have we covered that by discussing your 
18 conversation with Dr. O'Neil? 
19 A. If, by that question, you mean is that what I did to 
20 familiarize myself, then yes. 
21 Q. You rephrased my question a lot simpler than I asked 
22 it the first time; but, you're right, that's what I 
23 was asking for. 
24 A. Okay. 
25 Q. It also talks about "experiences in the peer review 
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process associated with his hospital staff privileges I I 
at Kootenai Medical Center and Northwest Specialty 
I 
Hospital, both in Idaho." 
I mean what experience do you have in the 
peer review process associated with staff privileges 
at Kootenai Medical Center other than your own 
personally applying for and then reapplying for staff 
privileges? 
A. Well, that during the course of one's hospital 
privileges, and I think it -- well, it's been true at 
each hospital that I've been an attending at -- you're 
required, as part of your medical staff membership, to 
review your associates and peers and their conduct of 
the practice of medicine to be sure that it meets your 
local standards of practice. 
Q. For instance, if there was a quality assurance 
indicator concerning a patient, i.e., post-operative 
infection that came about, part of the peer review 
process would be a peer would look at your chart and 
determine whether or not this was related to some 
breach in the standard of practice; correct? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. 
THEWITNESS: Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) All right. I mean do you undertake 
that type of peer review process, or does Shape have 
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that type of peer review process? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How does it go about doing a peer review in 
circumstances where there might be a complication 
concerning patient care? 
A. That peer review process has been different over the 
course of Shape. When there was two physicians 
present, the other physician would review that, there 
would be a discussion during a minuted meeting and we 
would talk about that. 
Now that there is one physician, we contract 
with a firm that provides outside peer review; so 
those cases are sent out to be reviewed by a physician 
and then we receive input back. 
Q. Did you ask Dr. O'Neil whether or not physicians 
practicing cosmetic surgery in Boise undertook a peer 
review process of patient complications? 
A. I did not ask him that. 
Q. It also indicates you will discuss your "experience in 
performing a large volume of liposuction and fat 
transfer procedures, his knowledge of how the Vaser 
ultrasonic liposuction procedure is performed." 
First of all, you don't do Vaser 
ultrasound -- ultrasonic liposuction, correct. 
A. I do not. 
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1 Q. Okay. It says, "Dr. Lundeby will testify that the 
2 infection rates desc1ibed by Dr. Kerr in his 
3 deposition and discovery responses are well below 
4 average for a cosmetic facility and are essentially 
5 zero" and it talks about some other things. 
6 But as far as your knowledge of infection 
7 rates, have you been provided -- Well, first of all, 
8 do you have an understanding whether or not Dr. Kerr 
9 tracks his patient complications in some type of 
10 written documentation? 
11 A. I'm thinking back to his deposition, and without 
12 reviewing it, I think that he said that they tracked 
13 it but not in written form. 
14 Q. Okay. I mean have you been -- I mean I know you 
15 brought everything that you've seen. You've not seen 
16 Dr. Kerr's patient charts from other patients before 
17 or after Krystal Ballard's procedure, correct? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Have you been provided any written information on 
20 patient outcomes for Dr. Kerr before and after 
21 Krystal Ballard's procedure? 
22 MR. JONES: Other than the depositions. 
23 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Other than the testimony, have you 
24 seen anything written that is maintained by Silk Touch 
25 concerning patients undergoing procedures at 
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1 Dr. Kerr -- by Dr. Kerr before and after 
2 Krystal Ballard? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. There's a comment, "Dr. Lundeby will explain that the 
5 standard of health care practice for plastic surgeons 
6 is not the standard of health care practice in the 
7 same medical specialty as his and Dr. Kerr." 
8 First of all, do you have an understanding 
9 that -- First of all, as it pertains to the standard 
10 of practice in Boise, in speaking with Dr. O'Neil, do 
11 you have an understanding that -- how one goes about 
12 cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable 
13 medical equipment and supplies is different based upon 
14 your medical background? 
15 MR. JONES: Object to form. 
16 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Meaning do you have an understanding 
17 speaking to Dr. O'Neil that general surgeons and 
18 plastic surgeons have a different standard of practice 
19 in cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing medical 
20 equipment and instruments? 
21 MR. JONES: Object to form. Lack of 
22 foundation. 
23 THE WITNESS: I -- from talking with 
24 Dr. O'Neil, the practice that he utilized in Boise in 
25 2010 is different from my practice now; and other than 
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that, I don't feel like I'm really -- The standard of 
practice issue is a legal construct that I'm not sure 
I fully understand. But it seems like they may be 
different based on, like I say, what I do versus what 
Dr. O'Neil represented that he did. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. I mean you have a -- First of 
all, what kind of -- What's his first name? I 
forgot. Do you know -- do you remember what his first 
name was? 
MR. JONES: Who are we talking about, 
counsel? 
MR. HADDAD: Dr. O'Neil. I'm sorry. 
Dr. O'Neil. Do you remember his first name? 
MR. JONES: Kelly. 
THE WITNESS: Kelly. Yes, Kelly. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Dr. O'Neil, Dr. Kelly O'Neil, is 
that -- do you have an understanding of what his 
medical background is? 
A. I talked to him about that, and his residence, his 
formal residency training, was in family practice. 
Q. Okay. Now, going back to it, did -- while 
Dr. O'Neill's practice in 2010, standard of practice, 
may have differed from yours in certain respects, do 
you have an understanding, as it pertains specifically 
to cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable 
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medical equipment and instruments, that 
non-residency-trained physicians do things differently 
than surgical residency-trained physicians? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Vague. 
THE WITNESS: I believe that's true. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) You believe what's true? They do it 
different? 
A. That they do it differently. 
Q. Okay. I mean tell me about how non-surgically-trained 
physicians -- what the standard of practice might be 
in Boise for cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing 
medical equipment. 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Overbroad. 
THE WITNESS: I guess I -- I guess --
MR. HADDAD: Okay. That's fair. That's 
actually a fair objection. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Let me -- let me try to refocus it. 
What's your understanding as to the differences that 
surgically-trained cosmetic physicians have in 
cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing reusable 
medical equipment and supplies from that of 
non-surgically-trained cosmetic physicians in Boise in 
2010? 
A. I guess I'm still a bit confused. I would like to 
answer your question, but I'm not sure what your -- I 
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1 mean I'm not sure what answer you want. I guess -- I 
2 guess I've told you what I learned from Dr. O'Neil, 
3 I've told you what I do, and I read your plaintiffs 
4 disclosure for your expert Dr. Sorenson; and it looked 
5 to me, from those perspectives, that Dr. O'Neil's 
6 standard of practice and Dr. Sorenson's standard of 
7 practice were different. 
8 Q. Okay. Fair. Let me ask you this, and I might focus 
9 in on that little bit more: Is the basis upon which 
10 you have to believe there is a difference in the 
11 standard of health care practice for a plastic surgeon 
12 versus a non-surgeon cosmetic physician, in the 
13 cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing of medical 
14 equipment and instruments, based on the differences 
15 that you perceive between the plaintiffs disclosure 
16 of experts and your discussions with Dr. O'Neil? 
17 A. For this case in question, yes. 
18 Q. Okay. It says you will testify that you have 
19 "performed cosmetic surgery with Dr. Kerr and 
20 witnessed his habits and customs in this regard in a 
21 surgical setting." 
22 Is that based on the occasion, at least the 
23 one occasion, that you remember Dr. Kerr came to your 
24 facility to learn or observe your technique as it 
25 pertains to a particular type of cosmetic procedure? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Did you have Dr. -- First of all, what type of 
3 procedure or procedures did Dr. Kerr actually 
4 participate in at your facility? 
5 A. We did liposuction. I don't remember of exactly what 
6 areas. And the only thing I remember is thinking that 
7 he was competent. 
8 Q. I mean he -- when you had Dr. Kerr, as part of his 
9 paid training, or education on your technique, how 
10 many patients did that involve? 
11 A. I can't remember with utter certainty, but I think 
12 probably -- a typical training would see two and 
13 sometimes three cases done during that course of time. 
14 Q. Do you basically hand him -- or allow him to do the 
15 entire procedure, as it pertains to liposuction, on a 
16 given number of patients? I mean does he do the 
17 entire thing start to finish? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Okay. How does that -- how did your training go, 
20 either by specific recollection or your practice and 
21 procedure, when somebody comes to your office to 
22 train? 
23 A. The usual practice for that, and it varies on 
24 depending on the person's surgical kind of skill and 
25 experience with liposuction and what they may have 
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done before, but the usual procedure for that would be I ! 
we would do the procedure together. The regulations I 
for training people specified, of course, that I had 
to be scrubbed, in the room, and immediately attentive 
to the needs of my patient, and then the person would 
basically be my assistant, do portions of the I procedure, and learn in a hands-on fashion. 
Q. Okay. Do you have -- I'm going to ask you, do you 
have a specific memory of the exact type of procedure 
done when Dr. Kerr was here? 
I 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. When -- So I'm going to ask you you your 
general practice and procedure. You say you both I I 
participate in the procedure? ! 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Kind of explain to me -- I mean I guess 
you do certain -- you might do certain contouring on a 
patient -- First of all, what kind of equipment do 
you use? 
A. We do Smart Lipo, which is a laser-assisted 
liposuction, and I use a tumescent technique with 
sedation. 
Q. So you would do part of the contouring using the Smart 
Lipo, and then you would hand the instrument over to 
Dr. Kerr who would do part of it and you would just 
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watch him. 
A. Yes. I Q. Okay. How long does it normally take for you to do a 
l 
liposuction procedure? For instance, we saw how much I fat was removed from Krystal Ballard based upon the 
medical records at Silk Touch, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is the amount of fat removed a factor in determining 
how long it's going to take to complete the procedure? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Incomplete 
hypothetical. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Let me ask you just generally, 
looking at Krystal Ballard's record, and recognizing 
that she had liposuction and fat transfer, how long 
does that typically take you to perform in a patient 
with the same amount of fat removed as Krystal Ballard 
and the same amount of fat injected into her buttocks? 
A. For the -- I guess for the hypothetical you presented, 
if I were going to book that case in my facility, I 
would -- I would probably allow an hour and a half for 
the liposuction and 45 minutes for the fat transfer. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And -- but that presumes that the patient would have 
sedation. It takes longer if the patient does not 
have IV sedation. You have to be more gentle in your 
17 (Pages 62 to 65) 
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l negative nitrite test and a negative leukocyte 
2 esterase test, what the negative predictive value is 
3 for that patient having a urinary tract infection? 
4 A. I do not know a number for that. 
5 Q. Do you see underneath you had referenced kind of the 
6 dipstick part separated from the microscopic by the 
7 line "Urine auto with micro," correct? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. So underneath the microscopic portion, it indicates 
10 "Epi" and then a space "cell." Do you understand that 
11 to be in reference to epithelial cells? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And it indicates that the result is 12 to 20 in this 
14 particular microscopic analysis of Krystal Ballard's 
15 urine, correct? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Do you know what the significance of a -- the presence 
18 of 12 to 20 epithelial cells is with respect to 
19 whether or not bacteria found in urinalysis is 
20 actually because of a urinary tract infection versus a 
21 contaminated specimen obtained from the patient? 
22 A. Epithelial cells make you wonder about the purity of 
23 the specimen, whether or not there were some cells 
24 obtained from outside the patient as opposed to true 
25 urine from only inside. 
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1 Q. Do you have an understanding as to, in 
2 Krystal Ballard's case with a negative nitrite test, a 
3 negative leukocyte esterase test, and the presence of 
4 12 to 20 epithelial cells on microscopic examination, 
5 what the likelihood is of whether or not bacteria 
6 found on microscopic examination of her urine is or is 
7 not a urinary tract infection? 
8 A. So if -- to clarify, to understand your question, 
9 you're asking me if I think that this urinalysis 
10 represents evidence that she has a urinary tract 
11 infection. 
12 Q. Versus just bacteria -- the bacteria being related to 
13 a contaminated specimen. 
14 A. Right. I am not sure. And one of the reasons that 
15 I'm not sure is I'm not sure how this was obtained. 
16 Do you know how it was obtained? 
17 Q. I can only tell you what the records might reflect. 
18 Do the records reflect how this was obtained? 
19 A. I don't see how it was obtained or collected, so I 
20 don't know. If it was -- if it was a catch specimen, 
21 so a cup applied to the outside of the patient's 
22 perineum, with or without her assistance, I think that 
23 would be difficult. If it was a -- if it was a 
24 catheter urine, I would be much more -- I guess much 
25 more sure that the results suggested a urinary tract 
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infection and not --
Q. Okay. 
A. So I would like to know how it was obtained. 
Q. Fair. Is there anything in the Elmore Medical Center 
records that indicate whether or not Krystal Ballard 
was catheterized during that hospitalization? 
A. Can I take a second? 
Q. Sure. 
A. (Reading.) 
Q. While you're doing that --
MR. HADDAD: -- how much time we have? Ten 
minutes? 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) You know, why don't you look for 
that, and let's go ahead and take our break now to ! 
change tapes. 
VIDEOGRAPHER: This will conclude Tape No. 2. 
The time is 10:28 A.M. 
(Recess taken.) 
VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the continued 
videotaped deposition of Dr. Lundeby in Tape No. 3. 
The date is Friday, July 26, 2013. The time is 
10:34A.M. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Doctor, we took a break just so we 
wouldn't bum tape while you tried to see if there was 
an answer to my question based on the records. Were 
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you able to determine whether or not it was a catch of 
the urine versus a specimen obtained through a 
catheter? 
A. Yes. It says on the sheet that the source was from a 
void. 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you: Are -- First of all, you've 
looked at the autopsy report, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you can certainly look at it. I'm just -- I don't 
know how much detail I'm going to get in. 
A. Are we done with the Elmore records? 
Q. Well, you can put them aside. We may refer back to 
them. Let me find it. 
On the front sheet -- well, you might have a 
different front sheet --
A. It's a --
Q. Just a cover sheet? 
A. The cover sheet, yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
-- listed at least in an order that I have 
them, and it may not necessarily be the right order, 
the front page says "Investigative Report" at the top. 
Is that what you have? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And then it goes on to a second page and the 
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1 second page lists "Cause of Death"? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. It says, "Sepsis with probable toxic shock 
4 syndrome." Is that the Cause A as identified by the 
5 Office of the Coroner? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Do you disagree with that, or have no opinion whether 
8 it's right or wrong? Well, strike that. 
9 Do you agree, disagree, or have no opinion 
10 about the accuracy of that postmortem diagnosis? 
11 A. That's --
12 MR. JONES: I'm going to object to the form 
13 to the extent you list that as the diagnosis. 
14 But if you understand the question, you can 
15 answer. 
16 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Let me rephrase the question. They 
17 list, "Sepsis with probable toxic shock syndrome" as 
18 Cause A, which you understand to mean Cause A for the 
19 cause of death? 
20 A. Well, one of the causes of death, but that's -- I 
21 guess Cause A means to me their principal cause. 
22 Q. We'll have to ask them. At least that's listed as a 
23 cause of death, correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Do you agree with that diagnosis, or do you agree with 
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1 that cause, meaning "Sepsis with probable toxic shock 
2 syndrome"? 
3 A. I reviewed this case and looked at it and -- well, 
4 I -- I guess that's a very broad question and I'm 
5 trying to figure out the best way to answer it for 
6 you. 
7 I think the clinical picture that she 
8 presented would be consistent with sepsis. The toxic 
9 shock syndrome, from my medical recollection and 
10 training, is probably not used accurately here in that 
11 my understanding of toxic shock syndrome is not a gram 
12 negative sepsis, which seems to be the question in the 
13 medical record. But when I looked at this entire 
14 record, I was very -- it was difficult to figure out 
15 exactly why this patient died. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. Like I say, the clinical picture would be most 
18 consistent with sepsis. I can see why the coroner's 
19 office and the medical examiner put that. 
20 Q. You just haven't -- Let me see if I can rephrase what 
21 you said, and ifl mess it up, you let me know. At 
22 this point in time, you don't know whether or not you 
23 have enough information to form an opinion as to the 
24 cause of this patient's death; is that fair? 
25 MR. JONES: Object to form. 
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THE WITNESS: I think forming an opinion as 
to the exact cause and having -- Yeah, I think -- I 
think that's fair. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. Based on the -- Do you have 
an understanding that tissue samples were taken from 
the area where the fat was injected into ! Krystal Ballard's buttocks for purposes of gram 
I staining? I MR. JONES: Object to form. Vague when you I 
say "area." ' 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Take a look at page 5. Let me see 
what you're looking at, doctor, to make sure we're on 
the same page. 
A. (Indicating.) 
Q. We are. Okay. Which at the top of the sheet, for 
purposes of identifying it, says "Microscopic," then 
underneath it says "Cassette A," and then it goes down 
B, C and D; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have an understanding that tissue gram stains 
of tissue were taken from Ms. Ballard's buttocks? 
A. It says Cassette A, B and C were buttocks; and 
Cassette D, abdominal wall. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So, yes. 
Page 85 
Q. And, "The tissue gram stain revealed many gram 
negative bacterial rods in the surgical site 
I specimen." That's what's reported by the pathologist, 
correct? 
I A. Yeah; that's separate, down from the report of each cassette. 
Q. Are gram negative rod bacteria supposed to be in the 
area that he took tissue from for purposes of the 
microscopic sections? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Foundation. 
Vague. 
THE WITNESS: When I reviewed this part, a 
question arose that I have not been able to see an 
answer to in the report, which was exactly -- The 
buttocks is a big area. I didn't know if this was 
taken at the surgical site, the puncture site, if it 
was taken deeper in the tissue. I don't know where it 
was from. And I would want to know where it was from 
before I said whether or not it could be present 
there. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Okay. If -- That's fair. Right 
now, you can't tell, from the way in which the autopsy 
was reported, exactly where these tissue sections were 
taken from Krystal Ballard; is that fair? 
A. That's true. 
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1 Q. By the way, have you ever done a -- you probably have 
2 rotated on pathology back in med school, is that 
3 correct? 
4 A. Pathology in medical school? I don't think I did a 
5 pathology rotation. 
6 Q. Okay. Have you ever participated in an autopsy? 
7 A. I've attended multiple autopsies. I don't know how 
8 many, but I've been present at a lot of autopsies. 
9 Q. Have you ever been the person performing the autopsy? 
10 A. I've not performed one. 
11 Q. Have you ever been asked at any point in time to 
12 arrive at a cause of death based upon a postmortem 
13 examination? Meaning have you ever been given the 
14 data from a postmortem and say, "We want you to 
15 prepare a cause of death" or "to arrive at the cause 
16 of death"? 
17 A. Not from --
18 MR.JONES: You mean like a reported cause of 
19 death? 
20 MR. HADDAD: Yeah. 
21 THE WITNESS: Not from a postmortem exam. 
22 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) As a treating physician, if you had 
23 somebody die, you would arrive at a conclusion, 
24 correct? 
25 A. Yeah. So I filled out death certificates, of course, 
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1 but not based on my conduct of a postmortem exam. 
2 Q. You may use the postmortem examination to fill out the 
3 death certificate, correct? 
4 A. If there's one performed. 
5 Q. Do you agree or disagree that Krystal Ballard had 
6 sepsis? 
7 A. I think the clinical picture was one of sepsis. 
8 Q. When we say "sepsis," do we mean an infection, from an 
9 infectious cause? 
10 MR. JONES: Object to form. 
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
12 Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Do you think that the autopsy was 
13 incomplete because tissue samples of the bladder 
14 weren't taken? 
15 A. I guess the short answer is I'm probably not qualified 
16 to answer that because I'm not a pathologist. I think 
17 it -- in light of the fact that the pathologist 
18 remarked in the report about erythema, redness of the 
19 bladder wall, I think it would have been appropriate 
20 to take those. But, again, that's -- I'm not a 
21 pathologist. 
22 Q. So you have an opinion, but it's not based upon any 
23 expertise in the area of where tissue samples should 
24 be taken as part of a postmortem examination. 
25 A. That's true. 
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MR.JONES: Object to form. Foundation. l 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) There's a reference in the I 
disclosure, your disclosure -- and I'll read part of I 
it, and if you need to read more to put it in context, i 1 
I 
do -- it indicates, "Dr. Lundeby will also comment 
' 
upon the significance from his perspective regarding I 
how the patient did not present to Elmore Medical 
I Center with any fever but had a white blood cell count 
of 14.7. He will discuss causes for an elevated white 
blood cell count including surgery, stress, and 
dehydration." 
Do you recall that the CBC from Elmore 
indicated a neutrophil count of 91.9? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is -- what are neutrophils? 
A. Neutrophils are the type of white blood cell that is 
often found in the setting of bacterial infection. 
Q. Okay. Can a white blood cell count be elevated in the 
face of stress and dehydration? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you have a neutrophil count of 91.9? 
MR. JONES: I think it was 91.7. 
MR. HADDAD: Is it? I hate to be inaccurate. 
THE WITNESS: I think it's 1.9, but --
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Either 91.9 or 91.7, that's --
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doesn't -- shades of gray, really. 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. If you have a neutrophil count of 91 or 
higher, in the face of an elevated white cell count, 
would you agree the most likely cause of the elevated 
white count is a bacterial infection? 
MR. JONES: Object to form. Incomplete 
hypothetical. 
THE WITNESS: I'd agree it's one of the 
potential causes. 
Q. (BY MR. HADDAD) Do you still believe -- do you 
believe that stress can cause a neutrophil count to be 
91 percent or greater? 
A. I'm not a hematologist either, but stress, steroids, 
dehydration, sepsis, there's a bunch of causes of an 
elevated white blood cell count and it has to be taken 
in the context of the patient's clinical situation. 
Q. Fair. I guess I can agree with that. Let me ask you 
specifically with Krystal Ballard. And when we say 
reasonable degree of medical probability, do you 
understand what that means? 
A. As I understand it, it's more likely than not. 
Q. You're -- at least we're talking on the same page. 
Whether we're right or not is another story. But I 
think I and you agree that medical probability means 
23 (Pages 86 to 89) 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
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PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S MISREPRESENTATION TO 
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Counsel for the Defendants, in his "Certification of Defense Counsel Per the Amended 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings" received by the undersigned 
today, states at the outset of this pleading that Plaintiff, on October 22, 2013, brought up 
mediation for the first time. More specifically, defense counsel represents to this Court that on 
October 22, 2013: 
For the first time in the history of the case, counsel for Plaintiff said that his client 
would agree to mediation, even though the trial is scheduled to start November 5, 
2013. Defense counsel had to decline the untimely suggestion of mediation due 
to the date the trial was to start, the impossibility of arranging mediation on such 
short notice and the fact that the bulk of the trial preparations had been completed 
and that defense counsel would be completely occupied with continued trial 
preparations. 
Certification of Defense Counsel, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
This representation by defense counsel is demonstrably false. By letter dated May 2, 
2013, counsel for Plaintiff wrote to this same lawyer for the Defendants and stated as follows: "I 
write to inquire whether your clients are interested in exploring settlement in advance of trial. If 
so, I suggest we do so through mediation and before significant additional resources are 
expended by the parties." Letter of May 2, 2013, from P. Gregory Haddad to Jeremiah Quane, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" ( emphasis added). Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of the 
foregoing letter and indicated: "Your recent letter regarding settlement negotiations will be 
considered but [sic] the carrier for Dr. Kerr and his entities. The carrier would like you to tender 
a settlement offer and so would Dr. Kerr." Letter of May 14, 2013, from Jeremiah Quane to P. 
Gregory Haddad, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." Plaintiff's counsel by letter dated June 10, 
2013, provided defendants with the requested settlement demand in a detailed, eight-page letter 
to which defendants did not respond until the October 22 conference when defense counsel 
acknowledge having received plaintiff's earlier demand. 
2 - Plaintiff's Response to Defense Counsel's Misrepresentation to the Court re Mediation 
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DATED this 301h day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 30, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served upon the following via email and facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Q~ANE JONES Mc~OLL PLLC 
16 Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1576 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
Email: tsj@guanelaw.com; corina@quanelaw.com 
4 -Plaintiffs Response to Defense Counsel's Misrepresentation to the Court re Mediation 
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BAILEY &GLASSERuP 
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 N. 6th Street, Suite 200 
PO Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Re: Estate of K,yslal Ballard 
Dear Mr. Quane: 
May 2, 2013 
Lawyers 
Internet www.balleyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9109 
28SS Cron berry Square 
Mori:antown, WV 26508 
The trial in this case is scheduled for September 24, 2013. I write to inquire 
whether your clients are interested in exploring settlement in advance of trial. If so, I 
suggest we do so through mediation and before significant additional resources are 
· expended by the parties. Alternatively, if you would prefer to simply negotiate this 
without the assistance of a mediator, we can proceed in that manner. 
Defendants should have the information they need to fairly evaluate their 
exposure and the relative strength of our client, SSgt Charles Ballard's claims. 
Plaintiff's expert disclosure makes clear that we are prepared to establish at trial 
through the testimony of respected and qualified medical experts that the applicable 
standard of care was violated, that this violation caused the death of SSgt Krystal 
Ballard and that this death c1;1used significant damages to Krystal's surviving spouse, 
SSgt Charles Ballard. In other words, this is not a case that will be decided by the Court 
on summary judgment. 
I don't presume to know whether confidentiality is important to your clients. With 
that said, you may anticipate that we would agree to a confidentiality provision as part of 
any settlement. Obviously, confidentiality will not exist in the event of a public trial. 
We anticipate providing you in the near future the details of SSgt Ballard's 
economic loss as calculated by our economist. If you wish to proceed with mediation, 
we can work, in the meantime, on selecting a mutually agreeable mediator and finding a 
date that will work for all concerned. We would provide you with our damage calculation 
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May 2, 2013 
Page 2 
Please let me know your position on the foregoing. 
PGH/flc 








2013/05/1412:37:41 3 /3 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLc 
Attorneys at law 
Jeremiah A. Qucne 
Ten-el'lCe s. Jones 
Matthew F. McColl 
Erin c. Pittenger 
VlA FACSIMILE: 





May 14, 2013 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranbef'JY Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
Our File No. 1107/25~938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
US Bank PIOZC'J 
101 S. Copltol Boulevard 
Svlle 1601 
P.O. BoK 1576 
Uolse, ID 8370 I 
(208) 780-3931' Telephone 
(206) 760-3930 Fccslrrile 
www.qucmelcrw.com 
I will see when Brianna Kerr finishes school and get you dates for her 
deposition in Boise. In your letter of May 8, 2013, you say that you are out of the country 
from June 10 to June 30. Does this mean that her deposition will not be taken during 
this time frame or what? I am totally unavailable for her deposition during the rest of 
May and J have a trial starting July 1, 2013 in Idaho Falls, Idaho that is scheduled to last 
the entire month of July. There are several days in June, with the exception of June 4 
through June 7, when I am avaUable, if she is. I am also unavailable June 26, 27 and 
28. 
I have asked the Ada County Coroner for blood samples from the blood 
taken at the autopsy and the Coroner's office tells me that their policy is to only allow 
samples to be sent to a lab for testing if there is an agreement between the Involved 
parties, meaning you and me. Will you agree to this if I provide you with the lab we want 
to use? If not, I will have to get a Court order which I hope to avoid. Your recent letter 
regarding settlement negotiations will be considered but the carrier for Dr. Kerr and his 
entnies. The carrier would Uke you to tender a settlement offer and so would Dr. Kerr. 
Very truly yours. 
JAQ/cf 
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ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, tN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO,,------;;-::::::-._---
IUO C:---A.M, ___ _,-,.M .JL · · . 
OCT 3 1 2013 ... 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOlSE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF FILING 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
Ptease find, attached, Defendants' Exhibit List. 
NOTICE OF FILING-1 .... 
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DATED this 31st day of October, 2013. 
NOTICE OF FILING - 2 
QUAN 
By~..jL..::....L...::=..:--~----
Jeremiah A. Quan , Of the firm 
Terrence S. Jo , Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31 51 day of October, 2013, I served. a true . 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING by delivering the same to each of · 
the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF FILING - 3 
{ ] \ . .LS. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand Delivered· 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ } U.S.- Mail, postage prepaig 
[ ] Hand Delivered · · · 
[ ] Overnight Mail . 
[X] Facsimile {304) '594'-9709 
[ ] U.S. M~il, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page 1 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Laurence 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Frankie 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller 
Medical records of Dr. Kerr and Silk 
Touch Laser 
Records ,of Elmore Medical Center 
for treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of Elmore Ambulance 
Service for care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of life Flight for care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center for treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of Ada County Coroner 
Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard 
21 photographs of Krystal Ballard 
taken by Dr. Kerr for his operative 
procedure 
43 photographs of Krystal Ballard 
taken at autopsy 
6 photographs of Susan Kerr that 
depict the positions of Krystal 
Ballard for the operative procedure 
of Dr. Kerr 
ADMITTED . DENl{=D : 
.. 
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DEFENDANTS'EXHlmTS 
Page 2 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Photographs of brain and kidney 
tissue from the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard prepared by Dr. Garrison 
that show the presence of fat emboli 
Autopsy tissue slides 
4 photographs of Krystal Ballard 
that depict the entry sites by 
markings for liposuction and fat 
transfer 
.Report of Dr. Morgan 
CT study of Krystal Ballard of Jury 
25,2010 
Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest 
x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010 
Report of Or. Schaff for chest x-ray 
of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010 
Visible glass container that shows 
the quantity of fluid measured in 
milliliters or the equivalent in cubic 
centimeters 
Medical devices, equipment, 
supplies, packaged material, 
autoclave and instruments used by 
Dr. Kerr for his procedures with 
photographs of the same 
Compilation of data and database 
for operative procedures of Dr. Kerr 
by date, procedure and patient's 
first name from December of 2007 
through December 23, 2010, with 
Krystal Ballard identified on July 21, 
201 O and the number of liposuction 
procedures, consisting of a total of 
338 procedures. 
.. 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page 3 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV DC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Documents, records, material, data 
and calendars produced with 
Defendants response to Plaintiff's 
First Requests for Production of 
Documents dated June 29, 2012 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
18 depicting liposuction of anatomy 
with and without the cannula 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
1 depicting anatomy for fat transfer 
in the bilateral buttocks 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
1 depicting various tissue layers 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
1 depicting the content of the 
abdomen 
: 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
1 depicting the urinary system 
: 
For illustrative purposes, the 
following medical artist illustrations: 
1 depicting gram negative and gram 









David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. ~ 
A.M. ____ F_IL~.M.: 9'.:Q: 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, ; LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST 
OR\G\NAL 
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Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, hereby submits his exhibit list for trial in 
accordance with the Court's Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further 
Proceedings, dated September 9, 2013. A more formal exhibit list with corresponding exhibit 
numbers will be submitted to the Court at trial. 
1. Curriculum Vitae of Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. 
2. Curriculum Vitae of George R. Nichols, II, M.D. 
3. · Curriculum Vitae of Keith Barclay Armitage, M.D. 
4. Curriculum Vitae of Cornelius A. Hofman 
5. · Complete medical record and chart for Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr including 
1. Contemporaneous photos of Krystal Ballard 
6. Complete medical record and chart for Elmore Ambulance 
7. • Complete medical record and chart for Elmore Medical Center 
8. Complete medical record and chart for Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
9. Complete Medical Record and Chart for Ada County Coroner and Dr. Groben 
including 
1. Autopsy Report, Photos, and 
11. Tissue Slides 
10. Funeral Placard for Krystal Ballard (red background) 
11. Funeral Placard for Krystal Ballard ( cream background) 
12. Photos of Charles & Krystal Ballard (close-up) 
13. Photos of Charles & Krystal Ballard ( on couch) 
14. Photos of Charles & Krystal Ballard (framed photographs) 
15. Photo of Krystal Ballard (Tubing) 
16. Marriage License for Charles and Krystal Ballard 
2 
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17. Death Certificate for Krystal Ballard 
18. CT Scans of Krystal Ballard 
19. Cell Phone Records of Dr. Brian Kerr 
20. Cell Phone Records of Susan Kerr 
21. Photos of tissue slides from autopsy 
22. Tillman Funeral Home Invoice 
23. Artistic Flowers Invoice 
24. Memorial Program for Krystal Ballard Memorial 
25. Bill from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
26. Bill from Elmore Medical Center 
27. Bill from Rost Funeral Home 
28. Bill from Lifeflight 
29. USAF Records Certification for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
30. Memorandum - Extension of Enlistment for PCS for Krystal Ballard (Elmendorf 
AFB) 
31. Line of Duty Determination for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
32. Awards & Decorations Info for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
33. Air Force Achievement Medal for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
34. Air Force Commendation Medal for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
35. DJMS LES for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
36. DJMS LES for Charles Ballard - USAF 
37. Letter from Major Thomas Brown to SSgt Charles Ballard from 2010 following 
death of Krystal Ballard 
38. Statement of Service 
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39. Enlisted Performance Review 2010 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
40. Enlisted Performance Review 2009 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
41. Enlisted Performance Review 2008 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
42. Enlisted Performance Review 2007 for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
43. Reenlistment Eligibility Annex for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
44. Air University CCAF Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
45. BSU Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
46. Embry-Riddle Transcript for Krystal Ballard - USAF 
47. University of Maryland Transcript for Krystal Ballard- USAF 
48. Sound Surgical Technologies The VASER System VentX Suction Handpiece 
User's Guide 
49. Bottle of Hibiclens 
50. Cannulae 
Plaintiff intends to employ charts and tables, which were generated and/or employed by 
Plaintiffs economic expert, Cornelius Hofman of the GEC Group (see Assessment of Economic 
Loss Krystal Melissa Ballard dated May 8, 2013). Some of the following tables and charts may 
be offered including for demonstrative or illustrative purposes. 
5 lA. Table 1 
Scenarios) 
51B. Table 2 
51C. Table 3 
51D. Table 4 
51E. Table 5 
PV of Pecuniary Loss Associated with Death of Krystal Ballard (2 
Money Earnings Base for Lost Financial Support - Scenario 1 
Money Earnings Base for Lost Financial Support - Scenario 2 
Money Earnings Base for Lost Financial Support (Post Military 
Career) Scenario 1 and 2 
Life Cycle Index for Lost Financial Support (Post Military Career) 
Scenario 1 and 2 
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51F. Table 6 US Economic Growth and the Growth in Wages of US Workers 
SIG. Table 7 Expected Risk Premiums of Corporate Pension Plans (Period 36 
years) 
51H. Table 8A Present Value of Earnings per $10,000 of Initial Earnings (Period 
36 years) 
Table 8B Future Value of Earnings per $10,000 of Initial Earnings (Period 
36 years) 
511 Table 9 Mrs. Ballard's Past Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 1 and 2 (normal worklife) (July 26, 2010 to May 8, 2013) 
5IJ Table 10 Mrs. Ballard's Past Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 1 and 2 (full worklife to age 67) (July 26, 2010 to May 8, 
2013) 
51K Table 11 Mrs. Ballard's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 1 (normal worklife) (From May 8, 2013 through normal 
retirement) 
511 Table 12 Mrs. Ballard's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 1 (full worklife to age 67) (From May 8, 2013 through 
age 67) 
51M Table 13 Mrs. Ballard's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 2 (normal worklife) (From May 8, 2013 through normal 
retirement) 
SIN Table 14 Mrs. Ballard's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment -
Scenario 2 (full worklife to age 67) (From May 8, 2013 through 
age 67) 
510 Table 15 PV of Ms. Ballard's Lost Military Retirement Income (through Mr. 
Ballard's life expectancy) - Scenario 1 (normal worklife) 
51P Table 16 PV of Ms. Ballard's Lost Military Retirement Income (through Mr. 
Ballard's life expectancy) - Scenario 1 (full worklife to age 67) 
51Q Table 17 PV of Ms. Ballard's Lost Military Retirement Income (through Mr. 
Ballard's life expectancy) - Scenario 2 (normal worklife) 
SIR Table 18 PV of Ms. Ballard's Lost Military Retirement Income (through Mr. 




52A Chart 1 
528 Chart 2 
52C Chart 3 
52D Chart 4 
52E Chart 5 
52F Chart 6 
520 Chart 7 
52H Chart 8 
Worklife Expectancy vis a vis Retirement 
Future Values of a $10,000 Salary over 36 years 
Future Values of a $10,000 Salary Increased 5 Percent Each Year 
Over 36 years 
A Demonstration of Present Value Increased for Wage Growth a 
5% and Decreased for Interest at 6% 
Present Value Using the Net Discount Rate Method Decreased for 
Net Interest at 1 % 
The Net Discount Rate Determines Present Value 
Assuming a Net Discount Rate of 0%, How Much Money Does it 
Take Today If you Need $10,000 in 10 years? 
Expected Risk Premium of Corporate Pension Plans. 
Plaintiff reserves the right to use at trial any of the exhibits identified by defendants as 
defendants' exhibits, other presently unanticipated exhibits including specifically documents 
exchanged by the parties during discovery and exhibits for impeachment purposes. 
Dated this 31st day of October, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~ By ____________ _ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory I Iaddad 
James B. Perrine 




f"I l ,,, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ~ereby certify that on the 31st day of October, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintifrs Exhib~t List by delivering the same to the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl3rk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
I. The Court Should Deny Plaintiffs' Efforts to Improperly 
Impeach the Defense Experts 
Plaintiff claims he should be able to impeach the defense experts at trial, 
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who do not include Dr. Kelly O'Neil, with questions and/or documents involving 
disciplinary action against Dr. O'Neil given his capacity as a familiarizing physician in this 
case. In support of their position, Plaintiff has produced a number of documents from the 
state of California purporting to be evidence of disciplinary action taken against Dr. O'Neil 
dating back to 1998. Setting aside the obvious hearsay implications associated with 
these documents which the defense maintains renders the documents themselves wholly 
inadmissible, the defense further maintains that any questions to the defense experts 
regarding Dr. O'Neil's prior disciplinary status is irrelevant and should be precluded at the 
trial. 
We start by evaluating the various documents submitted by Plaintiff in 
opposition to the defense motion. Ex. D is a document entitled "Decision" dated August 
14, 1998 by the Medical Board of California which has attached to it a stipulated 
settlement. The stipulation refers to an Accusation and First Supplemental Accusation, 
but those documents are not provided. The document also refers to a patient "J.G." but 
no information about that patient or the care at issue is provided. The document states 
that Dr. O'Neil's license is revoked, but refers him to complete a class and be placed on 
five years of probation along with other conditions. There is nothing in Ex. D which gives 
any indication as to what medical issue was involved regarding the one patient or if it even 
was a medical issue. 
Ex. E is a document entitled "Order for Reciprocal Discipline" dated 
November 2, 1998 by the Idaho State Board of Medicine which states that it is ordering 
reciprocal discipline in the state of Idaho for Dr. O'Neil. Again, this document does not 
identify what the medical care at issue involved. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE - 2 
001766
Ex. F contains multiple documents which are incapable of being reconciled 
individually or collectively. The first document is entitled "Decision" in case 1993-26899 
and is dated August 11, 2004. In this document, the Division of Medical Quality of the 
Medical Board of California states that based on its review of the prior case from 1998, Dr. 
O'Neil's license to practice medicine was revoked, but stayed provided Dr. O'Neil 
complete a training course. It further states that if the board were able to prove the 
accusations contained in the attached First Amended Accusation that they would 
constitute grounds for discipline. For settlement purposes, the parties agreed that Dr. 
O'Neil's license would be revoked, but again stayed so he could complete a training 
course. The settlement document does not state what the basis is for disciplining Dr. 
O'Neil other than referring to the complaint document. 
The second document in Ex. F consists of a First Amended Accusation, i.e. 
a complaint by the state against Dr. O'Neil dated October 16, 2002. In the complaint, it 
refers to allegations involving two patients whose care at issue dates back to 2000, some 
ten years prior to the care at issue in this case. Furthermore, the medical care at issue 
has nothing to do with the medical issues in this case. 
The first case involves a 70 year old female patient who underwent a 
chemical peel in July 2000 and had complications associated with the administration of 
intravenous lidocaine. The board claimed that Dr. O'Neil inappropriately discharged the 
patient and failed to recognize her cardiac instability. The second case involved a 72 
year old female who also had a chemical peel and a thigh liposuction in July 2000. The 
patient had complications associated with failure to maintain deep vein thrombosis 
precautions which led to a pulmonary embolism. The board claimed that Dr. O'Neil 
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should not have performed liposuction and the chemical peel at the same time due to the 
preoperative work-up showing the patient suffered from lower extremity venous 
insufficiency. The other issues in the case relate to the propriety and accuracy of Dr. 
O'Neil's advertising and whether he was improperly using an Embassy Suites hotel for his 
post-operative patients to stay. 
The third document in Ex. F is entitled "Decision After Nonadoption" and 
also relates to case 1993-26899. This 43 page decision goes through the evidence 
submitted apparently at a hearing or trial of some nature by both the state and Dr. O'Neil, 
including the opinions of the experts for both sides. The decision finds some of the 
allegations supported by adequate evidence and others were not. The decision 
concludes that Dr. O'Neil should be suspended from the practice of medicine for six 
months and be on probation or seven years. This decision is dated August 28, 2003, 
before the decision identified as the first document in Ex. F stating that Dr. O'Neil's license 
is not suspended. 
The fourth document in Ex. F is entitled "Notice of Non-Adoption of 
Proposed Decision" and simply states that the decision of the administrative law judge, 
which is the fifth document of Ex. F is not adopted by the Board. This decision, which is 
dated March 15, 2003 summarizes the same evidence referred to in the third document in 
Ex. F but finds no evidence of any violations by Dr. O'Neil and dismisses both the 
Accusation and First Amended Accusation. 
Ex. G is a June 15, 2005 document entitled "Public Reprimand" addressed 
to Dr. O'Neil from the Medical Board of California. It identifies two female patients who 
underwent an unknown "cosmetic surgery" who had postoperative complications. There 
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is no mention of what types of procedures the patients had or what types of post-operative 
complications they had. It is unclear whether the two patients referred to are the same or 
different patients than those identified in Ex. F. 
Also involving Dr. O'Neil, the first document in Ex. H refers to a March 14, 
2007 decision of the California Medical Board in matter 2003-147439 and is entitled 
"Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order." It states under paragraph 3 that 
Respondent, Dr. O'Neil is in possession of a certificate to practice medicine from the state 
of California that was "in full force and effect at all times relevant. .. " The document goes 
on to state under paragraph 8 that Respondent neither admits nor denies he violated 
Business and Professional Code section 2234 in his care and treatment of the patient in 
question referred to in Accusation No. 2003-147439. Under discipline, the order states 
that Dr. O'Neil's certificate is revoked, but stayed and that he is placed on probation for 35 
months and sets forth various training requirements. The stipulation states further under 
paragraph 14 that upon completion of the probation that Dr. O'Neil's "certificate shall be 
fully restored." 
The second document in Ex. H which consists of an Accusation, i.e. a 
complaint by the state against Dr. O'Neil dated June 9, 2006- presumably this is what the 
first document in Ex. H is based upon. In this complaint, it refers to allegations involving 
two patients. The first is a 71 year old female who underwent a chemical peel procedure 
in February 2003, over seven years prior to the care at issue in this case. The 
allegations related to patient selection for use of phenol as an anesthetic in a patient with 
pre-existing heart disease and patient follow up post procedure. The second patient's age 
is not listed, but she also underwent a chemical peel dated July 2002. The allegations 
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involve failure to maintain accurate and adequate medical records due in part to illegible 
handwritten records or having used some preprinted records which lacked individual 
patient content. 
Ex. I is a document entitled stipulation and order from the Idaho Board of 
Medicine dated April 28, 2008. This document states that Dr. O'Neil applied for an Idaho 
license to practice medicine in December 2007. Under paragraph II, it states that Dr. 
O'Neil had malpractice cases and a disciplinary order in California and states that Dr. 
O'Neil "incorrectly answered various questions on the application." The document goes 
on to state in paragraph 6(d) that he shall only perform chemical peels and liposuction. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, nowhere does the document state that Dr. O'Neil lied or 
falsified any information in his application for a license in Idaho. 
Ex. J is a document entitled decision of the Medical Board of California 
dated May 5, 2009 with the adopted proposed decision dated March 30, 2009 attached 
thereto. This document summarizes the prior discipline against Dr. O'Neil and explains 
the circumstances of his incorrect answers on his Idaho and other state licensing 
applications due to an error by a Utah company hired to complete and submit 
documentation. After investigating the matter, the administrative law judge stated in his 
legal conclusions that there was no cause to conclude that Dr. O'Neil had committed an 
act of dishonesty, but that he would be subject to further discipline by way of extended 
probation for the action taken in Idaho in response to his improperly completed Idaho 
application for a medical license. 
Although it is not specifically stated in his opposition, Plaintiff's counsel 
appears to argue that he should be allowed to not only question defense witnesses, but to 
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also utilize the above documents at trial for impeachment purposes. The defense 
objects and contends that none of these documents are admissible nor may they be used 
for purposes of impeachment in any fashion at trial. Plaintiff states that such 
impeachment should be fair game because the defense witnesses elected to utilize Dr. 
O'Neil as a familiarizing expert in order to confirm the local standard of practice applicable 
to Dr. Kerr. Plaintiff's memorandum summarily concludes that the above evidence 
regarding Dr. O'Neil's past is relevant and therefore admissible under IRE 402. The 
defense disagrees. 
Plaintiff fails to explain how administrative discipline involving Dr. O'Neil, a 
witness who is not going to be testifying at trial, involving unrelated medical care, 
unrelated medical issues, involving cases remote in time, in some cases involving 
stipulated settlements and involving different medical standards for discipline in another 
jurisdiction would in any way be relevant evidence in the case involving Krystal Ballard. 
The issue in the case is whether Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Medical Spa violated the 
standard of practice in Boise in 2010 applicable to a cosmetic surgeon and a cosmetic 
surgery facility. None of the medical issues in this case involve chemical peels, nor do 
they involve the adequacy of the medical records since it has nothing to do with the 
standard of practice allegations advanced by Plaintiff's expert disclosures made to date in 
this case. Plaintiff cites no case authorities from any jurisdiction wherein the testimony of 
an expert was allowed to be impeached involving the discussion had with a familiarizing 
physician like Dr. O'Neil. 
Not only are all of these events too remote in time to be of any probative 
value for impeachment purposes, but they focus on chemical peel procedures, not 
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liposuctions, post-operative infections or fat transfer procedures which are the medical 
issues in this case. Furthermore, the interactions between the defense experts and Dr. 
O'Neil were limited to confirming they had knowledge of the local standard of practice and 
to confirm that the way Dr. Kerr provided care and treatment and operated his surgical 
facility was consistent with the way things were typically done in Boise. Plaintiff suggests 
that Dr. O'Neil is the basis for all of the defense opinions which is patently false. The 
defense experts will testify at trial that their conversations with Dr. O'Neil were intended to 
confirm knowledge of the Boise standard of practice in 2010 and whether there were any 
deviations in that standard as compared to the way they practiced cosmetic medicine in 
their own communities. For example, the laws in Tennessee are different on the types of 
persons and places where anesthesia can be utilized as compared to Idaho and this 
difference was partially discussed in Dr. Laurence's deposition. 
Moreover, the California Medical Board documents use different standards 
which will only serve to confuse the jury and force the defense to present a trial within a 
trial about these irrelevant issues. For example, the legal conclusions set forth in the 
above administrative documents identify an entirely different format, standard of proof 
and list of definitions for purposes of imposing discipline which are completely different 
from whether or not there has been a violation of the standard of practice under Idaho law. 
The California decisions speak in terms of simple versus extreme negligence versus 
incompetence versus repeat acts of negligence. No such comparisons can be made to 
the application of Idaho Code §6-1012 nor the grounds for medical discipline under Idaho 
law per Idaho Code 54-1814. 
The licensing background of Dr. O'Neil or any other expert has nothing to do 
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with the issues in the case and will result in a trial within a trial about the underlying 
circumstances of each and every case or claim against each physician. Virtually every 
physician on both sides of this case has been involved in and/or listed as a defendant in 
one or more malpractice actions over the course of their careers. This does not make it 
admissible for purposes of impeachment. The fact that someone has been sued for 
malpractice or had a patient complaint to a state medical board does not render them 
incapable of confirming what the local standard of practice was at the time in question. 
None of the cases cited by Plaintiff stand for the proposition that it is proper impeachment 
to attack the credibility of the familiarizing local physician. 
Under the facts of this case, the Plaintiff had every opportunity to take Dr. 
O'Neil's deposition if he wanted to challenge his credibility and/or basis of knowledge of 
the 2010 Boise standard of practice for cosmetic surgeons, but he elected not to do so. 
To get around this problem, it appears Plaintiff's plan for trial is to question each and 
every defense expert about whether they were aware that Dr. O'Neil had a prior 
malpractice lawsuit or that he had one or more prior licensing issue dating back years in 
an attempt to throw mud at the foundation of the defense expert's opinions. The only 
way for the defense to respond to such testimony would be to call Dr. O'Neil to the trial 
and have an extended discussion with him on the stand about the facts and 
circumstances of each and every issue which led to either a lawsuit and/or inquiry by a 
state licensing entity. Such a process could last days. 
Plaintiff next contends that Dr. O'Neil was not truthful in completing his 
board of medicine license in Idaho. This is a totally false statement as evidenced by both 
the Idaho and California documents attached to Plaintiff's counsel's Affidavit which reflect 
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that he proved he had properly disclosed the requested information to the Utah Company 
who made the omission which Dr. O'Neil did not discover. See Plaintiff's Ex. J at pages 
4 and 5 of the Proposed Decision attached to the Affidavit of counsel in support of 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Motions in Limine. Unfortunately, since Plaintiff is 
not making accurate representations to this Court regarding the contents of these 
documents it makes this issue all the more concerning as to how Plaintiff would seek to 
use them at trial if allowed to do so. 
Plaintiff's various references to several Idaho case authorities regarding the 
use of a local consultant to familiarize and out of area expert have no bearing on this issue 
whatsoever. None of the medical malpractice cases cited stand for the proposition that a 
party can cross examine an expert regarding unrelated licensing matters involving 
someone else. The only answer the defense experts can say to such questions is 
whether they knew or did not know about the events or circumstances of the 
investigations and decisions outlined above. None of these witnesses were present, 
none of them were involved with the care at issue, none of them reviewed any of the 
medical records of these administrative actions and the only basis for the questions is to 
try and unfairly cast dispersions against Dr. O'Neil who will not even be present to defend 
himself. 
The defense does not dispute that questions about what an out of area 
expert did to become familiar with the local standard of practice is fair game at a trial, but 
that is not what Plaintiff's counsel is proposing to do. Instead, he wants to say in front of 
the jury to each of the defense experts "so did you know that the guy that Dr. Kerr's 
attorneys wanted you to talk to about the local standard has had his license in California 
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sanctioned multiple times?" Such questions have nothing to do with what the expert did or 
how the expert became familiar with the local standard of practice as set forth in Dulaney 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160 (2002) and its progeny. 
This Court should not allow Plaintiff to try and bootstrap improper impeachment under the 
phony guise that it would somehow qualify as valid questioning about how the expert 
became familiar with the applicable standard of practice. 
Plaintiff further contends that Rule 705 supports the admissibility of the 
above matters involving Dr. O'Neil. This rule states: 
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or 
Data Underlying Expert Opinion. 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give the reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, provided that the court may require 
otherwise, and provided further that, if requested pursuant to 
the rules of discovery the underlying facts or data were 
disclosed. The expert may in any event be required to 
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
The defense contends there is nothing in Rule 705 which entitles the 
Plaintiff to cross examine the defense experts about what they did or did not know about 
Dr. O'Neil's prior malpractice actions or administrative matters involving chemical peel 
procedures. None of these issues were discussed by the defense experts with Dr. 
O'Neil and therefore none of these issues can be said to have helped form the underlying 
facts and data of the individual expert's opinion. These matters are entirely collateral 
issues disconnected from the matters before the court which are unfairly prejudicial and 
therefore not fair game for cross examination. The competence and credibility of Dr. 
O'Neil to provide background and familiarizing information to the defense experts about 
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cleaning reusable medical equipment, what type of physician performs liposuction and 
was the way Dr. Kerr performed surgery in this case consistent with what they understand 
to be within the local standard of practice has nothing to do with the documents and 
administ~ative matters involving Dr. O'Neil. 
None of the out of state cases cited by the Plaintiff involve the 
circumstances presented here and are therefore entirely distinguishable. Plaintiff cites 
to a number of cases from other jurisdictions where a court exercised discretion in 
allowing an expert on the stand to be questioned about his or her own prior lawsuits or 
administrative licensing disputes. Not one of the cases cited by the Plaintiff involves a 
situation where Plaintiff seeks to impeach an expert regarding the prior lawsuits or 
administrative licensing disputes of a third party he talked to about entirely unrelated 
issues. 
As this court is well aware having reviewed Plaintiff's own Motions in Limine 
and the deposition excerpts submitted therewith, Plaintiff's counsel went to great lengths 
in deposition to question the defense experts, Ors. Stiller, Lundeby and Laurence about 
the content of their discussions with Dr. O'Neil. At no point, however, in any of his 
discussions did Plaintiff's counsel ever even mention or bring up any licensing issues or 
prior malpractice actions involving Dr. O'Neil. It is therefore clear, particularly 
considering the volume of materials they have now submitted in opposition to the defense 
motion, that Plaintiff's counsel intended all along to try and ambush and unfairly sandbag 
the defense experts with this issue at trial. 
Based on the foregoing, the defense requests the court grant his first and 
second Motions in Limine and preclude the Plaintiff from bringing any of these issues up 
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at trial in any fashion. 
II. Rule 608(b) does not provide a basis for Plaintiff to try and 
impeach Dr. Laurence with evidence of criminal charges for 
which he has not been convicted of and which may be totally 
dismissed. 
Plaintiff argues that he should be allowed to use as impeachment at trial the 
fact that Dr. Laurence has been indicted by a grand jury in the state of Colorado. The 
indictment involves allegations relating to tax evasion in response to poor advice Dr. 
Laurence and others received from the main targets of the case who were financial 
advisors to a large number of U.S. citizens. Plaintiff contends that these allegations 
against Dr. Laurence relate to his character for truthfulness, his fitness to practice 
medicine and his qualifications as a medical expert, such that the indictment should be 
fair game for impeachment at trial. Again, it is not clear from Plaintiffs briefing whether 
he seeks to merely question the witness or also try and utilize extrinsic evidence relating 
to the indictment. The defense disagrees that a mere criminal indictment may serve as a 
basis for either form of impeachment.1 
Plaintiff points out that the Court has broad discretion in terms of the 
admissibility of evidence and the latitude associated with the scope of expert 
impeachment. In support, Plaintiff contends that the defense too narrowly reads IRE 
608(b). The defense agrees that whether to admit evidence under Rule 608 is a matter of 
discretion for the trial court. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P .2d 872, 880 (1993). 
1 Plaintiff further attempts to buttress his flawed argument by claiming that the charges against Dr. 
Laurence "arise out of his medical practice" when in fact they arise out of his earned income period, 
regardless of whether he was a ditch digger, taxi cab driver or brain surgeon. Plaintiff takes quite the 
literary license in describing what he believes to be the charges and nature of alleged crimes committed by 
Dr. Laurence, however, his description, based solely on his reading of the criminal indictment, is nothing 
more than salacious fiction and unsupported allegations at this juncture. 
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However, this rule does not allow the nature of impeachment being 
proposed by Plaintiff regarding Dr. Laurence. IRE Rule 608 provides: 
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 608. Evidence of Character 
and Conduct of Witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction 
of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of 
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning 
(1) the character of the witness for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified. 
Plaintiff contends that evidence of a criminal indictment for tax evasion for 
which there has been no plea agreement, no conviction and no trial setting is somehow 
proper grounds for impeachment to try and establish the character of Dr. Laurence for 
untruthfulness. The defense contends that a criminal indictment for which there has 
been no conviction and for which the underlying defendant contests cannot, as a matter 
of law, qualify as a specific instance of conduct under IRE 608(b). The defense is aware 
of no case law in Idaho which so states. 
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Nevertheless, in support of his position, Plaintiff cites the recent Idaho Court 
of Appeals case of State v. Bergerud, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _ (Ct. App. October 22, 
2013). Bergerud involved Daniel and Kathleen Bergerud (the Bergeruds) who 
appealed their judgments of conviction entered following a jury verdict finding both guilty 
of several drug offenses. The issue on appeal involved the Bergeruds challenge of the 
district court's ruling prohibiting them from asking the State's rebuttal witness Jones if he 
had ever made a false statement to police. At trial, the defense position was that the 
State had not proved that it was the Bergeruds, rather than their occasional guest/renter, 
Jones, who engaged in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. 
In an unrelated past case, Jones had pied guilty to a misdemeanor charge 
of providing false information to a police officer. At trial, the Bergeruds sought to 
cross-examine Jones by asking whether he had ever lied to police, and if he denied 
having done so, the Bergeruds sought permission to impeach Jones with evidence of 
the conviction. The State objected that such cross-examination was prohibited by Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. The district court sustained the State's objection, 
precluding questioning of Jones about lying to police or about the conviction. The court 
held that Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 barred the admission of the conviction because the 
crime was not a felony and also held that an episode of lying to police was not relevant for 
impeachment because it was not probative of Jones's credibility. 
In analyzing the issue, the Bergerud court stated: 
As the Bergeruds point out, although Rule 608(b) prohibits 
extrinsic evidence of a witness's past conduct to attack 
credibility, it expressly allows cross-examination of the 
witness concerning instances of the witness's conduct if it is 
probative of the witness's truthfulness. They contend that 
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the district court did not recognize that the rule permitted this 
type of cross-examination and therefore abused its discretion 
in precluding cross-examination of Jones about having lied to 
police. We agree. Because Rule 608 expressly allows 
cross-examination of a witness concerning specific instances 
of conduct that are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
the Bergeruds' requested inquiry about the incident was not 
barred by this rule. 
We therefore hold that under Rule 608(b), the district court 
possessed discretion to permit cross-examination of Jones 
about his episode of lying to police and that the district court 
erred in failing to recognize this discretion. 
Bergerud, at p. 8-9 (citations omitted). 
The above discussion and excerpts from Bergerud demonstrate that the 
issue there involved whether a witness could be impeached with questions on cross 
examination under 608(b) of a prior misdemeanor conviction. No such conviction exists 
in this case therefore Bergerud does not support the proposition advanced that Plaintiff 
should be allowed to utilize 608(b) to try and impeach Dr. Laurence with cross 
examination questions relating to the fact a criminal indictment exists or any questions 
relating to it in any way. The defense contends that per Rule 403, any probative value for 
impeachment purposes of the indictment is massively outweighed by the realistic danger 
of unfair prejudice the defense and to misleading the jury with questions suggesting that 
Dr. Laurence committed some crime when no conviction or plea that he has ever done so 
exists. 
Plaintiff further attempts to inflame the court by asserting that Dr. Laurence 
has failed to properly disclose the indictment to the Idaho Board of Medicine. In support, 
Plaintiff cites Idaho Code §54-1814(1) and (21), neither of which have any application to 
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this case. By the very language of these statutes, they relate to the conviction or 
commission of any felony. Plaintiff ignores the obvious fact that an indictment is neither 
of these scenarios and therefore no reporting is necessary. 
Plaintiff further argues that IRE 404(b) allows him to use the criminal 
indictment against Dr. Laurence to show financial bias on his part. Such a claim makes 
no sense. In response to questions by Plaintiff's counsel at deposition, Dr. Laurence 
testified that in his entire medical career he has only been involved in two other 
malpractice cases as an expert witness and only one of those resulted in his deposition 
being taken.2 This hardly suggests he has a motive to "express a favorable opinion that 
will result in additional, lucrative expert witness work." Plaintiff's memo at p. 17. 
Plaintiff offers no case authority to support his claim that by reviewing two prior cases as 
an expert in his entire medical career that this somehow suggests Dr. Laurence is 
financially biased and that as a result Plaintiff's counsel should now be allowed to use his 
prior criminal indictment for impeachment purposes. 
Based on the above authorities, there is no valid basis upon which the 
Plaintiff should be allowed to cross examine or impeach Dr. Laurence by extrinsic 
evidence relating to the criminal charges for tax evasion. On this basis the court should 





Doctor, in terms of your involvement in this case, have you been involved in other medical 
malpractice cases before this one? 
I have. 
Okay. I think I saw an e-mail, and it may be in the disclosure, that there were two other 
instances that you've reviewed records in a medical malpractice case? 
That's correct. 
See Depo. of Dr. Laurence at p. 8, II 15 to 23. 
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Ill. Conclusion 
The defense stands by its prior arguments relating to the balance of its 
Motions in Limine. For the reasons stated herein and in the Defendants' opening 
Memorandum, the Defendants respectfully request the court grant their Motions in 
Limine. 
DATED this 151 day of November, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 151 day of November, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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. Judge Bail 110513 Tara Viii I Tiffany Fisher Courtroom51 O 
1CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 1 
··=·····-=···-=-=-·-··=··-··=···-·=··--=·-=······=····f-. -······-.. ·-·-·····································-···----·-}··················································--·-·--·-·······-····-·······-·---·-···---·-·····-··-···--·-·········--··············-····················································-·-················ 
09:36:25 AMiJudge iCalls case 
............................................................ 1 ............................................ ______ , .. , ..... ; ............................................................................................................. - ...................... _,_,, ..................................................................................................... . 
09:36:26 AM Scott McKay/ I on behalf of the Plaintiff 
Gre Haddad 1 
·o9:36:2i AM I ~e:::;~~~~~uane/ r on behalf of the-Defendanr·-------
.. 09:36:29 AM·j·Judge·······-····-···-·-·-······················Twill .. take ... u.p ·motions in limine __ .............................................................................................................................  
··~~;:~;11··~~·1·~~d~:ddad Ar~~~~sMco;~onnsse:n .. Limine··-····························----······-···-----·-··-········-······································--············ 
. 09:.53:·1·3··AM·j····················-··-···················-···········-·-·-···-[ Court .. recesses·············································································--·---·············-··································································-····-····-·· 
09:53: 17 AM I I Court resumes 
10:09:41 AM j j the jury panel is present 
10:09:49 AM I Clerk I Calls roll 
10: 13:42 AM I Clerk I Swears in the prospective jury panel 
····························································································································--T-·-----··············································································································································-··········-·····-····-··--·········--··---···--·················· 
10: 14:29 AM I Judge I Voir dires the prospective jury panel 
: :~:~:!6 •• ~~-:.~le:.,Kay :==l~:~;.:,:et~~-!~:::;~~=~ury_panel------------------------
11 :28:54 AM! S. McKay asses the panel with cause 
·····················································-·····--··········· ···-··················································································································-·-··········-·------··--····-································· .. ························~ 
11 :29: 15 A Judge dmonishes the prospective jury panel ......................... - ......... ,_,_,,, .... -....... ,_ .. _ ..
.. 1 .. 1.:29:.39 .. A......... ················-························-···--··-··!Court recesses ......................................................................................................... ·-····--······-··········-····-·-·-·····-·-··········-·-··-·-·· 
11 :48:26 AM I Court resumes 
11 :48:31 AM I jthe prospective jury panel is present 
11 :48:37 AM I J. Quane I Voir dires the prospective jury panel 
··1·2:·3·1·:48 .. PM·j·J.···auane·····--·······-···-··········Tpasses.the··panel··with .. cause·-··················--··-·······-·-········-···-···································-······································· 
··1·2:·3·1·:·ss··P·MlJudge·····················--·-······lThanks··and··excuses .. the···remaining· prospective·jury···pane1························ 
.. ~·~ ;.;: ;.~~···:·~ ·l···········································-·······························i·:~~~~:lr exercise .. their _peremptory .. challenges ..........................................................................  
12:54:02 PM I Judge I Seats the trial jury 
12:56:42 PM I Judge I Thanks and excuses the remaining prospective jury panel 
I !··---·····························································································································································-·················-················-··--·-·····-·---················-·· 
12:56:50 PM· Judge admonishes the jury 
12:59:37 PMI jCourt recesses ··o"~E:ff:":3·a···i:i·rvr r················-·······················································Tcoi:i"rf"resi:i-mes-·----·-··-·-···---·······-···········································································-·-···················-······--·-·········--·····-
02: 31 :41 PM j I the jury is not present 
.. 02:.3.1.:.so ... PM I.G: ... Haddad ............................ 1.Argues .. Motions ... in .. Limine .......................................... --···-----...................... - ................... --··-······ 
:~~i~~i~~:~~~~=1~;1~~t~~~:~~~~~~~== 
··02:"59:0s···PM·l·Judge···············-·----·-............ "['Reads .. preliminary.jury .. instructions --·-····-·-----·-·· .................................................................... ·-··· 
:~;:~~:;;:~~t g1_e~:ddad-=:j~;:~:~:::::~:ury ==::======= .. ~;;·;;;~;· .. ~~·!·~. ~~~~:d ·····························-l·~~;~~~ns~a~::::~ ........................................................................................................................................................... -········-···· 
··o3: 52 :·s2···PM TJudge -········· .. -·-·········-............. · Objection ... is .. sustained .. _ .. re-phrase remarks ....................................................................................  
04: 12: 11 PM JG. Haddad Objection - per Motion in Limine 
04: 12:33 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
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. 04 :43 :.1. a ... PM .i.J udge .. ~.~.~.?..~-~~.~.:~ ... !.~.:.J~.ry-.. ~~.~--:~.~.~-~.~J-.!~.:.~ .... !?..~ ... !.~.: ... 9..~Y. ............................... -.... - .. .. 
04:44:37 PM !J. Quane Requests witnesses be disclosed at the end of the day for the 
.......................................................... ! .................... _. ___ ............. _ ............... r.f ol lowing .. day ................................................................................. __ .. _ .. _ .. _ ..._ .. _ ... _ .. __ ......................................................................  
04:45:22 PM j G. Haddad I no objection 
04:45:28 PM I Judge I Grants Request 
04:45:32 PM j S. McKay f moves to have witnesses excluded except for experts 
04:45:57 PM I Judge I Grants the request to exclude lay witnesses 
04:46:14 PMI !Court recesses 
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Time Speaker Note 
08:49:22 AM I I CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 2 ..................................................................................................................................... J .................. -...................................... -....................................................................................................................................................... _. __ .. __ .... . 
08:49:52 AM I Scott McKay/ I on behalf of the Plaintiff 
................................................. _ ...... ! G reQ .. H add ad ................ ! .......................................................................................................... -.................. -·-···· .. ·--·----.. -·-·-........... _ ......................................................  
08:49:56 AM !Jeremiah Quane/ I on behalf of the Defendant 
IT erry Jones I 
...... ·---·-····-·--·········-......... ...1 ........................................................................ J .......................................................... _ ....... - .................................. --·-········-· ........ -.. ·---................................................................................................. _. 
09:35:54 AM Judge Calls case - the jury is not present 
09:36:00 AM S. McKay Counsel have stipulated to the admission of certain exhibits. 
Plaintiff - Exhibits 1 -4, 5-21. Has concerns with exhibit 5. 
Exhibits 22-28 have not been stipulated. Exhibits 29-43 have 
not been stipulated. Defendant-Exhibits A-G, 1-P. S has not 
! been stipulated. U, V, Wand X are duplicated exhibits 
I I ____ ........... -...................................................................................................... 1 .. -... - ..................................... -... - .......................................... --................................................................................................................................. - .... _ 
09:38:28 AM I Judge Exhibits 1-21 and A-G and 1-P are admitted 
.. 09:43:·1·6 .. AM f G ... Haddad ........................ TArgues .. admission ... of-Exhibit H-·-·-·····-···-·-.. ··-··· .. ··-····-··-.. ··-............................................................. -...... .. 
::~~ ~:~ ~~~··~~,Judge::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::! ~~~i~i~~:~:save:: to~ be ::redacted=~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=.:::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::~=::::~~::~ 
09:56:26 AM! I Court resumes 
10:09:30 AMJ jthejury is present ... . .. .. ................................. .. ............................................................ -.. -.... ··r·---.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... -......... .. 
10: 10:39 AM I G. Haddad ! Calls Brian Kerr, sworn, direct examination 
.. 1 O: 15: 1.4. AMJJ .... auane _····-·-......... _._J.objection ................................................. - ..... _ ...... - ............................................................................................................................  
.. 1.0:.15: 1.7 .. AMJJudge ............................. __ l.Objection .. is overruled ....................................................................................... ---·---·-.. -.. --................................... .. 
10: 16:29 AM I J. Quane Objection - asked and answered .................. .. .................................. ..! .......................................................................................... ·-·-·-..... - .... - ................... -·-------·--.. -............................................................................................................... ___ ... _._ ....... . 
10: 16:38 AM I Judge re-phrase question 
........................................................... 1 ...... - ............................ - ........................................................................................................................................ _ ..................... ___ ................................................................................................................. . 
10:18:09 AM J. Quane Objection - hearsay 
:· ~· ~ ~~~~·~·~:::~~·I:~ ~~gu:ne:::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::. ~~1:~::~~:~is ::sustained·~::::=::::=:~:~::::::::::~:::::~~::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
10:22: 11 AM i Judge Objection will have to be addressed at the time of the question 
............................................................ 1 ............... -................................ ___ ............ -.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
10:22:36 AM I J. Quane I Objection - relevance 
.. 1. 0 :.22 :46 .. AM .I.Judge ................................................. .!.Objection ... is ... overruled _ ......................... --............................................................................................................................... .. 
10:23:39 AM i J. Quane , Objection - argumentative 
.. 1.0:23:42 .. AM.l.Judge .............................................. Jobjection_is overruled ...................................................................................................... -....... ----.... --... - ................ .. 
10:23:53 AM! J. Quane Objection 
10:23:56 AM J Judge Objection is overruled 
10:24:40 AM J Jury is excused 
10:25:27 AM JG. Haddad Argues regarding excerpts of deposition of an expert Dr . 
.............. - .... - ............................... 1 ............................................................................. Coffman ........................................... -.......................... _ .............................................................................................................................................  
10:26:53 AM· J. Quane Objection - hearsay 
10:34:21 AM Judge would like an offer of proof 
10:34:52 AM J. Quane Responds 
10:35:07 AM G. Haddad Offer of proof 
10:38:34 AM Judge will allow the 3 questions to be asked but not by video 
10:40:26 AM Court recesses 
,.,,_,,, ........................................................................................................................... -............................................................... -....................................................................................... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .......................................... ,-......... --.. .. 
10:51 :21 AM Court resumes - the jury is present 
::1:0::5:1:::3.1:: AMJ:G:.:::Haddad~~~~~::::::::::::·continues::direc(examination.:of.the .witness .. -:Brian:::Kerr::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
·· ~· ~ ;.;~ ;. ~.~ .. ~~ l~~~u:ne ......................... -...... ·~~1:~::~~ ... is · overruled ............................................................................................................................................................... _ .. 
.. ~· ~ ;·;; ;.;~ ~~· ·~ ~~u:ne ................. -................. ·~~1:~!:~~·· ~st~~~~~led .................... --....................................................................................................................  
.. 1. 0 :·56 :' 14 .. AM ·1·J .... Quane ................................... ·objection .. - asked ... and .. answered .. in .. deposition ....... - .................................................... .. 
10:56: 17 AM Judge Objection is overruled ··· 
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10:57:57 AMIJ. Quane !Objection 
.. ~·~'.·;;;.;~··~~l~~~gu:·n·e ...................................... 1.~~1:~!:~~ ... is .. overruled ........ -........... - ................................................................................................................................... .. 
.................................... ...... ....................... - ...................... - ..... __ ....... _ .. _____ .1 ............................................................................................................... -·--··-.. ·---.. ·--...................................................................................................... . 
10:58:29 AM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
10:58:48 AM J.J .... Quane ·····-························- .Objection··--········· ................................................................................................................................... -··············--······························· .. 
10:58: Judge Objection is overruled 
11 :00:02 AM I J. Quane Objection -
11 :00:03 AM i Judge Objection is overruled 
11 :28:54 AM f G. Haddad Exhibit# 48 previously marked is identified 
11 :29:00 AM i G. Haddad Moves to admit Exhibit# 48 
.. f1.:29:'23 .. AMlJ .... Quane ...... ---·· Objection 
·····11····1···:.~····0o·-·:.··~·····3s·········AA······~rv1·······.,· .. GG······.:_ ....... ~j;·····aa····~~:~-............ Moves to admit Exhibit# 48 _ _ _ _ ..................................................... ,.lays. foundation ............................. -............ _ .............................................................................................................................................. -.. 
... r1· :· 36':·s°3 .. i\MlI····alia·n·e·······-.............................. 
1
··ot>Jectra·n···= .......................................... ___ ·-··---··········-··········-.. ································································································· .. .. 
............... ...... ... ......................................... --........................................................................................................................................... -........................... , .... _ .. _, .. _ ........ - ... - .......................................................................................................... . 
11 :30:58 AM I Judge I Exhibit# 48 is admitted 
········· ··· · ................. ·· ........ · ···r ..................................................... ----·i········-················ ....................................................................................... ---························································-··················································· .... . 
11 :38: 19 AM I G. Haddad I Objection - hearsay 
11 :38:28 AM ge I Objection is overruled 
11 :42:20 AM, Quane [ Objection - repetitious 
11 :42:21 AM f Judge 1ection is overruled 
11 :47:40 AMf J. Quane Objection - authoritativeness 
.. 1 ..1.:49:.07 .. AM_fJudge ................... __ ._..Jre-phrase .. question ...................................................................... --................................................................................................  
J ... ~ .. :~?.: ~9. .... Al\1 .. J.~.: .... 9.~.~·~·~··············· .. -··-----1.9bl~.~!.1.~~ ... : .. [~~~.~.~.!.\.~.~ ......................................................................................................................................................... -...... .. 
11 :52:32 AM i Judge [ Objection is overruled 
........................................................................................................................ -.... 1 .......................................... ---····················-········-······-··-··-.. ····················· .. ·· .. ·····························································································-···· .. ·-· 
11 :53:01 AM I J. Quane Objection - foundation 
11 :53:03 AM i Judge Objection is overruled 
11 :53:48 AM i Judge admonishes the jury 
11 :53:51 AM i Court recesses ··o'r:·:fi':'.f 3· .. P'rvt·r·····························-·······················- .. courf'resu·m·es ........................... -......................................... -.......................... -......................... _ ... - ................................................  
............................ ..... ...... .................. ! ................................................ ·-························· ············----········· .. ····-···--··············· .. ··········· ...................................................................................... - ................ _____ ··········-········ 
01:37:13 PMI lthejury is not present 
........................................................... 1 ............................................................................ L. ................ -·-·-·-·····················-·--···························-····· .. ·············· .............................................................................................. - .... -.................. .. 
01 :37:20 PM I Judge I Exhibit 5 may be redacted per the Plaintiff's request 
01 :40:20 T. Jones · esponds 
.. ci'f:40:24 PM I .. G·:··· Haddad arifies .... reda'ciki"ns ................................................. __ .......  
01 :42:48 PM i I theTury .... is ... p.reise.ni .................................................................................. ---···-··--·--·--·-· .. ··-······--.....................  
01 :44: 17 PM i G. Haddad ntinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
......................................................... 1 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... - ...... -··-····· 
02:00:27 PM I G. Haddad hibit # 53 is marked and identified 
.. ~~'.·~~;:~-·:~-i-~~~u:ne ............ - ....... _ ...... f·~~!e;~~:~.;~:;a;~ricf'·· ......... -----··············-··························································································· ................ . 
:~~:~~:!!:::~·1r-~;:~t == g~:::~~~::~:~:tt.#_53 =-======= 
02:40:06 PM1 J. Quane Objection - asked and answered 
02:40:08 prv,' Judge Objection is sustained 
02:41 :11 PM J. Quane Cross-examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
02:45:00 PM G. Haddad Objection - leading 
02:45:02 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
02:45:40 PM G. Haddad Objection - leading 
02:46:21 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
--~~:~~:~~--~~· -!~;:::::-tg~i=~:~~-'.~,:~;:!~:d------···-·-···-""""-"" ............................  
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02:53:27 PM I admonishes the jury 
02:53:32 PM f Jury is excused 
02:53:39 PM f Court recesses 
03:33:21 PMi jcourt resumes -the jury is present 
......................................... ·························-·····-·--·-··········----r········--··························-··-·····································································---·--········································-·········-···························-············ 
03:33:38 P J. Quane ! continues cross-examinaiton of the witness - Brian Kerr 
··oI":3~f:·4·3 ··G·:····Had"ciaci·············-··-···--j··Re:-aTre"ct·exa·m1·nafion····or"ffie···w,t"i,ess···=···sria·n··T<err···--------·-····-··-······· 
··o·:f":3·s·:·4ii. PM I J"·:···cru·a·n·e······································rRe=cross·ex·am-inafion···orffie-wffn.es·s···=···s·r,·a·n····i<iirr······-····-·····-···-··-···-··-·--·-·· 
··6:f3Ef36···i:irvrtcr···Hadaa,r··························-r··caHs···fiea·n···s·ore·ns·en·;···swa-rri":···cifrecf·exa·mrn·afio·n·····-·············································-····-·· 
··o3:40:·25···PM°f J.-·auane"··---·-···············Tobjection··_··1eading·········-·········-······---················--··------········-····-·······--················-·············································-·········· 
:~!::~:~;-:~[ ~~::ne ==·g~i:;:~~--::::::::~::: ======--=== 
··o·:rs·r:·o·r···P·f\,,-1T··cfuan·e·························-····-···Tc56JEicfio·n···=··to·undaiio·n··--·-···-·-··-··-··-············-······--·········-···················································································-···-··--· 
.. 03 :.5.1 : 03 ... P.M .i Judge ··-················--···---···-····.f.Objection ... is .. overruled __ ···-·--··········--·---······-·--·-·-······································································································· 
03:51 :22 PM! J. Quane ! Objection - moves to strike ........................................................................ -.................................................... ,_ ................................................................................................................. ,_ .... , .................................. , ..... -, .................................. -.................. -.................................... .. 
03:51 :30 PM iJudge I Objection is sustained. 
····· .. · ··- ........................ · .......... i ............................................ - ......................... -1··············-··· .. ············--··-··· .. ··· ..................................................................................................... ·-······--·-·-------.. ··--·---·--···-··-·······-·····-.. 
03:51 :49 PM J. Quane I Objection - foundation .. 0S:irf·s·2 .. ·r·M·· J udg;;-··················-·························· .. Tc56Jecfion·-,s"'-overrulecr·········· .................................................................................... -.............................................. _._ .. __ . 
................................. .................................................................................................... .1 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
03:52: 14 PM I J. Quane I Objection - foundation 
.. 6':fs·2·:·:i:f'PriATJ"uc1ge·--·-········--·-.. ·-····················1··ohJectio·n···is···ave·rru-iea······-·········-·---···-····---·······-............................................................................................................  
.. 03 :.53 :40 P.M JJ · ... auane ................. --·-----!-Objection .. - .. relevance ................................................................... _. _____ ·-------·-·····-·········--· .. ··-··-········ ....... .. 
03:53:41 PM i Judge I Objection is overruled ··o4·:·o·~r·2·0 .. r'M··p·:··a·u"a"n"e"·-·· .. ··--·--................. ,.ofi1ecfion ___ ............ -..... -............................................................................................... __ . __ .. _ ............. --.. ·-··-······· .. ---··---··-·· 
.. 04 :.0.1. :22 P .J udge ................................................ J Objection ... is .. overruled ................. ·-·····························--······-·-······· ..............................................................................................  
04:03:0 J. Quane Objection - foundation 
04:03:08 PM I Judge Objection is overruled 
.. 04 :.1 .. 1 : 4 7 .. PM J Judge ......... - ............ _. ___ .. ad m on is hes .. the .. j u ry .................................................................................................................. __ .. _ ............... _ ... _ ............ __ ..... .. 
04:11:51 PMI !Court recesses .. 64: .. ff:·s·s .. ·r·M··j··········· ............................................................. -.. ,·courfre·s·umes······-··-··---............................................................................................................. _ ............. _. ___ . ___ ...... _ .....  
........ .......... . .. .............. ................................................................................................ !.. ............................................................. _. __ ···· ..................... _ ................................................................................................................................... - ....... __ ... 
04:54:25 PM I · e jury is present 
04:55:25 PM i G. Haddad ntinues direct examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
........................................................... L ...................... ____ .. _.............................. .._ .................................................................................... ·-···-·----·-···-.. ·-·-----.. ·--.... ____ ................................................................... .. 
05: 10:08 PM I Judge dmonishes the jury 
05: 10: 12 PM i i Court recesses 
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08:40:37 A Scott McKay/ I on behalf of the Plaintiff 
··························--················-··· Greg._Haddad ··--···································································································································--··········------···············-··········································· 08:40:41 AM Jeremiah on behalf of the Defendant 
Quane/ 
···············································-·····-···Terry Jones··········································································-········································-·····················-·-·······························································································-·· 09:38:42 AM I J. Quane I Cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
09:49:51 AM I G. Haddad I Objection - speculation 
09:49:55 AM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
·· ~· ~;.~: :·~~ .. ~~ ·l·~~d::ddad ·-.................... 1.~~1:~::~~···is .. ·overruled--·····-.. ··-····---......................................................................................................... .. 
............................................................. ................................ --........................... r ..... - ................... _____ ......................................................................................................................................... ___ ...................................... . 
1 O: 19:57 AM I G. Haddad I Objection - relevance -: ~:!::;:-~~I~~~~: ---f ~:::~~:: ~~=:~d _____ ................................ ·-····-············-·-........ _ ................................... .. 
.. 1.0:.36:.34 .. AM.! ..................................................................... i.Court. recesses ......... -.............. _ ................................................................................................................... -......... -.. .. 
10:36:49 AM I Court resumes 
11 :01: 14 AM I the jury is present 
11 :01 :45 AM I J. Quane continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean 
Sorensen ............................... , 
11 :09:35 AM I J. Quane Publishes Deposition of Dean Sorensen 
11: 11:47 AM i G. Haddad Objection 
11:11:51 AMjJudge I Objection is overruled 
11 :21 :24 AM I G. Haddad bjection - argumentative 
11 :21 :26 AM I Judge 1ection is sustained 
11 :26: 18 AM I G. Haddad i Objection - moves to strike question and answer 
11 :26:20 AM I Judge I Objection is sustained 
11 :33:39 AM I Judge I admonishes the jury 
11 :33:46 AM I I Court recesses ............................................................ : .......................................... _ .......................... ,t,,, .... ___ ,,, ____ ,_ .......... - .... - .... ,-........................................................................................................................ _ .. , ........................... - ............. . 
01 :24:39 PM I I Court resumes 
01 :24:42 PM I jthe jury is not present 
01 :24:45 PM I Judge I adresses counsel regarding witnesses being taken out of 
I !order 
01 :25:22 PM IT. Jones I Responds regarding witness 
01 :25:24 PM I J. Quane I Responds regarding witness 
01 :26:41 PM Judge I will advise jury of schedule 
-~}~;::~-:~!Judge ____ J:;,/~:-~~~;;~~-schedule ------------------
.. o'1·:28:'03 ... PMTG· ... Haddad .... ·-···-··· .... ·calls .. George ... Nichols, ... sworn, ... direct"examination .................................. --.. . 
· 0·1·:'52:.35 ... P.MTJ .... Quane ............... -..... _ .. Objection ................................................................................................................................................ -............................ --·-
01 :52:37 PM· Judge Objection is overruled 
.. 01.:.53:.35 ... P.M .. J .... Quane ..... ___ ............. J.Objection ....... -.......................................................................................... -................................................................................... _ .. ~·}/·~i·1~-·~·~ .. ·J·:·~~u~a·n·e ............................... lg~~~~l-6~ ... !.~-~Y..:.~~.~~.~-~-.... ···-·-· ............................................................................................................................ _. 
01 :57:50 P Judge I Objection is overruled 
:~~i~ii~~:~~lJudge ==~=l~l~g;~E::~~ ======= 
02:49:04 PM J. Quane I Cross-examination of the witness - George Nichols 
001789
Judge Bail 110713 Tara Ville1...:_I Kristi Valcich Courtroom510 
03:26:32 l?M i G. Haddad I Re-direct examination of the witness - George Nichols 
----r--j ! 
.......... ·--·············-·l ... - .... ...1 .... -............................................................. J ........................................................... _______ ····--·····--·--·-······ .. ·-·-.. ·---.............................................................................. . 
03:27:45 PM I J. Quane I Objection - leading 
03:27:46 PM I Judge J Objection is overruled 
03:29:59 PM I J. Quane I Re-cross examination of the witness - George Nichols 
··c>':f3I·3lf'·P·rv1··· ......... : .... R"a"ddiici ..................... T6"6Jecfion:··beyo-rid ... ihe·scc:i'pe ...................................................................... __ ..... __ ...... -..... __ ........  
03:33:47 PM e jObjection is sustained .. o:f°:3lf: .. 14··-Prv1·· udge ............................................ J'excu·ses .. the···witness-= .. George· N'i'ch·o1s ......................................................................................  
03:34:52 PM . McKay !Video Deposition of Jonelle Buchanan 
.. 04:.08 :.ss ... PM. . Quane .............................. I.Objection .. -......................................................................................................................................................................................... -... 
04:09:17 PM !side bar 
.. _ ........................................................................... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .................................... I ..................................... , ... , ... , ... ,,_,., ............................................... _ ................................. ,,,, ...................................................................................... -, .. ,, .. . 
04: 10: 17 PM j Judge I Objection is overruled 
04:40:48 PM I Judge I admonishes the jury 
04:40:53 PM j j Court recesses 
04:49:08 PM I ! Court resumes ---==' I 04:49:10 PM I jthe jury is not present 
04:49: 10 PM IS. McKay I Objects to reading of certian questions of deposition -
... -.............................. 1 .......................................................... 1. hearsay ............................ - ................................................ - .. ·-·················-...................................................................................... .. 
04:49: 10 P Judge I Objections are overruled 
04:52:40 P S. McKay Objection - question regarding infection ........................................................ .. ..................... -......................... .. ...................................................................................................................................................................................... -.... , .... - ........................................ .. 
04:52:59 P Judge Objection is sustained 
...................................... .. .......................................................... _,_ ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... -.. 
04:56:38 PM e jury is present 
........... ___ .......................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
04:56:45 PM J. Quane ads 2 questions and answers from Deposition of Jonelle 
Buchanan 
05:06: 14 Judge I admonishes the jury 
05:06:27 PM j I Court recesses 
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09:10:38 AM' 1CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial- Day 
··09 :· 1· 3 :· 1· 8 · A Scott McKay/ ··················Ton ... beha.l(o(the···Plaintiff-·····-·-····-·····----······································ .............................................................. . 
·······················································--i Greg ... Haddad. ! .................................................................................................................... _ ....-............... _ ..._ ...................................................................................... _ ......... .. 
09: 13:21 AM I Jeremiah Quane/ on behalf of the Defendant 
1 Terry Jones 
.. -.. -...... -............... --............. ,,-, ................... ,,,_,,,, ........................................ . 
09:33: 12 AM I udge I Calls case .. oif3·:f"f:f fiJifr ................................................................. Ttiie .. Jury· .. ,s ... n.oi"p-res·enr ............ _ ............. --................... _ .... _ ...................................................................................... .. 
09:33:20 AM IS. McKay I Offers and moves to admit Exhibit# 29, 31-35 & 37-43 .. o§·:·3's':·o§···Arvrr,=·:···Jon-e"s" ........... --·--Tot>JecHori ... =··to ... exhT5Tf°Ji" ........................................ _ .................. -.......... -............... _ .......................... .. 
.............................................................................................................................. _ f ......... ---····························-.. ·-............................................................................................... _ ......................................................................... , ...... _ ....... _ ... l 
09:35:25 AM !Judge I Exhibits# 29, 31-35 & 37-43 are admitted 
09:36:39 AMIS. McKay !Argues Motion in Limine re: re-marriage · 
....................................................... _ ........................................................................... "t ................................... - ......................... ------············ .. ·•·••• .. ·············•·• .. ··•··················· .. ···················· ........................................................... _. 
09:36:58 AM I Judge I Grants the Motion in Limine 
.. 09:58:.03 .. AM j ..................... ·--····-................................ "[ Court .. recesses ...................... - .......... --··············--··················--......................................................................................... .. 
_ 1. 0: 4 8 :.26 .. AM .1 .................................................... -............ ..J Court .. resumes ..................................................................................................... _ .. _ .. _. ___ .. _. ____ ._·-········· ... · .. ·-······· 
10:48:30 AMI jthejury is not present 
10:48:33 AM j Judge I Juror# 265 has failed to appear 
10:50:03 AM I Judge I Releases Juror# 265 from this trial 
10:52:09 AM I j the jury is present 
......................................................................................... ·--····················-······r·························· .......................................................................................... _____ ........................................................................................................................  
10:53:25 AM! S. McKay I Calls Cornelius Hofman, sworn, direct examination 
11 :09:29 AM: J. Quane I Objection - relevance · ···· ····· · 
11 :09:33 A Judge bjection is overruled ·· ··· 
11: 10:45 AM i S. McKay xhibit # 51 b previously marked is identified 
11 : 11 :44 AM j S. McKay ~.:.~ ... !.~ ... ~~.~.!! .... ~~.~.!.~.!.! ... !_.~.!.~ ............... --·······-·------· .. ·--········ ... -........... ,, ............................................ 4 
11: 11 :49 AM I J. Quane I Objection - relevance 
11: 11 :57 AM I Judge j Objection is overruled 
·· 1 ·1· :· 1· 2 :·oo .. AMT Judge ......... -............... -·-····,· Exhibit .. # .. 51. b .. is ··admitted .............................................. _.-.... -............................................. . 
···1°T:··1°:f":§4 ... fiJ~;,T~f .... riiickay································ .. ·rExii-,tiiri··g1°c·-i>·re·v"io"iis1y···",-ari<ecfTs ... idenHtfea·························· .............................................. _ ...  
11: 16:08 AM IS. McKay ! Moves to admit Exhibit# 51 c 
... rr:1·lFffAJ,,f!T··au·iin·e··· ............................... ToEJection···=· .. rei·ev·ance·-·-············-----·················-·-············································· ..........................................................  
... ff: .. f6.:T4)iJv1TJ"ucige··············-... -........... -....... ToiiJectiori .. Ts ... ove·rruie,r············ ........ -....................... _. __ ................................................................................................  
.......................................................... T ..................................................... _ .... - ................ - ................................................................................................................................. - .......................................................................................... . 
11 :16:17 AM 1Judge j Exhibit# 51c is admitted 
.. ~ .. ~.;.~.:;.~;··~~·l·~:···~~~:~······ .. ······················ .. ··l·~:~:: !·~~~;~~~~~~y# ~~~ked···is .. identified·············································-·············-······· 
11 :18:55 AM I J. Quane I Objection - relevance 
.. 1 .. 1. :.1. 8 :.56 .. AM ·t·Judge ............ ·-----I Objection ... is .. overruled ...................................... ___________ .. ___ ........ --.............................................. . 
.. 1.1.:.1.8:.56 .. AM ~ Judge .............. -... ··-·· .. ··--··· .Exhibit.# .. 51.d ... is .. admitted ...................................................................................................................................... - ........ . 
.. ~ .. ~ · ;~.~ · ;.;: .. ~~ ·t·~ ~~u:.~.: ...................................... ,.~~1:~!:~~ · is sustained ... _ .. re-phrase .. question ................................................................... -... ··-· 
11 :25: 12 AM S. Mckay Exhibit# 51 k previously marked is identified 
11 :25:47 AM S. Mckay Moves to admit Exhibit# 51k ........................................................... ""'""'"'""''""""' ___ ,.,_, ......... 
11 :25:52 AM J. Quane Objection - relevance ........................................................... .................................................................... ... ........ --..................................... -......................................................................................................................................... ,_ ......................................................... .. 
11 :25:53 AM Judge Objection is overruled 
· 1°'1 :25:.56 .. AMlJudge ............................................... ,.Exhibit ·#· 51 k .. is .. adm.itted .............................................................................................. -................................................. . 
f 1 :28 :·04 .. AM Ts .... Mckay" ................................... · Exhibit"# .. 51. m .. previously· marked ... is ... identified ............................................................. - ...... _ .
.. 1°'1 :28:·1 O .. AMTS ... Mckay ................................... rMoves .. to .. 'admit' Exhibit# 51'm ....................................................................................................................................  ........................................................... r ...................... _,, ................................................................................................................................................... -..................... -...................................................................................................................... .. 
.. ~ .. ~.;.~:;.~.~ .. ~~·1·~~~u:ne .......... -................... 1 ~~1:~!:~~ ... ~sr~~:r~:~~ .......................................................... -........................................................................................................  
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11 :28: 12 AM I Judge I Exhibit# 51 m is admitted 
11 :35:42 AM IS. McKay I Exhibit# 51 a previously marked is identified ··:rf:j·trs·;f Ji:tvfi s~-riiicRay············-··· .................. frv1ov·,is···to ... acinii'rExhH:>if"1n{ra··· .... -............... _._ ............. _ ..................................................................................... .. 
11 :36: 15 AM j J. Quane I Objection - relevance 
........................................................... ~ .............................. ___ ........... - ........... T ............. --....................................................................................................... _ .................................................. _ .......... ___ ................................................... .. 
11 :36:30 AM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
11 :36:31 AM jJudge j Exhibit# 51a is admitted 
11 :42:11 AM jJ. Quane I Objection - relevance 
.. 1 ..1 :42 :' 15 ·AM ·1·J udge .................................................. l Objection ... is .. overruled ................................ - .... - .................. ___ ......................................................................................... -.... . 
11 :45:28 AM jJ. Quane I Objection - relevance .. f 1 · :45 :·38 .. AM ·f Judge ........... _ ... __ .. ___ ........ "'[' Objection ... is .. overruled ............................................... --.--.. ··----................................... _. ___ ................... . 
11 :50:28 AM I J. Quane I Cross-examination of the witness - Cornelius Hofman 
.. 1 ..1·: 53 :· 1· 3 .. AM .............. McKay .............................. T Objection· _ ..argumentative·-.................................................................................................................................. --·-·--
.. 1.1.: 53 :.1. 5 .. AM .,.J udge .......... -.. _ ............................ 1.objection ... is .. sustained-·--·-·-----......... -........... _ ................................... _ ......................................................... . 
11 :53:32 AM IS. McKay I Objection - relevance 
11 :53:34 AM I Judge I Objection is sustained 
11 :54: 17 cKay i Objection - relevance 
11 :54:20 AM! Judge Objection is sustained 
11 :56:07 AM j S. McKay I Objection - relevance 
11 :57:05 AM IS. McKay I Objection - argumentative ... fr:·s-r·oif'Arvf Puc1g·e .................... __ ... _ ........... TB'bJecti'o·n ... i's ... s.ustafnec1 ................ _ ...................... _ .. __ .............. ____ .. _ ........................................................................  
12:01 :49 PM j S. McKay I Objection - asked & answered ... 1°~E6'r:·s·f .. i5'riifpuc1ge .............................. __ robJeciion ... is-sustaine,r ...................................................................................................................... -............................... _ .. 
··1':2':02:'Lfi.i=>'riifl's": .... rvicRay ............................. _ .. loii1eciion·-:··asi<eir&·aii·swerec1 ................................................................................................... _ .................... _ 
iI~fi~-:~!~~:~=---l~~:~~::::s~:t~~d--~--
01 :18:38 PM jCourt resumes 
01:18:39 PM the jury is present -···-,............................................... ................................................................. .. ....................... ,-..................... --.. -........................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
01: 18:41 PM Quane continues cross-examination of the witness - Cornelius Hofman 
01 :20:41 PM IS. McKay i Objection - argumentative 
01 :20: · udge ................ ____ ........ .J Objection ... is .. overruled ......................................................................... ---·--·-··-··-·-·-···-.... ·-·--............. .. 
01 :23:4 . McKay I Objection - argumentative 
Ji.:~~:~~::~ lf ~:~Kay ==i.~~1:;:~~:~:a=~=I~nswered ======:= 
.. ~.~. ~;; ~~:···~~ 'l'~ ~::ne ............. -...... - .. ,.~~~:~!:~~ .. ~s a~~~:~~:tive ..................................................................................... ___ ..................................... _ ......... . 
-~i·::i:~r:~f !~~~=: ~g~;:;:~~ '.s::~:~;~~:::::::·····-
.. ~.~ · '.:6 '.·~: ... ~~ J~ ~~:Kay ·----.......... ~~~:~:::~ .. ~s c~:;~~~~ ....................................... -...................... -........ -.............. -.--......... - ......... _ ....................... . 
01 :50:31 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
O 1 : 52: S_. ... McKay ................................... Objection .. -.. relevance ............... _ ................ -.. -........................................................................................................ -.... .. 
01 :52:21 P Judge Objection is sustained 
01 :53:38 PM IS. McKay Objection - relevance .. o'f 53 :46 .. P.M .,. Judge ...................... _ ......... "[' Objection ... is .. sustained ........................................ - .. - .......... ____ ............... --.................................................. .. 
............................................................ ................................................. -·---·-··r---·--........................................................................................................................... -............. -----··-·---·-·-··· ........ -..........  
02:00:43 PM S. McKay I Objection - asked & answered 
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02:00:46 PM Judge j Objection is overruled 
02:04:35 PM . McKay i Objection - relevance 
.. 02:.04:4.1 .... PM Judge .............. --.. ··-............ ,-................. ction ... is .. sustained .................................... _,_ ................... -.................... __ ... _ ........................................................ .. 
02:09: 18 PM IS. McKay I Objection - asked & answered 
02:09:20 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled .. o:r·fifj·r·i=>'rvfJ's·: .... rilicRay ............................ __ TotiJecfion ... = .. ·rei'ev·a·r,-ce ............................................................................................................. _ .................................... ___ .......... .. 
.. 02:·1·8:40 ... PM·l·Judge ................................................ 'fObjection ... is overruled ............................................................................................................................................................. _ .... __ .. 
.. ~~;~;;.~: ... :~·! ~~:~Kay _ ............................. f .~~1:~::~~ ... ~t:~:~i~e~nswered ..... ____ ........... -....................................... _._ ................... _ ................................. .. 
02:28:57 PM IS. McKay I Objection - asked & answered 
.. ~~;~:;;~· .. :~·l·~~:;Kay .................................. l.~~1:~::~~ ... ~s a~~~:~~:ative .... -.................................................................................................................................. -... ·-·· 
02:29:31 PM I Judge bjection is sustained 
02:33:18 PMIS. McKay 1 1ection - asked & answered 
02:33:20 PM I Judge I Objection is sustained 
02:41 :25 PM j S. McKay j Re-direct examination of the witness - Cornellus Hofman 
i i ...... -............................. -................. : ................................................................... ·-·-y .. , ......... -, ....................... _ .. _ .. _ .. _ ................ _ .. _,_ .. __ .. _ .. ,_. __ .. _ .. __ .. ,_ ................................................................................................................ __ ,_, __ 
02:42:39 PM I J. Quane I Objection - asked & answered 
.. 02:42:42 ... PM. Judge .J.Objection .. _is .. overruled ........................... - ........ - ........ ·-·--·-.. --.. - ... -.................................................................  
02:42:44 PM Judge I admonishes the jury 
-~i:~~::i-~~i-------!I~;~;:;::ent---···-·-···-···-.......................................... _ .......................................................................................... T .................................................. _ ...... --... --.---·--.. ---· ... - .... - .................................................................................................................................. . 
03:06: 10 PM I J. Quane i continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
I I 
03:12:36 PMjG. Haddad jobjection - speculation 
03:12:38 PMIJudge !Objection is overruled 
03: 18:28 PM IS. McKay I Objection - asked & answered 
03: 18:31 PM I Judge I Objection is sustained .. 63:31:·02 .... i5rJiTcf .... Haci,ia'ci ............................ 'TofiJeaia·n·-= .. ni1scharacier1zat1an .................................................................................................................... _ .... _ .. .. 
03:31: 14 PM I Judge I Objection is sustained ........................................................... r .. --..................... -................................. _ ................................................................................................................... ___ .. _ ...._ ... _ ............................................................................................................. . 
03:34:58 PM1G. Haddad jObjection 
03:37:40 P I e i Objection is overruled ......................................... ---·-·· .... r-............... _ .. ___ , .. _ ................. ---·--.......................... -............................................................................. -......... -....................... ___ ,_, __ ... _ ... _ .... . 
03:43: 10 PM, G. Haddad I Objection 
-~~::~::~ -:~ l~udi:ddad ····------1~:1:::~~ _is _sustained ________________________________ _ 
.. 03 :.5 7 :.1. 3._ PM 1 Judge ...... _____ ......... ----·--· . Objection ... is _.sustained .......................... ___ ...................................................................... __ ................................................. . 
04:00:49 PM I G. Haddad Objection - relevance .. 04:·oo:·57 ... P.MlJudge .................................................. Objection is .. sustained ............................................................................................... _. ____ ... _ ............ _,_ .......................... _ 
04:08:47 PM I G. Haddad Objection - relevance 
04:08:48 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
04: 15: 15 PM G. Haddad Objection - asked & answered .......................................... ... ................................. -, ...... -, .. ·---· ............................................................................................................ - ...................... ____ .,., __ ......... -... -......... _,_ .... , .............. , __ ,, .. , .................... .. 
04: 15:26 dge Objection is sustained 
04: 18:05 PM G. Haddad Objection - relevance 
"04 :· 1· 8 :·oa·· PM TJ udge ......... -.......................... _ .. _ ... ·objection ... is sustained ............................................................................. -.................................................. -......... _,_ .... _ .... . 
:Eii•ii~i:~~II~:::ddad ==•f tf E~:E.:~n~d~=======---
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04:29:57 PM I Court resumes 
04:30:03 PM j j the jury is present 
04:30:06 PM I J. Quane I continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
; I 
04:40: 13 PM! G. Haddad I Objection - asked & answered 
04:40: 16 PM! Judge I Objection is sustained .............................................................................................................. -.................... T-·······-··· ............................................................................................................................................................................ ------······-................... --.... . 
04:42:05 PM I G. Haddad I Objection - asked & answered 
04:42: 1 O P Judge I Objection is sustained 
04 :42: 58 P G. ···Haddad····························Tobjection·· - · asked···&·· answered ...................................................................................................................... -··-·· 
04:43:04 P Judge Objection is overruled 
··~: ;:: ;.;;-·:~ ·j·~~d~:ddad ............................... j.~~1:~!::~. ;s a:::~i~e~nswered _ ................................................................................................... -.................... _. 
04:45:59 PM I G. Haddad I Objection 
04:46:02 PMIJudge I Objection is overruled 
04:59: 17 PM j G. Haddad j Re-direct examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
............................................. i 
05:00:07 PM ne jObjection 
05:00:09 PM e I Objection is overruled 
............................................................ . ........... -------························ r··························· .. ····························································································-···················--......... - .................... - ...................................................... . 
05:00:45 PM uane i Objection - asked & answered 
~~:~~:ii-:~ . ciu:ne -i~:1:::~~-'.8a~::;u!e:nswered ______ _ 
··o"s·:·o·r :·3·s···i=irvfi J udge··················-----..... fo1>Jecfion···i-s···ove·rruie,r·················-·································--··························································-························--········· 
··os·:·0T:·s·4····P"fvf(I .... a.uii.ne-... -........... ____ To5Jectio·;,· .. = .. ·i'eaciing·········································· .. ·····························--··-·························-·····-··-·-··-··-··························-·-··-.. ·-····· 
··~;;·~~;~~···:~·l·~~~~: ............................................ -1.~::~~~~!:·~~=~~id··-······ ... -............................................................................................................. --·····-······-.. ····-· 
05:02:20 PM I I Court recesses for the day 
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Time Speaker Note 
08:37:37 AM I I CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 5 
.. 09 :.36 :25 .. AM JJudge····-···-········--·························1· Calls .. case .. -. the. jury .. is. not .. present·-·----·--··-··-·-······-··································--······························---········ 
09:36:29 AM IS. McKay I comments re: medical bills 
09:43:51 AM IJ. Quane I Responds 
09:47:04 AM j J. Quane j Offer of Proof - regarding who paid the medical bills 
09:47:57 AMjT. Jones jcomments re: witnesses 
09:56:29 AM I jthe jury is present 
09:56:53 AM IS. McKay I Calls Charles Ballard, sworn, direct examination 
10:26:53 AM IS. McKay I Exhibit# 36 previously marked is identified 
10:27:02 AM IS. McKay I Moves to admit Exhibit# 36 
···:ro":Ii":°4"o"."Ji:KifiT···,5u·iin·e········-··--···-·-······ro-i:,rectio"i,···=-·reTev·a·r,-ce····································································-···················-····-···············-··-·········-····················-·----·-···· 
10:27:50 AM IS. McKay I Responds 
······································-·-··--··········~······---······························-···--··-·--·--····r·········································································································--················-·--·-·············---··-····-··············-······························································-10:28:23 AM Judge I Objection is overruled 
10:28:32 AM, ge I Exhibit# 36 is admitted 
·:ro:·4:;f:"4·:rArvf rI···ci"u·a·n·e·······-······················--·Tc5b1ection···-·-···-··-·---·····························-··-·········--··········-····-·····-·-···-···································-····················-····-···-····-··--·-·-··-········-··--
10:44:53 AM· Judge j re-phrase question 
10:45:20 AM I J. Quane I Objection - leading 
10:45:25 AM· j Objection is sustained 
.. ~· ~ ;:: ;~~··:~ .
1
.~ ~~u:ne·-···-·····-·····----1 ~:1:~::~~·· ~s a~:=~u~e~nswered····--·-··············--··-········---··········---················-···························-·········· 
11: 12:07 AM I Judge I admonishes the jury 
Tf·f=Ffs)\rvfr·································································-···Tcou·rfre·cesii"e·s···-·-········-·······················----···············-····--·----····-·······-···········-·--···········-··············-·········-···········-··········--······ 
·····································-····-···-·-····· :-·-·-·-···········-----·-··-···---- r·································································································-···-···---·-··---··-·········--·-·-···-·---··-···-·------·-·-··-·······-··········-·-·························· 
11 :27:47 AM I 1Court resumes 
_ ]_] :;;:;~_ ~~ i S. McKay __ ·::~:~~~:_ ~::~xamination _ of the witness _-Charles~ Ballard __ _ 
11 :31 :21 AM IS. McKay I Exhibit# 24 previously marked is identified 
11 :31 :45 AM IS. McKay I Moves to admit Exhibit# 24 
··rr3·:r:·s·:ifAMTI"··c:i"u·a·n·e······························-····rNo"·obJecffo·n··············-·····························-········-·····················-··-·-··························································································-·························-
11 :32:26 AM j Judge I Exhibit# 24 is admitted 
11 :34:21 AM IS. McKay I Exhibits# 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 & 28 previously marked is 
I I identified 
11 :34:26 AM i S. McKay I Moves to admit Exhibit# 26 
11 :34:30 AM j J. Quane j Objection - to all exhibits previously stated 
11 :34:41 AM j Judge j Exhibit# 26 is admitted 
11 :34:50 AM IS. McKay Moves to admit Exhibit# 28 
··1··1·:'34:'58 .. AMTJudge·············-·-··········--·--· ·Exhibit .. #··28···is .. admitted··································--............... ·---····························-·-······ 
·· 1 · 1 · :·35 :·oa .. AM J s· .... McKay ......................... _ .. Moves·· to ··admit -Exhibit.#. 25 ................................................................................................. ·--·--·----·-···-·····-
... 1 .. ~... :.~.~ .. : .. 1 .. 1 .. ~·~·1·~·~·~·~-:. .... --.. -........................... ~.~~!.~!.~ ... ! ... ?.?..J~ ... ~9..~.!.!.!:..~ .......... _ .. ____ ............... - ... -.... --···-------·-.. -............. -................................  
··}~·:·~!:·~~··:~··~~:~Kay·-·········-················~:~~~: ;;:i::~~~:~ #.27 .................................................... --·-····-·-········-···----........ -.... ·-
.. 1°'1.:°35:.33 .. AMlS .... McKay ..................................... Moves to ·admit Exhibit·#·2i"' ................................................................................................................. -....................... .. 
11 :35:37 AM I Judge Exhibit# 22 is admitted 
:: 1::1 · :'35 :44:: AM Js: .. ::_McKay ·:::::::~'.:~::::::~::::J Moves .. to '.:admit:· Exhibit .. # :·23:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::=:::::::::::::=~:::~:::::: 
11 :35:50 AM Judge Exhibit# 23 is admitted 
11 :36:27 Judge Objection is noted and not waived 
11 :39:00 J. Quane Cross-examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
12:01 :43 PM, S. McKay , Objection - vague 
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12:01 :55 PM I Judge I admonishes the jury 
12:02:04 PM! fcourt recesses ............................................... r ...................................................................... +·····-··-·························································································································································································································--·-· 
01:59:18 PM1 \Court resumes 
01 :59:23 PM j jthe jury is present 
01 :59:45 PM' J. Quane I continues cross-examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
02:05:01 PM S. McKay jObjection - asked & answered 
··02 :'05 :'03 .. PM .Judge ·························-·······-Tobjection···is ··overruled··········································--·-·····-·--····-··--···································································· 
02:09: 17 PM I J. Quane j Publishes the first deposition of Charles Ballard 
··02:2a:'09···PM Ts·. ···McKay········· ......................... Objection·_·· hearsay·····-·········-························· .. ···················································································································-····· 
·.·.02:2a:·.1·.4· ... P .. Ml J. Quane • '"'~t""'' '"'~ ··············································-········-·---····························· .. ··························································································· 
!··········-········································--·---··········--··············· ..................................................................................................................................................... ,-.. - ....................................................................... . 
02:28:57 PMJ Juage Objection is sustained 
02:32:45 PM I Judge admonishes the jury 
02:32:51 PM jJury is excused 
02:33:29 PM J. Quane I Offer of proof re: testimony 
............................ . ....................................................... ·-··r···--·--········································-···············································································································-·······-·-······-----·--·-··············-······ 
02:35: 1 o r ,v,; Judge I Inquires of witness 
...... . ······-···· ··············-····· ........................................... ·-·····························r··········· .. ··················································--·-··-···················-·-··············-··----·--······································································································· 
02:35:46 PM!Judge 10bjection is sustained 
.. 02: 38 :.1. 7 ... PM .1............................................. Court recesses·-······························································································································-································-········-·· 
02:45:23 PM I j Court resumes 
.. 02: 45: 2 9 .. P.M .1 ....... ·--··············-·······················-.. ·-··-.. J.the) u ry .. is .. present·······························-----·············-············----······-·-······-···························································· 
02:47:27 PM I J. Quane j continues cross-examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
I i 
·02:55:'1.6 ... P.M'fJ .... Quane .................................... TPublishes·the .. second-deposition .. o(Charles .. Ballard···························-····-······ 
··02:58:·07· PM·j·s·.···McKay········ .......................... '[.Objection············-·····---·-·-··························-·-···············-···············-········································································································ 
03:02: 19 PM IS. McKay [ Objection - relevance 
"03:·02:·24···PMTJ .... Quane·······················-·rResponds········--........................................................................................................... -.... ···········------.. ·-·· .. ----··---··················-
··03·:·02·:·3·:rP·MTJ°udge·········· .. ····-···························· .. ,·'6't>Jection···i-s ... sustained·········· .. ·····-······················-······················································································· .. -···················· 
.. 03 :'06 :' 1· 1···PM 'j' S. ···McKay ............................. TObjection· .. _·· assumed .. facts -·-··············-·--··-·············· .. - ...............................................................................  
03:06: 19 PM I Judge I Objection is sustained 
03:06:43 PM IS. McKay I Objection - asked & answered 
··oI·oi·:··ff·P·M·rs·:-rilici<ay···········-················· ... T"BhJecfio·ii···=···iiissu·rr,-ecrtacis-················-·--··············---.. -·························· ...................................................................  
~~;;_~!~~~-ra~;-~:~~~'.·~;:~~nswerecr------------------------
.. 03:.1 .. 1.:4.1 ... PM. Judge I Objection is sustained 
03: 12:00 PM 1 S. McKay , --, on - asked & answered 
03: 12:04 PM j Judge j Objection is sustained 
-~;:~~:}~-:~t~:;~~Kay -t ~~::~:~~ ;. •:~=~~8~nswered ___ _ 
.. 03: 1· 3 :·3·1 .... P.M Ts· .... McKay ........ --.................. T Objection .. - · asked· & .. answered ......................................................................................... -................ - ... -... . 
··~; ~·~; ~·~~ ... ~~ l~~~~Kay_ ................ -... ·-1~~1:~!:~~ ... ~s a:~:~i~e:n.swereei ........ ___ ......... --·-······--· ...... ---·-··················-..................................... . 
.. 6.s':':2°3·:··1··Ef P·M··1 Judge _f'c55Jection· .. i-s-·ove·rruieci· .......................................................... _ ..................... ___ ............. _ .. ______ ............. -......... .. 
.. 03:42:'55 ... PMTJ .... Quane .................................... TObjection ·-.. mischaracterized .................................................................................................. _ ....................... -........ . 
.. ~; ~ :; ~-!!·-~·~ I·~ ~~gu:·n·e· .... ______ .... ___ ........ · ~~r:;:~~ .. ~ ~:i:~~~·ce ...................................... -............................................................... _ .................. - ........................ .. 
.. ~;~:;~~:·-~~ t·~~~gu:·n·e ................................. ·~~1:~!:~~ ... ~sl.;;;i~~led ........... -........................ -........................................................................................................................ .. 
.. ~;~::~~~ ... ~.~ l·~~~gu:·ne __ .............................. ~~1:~!:~~ .. ~51:~;~~~ned ............................................................................................................... -...... _ ................... -... -
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03:45: 13 PM I Judge I Objection is sustained . 
03:47:44 PMjJ. Quane !Objection 
03:4 7:50 PM i Judge i Objection is overruled 
03:49:35 PM jJ. Quane j Re-cross examination of the witness - Charles Ballard .................. .. 
03:50:43 PM IS. McKay j Re-direct examination of the witness - Charles Ballard ............ .. ... _ ................................................................................................................ ---r· .... --............................................................................................................................................................................... _ ...................................... _ ..._ ..
03:53:03 PM I Judge i excuses the witness - Charles Ballard 
03:53: 19 PM i Judge j admonishes the jury ........................................................................................... ___ ..................... _t" ......................................................................................................... _ .......................... _, _____ .... ,_, ___________ .. , ........... --................................. . 
03:53:27 PM I 1Jury is excused .. oI·s:iE:~n .... i=>.Kif f'J ... a·u·iirie .............................. _Tco·m·m·e·n·ts-·r,i: ... ie.stfrn·o·n·y ... fomo·rrow ........................ _ .............. _._ .. _ ........ _____ .. ______ .. __ .. _ .... _ ...... .. 
03:55:00 PM I G. Haddad I comments re: motion in limine 
03:57:46 PM jJ.Quane I Responds 
.. 04:00:_33 ... P.M.!.Judge ..................................... -.......... 1.instructs_ counse1 ......................................................................................................................................... -.............................. _ 
04:11 :30 PM I I the jury is present 
04: 11 :53 PM IS. McKay I The Plaintiff rests ........................................................................................... _____ ..................... r ............ - .......................................................................................................................... - .................................................. . 
04:12:00 PMIJudge iadmonishes the jury .. 04:'1'2:'33 .. 'p'M'I ........................................................................ Tcourt .. recesses .. ,_, _______ ,-.................................................................................................................. .. 
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OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MEMORANDUM OBJECTING TO 
PLAINTIFF RECOVERING FOR 
KRYSTAL BALLARD'S MEDICAL 
COSTS AND BURIAL BENEFITS 
AND EXPENSES 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is solely a wrongful death action brought by Charles Ballard, 
MEMORANDUM OBJECTING TO PLAINTIFF RECOVERING FOR KRYSTAL 
BALLARD'S MEDICAL COSTS AND BURIAL BENEFITS AND EXPENSES - 1 
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individually, that is based on allegations that Defendant Dr. Kerr breached the standard of 
health care practice. Plaintiff should not be permitted to recover, as a windfall, expenses 
that were incurred and paid by Krystal Ballard, or her estate. Mr. Ballard must not be 
allowed to recover for expenses and obligations which died with his spouse, including 
medical bills and burial costs/benefits. All of these costs and expenses were paid for by 
Krystal Ballard's military medical insurance carrier, Tricare. Mr. Ballard did not pay these 
expenses and is under no obligation to reimburse any party for these expenses. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
It is well established that at common law, the death of either the victim of the 
tort or the tortfeasor, extinguished the victim's right of action, and could not be continued 
by a representative of the estate. Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 857, 736 P .2d 1309, 
1311 (1987); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 215-16, 769 P.2d 87, 92-93 
(1990). In addition, at common law where a person's death was caused by the wrongful 
act of another, the relatives and dependents of the victim had no cause of action on their 
own. Evans, 118 Idaho at 215. 
In 1881, in order to alleviate the harshness of the common law rules 
regarding survival, Idaho enacted the Wrongful Death Act. The statute "as originally 
enacted, has remained virtually intact for over one hundred years." Westfall v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 922, 821 P.2d 973, 977-78 (1991). The statute, Idaho 
Code § 5-311 , "did not create a rig ht for a survival action, but a new cause of action for the 
benefit of the heirs." Vulk, 112 Idaho at 858. 
According to well established Idaho law, "[a] survival action is for the 
MEMORANDUM OBJECTING TO PLAINTIFF RECOVERING FOR KRYSTAL 
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damages the deceased suffered and could have sued for had he survived, while a 
wrongful death action involves the damages suffered by the heirs of the decedent 
because of his death, such as loss of guidance, support, etc." Hayward v. Valley Vista 
Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 353, 33 P.3d 816, 827 (2001). The Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that no right of action is given to the estate of the victim of the tort, but is granted 
only to his or her heirs. Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 605, 151 P.2d 765, 770 (1944), 
overruled on other grounds by Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., Inc. 93 Idaho 
888,477 P.2d 511 (1970). "If there are no heirs, no right of action vests in anybody." Id. 
According to Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, "[w]hen the death of a person is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal 
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person 
causing the death." I.C. §5-311. This statute "does not allow a decedent's claims to 
survive, but creates a new cause of action in favor of heirs or personal representatives." 
Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192, 194, 24 P.3d 1208, 1210 (Ct. App. 2009). Pursuant to 
Idaho's Wrongful Death Act, Charles Ballard may only pursue and recover his damages 
that he alleges were caused by his wife's death. Her medical and final expenses were her 
expenses and obligations. Her claims do not survive. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Charles Ballard should not be permitted to 
recover expenses which were the sole possession and obligation of Krystal Ballard. To 
allow this would be a windfall to Charles Ballard as he would have no obligation to repay 
the expenses. 
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DATED this lv day of November, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jer I A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Att neys for Defendants 
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~ f I .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this fVday of November, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OBJECTING TO PLAINTIFF 
RECOVERING FOR KRYSTAL BALLARD'S MEDICAL COSTS AND BURIAL 
BENEFITS AND EXPENSES by delivering the same to each of the following, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
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Judge Bail 111313 Tara VillL I Roxanne Patchell Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
09:07:04 AM i I CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 6 
09:36:38 AM !Judge !Calls case 
09:37:35 AM I J. Quane I Calls Brian Kerr, sworn, direct examination 
.. 1.0:_00:5.... _s ... _McKaY .......... _______ 1l_Objection -.. relevance .............................................................................................................. · ... :·: .................. _.~: 10:01 :0 J. Quane Responds 
-iI:ni ~M f :~:ddad =,l.~~:;:~~::::::::~::=====-=~·-
10:45:5 Judge admonishes the jury .. ~.~:~::4 ............................................................ ,-.. ,l·~~~~-~:~~::: -····-·---.. , ...................................................................................................................................  
11 :08:50 A jthe jury is present 
11 :09:26 AM I J. Quane I continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
............................................................ ! ......... - .......... __ ............................ ___ .. ,: ............. _ .. , ................................................................................................... _ ..................................................................................................................... _ 
11:12:01 AMjJ. Quane jExhibit#Z1 previously marked is identified 
11: 15:02 AM I J. Quane I Moves to admit Exhibit# Z1 - for demonstrative purposes 
,_ .............................................. ..! ..................................................................... ..I. ...................................................................................... _ ...... -, ... --.............................................................................................................. _ 
11: 15: 11 AM! Judge I Exhibit# Z1 is admitted - for demonstrative purposes 
................................................ -, ...................... _ .. __ .................... -........... 1 ................................................................................................ _., ......... ,--................................ _ ..................................................................... .. 
11 :23:05 AM I J. Quane , Exhibit# H previously marked is identified 
11 :48:58 AM I G. Haddad I Objection - leading 
11 :48:59 AM I Judge I Objection is sustained - re-phrase question .................................................................................................................... _ ..__ ,, .......... _ .._ ..___ .................. , ____ ....... _ .._____ ................................................................................... ,-................................ __ 
11 :49:01 AM I G. Haddad Objection - foundation 
.. 1 .. 1. :49 :22 .. AM JJudge .............................. -...... ,1.0bjection ... is .. overruled ___ ............ _,_ ............................................................................................................. .. 
11 :53:02 AM I G. Haddad Objection - relevance 
11 :53:06 AM I Judge I Objection is sustained 
01 :39:03 PM I jthe jury is not present 
01 :39:04 P G. Haddad jArgues in opposition to exhibit, it was not disclosed .. 0·1·:40:22 .. PM j·J ... Quane ............................. TResponds .............................................. _ ..__ ......... - ... - ......... -........................................................................................ .. 
01 :49:40 PM I J. Quane Offer of proof re: exhibit 
.. o'f5o:·3o ... PM.J J .... Quane __ ............. ·Exhibits·# ... li"'and .. JJ°"are .. marked .. and .. identified ·-·--·-·-..................... .. 
01 :52:52 PM \J. Quane ves to admit Exhibit# II & JJ - for offer of proof 
.. o'1.:53:'1·a ... PM. ·Judge ................................... ·Exhibits·# II & .. JJ° wilf"not"be .. admitted ................................................. --.··--····-...... . 
.. o· 1·:·55: 08 ... PM T ..................................................................... 'the .. j u ry .. is present ............................ _ ......................... -............................................................................................. _ .. ....................... ,_ .. ,_, ...................... l .... ,-....... ,-.......... -................................................................................................................................ _,_ ............ _ .. , __ ,., ......... --.. ·-····· .. --........................................................  
01 :55: 11 PM J. Quane continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
.. o'1·:·57:.55 ... PMTS ... McKay ...................... ·objection .. -.. foundation ..................................... -.................. ____ ............... - ......................................... .. 
:·o· 1: :·5 7 ::5 9 ::: P.M: : Judge ::::::::=~:::::=::::::::::::::1: Objection_::is ::sustained::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::~-~:::::::::::::::::::::~~~:::::::=:: 
· ~ ~ ~~~~ ~; ... ~~ -~~:~KaY ............................. j.~~~:~::~~ ... is · overruled ............................ -................................................................................................................  
02:04: J .... Quane ............................. "j'Exhibits .. # .. 01 ... _ ..02f.previously 'marked ·is .. identified .................................. .. 
02:06:24 PM ...... - .. -.................................... __ j'Moves·to' .. admit .. Exhibit # .. 01"·- 021 .......................................................................................... .. 
02:06:27 PM No objection 
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. . 
02:06:30 PM I Exhibits# 01 - 021 • :~~:~i:~~::~ 
1 
Judge ---~~~~~~:;~::e:jury == ===~:::::~::::::::::::::::= 
··o-~E2j·:·3·:rF,.MT·······················---···-----··--··························1·t11e'}u·ry···,s···p·rese·nr························--···-·-··-···-····-·-----···············--·-·--····---··----····--········--------------.. ------------··----············ 
--·-·------------------------------------------------·, --·-----------------------------------------------------------·T--------.. --------------·--·----------------------------------------------·-----·-----------------···--··---------------·----------------------··--------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
02:24:24 PM I J. Quane I continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
--02·:·;~i-:FiEf PM .... J":··ai:i'iiii·e·-----··-----·--------------TE·x11,6ff--1ra--·previau·sTy--·mar1<ecT,sTcie·iimTe·,r--···················------------·· .. ·----------·--------········--
--0·2·:·44.:4·:r·f5rvi- ·I"·aua·n·e··--·--------------------·,--Mov·e·s--·fc,-·a,frn'ff-Exti1.bii"'ira-~-musfrathi"e-purpos·es····--·--··--···------··--·--····--------· 
02:45: 10 PM G. No objection 
02:45: 16 PM I Judge Exhibit# Q is admitted - illustrative purposes 
02:49:24 PM I J. Quane I Exhibit# T previously marked is identified 
02:50:30 PM j I Moves to admit Exhibit# T 
--~~; ~~;.;: --:~ ·l·~ie~addad------------------------·l·~~!e~~~i~its--are--marked· r1· ,--T2,--T3 --and--T 4---·-----------------------------------------------·------------
--0.2:5I--f'1 i=>rJiTcf ... Fiaeiei~i,r----------------·------·--ohJect,on--·fo-f3--·:--tou·iiaafion--------·---------------------------------------------------------·---------------------------·--·--------------· 
_ ...... --... -.............. __ ......................... t .. , ........ _, .. ,,.._ ....... -....................................................................................... - ............................................... ,_ ... ,_ .......... , ____ ... , ..... _,,_,,, ............................................................................... .. 
02:53:20 PM I Judge Exhibits# T1, T2 and T4 are admitted 
02:56:27 PM j J. Quane Moves to admit Exhibit# T3 
02:56:38 PM j G. Haddad I Objection - inquires to aid the objection 
--0·2:·sif.44--·i=>·rviTG:··Fiaeici~i,r·--------------------·rvvH11araws--·t11e--·o'i:>Ject,aii-----·-·----·-------------·-----------·--·----·------------··----------·· .. ----------·------------·-----------·----·--I 
-~~:J::~!-:~.l.~~~~=---------l-~~:~:===~~:~;~tted---------------------
··~; ;:: ; ~~--.:~ ·1 --·t·~~~~~e:u;::e.iii ................. --.. ·---.. - ........... -... --........................................................................................  
.......................................................... : .................... - ............ - ............................ T ................................................................... - ...... _._ ............... ---....... --.............. _ .......................................................................... . 
03:47:06 PM I J. Quane I continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
04:08: 17 PM j G. Haddad I Objection - asked & answered 
04:08:20 PM j Judge I Objection is sustained 
04: 11 :26 PM I G. Haddad I Objection - speculation 
04: 11 :41 PM! Judge ire-phrase question 
.. ~:;·~·;;;~ ... :~·j ~~d~:ddad ....................... j~~~~~:~:· ~~:~~i:~ntative .. -····--................................................................................................................ .. 
04:31 :23 PM j G. Haddad I Objection - leading 
04:32:02 PM I Judge I re-phrase question 
.. 04 :·33 :20· PM ·1· G· ... Haddad ...................... "j' Objection .. _ .. relevance··--·-............... - ............................................................................................................. .. 
04:33:54 PM I Judge j Inquires of witness 
04:37:13 PMjG. Haddad jObjection - relevance 
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.... Judge Bail 111413 Tara V.ir. I Roxanne Patchell Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
09:08:39 AM I jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 7 .. 09:35: 18 .. AM.1 Judge ................................................ Tcalls"case _ .._, ................................................................................................................................................................................ --...... -.... , 
.. 6'~f:":3's·: .. f if A. .. .............................................. _ .. _Ttti"e]Li'ry ... is .... r,.otpreiiiinr ................ -........................................................................................... _ ........................... _ .. ____ .. ___ .. .. 
-o·g·:':3·s·:·2·{ ... AKil\Y: ... J.ones·-............................. __ Tconimei'nts ... r,i:c·aTiTn·g ... wffn.ess ... c,.urora·raer ................................................... _ ...... ____ .. _ ... _ .. 
.. o§·:':3·s·:·s·:fA ......... i ~f .... McKay_ ....................... __ fRes.i:ion·as ............ _. __ .................................................................................. _ ............................. -......... -..................................... __ ............ .. 
................................................... .. .................................... -.. ·-·----·r ...... __ ............................................................................................................................................ -.......... --·--·-·-................ - ....... _ ................................ -....... . 
09:38:46 A . . addad I comments re: Objection to the admission of Exhibit V .. o§·:':3§·:·4·s .. ·Arv1rr·"J'one·s· .. ··-·-·--.. -----fRtis.i:ionas·-·-.............................................................. _ .............. -....... _. ___ .... _____ .. _____ , ____ ............ ____ ...................... -............. .. 
.. 09 :40: 1· 7 .. AM ·j Judge .... -.. ·--·---·-·---.. --T Objection ... is .. sustained ................. _ ................................ ___ .. ____________ ..... -............. - ............................................... .. 
09:42:40 AM I I the jury is present 
09:45:31 AM jT. Jones jCalls Geoffrey Stiller, sworn, direct examination 
-i~:~~:;i_;~J~ud~:::::----l~~=;:~~ '.:~;~:~::d _________ _ 
........................................................... .. .................................................................. f" ................................................... _ ... _ .. ,.,_ ............... _ ............. _, ______ ................................................................................................................ _, _____ .. _ 
10:07:22 AM Judge i Objection is sustained 
10:08:58 AM j G. Haddad j Objection - broad 
.. 1.0:09:02 .. AM .. 1 J.udge ........................................... _. 1.0bjection ... is overruled ..................... _ ............................................................................................................................. ______ _ 
10:09:45 AM . Haddad I Objection - relevance 
10:09:48 AM e I Objection is sustained 
10: 12:27 I admonishes the jury 
10:12:31 AM! jJury is excused ... rcr .. ri·o·7 ... J.\.rv1Tcf .... Haci'diici'_ ..................... -rcom·me·nts-re-: .. n·ew .. evr'dence .. fiy .. wffn.es's' ........................................................................... ______ .... .. 
-~~:~~::~-~ T. Jones --f ::~:;~,:---------------
.. 1 ..1 .. : 0 5: 54 .. AM .. 1 .............. -.......................... ~~~.~ .... ~.:.?..:.~.~.~~ ................................................... -.................... ----.. ·------·----............................................................... .. 
11 :06:01 AM I Court resumes 
.. 1 ..1.: 06 :_ 1_ 3 .. AM .1 .......... --... -.................... _ .. ________ .... ..J.the) u ry .. is .. present ................................. _ ...................................... _ ... -·-·---·--·-....................................................................  
11 :06:16 AM IT. Jones I continues direct examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
.................................................................................................................................. J ............................................................................................................ ,_ ................... -.......................... - .................................................................................... .. 
11: 11 :06 AM I G. Haddad I Objection - foundation 
11: 11 :08 AM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
11: 11 :33 AM j G. Haddad ion - relevance 
11: 11 :37 AM! Judge I Objection is sustained 
: ]:l•iii!ii:f ~ !•I:~~:::::=:~~=! f ~g~~:/~~;~If t ==::::=:::~=~-~~=~-= 
11 :46:38 AM IG. Haddad 1ection -~-~·::~:~~-~~l~udi:~-l~~i:::~~-is_overruled ___________ _ 
:jJ.iiiiil:f ~l:~~::ddad==f [{~Eti:J.If :t:::=-~======::=:= 
:il i~~ii~:t~.1.:~~;:es:~=li~g:1~:::•I==-=======:::=~==-= 
01 :33:11 PM i 1the jury is not present 
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. ~ Judge Bail 111413 Tara Viii, 11 Roxanne Patchell Courtroom510 
01 :33: 15 PM I Judge I addresses counsel re: Motion in Limine as to other infections 
............................................................ ' ................... - ........ --.. ··-·········· ................ ,1. .................................................................. - ....................... -----·····-·--.. ·-··············-·-.................................................................................................. . 
01 :35:56 PM l Judge I Declares a mis-trial 
01 :35:58 PM I Judge awards expert witnesses costs to be paid to Plaintiff to be paid 
I prior to the next trial. Reserves the issue on attorney fees . 
............................................................ 1... ........................ - ...... -···--·-· .. ····-.. ·-····-·-··-·--................................................... _ ............................................................. -----·-··-····-·-----·-······---·----·-----····--·-········· 
01 :37:35 PM IS. McKay I comments re: mis-trial 
-~~.::~:~r:~.:.Judge_=:_~:-=:j~:~~::::::~::es_ the)ury ==-~=:~-=::_=-=~===== 
01 :46:31 PM I I Court recesses - all exhibits were returned to counsel · 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
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303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. ~ 
A.M FIL~~=3:t;-
DEC O 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, ~LP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS, FOR FULL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS 
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED, AND 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF 




Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, respectfully moves this Court pursuant to 
Rule 37(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for an order imposing sanctions upon 
Defendants and Defense counsel as a result of the mistrial declared by the Court on November 
14, 2013. The declaration of a mistrial followed repeated warnings by the Court that it would 
declare a mistrial and impose sanctions in the form of payment to the non-offending party of all 
attorney fees associated with the trial, expert trial costs, and other costs of trial if the Court's 
orders in limine were violated. Following the declaration of this mistrial, the Court further 
indicated it would consider all other appropriate relief requested. Accordingly, Plaintiff now 
seeks through this motion an Order as follows: 
• Imposing sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorney fees associated with 
reasonable trial preparation and the handling of the trial by Plaintiffs counsel; 
• Imposing sanctions in the form of reimbursement of the costs associated with 
Plaintiffs experts' travel, lodging, and testimony at the trial of this matter; 
• Imposing sanctions in the form of reimbursement of reasonable trial costs 
incurred by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel to include travel, lodging, and meals 
for SSgt Charles Ballard, attorney Greg Haddad, paralegal Farrah Caruthers, costs 
associated with Plaintiffs courtroom technician to run Trial Director, costs for 
service of trial subpoenas, costs of trial witness fees, and other reasonable costs to 
he submitted to the Court upon entry of an Order imposing sanctions; 
• : Imposing sanctions in the form of striking Defendants' liability defenses; 
• Imposing sanctions in the form of the remaining attorney fees requested by 
Plaintiff following the Court's earlier imposition of sanctions against Defense 
counsel for improperly refusing to answer Plaintiffs discovery (See Court's 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - Page 2 
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Order, filed October 11, 2012, imposing sanctions against Defendants' counsel in 
the amount of $1,500.00 and permitting Plaintiff to later seek reimbursement for 
full fees incurred in bringing motion to compel); 
• Enforcing existing discovery and disclosure deadlines; 
• Disqualifying Jeremiah Quane, Terrence Jones, and the law firm of Quane, Jones 
and McColl from handlin~ the retrial of this matter; and 
• Other sanctions deemed appropriate by the Court, including reimbursement to 
Ada County of the jury costs associated with the trial. 
Good cause exists for this motion given Defendants' and defense counsel's conduct in 
ignoring the admonitions of the Court concerning conduct at trial, including specifically the need 
to strictly adhere to the Court's limine orders and pretrial rulings, as well defense counsel's 
repeated and persistent efforts to undermine the fairness of these proceedings, all of which 
ultimately caused a mistrial at great cost and prejudice to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks 
an Order consistent with the foregoing, after which Plaintiff will submit an itemized statement of 
costs and attorney fees for consideration by the Court. 
A memorandum of law and declaration of counsel are submitted contemporaneously 
herewith. Plaintiff requests a hearing on this motion. 
Dated this 61h day of December 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
PLAINTIFF'S MO'JJON FOR SANCTIONS - Page 3 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of December, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
Scott McKay 
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BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
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T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DEC O 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER O 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DECLARATION OF P. GREGORY 
HADDAD IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS, FOR FULL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS 
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED, AND 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF 





DECL.i\RATION OF P. GREGORY HADDAD 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA., 
_COUNTVOF MONONGALIA, TO WIT: 
· , 1. I ~m an ~ttorney, duly licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia, and a 
.· partner with the law firm of .Bailey & Glasser LLP in Morgantown, West Virginia. I am 
,I 
. admitted pro hac vice in this case, and I am lead counsel for PlaintJff, Charles Ba}lard. Together 
· with the law firm of N'evi~, Benjamin~ McKay & Bartlett LJ.,P, I have prose9uted this case, and I 
was present throughout the trial of this matter, which began on November 5, 2013, and ended 
upo11 the declaration' of l;l. mistrial on November 14, 2013. I make the statements contained in 
thi~ P~claration based ·upon my personal ·observations and in support of a conte~poraneously 
filed ~otion for sanctions. . 
. '. 2. To my knowledge, a c~mplete transcript of the above referenced trial)n this matter 
ha; n~t been :prepared. Nevertheless, I have reviewed the factual assertions· sta.ted in the 
contemporaneously filed motion and memorandum of law, and I believe the descriptions of such 
factual.matters to be true, accurate and consistent with my memory of such matters during trial. 
This ends my declaration. 
I decl'1,ie under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho; that the 
foregoing is true and concct to.the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
. . . 
· PECLARATION IN SUPPORT .OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTJONS - Page 2 . . -- ' -. ; 
~ .,. ~; l'-,'.. • .... 
• 'la • ·,: •• 
; 






. ST~TJi.oF U/o,gt" tl~1~1&,·~ 
.COUN~~ 0~ /Y\t~<IP' «J,a flW& 
,' , ~ - 1' 
' 
, to-wit: 
! . ' • - ' . . ,-ilc· . 
TaJ<et1, subscribed and sworn to l;>efore me this _L day of December, 200. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of December, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
~~ 
Scott McKay 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to Rule 
37(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and moves for an order imposing sanctions upon 
Defendants and defense counsel following the declaration of a mistrial by the Court in this 
matter. . 
On November 14, 2013, this Court declared a mistrial as a result of the Defendants' 
violation of a pretrial limine order of the Court in the presence of the jury. The mistrial 
declaration occurred on the eighth day of trial, and it followed repeated warnings by the Court 
that if orders in limine were violated, the Court would declare a mistrial and impose sanctions in 
the form of payment to the non-offending party of all trial related attorney fees, expert trial costs, 
and other trial related costs. Following the mistria! declaration, the Court further indicated it 
would co~sider all other appropriate relief requested. 
Plaintiff now seeks an Order not only consistent with the above admonitions, but also 
commensurate with defense counsel's repeated disregard for this Court's pretrial rulings and 
persistent efforts to undermine the fairness of these proceedings, all of which ultimately caused a 
mistrial at great cost and prejudice to Plaintiff. The sanctions requested through this motion and 
set forth below are wholly within the Court's discretion. Moreover, the requested sanctions are 
required to bring some semblance of fairness to these proceedings in light of Defendants' 
persisten~ disregard for the rules, the blatant indifference defense counsel exhibited toward this 
Court's authority to govern the parties' conduct at trial, as well as the inexcusable prejudice 
defense counsel inflicted upon Plaintiff Charles Ballard. 
No better example highlights the disrespect Defendants exhibited not only toward 
Charles Ballard, but also toward the Court, than Defendants' conduct when the Court recessed to 
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consider, and ultimately grant, Plaintiffs motion for mistrial. After committing the fatal 
violation of this Court's in limine Order, and after the Court indicated that it would declare a 
mistrial prior to the noon break, Defendants and their counsel could be seen smiling, apparently 
pleased about the prospect of a mistrial, rather than demonstrating any measure of contrition. 
After the noon break, while the Court issued its mistrial ruling and explained the necessity of 
same as a direct result of Defendants' misconduct, Defendants' lead counsel, Jeremiah Quane, 
had the audacity to rotate his chair and turn his back to the Court. 
In commencing its analysis under these circumstances, the Court need ask one 
fundamental question: which party should bear the costs and expenses incurred in preparing and 
attending trial -- including those of readily calculable monetary value (trial related attorney fees 
and costs), as well as those less readily quantifiable (the jurors' time wasted, the Court's time 
wasted, Charles Ballard's time wasted away from active duty in the United States Air Force, and 
the emotional toll Charles Ballard suffered while recounting his wife's death on the witness 
stand) -- when the conduct of the Defendants, defense counsel, and defense witnesses 
demonstr~ted such profound and flagrant disregard for the Court's authority and disrespect for 
Staff Sergeant Charles Ballard that a mistrial was required? Of course, the answer is as simple as 
the question: it must be the Defendants. Otherwise, any party would, in effect, be granted license 
to disrupt the orderly and efficient administration of justice at trial with only limited 
repercussions. Surely, the sanctions being requested here are moderate in comparison to those 
the Plaintiff must face in terms of a retrial. 
The Court itself, in ruling on the mistrial, astutely observed that the mistrial was not 
caused by an isolated incident of misconduct, but rather a demonstrated "pattern and practice" of 
misconduct. Noteworthy is the fact that defense counsel's misconduct at trial is consistent with, 
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and comprises, a pattern of misconduct taking place over the course of months. This same 
pattern and practice, while pervasive throughout the litigation, became ·so prejudicial as to 
destroy the fundamental fairness that every litigant should rightfully expect at trial. 
In addition to costs, expenses, and attorney fees, Plaintiff moves for enforcement of 
existing discovery and disclosure deadlines, which have long passed. Neither defense counsel, 
nor Defendants should realize any benefit by a new trial necessitated by their misconduct, and 
specifically, by the admission of evidence not previously produced, or by the elicitation of 
opinions not previously disclosed. Defendants should be strictly confined to the record evidence 
exchanged in this case before defense counsel sabotaged the fairness of trial; otherwise, 
Defendants, no matter the sanctions ultimately imposed, will reap significant benefits for their 
counsel's blatant unwillingness to follow the rules and this Court's repeated mandates, and 
Plaintiff will suffer even greater prejudice in the form of trial by ambush. 
Additionally, Charles Ballard seeks imposition of the following sanctions: full imposition 
of sanctions previously imposed, but held in abeyance, as a result of Defendants' refusal to abide 
by the rules of discovery; the striking of Defendants' liability defenses; the disqualification of 
Defendants' present counsel from handling the retrial of this matter; and such other relief and 
sanctions this Court deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, reimbursement of the jury 
costs associated with this trial to Ada County. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
a. Defense Counsel's Conduct at Trial is Part of a Larger Pattern of 
Obstructive and Noncompliant Conduct. 
Defense counsel's behavior, which the Court correctly noted had become a pattern during 
trial, actually extends back to ·the very first hearing in this case. As the Court will likely recall, 
on September 12, 2012, Plaintiff was forced to bring a motion to compel discovery after 
Defendants refused to answer any of Plaintiffs initial interrogatories. Defendants claimed that 
those interrogatories exceeded the number permitted by rule, thus purportedly excusing 
Defendants from answering any of those interrogatories. The Court, of course, deemed 
Defendants' position baseless, ordered Defendants to answer all of Plaintiffs interrogatories, and 
assessed sanctions against defense counsel in the amount of $1,500.00. (See Order, Oct. 11, 
2012.) The Court also ruled, however, that "[t]his order does not preclude plaintiff from 
requesting full fees at a later date." (Id.) 
Defense counsel's pattern of obstructive and noncompliant behavior continued to develop 
when, shortly prior to trial, defense counsel attempted to mislead this Court regarding Plaintiffs 
willingness to engage in mediation. In reference to the parties' pretrial exchange of information 
conference, defense counsel made the following representation to this Court: 
· For the first time in the history of the case, counsel for Plaintiff said that his client 
would agree to mediation, even though the trial is scheduled to start November 5, 
2013. Defense counsel had to decline the untimely suggestion of mediation due 
to· the date the trial was to start, the impossibility of arranging mediation on such 
short notice and the fact that the bulk of the trial preparations had been completed 
and that defense counsel would be completely occupied with continued trial 
preparations. 
(Certification of Defense Counsel 2, Oct. 29, 2013.) In so doing, defense counsel audaciously 
assigned blame for the undersigned's "untimely" willingness to participate in mediation, all the 
while making a demonstrably false representation as evidenced by correspondence exchanged 
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'; 
six months earlier, which Plaintiff was compelled to produce to the Court in an effort to confront 
defense counsel's astounding betrayal of reality. (See Pl.'s Resp. to Defense Counsel's 
· Misrepresentation Re: Mediation, Oct. 30, 2013.) Defense counsel became remarkably quiet 
when it came time to acknowledge, or offer any explanation for, their misrepresentation; in fact, 
· they filed nothing in reply to Plaintiffs correction. 
Furthermore, in response to Plaintiffs Motions in Limine to Preclude Speaking 
Objections, Unswom Testimony of Counsel, and References to the Parties' Motion Practice 
While in the Jury's Presence, Defendants offered the following, self-righteousness statement: 
"Defense counsel have tried cases before this court in the past and were quite capable of staying 
within the rules of this court." (Defs.' Mem. in Opp. to Pl.'s Mots. in Limine 40, Oct. 29, 2013.) 
In the wake of a mistrial caused by Defendants, their counsel, and their witnesses, one would 
quite naturally wonder, then, whether Defendants lacked the capacity, or perhaps only the 
willingness, to act accordingly in this instance. Defendants' response continued, "Defense 
counsel is comfortable that this Court is fully capable of determining whether any lines are about 
' to be crossed during the trial before it occurs." (Id. at 41.) As defense counsel proved at trial, 
they are also quite comfortable disregarding any such determinations. 
Throughout the trial, when objections were sustained by the Court, defense counsel, 
within the hearing of the jury, stated the testimony he wished to elicit, though the Court had 
previously ruled the testimony improper. Undeterred, not only did defense counsel state the 
substance of the precluded testimony, but he also declared the inference to be drawn from the 
inadmissible testimony. Defense counsel's conduct sunk to such a level that Plaintiff counsel 
asked the Court to admonish defense counsel. And though the Court did admonish defense 
counsel, the admonishment had little, if any, deterrent effect on defense counsel. 
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In granting Plaintiffs motion in limine on the topic, the Court explicitly ruled that 
evidence of Krystal Ballard's purported "noncompliance" would be precluded because it lacked 
any causal connection to the alleged injuries. The Court reasoned that evidence and argument 
pertaining to Krystal Ballard's reluctance to use narcotic pain medication, her failure to inform 
her husband of the liposuction procedure, and her failure to inform the Air Force about the 
liposuction procedure had nothing whatsoever to do with Krystal Ballard's death from an 
infection. And prior to commencement of trial, the Court warned both sides that if pretrial 
rulings on any matter needed to be revisited, those issues would be addressed outside the 
presence of the jury. 
Despite the Court's admonition, and in direct contravention of the Court's pretrial 
rulings, defense counsel attempted to introduce evidence of Krystal Ballard's "noncompliance." 
Defense counsel elicited testimony from his own client of Krystal Ballard's "noncompliance" 
without seeking reconsideration of the Court's pretrial ruling. Additionally, even after an 
objection, defense counsel, again, in the jury's presence, blurted out that "this goes to the issue of 
noncompliance". 
Plaintiffs counsel responded by moving for a mistrial based on a clear violation of the 
Court's pretrial rulings. Although the Court acknowledged that the Defendant and his counsel 
had violated the Court's order, it did not feel that the prejudice inflicted by the violation rose to a 
level justifying a mistrial. However, the Court advised the parties, yet again, that if a mistrial 
was occasioned by a violation of its pretrial rulings, the Court would award sanctions in the form 
of costs, expenses, and fees. It goes without comment that the Defendants, their counsel, and . . 
their witnesses ignored this admonition as well. 
The fatal violation necessitating a mistrial occurred during Defendants' presentation of 
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their expert, Dr. Stiller. Defense counsel asked Dr. Stiller directly why he believed Defendants 
had not violated the standard of practice, to which Dr. Stiller responded that there had not been 
any other infections at Defendants' facility. This testimony was offered despite the fact that the 
Court had previously deemed this information inadmissible. At no time did defense counsel 
even feign an attempt to stop Dr. Stiller as he rambled on for several sentences in this prohibited 
area. And though defense counsel characterized Dr. Stiller's prohibited testimony as inadvertent, 
other areas of Dr. Stiller's testimony reveal the speciousness of defense counsel's explanation. 
First, despite only speaking with Dr. O'Neil on one occasion prior to trial in order to avail 
himself of knowledge pertaining to the applicable standard of care, Dr. Stiller admitted that he 
conferred with Dr. O'Neil the night before taking the witness stand at trial, after he recognized in 
reviewing his deposition transcript that he had insufficient information about the local standard 
of practice. This conversation, clearly intended to remedy the paucity of information derived 
from Dr. Stiller's previous conversation with Dr. O'Neil, was never disclosed to Plaintiff's 
counsel. It is apparent, then, that_ Defendants attempted to sandbag Plaintiff, who had no ability 
to discover the substance of the conversation, and therefore, had no meaningful capacity to cross-
examine Dr. Stiller on that topic. 
Second, Dr. Stiller had not been provided information about the absence of other 
infections at Silk Touch prior his deposition. The compilation of information purportedly 
revealing a lack of other infections had been, according to defense counsel, "prepared shortly 
before August 20," well after Dr. Stiller's deposition of July 19. (Letter from J. Quane to P. 
Gregory Haddad 1, September 26, 2013; see also Pl.'s Consol. Mots. in Limine 12-18, Oct. 22, 
2013 (providing chronology and analysis related to "absence of infection" information.).) 
Defendants never provided an opportunity to engage in discovery on the data underlying this 
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compilation. Thus, Stiller had only recently been provided the information, which agam 
demonstrates a pattern of sandbagging in violation of discovery rules, as it does the propriety of, 
and necessity for, Plaintiffs motions in limine. 
Lastly, defense counsel asked Dr. Stiller, who previously served in the military, about Air 
Force protocol, which violated the Court's prohibition of evidence and argument pertaining to 
Krystal Ballard's failure to inform the Air Force of her liposuction. In fact, defense counsel 
didn't simply ask Dr. Stiller once, but even after an objection was sustained, defense counsel 
attempted to ask the same question immediately after the Court sustained the objection. 
To suggest mere inadvertence in eliciting testimony from Stiller on the issue of an alleged 
lack of infections requires an untenable suspension of disbelief in light of the numerous instances 
of Defendants' misconduct, which are almost too numerous to recount. Each such instances of 
misconduct placed Plaintiffs counsel in the impossible position of having to choose whether to 
object in the jury's presence, ~d thus call attention to the issue, or to silently allow the 
questioning notwithstanding the prejudicial effect. For example, Plaintiffs counsel chose not to 
object during the cross-examination of SSgt Ballard when defense counsel immediately 
published to the jury a pay stub of Plaintiffs wife and asked Plaintiff to identify deductions from 
Mrs. Ballard's earnings, which were made for life insurance and federal taxes. The Court had 
previously and clearly prohibited inquiry into these areas in its limine rulings. Nevertheless, 
defense counsel immediately forged ahead into these areas upon the opportunity to examine SSgt 
Ballard. 
Defendants' claim of inadvertence rings hollow in light of the pervasive pattern of 
conduct in this case, including violations of discovery rules, rules of evidence, Court rulings, 
sustained objections, and fundamental notions of fairness and professional conduct. However, 
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even if one were to believe that Dr. Stiller's improper testimony was the product of inadvertence, 
the prejudice and damage caused by that inadvertence is obvious, and it is the responsibility of 
the party sponsoring a witness to ensure that the witness does not offer precluded testimony. 
Neither Charles Ballard, nor his witnesses, nor his attorneys should be the ones to bear the 
resultant costs, expenses, and fees. 
On at least three occasions prior to the Court's declaration of mistrial, the parties were 
warned that a violation of its rulings would result in an assessment of expert costs, trial costs, 
and attorney fees against the party responsible for a mistrial. Notwithstanding these repeated 
warnings, Defendants acted unprofessionally and violated clear and unequivocal Court mandates. 
In so doing, defense counsel exhibited disrespect toward the Court, as well as toward the jurors, 
all of whom set aside two weeks of their lives to perform an honorable civic duty. What renders 
defense counsel's conduct particularly inexcusable, however, is the disrespect shown for Staff 
Sergeant Charles Ballard, who seeks and deserves nothing more, and certainly nothing less, than 
the fair administration of justice in relation to the death of his wife. Charles Ballard is the most 
severely impacted by defense counsel's apparent disdain for fair and orderly trial proceedings. 
Charles Ballard, who is on active duty in the United States Air Force, and who is 
currently stationed in Florida when not deployed overseas, is now, due to defense counsel's 
I 
conduct, forced to seek two to three weeks of additional leave in order to participate in a second 
trial. · And he will be forced to once again endure agonizing memories associated with the loss of 
his wife, the effects of which this Court observed when Charles Ballard described his loss from 
the witness stand. 
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b. This Court is Afforded Considerable Discretion to Impose Significant 
Sanctions Upon Defense Counsel for Their Disdainful, Noncompliant, and 
Highly Prejudicial Conduct. 
By his motion to compel discovery, as well as his memorandum of law in support 
thereof, both filed on August 24, 2012, Plaintiff provided full legal support in requesting 
sanctions for Defendants' refusal to answer Plaintiffs interrogatories. This Court granted 
Plaintiffs motion by Order dated October 11, 2012, awarding $1,500.00 in fees and costs. 
, 
Pursuant .to that Order, Plaintiff now seeks full reimbursement of fees and costs incurred in 
pursuing Defendants' compliance with their discovery obligations. 
Whereas Rule 37(a)(4) justified sanctions under those circumstances, Rule 37(e) 
authorizes sanctions for defense counsel's misconduct at trial: 
General Sanctions--Failure to Comply With Any Order. In addition to the 
sanctions above under this rule for violation of discovery procedures, any court 
may in its discretion impose sanctions or conditions, or assess attorney's fees, 
costs or expenses against a party or the party's attorney for failure to obey an 
order of the court made pursuant to these rules. 
Moreover, under the instant circumstances, dismissal of Def~ndants' liability defenses is 
a permissible and justified sanction. Due to the severity of this sanction, there is no doubt that 
this Court must consider the ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions. However, "explicit warnings are 
among the lesser sanctions that are appropriate before imposition of the drastic sanction of 
dismissal." Adams v. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 39, 57 P.3d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Ashby v. 
W. Council, Lumber Prod & Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684,687, 791 P.2d 434,437 (1990)). 
Additionally, "the Idaho Supreme Court enumerate[s] factors that must be expressly 
considered by the trial court in deciding whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted: 
The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser 
sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one "aggravating" 
factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by 
the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant. The 
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consideration of these factors must appear in the record in order to facilitate 
appellate review. 
Adams, 138 Idaho at 39, 57 P.3d at 508 (quoting Ashby, 117 Idaho at 686-87, 791 P.2d at 436-
37). 
"As to the ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions, the district court found that during . . . 
hearings of October 30, 2000 and March 19, 2001, the Adamses were specifically warned that 
failure to comply with discovery could result in dismissal, and they were admonished to 
immediately respond to outstanding discovery requests." Adams, 138 Idaho at 39, 57 P.3d at 
508. Moreover, "[t]he district court's finding of a clear record of delay [was] amply supported 
by the record . . . which demonstrates that the Adamses were routinely late in responding to 
discovery, were repeatedly noncompliant with deadlines set out in pretrial orders, and on one 
occasion failed to engage in court-ordered mediation." Adams, 138 Idaho at 39, 57 P.3d at 508. 
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's imposition of dismissal as a 
sanction for repeated misconduct. 
1. Plaintiff seeks full reimbursement of fees and costs for pursuing his 
successful motion to compel Defendant's discovery responses. 
In accordance with this Court's Order of October 11, 2012, Plaintiff requests that defense 
' 
counsel be ordered to pay $5,651.36, which represents the difference between the sanctions 
imposed by the Court in October 2012, and the total fees and expenses associated with Plaintiff's 
pursuit of an order compelling Defendants to comply with well-established discovery 
obligations. (See Aff. of Counsel, Sept. 14, 2012 (setting forth $7,151.36 in reasonable fees and 
expenses).) 
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2. The reprehensible conduct of Defendants and defense counsel, which 
necessitates a new trial, warrants full reimbursement of Plaintiffs 
reasonable trial related fees, costs and expenses, all of which will be 
replicated for retrial. 
In addition to full reimbursement of attorney fees incurred as a result of Defendants' 
failure to comply with discovery rules, Plaintiff also moves for an order compelling Defendants 
to reimburse the following, reasonable trial related fees, all of which will be itemized and 
submitted for the Court's consideration upon the granting of this motion: 
• attorney fees incurred in trial preparation, including preparation of Plaintiffs 
expert witnesses to the extent the time associated with such fees will be replicated 
in preparation for retrial; 
• attorney fees incurred for lead plaintiff counsel and his trial paralegal to travel to 
and from Boise, Idaho, for trial; 
• attorney fees incurred from November 4, 2013, through November 14, 2013 (the 
first di!Y of trial through the date the Court declared a mistrial); and 
• attorney fees incurred in drafting and presenting this motion. 
Sanctions should also include reimbursement of Plaintiffs reasonable, trial related costs 
and expenses, all of which will be itemized and submitted for the Court's consideration upon the 
granting of this motion: 
• costs incurred for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard's travel from Florida to Boise, Idaho, 
and costs incurred for his return; 
• costs incurred for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard's lodging and meals while in Boise, 
Idaho; 
• travel costs incurred for lead plaintiff counsel and his trial paralegal to and from 
Boise, Idaho; 
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• costs incurred for Plaintiffs lead counsel and his trial paralegal' s lodging and 
meals while in Boise, Idaho; 
• costs and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs counsel for trial technology support; 
• costs incurred for Dr. Dean E. Sorensen's trial preparation and expert witness 
appearance at trial; 
• costs incurred for Dr. George R. Nichols's trial preparation and expert witness 
appearance at trial; 
• costs incurred for Cornelius Hofman's trial preparation and expert witness 
appearance at trial; and 
• costs for service of trial subpoenas, costs of trial witness fees, and other 
reasonable costs to be submitted. 
Because Plaintiff will incur these fees and expenses upon retrial, defense counsel should 
be ordered to pay all of those fees and costs. The Plaintiff should not bear the cost, fees, and 
expenses, which must now be duplicated secondary to the Defendants' misconduct. To rule 
otherwise would send the message that mistrial bears no consequences and encourage parties to 
create a second opportunity in cases where a trial is not proceeding favorably. 
3. Defendants' liability defenses should be dismissed because Defendants 
repeatedly disregarded Court rulings and warnings, because previous 
sanctions had no deterrent effect on Defendants' adherence to Court 
orders, and because extraordinary delay and prejudice befell Plaintiff 
upon the Court's declaration of mistrial. 
Defendants were sanctioned by this Court in 2012 for failing to comply with discovery 
rules. Defense counsel made patently false representations regarding Plaintiffs willingness to 
engage in mediation. Defense counsel, despite multiple warnings from the Court, repeatedly 
violated explicit pretrial rulings, which eventually resulted in a mistrial. 
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Plaintiff not only incurred significant fees and costs in presenting this case to a jury, but 
he took leave from active duty to participate in seeking justice at trial for the death of his wife. 
Additionally, Plaintiff incurred the emotional cost of reliving his wife's death on the witness 
stand. Plaintiff will incur all of these costs when the case is retried. 
Pursuant to the analysis set forth in Adams v. Reed, dismissal of Defendants' liability 
defenses is wholly appropriate. And though, in Adams, the plaintiffs were the offending party, it 
is only appropriate that all parties be subject to sanctions for conduct satisfying the criteria set 
forth in that case. Lesser sanctions, including the sanctions imposed by the Court's Order -of 
October 11, 2012, as well as the explicit warnings issued to defense counsel during trial, were 
previously imposed, yet Defendants continued to defy Court orders and disregard Court 
warnings. In doing so, Defendants compromised the fairness of the trial proceedings to such a 
degree that the Court had little choice but to declare a mistrial. 
Obviously, Defendants' misconduct will delay the administration of justice in this case, 
likely for months. While Plaintiffs counsel is currently attempting to identify a time for retrial 
that works for Plaintiff, Plaintiffs counsel and Plaintiffs witnesses, it is difficult to imagine that 
Plaintiffs counsel would be available to retry this case until February 2014, at the earliest. 
Because there can be little question by the repeated and overtly defiant instances of misconduct 
that defense counsel's conduct was intentional, and because there can be no question that 
Plaintiff suffered, and continues to suffer, extraordinary prejudice as a result of defense counsel's 
misconduct, dismissal of Defendants' liability defenses is entirely justified because all criteria 
under Adams is not only satisfied, but exceeded. 
4. Defense counsel should be disqualified from this case. 
Rule 37(e) authorizes this Court to impose sanctions or conditions for failure to obey an 
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order in addition to those sanctions delineated by the rule. Additionally, the Court is afforded 
discretion to grant a motion to disqualify counsel. Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd, 128 Idaho 114, 
122, 910 P.2d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 1996); Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 
114 (Ct.App.1991). This dis~retion derives from the Court's inherent authority to supervise the 
professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it. United v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d 
Cir. 1980); see also Pichon v. Benjamin, 108 Idaho 852, 854, 702 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(regulation of the practice oflaw is an inherent power of the judiciary). 
The party seeking disqualification has the burden of establishing the grounds, and the 
goal of the Court is to shape a remedy that will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of 
the judicial process. Crown, 128 Idaho at 122-23, 910 P.2d at 794-95; Weaver, 120 Idaho at 696, 
819 P.2d at 114. In extreme circumstances, a party to a lawsuit is permitted to interfere with the 
attorney-client relationship of his opponent. Alexander v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa 
County, 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. 1984). A motion to disqualify opposing counsel should be 
filed with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts upon which the motion is based 
have become known. Crown, 128 Idaho at 122-23, 910 P.2d at 794-95; Weaver, 120 Idaho at 
696, 819 P.2d at 114. 
In engaging in a pervasive "pattern and practice" of refusing to obey Court orders and 
other conduct, as described above, defense counsel violated their duty under Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.2, which requires a lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation consistent with the interests of the client." This rule reflects "that dilatory practices 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute." Cmnt 3.2. The rules of professional conduct 
also prohibit counsel from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal. 
I.R.P.C. 3.4(c). 
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Given defense counsels' ongoing practice of disobeying court orders notwithstanding 
admonitions and sanctions, the Court can expect such willful violations to continue to cause 
undue delay. In the event the Court determines that striking Defendants' defenses is too drastic a 
remedy, removing defense counsel from representation and requiring the appearance of counsel 
who will not disregard court orders is the only way to prevent further prejudice to Plaintiff. 
c. Existing Discovery and Disclosure Deadlines Must Be Enforced to Ensure 
that Defendants Enjoy No Benefit Stemming from Their Misconduct. 
As this Court knows, Defendants disclosed untimely and unsupported "demonstrative" 
evidence purportedly indicative of a lack of other infections at Defendants' practice. 
Defendants' expert, Dr. Garrison, revealed ~ previously disclosed opinion pertaining to fat 
embolism well after the expert disclosure deadline had passed. At trial, defense counsel 
attempted to elicit testimony from their expert witness, Dr. Stiller, pertaining to a conversation 
Plaintiff had no opportunity to discover because the conversation between Dr. Stiller and a local 
physician occurred the night prior to trial. 
The mistrial caused by defense counsel should not benefit Defendants in any way. 
Specifically, Defendants should not be allowed, upon retrial, to depart from the record evidence 
exchanged during discovery in this matter, and, in essence, advance a trial by ambush strategy, 
which defense counsel so clearly espouses. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks strict enforcement of the 
discovery and disclosure deadlines set forth by the Court's Amended Notice of Trial Setting and 
Order Governing Further Proceedings, which the Court entered on September 9, 2013, as well as 
the pretrial rulings made by the Court prior to the start of trial. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the instant motion and enter an Order 
( 1) imposing sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorney fee~ associated with reasonable 
, 
trial preparation and the handling of the trial by Plaintiffs counsel; (2) imposing sanctions in the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - Page 17 
001832
form of reimbursement of costs associated with Plaintiffs expert's travel, lodging, and testimony 
' 
at the trial of this matter; (3) imposing sanctions in the form of reimbursement of reasonable trial 
costs incurred by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel to include travel, lodging, and meals for SSgt 
Charles Ballard, attorney Greg Haddad, paralegal Farrah Caruthers, costs incurred for Plaintiff's 
courtro~m technician to run evidence and exhibit presentation software at trial, costs for service 
of trial subpoenas, costs of trial witness fees, and other reasonable costs to be submitted to the 
Court upon entry of an Order imposing sanctions; (4) imposing sanctions in the form of striking 
D_efendants' liability defenses; (5) imposing sanctions in the form of the remaining attorney fees 
requested by Plaintiff following the Court's earlier imposition of sanctions against Defense 
counsel for improperly refusing to answer discovery; (6) enforcing the discovery and disclosure 
deadlines previously imposed by the Court; (7) di~qualifying Jeremiah Quane, Terrence Jones, 
and the law firm of Quane, Jones and McColl from handling the retrial of this matter; and (8) 
other sanctions deemed appropriate by the Court, including reimbursement to Ada County of the 
jury costs associated with the trial. 
Upon entry of an Order consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff will submit an itemized 
statement of costs including expert costs and attorney fees for consideration by the Court. 
Dated this 61h day of December 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i hereby certify that on the 61h day of December, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
~·~6 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
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P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT . 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA. 
I 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 . 
OBJECTION· TO 'PLAINTIFF'S· 
MOTiON FOR.SANCTIONS, FOR 
FULL ENFORC.EMENT.()F .·' . · .. · 
SANCTlONS PREVIOUSLY 
IMPOSED, .ANlYFOR. . 
. ... · 
.... 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
ENFORCEMENTOF EX'ISTlNG-
DISCOVERYANP t:>ISCLQJ3°u~E ·.. . .. ·.:··.;. 
DEADLINES . ·: .. 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel:of record, and 
. . . 
hereby submit their objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions. To the extent this· Motion 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, FOR.: FUlL . 
ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS PREVIOUSLY IMPOSJ:D·, . AND . FOR · :. 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE..OEADLINES·-:·1 .. : ·· . . . . :· '. . . •', . •, 
0 
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:: .. :· ... : .• ... 
·-:_ .·:·. · .. : 
is viewed as a substitute for a memorandum of costs under Rule 54(d), D~fendant hereby 
objects and gives notice that it intends to oppose the Motion and will. st:1~D1it · .th_e 
. ',,'• 
. . . . . : . 
appropriate opposition including copies of relevant transcripts and· affidavits once ·Plai~tiff · · · · · : ·.· · · . . . . . 
provides timely notice of hearing for his Motion. 
. .. 
: ... 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, FOR . FULL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS PREVIOUSLY. ·1MPOSED, · ··AND.·-· .FOR-·.,-·._.· .. 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE DEADLIN.ES .,z -,:·. · ·· . 
. . . - :: . . . . . . . . ~-
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. . . . . . :· .· ·,. .·.·: . · .. : .. 
•I• •: 
,,• ... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of D~c~n:tber-, ··2013Pe~mb~r.. . · · 
2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION-·TO.·P.LAINTIFf'S·.. . ···. ·. 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS,· FOR FULL ENFORCEMENT." · .OF ··-SANCTIONS. · . · . . . 
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED, AND FOR ENFORCEMENT OF EXIS1INCI t)iSCOV.ERY. . ·· .. :-
AND DISCLOSURE DEADLINES by delivering the same to e·acti oflhe foliowjng; by t~.~ .. ·, 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: · ... 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
. 2855 Cranberry Square 
. , Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
··Telephone (304) 594-0087 
· Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-~253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered · · · · 
[ ] Overnight' Mail: 
. .. . 
. ;•. 
[X] Facsimife (208) 345:..8274 
]. · l:).$. Miir; postage·prep·~ict 
1 . Han·ct Qeliv!3~¢d. · . . . . . .. 
[ L Overnigf)t Mair . . . :,. . . . . . ·. " 
{X] Facsimi_lef(304)'5~4~970.9 : :·. .: ·._ 
[ ] ·. U.S . .Mail, postage prep~fd · ·. · ..
[ J Hand ,Delivered . 
[ ] Overillglit Ma.ii.·.·:. . . 
[X] Facsirriil$ (205) 733-4896 
·: '• · .
. .. . · . . . . · . 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, FOR FULL · 
ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED, AND .. ·FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE 'DEADLINES - ·3: · ·. ·· . . . . . . 
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(')( 
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:.::::::: .. u:,p=~~a-+,,,-,-~ .... ~.::;-·;iw. 
7 rz::/-
•'DEC 2 ~ 2013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By STEP~,e ViDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, d/b/a 
SILK TOUCH MED SPA, and/or SILK 
TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER CENTER, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED S? A, LASER, and 
LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
625782 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
, 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
ORIGINAL 
001839
Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, gives notice that his Motion For Sanctions, 
For Full · Enforcement Of Sanctions Previously Imposed, And For Enforcement Of Existing 
Discovery And Disclosure Deadlines will be heard at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 12, 2014. 
Plaintiff further gives notice that he will request that the Court address setting a new trial date at 
this hearing. 
625782 
Dated this 24th day of December, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~/I_/(. e-By~ ~~~~~~~~~~~--~-.e--~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on December 24, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by mailing the same to the following: 
625782 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1576 
Facsimile - 208-780-3930 
g:..6r"~~ 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. FILED { 05'vt.: 
A.M.----P.M.!.--"""----
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE OVER LENGTH 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane Jones McColl, 
PLLC, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) and Fourth Judicial District Local 
Rule 8.1, hereby move this Court for an Order granting leave to file an over length brief in 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, in excess of the 25-page 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 1 
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limitation set forth in Local Rule 8.1. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is 37 pages in length inclusive of the caption page and 
Certificate of Service. 
This Motion is brought in good faith and on the grounds that the 25-page 
limitation set forth in the local rule is insufficient to allow Defendants to respond to the 
numerous issues raised and/or omitted from Plaintiff's moving papers which seek 
substantial sanctions which, if granted, would severely prejudice the defense. 
References to deposition testimony and discovery documents are being provided within 
the body of the brief for the convenience of the Court and counsel, in addition to the actual 
excerpts which are being attached to the Affidavit of Counsel filed concurrently in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions. 
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully requests that the Court grant 
this Motion and permit it to file an over length brief as requested herein. 
Defendants do not request oral argument on this Motion, and leaves the 
determination as to the necessity of oral argument on this Motion to the sound discretion 
of the Court. 
A proposed Order granting this Motion for Leave to File Over length Brief is 
attached hereto. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2014. 
NE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
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I ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of February, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
OVERLENGTH BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT APV'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] Email 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
[X] Email 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 3 
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. J;r:;·. 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
~~J· .(~.,. .~~ • .,. ... ~ ,, j .... , .. ' 
. , .... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO. FILED /~ 
A.M.---_.-.M----
FEB O 5 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 1 
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1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, and the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2). Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copy of portions of 
the transcript of the Court's hearing of November 14, 2013. 
3). Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 
Court's Amended Scheduling Order. 
4). Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the 
November 14, 2013 transcript of the testimony of Dr. Stiller. 
5). Attached hereto as Exhibit Dare true and correct copies of portions 
of the November 5, 2013 hearing transcript. 
6). Attached hereto as Exhibit E are true and correct copies of portions 
of the November 8, 2013 hearing transcript. 
7). Attached hereto as Exhibit F is the email of Terrence Jones to Mr. 
Haddad dated October 1, 2013. 
8). Attached hereto as Exhibit G is Certification of Defense counsel. 
9). Attached hereto as Exhibit H is Defendants' exhibit list. 
10). Attached hereto is Defendants Exhibit AA. 
11). Attached hereto is Defendants Exhibits U, Wand X. 
12). Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of portions of 
the deposition of Dean E. Sorensen, M.D. dated August 21, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
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FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day of February, 2014. 
CORINA FERRIS 
STATE OF IDAHQ . 
' ' 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of February, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed 
as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] Email 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
[X] Email 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
Q. Did the standard of practice require 
Dr. Kerr to have any of his employees certified in 
any fashion in order for them to be able to clean, 
sterilize, and disinfect his reusable medical 
equipment? 
A. I don't believe there is any 
certification for that. 
Q. Now, you likened cleaning, 
disinfecting, and sterilization to the use of the 
dishwasher at home. When you were in the military 
in the Air Force, did you have to perform 
sterilization in a field setting? 
A. When I was at Mountain Home, I was on 
the -- I was deployable, which means and it was 
right after 9/11, so obviously, they geared us all 
up to ship. And Mountain Home, at that point in 
time, was a base where the whole base could up and 
move and you would have a whole fighting team 
because we had the bombers and everything. So as 
the surgeon, yeah. They sent me to all kinds of 
training to do that. 
I had to do something called C4, which 
is combat, casualty, and something training. And 
during that we had to set up a tent and we had to 
set up an autoclave as well. Did I run the 
Page 15 
































Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
autoclave myself? Did l do the cleaning? No. 
Again, I had scrub techs there, but I was in the 
process of -- I was with the process of setting up 
the operating room and having that all available 
for us while we were there. It was actually the 
same equipment we would deploy with.· 
Q. And this was out in a field setting, 
not inside a building somewhere? 
A. It was in a tent. 
Q. And you were able to reach sterility? 
A. As best as we can in a tent, yes. 
Q. During Dr. Kerr's examination by the 
plaintiff, he was asked about a manual that exists 
for the Vaser machine? 
A. Okay. 
Q. A sound surgical technology manual. 
Have you had an opportunity to see that manual? 
A. I have. 
MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, this was not 
provided to him prior to his deposition. We've 
had no supplementation on any opinions regarding 
the significance or lack of significance of the 
Vaser manual. It was produced in discovery by the 
defendants long ago. It was available. They 
didn't provide it to him. 
Page 16 





























Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, this is consistent 
with his disclosure, which predated 
THE COURT: Which I've read. 
MR. JONES: -- a deposition. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to 
allow him to respond to the question. The 
objection is overruled. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. I'd asked you if you had occasion to 
see that document. 
A. I have. 
MR. JONES: All right. And I don't remember 
which exhibit that was of yours, counsel. 
Could I have the overhead? If the 
witness could be handed Exhibit 48. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Now, there were two sections that were 
discussed with Dr. Kerr. One had to do with the 
fragmentation hand piece and the other had to do 
with the Vaser System Ventex Control Users guide. 
And for ease of use so you don't have 
to dig through there and find it, I'm going to put 
them up on the overhead. One is page 8 of 14. 
And if I remember the instructions the judge gave 
me, if I zoom in, it will get better. And it 
Page 17 































Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
does. 
The other page that talks about 
cleaning and sterilization, you've seen both 
pages; haven't you not? 
A. I have. 
Q. All right. Now, the representation was 
made in questioning of Dr. Kerr that this manual 
in that second, I guess, it would be the third 
paragraph in the first sentence as wel; up at the 
top where it says, "This section described 
cleaning procedures and sterilization procedures 
and must be used to ensure clean systems." Do you 
see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And then you go down to the fourth 
paragraph where it says, "Follow the cleaning 
procedures and guidelines recommended by your 
institution. The following are guidelines that 
may be used in conjunction with your institution's 
procedures and guidelines." Did I read that 
correctly? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. All right. Now, my question to you 
regarding these two documents, which are 
identical, is simply this: Based on your 
Page 18 































Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
s 
understanding of the standard of healthcare 
practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in Boise in 2010, 
was he required to clean, disinfect, and sterilize 
his reusable surgical equipment as is discussed on 
this overhead document? 
A. Well, he did on the second portion, not 
the first portion. And that being said, we've 
already discussed there is no magical wash, so he 
did follow within the standard of care. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Or standard of practice, excuse me. 
Q. Thank you. That's all I have for that 
document. 
Now, during the surgery -- get us back 
to our timeline here on July 21, 2010. I want you 
to assume that Dr. Kerr utilized reusable medical 
equipment during the liposuction and fat transfer 
which had been cleaned, disinfected, and 
sterilized as he described in his deposition as 
we've discussed here today. All right? 
A. Okay. 
Q. All right. Now, with that assumption, 
you are aware of the autopsy findings in this case 
that observe the presence of gram negative 
bacteria; are you not? 
Page 19 































Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
A. I am. 
Q. All right. And the jury already has 
some idea of gram negative bacteria, but just so 
they know you know, can you just, in a nutshell, 
tell us what gram negative bacteria are. 
A. So again we talk about two different 
types of staining for bacteria, negative and 
positive. Gram negative bacteria are a class of 
organisms that can be both aerobic and anaerobic. 
Anaerobic means can't use -- it will die in the 
presence of oxygen. Aerobic means it has to have 
oxygen. 
So when you talk about a gram negative 
rod, it could be E coli or bacteroides or it could 
be pseudomonas so that is basically what you talk 
about with gram negatives. 
Q. So there are different types? 
A. There are. 
Q. All right. Is there a more common type 
of gram negative bacteria that you are aware of? 
A. The most common types, at least on 
humans, in humans would be E coli's and 
bacteroides. 
Q. And the jury has heard that they live 
in the intestinal track. 
Page 20 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
A. Correct . 
Q. All right. Are bacteria capable, in 
your opinion, Doctor, from being killed or 
eliminated from reusable surgical equipment? 
A. That's the whole point of 
sterilization, yes. 
Q. Is that the whole point of the 
autoclave? 
A. That is the whole point of the 
autoclave. 
Q. All right. And I have this question 
for you, Doctor: Is the presence of gram negative 
bacteria being found at the autopsy of 
Krystal Ballard at her buttock, is that proof to 
you that Dr. Kerr did anything wrong? 
A. No. 
Q. Explain your answer, please. 
A. Gram negative rods or gram negative 
bacteria can come at any point in time. It's in 
your stool. If she wiped herself in the wrong way 
and put her hand on her buttock, it can go into 
the wound. So it isn't directly applicable to the 
surgical therapy. 
Q. Now, Dr. Sorensen has rendered the 
opinion that he believes the patient became 
Page 21 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
infected with gram negative bacteria as a result 
of contaminated reusable surgical instruments from 
Dr. Kerr's office being used on Krystal Ballard. 
You are aware of that? 
A. I am. 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
Q. All right. Do ·you have an opinion in 
this case whether or not the gram negative 
bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
contaminated reusable medical instruments by 
Dr. Kerr? 
A. I do have an opinion. 
Q. What·is your opinion? 
A. That that is incorrect. 
Q. What is your opinion based on? 
A. In order -- well, there's multiple 
different ways of looking at it. 
As far as the process of sterilization, 
we know that a chemical marker was done so we've 
reached sterilization as far as the temperature is 
concerned as long as the machine basically said 
that it was adequate time. All the autoclave 
machines will have a register on it saying whether 
it has reached adequate time or not. So by that 
definition, it's been sterilized; okay. 
Spore counts don't matter. It's a gram 
negative; okay. When you look at the process of 
liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and 
then injecting it back in, as far as it being done 
sterilely, a gram negative rod corning from the 
colon to the uria (phonetic) or from one of his 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
equipment, I don't see how it can happen. 
Let alone the fact of -- that no 
pertinent or persistent infections in the office. 
There is no history of the fact that --
MR. HADDAD: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
MR. HADDAD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll break for the 
noon recess. Please remember my usual reminder 
and I will see you at 1:30. 
( Jury Leaves. ) 
THE COURT: Is there some reason why you did 
not tell your witness about the order in limine? 
THE WITNESS: He did; I apologize. 
THE COURT: Well, that may not be 
sufficient. 
MR. HADDAD: Well, Your Honor, at this time 
we are obligated, based upon the discussion with 
the Court earlier and the clear mandate by this 
Court on this very issue, not on other issues, 
this very issue, that if the issue of persistent 
history of infections or lack of infections came 
into this trial, that the Court would grant a 
mistrial and award attorneys' fees, costs, and 
expenses to the party that violated that order. 
Page 24 
































Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
This is a clear violation of that order. 
Based upon the activities in this 
trial, I am suspect as to the serendipity of that 
statement being made in the presence of this jury 
by this witness, but we move for a mistrial at 
this point in time, Your Honor, and ask you to 
enforce your admonition to these parties as you 
made earlier and on numerous occasions. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, first o~ all, I did 
make that discussion on more than one occasion 
with this particular witness. So to the extent it 
came out, I'll take responsibility for it; he's my 
witness. But the discussion was had and was had 
more than once. 
I would like to see exactly what the 
witness said so I can better comment on it to the 
judge on the issue of grounds for a mistrial. I 
do know that when this judge -- when Your Honor 
talked about this initially, the issue of costs 
and attorney fees and granting a mistrial was in 
response to bringing up the issue of whether the 
patient was going to remarry. 
Now, I know there was subsequent 
discussions about the issue of other infections, 
and I don't believe what this witness just 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
testified to and what he said --
THE COURT: I said there was not to be any 
reference to any other infections. 
I don't see I have any choice but to 
grant a mistrial. And I will address the costs 
and attorniy fees later, but it seems to me that 
this was something I addressed specifically. I 
said, "take it up outside the presence of the 
jury." 
This is a serious violation of the 
Court's prior order, and I don't see the Court has 
any choice but to grant counsel's request for a 
mistrial. 
MR. KERR: Your Honor, can I --
MR. JONES: No. No. 
THE COURT: We'll recess. I'll see you all 
at 1:30. 
(Court in recess. ) 
THE COURT: I have reviewed extensively all 
of the orders and arguments in limine that we had 
' 
the first day of the trial. And I specifically 
reviewed the testimony relating to the absence of 
other infections. 
I discussed in general terms the 
general rule that the absence of other accidents 
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Ballard v. Kerr . 11/14/2013 
is not generally admissible to prove the absence 
of negligence in a particular case. There are 
exceptions, and those exceptions require a 
foundation of a significant nature to establish 
why the evidence would be relevant and admissible 
in a particular case. 
As our discussion on that issue 
continued, I was advised by plaintiff's counsel 
that they had not been provided the unoerlying 
data that went into the summary that there had, in 
fact, been no other infections. The failure to 
provide the data, which would support the 
conclusion, then played directly into my decision 
to grant the order in limine with respect to the 
absence of other infections as being not 
permissible and to direct counsel not to address 
that unless we had a discussion outside the 
presence of the jury and a foundation was laid. 
But it was particularly of concern to 
me that the underlying records had not been 
provided to the plaintiffs so that the plaintiffs 
could independently verify whether that was a 
conclusion which could be drawn from the records. 
So there were a number of -- there were a number 
of problems that were flagged that were discussed 
Page 27 
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by counsel on the first day of trial. 
And at approximately 2:40 in the 
afternoon on the first day of trial, I said I'm 
granting an order in limine and I will not allow 
evidence of absence of other infections. And I 
expressly outlined the normal procedure to follow 
when counsel wants that revisited, which is draw 
my attention outside the presence of the jury and 
we would discuss it. But it was part~cularly 
critical because of the failure to disclose the 
underlying data. 
I am therefore declaring a mistrial in 
this case, and I will award expert witness's cost 
to be paid to the plaintiff prior to the retrial. 
And I will ask counsel that you take a 
look at your calendars and see when you would next 
be available. I know you will have to meet with 
various witnesses and consult with them so we can 
have so that we can proceed. 
MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, are you only 
awarding expert witness costs? 
THE COURT: I'm awarding expert witness 
fees. I'm reserving the issue on attorney fees. 
I'm not denying it. I said that it was something 
that I would consider if my orders in limine were 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. All right. Are ·bacteria capable, in 
3 your opinion, Doctor, from being killed or 
4 eliminated from reusable surgical equipment? 
5 A. That's the whole point of 
6 sterilization, yes. 
7 Q. Is that the whole point of the 
8 autoclave? 
9 A. That is the whole point of the 
10 autoclave. 
11 Q. All right. And I have this question 
12 for you, Doctor: Is the presence of gram negative 
13 bacteria being found at the autopsy of 
14 Krystal Ballard at her buttock, is that proof to 
15 you that Dr. Kerr did anything wrong? 
16 A. No. 
1 7 Q. Explain your answer, please. 
18 A. Gram negative rods or gram negative 
19 bacteria can come at any point in time. It's in 
20 your stool. If she wiped herself in the wrong way 
21 and put her hand on her buttock, it can go into 
22 the wound. So it isn't directly applicable to the 
23 surgical therapy. 
24 Q. Now, Dr. Sorensen has rendered the 
25 opinion that he believes the patient became 
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1 Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in 
2 this case whether or not the gram negative 
3 bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
4 contaminated reusable medical instruments by 
5 Dr. Kerr? 
6 A. I do have an opinion. 
7 Q. What is your opinion? 
8 A. That that is incorrect. 
9 Q. What is your opinion based on? 
10 A. In order -- well, there's multiple 
11 different ways of looking at it. 
12 As far as the process of sterilization, 
13 we know that a chemical marker was done so we've 
14 reached sterilization as far as the temperature is 
15 concerned as long as the machine basically said 
16 that it was adequate time. All the autoclave 
1 7 machines will have a register on it saying whether 
18 it has reached adequate time or not. So by that 
19 definition, it's been sterilized; okay. 
20 Spore counts don't matter. It's a gram 
21 negative; okay. When you look at the process of 
22 liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and 
23 then injecting it back in, as far as it being done 
2 4 sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from the 
25 colon to the uria (phonetic) or from one of his 
Page 22 
1 infected with gram negative bacteria as a result 
2 of contaminated reusable surgical in~truments from 
3 Dr. Kerr's office being used on Krystal Ballard. 
4 You are aware of that? 






















1 equipment, I don't see how it can happen. 
2 · Let alone the fact of -- that no 
3 pertinent or persistent infections in the office. 
4 There is no history of the fact that --
5 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
7 MR. HADDAD: Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: All right. We'll break for the 
9 noon recess. Please remember my usual reminder 
10 and I will see you at 1:30. 
11 (Jury Leaves.) 
12 THE COURT: Is there some reason why you did 
13 not tell your witness about the order in limine? 
14 THE WITNESS: He did; I apologize. 
15 THE COURT: Well, that may not be 
16 sufficient. 
1 7 MR. HADDAD: Well, Your Honor, at this time 
18 we are obligated, based upon the discussion with 
19 the Court earlier and the clear mandate by this 
20 Court on this very issue, not on other issues, 
21 this very issue, that if the issue of persistent 
22 history of infections or lack of infections came 
23 into this trial, that the Court would grant a 
24 mistrial and award attorneys' fees, costs, and 
25 expenses to the party that violated that order. 
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AMEiDED 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING 
AND ORDER GOVERNING 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS .. 
This case is set for Jury Trial to commence on the Tuesday, November 5, 2013 at 09:30 AM and 
continue for ten (10) days. No trial proceedings will be held on Mondavs, because it is the Court's 
criminal calendar dav. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED: 
1. All pretrial motions, with the exception of Motions in Limine, shall be heard and 
completed at least twenty-eight (28) days before the trial date. A Judge's copy of all motions and 
. ~ . ,- . 
memoranda in support thereof should be filed directly with ch.ambers. *Motions in limine must be 
filed not later than two (2) weeks prior to trial. No Motions filed after th.at time will be considered. 
Motions in Limine shall be heard on the moming o.f trial, unless otherwise scheduled by the Court. 
a. The last day to file written discovery. (Interrogatories and request for production of 
documents) shall be no later than ninety (90) days prior to trial. 
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b. The plaintiff shall disclose ali expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one 
hundred eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
c. The defendants shall disclose all expert witnesses to be used at trial by no later than one 
hundred twenty (120) days prior to trial. 
d. The last day for the taking of any discovery depositions shall be no later than sixty ( 60) 
days prior to trial. 
e. The last day to file amendments to join any additional parties shall be no later than one 
hundred eighty (180) days prior to trial. 
f. **MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. SHALL BE FILED NO LATER 
THAN NINETY (90) DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
**NO HEARING ON ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT WILL BE PERMITTED IN 
THE SEVENTY-FIVE (75) DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO TRIAL, REGARDLESS OF 
WHEN THE MOTION IS FILED. 
**IT IS ADVISABLE TO SCHEDULE YOUR MOTION FOR HEARING AS SOON 
AS FEASIBLE. 
** ALL WITNESSES ARE TO BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME AND ADDRESS. 
2. Not later than fourteen (14) days before the trial date, counsel for all parties to the action 
shall hold a conference for exchange of information and discussion of matters specified by I.R.C.P. 16(a) 
and 16(b). 
3. Not later than seven (7) days before trial: (a) each attorney shall ce1iify to the Court in 
writing that such Exchange of Information Conference has taken place and furnish with such ce1iification 
a list of the names of persons disclosed as possible witnesses pursuant to Rule 16(a)(4), and a descriptive 
list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence, reciting which exhibits counsel have agreed may be 
received in evidence without objection and those to which no objection will be made on grounds other 
than irrelevancy or immateriality; or (b) in lieu thereof, all counsel may join in submitting a written 
stipulation in conformance with Rule 16(b ). 
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4. Any objection to the date of this trial must be made by any party within fifteen (15) days 
from the date of this notice. 
5. All exhibit lists must be submitted to the Court five (5) days prior to trial. 
6. All requested jury instructions must be submitted to the Court, both hard copy and e-
mailed to lsimsdouglas@adawcb.net fourteen (14) days prior to trial. 
7. This Order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified for good cause 
shown to prevent manifest injustice. 
8. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of this order, which may include 
assignment of the trial date to another case. 
9. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an 
alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case if the assigned judge is unavailable. 
The following is a list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G. D. Carey 
Hon. Gregory M. Culet 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
· Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr. 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Justice Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Justice Linda Copple Trout 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Hon. W. H. Woodland 
All Sitting Fourth District Judges 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 
40( d)(l ), each party shall have the right to file one ( 1) motion for disqualification without cause as to any 
alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after service of this notice. 
DATED Monday, September 9, 2013. 
DEOORAH ' CHI( 
DEBORAH A BAIL 
District Judge 
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21 I think that -- frankly, I'm perturbed 
22 by the pattern in this case of pulling out 
23 exhibits and items that haven't previously been 
24 disclosed and then try to end run around the fact 
25 that when a person at a deposition is asked what's 
7 
1 their opinion, what's it based on, and they 
2 respond in a certain way, then I see no reason to 
3 allow information to slip in later that they did 
4 not rely on when they formed their opinion and 
5 related their opinion a very brief time ago. 
6 I don't think that is fair or 
7 reasonable. And I'm not going to permit it. 
8 MR. JONES: so I'm clear, Your Honor. He is 
9 certainly capable, then, of talking about the 
10 reports which he reviewed and replied upon. 
11 THE COURT: He can talk about everything he 
12 reviewed and testified about in his deposition, 
13 and I hope he will and I hope the jury find it 
14 informative. 
15 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 And also, with respect to the two in 
17 limine issues, there will be an offer of proof in 
18 about the middle of this witness that will need to 





THE COURT: That's a very good idea. 
MR. JONES: I'm just letting the court know. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm very concerned 
24 that we are not using our jury time well. 
25 MR. JONES: I'll try to move quickly this 
Page 6 
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Sti 11 er-fnl 
12 bacteria being found at the autopsy of 
13 Krystal Ballard at her buttock, is that proof to 








Explain your answer, please. 
Gram negative rods or gram negative 
18 bacteria can come at any point in time. It's in 
19 your stool. If she wiped herself in the wrong way 
20 and put her hand on her buttock, it can go into 
21 the wound. so it isn't directly applicable to the 
22 surgical therapy. 
23 Q. Now, Dr. Sorensen has rendered the 
24 opinion that he believes the patient became 
25 infected with gram negative bacteria as a result 
103 
1 of contaminated reusable surgical instruments from 
2 Dr. Kerr's office being used on Krystal Ballard. 
3 You are aware of that? 
I am. 4 
5 
A. 
Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in 
6 this case whether or not the gram negative 
7 bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
8 contaminated reusable medical instruments by 











I do have an opinion. 
what is your opinion? 
That that is incorrect. 
what is your opinion based 
In order -- well, there's 
15 different ways of looking at it. 
on? 
multiple 




17 we know that a chemical marker was done so we've 
18 reached sterilization as far as the temperature is 
19 concerned. As long as the machine basically said 
20 that it was adequate time, all the autoclave 
21 machines will have a register on it saying whether 
22 it has reached adequate time or not. so by that 
23 definition, it's been sterilized; okay. 
24 spore counts don't matter. It's a gram 
25 negative; okay. when you look at the process of 
104 
1 liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and 
2 then injecting it back in, as far as it being done 
3 sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from the 
4 colon to the uria or from one of his equipment, I 
5 don't see how it can happen. 
6 Let alone the fact of that no pertinent 
7 or persistent infections in the office. There is 












MR. HADDAD: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: sustained, and we'll address it. 
MR. HADDAD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll break for the 
noon recess. Please remember my usual reminder 
and I will see you at 1:30. 
(Jury Leaves.) 
THE COURT: Is there some reason why you did 
not tell your witness about the order in limine? 
THE WITNESS: He did; I apologize. 






1 patient was going to remarry. 
2 Now, I know there was subsequent 
3 discussions about the issue of other infections, 
4 and I don't believe what this witness just 
5 testified to and what he said 
6 THE COURT: I said there was not to be any 
7 reference to any other infections. 
8 I don't see I have any choice but to 
9 grant a mistrial. And I will address the costs 
10 and attorney fees later, but it seems to me that 
11 this was something I addressed specifically. I 
12 said take it up outside the presence of the jury. 
13 This is a serious violation of the 
14 court's prior order, and I don't see the court has 
15 any choice but to grant counsel's request for a 
16 mistrial. 
17 MR. KERR: Your Honor, can I --
18 MR. JONES: No. No. 
19 THE COURT: we'll recess. I'll see you all 
20 at 1:30. 
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Held on November 5, 2013, bo..fore 
Honorable Doborah A. Bail., Distri.ct Cow:t Judge. 
24 Reported by 
Tiffany Fisher, RPR 
25 CSR No. 979 
November 5, 2013 
BO IS E, ID AH 0 
THE COURT: Allrlght. lwilltakeup 
Ballard vs. Kerr, No. 2012-4792. 
Is the plaintiff ready to proceed? 
M R • M C KAY : W e a re, Your H on o r. 
3 
THE COURT: Is the defense ready to proceed? 
MR. QUANE: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll take up a 
few prellm lnnry matters rtrst, and then rll 
explain the jury selection process. The first 
thing we'll take up are m otlons In llm lne filed by 
both plaintiff and defense. 
The purpose of a m otlon In llm lne under 
the rules Is to address some Item of anticipated 
evidence that is so problematic that It should be 
addressed at the start of the trlal. However, a 
m otlon In llm lne is actually supposed to be a 
somewhat rare motion, because a Judge, when 
considering It, lacks the context or the 
testlm ony. 
And, therefore, a motion in llm lne 
should only be used to address unusual matters 



















































FOR THE PLAIN TIFF 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY&. BARTLETT 
303 West Bannock Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER 
209 Capitol Street 
Charleston, West Virginia 25301 
FOR THE DEFENSE 
Jerem lah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, MCCOLL, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
4 
2 
mere reference of those issues could present a 
problem form aintaining the same jury. For that 
reason, it is not appropriate to deal with -- a 
motion In lim lne is not a proper m echanlsm to deal 
with things that should be addressed by way of a 
regular objection or things which should have been 
addressed by pretrial motions of a different 
nature. 
Review Ing your m otlons in lim ine, there 
are certain things that are obviously proper in 
them otlons that have been filed before the Court. 
The Court will bar all reference and 
grant am otlon In llm lne with respect to 
references to Insurance of any kind. 
The Court will grant them otion In 
llm lne with respect to any collateral source 
Inform atlon. Since that's now presented to the 
jury, that's presented for the Court post-verdict, 
and the Court makes any appropriate adjustments. 
The Court w Ill grant them otion in 
llm lne with respect to all settlement negotiations 
and settlement offers, since that is always 
Im proper testlm ony. 
Those are them otlons In llm ine that 




1 issues to address in limine. 
2 I will now take up the rest of your 
3 motions. But I would like you to prioritize, at 
4 this point, and address only those items that you 
5 think are going to come up during jury selection. 
6 We'll have a longer discussion after we select the 
7 jury, but before opening statements. 
8 Question, Counsel? 
9 MR. QUANE: Your Honor, I didn't hear 
10 exactly about the matter of insurance you 
11 mentioned. 
12 THE COURT: I have granted the motion in 
13 limine barring any reference to insurance, by any 
14 party, covering anything, since that is a 
15 traditionally appropriate motion. 
16 Now, that means that I left out some 
17 that you may feel warrant immediate attention. 
18 And so I'd like to address those now, before we 
19 begin with jury selection. 
20 Now, of course, during jury selection, 
21 I would not anticipate that there would be 
22 anything other than very cursory reference to the 
23 facts of this particular case. And I would 
24 anticipate that we would be exploring those 
25 general issues that might make a person not an 
7 
1 so we can resolve any remaining questions. 
2 Counsel for the plaintiff? 
3 MR. HADDAD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 Your Honor, in taking the guidance from 
s the Court as far as its preference, you know, to 
6 the extent that there's not a lot of issues, 
7 factual issues that are addressed with the jury in 
8 the voir dire, just based on my very cursory 
9 review of our motions, it appears there wouldn't 
10 be anything necessarily substantive that the Court 
11 needs to address at this point in time, until we 
12 impanel the jury and then decide how we want to 
13 deal with those evidentiary issues. 
14 THE COURT: All right. How about with the 
15 defense, are there issues you would like to have 
16 addressed before we begin jury selection? 
17 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 There are so many that are 
19 intermingled, if the plaintiffs are willing to 
20 defer, we will do the same. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. And I will say, it is not 
22 my practice to address speaking objections. I 
23 don't think it's necessarily appropriate for 
24 motions in limine. 
25 But when an objection Is made, I do 
6 
1 acceptable juror. 
2 We will have too many jurors today 
3 because there is a defect -- was a defect in the 
4 computer system. Now, I think we've asked for 
5 them to check and see how many no-shows we have. 
6 But what happened was there was a problem in the 
7 automatic draw system that meant the notices went 
8 out a bit later than they should have. 
9 And, for that reason, the jury 
10 commissioner anticipated that there might be more 
11 than average no-shows, because there's not as much 
12 notice as we usually give. And so the jury 
13 commissioner has given us an overlarge panel. 
14 Hopefully, it won't be that overlarge. And I have 
15 said, if we get everybody, which is not too likely 
16 -- if you get everybody, I only asked for 45. I 
17 think 45 is adequate. 
18 And so we'll probably stop at the 
19 No. 45 on your list. And that would be the number 
20 on this column. 
21 Now, let's talk about, first from the 
22 plaintiff, those issues that you feel are so 
23 critical that you would like to address them now 
24 before we get to the jury selection. As I said, 
25 we'll take a break before you begin your openings 
8 
1 follow the traditional and less exciting approach 
2 that a party should simply state the objection, 
3 the grounds for objection, and then weigh it, 
4 because most of the time it's not necessary to go 
5 further than that. But if we do have to have a 
6 more likely discussion, I'll excuse the jury. 
7 So I do not welcome very significantly 
8 speaking objections. So just state the basis, 
9 "Objection, relevance"; "objection, hearsay." And 
10 if I need more discussion, I'll ask you for it. 
11 Because I think that's always the cleanest way to 
12 go. 
13 (Voir dire of prospective jury panel. 
14 A jury of 13 is impaneled.) 
15 (Recess.) 
16 THE COURT: Let's proceed. 
17 MR. HADDAD: To lay the chronology down, 
18 Your Honor, on August 20, 2013, we took the 
19 deposition of Dr. Thomas Kaufman, the plaintiff's 
20 infectious disease expert. At that point in time 
21 -- or the defendant's infectious disease expert. 
22 I'm sorry. And I might slip every once in a 
23 while, because I do a lot of defense work. 
24 But during the time that they brought 




1 produced to me at that time what appeared to be 
2 simply a chart with patient names, dates of 
3 procedure, and types of procedure. 
4 THE COURT: Right. And, generally, that's 
5 not relevant. 
6 So what is it you're specifically 
7 concerned about? 
8 MR. HADDAD: Well, I'm concerned because we 
9 learned, after Dr. Kaufman's deposition when I 
10 asked, "Have you seen any charts that go along 
11 with this," "no," later the plaintiffs in 
12 September, after the discovery deadline, 
13 supplemented an interrogatory where they 
14 identified that Susie Kerr will testify that she 
15 and other staff went through all of the patient 
16 charts at Silk Touch and determined that there 
17 were no other infections. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I'm certainly not going to 
19 permit that. So let's move on to the next topic. 
20 That is obviously a proper subject in limine, and 
21 your motion is granted with respect to that. And 
22 if counsel wanted me to revisit that, they would 
23 have to bring it up outside the presence of the 
24 jury. 
25 Because clearly the absence of other 
11 
1 that her actions were noncompliant. But, more 
2 importantly and I think undisputedly, nobody has 
3 testified to anything in terms of deciding not to 
4 take narcotic medications, not having somebody 
5 drive her home after the procedure, not telling 
6 Charles she had a procedure or telling the 
7 Air Force, no expert, nor has Dr. Kerr, connected 
8 that with any causative effect. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Let's focus a bit more 
10 narrowly. Not telling her husband or the Air 
11 Force is irrelevant as to whether there was or was 
12 not negligence. So, certainly, I see no relevance 
13 in that, and I see no reason to address it, nor do 
14 I care what the Air Force procedures were with 
15 respect to what people do about seeking all of 
16 their medical attention. And I don't see that 
17 that's a problem. 
18 But, of course, it's always relevant 
19 whether she followed the doctor's instructions 
20 about care of the wound or that area. And that's 
21 entirely admissible. 
22 MR. HADDAD: Yeah, I would agree with that, 
23 Your Honor. But there's no testimony, at least 
24 thus far. So maybe that's something that we can 
25 address. 
10 
1 car accidents is not relevant. The review of 
2 other charts with -- if it were to become 
3 relevant, counsel would have to draw my attention 
4 to it outside the presence of the jury. And then 
5 we would discuss it in full. Of course, that's 
6 not generally admissible. 
7 MR. HADDAD: The other issue that we wanted 
8 to raise, Your Honor, was a theme that has been 
9 throughout this case on the defense side, which is 
10 the alleged noncompliance of Krystal Ballard. 
11 THE COURT: Yes. And I read your brief on 
12 that subject. And it appeared -- first, it 
13 appears to me that there would have to be specific 
14 evidence of something she was noncompliant about. 
15 Now, it is, of course, admissible if 
16 she were noncompliant. But -- and it would be a 
17 subject of cross-examination. But to simply 
18 speculate that she might have been noncompliant 
19 raises questions in my mind. 
20 MR. HADDAD: I appreciate that, Your Honor. 
21 But there's actually a second step in that 
22 process, which means: If she was noncompliant, 
23 was there any causation that attaches to that 
24 noncompliance? 
25 And, I think, certainly we don't feel 
1 
12 
But there has been no testimony. In 
2 fact, there has been contrary testimony from 
3 Dr. Kerr. And specifically he said, when he 
4 examined her in the postoperative period, there 
5 was nothing that he saw that led him to believe 
6 that she was not appropriately managing herself in 
7 terms of bandage changes and the like. It was 
8 completely absent from his testimony and absent 
9 from any other expert's testimony that has offered 
10 any opinions In this case. 
11 So, with that caveat, understanding the 
12 Court may need to hear that testimony as it 
13 develops, I understand the Court's limitations. 
14 THE COURT: Certainly, her care of the wound 
15 and her following of procedures that would 
16 minimize the risk of Infection are, of course, 
17 relevant. But to the extent it has -- it is 
18 irrelevant to any issue of cause, I would not 
19 permit, I don't see, nor do I see any basis to 
20 permit, any evidence about whether or not she told 
21 the Air Force or whether or not she told her 
3 
22 husband, unless counsel can explain to me why that 
23 would be relevant to an Infection. 
24 And, as far as the Air Force goes, I'm 




1 relevant. It's not going to be permitted. 1 irrelevant. It all focuses on what did Dr. O'Neil 
2 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, I guess maybe just 2 tell them and how did that help them understand 
3 as an offshoot, we moved in limine about 3 the standard of care. 
4 conversations Dr. Kerr had with Krystal's aunt 4 And three experts on that and 
5 that, quite frankly, raised the issue of that 5 regurgitating the same conversation seems to be 
6 conversation touching upon alleged noncompliance. 6 cumulative, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: That's hearsay. So make your 7 THE COURT: All right. Your reply? 
8 objection when it comes up. 8 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I want to make sure 
9 MR. HADDAD: Thank you. 9 I understand the Court's ruling on the issue of 
10 Your Honor, there's some issues with 10 noncompliance. 
11 the experts, on the cumulative nature of them. We 11 The Court isn't saying we're not 
12 had raised that before the Court, thought it was 12 allowed to present evidence of noncompliance as it 
13 premature, but did not think necessarily three 13 relates to issues that would have impacted medical 
14 experts were, on the face of it at the point in 14 care and treatment decisions of the healthcare 
15 time in time when we were presenting that motion, 15 providers; correct? 
16 unduly burdensome. 16 THE COURT: I'm saying that if it relates to 
17 We had deposed all three of those 17 why there might be an infection, you can talk 
18 experts, none of which practiced in Boise in 2010, 18 about it. If it relates to whether or not she 
19 all three of which relied upon a conversation they 19 told the husband or the Air Force, that's 
20 had with a Dr. Kelly O'Neil in order to avail 20 irrelevant. I'm not going to allow you to go into 
21 themselves about the knowledge of the standard of 21 that, so don't go there. 
22 care. To have three experts come in and simply 22 As to -- I think it is a questionable 
23 parrot their conversations with Dr. O'Neil, we 23 relevance whether she drove herself home from the 
24 think is cumulative, especially since the 24 procedure or not. But perhaps you can fill me in 
25 individual doctor's backgrounds almost become 25 on why that might present a problem. 
15 16 
1 MR. JONES: In your statement about whether 1 MR. JONES: Okay. Now, with respect to the 
2 or not she told her husband, it absolutely has to 2 issue involving other infections, we provided the 
3 do with medical care and treatment because the 3 Court with information regarding the opinions of 
4 records discuss and the testimony discusses how 4 the plaintiff's own expert on the importance of 
5 the patient was instructed to have someone at home 5 other infections and how he testified in his 
6 to take care of her. 6 deposition. And it's in our brief that he said 
7 If she didn't even tell her husband -- 7 that was the very best evidence; the very best 
8 in fact, the evidence will show -- 8 evidence of whether or not someone is having 
9 THE COURT: Well, I'm granting the motion in 9 problems with their sanitizing, disinfecting, 
10 limine with respect to that. I think I find that 10 sterilization procedures, is whether or not they 
11 rather strange, Counsel, and a very peculiar 11 are having issues with other infections. 
12 argument. 12 And so, I guess, for the benefit of 
13 MR. JONES: I'm not sure I'm understanding 13 making sure --
14 what the Court is saying. Peculiar that she 14 THE COURT: But you didn't have that -- you 
115 didn't tell her husband? 15 had that work done by personnel working for the 
16 THE COURT: I find this discussion peculiar. 16 defendant, just pulling files and looking to see 
!17 Before you even g,et into it, I'm going 17 if they had any notations about infection. 
11s to grant the motion in limine with respect to 18 You either limit it on time. I mean, 
19 that. Before you get into it, if it becomes 19 we're talking about a risk of extremely collateral 
20 relevant on particular testimony, we can revisit 20 information. So refine it, and tell me what 
121 it outside the presence of the jury -- 21 you're talking about. 
22 MR. JONES: Very good, Your Honor. 22 Are we talking about that day? 
123 THE COURT: -- so that I can get the benefit 23 MR. JONES: We can talk about that day. We 
24 of hearing from the physician why or why not that 24 can talk about the week before, the week after. 




1 THE COURT: The week after is irrelevant, so 
2 don't bother with the week after. 
3 MR. JONES: Actually, Your Honor, the 
4 infectious disease guy will talk about how --
5 THE COURT: Well, he will not. 
6 MR. JONES: Well, the week after, if you 
7 would allow him to, he would talk about how you 
8 want to look at the time period. Do you have --
9 THE COURT: No, you're not allowed to -- you 
10 may not go into the week after the accident. 
11 Fill me in on the day of, the week 
12 before. Fill me in on your theory on that. 
18 
1 cases. So there's that aspect of it. 
2 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
3 MR. JONES: Secondly, you have, from an 
4 infectious disease standpoint, what they look at 
5 and consider for purposes of evaluating whether or 
6 not a facility has problems with their infection 
7 control. They look at infection rates and look at 
8 that data. 
9 As far as who gathered the information, 
10 Dr. Kerr has testified in his deposition regarding 
11 his knowledge, personally, of his own infection 
12 rates. And he should be able to testify regarding 
5 
13 MR. JONES: Your Honor, there's two parts to 13 his knowledge, as opposed to concerns about, for 
14 it. The first is what the plaintiffs own expert 
15 said, where he said that was the best evidence to 
16 consider the infection issues. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. JONES: And so, whether or not we would 
19 offer testimony, we should be able to at least 
20 address, through the plaintiffs own expert, 
21 issues associated with his opinion. His opinion 
22 being that the best evidence in the case is to 
23 whether or not Dr. Kerr and his clinic are doing 
24 what they're supposed to do, is to look at either 
25 the presence of or absence of infections in other 
19 
1 THE COURT: Um-hmm. Well, I can see how if 
2 the plaintiffs expert were to testify in that 
3 fashion, then there could be some relevance to 
4 problems that day or problems in the immediate 
5 time period proceeding. But, as a general rule, 
6 one doesn't get into the absence of other 
7 accidents in establishing whether there was or was 
8 not negligence on a particular occasion. 
9 And so it sounds to me like that, 
10 again, is probably one that we should revisit once 
11 we have an opportunity to hear the testimony. And 
12 it sounds to me that would be reasonable to 
13 revisit again. 
14 Just draw my attention to it prior to 
16 bringing out the evidence. We'll exclude the 
16 jury, because it sounds to me that could have some 
17 relevance. In particular, that's what an expert 
18 in the field would rely on, then I think that It 
19 could be an appropriate area, provided it's 
20 limited to day of and time period immediately 
21 proceeding. 
22 It could be reteva1_1t without leading us 
23 Into too many collateral matters. But I think It 
24 would be prudent to have that discussion outside 
25 the presence of the jury, since the absence of 
14 example, a non-physician looking at the charts, 
15 which I understand is one of the concerns. So 
16 there's another avenue, I guess, in terms of 
17 utilizing Dr. Kerr's testimony on that basis. 
18 But we take the position that because 
19 of the plaintiffs own expert testimony on that 
20 issue, at the very least Dr. Kerr's knowledge of 
21 his own infection rates, that that data ought to 
22 be something that should be considered by the jury 
23 when they're being asked in this case to evaluate 
24 the sterilization procedures, cleaning procedures, 
25 things of that nature. 
20 
1 other injuries, as a rule, is not viewed as 
2 relevant. 
3 So I'll revisit that one, if you'll --
4 when you get ready to -- when you feel it has 
5 reached the point where it may be relevant for 
6 some purpose, just draw my attention to it. We'll 
7 excuse the jury, and we'll discuss it. 
8 MR. JONES: So, for the purposes of opening 
9 statements, we should avoid that topic? 
10 THE COURT: For opening statements, I would 
11 avoid it, because I think it's fair to say they 
12 followed proper practice. They did what was 
13 reasonable and required. And that's not, in their 
14 view, why anything occurred. And I think that's 
15 fair. 
16 But to get more -- the risk of 
17 collateral evidence becomes rather high. And the 
18 fact that generally absence of other accidents is 
19 not admissible is also playing a role in my 
20 feeling that the preferred practice would be to 
21 just draw my attention to it, we'll have an 
22 extensive discussion outside the presence of the 
23 jury, and I'll revisit It. Because then I'll have 
24 the benefit of hearing the testimony that may have 
25 made it both relevant and admissible. 
001884
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1 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, I understand your 
2 directive. I just want to make sure that the 
3 Court understands that part of the dilemma that 
4 even revisiting that has is: We've never been 
5 supplied the information upon which, allegedly, 
6 there was no other infections, other than 
7 anecdotally by the defendants. 
8 THE COURT: You were never given access to 
9 all of the other records that show there was no 
10 infection? 
11 MR. HADDAD: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: Are you telling me you were 
13 never given that --
14 MR. HADDAD: No. We asked for it. As soon 
15 as they supplemented with the interrogatory 
16 answer, we asked the defendants, "We need the 
17 records that went into the summary so we can 
18 analyze that." They did not respond to that. 
19 We then re-noticed Mrs. Kerr, because 
20 she was a 30(b)6, and said, "Bring those records 
21 with her." They told us we were untimely and 
22 refused to produce them. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Well, in that case, 
24 I will definitely bar this in limine. And I will 
25 . not revisit it, until we have a discussion outside 
1 
23 
Your position on Motion in Umine No. 4 
2 is correct. Your motion in limine is granted. 
3 Your -- I don't see a motion in limine 
4 level of problem with respect to No. 5. 
5 And, in general, with respect to your 
6 Motion in Umine No. 6, neither side is usually 
7 permitted to argue the societal broad impacts of a 
8 particular decision in a particular case, as 
9 opposed to focusing on the case itself and the 
10 facts of the case. 
11 So I didn't quite -- your 
12 No. 5, I suppose that it could be relevant that 
13 they had a friendly relationship with counsel, 
14 defense counsel. I suppose that would be fair. I 
15 have a hunch they have an answer for that. I 
16 don't think that rises to the level of an in 
17 limine concern. 
18 MR. JONES: I understand. Thank you, Your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Was there anything else on that? 
21 I think I pretty much granted your motions. 
22 What else? 
23 MR. JONES: You did, Your Honor. I want to 
24 digress only t<;> the motion regarding cumulative 
25 nature of the testimony. 
22 
1 the presence of the jury. And do not refer to it 
2 during opening statements. And we'll revisit it 
3 in its entirety, should the necessity arise. 
4 But the lack of disclosure of data 
5 underlying the summary presents a separate and 
6 considerably more serious problem. 
7 MR. JONES: I'll reserve my response on that 
8 issue, because there are more --
9 THE COURT: Yeah, I'll let you respond more 
10 fully on that. 
11 MR. JONES: Yeah. Moving on, Your Honor, to 
12 the defense motions in limine. 
13 THE COURT: Yes, and I think I granted some 
14 of those. So let me pull my notes up. 
15 I granted your motion about whether 
16 complaints have been filed against any of your 
17 treating physicians. Complaints aren't evidence. 
18 So in your Motion in Limine No. 1, that's -- your 
19 motion is granted. 
20 With respect to Motion in Limine No. 2, 
21 your position is correct. Your motion in limine 
22 is granted. 
23 Your position with respect to Motion in 
24 Umine No. 3 is well taken. Your motion is 
25 granted. 
24 
1 I don't know if I need to respond, 
2 given the Court's comments. We did argue this on 
3 July 10th. And I believe our testimony -- or the 
4 argument that I made at that point would again 
5 apply. I think the judge can take this up witness 
6 by witness, topic by topic. 
7 THE COURT: I think I will take it up when 
8 it arises. I don't think it would be appropriate 
9 to allow extensive cumulative testimony. And it 
10 taxes a jury a great deal. And when they tend to 
11 resent that, it doesn't benefit either party. 
12 But I think it's something that should 
13 be addressed with an objection made and after 
14 we've gotten into the testimony. And I don't 
15 think I can rule on it in any sensible fashion by 
16 way of an in limine motion. 
17 I am not troubled by the fact that 
18 maybe more than one physician would have to talk 
19 to the same person to identify what the local 
20 standard of care is. And I don't think, In and of 




So I'm deferring any ruling on 
24 cumulative testimony, until it appears to me that 
25 there is cumulative testimony. And then I will 
6 
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1 welcome an objection by either side, if the 
2 testimony has become unduly cumulative. 
3 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Now, what exhibits? You 
5 have stipulated to some? 
6 MR. MCKAY: We have. Before we get into 
7 that, Your Honor, would it be possible to raise 
8 one issue with respect to the defense motions in 
9 limine? And that is --
10 
11 
THE COURT: Yes, one issue is fine. 
MR. MCKAY: Okay. And that's the second 
12 part of their motion dealing with instances where 
13 defense experts have previously been sued. 
14 And this is an issue that we just 
15 recently discovered. And it concerns one of their 
16 standard of care experts, Dr. Lawrence, the fellow 
17 who was also criminally indicted. 
18 Dr. Lawrence testified at his 
19 deposition, he was asked how many times has he 
20 been named as a defendant. And testifies to two 
21 instances where he had been named, one where he 
22 was name9 among a bunch of other physicians where 
26 
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. MCKAY: And the second case was part of 
3 his obstetrical practice. And it was some time 
4 ago. And he indicated the hospital was sued, the 
5 hospital settled, and then he was dismissed out of 
6 it. 
7 What he didn't mention was that there 
8 was a current suit where he is named. 
9 THE COURT: And what would be the relevance 
10 of this, Counsel? 
11 MR. MCKAY: That he testified at his 
12 deposition that he had only been sued twice, when, 
13 in fact, he has an ongoing lawsuit where he has 
14 just recently given a deposition. It's not some 
15 matter that he --
16 THE COURT: Well, the question, "Have you 
17 ever been sued," to me, is not a proper question, 
18 anyway. Because when you're talking about 
19 somebody suing someone, you're saying their 
20 opinion is that somebody else did something that's 
21 negligent. That's hearsay. You're not going to 
22 bring in this out-of-court declarant to say, "This 
23 he was acting as the -- 23 is my basis." Plus, it gets you into collateral 
trial, and it's not a permissible question. 24 THE COURT: Who asked the question, you did? 24 
25 MR. MCKAY: It was Mr. Haddad. 
27 
1 question. And so I think that would certainly be 
2 in the range of things that a person might 
3 normally Inquire in a deposition. But it's not a 
4 relevant trial question. 
5 MR. MCKAY: We would not ask the question. 
6 We would not revisit the issue with him to suggest 
7 that because he had been sued this third time, 
8 that it somehow suggests that he's not qualified 
9 to render an opinion on the standard of care. 
10 The issue is more that he didn't tell 
11 the truth at the deposition when he was asked 
12 about It, and asked very, very clearly about it. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to permit 
14 it. I don't think it's permissible. It's 
15 somebody else's opinion about whether he did or 
16 did not do something that was negligent. It 
17 involves collateral matters. And it's not 
18 admissible Impeachment. 
19 MR. MCKAY: Okay. All right. And you have 
20 ruled also that the information that we have about 
21 Dr. O'Neil's various disciplinary matters in this 
22 state and in California --
23 THE COURT: That's correct. 
24 MR. MCKAY: -- is not admissible? 



























Now, It's an acceptable deposition 
28 
MR. MCKAY: All right. Thank you. 
(Opening arguments of counsel.) 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
MR. McKAY: I haven '.t moved the admission of 
38. 
MR. QUANE: Oh. 
THE COURT: Actually, you did. You did move 
38. 
MR. McKAY: I'm sorry. I did and I intended 
to move it. I'm sorry. I misspoke. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you had other 
issues to bring up. 
MR. McKAY: Right. Our first witness this 
morning is an economist. We have moved in limine 
to forbid opposing counsel from inquiring, 
speculating about the possibility that Mr. Ballard 
might someday remarry. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. McKAY: And we don't think that is an 
appropriate subject of examination, and we wanted 
to cover that with the Court to the extent defense 
counsel is intending to do that. And I'll present 
further argument on that. 
THE COURT: Well, it's not necessary to 
present further argument on it. Both sides very 
thoroughly briefed the issue. And rather than 
relying on a 1982 Michigan case, I'm going to rely 
on the 1991 Idaho case, Westfall versus 
Page 4 




























Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
Caterpillar, Incorporated. 120 Idaho 918, 821 
P2d 973(1991). The case that sets forth the law 
in Idaho. 
I informally polled my colleagues to 
see if anybody had been tempted to stray by 
existing Idaho law. And it was adviied that none 
had been tempted nor had done so. So I am going 
to hold to existing Idaho precedent Westfall 
versus Caterpillar, Incorporated. 
I will grant the motion in limine and 
under no circumstances whatsoever can a party 
refer to any possibility of remarriage nor to 
anyth~ng of that sort. There will be no evidence 
allowed of any potential remarriage by 
Mr. Ballard, period. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, may I make a point 
on the record for that? 
THE COURT: Well, you already did in your 
motion. You did a very thorough job in your 
briefing. So you are preserved in terms of your 
objection. 
MR. JONES: Very well, Your Honor, just so 
the record is clear that we disagree respectfully. 
THE COURT: And I think it's quite clear and 
I thought it was a very thorough job, but I am 
Page 5 





























Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
s_ticking with Idaho precedent. It's clear. It's 
established. And it.has some solid reasoning that 
still appears to be good solid reasoning, but 
whether it was solid reasoning or not, which it 
happens to be in this case, I would still be bound 
to follow it because it is existing Idaho law. 
I'm the trial judge. That's my obligation. 
MR. QUANE: Could I have one point of 
clarification, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. QUANE: Does it -- does the prohibition 
apply only to remarriage or divorce? What -- I 
need to know exactly what the prohibition relates 
to and I don't understand that yet. 
MR. McKAY: Is counsel suggesting that he 
would argue or question the economist about this 
couple getting a divorce? 
THE COURT: Well, it's not -- I'm barring 
that. There will be no evidence. There will be 
no question. There will be no discussion of that. 
And if I have to grant a mistrial, I'm granting 
all witness costs and all attorney fees costs 
against anybody who causes it. 
MR. QUANE: Well, all I need to know, judge, 
is what does the prohibition apply specifically 
Page 6 





























Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
to. That's all I'm asking. Remarriage? 
THE COURT: And any -- it covers remarriage, 
and it covers all the speculation about all of the 
change, any change as a result of the death. 
Because the reasoning behind Idaho law is what the 
plaintiffs had a right to expect to receive from 
the party during their life and that is a loss for 
which they are to be compensated. What they get 
after the death of a person who has been taken, 
does not enter into the case. 
So the law spoke of the taking away of 
that which they would have received had the person 
lived, the destruction of their expectations in 
that regard. And that is what the law bars 
that -- appears that Idaho also follows a majority 
rule with respect to this. 
MR. QUANE: Now, I'm just trying to 
understand what the prohibition is so I don't 
invade it. I have to know what it is. Would it 
prohibit, for instance, the loss of his position 
in the Air Force as a possibility that would 
affect the economic analysis? 
First, what if the Air Force downsized? 
THE COURT: All right. That is undue 
speculation. I won't permit it. I think that 
Page 7 




























Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
unduly speculative. You largely look at the 
circumstances and expectations as of the date of 
death. And all the -- and I don't think there's 
any purpose in asking the jury to speculate about 
all the things that are simply possible for 
anybody to know about. There is always an element 
of uncertainty in certain kinds of damages for 
wrong death, but it is the loss of the 
companionship and support that they are talking 
about. 
So, I don't think that speculating 
about Mr. Ballard might find his position 
downsized is relevant. I don't think that would 
be an appropriate area of inquiry. 
MR. QUANE: What about -- what about -- the 
economist will say, according to him, Mr. Ballard 
had a life expectancy of so many years. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. QUANE: Well, does that take into 
account, for instance, if he dies within 20 years, 
as an element that would be contrary to the 
assumption he would live 20 more years? The 
questions like that on cross-examination? 
THE COURT: Just a moment. 
MR. McKAY: Your Honor, if I may respond? 
Page 8 



























Ballard v. Kerr 11/8/2013 
THE COURT: I don't need you to respond. I 
don't see speculating what a third party might do 
like whether the Air Force will or will not 
downsize is worth consuming jury time because I 
think that is undue speculation. 
And there will not be anyone on the 
planet who could truthfully answer the question 
about whether the Air Force will or will not 
downsize. But it is proper it is proper for 
you to discuss his occupation, health habits, and 
other activities. And so it is proper to discuss 
things like -- it would be proper to discuss those 
things that relate to his health habits and other 
activities which would mean that the standard 
mortality table would have to be adjusted in his 
particular case. That is a fair area of inquiry. 
Now, as far as speculating about 
whether the Air Force might downsize, I think that 
is unduly speculative. On the other hand, there 
are already existing requirements about standards 
that people have to meet, what are existing 
factors that play into whether a person can make 
their full career in the military. 
And to the extent that it relates to 
what exists now, and affects a person's ability to 
Page 9 
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stay in their full career, then occupation, health 
habits, and other activities are permissible areas 
to inquire into. 
MR. QUANE: Just for clarification, I 
anticipate, having been through this many times, 
that the economic expert will say these are his 
economic losses based on the assumption he will 
continue to be in the military service for a 
designated period of time and he will live that 
long. He is assuming that for the purpose of his 
calculations. 
What I have done in the past and been 
permitted to do is say, "Well, you don't take into 
account the variables that what you are assuming 
may not come to pass." Because it's his 
assumption . 
THE COURT: All right. It is his 
assumption. And there are existing variables that 
play a role into whether a person can make a full 
career in the military. 
Now, I'm not as familiar as -- and I'm 
generally familiar with the fact that there are 
existing requirements that play into whether you 
can keep going on in the military. But I just 
don't I think to speculate about whether or not 
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there might be a downsizing in the future, would 
need to be more finely -- would have to be a more 
refined condition. 
MR. QUANE: Well, I'm not asking him to 
speculate on that. I'm just saying, "Does your 
assumption take into account the assumption that 
he will always be in the military for the length 
of time you project for your economic losses?" 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. QUANE: And he will probably say, 
"Statistically yes, but not as it pertains to 
Mr. Ballard." 
THE COURT: Right. It's fair to inquire 
about his occupation, health habits, and other 
activities that will play a direct role in his 
life expectancy. That is fair to inquire into. 
But as to remarriage, you can --
MR. QUANE: I understand the remarriage. 
There is no doubt about that. That was the motion 
in limine was remarriage . 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. QUANE: I understand that perfectly. I 
won't mention that ever. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I don't think the 
other area outside that approach is in limine, the 
Page 11 
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approach is in limine lev~l. So if counsel does 
have an objection, they need to make the 
objection. 
MR. QUANE: Okay. Fine. 
THE COURT: That does -- I am saying I do 
think that to speculate what a third party would 
do -- to speculate what congress would do about 
military funding is such an endless guessing game. 
MR. QUANE: I'm not going to ask him to 
speculate. I'm just going to say, "You assume 
this 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. QUANE: -- per your calculation. Have 
you taken account other reasons why your 
calculation may be erroneous?" 
THE COURT: Sure. That is fair. 
MR. QUANE: That kind of approach is all I 
am saying. 
THE COURT: That's all right, and council 
can make an objection if they think it's over --
but I don't think that approaches an in limine 
level where the remarriage issue is settled in 
Idaho. 
All right. Well, hopefully (name 
redacted) -- I will tell you that (name redacted) 
Page 12 
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1 MR. QUANE: It isn't malpractice? 
2 THE COURT: He said if everything were 
3 perfect. 
4 MR. QUANE: It wouldn't be malpractice? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. QUANE: Okay. If he said that, that's 
7 what I'm asking him. 
8 THE COURT: That's what he said. 
9 MR. QUANE: And that was part of my 
10 question. 
11 MR. HADDAD: Objection. 
12 Q. BY MR. QUANE: You agree? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Does all surgery to some extent or 
15 another relate -- result in an inflammatory 
16 response? Let me shoot out ophthalmology surgery. 
17 A. I think any time you cut the body, 
18 there's an inflammatory response. 
19 Q. Isn't it true that just because there's 
20 bacteria present in an area, that doesn't mean the 
21 patient is infected? 
22 MR. HADDAD: Objection, asked and answered. 
23 MR. QUANE: I haven't asked that one. 
24 THE COURT: Sustained. You have covered 






Q. And you're assuming that, aren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's an assumption on your part? 
A. Yes. 
5 Q. In your opinion is an assumption 
6 tantamount to conjecture? 
7 A. I have no -- I don't know how to 
8 discriminate between those two words. 
9 Q. They mean the same, don't they? 
10 A. I don't know, Counselor. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, I think that's unduly 
12 argumentative. Please ask your next question. 
13 Q. BY MR. QUANE: Isn't it true, Doctor, 
14 in your opinion that there's no proof by any means 
15 of the fact at the time of the surgery by Kerr 
16 that these gram negative bacteria went into her 
17 body, is there? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Not a dime's worth of proof, is there? 
20 MR. HADDAD: Objection, argumentative, asked 
21 and answered. 
22 THE COURT: Sustained. 
23 Q. BY MR. QUANE: But you agree that's 
24 your opinion? 








MR. QUANE: Pardon? 
THE COURT: You have covered this topic. 
MR. QUANE: I asked that question? 
THE COURT: Yes, you have. 
MR. QUANE: Oh, okay. I didn't think I had. 
Q. BY MR. QUANE: Is -- let me ask you 
7 this: Do you subscribe to the view that under the 
8 best of circumstances and the highest degree of 
9 quality of care in performing surgery that 
10 infections can occur? 
11 MR. HADDAD: Objection, asked and answered. 
12 MR. QUANE: He hasn't answered that-- the 
13 way I worded that. 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: I'm going to let the answer 
16 stand. I do think you covered this multiple 
17 times. 
18 MR. QUANE: Well, I talked about equipment 
19 before. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 Q. BY MR. QUANE: And when you gave your 
22 opinion, Doctor, isn't it true that you were 
23 assuming that bacteria did enter her body during 
24 Dr. Kerr's proceeding? 
25 A. Yes. 
70 
1 THE COURT: Sustain the objection. It has 
2 been asked and answered. 
3 MR. QUANE: Oh, okay. 
4 Q. BY MR. QUANE: You would agree, would 
5 you not, that Dr. Kerr is in a better position 
6 than you to know more about Crystal Ballard and 
7 what he did than you do? 
8 MR. HADDAD: Objection, goes to the weight, 
9 Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Overruled. 




because of that. I did not hear it, Judge, 
because he interrupted. 
THE COURT: All right. You can state your 
15 answer again. 
16 THE WITNESS: Counselor, he has to know more 
17 than I do about his own patient. 
18 Q. BY MR. QUANE: Right. Does the term in 
19 medicine prophylaxis have a meaning? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What does it mean? 
22 A. It means preventative. 
23 Q. Does the term etiology in medicine have 
24 a meaning? 
25 A. Yes. 












Tuesday, October 01, 2013 12:45 PM 
Philip G. Haddad; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com' 
Corina Ferris 
RE: Ballard v. Kerr 
I have been out of state on other matters. I see you sent out a notice of depo for Ms. Kerr for tomorrow. In addition to 
your notice being untimely, please be advised she will not be attending. Neither the witness nor Jerry are available in 
addition to which this witness has already been deposed and we object to producing her again. I am covering the depo 
of Dr. Laurence tomorrow while Jerry is out of state on other matters. You will need to take up the issue of obtaining a 
further depo of Ms. Kerr with the court consistent with Jerry's correspondence to you on this issue. I am working on 
getting the file for Dr. Laurence emailed to you later today so you will have it in advance of tomorrow. Please note that 
we also object to the breadth of your depo notice for Dr. Laurence and the limited time we have had to try and 
respond. We will do our best to have the requested information. 
Terry. 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
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Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE 
COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND 
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 
Undersigned counsel for the Defendants hereby certifies that the Court 
ordered exchange of information conference with counsel for the Plaintiff was conducted 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 1 
001903
October 22, 2013 and that a discussion was held on matters specified by Rules 16(a) and 
16(b), I.R.C.P. and the attorneys for the parties engaged in an exchange of information. 
The subject of settlement or alternate dispute resolution was brought up by Defense 
counsel and discussed. For the first time in the history of the case, counsel for the Plaintiff 
said that his client would agree to mediation, even though the trial is scheduled to start 
November 5, 2013. Defense counsel had to decline the untimely suggestion of mediation 
due to the date the trial was to start, the impossibility of arranging mediation on such short 
notice and the fact that the bulk of the trial preparations had been completed and that 
defense counsel would be completely occupied with continued trial preparations. 
Persons disclosed as possible witnesses for the Defendants 




Or. Thomas Coffman 
Dr. Charles Garrison 
Dr. Gregory Laurence 
Dr. Alan Frankie 
Dr. John Lundeby 
Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
Stephanie Miller 
Dr. Karl Olson 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETIING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 2 
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Dr. Matthew Campbell 
Dr. Glen Graben 
Dr. Billy Morgan 
Dr. Howard Schaff 




Dr. Tisha Fujii 
Charles Ballard 
Descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence by 
the Defendants 
1. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr; 
2. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Laurence; 
3. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison; 
4. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman; 
5. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Frankie; 
6. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby; 
7. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller. 
8. Medical records of Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch Laser. 
9. Records of Elmore Medical Center for treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
10. Records of Elmore Ambulance Service for care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard. 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 - 3 
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11. Records of Life Flight for care and treatment of Krystal Ballard. 
12. Records of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of 
Krystal Ballard. 
13. Records of Ada County Coroner. 
14. Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard. 
15. 21 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken by Dr. Kerr for his operative 
procedure. 
16. 43 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken at autopsy. 
17. 6 photographs of Susan Kerr that depict the positions of Krystal 
Ballard for the operative procedure of Dr. Kerr. 
18. Photographs of brain and kidney tissue from the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard prepared by Dr. Garrison that show the presence of fat emboli. 
19. Autopsy tissue slides. 
20. 4 photographs of Krystal Ballard that depict the entry sites by 
markings for liposuction and fat transfer. 
21. Report of Dr. Morgan. 
22. CT study of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010. 
23. Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010. 
24. Report of Dr. Schaff for chest x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010. 
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SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
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25. Visible glass container that shows the quantity of fluid measured in 
milliliters or the equivalent in cubic centimeters. 
26. Medical devices, equipment, supplies, packaged material, autoclave 
and instruments used by Dr. Kerr for his procedures with photographs of the same. 
27. Compilation of data and database for operative procedures of Dr. 
Kerr by date, procedure and patient's first name from December of 2007 through 
December 23, 2010, with Krystal Ballard identified on July 21, 2010 and the number of 
liposuction procedures, consisting of a total of 338 procedures. 
28. Documents, records, material, data and calendars produced with 
Defendants responses to Plaintiff's First Requests for Production of Documents dated 
June 29, 2012. 
29. For illustrative purposes, the following medical artist illustrations: 
a. 18 depicting liposuction of anatomy with and without the 
cannula. 
b. 1 depicting anatomy for fat transfer in the bilateral buttocks. 
c. 1 depicting various tissue layers. 
d. 1 depicting the content of the abdomen. 
e. 1 depicting the urinary system. 
f. 1 depicting gram negative and gram positive bacteria or rods. 
Exhibits counsel have agreed may be received in evidence without 
objection: 
Defense exhibits to which this section applies are numbers 1 through 16, 
19, 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
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The rest of defense exhibits are objected to by the Plaintiff on all grounds 
allowed by law. 
Plaintiff's exhibits to which this section applies are numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24 and 25. 
The rest of Plaintiff's exhibits are objected to by the defense on all grounds 
allowed by law except that no objections will be asserted to the following exhibits on the 
basis of authenticity- numbers 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
The Plaintiff disclosed the following exhibits at the exchange of information 
conference that undersigned counsel has numbered 1 through 37. 
1. Medical records - charts for Silk Touch, Elmore Ambulance, Elmore 
Medical Center, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ada County Coroner including 
Autopsy Report; 
2. Cell phone record of Silk Touch; 
3. Curriculum Vitaes of Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Nichols, Dr. Armitage and 
Cornelius Hofman; 
4. Funeral placard; 
5. Funeral placard; 
6. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
7. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
8. Framed photos of Charles and Krystal; 
9. Photo of Krystal tubing; 
10. Marriage License; 
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11. Death Certificate; 
12. Tillman Funeral Home invoice; 
13. Artistic Flowers invoice; 
14. Memorial program; 
15. Bill from St. Alphonsus; 
16. Bill from Elmore Medical Center; 
17. Bill from Rost Funeral Home; 
18. Bill from Lifeflight; 
19. Memorandum - Extension of Enlistment for PCS (Elmendorf); 
20. USAF Records Certification; 
21. Line of Duty Determination; 
22. Awards and Decorations info; 
23. Air Force Achievement Medal; 
24. Air Force Commendation Medal; 
25. DJMS LES - Krystal; 
26. DJMS LES - Charles; 
27. Letter from Major Thomas Brown to Charles expressing sympathies; 
28. Statement of Service; 
29. Enlisted Performance Review 2010; 
30. EPR 2009; 
31. EPR 2008; 
32. EPR 2007; 
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33. Reenlistment Eligibility Annex; 
34. Air University CCAF Transcript; 
35. BSU Transcript; 
36. Embry-Riddle Transcript; and 
37. University of Maryland Transcript. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
l5{ By~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of October, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS DATED SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLElT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED 
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Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Laurence 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Frankie 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller 
Medical records of Dr. Kerr and Silk 
Touch Laser 
Records of Elmore Medical Center 
for treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of Elmore Ambulance 
Service for care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of Life Flight for care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center for treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of Ada County Coroner 
Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard 
21 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
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DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
43 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
taken at autopsy 
6 Photographs of Susan Kerr that 
depict the positions of Krystal 
Ballard for the operative procedure 
of Dr. Kerr 
46 Photographs of brain and kidney 
tissue from the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard prepared by Dr. Garrison 














Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Autopsy tissue slides 
4 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
that depict the entry sites by 
markings for liposuction and fat 
transfer 
Report of Dr. Morgan 
CT study of Krystal Ballard of July 
25, 2010 (44 films) 
Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest 
x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010 
Report of Dr. Schaff for chest x-ray 
of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010 
Visible glass container that shows 
the quantity of fluid measured in 











Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Various medical devices, 
equipment, supplies, packaged 
material, autoclave and surgical 
instruments used by Dr. Kerr for the 
liposuction and fat transfer 
procedure with illustrative 
photographs of the same 
Compilation of operative 
procedures of Dr. Kerr from 
December of 2007 through 
December 23, 2010, with Krystal 
Ballard identified on July 21, 2010 
with the total number of liposuction 
procedures, consisting of 338. 
Documents, records, material, data 
and calendars produced with 
Defendants response to Plaintiff's 
First Requests for Production of 













Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204 792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Medical illustrations depicting 
liposuction of anatomy with and 
without cannula of Krystal Ballard 
Medical illustrations depicting 
anatomy for fat transfer in the 
bilateral buttocks of Krystal Ballard 
Medical illustrations depicting 
various tissue layers 
Medical illustrations depicting the 
content of the abdomen 
Medical illustrations depicting the 
urinary system 
Medical illustrations depicting gram 






Last Name First Name Date ofTx procedures 
Kerr Susan Kerr 12.11.2007 abdomen 
Tiffany 12.11.07 upper arms, abdomen 
Erica 12.24.07 abdomen, love handles, flank 
.fv1ike i abdomen love handles & flank 
• o,No•• oRHOOO,,oHH"O O O O O • : . 
t 
• • T""'" _, • ' - . '""·-··i'". 
L . .. -~ 
001919
Last Name · First Name Date.ofTx procedures. 
Vicki 01.29.08 neck 
Donna 01.31.08 thiohs 
Julie 02.01.08 full ab, love handles, bra fat 
-1-ru_th ______ o:..::2;;.;.o:..::2.::co:.:8:.._ _ --1-l:..::o"'"'w""e-'--r .:..:ab.c..:•....:u""n""d"""er'--bC...u'-'-m'"".'-o....:u....:te_r-'-h~iP_s _______ ---1 ··· 
Jane 02.08.08 inner & outer thioh, knees 
-i-:-:-M:..::a.:..:ttc:.he:;..;wc.;.._ __ ~0:..::2:.:.:.0:..:8:::.0:.:8:.._ _ _....a:::b::..:d:..:o;.:.;mc.::ec:..n"-, .:..:.fla:::n.:..:k.;.;;;s _____________ ---1-
Nancv 02.11.08 neck, full abdomen & luvs 
Matthew 02.21.08 abdomen, chest 
i.:.K..:.:ecc.r'-r -----t-S:..::u:..::s.:..:an'-'------1-=-02::;·::25:::·:.:.0.::.8 ___ -i.:.lu:;..;v;...;hc:..:acc.n;.;;dc.:le:..::s,._, "'fla"'n-"-k'----------------1 ··- ··-·- ..... . 
Ruth 02.25.08 luvs, inner thioh 
Jennifer 02.28.08 banana roll, inner & outer thiqh i-=.:.;.;.;.c.;:;_ __ -1..::.=.==---+=.::.c:.::...c.::;.;,....;.:.;.;.c.::.;_:;c..::.=.=c...;:.;""'-'------------j·· 
Char 02.29.08 abdomen 
Patty 03.03.08 abdomen 
Pattv 03.03.08 abdomen 
Chervl 03.04.08 abdomen, flank & loves 
Timothv 03.11.08 abdomen, flanks 
t-J_o_n·_, ------1-'-0-'-3.'--1-'-3.'--0""8 ___ --1-a....:b_d_o_m_e_n~, n_e_c_k _____________ -i ............. ··-····--·-
Mike 04.01.08 abdomen & flank touch uo · 
Kristvn 04.03.08 abdomen, flank, inner thioh, tootsie roll, uooer arm 
Simone 04.07.08 abdomen & flank 
Dee 04.09.08 abdomen, flanks 
Cindv 04.11.08 abdomen 
Tauni 04.17.08 inner & outer thioh, tootsie roll 
1-T'-'o'-n-'-"-va ____ -1-=0..:.4:...:.1.::.8:..:.0:..::8 ___ -+a:.:b:..:d:..::o.:..:m.:.:e"'n.,_, '-'-hi=os,'-'i'-'-nn;...;e:ccr....:th'""'i.,_oh"-------------1 -·· ....•.. --·-·-. _______ . 
i-:D:.;e::.:.ncc.n..c.:is:.._ __ -+=0-'-4:..:.1.::.9:..:.0c:::8 ___ -+a::.:b:..:d:.::o.:..:m.:.:eco.:n.,_, fl:.;.:a::..:n.:..:.k;;::s!.;. 1c.:,e:.:c;.:.;k'-------------1-·-·-····· •..... . ..... _ ·-· 
Mvrna 05.08.08 flanks.abdomen 
l-'---'------1..::..::..:..::..::.:..::..:: ___ -+....:;__..c,:...-~;_..c...---------------1 ··-·· ····--·-··-·· ··-. ······· 
Cindv 05.13.08 abdomen i-c...;.c.:;..;<------l..::..::.:..:.::.:..:c:::----+~:..:;;.;.:.:;.:.;c.._ _______________ -t ... ··-·-·--····-·- .. 
Molly 05.13.08 abdomen 
1-S_h_e_il_a ____ -1-=0:..::5....:.1:..::5.:.:.0...=8 ___ -+a:..::b;....:d_o"'"'n_ie ___ n.,_, -'-ou'-t'""e_r l_e~o, fl_a_n_k ... s,'-F_a_t_tr_a_ns_f_er_t_o_fa_c_e ____ .. . ......•. 
LeAnn 05.19.08 full ab 1-------1..::..::.:...:.::.=----+..;.;;....c..a. _________________ -t --··-······· -
Vicki 05.19.08 flank & bra fat 1-.c..;c-----i..=..::~.:.:: ::.._ __ --4-:.=.=..;:;:....:c:..::;...-=.. ______________ -; ..•....•........ 
Patricia 05.20.08 inner and outer thioh 1-'-':;;;;_=----i-==.:.::.::.._ __ --!-;.:.;.;.c.::.;...;:::..:.:=-::..=c..:.:.::..w.:..: ____________ --l ... ··--·-·············· .• 
Melinda 05.21.08 inner & outer thiohs 1-------i:..::.c=-c~c...._----l--'-'-'--..C.......:-~---------------i-·-- --··-·--······--·-······· 
Jennifer 05.21.08 inner & outer thiohs 
l-"--'--'-"'----i..=..::.:.::..:.:.::.:::.._ __ --4-~=-::c.:..::.::..:..;;-'---"~-'-"----------------i·--···-·· . ····· ·······-········ 
rD;:..e::..:b:;.::b'""ie::.._ __ --i-:0=5.:::.2:=2c:..:.0:..::8:.._ _ 4 a:::;b::..:d:.:o;.:.;mc.:e:.:.n:.L, .:..:fla:::1c;.;1k-'-----------------!·····-·-·-· .... . . • ...•..... 
1-J_o_A_n_n ____ --i..;;o..cs"".2""2-'-'.0'-'8'-----1-a'-b""d~o ... m_e'--n-'-, _ch_i_n----------------i····-···············-· ..... . 
Kimber 05.29.09 abdmen & flank 
l-'-'-'-'""-'-------'f==.:..::..::c..._ __ --4-;;cc;..;::.;.....:......:.....=.c.;..._---------------i ....... ·-·-····················. 
rK-"i.;..;.m'--------i-:0=6.:.:.0:.c:6.:.:.0:..::8:.._ __ 4 a::.:b::..:d:.:o::..mc.:ecc.n:...&=lo:..:v..:;e...;.h:..::ac..:n.::.dl:..::e.::.s __________ --1 ···- ·- .... ·····-············· 
Diane 06.26.08 abdomen 
!--------i-c----c...=:..::.:..::..::-----1--'---------------------i·· 
+-T ... e-'-rec..s:..::a;..._ __ -i.:;0..:.7.:..::0.::.3:..:.0c::8 ___ -+a"'b:..:d:..-;o.;..;m.:.:e;.;.;n.,_. fl..c..a:..:n.cc.k:..::s _____________ -1-·····--· ....... ····--·····-
Teresa 07.03.08 abdomen, flanks +.;..:c=.=-=-----i-.::.:.=='-----1-==:c::.:~==---------------; .. ········-····· ·---- .. 
Randae 07.10.08 abdomen, flank, neck 1--....:....:..c..cc ____ i-;..;..;....:..;:.:..::..::;__ _ --4-.:..::;..;;....::.;.;...c..c.'"--=---'-'-'-'--"---------------1 ......•...........• ----- --
Pattv 07.11.08 abdomen touch up 
Pattv 07.11.08 lower abdomen 
Kathv 07.12.08 upper & lower abdomen 1-:c=.'------i.=.:.:..=c:..::..::;_ __ --4-=;....::.;...:;..;.::.;.c.=...c=..::;.::;.:.;..:.;::.;.c.._ _________ -i . . ... ·----- ······-· ... 
Lisa 07.16.08 abdomen, fllank 
Krissie 07.17.08 abdomen 1-;.c:..::~-----1i..::..:..;;.c.;..:..::..:::.._ _ --4-=.;;....::.;.;...c..c.;__ ______________ -i ...................... . 
Jenny 07.24.08 abdomen, bra & back fat, 1--"-------lf-C.-----'-'--"--------'-----~------------i ... ····--· ---·--···· .......... . 
+P_a;;.cm.:..:....------i-:0:..:.7~.2:.:5:.:..0:..:B:.._ _ --1.::.a.::.bd:;..;oc.cm.;..;.e:..:n.:..,.,.;..la:..::tc.::.er:..-;a.c.l""wc::a:..cis-'-t------------;----·-············------·--
Steve 07.30.08 abdomen love handles & chest -1-----------1i..;..;..~.;...;..;;----+--'-------'-'---'----------------i ·-- -·--· ................... . 
Marv Ann 07.30.08 neck +=""'-'--'-".:..:.;_---i====------+'-=;c;..;....------------------1 ... ·····-··-··-······--···"····. 
+-N_a_n __ c.._v ____ o;;.;7...;..3;;..1'"'".0;;.;8=------1-h--i.a..01s'-------------------i •. ················---; 
Lvubov 08.09.08 abdomen 
Jeanette 08.15.08 abdomen, thorax, waist, lat bra fat area 
Nancy 08.19.08 luv handles 
Kendall 09.03.08 arms ' ................ -... ~ 
+D_e;_n_is ____ i..:0:..::9.:.:.0;...;4.:.:.0:..:8'-----""B'-'re:..:a .... s-'-l-----------------, ···-········· ..•..•••. ; 
+:B::..:e::..:v..::.e:..:.rly,_ __ +0::..:9:.:;.0:..:5:.:;.0::..:8=-----1'a::.:b:..:s;...;&~na:::.n.::.:k:-.. _____________ ----t·····--- --· ·-·-··--······ i 
+D;;;..e.;;.;b:..:b:..cie:;._ __ ~09:.:..0=-8:.:.·.::.08=-----+.;:;.ab::..:d:.:o:..:.m.:.:e;.;..n'-------....,..,.----:-:---------i···· ··············--·--············· 
Eleanor 09.16.08 abdomen, lat waist. flank and lateral bra area ~----"--=----+=~:.;.:;..;::.._ __ --l..::..::.-'--'--""-'------..;.....c----------------t"'""' ....................... ,. ___ . ..,, 
+J::..:e:.:.n""n"'if.:::;er'-----1-'0:..:9:.:..1:.:6:.:..0::..:8=------1i-=oc=:u.:.:le::..r..::.&:...i:..:.nn:..:.e::.:r....:tc.:chi;,,.:.:c::ih-'-'' b::.cu:..:tt.:.:o:..::c:..:.ks:a-_________ -1 ··• .. •. ·······-·- .•.......... , 
.._ ______ ...cM.;..;.a;;.;n.:.:·o""n'-----....i...:0.::.9:....1..:.7.:.:.0:.c:8:.._ _ __,_w.;.;.;;;a:..::is""t,-"ncca.;..;.nk-",-'n.:.:e;.;;c.;.;;k,'""'b:.:.r.;:;.a...;;fa"'t __________ ~ ............................. J 
001920
Jennv 09.19.08 arm, lat waist, flank 
Michelle 09.23.08 abdomen, lateral waist & thiah 
Jennifer 09.25.08 inner/outer thiah, knees 
Ernie 09.26.08 luvs, chest 
Kimber 10.02.08 abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
Lisa 10.07.08 outer & inner thioh, abdomen 
Patty 10.30.08 abdomen flank, waist and bra area, arms, butt 
Kim 11.04.08 abdomen waist, fat transfer to face 
Katie 11.12.08 inner & outer thiqhs 
Becky 11.17.08 arms 
linda 12.08.08 fulll ab, hips, luv, bra fat 
Erica 12.27.08 abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
MANDI 12.28.08 abdomen, chin, inner thiahs, arms 
001921
Last Na.roe · f.irst Nam.e · . Date of Tx procedures 
. --: .. :_: ... .. .. : . : . .. .. .. . ... .. 
Terri 01.07.09 abdomen & neck, fat transfer to face 
Phvllis 01.15.09 abd, luv, bra fat 
Kayce 01.16.09 abdomen, luv handles, flank 
Leah 01.19.09 ankles 
Barbara 01.20.09 ful abd, chest from hip to armpit 
Pollv 01.21.09 abd, luvs & flank 
Jennifer 01.22.09 abd 
Cheryl 01.22.09 abd ... 
Cathi 01.23.09 full ab, luv, bra fat 
Jenny 01.23.09 abdomen, outer thiqhs 
" 
Barbara 01.26.09 inner & outer thiah, 
""' 
Kerry 01.28.09 ankle, thiah, knee 
Ruth 01.30.09 outer thiqh 
Carole 02.10.09 ab, luv, flank. bra fat 
Beverly 02.11.09 abdomen, luv handles 
Julie 02.13.09 inner & outer thiah 
Christina 02.16.09 abd, waist, outer thiqh .. 
Linda 02.17.09 uooer arm & lower arms, neck 
Helena 02.18.09 abdomen 
Jacaue 02.18.09 full abdomen 
Phvllis 02.19.09 outer, inner thiah, knees .. 
LeAnn 02.20.09 outer & inner thiah, knee 
Liz 02.23.09 abdomen, full waist and flank -· 
Judie 02.26.09 full abdomen .. 
Bonnie 03.04.09 abdomen, lat waist & flank, & bra fat 
Vicki 03.05.09 neck & lower iowels .. 
lat thigh touch up, fat transfer to outer 
Jennifer 03.06.09 thiqht 
inner & outer thigh, fat transfer to labia & 
Jovce 03.10.09 face 
outer & inner thigh, flanks, fat transfer to 
Kristi 03.11.09 face 
Gentry 03.19.09 ab, luv handles 
Sherrie 03.20.09 abd, outer thiohs 
Kristin 03.21.09 chin, neck, arm -
Sherri 03.26.08 abdomen and flanks .. 
Barbara 03.30.09 unoer arms, fat transfer to breast 
Connie 03.30.09 arms, fat transfer to face 
Chris 04 .. 20.09 abdomen, lateral waist 
Carole 04.01.09 arm & bra fat 
Sherri 04.07.08 Fat transfer to face 
Leslie 04.09.09 outer & inner thiqh .. 
-- . . ..... "·- .. ·- ··- ..... ~ 
-······ ·-·-··-· .. ·····-" . \ 
Jackie 04.10.09 outer & inner thioh & knees ; 
Patricia 04.13.09 abd, lat waist & thorax 
Nola 04.21.09 full abd, luv & flank 
Pattv 04.21.09 abd touch uo, bra fat .. 
Judv 04.22.09 neck 
Bruce 04.28.09 abdomen & luv handles 
Jackie 04.29.09 ankles, arms ' .... - _ ......................... .... : 
Cheri 04.30.09 neck 
MarvAnn 05.01.09 Uooer & lower arms, fat transfer to face 
. ·-·-·-· ........... ··- . --! 
Kim 05.06.09 arm, fat transfer to breasts 
Kellv 05.07.09 knees, f/t to breast 
Debra 05.14.09 inner thioh, ft to face and breast 
Tina 05.19.09 full ab, flank, bra fat 
··-·-· ... _ ............................ : 
' ·_·_ ................ _· .... { 
' 
Alisa 05.20.09 abd, luv, bra fat, flank 
Kendra 05.29.09 full ab, armpit 
i 
...... _ --··-·- ···---- ~ 
i ·- ... .,,, ___ ·- ·-·-- ............ _ 
001922
Ed 05.30.09 abd, lateral waist & flank -
Marion 06.01.09 lea, thiah, arm, chest wall, f/t to breast .. 
Tina 06.02.09 outer thiahs, f/t to buttocks scar 
Letty 06.02.09 ab, luv, flank, f/t to butt 
abdomen, waist.bra fat, knees and right 
Lisa 06.03.09 upper leQ 
abdomen, lateral waist, inner & outer thigh, 
Shanna 06.13.08 upper lat buttocks, fat transfer to face 
Donna 06.17.09 outer thiahs 
Tara 06.15.09 neck 
Donna 06.17.09 thiQhs 
Cheryl 06.22.09 full ab, waist & flank 
Cheryl 06.24.09 inner thiqh,bra fat, fat transfer to breast? 
Anthony 07.06.09 abdomen, lateral waist . 
Michelle 07.07.09 ab & fat transfer to face .. 
Aaron 07.08.09 breast, neck 
Jackie 07.30.09 full ab, love handles 
Terri 07.31.09 abd, waist, neck f/t to breast 
Stacv 08.19.09 full ab, waist ft to face/hands/breast 
Keil 08.27.08 breast, full ab 
Carrie 08.27.09 full ab, flank, inner/outer thiah 
Glenn 09.03.09 abd, lateral waist & flank 
Teresa 09.04.09 abdomen & waist 
Teresa 09.04.09 abdomen and lateral waist 
"' 
Chris 09.08.09 breast 
Phvllis 09.17.09 abd anterior, lower inner thiah 
Ann 09.21.09 full abd, lat waist & flank 
Maureen 09.22.09 full abd, inner thiah 
Carol 09.23.09 full abdomen 
Jennifer 09.25.08 outer thiahs 
linda 09.25.09 arms .. 
LaDoena 09.30.09 abd,flank 
LaDoena 09.30.09 abd, flank, bra fat 
aladvs 10.01.09 ab.bra fat, fat transfer to breast 
Tarena· 10.02.09· abdomen, flank, love handles .. 
Lori 10.14.09 Lower ab, neck, · 
Katie 10.21.09 outer & inner thiqh f/t to breast 
Minni 10.22.09 abdomen, flank 
Lisa 11.13.09 love handle, flank, outer thiah 
Brandy 11.16.09 abdomen, flanks 
Helena 11.18.09 ab, love handles, neck 
Jackie 11.19.09 uooer knee, arms . 
Marion 11.20.09 ankle, calfs, inner thiqh, axilla, flank, 
ruth 11.23.09 knees, lateral waist 
! Julia 11.24.09 outer & inner thiah, fat transfer to breast 
Theresa 11.25.09 abd, lat waist, neck f/t to breast 
Ashlev 12.04.09 abdome, lateral waist & flank 
Jim 12.11.09 abd, waist, chest ............... 
Travis 12.14.09 neck ' 
Alyson 12.15.09 abdomen, lat waist & flank 
Becky 12.17.09 ab, luv, inner thiQh 
LeaAnn 12.18.09 abd, waist, butt f/t 
Adrienne 12.18.09 outer thiQh 
Caivun 12.21.09 ab, luv, bra fat, 
Janina 12.23.09 abd, waist, neck f/t to breast 
John 12.24.09 chest 
Theresa 12.24.09 outer & inner thiah f/t to breast 
........ ---.. ·--·· l 
) 
001923
Last Name First Name DateofTx I Procedures 
Tawnia 1.5.10 ab, flank bra .. 
Christine 1.8.10 thiohs, waist 
Brandy 1.14.10 abd, flank, thioh 
nancv 1.25.10 neck, torso, lateral waist, thorax FAT transfer 
Julie 1.29.10 ab revision, FAT transfer 
olivia 2.4.10 abd FATto liP -
Christine 2.5.10 abd, arms, inner thioh 
Kerr Susan 2.10.10 ab touch UP .. 
Jennifer 2.10.10 lat outer thiah 
Linda 2.11.10 flank, FAT 
Stephen 2.17.10 neck 
HHaleena 2.18.10 ab .. 
Pamela 2.19.10 ab, flank, FAT face .... 
Linda 2.23.10 abd,flank ... 
Deborah 2.24.10 abd, flank ... 
Tina 3.1.10 Ab, flank 
Karrie 3.1.10 outer thiohs .. 
Janet 3.3.10 thiahs, FAT breast.face, hands 
Lettv 3.4.10 abd, arm, FAT bust, butt 
Chris 3.5.10 chest touch uo 
Jennifer 3.5.10 knees, abdomen, outer thiah ·-Kellv 03.08.10 abd, lat waist .. 
AnQie 3.11.10 inner, outer thiah, FAT breast -
Lisa 3.10.10 outer thiah. FAT breast 
-· _,,_ ..... ~--- ·-· -------- -, 
Linda 3.10.10 REVision thiahs -
Erin 3.12.10 flank FAT breast . 
Janet 3.16.10 neck, FAT to face 
Patricia 3.18.10 abd, arms, FAT lo butt 
l ..... --· 00-0MO --- ••-M·-·--··-i 
.............. ' ---·-··"-··-·---~ 
Jessica 3.19.10 abd, waist .... ···---- ·--· --·-·---·. 
Michelle 3.22.10 abd, lat waist ' . 
Dwayne 3.23.10 ab.flank 
Geo 3.24.10 abdm flank -
Elsie 3.25.10 abd, flank,FATface 
Kim 3.25.10 abd 
Ruth 4.5.10 lat thiah touch uo 
Julia 4.6.10 thiahs .. ·-····- -·-·· .......... ,. ___ , 
Nancie 4.8.10 abd, flank, FAT 
Emilv 4.9.10 outer thiah, inner FAT to breast -
Pauline 4.12.10 abd, arms, -
.. -·-·- ..... -~··· ··- -------; 
Sandy 4.13.10 abdomen FAT 
Elizabeth 4.14.10 abd, flank, inner thiah 
Sara 4.16.10 arms, FAT breast . 
Joanna 4.16.10 abd, waist 
Phvllis 4.19.10 touch uo 
Jackie 4.21.10 3 areas, touch uo, FAT 
Denise 4.30.10 abd, FATto face 
Sandv 4.13.10 abdomen FAT 
Patty 4.13.10 abd TU, bra, Fat transfer 
- ... - - ; 
... .. ·-·· --- .. ·-·-·-1 
____ _,,, ............. __ .... ,_ ... i 
Pauline 4.19.10 inner & outer thiah ! .................... ---· .. --l 
Tiffany 4.21.10 flanks ; 
"-··· ............... ••••• --1 
Rebecca 4.22.10 abd -
Kathleen 4.30.10 thiohs 
---··"·· ............... -............. , 
Deborah 5.2.10 arms ' _., _____ ,,,,,.... . • ... -·-----· i 
Jeanie 5.4.10 ab, flank, FAT to breast 
Marianne 5.6.10 3 areas FAT to butt 
Trina 5.7.10 abd, waist lhioh, FAT BUTI 
I 
1 -- -···--· --····-----·--1 
--·-· .... ---·- _ ........ --·-- l 
·1 Dianne 5.14.2010 abd, FAT to face ; ·-·-··----- - . _____ i 
001924
Loretta 5.17.10 abd, flank, bra, FAT 
Rhonda 5.18.2010 Thiahs, FAT breast & butt 
Bette 5.18.10 flanks, arms 
Melissa 5.20.10 ab.flank 
Gwen 5.25.10 fat transfer 
Debbie 5.26.10 inner, outer thioh, FAT breast 
Jackie 5.28.10 thiahs, FAT thiahs .. 
Paula 5.28.10 abd 
Barbara 6.2.10 ab, waist, bra fat 
Marv 6.3.10 abd, thiqhs 
Lucy 6.4.10 3 areas(abdomen\ FAT to hands 
Meqan 6.8.10 abd, flank FAT 
Sheri 6.8.10 neck, iowels 
Valerie 6.9.10 ab.flank ... 
Sallv 6.16.10 outer thiah, flank, FAT 
Brianna 6.17.10 knees, thiQhs, flank 
Melinda 6.18.10 abdm, flank waist 
Deborah 6.20.10 abd, flank bra 
Sara 6.21.10 ab, waist, bra fat, 
Pamela 6.22.10 neck, jaw, abd, FAT to face 
Tracv 6.24.10 abdomen, flan!< 
Brenda 6.25.10 breast, thiah 
Deborah 6.30.10 arms 
Carolyn 7.1.10 abdm flank, FAT to face .. 
Linda 7.7.10 abd 
.. ·--: 
Kave 7.6.10 abd, flank, arms, FAT to breast .. 
Shawn 7.13.10 neck .. 
full abdomen, luv_ handles, flank & fat 
Ballard Krvstal 07.21.10 transfer to butt 
Roxann 07.22.10 abd, lat waist .. 
BECKY 07.23.10 Abd, flanks, fat transfer breast -· 
Melinda 7.24.10 arms. FAT to breast 
Christopher 7.26.10 abd, flank, neck -
Barbie 7.27.10 liaw, neck 
Becky 7.28.10 ab, luvs, fat transfer breast 
Jessica 7.29.10 abd, lat, waist, flank, breast 
Melinda 7.30.10 thiohs .. 
Beverlv 8.3.10 neck 
·-
WAFAA 8.4.10 Abd, lat waist, flank 
Mike 8.5.10 abd,flank 
Kristen 8.6.10 abd, flank 
Marv 8.13.10 abd, flank 
Becky 8.19.10 thiahs .. 
Dennis 8.19.10 neck 
Bonnie 08.19.10 neck 
Josie 8.25.10 abd, fat transfer breast 
Vicki 08.30.10 unner & lower ab 
Rita 9.01.10 abd, fat transfer 
Orie 09.02.10 ab, flank, fat transfer 
-··---~·-- .... ,. .q ---- --·---. 
Mollv 09.03.10 ab, flanks, 
Christine 09.15.10 elbo, inner knee • thiqht 
Jackie 09.15.10 abd, uooer ab, lat waist & back 
Lee 09.16.10 abd, chest ' 
• •• •• -- • ·---··· •• -'4 ... -~ •• 
Melinda 09.16.10 uooer, lower abdomen larqe 
Melissa 9.20.10 arms 
Ginqer 9.21.10 abs, flanks, luvs 
-- . - .... -- . ·----·· ---: 
Scott 9.22.10 abd, flank 
Amy 9.23.10 arms, bra 
Cindy 9.24.10 abd, butt banana roll 
001925
;DR. KERR DID i 
(APPROX 4 LIPOS 1 
fAWEEK. 44 i 
tWEEKS (8 : 























































































abd, lat waist, flank 
inner outer thiqh 
lat waist, flank, chest, fat transfer to face 
chest, axilla 
chest 
abd, lat waist flank. -
abd, flank, chest, fat transfer to butt, breastt 
lat waist touch up 
ant ab touch UP 
abd,flank 
arm, breast fat transfer 
thiohs, fat transfer breast 
inner, outer lhiqhs 
abs.flanks 
abd touch up 
abd, flank, inner, outer, fat to breasts 
abd, breasts, neck 
abd, flank, breast 
lat waist, luv, flank touch up ,. 
arms 
ankle, inner thiqh 
flanks, butt fat -
flanks, fat transfer to hands 
touch up ab . 
outer, inner thiqh 
abd, flank, ftransfer breast 
ab, waist, fat transfer 
ab, breast fat transfer -
chin, ab 
flanks, fat transfer to butt 
flanks 
abd,flank 
abd, bra fat 
abd,flank 
abd, flank, fat transfer breast 
abd, flank 
waist, breast fat trans 
inner outer thiqh 
abd, flanks 
uooer ab, thiqhs 
abd,flanks 
~ "MO• ... ; 
001926





' I . ~ 
@ Saint Alphonsus I Health Information Management 




000807064 Hosp. Serv: ER- IPA 
3104-CII 
07,'25/2010 
Diet. Prov: All.l.Y R. MOltGAX MD••• 
VISIT#: (020600274 Room/Bed: 
Date ofBirtb: 04/19/1983 Admit: 
EMPI: 4828667 Dischffran,fer: 
Job Number: 684099 
CONSUIJ61JQN 
SURGICAL CONSULT 
CONSUL TING FOR: 
Dr. Fujii, critical care. 
CH.lF.F COMPLAINT: 
Att. MD: TISHA K FUJ!l oou 
DOS: 07/25/20 to 
Version: l 
Sepsis, ARDS, hypotcnsion, status post liposuction and transplantof fat to the buttocks ........ ·· 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
This is a 27-year-old black tcmale who apparently underwent liposuction wilh transplantation of the fat 
from the anterior abdominal wall to the buttocks on both sides. This apparently occurred on 07/21/20!0. 
She apparently had it done at a MediSpa somewhere. Apparently they contacted a physician several times 
and subsequently she became increasingly ill on rriday, complaining of increasing pain in the 
transplantation site on her buttocks. She had nod rainage from any of the wounds. She did not have a fever, 
no chills and apparently yesterday apparently passed out and early this morning was taken to the Elmore 
Emergency Room where she was seen and evaluated and subsequently transferred here. She arrived here at 
approximately 7:20 this morning and after a vigorous resuscitation she barely had a blood pressure. had 
significant findings on her chest x--ray and her CT is consistent with significant RDS in both lower lobes 
posteriorly. The patient had marked hypoxemia with a p02 in the 40s and was admitted to the Coronary 
Care Unit by Or. Fujii and she asked me ifl would evaluate the patient. CT also showed that sht: bas sorre 
stranding in the anterior abdominal wall anterior to the fascia consistent with her liposuction. She also has 
some subcutaneous air in the Jen posterior buttocks area in the soft tissues, but not in the muscle itself and 
not associated ~th the fascia according to my review of films . 
. LABORATORY VALUES: 
lnElmore,showi!d a WBC of 14.7. Her hemoglobin was l0.3 and her hematocrit was 32.0. She had 
189,000 platelets. She had 92 segs, 5 lymph~ and 3 monos. Her CK-MB was 3.2. I lcr myoglobin VY-as 277 
and her T and I was 0.079 and her CK was 51. Again inconsi!,"tcnt with a necrotizing fasciitis. I !er sodium 
is 142, potassium is 3.4. chloride is 102, her CO2 was I J, glucose was 93, BUN wus 31, creatinine was 3.2. 
Her albumin was low at 2.4, total bilirubin was I. Her total protein is 6.2 and her globulin was 3.8. Her alk 
phos was 73, AST v.as l 9, ALT was 24. Her blood gas from the Elmore Emergency Room showed a pH of 
6.99. Her pC02 was 36. Iler p02 was 21 and her base excess wa.'> ~22 and her bicarbonate was 8.7. Her 
02 saturation, and her 02 saturation was minimal. She was seen in the Intensive Care Unit. 



















Chest x-ray froi'tfEtmore County shows bronchitis and bi basilar subsegrnental atelectasis or scarring. 
minimal superimpose<f pneumonitis, aspiration of bronchiolitis not excluded and findings possibly a similar 
fat emboli syndrome. The patient is on a ventilator in the Intensive Care Unit. 
OBJECTIVE: / 
VITAL SIGNS: B~, /pressure at the time of my arrival is l 05/60, heart rate in the 120s. Her 02 sat is not 
reading. CVP is 18. he does have a left femoral arterial line in. 
HEENT: Shows th t her pupils are sluggish and equal. She has bilateral mild proptosis and her sclerac are 
unremarkable. I see no petechial hemorrhages in and around the area of the sclerae or the upper and lower 
lids. 
NECK: Supple, non1endcr, no step-offs or defonnities. She has no jugular venous distension. 
LUNGS; Clear to auscultation and percussion. Bre-.i.th sounds arc bilateral and equal in the upper lobt:s and 
marked rales in both bases. The cardiac exam shows a rapid rate and rhythm \Vithout munnurs or gallops. 
CARDIAC: Echocardiogram done at the time of my evaluation shows that she has markedly hypokinetic 
segments in the apex and in both ventricles with an ejection fraction estimated by the tache at around 17-
20%. 
ABDOMEN: She has 4 Steri-Strips wounds in the anterior abdomen, 2 on each side with no subcutancotLc; 
emphysema or crepitance or redness or any sign of infection. 
EXTREMITIES: Her extremities show l+ edema times all four extremities. 
BUTIOCKS: The patient's burtocks show 2 wounds I on the posterior superior iliac crest on each side with 
no crepitance to the subcutaneous tissue. No evidence of redness or inflammation and no drainage rrom the 
insertion sites for the fat transplants. The patient's current blood gas shows a pH of 6.84. Her pC02 is 42. 
Her pC02 is38 and she has a bicarbonate of7.2. Her calcium is 0.77 in ionized perfonned. Her02 sat is 
30%. The patient's EK Gs are essentially show slight ST elevation in nil leads. 
IMPRESSION: . 
This most likely represents an unfortunate young black female who underwent liposuction with subsequent 
transplant of the fat into the buttocks on both sides 4 days ago. She now has what appears to be a probable 
fat emboli syndrome with significant ARDS, massive hypoxemia, unresponsive to ventilator modes from a 
surgical standpoint, l foe! in light of the ejection fraction of 17% and a marked hypoxemia and a marginal 
cardiac output that she would not tolernte a trip to the Operating Room. I doubt very seriously that this 
represents necrotizing fasciitis in light of the CT scan, which only shows 11 small amount ofair and no tluid 
anterior and/or posterior to the fascia in the buttocks. I have discussed these findings with Dr. Fujii, and 
will be available to continue to follow the patient and should there be any surgical needs. 
Dictation electronically signed by 
BfLL Y R MORGAN, MD+** 
on 07/26/2010 02:4 l :I 8 
BILLY R MORGA!\, MD•o 
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To: ELMORE MEDICAL~ From: St. Als Regional Medi~al Cenv--
ELMORE MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL DISTRICT MOUl'ITAIN HOME ID 83647 
Patient: TAL 
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Ref, Prov: KARL H. OLSON MD' Exam; l:LM251600 







CHF.,ST RAOlOGRAPJf, 2 VJEWS1 FRUl'ffAL AND LATERAf, 











Pen:ihilnr opncities including b.ronchial wall thickoning. Addilion11l bibasililr howrogeneons 
opJ1dtiea. 
Normal sizo cardiac silhouette. 
Normal. 
Nornllll. 
Nonna! for age. 
Bilateral nippfo pl~. 
Bronchitis and bibosilnr subsegmental atelectusis or st.-aning. Mininllll ilupcl'imposcd 
pm?umonitis, 11Spiration, or brouchiolitii is not e1cludcd. Sirnilal' fLudiugl! may be soon in 
settu1g of fat CtllbOlfaIIL 
DidRt1:d 11;': Dcrtrmn Stemmler, M.D. ou 7125/lOlO ai 3:30 
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Elmore Medical Center, XR. XR CHEST 2 VIEWS PA AND LAT, 7l25/2010, 3:09. 
Bilateral diffuse patchy airspace disease significantly progressed since the prior study. 
Normal size cardiac silhouette. 
Nonna!. 
Nonna!. 
·Nonna! for age. 
Negative. 
St9NCLUSION: Significant interval development or bilateral diffuse patchy air space disease. Gh·en the 
patient's history of recent liposuction and rapid Interval de,·elopnumt of pulmonary airspace 
disease, findings may represent fat embolism, pulmonary edema, and/or adult respiratory 
distress syndrome. 
Dictated by: Ho11ard Scharf. M.D. on 7/2512010 at 8:24 
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Dean E. Sorensen, M.D., F.A.C.S. 8/21/2013 
1 A. Pneumonia is an infection. Prostatitis is an 
2 infection. Bladders have infections. 
3 Q. In your opinion, am I covered with bacteria --
4 my skin? 
5 A. Outside and inside. 
6 Q. I'm covered with it, aren't I? 
7 A. Of course. 
8 Q. Am I infected? 
9 A. No. There're symbiotic. 
10 Q. Pardon? 
11 A. They're symbiotic. They're there to help you --
12 and you help them in many cases, for example. 
13 Q. So just because there's bacteria present, that 
14 doesn't mean I'm infected? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Well, that's what I'm getting at. 
17 So, in that context, what does infection mean? 
18 A. I would say that infection - - are you talking 
19 about any infection with or without surgery? 
20 Q. I'm talking about in order to classify something 
21 some process as an infection, does it require more than 
22 just the presence of bacteria? 
23 A. Sure. It requires a response to it. I mentioned 
24 those responses. 
25 Q. So part of the definition then of 11 infection 11 
Page 72 
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Dean E. Sorensen, M.D., F.A.C.S. 8/21/2013 
1 quality of care in performing surgery, that infections 




Q. Do you think that infection is the primary 
5 nightmare of surgeons 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. - - for postoperative complications? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Where does it rank, in your opinion, number 
10 A. Well, it gets up there, but I think bleeding 
two? 
11 because it's more life-threatening would be one that you 




A. And then infection is in there, but, you know, 
15 they're uncommon, so it needs to be mentioned and dealt 
16 with, but, you know, today we do so much to prevent it 
17 that it's one of the reasons it's rare. 
18 I can go into detail if you want me to. 
19 Q. Well, even if it's rare, under the best of 
20 circumstances and care it sometimes can't be prevented? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. We were talking earlier about your 
23 knowledge of infections, and we discussed some things 
24 that go to your so-called "expertise," if any, with 
25 infections, and we didn't mention bacterial organisms. 
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Dean E. Sorensen, M.D., F.A.C.S. 8/21/2013 




Q. But it's an assumption, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's no proof by any means of the fact 
5 at the time of the surgery these gram-negative bacteria 




Q. Okay. Have you formed an opinion as to what 
9 is the best evidence that a doctor utilizes appropriate 
10 sterile conditions during surgery, disinfectant procedures 
11 with equipment, operating room, and the entire area where 
12 the procedure is done, cleansing of instruments -- what's 
13 the best proof that that is being done appropriately? 
14 What would be the best proof? 
15 A. I think lack of complications would be the 
16 best answer. 
17 Q. Right. Did you ever hold any committee 
18 assignments or positions at St. Luke's or ever? 
19 A. You know, yes, but it's been so long ago, 
20 I can't remember. You know, I did a lot stuff I just 
21 don't remember. 
22 Q. Okay. Let's say the last five years. Have 
23 you held any 
24 A. Do you mean chairmanships or just being on 
25 a committee? 
Page 152 
208-345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 800-234-9611 
001937
CJ 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. FILED1 'co) 
A.M. ___ _.-,.M ___ _ 
FEB O 5 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRENCE S. 
JONES IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Terrence S. Jones, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRENCE S. JONES IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS - 1 
001938
says: 
1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, and the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2). On Wednesday, November 13, I met with Dr. Geoffrey Stiller, one of 
our expert witnesses in this case for purposes of further preparing for trial. At the start of 
our meeting I informed Dr. Stiller of the Court's rulings on the Motions in Limine, 
specifically including the order regarding testimony and proof of other patient infections. 
I informed Dr. Stiller that per the Court's order, we would need to address this issue 
outside the presence of the jury first in order to get approval and that until that approval 
was given, no testimony in front of the jury on that issue could be given. Dr. Stiller 
indicated he understood this admonition. 
3). I renewed this instruction and admonition to Dr. Stiller the morning of 
Thursday, November 14 both in my office during a second meeting and then a third time 
at the courthouse just prior to Dr. Stiller taking the stand. This issue was discussed in 
connection with my outline with Dr. Stiller for how the testimony would be presented so 
that I could timely request a break to address the issue with the court. On each of these 
occasions I reminded Dr. Stiller that the Motion in Limine issues, including the absence of 
infections involving other patients, was an issue that the court had said could not be 
presented to the jury without first bringing it up with her outside the jury to see if the Court 
would agree that such evidence and testimony should be allowed. 
4). This was the very reason that I informed the court at the start of Dr. 
Stiller's testimony that morning that I had a matter that we would need to bring up later 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRENCE S. JONES IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
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that day outside the presence of the jury. My questions leading up to as well as the 
answer given by Dr. Stiller were not intended to elicit a response which violated the 
Court's Orders in limine. This is why I asked the Court prior to the lunch recess for the 
opportunity to review precisely what was stated by the witness because I did not then, nor 
do I now, believe that Dr. Stiller had rendered testimony which ran afoul of the Court's 
order. As the transcript submitted reflects, I was never given an opportunity to address 
the court or make any sort of record following the lunch recess. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this tfH." day of February, 2014. . --
(SEAL) 
CORINA FERRIS 
STATE OF IDAHQ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
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each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] Email 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
[X] Email 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GEOFFREY D. 
STILLER 
Geoffrey D. Stiller, M.D., having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
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1). The matters and facts specified and recited herein are based on 
your Affiant's actual personal knowledge and are true and accurate. 
2). I was retained by counsel for the Defendants to act as an expert 
witness in this case and in that capacity I gave testimony on November 14, 2013 at the 
trial of this case. I have been provided with the attached Court Reporter's partial 
transcript of proceedings for my testimony on November 14, 2013 that is accurate and 
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. In the afternoon of Novembe'r 13, 2013 I 
met with attorney Terrence Jones in his office in connection with preparations for my trial 
testimony. At the beginning of our meeting, Mr. Jones informed me of the Court Order 
which precluded me from offering any testimony at trial regarding or related to the lack of 
prior infections of Dr. Kerr with other patients of his. The following morning, November 
14, 2013 at his office, Mr. Jones repeated this admonition to me and he did so again on 
November 14, 2013 at the courthouse shortly before I took the witness stand to testify. 
On each of these occasions, Mr. Jones told me the Judge had said that I must not testify, 
in the presence of the jury, that Dr. Ker had not had any infections with other patients 
without first bringing the issue up outside the jury to see if the Judge would allow such 
testimony by me. I understood completely these instructions of Mr. Jones. Before 
\. \t,,vember 13, 2013, I had been provided with and reviewed the medical records of 
-~~},;more Medical Center, Dr_ Kerr, Silk Touch Laser, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical _Jf5 
~ f Center, Dr. Campbell, Dr. Olson, Dr. Morgan and Dr. Fujii. The records of Dr. Kerr and. (j~ 
~ Silk Touch Laser, reflect that there is no evidence of infection of Krystal Ballard on eitheri ~ 
July 21, 2010 or July 23, 2010. The records of Elmore Medical Center and Dr. Olson - .. 
reflect that there js no evidence of infection of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010. The 
records of Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Dr. Campbell and Dr. Morgan 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GEOFFREY D. STILLER - 2 
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reflect that there is no evidence of infection of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 and July 
26, 2010. Based on these records, it is my opinion that Krystal Ballard did not have 
infection on the dates reflected in these records and I was going to testify to this until my 
testimony on November 14, 20130 was terminated. None of the questions and my 
answers leading up to the last question asked of me and my partial incomplete answer 
involved or related to the absence of any prior infections of patients of Dr. Kerr. The 
questions asked of me, page 22 of the Court Report transcript, are: 
Q. All right, do you have an opinion in this case whether 
or not the gram negative bacteria found on Krystal Ballard 
came from contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. 
Kerr? 
A. I do have an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. That that is incorrect. 
Q. What is your opinion based on? 
A. In order, well there's multiple different ways of looking 
at it. As far as the process of sterilization, we know that a 
chemical marker was done so we've reached sterilization as 
far as the temperature is concerned as long as the machine 
basically said that it was adequate time. All the autoclave 
machines will have a register on it saying whether it has 
reached adequate time or not. So by that definition it's been 
sterilized. Okay. Spore counts don't matter. It's gram 
negative, okay. When you look at the process of liposuction 
and removing all of that tissue, and then injecting it back in, a 
far as it being done sterily, a gram negative rod coming from 
the colon to the uria or from one of his equipment, I don't see 
how it can happen. Let alone the fact of that no pertinent or 
persistent infections in the office. There is no history of the 
fact that. .. 
Mr. Haddad: Your Honor 
The Court: Sustained and we'll address it. 
3). The foregoing questions and answers pertain solely to Krystal 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GEOFFREY D. STILLER - 3 
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Ballard and whether the gram negative bacteria from contaminated reusable medical 
instruments by Dr. Kerr. They do not ask for or involve prior infections of other patients of 
Dr. Kerr. The part of the answer to the last question, "let alone the fact of ... that no 
pertinent or persistent infections in the office" is in reference to Krystal Ballard only and 
responsive to the last question. It means, in the opinion of Dr. Stiller, what he meant by 
this answer was the fact that Krystal Ballard had no infections pertinent or persistent in 
the office of Dr. Kerr. The word persistent means enduring, permanent, continuous, and 
has no relationship to prior infections or their absence of Dr. Kerr. This answer refers to 
the fact that Krystal Ballard was not infected when Dr. Kerr operated on July 21, 2010, 
evaluated Krystal Ballard on July 23, 2010, and the records of the subsequent treating 
physicians of Krystal Ballard of no evidence of infection. The word persistent does not 
mean or even imply anything to do with facts and events occurring before July 21, 201 O 
and the answer to the question is specifically in reference to Krystal Ballard and no one 
else. 
4). The answer of your affiant was made in regard to Krystal Ballard 
and her lack of infection and did not violate the instructions received from Mr. Jones or 
the Court Order explained by Mr. Jones. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not 
Geo y D. Stiller, M.D. 
' ~111,vc..t'-f 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of .Qeee111ber;--
\'''\''~Lf~f!,, 
~'\\_,.~to,~~~',,. . I~/.,..~//_, _ ,,/ ./A _..-
0:-~ .. , ..... ·-~~ ...,,.. . v~- --f .·· ~1/'!JJ-, . ._,-:: · \ -N-o-ta--P"-u-b-lic__,__r,,.q.ld_a.,_h_o-=---'-'-----
: ·. ~~~ } : Residing at /110.5(!,tl-U), :fl) 
\ -~ -~'? f O § Commission expires 9-11 - I b 
~ (S)~, ,..--(,~.//: $ ,,,;'!"Ji. OF. \Q~,,, 
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Ballard v. Kerr 11/19/2013 
infected with gram negative bacteria as a result 
of contaminated reusable surgical instruments from 
Dr. Kerr's office being used on Krystal Ballard. 
You are aware of that? 
A. I am. 
Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in 
this case whether or not the gram negative 
bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
contaminated reusable medical instruments by 
Dr. Kerr? 
A. I do have an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. That that is incorrect. 
Q. What is your opinion based on? 
., 
A. In order -- well, there's multiple 
different ways of looking at it. 
As far as the process of sterilization, 
we know that a chemical marker was done so we've 
reached sterilization as far as the temperature is 
concerned as long as the machine basically said 
that it was adequate time. All the autoclave 
machines will have a register on it saying whether 
it has reached adequate time or not. So by that 
definition, it's been sterilized; okay. 
Spore counts don't matter. It's a gram 
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negative; okay. When you· look at the process of 
liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and 
then injecting it back in, as far as it being done 
sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from the 
colon to the uria (phonetic) or from one of his 
equipment, I don't see how it can happen. 
Let alone the fact of -- that no 
pertinent or persistent infections in the office. 
There is no history of the fact that 
MR. HADDAD: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
MR. HADDAD: Thank you. 
Page 23 
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THE COURT: All right. We'll break for the 
noon recess. Please remember my usual reminder 



















THE COURT: Is there some reason why you did 
not tell your witness about the order in limine? 
THE WITNESS: He did; I apologize. 
THE COURT: Well, that may not be 
sufficient. 
MR. HADDAD: Well, Your Honor, at this time 
we are obligated, based upon the discussion with 
the Court earlier and the clear mandate by this 
Court on this very issue, not on other issues, 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
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I. Introduction 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion made pursuant to 
Rule 37(e) seeking various sanctions against the Defense following the Court's grant of a 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 1 
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.-
mistrial on November 14, 2013. Plaintiff goes to great lengths to cast aspersions upon 
Defense counsel associated with the mistrial, however, the transcript of what actually 
transpired in this case which is provided along with this memorandum speaks volumes to 
the contrary. The Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for a mistrial based on the 
perceived belief that one of the Defense witnesses, Dr. Geoffrey Stiller, had made 
statements in answer to Defense counsel questioning in violation of the Court Order in 
Limine regarding lack of prior infections involving other patients. 
After excusing the jury, the Court promptly questioned both Defense 
counsel, Terry Jones, and the witness on the stand about whether notice of the Court's 
Order had been relayed to the witness so as to avoid improperly addressing various 
issues in front of the jury without approval from the Court. As will be outlined below, the 
Court heard from the witness on the stand confirm that he, indeed, was told by Defense 
counsel on more than one occasion that he needed to avoid discussing certain topics until 
the matter could be addressed outside the presence of the jury. Even more telling, 
however, is the actual transcript of what was said by the witness which demonstrates that 
at no time did he run afoul of the Court's Order. As a result, there was no valid basis to 
grant the mistrial based on what Dr. Stiller testified to and/or the preceding question 
advanced by Defense counsel. The Court should therefore decline to enter an award of 
any sanctions against the Defendants and their counsel and reconsider and reverse its 
Order granting and declaring a mistrial. 
II. Factual background 
This case proceeded to trial on November 5, 2013. Per the pleadings, 
Plaintiff was represented by three different law firms including Scott McKay as local 
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counsel from Boise, Gregory Haddad from West Virginia and James Perrine from 
Alabama, both admitted pro hac vice. The Defendants were represented by one firm, 
with Jeremiah Quane and Terry Jones appearing as counsel of record. At the start of 
the trial, the Court took up the various motions in limine filed by the parties. The 
transcript of the Court's hearing on this issue is attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions as Exhibit D. As discussed in greater detail 
below, the Court granted and denied various motions in limine after stating that several of 
the Motions did not qualify as motions in limine and the issues they embodied would 
therefore have to be addressed during the trial when the issue came up. 
The Court then allowed the parties to proceed with voir dire during which 
time the Court asked the prospective jury panel various initial questions regarding 
knowledge of the parties and witnesses, juror schedules, etc. before allowing the 
attorneys to question the remaining panel members. The Court made the decision to 
have only one alternate juror. The Court's Amended Scheduling Order dated 
September 9, 2013 specifically states this case was expected to continue for ten days. 
See Court's Amended Scheduling Order attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions as Exhibit B. By the wording of this Order, that meant 
that the trial in this case was expected to run for ten trial days or through November 20, 
2013, taking into account weekends and Mondays when no trial would be held. On this 
basis, the Defense scheduled its witnesses for trial, estimating as best as possible when it 
might be able to start its case in chief. Keeping in mind the Amended Court Scheduling 
Order for ten trial days, the defense scheduled and planned its witnesses, lay and expert, 
to complete its case as scheduled within the time frame established by the Court. 
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), 
Early on in the trial on November 8, the trial was stalled when Juror No. 11 
failed to show that morning. The parties waited over two hours for the juror during which 
time the Court informed the parties that officials had been sent looking for Juror No. 11 at 
his work and home. Unable to find him, the Court ultimately excused Juror No. 11 after 
which the case proceeded with only twelve jurors. It was later disclosed to the attorneys 
by the Court that Juror No. 11 had been erroneously sent a notice by the jury 
commissioner stating that he was no longer needed. In other words, it was an error of 
the jury commissioner's office which resulted in the loss of the one juror. 
During the second trial week, the Court provided notice to the parties that 
two of the remaining twelve jurors had reported a conflict due to work and/or travel plans 
and that they would not be able to attend the trial the following week or November 19 and 
20. This was reported to the attorneys despite the fact that the time frame that the two 
jurors said they were no longer available was still within the original ten trial day time 
period that the case was scheduled to run. The Court granted the mistrial before this 
issue was resolved, however, it appears clear that had the Court not granted the mistrial 
on November 14, that it would have been forced to grant such a mistrial based on having 
less than twelve jurors the following week, had the Court excused the two jurors who were 
unavailable after November 15 or simply failed to return. 
Had the Court waited to grant the mistrial the following week, no sanctions 
of any kind would have been available to award against any party since the mistrial would 
have been based on having an insufficient number of jurors per Rule 48(a). Based on the 
events of November 14, Plaintiff's counsel claimed all manner of prejudice both real and 
imagined in the presence of his client and the Court and demanded a mistrial without 
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even taking a break to consult with his client. After granting the mistrial, Plaintiff's 
counsel then requested all sorts of relief including costs, attorney fees, striking of 
defenses and even the disqualification of Defense counsel from further appearing in the 
case. Plaintiff's counsel's argued that a mistrial somehow benefitted the Defense and 
that the case should be promptly reset in order to obtain justice for his client. Despite his 
strenuous demands back in November, it is curious that Plaintiff's counsel then elected to 
wait over 3 weeks to file any motion for sanctions and has yet to request the trial be reset 
in this matter or to even provide the Court with any available trial dates. Indeed, by the 
time this pending Motion for Sanctions is scheduled for hearing, it will be three months 
after the grant of a mistrial with still no proposal for available trial dates from Plaintiff's 
counsel nor any sense of any urgency being advanced. 
Ill. Argument 
A. Plaintiff's reliance on Rule 37(e) is misplaced as this rule 
does not provide Plaintiff with a means to recover the 
sanctions requested following the grant of a mistrial in 
view of the existence of and requirements of Rule 47(u). 
It is well settled in Idaho that "trial courts have broad discretion when ruling 
on a motion in limine." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 
Idaho 761, 767 (2004). Appellate Courts review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion in limine under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 768. A trial court may deny 
the motion and wait until trial to determine if the evidence should be admitted or excluded. 
Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492 (1997). If the trial court defers a ruling 
on the motion a party must reassert an objection at the time of the offer in order to 
preserve the issue. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988). See also Gunter v. 
Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25 (2005). As outlined below, in this case the 
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issue involving the absence of infections regarding other patients was a deferred ruling. 
A motion in limine does not involve a discovery order, but an order 
addressed to the presentation of evidence at the trial itself. A court's ruling regarding a 
motion in limine is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual 
testimony differs from what was expected. U.S. v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 2d 564 (E.D. 
N.Y. 2011 ). The purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent the proponent of potentially 
prejudicial matter from displaying it to the jury in any manner until the trial court has ruled 
upon its admissibility in the context of the trial itself. State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201 (R.I. 
2012). An order resulting from a motion in limine is a temporary protective order that is 
subject to change during the trial. State v. Breedlove, 286 P.3d 1123 (Kan. 2012). A 
ruling on a motion in limine is not on the merits and only relates to the administration of the 
trial. Wert v. State, 383 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2012). A "motion in 
limine" seeks a preliminary expression of the court's opinion as to the admissibility of the 
evidence. Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. 2013). See also, 20 Am. Jur. 
Trials 441. 
Based on the alleged violation of the Order in Limine, Plaintiff has filed his 
Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e) which provides as follows: 
General Sanctions - Failure to Comply With Any Order. 
In addition to the sanctions above under this rule for violation 
of discovery procedures, any court may in its discretion 
impose sanctions or conditions, or assess attorney's fees, 
costs or expenses against a party or the party's attorney for 
failure to obey an order of the court made pursuant to these 
rules. 
While recognizing that Rule 37(e) provides the court with broad authority to 
enter orders, there is a more specific rule which applies directly to sanctions following the 
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granting of a mistrial. The order at issue which the Plaintiff claims the defense violated 
was not a discovery order, but rather an order in limine involving the presentation of 
evidence to the jury and its admissibility. The defense contends that resolution of this 
matter is therefore not controlled by Rule 37(e), but rather by Rule 47(u) which sets forth 
what the court should consider when addressing the issue of sanctions following a 
mistrial. 
Rule 47(u) provides: 
Declaration of Mistrial - Sanctions. 
After trial is commenced, at any time prior to the rendering of a 
verdict, the court on its own motion or upon motion of any 
party may declare a mistrial if it determines an occurrence at 
trial has prevented a fair trial. If the court determines that a 
mistrial was caused by the deliberate misconduct of a party or 
attorney, the court may require the adverse party or the 
attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses including 
attorney fees incurred by the opposing party or parties 
resulting from such misconduct. (Emphasis added). 
Despite the existence of this rule and the requirements set forth within it, 
Plaintiff does not cite this rule anywhere in his moving papers nor does he discuss the 
required deliberate misconduct analysis. Instead, Plaintiff's counsel tries to exaggerate a 
prior entirely unrelated discovery issue from the fall of 2012 and suggest to this Court that 
it supports some pattern of bad behavior on the part of the defense. Using this bootstrap 
and suspenders approach, Plaintiff's counsel's moving papers engage in significant 
conjecture, overstatement and improper magnification of the circumstances at issue in 
order to support his Motion and attempt to influence this Court. 
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B. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of sanctions against 
the Defendants or their counsel because per the 
requirements of Rule 47(u), the Defense did not engage 
in any deliberate misconduct 
Per the above requirements of Rule 47(u), sanctions are only justified "If the 
court determines that a mistrial was caused by the deliberate misconduct of a party or 
attorney ... " Only after making such a finding is the court then allowed to award against 
"the adverse party or the attorney, or both ... the reasonable expenses including attorney 
fees incurred by the opposing party or parties resulting from such misconduct." Under 
the facts of this case, the witness in question, Dr. Stiller, was neither a party nor an 
attorney nor had he ever before testified as an expert witness. Dr. Stiller specifically 
stated under oath to the Court that he had been instructed by Defense counsel not to 
discuss certain topics, including the topic involving infections related to other patients. 
See also the affidavit of Dr. Stiller submitted in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Sanctions and the Affidavit of Mr. Jones. 
In his moving papers, Plaintiff represents to this Court that the Defense 
asked Dr. Stiller "why he believed Defendants had not violated the standard of practice, to 
which Dr. Stiller responded that there had not been any other infections at Defendants' 
facility." See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions at P. 8. This 
representation by the Plaintiff is totally false and further demonstrates that Plaintiff 
(whether intentionally or not) is misconstruing the record for the sole purpose of trying to 
improperly influence the Court. The actual exchange which occurred in Court went as 
follows: 
Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in this case whether 
or not the gram negative bacteria found on Krystal Ballard 
came from contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. 
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Kerr? 
A. I do have an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. That that is incorrect. 
Q. What is your opinion based on? 
A. In order - well, there's multiple different ways of 
looking at it. As far as the process of sterilization, we know 
that a chemical marker was done so we've reached 
sterilization as far as the temperature is concerned as long as 
the machine basically said that it was adequate time. All the 
autoclave machines will have a register on it saying whether it 
has reached adequate time or not. So by that definition, it's 
been sterilized; okay. Spore counts don't matter. Its' a gram 
negative; okay. When you look at the process of liposuction 
and removing all of that tissue, and then injecting it back in, as 
far as it being done sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from 
the colon to the uria (phonetic) or from one of his equipment, I 
don't see how it can happen. Let alone the fact of - that no 
pertinent or persistent infections in the office. There is no 
history of the fact that -
Mr. Haddad: Your Honor. 
The Court: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
Mr. Haddad: Thank you. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit C at p. 23, II 1 to p. 26, II 
13. 
Contrary to the statements by Plaintiff's counsel, Dr. Stiller did not state that 
his opinion was based on their being no other patient infections at Defendant's facility. 
The transcript conclusively proves that nothing even remotely close to that ever came out 
of Dr. Stiller's mouth. Moreover, the question posed by Defense counsel was not framed 
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to elicit an improper response. The interruption by Mr. Haddad of Dr. Stiller's testimony 
which the Court sustained without an objection even being made was totally premature 
considering the transcript reveals that Dr. Stiller did not testify contrary to, nor did Defense 
counsel ask a question contrary to the Court's Order in Limine. The Court should 
therefore reconsider the basis for the mistrial being based on the testimony of Dr. Stiller 
considering he did not violate the Order in Limine. 
Dr. Stiller did not testify about an absence of prior infections involving other 
patients or that he had reviewed any chart or representations involving other patients. 
He simply stated "no pertinent or persistent infections in the office." Plaintiff interprets 
this statement to infer that Dr. Stiller must have been referring to infections involving other 
patients. While this interpretation represents nothing more than sheer speculation on 
the part of Plaintiff's counsel, the fact remains that an equally plausible interpretation by 
the jury was the fact the patient herself had never presented with any evidence of 
infection during her office visits and/or subsequent discussions with Dr. Kerr. There was 
simply no basis upon which the jury would have reasonably concluded Dr. Stiller was 
bringing in evidence related to other patients. As a result, there was no basis to 
conclude that the jury was somehow tainted with improper information based on what Dr. 
Stiller said such that a mistrial should have been granted or that Plaintiff was prevented a 
fair trial. 
Plaintiff provides no case authority from any jurisdiction supporting such a 
proposition, nor is there any case authority in Idaho applying either Rule 47(u) or Rule 
37(e) in such a fashion. There was only one Court Order issued on discovery matters and 
it was promptly obeyed by the Defense. The Defense did not violate any of the Orders 
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issued by the Court on the Motions in Limine and the Defendants and their counsel did 
nothing that amounted to a violation of the Court Order on evidence of prior infections of 
other patients of Dr. Kerr. In fact, counsel for the Defendants did everything possible and 
reasonable to prevent Dr. Stiller from offering testimony that was in violation of the Court 
Order. The question asked of Dr. Stiller that resulted in his answer that is in question, 
related solely to whether gram negative bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. Kerr and it defies logic to conclude that 
this question could be construed to include anything to do with the absence of infections 
of other patients of Dr. Kerr. 
In the court reporter's transcript for the matters discussed and taken up after 
the noon recess on November 14, 2013, the Court made the following statement: "I said 
there was not to be any reference to any other infections." See Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, as Exhibit A. The question asked of Dr. 
Stiller referred to Krystal Ballard only and did not refer to other infections. The answer of 
Dr. Stiller was, among other testimony, "let alone the fact of that no pertinent or persistent 
infections in the office." (Emphasis added). It is logical that the jury would interpret the 
answer to mean the ordinary dictionary definition of the words pertinent and persistent. A 
standard dictionary definition of these words are: "Persistent, persevering or stubborn in a 
course or resolve. Enduring, permanent, continuous. Not falling away. Remaining past 
the time of majority." "Pertinent, related to or properly bearing upon the matter in hand, 
relevant." Applying these definitions, there is no basis for the conclusion that these words 
mean other infections, because the question related only to Krystal Ballard and whether 
gram negative bacteria found on her came from contaminated reusable medical 
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instruments by Dr. Kerr. 
The questions of Dr. Stiller and his answers leading up to the testimony in 
question of Dr. Stiller, did not relate to or involve testimony that pertained to other 
infections. Presumably with knowledge of this fact, Plaintiff spends the majority of his brief 
trying to discredit and condemn the Defense on collateral issues which are not only 
disputed, but have absolutely nothing to do with the issue before the Court on why the 
mistrial was granted. In an attempt to manufacture evidence of alleged deliberate 
misconduct, Plaintiff's counsel fills his brief with inflated and half-truth statements aimed 
at maligning the Defense in hopes that the Court will award one or more of the requested 
sanctions. Plaintiff's moving papers are filled with statements which are not only 
irrelevant to the matter at hand, but are objectionable and clearly aimed at trying to create 
improper bias against the Defense. 
For example, Plaintiff states that Mr. Quane turned his back on the Court 
somehow suggesting this was done as a sign of disrespect when in reality he was 
coughing, blowing his nose and conferring with his client about what the Court had stated. 
Mr. Quane is 79 years old and his hearing is not perfect as was demonstrated during the 
trial when he asked both the Court and various witnesses on occasion to repeat 
themselves. It is hard to imagine a physical disability like hearing loss and old age being 
relied upon by Plaintiff's counsel as a legitimate basis to award sanctions against a party 
and/or their attorney. Furthermore, as was obvious to all at the trial, both Defense 
counsel were ill during the trial which resulted in Mr. Quane being briefly sick. This did not 
justify the sanctions sought nor was it grounds for the mistrial. 
Plaintiff further claims that the Defense was pleased about the fact that a 
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mistrial was granted. Nothing could be further from the truth. Frankly this is a totally 
disingenuous and baseless allegation for Plaintiff's counsel to advance. Trials are rare 
occurrences in today's practice and no one wants to have to prepare a second time or to 
expose their client to multiple trials. It is without question that significant time, money 
and effort had been put in to preparing the Defense case. Most assuredly the 
Defendants themselves, Dr. Kerr and his wife, do not want to spend another ten trial days 
away from their practice in order to attend a second trial. Plaintiff seems to forget and/or 
ignore the fact that by attending the trial to defend himself Dr. Kerr basically had to shut 
down the majority of his practice at great financial loss with no means of recovery. 
In addition, the defense has already had to endure a significant financial 
penalty as a direct result of the mistrial being granted. In addition to Dr. Kerr, the 
defense expert witnesses were already scheduled and indeed, some were in route to 
testify when the mistrial was granted. The defense not only had to reimburse these 
experts for their time in preparing and for cancelling their respective practices so they 
could attend the trial, but now the defense will be forced to incur these costs a second 
time - again at significant expense. It is therefore clear that the respective costs of the 
mistrial are not lopsided to one party or the other, but rather to both parties. 
Another example can be found in Plaintiff's characterization of Dr. Stiller's 
prior testimony. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Stiller and/or Defense counsel had done 
something improper by having Dr. Stiller engage in further conversation with Dr. O'Neil, 
the familiarizing local cosmetic surgeon. In response to Plaintiff's objection, the Court, 
during a break outside the presence of the jury specifically asked Dr. Stiller if he learned 
anything new about the local standard of practice as a result of his conversation with Dr. 
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O'Neil and he said he had not. This ended the issue and Defense counsel was 
instructed simply to avoid discussing the second conversation with the witness. 
This issue has nothing to do with why the mistrial was granted and is simply 
another example of Plaintiff trying to unfairly characterize this issue and engage in 
mud-slinging against the Defense. There is no case authority in Idaho which states that 
a witness cannot discuss as many times as he/she wants to, issues with the familiarizing 
expert. Defense counsel cited the Court to an Idaho appellate case in which the district 
Court allowed the out of area expert to take a break in the trial to try and contact a 
familiarizing expert during the middle of the trial. See Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 296, 
815 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1991) (the trial court delayed the proceedings to allow Dr. Tune an 
opportunity to re-contact Dr. Groberg, or any other doctor, in an attempt to familiarize Dr. 
Tune with the local community standard of care). 
Another example can be found in Plaintiff's characterization of the lack of 
prior patient infections issue as a whole. Without the opportunity to consider the issue, 
the Court initially compared it to the Defense trying to have the jury consider the absence 
of other car accidents as proof that the defendant was a good driver. See November 5, 
2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit D at p. 9, II 18 to p. 10, II 6. However, this is not 
a fair comparison when taken in connection with the testimony of Plaintiff's expert, Dr. 
Sorensen, outlined below that he considered the lack of other patient complications to be 
the best evidence that Dr. Kerr and his staff were cleaning and disinfecting the equipment 
correctly. 
Plaintiff's attorney took the deposition of Dr. Kerr on January 30, 2013 and 
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asked Dr. Kerr about post-operative infections of patients undergoing lipolysis, whether 
any patient's died, how any post-operative infections were diagnosed, and conditions of 
cellulitis that Dr. Kerr answered. Plaintiff's counsel never asked at that time for medical 
records of other patients. Instead, he elected to wait until after the end of discovery, as 
ordered in the Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings 
dated September 9, 2013, to raise this issue to try and cast a shadow over the Defense in 
a deliberate effort to prevent relevant evidence from being admitted at the trial by claiming 
they had asked for information which the Defense failed to provide. 
The Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further 
Proceedings provided in part that no later than 7 days before trial each attorney shall 
certify to the Court a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence. The 
same Notice provided that the last day for the taking of any discovery depositions shall be 
no later than 60 days prior to trial which was September 5, 2013. 
The Defense submitted its list of trial exhibits that included exhibit number 
AA with a description that reads "Compilation of Operative procedures of Dr. Kerr from 
December of 2007 through December 23, 2010, with Krystal Ballard identified on July 21, 
2010 with the total number of liposuction procedures, consisting of 338." Exhibit number 
AA was produced at the Plaintiff's deposition of Dr. Coffman on August 20, 2013. No 
exhibits of the Defendants were listed that consisted of records and data of Silk Touch for 
infections. Exhibit AA was simply a list of the procedures of Dr. Kerr and nothing else 
and had nothing to do with patient infections. 
On September 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice to take the video conference 
deposition duces tecum of Susan Kerr on October 2, 2013 that specified she produce at 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 15 
001963
the deposition records and data of Silk Touch for infections and patients among other 
things. September 27, 2013 was a Friday and on October 1, 2013, Terrence Jones sent 
an email to Mr. Haddad, objecting to the deposition of Susan Kerr, Exhibit F in the 
Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. The Notice of Taking the Deposition of Susan Kerr and 
the date for the deposition were untimely and in violation of the Court Order for the last 
day for taking depositions, being September 5, 2013. The Notice of the deposition was 
not timely because it only allowed for slightly over 2 working days before the deposition 
was scheduled October 2, 2013 at noon, the same day the Plaintiff had scheduled the 
deposition of Dr. Laurence. The Notice of the deposition was received by Defense 
counsel the mid-afternoon at September 27, 2013 by fax transmission. The notice, being 
duces tecum, did not comply with Rule 34 that governs the procedure for taking 
depositions duces tecum. The short notice for the deposition of Susan Kerr mad~ it 
impossible to assemble the records requested, redact the patient names, data and SS 
numbers in order to comply with HIPAA rules and the fact that Susan Kerr was not 
available to be deposed on October 2, 2013. 
After being advised by Mr. Jones that an objection to the deposition of 
Susan Kerr was asserted, Mr. Haddad did not move the Court to compel the deposition or 
seek relief from the Court Order limiting the time frame for taking depositions, although 
there was time for him to do so before the trial on November 5, 2013. The certification of 
Defense counsel per the Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further 
Proceedings dated September 9, 2013, lists the exhibits of the Defendants, including 
exhibit AA and no exhibit is listed of the records of Silk Touch for infections or lack of 
infections of other patients. Plaintiff never challenged the objections advanced by 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 16 
001964
Defense counsel, but yet represents to this Court that the Defense did not comply with 
discovery of the Plaintiff and accused the Defense of somehow trying to hide information 
from the Plaintiff's counsel which was false. In the court reporter's transcript of November 
14, 2013, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, the Court said in regard to the 
testimony of Dr. Stiller "He can talk about everything he reviewed and testified about in his 
deposition, and I hope he will and I hope the jury find it informative." This statement by the 
Court should be equally applicable to the deposition testimony of Dr. Kerr in his 
deposition taken January 30, 2013, that is described and set forth above. Again, this 
issue was raised for the first time during oral argument on the Motions in Limine and the 
Defense was never given an opportunity to advance argument on this issue, but was 
instead told the matter would be revisited during the trial outside the presence of the jury. 
Something the Defense was never allowed to do given the mistrial. 
Plaintiff claims that the Defense was warned on three occasions that a 
violation of the Court's rulings would result in an award of costs and fees. Defendant 
would like to know precisely where in the transcripts of this case such citations can be 
found. The Defense has provided the Court with the only reference which could be 
found dealing with the risk of a mistrial with the attendant costs and fees and it dealt 
squarely with the issue of whether the Plaintiff would seek to remarry - not the issue of 
prior patient infections. See November 8, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the 
Affidavit of Counsel as Exhibit E. 
Plaintiff's counsel claims that the Defense was somehow disrespectful to 
the Plaintiff himself. This is an absurd statement which has no factual basis in support 
and which should be ignored by this Court. After the mistrial was granted, Plaintiff's 
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counsel watched as the Defendants both personally went over and apologized to the 
Plaintiff for the fact that his wife had died and Defense counsel apologized directly to the 
Plaintiff that the events had led to a mistrial. The Defense did not want this case to result 
in a mistrial. Plaintiff claims that the Defense was somehow happy that the case resulted 
in a mistrial. This is not true. The Defense was barely into its second day of its case, 
had all of its witnesses, both lay and expert, still set to testify and was prepared to rebut 
and overcome both the standard of practice and causation arguments advanced by the 
Plaintiffs. 
Suggesting that the Defense would intentionally try to sabotage the trial so 
that it would end prematurely is both offensive and absurd. Mr. Quane has handled and 
defended physicians in over 2,000 medical cases and matters of all types, and tried 
medical malpractice jury trials for physicians in many of these cases. He has conducted 
over 175 civil jury trials of all types in his career including those for physicians and never 
had any that ended or terminated with a mistrial. Mr. Jones has never been involved in a 
trial that was terminated by a mistrial. This was not the desired outcome for this case by 
the Defendants, and it is not fair to make the Defense the scapegoats for the costs of a 
retrial. Plaintiff's counsel made it perfectly clear that the only reason he was seeking a 
mistrial was based on one narrow issue of other patient infections, but yet now in support 
of sanctions Plaintiff is advancing the entire kitchen sink argument. After sustaining 
Plaintiff's counsel, the following exchange occurred after the lunch break on November 
14: 
The Court: All right. We'll break for the noon recess. 
Please remember my usual reminder and I will see you at 
1:30. 
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(Jury leaves.) 
The Court: Is there some reason why you did not tell your 
witness about the order in limine? 
The Witness: He did; I apologize. 
The Court: Well, that may not be sufficient. 
Mr. Haddad: Well, Your Honor, at this time we are obligated, 
based upon the discussion with the Court earlier and the clear 
mandate by this Court on this very issue, not on other issues, 
this very issue, that if the issue of persistent history of 
infections or lack of infections came into this trial, that the 
Court would grant a mistrial and award attorneys' fees, costs 
and expenses to the party that violated that order. This is a 
clear violation of that order. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit A. (Emphasis added). 
The above comments by Mr. Haddad make it clear that he sought the 
mistrial solely on the issue of whether testimony had come in regarding the lack of other 
patient infections and this was the sole basis for the Court granting the mistrial. Despite 
making this claim crystal clear at that time he sought a mistrial, Plaintiff now argues 
everything under the sun in support of his claim that all manner of sanctions should be 
levied against the Defense. This is improper and should not be countenanced by this 
Court. Virtually all of the arguments advanced by Plaintiff relate to alleged "other bad 
conduct" to which he seeks to bootstrap his claim for sanctions as outlined above. 
To the contrary, with the benefit of the transcript and in viewing the question 
and answer between Defense counsel and Dr. Stiller, the Defense contends there is 
nothing to indicate that he violated the Court's Order or that Defense counsel or the 
defendant engaged in any "deliberate misconduct", much less that it would justify granting 
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a mistrial or awarding costs and attorney fees or other sanctions against the Defense. 
Defense counsel suspected as much at the time and requested the opportunity to review 
the actual record of what was stated, but was never given the opportunity to address the 
Court at all regarding what was actually said: 
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, first of all, I did make that discussion 
on more than one occasion with this particular witness. So to 
the extent it came out, I'll take responsibility for it; he's my 
witness. But the discussion was had and was had more than 
once. I would like to see exactly what the witness said so 
I can better comment on it to the judge on the issue of 
grounds for a mistrial. I do know that when this judge -
when Your Honor talked about this initially, the issue of costs 
and attorney fees and granting a mistrial was in response to 
bringing up the issue of whether the patient was going to 
remarry. Now, I know there was subsequent discussions 
about the issue of other infections, and I don't believe 
what this witness just testified to and what he said - -
The Court: I said there was not to be any reference to any 
other infections. I don't see I have any choice but to grant a 
mistrial. And I will address the costs and attorney fees later, 
but it seems to me that this was something I addressed 
specifically. I said, "take it up outside the presence of the 
jury." This is a serious violation of the Court's prior order, and 
I don't see the Court has any choice but to grant counsel's 
request for a mistrial. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit A. (Emphasis added). 
At no time after the noon recess was Defense counsel even allowed to 
address the Court to advance any argument in an attempt to dissuade the Court from 
granting the Motion for a mistrial. Finally, regarding the Motions in Limine, Defense 
counsel has found nothing in the Court transcripts obtained to date which stands for the 
proposition advanced by Plaintiff's counsel on the issue of other patient infections and 
that a violation of the Court's Order in Limine would result in an award of all costs and 
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attorney fees against the Defense. 
On the first day of the trial, the Court addressed the Motions in Limine filed 
by the parties. Although no written decision was issued regarding the Court's ruling on 
the Motions in Limine, the transcript read as follows: 
Mr. Jones: Okay. Now, with respect to the issue involving 
other infections, we provided the Court with information 
regarding the opinions of the Plaintiff's own expert on the 
importance of other infections and how he testified in his 
deposition. And it's in our brief that he said that was the very 
best evidence; the very best evidence of whether or not 
someone is having problems with their sanitizing, disinfecting, 
sterilization procedures, is whether or not they are having 
issues with other infections. And so, I guess, for the benefit of 
making sure --
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, there's two parts to it. The first is 
what the plaintiff's own expert said, where he said that was 
the best evidence to consider the infection issues. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Jones: And so, whether or not we would offer testimony, 
we should be able to at least address, through the plaintiff's 
own expert, issues associated with his opinion. His opinion 
being that the best evidence in this case is to whether or not 
Dr. Kerr and his clinic are doing what they're supposed to so, 
is to look at either the presence of or absence of infections in 
other cases. So there's that aspect of it. 
The Court: Um-hmm. 
Mr. Jones: Secondly, you have, from an infectious disease 
standpoint, what they look at and consider for purposes of 
evaluating whether or not a facility has problems with their 
infection control. They look at infection rates and look at that 
data. 
As far as who gathered the information, Dr. Kerr has testified 
in his deposition regarding his knowledge, personally, of his 
own infection rates, and he should be able to testify regarding 
his knowledge, as opposed to concerns about, for example, a 
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non-physician looking at the charts, which I understand is one 
of the concerns. So there's another avenue, I guess, in terms 
of utilizing Dr. Kerr's testimony on that basis. 
But we take the position that because of the plaintiff's own 
expert testimony on that issue, at the very least Dr. Kerr's 
knowledge of his own infections rates, that that data ought to 
be something that should be considered by the jury when 
they're being asked in this case to evaluate the sterilization 
procedures, cleaning procedures, things of that nature. 
The Court: Um-hmm. Well, I can see how if the plaintiff's 
expert were to testify in that fashion, then there could be some 
relevance to problems that day or problems in the immediate 
time period proceeding. But, as a general rule, one doesn't 
get into the absence of other accidents in establishing 
whether there was or was not negligence on a particular 
occasion. 
And so it sounds to me like that, again, is probably one that we 
should revisit once we have an opportunity to hear the 
testimony. And it sounds to me that would be reasonable to 
revisit again. 
Just draw my attention to it prior to bringing out the evidence. 
We'll exclude the jury, because it sounds to me that could 
have some relevance. In particular, that's what an expert in 
the field would rely on, then I think that it could be an 
appropriate area, provided it's limited to day of and time 
period immediately proceeding. 
It could be relevant without leading us into too many collateral 
matters. But I think it would be prudent to have that discussion 
outside the presence of the jury, since the absence of other 
injuries, as a rule, is not viewed as relevant. 
So I'll revisit that one, if you'll - when you get ready to - when 
you feel it has reached the point where it may be relevant for 
some purpose, just draw my attention to it. We'll excuse the 
jury and .we'll discuss it. 
See November 5, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit D at p. 16, 111 top. 20, II 7. 
By way of additional background for the Court, Plaintiff's expert, Dr. 
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Sorensen gave the following answer during his deposition regarding the importance of 
what he considered to be the best evidence of the adequacy of a physician's cleaning and 
disinfection procedures: 
Q. There's no proof by any means of the fact at the time of 
the surgery these gram-negative bacteria went into her body, 
is there? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay ... Have you formed an opinion as to what is the 
best evidence that a doctor utilizes appropriate sterile 
conditions during surgery, disinfectant procedures with 
equipment, operating room, and the entire area where the 
procedure is done, cleansing of instruments -- what's the best 
proof that that is being done appropriately? What would be 
the best proof? 
A. I think lack of complications would be the best answer. 
See August 21, 2013 deposition transcript of Dean Sorensen, M.D. attached to the 
affidavit of counsel in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit J. 
(Emphasis added). 
While Plaintiff's counsel seeks to crucify the Defense counsel for the mistrial 
in this case, the Court is obligated to review and address what actually transpired with the 
benefit of the above transcripts. Similar to the findings of the Ninth Circuit in the case of 
U.S. v. Meza-Soria, the Defense contends "there was no good legal reason whatever to 
grant the mistrial, and that absence of a reason makes the grant an abuse of discretion." 
United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166, 170-71 (9th Cir. 1991). In further support, 
Dr. Stiller submitted an affidavit in which he represents to the Court that the questions and 
answers which were being presented were not intended to come even remotely close to 
violating the Court's ruling that the prior patient infection issue needed to be addressed 
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outside the presence of the jury for approval before presenting evidence of that nature. 
In fact, as further proof that the Defense was both aware of and being 
mindful of the Court's ruling, the Court should consider the transcript at the beginning of 
Dr. Stiller's testimony the morning of November 14. Defense counsel made it clear 
before starting the examination of Dr. Stiller that he would need to take up a matter 
outside the presence of the jury regarding the witness' testimony. The very reason this 
advance notice was given was to inform the Court that the lack of prior infections involving 
other patients was an issue that the Defense would need to discuss outside the presence 
of the jury in order to revisit it with the Court - just as Defense counsel had been 
instructed on day one of the trial. The statements of Defense counsel were as follows: 
Mr. Jones: Thank you, your honor. And also, with respect to 
the two in limine issues, there will be an offer of proof in about 
the middle of this witness that will need to be made. Perhaps, 
we can take it up during a break. 
The Court: That's a very good idea. 
Mr. Jones: I'm just letting the Court know. 
See Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. 
Why would the Defense counsel and/or this witness intentionally run afoul 
of the Court's Orders in Limine while at the same time specifically state to the Court at the 
start of the witness' testimony that he wanted to address the issue outside the presence of 
the jury just as the Court had ordered him to do? The Defense contends this is strong 
evidence that the Defense did not engage in anything even remotely close to deliberate 
misconduct. Pursuant to Rule 47(u), the Defense contends that the necessary showing 
has not been made to support any award of sanctions against the Defense arising out of 
the Court granting the Plaintiff's Motion for a mistrial. 
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C. The range of sanctions available under Rule 47(u) does 
not include striking defenses or disqualifying Defense 
counsel. 
In addition to costs and attorney fees, Plaintiff further seeks the imposition 
of even more harsh sanctions including striking the Defendant's defenses and 
disqualifying Defense counsel. In support, Plaintiff relies on the case of Adams v. Reed, 
138 Idaho 36, 57 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2002). Adams involved a personal injury action 
which followed a long and protracted discovery process that included multiple motions to 
compel, motions for mediation and motions to dismiss. The case was reset for trial 
multiple times in front of different judges over an extended time period. Id. at 38. After 
repeated delays, Reed filed a motion to dismiss the action as a sanction for repeated 
discovery violations, noncompliance with pretrial orders, and untimely submission of the 
Adams' pretrial memorandum. The district Court concluded that dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction and granted the motion. Id. at 39. 
On appeal, the Court noted that "a trial Court's discretion is not unfettered, 
however, particularly where the ultimate sanction, dismissal of a party's claim, has been 
imposed." Id. The Court explained that "a trial court possesses authority to sanction 
parties for failure to comply with discovery orders or pretrial orders and for failure to 
seasonably supplement responses to discovery." Id. citing Rules 16(i), 26(e)(4), and 
37(b). Permissible sanctions include those identified in Rule 37(b) which includes 
dismissal of an action. Citing Ashby v. W. Council, Lumber Prod. & Indus. Workers, 
117 Idaho 684, 791 P.2d 434 (1990), the court stated that there were several "factors that 
must be expressly considered by the trial court in deciding whether dismissal with 
prejudice is warranted: 
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The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and 
ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the 
presence of at least one "aggravating" factor, including: 1) 
delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by 
the plaintiff personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the 
defendant. The consideration of these factors must appear in 
the record in order to facilitate appellate review. 
Ashby, 117 Idaho 686-87 (citations omitted). 
Analyzing the Ashby factors, the Adams court found evidence of a clear 
record of delay which included: "the Adamses were routinely late in responding to 
discovery, were repeatedly noncompliant with deadlines set out in pretrial orders, and on 
one occasion failed to engage in court ordered mediation." Adams, 138 Idaho at 39. 
Regarding the ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions, "the district court found that during the 
hearings of October 30, 2000 and March 19, 2001, the Adamses were specifically warned 
that failure to comply with discovery could result in dismissal, and they were admonished 
to immediately respond to outstanding discovery requests." Per the Ashby decision, 
explicit warnings are among the lesser sanctions that are appropriate for the court to 
impose before imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal. Ashby, 117 Idaho at 687, 
791 P.2d at 437. 
Applying the Adams decision and the primary factors analysis used therein 
by the court to the facts of this case, the Adams decision strongly favors the Defense as 
there is no pattern of delay in this case that would support any monetary or dismissal 
sanctions including striking of defenses or exclusion of Defense counsel. Plaintiff has 
not demonstrated fulfillment of any of the Ashby factors outlined above. There has been 
no "pattern of delay" on any issue by the Defense which played any role in the granting of 
the mistrial which was based solely on the erroneous conclusion that Dr. Stiller had 
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rendered testimony in violation of a Court Order in Limine regarding testimony of 
infections involving other patients. As a result, the Adams decision cuts squarely 
against Plaintiff's motion for sanctions whether applying Rule 37(e) or Rule 47(u). 
Plaintiff next cites to the case Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 
910 P.2d 786 (1996) for the proposition that the Court should disqualify the Defense 
counsel as a sanction. Crown involved a bench trial as to the duties of a director of a 
warehouse corporation related to its bean grower members. As a sub-issue on appeal, 
the bean growers argued that Nungester's legal counsel should have been disqualified 
because a conflict of interest existed between Nungester and Hepworth, Lezamiz and the 
law firm. The growers asserted that if Nungester's actions as a director of the warehouse 
corporation were found to be negligent, the assets of the law firm and its partners would 
be implicated. They submitted that such a direct, personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation violates Rule1 .7(b) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Crown, 128 
Idaho 122. 
Relying upon the case of Weaverv. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,696,819 P.2d 
110, 114 (Ct.App.1991 ), the Crown court stated: 
The moving party has the burden of establishing grounds for 
the disqualification. The goal of the court should be to shape a 
remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the 
integrity of the judicial process. Whenever possible, courts 
should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome 
to the client. Where the motion to disqualify comes not from 
a client or former client of the attorney, but from an opposing 
party, the motion should be reviewed with caution. 
Crown, 128 Idaho at 123 (citations omitted). 
After addressing Model Rule 1.7 and after concluding that the growers had 
waited almost five years before first seeking to file a motion to disqualify opposing 
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counsel, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to disqualify. Id. In the matter before the court, Plaintiff cites to Crown as support 
for excluding Defense counsel as a sanction for the mistrial. A review of the Crown 
decision aptly demonstrates that it supports no such proposition. The disqualification 
issue in Crown involved concerns over whether the attorney had an improper financial 
interest in the outcome of the case such that he should be disqualified from serving as 
counsel. The disqualification was not being sought as a sanction for alleged conduct 
resulting in a mistrial as Plaintiff claims in the instant motion. 
Plaintiff's reliance on the Weaverv. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,696, 819 P.2d 
110, 114 (Ct.App.1991) is similarly misplaced. Weaver involved a commercial 
transaction to build fish ponds. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify either the attorney for contractor or 
the attorney for third-party defendant partner, who were both represented by attorneys 
from same law firm. Again, this case involves potentially conflicted counsel and has 
nothing to do with the issues in this case. 
Plaintiff next cites to Model Rule 3.2 and 3.4 in further support of their 
Motion for Sanctions. Rule 3.2 relates to making reasonable efforts to expedite the 
litigation consistent with the interests of the attorney's client. The portion of Rule 3.4 
cited by Plaintiff states that an attorney shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under 
the rules of the tribunal. Since the mistrial was granted based on the belief that a trial 
witness, not a party, included in his answer to a question information otherwise subject to 
an Order in Limine, these rules have no application and do not serve to support Plaintiff's 
request to strike defenses or exclude Defense counsel. In addition, similar to the 
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language of rule 47(u) which requires the court to find an act of deliberate misconduct by 
a party or the party's attorney, Model Rule 3.4 refers to an attorney who "knowingly 
disobeys" the rules. 
Because the question posed to Dr. Stiller, who admitted he was informed by 
Defense counsel of the court's limine rulings on other patient infections, did not request 
him to comment upon that topic in his answer, there is no evidence that Defense counsel 
engaged in conduct which would be considered in violation of Model Rule 3.4, nor is there 
any evidence that Defense counsel or the Defendant himself engaged in any "pervasive 
pattern of refusing to obey court orders." See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Sanctions at p. 16. As a result, Plaintiff's Motion seeking the sanction of 
disqualifying Defense counsel is without merit and should be denied. 
D. Because Dr. Stiller did not testify in violation of the 
Court's Order in Limine, the Plaintiff's Motion for a 
mistrial should not have been granted 
Even if Dr. Stiller had made the improper disclosure being alleged, (which 
the Defense contends the above transcript clearly refutes) the Defense maintains that it 
would not have been grounds for a mistrial, especially given the lack of any effort at a 
curative instruction to the jury to disregard any perceived improper testimony. 
Furthermore contrary to the arguments of Plaintiff, the Court had not issued a number of 
prior cautionary instructions to the jury prior to granting a mistrial. The author of this 
document was not able to find any case authority in Idaho regarding the granting of 
mistrials in a civil case setting. In the criminal arena, however, there is some analogous 
case authority. Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 states that "a mistrial may be granted only 
where there is an "error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside of 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 29 
001977
the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial." 
Applying Rule 29.1, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
The admission of improper evidence does not automatically 
require the declaration of a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 
125 Idaho 266, 269, 869 P.2d 583, 586 (Ct.App.1994). Where 
improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and 
the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such 
evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "it is ordinarily 
presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." 
See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 
1334 (1989); State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187,192,646 P.2d 
429, 434 (Ct.App.1982). 
No less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, 
unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury will 
be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong 
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
"devastating" to the defendant. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 
766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In State v. Hill, the Court of Appeals reviewed a case in which the trial court 
refused to grant a mistrial and instead instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's 
question which included reference to the defendant having been in jail. The court found 
that "the prosecutor's disclosure to the jury that Hill had been in jail could hardly be 
characterized as "devastating." Given that Hill was on trial for a criminal offense, even in 
the absence of the prosecutor's question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror likely 
would have surmised that Hill had at some point been in jail. Hill has not demonstrated 
that she was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in 
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denying her motion for a mistrial." State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
Likewise in this case, the above testimony by Dr. Stiller can hardly be 
considered "devastating" to the Plaintiff's case. There was nothing stated which "let the 
genie out of the bottle" regarding the issue of lack of prior infections involving other 
patients which the Court previously indicated it would revisit later in the trial, something 
that the Defense was never allowed to do by virtue of the mistrial being granted. Not only 
was the question about other patient infections not asked, but that issue never came out 
in Dr. Stiller's answer. Instead, Plaintiff's counsel, interpreted Dr. Stiller's statement as 
containing information which it did not and which the Defense contends the jury could not 
have possibly attached anywhere near the same meaning to it that Plaintiff's counsel 
claims. 
The Court instructed the parties to bring this issue up outside the presence 
of the jury which is what the Defense was planning to do when it was time to present that 
issue. Had the Defense been given the opportunity to address with the Court the above 
testimony from Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Sorensen that the lack of other patient infections was 
the "best evidence" that Dr. Kerr was properly cleaning and sterilizing his equipment, then 
the Defense would have sought the right to ask a direct question to Dr. Stiller on that very 
subject referring to the deposition question and answer by Dr. Sorensen. The Defense 
contends that where the Plaintiffs expert has the opinion that the best evidence in an 
alleged failure to sterilize equipment is whether there is the presence or absence 
historically of other complications, that this is relevant and proper consideration by the 
jury which the Defense intended to pursue consistent with the Court's Order in Limine. 
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Plaintiff claims that there was some "pattern and practice" of misconduct, 
but yet cannot point to a single instance wherein the Court admonished the jury to 
disregard any statement made by either Defense counsel or a Defense witness. It is 
hard to understand how there could be any alleged pattern of conduct by the Defense 
where the jury has not been told on numerous occasions, much less even one time, to 
disregard a statement, opinion, question or comment of a witness. Thus, pursuant to the 
Adams decision outlined above, there has not been a showing as to the ineffectiveness 
of lesser instructions. 
Based on what the transcript shows clearly transpired, it is unknown why 
Plaintiff's counsel, without even consulting his own client, would jump up and demand a 
mistrial. It suggests an alternative motive to seeking this drastic remedy which he 
repeatedly claims has unfairly prejudiced his client. Such an alternative motive would 
include knowledge of the fact that at least two jurors stated they would be unable to 
continue the trial into the following week. With knowledge that the lone alternate juror 
had been lost due to an error by the jury commissioner's office, there is no way the trial 
would have been able to continue into the third week and a mistrial would have, in all 
likelihood, have been granted at that time anyway. By demanding the mistrial when they 
did, Plaintiff's counsel was clearly trying to jump on this issue early by seeking to lay 
blame on the Defense so they could try and recover some of their costs against the 
Defense - whereas if the mistrial had been granted due to having less than twelve jurors 
they would have no one to blame. 
Plaintiff seeks to bootstrap its claim by referring to a Motion to Compel it 
prevailed upon filed some fourteen months before the trial and the fact that no mediation 
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occurred. Despite the fact that Defense counsel advanced what he believed to be valid 
objections regarding the number of interrogatories and the topics covered, the issue was 
brought before the Court and the Defense was ordered to respond to the discovery. The 
Defense therefore complied with the one and only discovery Order entered in this case 
which clearly does not support Plaintiff's claim of any so-called pattern of conduct nor 
does it show that lesser sanctions were ineffective. Furthermore, Plaintiff's counsel 
makes several references to why mediation did not occur, but fails to concede the obvious 
fact that he had the ability to file a motion to request mediation at any time which he did 
not do. By virtue of the multiple sanctions requested in the Plaintiff's Motion, the Plaintiff 
seeks to be put in a position, sanction-wise, superior to the sanctions authorized by Rule 
47(u). It is clear that the Court's Order on sanctions is confined to sanctions for having to 
declare a mistrial and none others. In this regard, Plaintiff's Motion that included 
enforcement of existing discovery and disclosure deadlines, is not pertinent to or the 
subject of the Court Order on sanctions related to the mistrial or sanctions authorized by 
Rule 47(u). 
IV. Conclusion 
What Plaintiff's counsel is truly trying to relay to this Court is that they do not 
want Jeremiah Quane and Terrence Jones to continue to be Defense counsel, taking into 
count that Jeremiah Quane's record in the defense of physicians is 98% total wins and 
that he has tried jury cases for physicians over the past 22 years, none of which, resulted 
in a verdict of negligence against a physician. Plaintiff's attorney seeks disqualification of 
defense counsel on a bogus argument of some other nefarious intent for the purpose of 
unfairly benefiting their own client, without consideration of the detriment to the 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 33 
001981
Defendants if Defense counsel is disqualified. Counsel makes numerous references to 
statements claimed to be contrary to Court Orders, but fails to present any actual 
evidence for the Court to consider. 
The Defense, however, has presented the Court with the actual transcripts 
to see for itself what was said and by whom. These transcripts stand in stark contrast to 
the representations advanced by Plaintiffs counsel in its memorandum seeking 
sanctions. Plaintiff's counsel misrepresents to this Court the statements made by Dr. 
Stiller by suggesting that he testified about the reasons the Defendants had not violated 
the standard of practice was because there had not been any other infections at 
Defendants' facility. The actual transcript shows no such testimony was ever elicited by 
Defense counsel nor offered by the Defense witness, Dr. Stiller, such that the Court 
should reconsider the basis for its decision granting the mistrial considering the Court did 
not have all the facts at the time it ruled. 
In the Plaintiff's case-in-chief, the medical records of Dr. Kerr, Elmore 
Medical Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were admitted in evidence 
and these records were reviewed long before trial by Dr. Stiller. These records contain 
the reports of several doctors in which they state that there is no evidence of infection in 
Krystal Ballard which include the records of Dr. Kerr for his assessment of Krystal Ballard 
on July 23, 2010. 
Dr. Billy Morgan, is a general surgeon at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center who evaluated Krystal Ballard at the request of Dr. Tisha Fujii, who was the 
primary treating physician of Krystal Ballard at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. 
Dr. Morgan issued a report that covered his evaluation of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 
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and the report states in pertinent part "she now has what appears to be a probable fat 
emboli syndrome with significant ARDS, massive hypoxemia, unresponsive to ventilator 
modes from a surgical standpoint." His report goes on to say in part in regard to the chest 
x-ray from Elmore Medical Center "findings possibly a similar fat emboli syndrome." 
His Report also states in regard to the buttocks of Krystal Ballard, 'The 
patient's buttocks show 2 wounds, 1 on the posterior superior iliac crest on each side with 
no crepitance to the subcutaneous tissue. No evidence of redness or inflammation and no 
drainage from the insertion sites for the fat transplants." Defendants' Exhibit U. On July 
25, 2010, chest x-rays of Krystal Ballard were taken at Elmore Medical Center and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and interpreted by radiologists Dr. Stemmler and Dr. 
Schaff. They issued radiology reports for their respective interpretations of the chest 
x-rays, Defendants' Exhibits Wand X. Exhibits U, Wand X are identified in the Affidavit of 
Jeremiah A. Quane. Their reports collectively provide that similar findings may be seen in 
setting of fat embolism and findings may represent fat embolism. 
The subject records, put in evidence by the Plaintiff, demonstrate that no 
pertinent or persistent infections existed which is the testimony of Dr. Stiller that resulted 
in the mistrial Order of the District Judge. At the time of the subject testimony of Dr. 
Stiller, the entries in the subject records had not yet been explained by witnesses 
although the records themselves that contained the entries of doctors of no evidence of 
infection in Krystal Ballard were in evidence at the doing of the Plaintiff. See also the 
Affidavit of Dr. Stiller. The foregoing litany of events and facts, give context to the 
testimony of Dr. Stiller that in fairness the Court may not have been aware of when the 
mistrial was declared. 
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Plaintiff's counsel has blatantly inflamed and exaggerated the nature of the 
testimony and the events at issue solely hoping to unfairly influence the Court and further 
-
their quest for sanctions. Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 47(u), Plaintiff can point 
to no "deliberate misconduct" by the Defense which resulted in the granting of the mistrial. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff cites to no case authority to support such an award of sanctions 
against a party in response to a mistrial whether applying Rule 37(e) or Rule 47(u). For 
these reasons, the Defense requests the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions in its 
entirety. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
(J AA!.M.-=a 
Jer&hiiah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Terrence S. Jones, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
I. Introduction 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion made pursuant to Rule 
37(e) seeking various sanctions against the Defense following the Court's grant of a mistrial on 
November 14, 2013. Plaintiff goes to great lengths to cast aspersions upon Defense counsel 
associated with the mistrial, however, the transcript of what actually transpired in this case which 
is provided along with this memorandum speaks volumes to the contrary. The Court granted the 
Plaintiffs Motion for a mistrial based on the perceived belief that one of the Defense witnesses, 
Dr. Geoffrey Stiller, had made statements in answer to Defense counsel questioning in violation of 
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the Court Order in Limine regarding lack of prior infections involving other patients. 
After excusing the jury, the Comi promptly questioned both Defense counsel, 
Terry Jones, and the witness on the stand about whether notice of the Court's Order had been 
relayed to the witness so as to avoid improperly addressing various issues in front of the jury 
without approval from the Court. As will be outlined below, the Court heard from the witness on 
the stand confirm that he, indeed, was told by Defense counsel on more than one occasion that he 
needed to avoid discussing certain topics until the matter could be addressed outside the presence 
of the jury. Even more telling, however, is the actual transcript of what was said by the witness 
which demonstrates that at no time did he run afoul of the Court's Order. As a result, there was no 
valid basis to grant the mistrial based on what Dr. Stiller testified to and/or the preceding question 
advanced by Defense counsel. The Court should therefore decline to enter an award of any 
sanctions against the Defendants and their counsel and reconsider and reverse its Order granting 
and declaring a mistrial. 
II. Factual background 
This case proceeded to trial on November 5, 2013. Per the pleadings, Plaintiff was 
represented by three different law firms including Scott McKay as local counsel from Boise, 
Gregory Haddad from West Virginia and James Perrine from Alabama, both admitted pro hac 
vice. The Defendants were represented by one firm, with Jeremiah Quane and Terry Jones 
appearing as counsel of record. At the start of the trial, the Court took up the various motions in 
limine filed by the parties. The transcript of the Court's hearing on this issue is attached to the 
affidavit of counsel in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions as Exhibit D. As discussed 
in greater detail below, the Court granted and denied various motions in limine after stating that 
several of the Motions did not qualify as motions in limine and the issues they embodied would 
therefore have to be addressed during the trial when the issue came up. 
The Court then allowed the parties to proceed with voir dire during which time the 
Court asked the prospective jury panel various initial questions regarding knowledge of the parties 
and witnesses, juror schedules, etc. before allowing the attorneys to question the remaining panel 
members. The Court made the decision to have only one alternate juror. The Court's Amended 
Scheduling Order dated September 9, 2013 specifically states this case was expected to continue 
for ten days. See Court's Amended Scheduling Order attached to the affidavit of counsel in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions as Exhibit B. By the wording of this Order, that 
meant that the trial in this case was expected to run for ten trial days or through November 20, 
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2013, taking into account weekends and Mondays when no trial would be held. On this basis, the 
Defense scheduled its witnesses for trial, estimating as best as possible when it might be able to 
start its case in chief. Keeping in mind the Amended Comi Scheduling Order for ten trial days, 
the defense scheduled and planned its witnesses, lay and expe1i, to complete its case as scheduled 
within the time frame established by the Court. 
Early on in the trial on November 8, the trial was stalled when Juror No. 11 failed to 
show that morning. The parties waited over two hours for the juror during which time the Court 
informed the parties that officials had been sent looking for Juror No. 11 at his work and home. 
Unable to find him, the Comi ultimately excused Juror No. 11 after which the case proceeded with 
only twelve jurors. It was later disclosed to the attorneys by the Court that Juror No. 11 had been 
erroneously sent a notice by the jury commissioner stating that he was no longer needed. In other 
words, it was an error of the jury commissioner's office which resulted in the loss of the one juror. 
During the second trial week, the Court provided notice to the parties that two of 
the remaining twelve jurors had reported a conflict due to work and/or travel plans and that they 
would not be able to attend the trial the following week or November 19 and 20. This was 
reported to the attorneys despite the fact that the time frame that the two jurors said they were no 
longer available was still within the original ten trial day time period that the case was scheduled to 
run. The Court granted the mistrial before this issue was resolved, however, it appears clear that 
had the Court not granted the mistrial on November 14, that it would have been forced to grant 
such a mistrial based on having less than twelve jurors the following week, had the Court excused 
the two jurors who were unavailable after November 15 or simply failed to return. 
Had the Court waited to grant the mistrial the following week, no sanctions of any 
kind would have been available to award against any party since the mistrial would have been 
based on having an insufficient number of jurors per Rule 48(a). Based on the events of November 
14, Plaintiffs 'counsel claimed all manner of prejudice both real and imagined in the presence of 
his client and the Court and demanded a mistrial without even taking a break to consult with his 
client. After granting the mistrial, Plaintiffs counsel then requested all sorts of relief including 
costs, attorney fees, striking of defenses and even the disqualification of Defense counsel from 
further appearing in the case. Plaintiffs counsel's argued that a mistrial somehow benefitted the 
Defense and that the case should be promptly reset in order to obtain justice for his client. Despite 
his strenuous demands back in November, it is curious that Plaintiffs counsel then elected to wait 
over 3 weeks to file any motion for sanctions and has yet to request the trial be reset in this matter 
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or to even provide the Comi with any available trial dates. Indeed, by the time this pending Motion 
for Sanctions is scheduled for hearing, it will be three months after the grant of a mistrial with still 
no proposal for available trial dates from Plaintiffs counsel nor any sense of any urgency being 
advanced. 
III. Argument 
A. Plaintiff's reliance on Rule 37(e) is misplaced as this rule does 
not provide Plaintiff with a means to recover the sanctions 
requested following the grant of a mistrial in view of the 
existence of and requirements of Rule 47(u). 
It is well settled in Idaho that "trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a 
motion in limine." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767 
(2004). Appellate Courts review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 768. A trial court may deny the motion and wait until trial to 
determine if the evidence should be admitted or excluded. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 
486,492 (1997). If the trial court defers a ruling on the motion a party must reassert an objection at 
the time of the offer in order to preserve the issue. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988). See also 
Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25 (2005). As outlined below, in this case the 
issue involving the absence of infections regarding other patients was a deferred ruling. 
A motion in limine does not involve a discovery order, but an order addressed to the 
presentation of evidence at the trial itself. A court's ruling regarding a motion in limine is subject 
to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was 
expected. U.S. v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 2d 564 (E.D. N.Y. 2011). The purpose of a motion in 
limine is to prevent the proponent of potentially prejudicial matter from displaying it to the jury in 
any manner until the trial court has ruled upon its admissibility in the context of the trial itself. 
State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201 (R.I. 2012). An order resulting from a motion in limine is a 
temporary protective order that is subject to change during the trial. State v. Breedlove, 286 P.3d 
1123 (Kan. 2012). A ruling on a motion in limine is not on the merits and only relates to the 
administration of the trial. Wert v. State, 383 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2012). A 
"motion in limine" seeks a preliminary expression of the court's opinion as to the admissibility of 
the evidence. Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. 2013). See also, 20 Am. Jur. Trials 
441. 
Based on the alleged violation of the Order in Limine, Plaintiff has filed his Motion 
for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e) which provides as follows: 
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General Sanctions - Failure to Comply With Any Order. 
In addition to the sanctions above under this rule for violation of 
discovery procedures, any court may in its discretion impose 
sanctions or conditions, or assess attorney's fees, costs or expenses 
against a party or the party's attorney for failure to obey an order of 
the court made pursuant to these rules. 
While recognizing that Rule 37(e) provides the court with broad authority to enter 
orders, there is a more specific rule which applies directly to sanctions following the granting of a 
mistrial. The order at issue which the Plaintiff claims the defense violated was not a discovery 
order, but rather an order in limine involving the presentation of evidence to the jury and its 
admissibility. The defense contends that resolution of this matter is therefore not controlled by 
Rule 37(e), but rather by Rule 47(u) which sets forth what the court should consider when 
addressing the issue of sanctions following a mistrial. 
Rule 47(u) provides: 
Declaration of Mistrial - Sanctions. 
After trial is commenced, at any time prior to the rendering of a 
verdict, the court on its own motion or upon motion of any party 
may declare a mistrial if it determines an occurrence at trial has 
prevented a fair trial. If the court determines that a mistrial was 
caused by the deliberate misconduct of a party or attorney, the court 
may require the adverse party or the attorney, or both, to pay the 
reasonable expenses including attorney fees incurred by the 
opposing party or parties resulting from such misconduct. 
(Emphasis added). 
Despite the existence of this rule and the requirements set forth within it, Plaintiff 
does not cite this rule anywhere in his moving papers nor does he discuss the required deliberate 
misconduct analysis. Instead, Plaintiffs counsel tries to exaggerate a prior entirely unrelated 
discovery issue from the fall of 2012 and suggest to this Court that it supports some pattern of bad 
behavior on the part of the defense. Using this bootstrap and suspenders approach, Plaintiffs 
counsel's moving papers engage in significant conjecture, overstatement and improper 
magnification of the circumstances at issue in order to support his Motion and attempt to influence 
this Court. 
B. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of sanctions against the 
Defendants or their counsel because per the requirements of 
Rule 47(u), the Defense did not engage in any deliberate 




Per the above requirements of Rule 47(u), sanctions are only justified "If the court 
dete1mines that a mistrial was caused by the deliberate misconduct of a party or attorney ... " 
Only after making such a finding is the court then allowed to award against "the adverse party or 
the attorney, or both ... the reasonable expenses including attorney fees incurred by the opposing 
party or parties resulting from such misconduct." Under the facts of this case, the witness in 
question, Dr. Stiller, was neither a party nor an attorney nor had he ever before testified as an 
expert witness. Dr. Stiller specifically stated under oath to the Court that he had been instructed 
by Defense counsel not to discuss certain topics, including the topic involving infections related to 
other patients. See also the affidavit of Dr. Stiller submitted in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Sanctions and the Affidavit of Mr. Jones. 
In his moving papers, Plaintiff represents to this Court that the Defense asked Dr. 
Stiller "why he believed Defendants had not violated the standard of practice, to which Dr. Stiller 
responded that there had not been any other infections at Defendants' facility." See Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions at P. 8. This representation by the Plaintiff is 
totally false and further demonstrates that Plaintiff (whether intentionally or not) is misconstruing 
the record for the sole purpose of trying to improperly influence the Court. The actual exchange 
which occurred in Court went as follows: 
Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in this case whether or not 
the gram negative bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. Kerr? 
A. I do have an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. That that is incorrect. 
Q. What is your opinion based on? 
A. In order-well, there's multiple different ways oflooking at 
it. As far as the process of sterilization, we know that a chemical 
marker was done so we've reached sterilization as far as the 
temperature is concerned as long as the machine basically said that 
it was adequate time. All the autoclave machines will have a register 
on it saying whether it has reached adequate time or not. So by that 
definition, it's been sterilized; okay. Spore counts don't matter. 
Its' a gram negative; okay. When you look at the process of 
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liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and then injecting it back 
in, as far as it being done sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from 
the colon to the uria (phonetic) or from one of his equipment, I don't 
see how it can happen. Let alone the fact of - that no pertinent or 
persistent infections in the office. There is no history of the fact 
that-
Mr. Haddad: Your Honor. 
The Court: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
Mr. Haddad: Thank you. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit Cat p. 23,111 top. 26, 1113. 
Contrary to the statements by Plaintiffs counsel, Dr. Stiller did not state that his 
opinion was based on their being no other patient infections at Defendant's facility. The 
transcript conclusively proves that nothing even remotely close to that ever came out of Dr. 
Stiller's mouth. Moreover, the question posed by Defense counsel was not framed to elicit an 
improper response. The interruption by Mr. Haddad of Dr. Stiller's testimony which the Court 
sustained without an objection even being made was totally premature considering the transcript 
reveals that Dr. Stiller did not testify contrary to, nor did Defense counsel ask a question contrary 
to the Court's Order in Limine. The Court should therefore reconsider the basis for the mistrial 
being based on the testimony of Dr. Stiller considering he did not violate the Order in Limine. 
Dr. Stiller did not testify about an absence of prior infections involving other 
patients or that he had reviewed any chart or representations involving other patients. He simply 
stated "no pertinent or persistent infections in the office." Plaintiff interprets this statement to 
infer that Dr. Stiller must have been referring to infections involving other patients. While this 
interpretation represents nothing more than sheer speculation on the part of Plaintiffs counsel, the 
fact remains that an equally plausible interpretation by the jury was the fact the patient herself had 
never presented with any evidence of infection during her office visits and/or subsequent 
discussions with Dr. Kerr. There was simply no basis upon which the jury would have reasonably 
concluded Dr. Stiller was bringing in evidence related to other patients. As a result, there was no 
basis to conclude that the jury was somehow tainted with improper information based on what Dr. 
Stiller said such that a mistrial should have been granted or that Plaintiff was prevented a fair trial. 
Plaintiff provides no case authority from any jurisdiction supporting such a 
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proposition, nor is there any case authority in Idaho applying either Rule 47(u) or Rule 37(e) in 
such a fashion. There was only one Court Order issued on discovery matters and it was promptly 
obeyed by the Defense. The Defense did not violate any of the Orders issued by the Court on the 
Motions in Limine and the Defendants and their counsel did nothing that amounted to a violation 
of the Court Order on evidence of prior infections of other patients of Dr. Kerr. In fact, counsel for 
the Defendants did everything possible and reasonable to prevent Dr. Stiller from offering 
testimony that was in violation of the Court Order. The question asked of Dr. Stiller that resulted in 
his answer that is in question, related solely to whether gram negative bacteria found on Krystal 
Ballard came from contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. Kerr and it defies logic to 
conclude that this question could be construed to include anything to do with the absence of 
infections of other patients of Dr. Kerr. 
In the court reporter's transcript for the matters discussed and taken up after the 
noon recess on November 14, 2013, the Court made the following statement: "I said there was not 
to be any reference to any other infections." See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions, as Exhibit A. The question asked of Dr. Stiller referred to Krystal Ballard 
only and did not refer to other infections. The answer of Dr. Stiller was, among other testimony, 
"let alone the fact of that no pertinent or persistent infections in the office." (Emphasis added). It 
is logical that the jury would interpret the answer to mean the ordinary dictionary definition of the 
words pertinent and persistent. A standard dictionary definition of these words are: "Persistent, 
persevering or stubborn in a course or resolve. Enduring, permanent, continuous. Not falling away. 
Remaining past the time of majority." "Pertinent, related to or properly bearing upon the matter in 
hand, relevant." Applying these definitions, there is no basis for the conclusion that these words 
mean other infections, because the question related only to Krystal Ballard and whether gram 
negative bacteria found on her came from contaminated reusable medical instruments by Dr. Kerr. 
The questions of Dr. Stiller and his answers leading up to the testimony in question 
of Dr. Stiller, did not relate to or involve testimony that pertained to other infections. Presumably 
with knowledge of this fact, Plaintiff spends the majority of his brief trying to discredit and 
condemn the Defense on collateral issues which are not only disputed, but have absolutely nothing 
to do with the issue before the Court on why the mistrial was granted. In an attempt to 
manufacture evidence of alleged deliberate misconduct, Plaintiffs counsel fills his brief with 
inflated and half-truth statements aimed at maligning the Defense in hopes that the Court will 
award one or more of the requested sanctions. Plaintiffs moving papers are filled with 
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statements which are not only irrelevant to the matter at hand, but are objectionable and clearly 
aimed at trying to create improper bias against the Defense. 
For example, Plaintiff states that Mr. Quane turned his back on the Court somehow 
suggesting this was done as a sign of disrespect when in reality he was coughing, blowing his nose 
and conferring with his client about what the Court had stated. Mr. Quane is 79 years old and his 
hearing is not perfect as was demonstrated during the trial when he asked both the Court and 
various witnesses on occasion to repeat themselves. It is hard to imagine a physical disability like 
hearing loss and old age being relied upon by Plaintiffs counsel as a legitimate basis to award 
sanctions against a party and/or their attorney. Furthermore, as was obvious to all at the trial, both 
Defense counsel were ill during the trial which resulted in Mr. Quane being briefly sick. This did 
not justify the sanctions sought nor was it grounds for the mistrial. 
Plaintiff further claims that the Defense was pleased about the fact that a mistrial 
was granted. Nothing could be further from the truth. Frankly this is a totally disingenuous and 
baseless allegation for Plaintiffs counsel to advance. Trials are rare occmTences in today's 
practice and no one wants to have to prepare a second time or to expose their client to multiple 
trials. It is without question that significant time, money and effort had been put in to preparing 
the Defense case. Most assuredly the Defendants themselves, Dr. Kerr and his wife, do not want 
to spend another ten trial days away from their practice in order to attend a second trial. Plaintiff 
seems to forget and/or ignore the fact that by attending the trial to defend himself Dr. Kerr 
basically had to shut down the majority of his practice at great financial loss with no means of 
recovery. 
In addition, the defense has already had to endure a significant financial penalty as 
a direct result of the mistrial being granted. In addition to Dr. Kerr, the defense expert witnesses 
were already scheduled and indeed, some were in route to testify when the mistrial was granted. 
The defense not only had to reimburse these experts for their time in preparing and for cancelling 
their respective practices so they could attend the trial, but now the defense will be forced to incur 
these costs a second time - again at significant expense. It is therefore clear that the respective 
costs of the mistrial are not lopsided to one party or the other, but rather to both parties. 
Another example can be found in Plaintiffs characterization of Dr. Stiller's prior 
testimony. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Stiller and/or Defense counsel had done something 
improper by having Dr. Stiller engage in further conversation with Dr. O'Neil, the familiarizing 
local cosmetic surgeon. In response to Plaintiffs objection, the Court, during a break outside the 
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presence of the jury specifically asked Dr. Stiller if he learned anything new about the local 
standard of practice as a result of his conversation with Dr. O'Neil and he said he had not. This 
ended the issue and Defense counsel was instructed simply to avoid discussing the second 
conversation with the witness. 
This issue has nothing to do with why the mistrial was granted and is simply 
another example of Plaintiff trying to unfairly characterize this issue and engage in mud-slinging 
against the Defense. There is no case authority in Idaho which states that a witness cannot discuss 
as many times as he/she wants to, issues with the familiarizing expert. Defense counsel cited the 
Court to an Idaho appellate case in which the district Court allowed the out of area expert to take a 
break in the trial to try and contact a familiarizing expert during the middle of the trial. See Gubler 
v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 296, 815 P .2d 1034, 1036 (1991) (the trial court delayed the proceedings to 
allow Dr. Tune an opportunity to re-contact Dr. Groberg, or any other doctor, in an attempt to 
familiarize Dr. Tune with the local community standard of care). 
Another example can be found in Plaintiffs characterization of the lack of prior 
patient infections issue as a whole. Without the opportunity to consider the issue, the Court 
initially compared it to the Defense trying to have the jury consider the absence of other car 
accidents as proof that the defendant was a good driver. See November 5, 2013 hearing transcript 
attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions attached as 
Exhibit D at p. 9, 11 18 to p. 10, 11 6. However, this is not a fair comparison when taken in 
connection with the testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Sorensen, outlined below that he 
considered the lack of other patient complications to be the best evidence that Dr. Kerr and his staff 
were cleaning and disinfecting the equipment correctly. 
Plaintiffs attorney took the deposition of Dr. Kerr on January 30, 2013 and asked 
Dr. Kerr about post-operative infections of patients undergoing lipolysis, whether any patient's 
died, how any post-operative infections were diagnosed, and conditions of cellulitis that Dr. Kerr 
answered. Plaintiffs counsel never asked at that time for medical records of other patients. 
Instead, he elected to wait until after the end of discovery, as ordered in the Amended Notice of 
Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated September 9, 2013, to raise this 
issue to try and cast a shadow over the Defense in a deliberate effort to prevent relevant evidence 
from being admitted at the trial by claiming they had asked for information which the Defense 
failed to provide. 
The Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings 
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provided in paii that no later than 7 days before trial each attorney shall ce1iify to the Comi a 
descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence. The same Notice provided that 
the last day for the taking of any discovery depositions shall be no later than 60 days prior to trial 
which was September 5, 2013. 
The Defense submitted its list of trial exhibits that included exhibit number AA 
with a description that reads "Compilation of Operative procedures of Dr. Kerr from December of 
2007 through December 23, 2010, with Krystal Ballard identified on July 21, 2010 with the total 
number of liposuction procedures, consisting of 338." Exhibit number AA was produced at the 
Plaintiffs deposition of Dr. Coffman on August 20, 2013. No exhibits of the Defendants were 
listed that consisted of records and data of Silk Touch for infections. Exhibit AA was simply a list 
of the procedures of Dr. Kerr and nothing else and had nothing to do with patient infections. 
On September 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice to take the video conference 
deposition duces tecum of Susan Kerr on October 2, 2013 that specified she produce at the 
deposition records and data of Silk Touch for infections and patients among other things. 
September 27, 2013 was a Friday and on October 1, 2013, Terrence Jones sent an email to Mr. 
Haddad, objecting to the deposition of Susan Kerr, Exhibit F in the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. 
Quane. The Notice of Taking the Deposition of Susan Kerr and the date for the deposition were 
untimely and in violation of the Court Order for the last day for taking depositions, being 
September 5, 2013. The Notice of the deposition was not timely because it only allowed for 
slightly over 2 working days before the deposition was scheduled October 2, 2013 at noon, the 
same day the Plaintiff had scheduled the deposition of Dr. Laurence. The Notice of the deposition 
was received by Defense counsel the mid-afternoon at September 27, 2013 by fax transmission. 
The notice, being duces tecum, did not comply with Rule 34 that governs the procedure for taking 
depositions duces tecum. The short notice for the deposition of Susan Kerr made it impossible to 
assemble the records requested, redact the patient names, data and SS numbers in order to comply 
with HIP AA rules and the fact that Susan Kerr was not available to be deposed on October 2, 2013. 
After being advised by Mr. Jones that an objection to the deposition of Susan Kerr 
was asserted, Mr. Haddad did not move the Court to compel the deposition or seek relief from the 
Court Order limiting the time frame for taking depositions, although there was time for him to do 
so before the trial on November 5, 2013. The certification of Defense counsel per the Amended 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated September 9, 2013, lists 
the exhibits of the Defendants, including exhibit AA and no exhibit is listed of the records of Silk 
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Touch for infections or lack of infections of other patients. Plaintiff never challenged the 
objections advanced by Defense counsel, but yet represents to this Court that the Defense did not 
comply with discovery of the Plaintiff and accused the Defense of somehow trying to hide 
information from the Plaintiffs counsel which was false. In the comi reporter's transcript of 
November 14, 2013, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane, the Court said in regard to 
the testimony of Dr. Stiller "He can talk about everything he reviewed and testified about in his 
deposition, and I hope he will and I hope the jury find it informative." This statement by the Court 
should be equally applicable to the deposition testimony of Dr. Kerr in his deposition taken 
January 30, 2013, that is described and set forth above. Again, this issue was raised for the first 
time during oral argument on the Motions in Limine and the Defense was never given an 
opportunity to advance argument on this issue, but was instead told the matter would be revisited 
during the trial outside the presence of the jury. Something the Defense was never allowed to do 
given the mistrial. 
Plaintiff claims that the Defense was warned on three occasions that a violation of 
the Court's rulings would result in an award of costs and fees. Defendant would like to know 
precisely where in the transcripts of this case such citations can be found. The Defense has 
provided the Court with the only reference which could be found dealing with the risk of a mistrial 
with the attendant costs and fees and it dealt squarely with the issue of whether the Plaintiff would 
seek to remarry - not the issue of prior patient infections. See November 8, 2013 hearing 
transcript attached to the Affidavit of Counsel as Exhibit E. 
Plaintiffs counsel claims that the Defense was somehow disrespectful to the 
Plaintiff himself. This is an absurd statement which has no factual basis in support and which 
should be ignored by this Court. After the mistrial was granted, Plaintiff's counsel watched as the 
Defendants both personally went over and apologized to the Plaintiff for the fact that his wife had 
died.and Defense counsel apologized directly to the Plaintiff that the events had led to a mistrial. 
The Defense did not want this case to result in a mistrial. Plaintiff claims that the Defense was 
somehow happy that the case resulted in a mistrial. This is not true. The Defense was barely into 
its second day of its case, had all of its witnesses, both lay and expert, still set to testify and was 
prepared to rebut and overcome both the standard of practice and causation arguments advanced 
by the Plaintiffs. 
Suggesting that the Defense would intentionally try to sabotage the trial so that it 
would end prematurely is both offensive and absurd. Mr. Quane has handled and defended 
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physicians in over 2,000 medical cases and matters of all types, and tried medical malpractice jury 
trials for physicians in many of these cases. He has conducted over 175 civil jury trials of all types 
in his career including those for physicians and never had any that ended or terminated with a 
mistrial. Mr. Jones has never been involved in a trial that was terminated by a mistrial. This was 
not the desired outcome for this case by the Defendants, and it is not fair to make the Defense the 
scapegoats for the costs of a retrial. Plaintiff's counsel made it perfectly clear that the only reason 
he was seeking a mistrial was based on one nanow issue of other patient infections, but yet now in 
support of sanctions Plaintiff is advancing the entire kitchen sink argument. After sustaining 
Plaintiff's counsel, the following exchange occurred after the lunch break on November 14: 
The Court: All right. We'll break for the noon recess. Please 
remember my usual reminder and I will see you at 1 :30. 
(Jury leaves.) 
The Court: Is there some reason why you did not tell your witness 
about the order in limine? 
The Witness: He did; I apologize. 
The Court: Well, that may not be sufficient. 
Mr. Haddad: Well, Your Honor, at this time we are obligated, 
based upon the discussion with the Court earlier and the clear 
mandate by this Court on this very issue, not on other issues, this 
very issue, that if the issue of persistent history of infections or lack 
of infections came into this trial, that the Court would grant a 
mistrial and award attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to the party 
that violated that order. This is a clear violation of that order. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit A. (Emphasis added). 
The above comments by Mr. Haddad make it clear that he sought the mistrial solely 
on the issue of whether testimony had come in regarding the lack of other patient infections and 
this was the sole basis for the Court granting the mistrial. Despite making this claim crystal clear 
at that time he sought a mistrial, Plaintiff now argues everything under the sun in support of his 
claim that all manner of sanctions should be levied against the Defense. This is improper and 
should not be countenanced by this Court. Virtually all of the arguments advanced by Plaintiff 
relate to alleged "other bad conduct" to which he seeks to bootstrap his claim for sanctions as 
outlined above. 
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To the contrary, with the benefit of the transcript and in viewing the question and 
answer between Defense counsel and Dr. Stiller, the Defense contends there is nothing to indicate 
that he violated the Cami's Order or that Defense counsel or the defendant engaged in any 
"deliberate misconduct", much less that it would justify granting a mistrial or awarding costs and 
attorney fees or other sanctions against the Defense. Defense counsel suspected as much at the 
time and requested the opportunity to review the actual record of what was stated, but was never 
given the opportunity to address the Court at all regarding what was actually said: 
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, first of all, I did make that discussion on 
more than one occasion with this particular witness. So to the 
extent it came out, I'll take responsibility for it; he's my witness. 
But the discussion was had and was had more than once. I would 
like to see exactly what the witness said so I can better comment 
on it to the judge on the issue of grounds for a mistrial. I do 
know that when this judge -when Your Honor talked about this 
initially, the issue of costs and attorney fees and granting a mistrial 
was in response to bringing up the issue of whether the patient was 
going to reman·y. Now, I know there was subsequent discussions 
about the issue of other infections, and I don't believe what this 
witness just testified to and what he said - -
The Comi: I said there was not to be any reference to any other 
infections. I don't see I have any choice but to grant a mistrial. And 
I will address the costs and attorney fees later, but it seems to me 
that this was something I addressed specifically. I said, "take it up 
outside the presence of the jury." This is a serious violation of the 
Court's prior order, and I don't see the Court has any choice but to 
grant counsel's request for a mistrial. 
See November 14, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit A. (Emphasis added). 
At no time after the noon recess was Defense counsel even allowed to address the 
Court to advance any argument in an attempt to dissuade the Court from granting the Motion for a 
mistrial. Finally, regarding the Motions in Limine, Defense counsel has found nothing in the Court 
transcripts obtained to date which stands for the proposition advanced by Plaintiffs counsel on the 
issue of other patient infections and that a violation of the Court's Order in Limine would result in 
an award of all costs and attorney fees against the Defense. 
On the first day of the trial, the Court addressed the Motions in Limine filed by the 
parties. Although no written decision was issued regarding the Court's ruling on the Motions in 
Limine, the transcript read as follows: 
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Mr. Jones: Okay. Now, with respect to the issue involving other 
infections, we provided the Comi with information regarding the 
opinions of the Plaintiffs own expe1i on the imp01iance of other 
infections and how he testified in his deposition. And it's in our 
brief that he said that was the very best evidence; the very best 
evidence of whether or not someone is having problems with their 
sanitizing, disinfecting, sterilization procedures, is whether or not 
they are having issues with other infections. And so, I guess, for the 
benefit of making sure --
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, there's two parts to it. The first is what 
the plaintiffs own expert said, where he said that was the best 
evidence to consider the infection issues. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Jones: And so, whether or not we would offer testimony, we 
should be able to at least address, through the plaintiffs own expert, 
issues associated with his opinion. His opinion being that the best 
evidence in this case is to whether or not Dr. Kerr and his clinic are 
doing what they're supposed to so, is to look at either the presence 
of or absence of infections in other cases. So there's that aspect of it. 
The Court: Um-hmm. 
Mr. Jones: Secondly, you have, from an infectious disease 
standpoint, what they look at and consider for purposes of 
evaluating whether or not a facility has problems with their infection 
control. They look at infection rates and look at that data. 
As far as who gathered the information, Dr. Kerr has testified in his 
deposition regarding his knowledge, personally, of his own 
infection rates, and he should be able to testify regarding his 
knowledge, as opposed to concerns about, for example, a 
non-physician looking at the charts, which I understand is one of the 
concerns. So there's another avenue, I guess, in terms of utilizing 
Dr. Kerr's testimony on that basis. 
But we take the position that because of the plaintiffs own expert 
testimony on that issue, at the very least Dr. Kerr's knowledge of his 
own infections rates, that that data ought to be something that 
should be considered by the jury when they're being asked in this 
case to evaluate the sterilization procedures, cleaning procedures, 
things of that nature. 
The Court: Um-hmm. Well, I can see how if the plaintiffs expert 
were to testify in that fashion, then there could be some relevance to 
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problems that day or problems in the immediate time period 
proceeding. But, as a general rule, one doesn't get into the absence 
of other accidents in establishing whether there was or was not 
negligence on a particular occasion. 
And so it sounds to me like that, again, is probably one that we 
should revisit once we have an opportunity to hear the testimony. 
And it sounds to me that would be reasonable to revisit again. 
Just draw my attention to it prior to bringing out the evidence. We'll 
exclude the jury, because it sounds to me that could have some 
relevance. In particular, that's what an expert in the field would rely 
on, then I think that it could be an appropriate area, provided it's 
limited to day of and time period immediately proceeding. 
It could be relevant without leading us into too many collateral 
matters. But I think it would be prudent to have that discussion 
outside the presence of the jury, since the absence of other injuries, 
as a rule, is not viewed as relevant. 
So I'll revisit that one, if you'll -when you get ready to -when you 
feel it has reached the point where it may be relevant for some 
purpose, just draw my attention to it. We'll excuse the jury and we'll 
discuss it. 
See November 5, 2013 hearing transcript attached to the affidavit of counsel in opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit D at p. 16, 11 1 to p. 20, 11 7. 
By way of additional background for the Court, Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Sorensen 
gave the following answer during his deposition regarding the importance of what he considered to 
be the best evidence of the adequacy of a physician's cleaning and disinfection procedures: 
Q. There's no proof by any means of the fact at the time of the 
surgery these gram-negative bacteria went into her body, is there? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay.· ·Have you formed an opinion as to what is the best 
evidence that a doctor utilizes appropriate sterile conditions during 
surgery, disinfectant procedures with equipment, operating room, 
and the entire area where the procedure is done, cleansing of 
instruments -- what's the best proof that that is being done 
appropriately? What would be the best proof? 
A. I think lack of complications would be the best answer. 
See August 21, 2013 deposition transcript of Dean Sorensen, M.D. attached to the affidavit of 
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counsel in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions attached as Exhibit J. (Emphasis added). 
While Plaintiffs counsel seeks to crucify the Defense counsel for the mistrial in 
this case, the Court is obligated to review and address what actually transpired with the benefit of 
the above transcripts. Similar to the findings of the Ninth Circuit in the case of U.S. v. Meza-Soria, 
the Defense contends "there was no good legal reason whatever to grant the mistrial, and that 
absence of a reason makes the grant an abuse of discretion." United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 
F .2d 166, 170-71 (9th Cir. 1991 ). In further support, Dr. Stiller submitted an affidavit in which he 
represents to the Court that the questions and answers which were being presented were not 
intended to come even remotely close to violating the Court's ruling that the prior patient infection 
issue needed to be addressed outside the presence of the jury for approval before presenting 
evidence of that nature. 
In fact, as further proof that the Defense was both aware of and being mindful of the 
Court's ruling, the Court should consider the transcript at the beginning of Dr. Stiller's testimony 
the morning of November 14. Defense counsel made it clear before staiiing the examination of 
Dr. Stiller that he would need to take up a matter outside the presence of the jury regarding the 
witness' testimony. The very reason this advance notice was given was to inform the Court that 
the lack of prior infections involving other patients was an issue that the Defense would need to 
discuss outside the presence of the jury in order to revisit it with the Court - just as Defense 
counsel had been instructed on day one of the trial. The statements of Defense counsel were as 
follows: 
Mr. Jones: Thank you, your honor. And also, with respect to the 
two in limine issues, there will be an offer of proof in about the 
middle of this witness that will need to be made. Perhaps, we can 
take it up during a break. 
The Court: That's a very good idea. 
Mr. Jones: I'm just letting the Court know. 
See Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. 
Why would the Defense counsel and/or this witness intentionally run afoul of the 
Court's Orders in Limine while at the same time specifically state to the Court at the start of the 
witness' testimony that he wanted to address the issue outside the presence of the jury just as the 
Court had ordered him to do? The Defense contends this is strong evidence that the Defense did 
not engage in anything even remotely close to deliberate misconduct. Pursuant to Rule 47(u), the 
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Defense contends that the necessary showing has not been made to support any award of sanctions 
against the Defense arising out of the Comi granting the Plaintiffs Motion for a mistrial. 
C. The range of sanctions available under Rule 47(u) does not 
include striking defenses or disqualifying Defense counsel. 
In addition to costs and attorney fees, Plaintiff further seeks the imposition of even 
more harsh sanctions including striking the Defendant's defenses and disqualifying Defense 
counsel. In support, Plaintiff relies on the case of Adams v. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 57 P.3d 505 (Ct. 
App. 2002). Adams involved a personal injury action which followed a long and protracted 
discovery process that included multiple motions to compel, motions for mediation and motions to 
dismiss. The case was reset for trial multiple times in front of different judges over an extended 
time period. Id. at 38. After repeated delays, Reed filed a motion to dismiss the action as a 
sanction for repeated discovery violations, noncompliance with pretrial orders, and untimely 
submission of the Adams' pretrial memorandum. The district Court concluded that dismissal was 
an appropriate sanction and granted the motion. Id. at 39. 
On appeal, the Court noted that "a trial Court's discretion is not unfettered, 
however, particularly where the ultimate sanction, dismissal of a party's claim, has been imposed." 
Id. The Court explained that "a trial court possesses authority to sanction parties for failure to 
comply with discovery orders or pretrial orders and for failure to seasonably supplement responses 
to discovery." Id. citing Rules 16(i), 26(e)(4), and 37(b). Permissible sanctions include those 
identified in Rule 37(b) which includes dismissal of an action. Citing Ashby v. W. Council, 
Lumber Prod. & Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 791 P.2d 434 (1990), the court stated that there 
were several "factors that must be expressly considered by the trial court in deciding whether 
dismissal with prejudice is warranted: 
The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective 
lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at least 
one "aggravating" factor, including: 1) delay resulting from 
intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or 3) 
delay causing prejudice to the defendant. The consideration of these 
factors must appear in the record in order to facilitate appellate 
review. 
Ashby, 117 Idaho 686-87 ( citations omitted). 
Analyzing the Ashby factors, the Adams court found evidence of a clear record of 
delay which included: "the Adamses were routinely late in responding to discovery, were 
repeatedly noncompliant with deadlines set out in pretrial orders, and on one occasion failed to 
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engage in court ordered mediation." Adams, 138 Idaho at 39. Regarding the ineffectiveness of 
lesser sanctions, "the district court found that during the hearings of October 30, 2000 and March 
19, 2001, the Adamses were specifically warned that failure to comply with discovery could result 
in dismissal, and they were admonished to immediately respond to outstanding discovery 
requests." Per the Ashby decision, explicit warnings are among the lesser sanctions that are 
appropriate for the court to impose before imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal. Ashby, 
117 Idaho at 687, 791 P.2d at 437. 
Applying the Adams decision and the primary factors analysis used therein by the 
court to the facts of this case, the Adams decision strongly favors the Defense as there is no pattern 
of delay in this case that would support any monetary or dismissal sanctions including striking of 
defenses or exclusion of Defense counsel. Plaintiff has not demonstrated fulfillment of any of the 
Ashby factors outlined above. There has been no "pattern of delay" on any issue by the Defense 
which played any role in the granting of the mistrial which was based solely on the erroneous 
conclusion that Dr. Stiller had rendered testimony in violation of a Court Order in Limine 
regarding testimony of infections involving other patients. As a result, the Adams decision cuts 
squarely against Plaintiffs motion for sanctions whether applying Rule 37(e) or Rule 47(u). 
Plaintiff next cites to the case Crown v. Hawkins Co., Ltd., 128 Idaho 114, 910 
P.2d 786 (1996) for the proposition that the Court should disqualify the Defense counsel as a 
sanction. Crown involved a bench trial as to the duties of a director of a warehouse corporation 
related to its bean grower members. As a sub-issue on appeal, the bean growers argued that 
Nungester's legal counsel should have been disqualified because a conflict of interest existed 
between Nungester and Hepworth, Lezamiz and the law firm. The growers asserted that if 
Nungester's actions as a director of the warehouse corporation were found to be negligent, the 
assets of the law firm and its partners would be implicated. They submitted that such a direct, 
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation violates Rulel.7(b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Crown, 128 Idaho 122. 
Relying upon the case of Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,696,819 P.2d 110, 114 
(Ct.App.1991), the Crown court stated: 
The moving party has the burden of establishing grounds for the 
disqualification. The goal of the court should be to shape a remedy 
which will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the 
judicial process. Whenever possible, courts should endeavor to 
reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client. Where the 
motion to disqualify comes not from a client or former client of the 
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attorney, but from an opposing party, the motion should be reviewed 
with caution. 
Crown, 128 Idaho at 123 (citations omitted). 
After addressing Model Rule 1. 7 and after concluding that the growers had waited 
almost five years before first seeking to file a motion to disqualify opposing counsel, the court 
concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. Id. In 
the matter before the court, Plaintiff cites to Crown as support for excluding Defense counsel as a 
sanction for the mistrial. A review of the Crown decision aptly demonstrates that it supports no 
such proposition. The disqualification issue in Crown involved concerns over whether the 
attorney had an improper financial interest in the outcome of the case such that he should be 
disqualified from serving as counsel. The disqualification was not being sought as a sanction for 
alleged conduct resulting in a mistrial as Plaintiff claims in the instant motion. 
Plaintiffs reliance on the Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 
114 (Ct.App.1991) is similarly misplaced. Weaver involved a commercial transaction to build 
fish ponds. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying a motion to disqualify either the attorney for contractor or the attorney for third-party 
defendant partner, who were both represented by attorneys from same law firm. Again, this case 
involves potentially conflicted counsel and has nothing to do with the issues in this case. 
Plaintiff next cites to Model Rule 3 .2 and 3 .4 in further support of their Motion for 
Sanctions. Rule 3.2 relates to making reasonable efforts to expedite the litigation consistent with 
the interests of the attorney's client. The portion of Rule 3.4 cited by Plaintiff states that an 
attorney shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of the tribunal. Since the 
mistrial was granted based on the belief that a trial witness, not a party, included in his answer to a 
question information otherwise subject to an Order in Limine, these rules have no application and 
do not serve to support Plaintiffs request to strike defenses or exclude Defense counsel. In 
addition, similar to the language of rule 47(u) which requires the court to find an act of deliberate 
misconduct by a party or the party's attorney, Model Rule 3.4 refers to an attorney who 
"knowingly disobeys" the rules. 
Because the question posed to Dr. Stiller, who admitted he was informed by 
Defense counsel of the court's limine rulings on other patient infections, did not request him to 
comment upon that topic in his answer, there is no evidence that Defense counsel engaged in 
conduct which would be considered in violation of Model Rule 3.4, nor is there any evidence that 
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Defense counsel or the Defendant himself engaged in any "pervasive pattern of refusing to obey 
court orders." See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions at p. 16. As a 
result, Plaintiffs Motion seeking the sanction of disqualifying Defense counsel is without merit 
and should be denied. 
D. Because Dr. Stiller did not testify in violation of the Court's 
Order in Limine, the PlaintifPs Motion for a mistrial should not 
have been granted 
Even if Dr. Stiller had made the improper disclosure being alleged, (which the 
Defense contends the above transcript clearly refutes) the Defense maintains that it would not have 
been grounds for a mistrial, especially given the lack of any effort at a curative instruction to the 
jury to disregard any perceived improper testimony. Furthermore contrary to the arguments of 
Plaintiff, the Court had not issued a number of prior cautionary instructions to the jury prior to 
granting a mistrial. The author of this document was not able to find any case authority in Idaho 
regarding the granting of mistrials in a civil case setting. In the criminal arena, however, there is 
some analogous case authority. Idaho Criminal Rule 29 .1 states that "a mistrial may be granted 
only where there is an "error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside of the 
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." 
Applying Rule 29.1, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require 
the declaration of a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 
269, 869 P.2d 583, 586 (Ct.App.1994). Where improper testimony 
is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly 
instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that "it is ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the 
court's instruction entirely." See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 
192,646 P.2d 429,434 (Ct.App.1982). 
No less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless 
there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable 
to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the 
effect of the evidence would be "devastating" to the defendant. 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 
618 (1987) (citations omitted). 
State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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In State v. Hill, the Corni of Appeals reviewed a case in which the trial court 
refused to grant a mistrial and instead instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question 
which included reference to the defendant having been in jail. The corni found that "the 
prosecutor's disclosure to the jury that Hill had been in jail could hardly be characterized as 
"devastating." Given that Hill was on trial for a criminal offense, even in the absence of the 
prosecutor's question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror likely would have surmised that Hill 
had at some point been in jail. Hill has not demonstrated that she was denied a fair trial. 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying her motion for a mistrial." State 
v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Likewise in this case, the above testimony by Dr. Stiller can hardly be considered 
"devastating" to the Plaintiffs case. There was nothing stated which "let the genie out of the 
bottle" regarding the issue of lack of prior infections involving other patients which the Court 
previously indicated it would revisit later in the trial, something that the Defense was never 
allowed to do by virtue of the mistrial being granted. Not only was the question about other 
patient infections not asked, but that issue never came out in Dr. Stiller's answer. Instead, 
Plaintiffs counsel, interpreted Dr. Stiller's statement as containing information which it did not 
and which the Defense contends the jury could not have possibly attached anywhere near the same 
meaning to it that Plaintiffs counsel claims. 
The Court instructed the parties to bring this issue up outside the presence of the 
jury which is what the Defense was planning to do when it was time to present that issue. Had the 
Defense been given the opportunity to address with the Court the above testimony from Plaintiffs 
expert, Dr. Sorensen that the lack of other patient infections was the "best evidence" that Dr. Kerr 
was properly cleaning and sterilizing his equipment, then the Defense would have sought the right 
to ask a direct question to Dr. Stiller on that very subject referring to the deposition question and 
answer by Dr. Sorensen. The Defense contends that where the Plaintiff's expert has the opinion 
that the best evidence in an alleged failure to sterilize equipment is whether there is the presence or 
absence historically of other complications, that this is relevant and proper consideration by the 
jury which the Defense intended to pursue consistent with the Court's Order in Limine. 
Plaintiff claims that there was some "pattern and practice" of misconduct, but yet 
cannot point to a single instance wherein the Court admonished the jury to disregard any statement 
made by either Defense counsel or a Defense witness. It is hard to understand how there could be 
any alleged pattern of conduct by the Defense where the jury has not been told on numerous 
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occasions, much less even one time, to disregard a statement, opinion, question or comment of a 
witness. Thus, pursuant to the Adams decision outlined above, there has not been a showing as to 
the ineffectiveness of lesser instructions. 
Based on what the transcript shows clearly transpired, it is unknown why Plaintiffs 
counsel, without even consulting his own client, would jump up and demand a mistrial. It 
suggests an alternative motive to seeking this drastic remedy which he repeatedly claims has 
unfairly prejudiced his client. Such an alternative motive would include knowledge of the fact 
that at least two jurors stated they would be unable to continue the trial into the following week. 
With knowledge that the lone alternate juror had been lost due to an en-or by the jury 
commissioner's office, there is no way the trial would have been able to continue into the third 
week and a mistrial would have, in all likelihood, have been granted at that time anyway. By 
demanding the mistrial when they did, Plaintiffs counsel was clearly trying to jump on this issue 
early by seeking to lay blame on the Defense so they could try and recover some of their costs 
against the Defense - whereas if the mistrial had been granted due to having less than twelve jurors 
they would have no one to blame. 
Plaintiff seeks to bootstrap its claim by referring to a Motion to Compel it prevailed 
upon filed some fourteen months before the trial and the fact that no mediation occun-ed. Despite 
the fact that Defense counsel advanced what he believed to be valid objections regarding the 
number of inten-ogatories and the topics covered, the issue was brought before the Court and the 
Defense was ordered to respond to the discovery. The Defense therefore complied with the one 
and only discovery Order entered in this case which clearly does not support Plaintiffs claim of 
any so-called pattern of conduct nor does it show that lesser sanctions were ineffective. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel makes several references to why mediation did not occur, but fails 
to concede the obvious fact that he had the ability to file a motion to request mediation at any time 
which he did not do. By virtue of the multiple sanctions requested in the Plaintiffs Motion, the 
Plaintiff seeks to be put in a position, sanction-wise, superior to the sanctions authorized by Rule 
47(u). It is clear that the Court's Order on sanctions is confined to sanctions for having to declare a 
mistrial and none others. In this regard, Plaintiffs Motion that included enforcement of existing 
discovery and disclosure deadlines, is not pertinent to or the subject of the Court Order on 
sanctions related to the mistrial or sanctions authorized by Rule 47(u). 
IV. Conclusion 
What Plaintiffs counsel is truly trying to relay to this Court is that they do not want 
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Jeremiah Quane and Terrence Jones to continue to be Defense counsel, taking into count that 
Jeremiah Quane' s record in the defense of physicians is 98% total wins and that he has tried jury 
cases for physicians over the past 22 years, none of which, resulted in a verdict of negligence 
against a physician. Plaintiffs attorney seeks disqualification of defense counsel on a bogus 
argument of some other nefarious intent for the purpose of unfairly benefiting their own client, 
without consideration of the detriment to the Defendants if Defense counsel is disqualified. 
Counsel makes numerous references to statements claimed to be contrary to Court Orders, but fails 
to present any actual evidence for the Court to consider. 
The Defense, however, has presented the Court with the actual transcripts to see for 
itself what was said and by whom. These transcripts stand in stark contrast to the representations 
advanced by Plaintiffs counsel in its memorandum seeking sanctions. Plaintiffs counsel 
misrepresents to this Court the statements made by Dr. Stiller by suggesting that he testified about 
the reasons the Defendants had not violated the standard of practice was because there had not 
been any other infections at Defendants' facility. The actual transcript shows no such testimony 
was ever elicited by Defense counsel nor offered by the Defense witness, Dr. Stiller, such that the 
Court should reconsider the basis for its decision granting the mistrial considering the Court did 
not have all the facts at the time it ruled. 
In the Plaintiffs case-in-chief, the medical records of Dr. Kerr, Elmore Medical 
Center and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center were admitted in evidence and these records 
were reviewed long before trial by Dr. Stiller. These records contain the reports of several 
doctors in which they state that there is no evidence of infection in Krystal Ballard which include 
the records of Dr. Kerr for his assessment of Krystal Ballard on July 23, 2010. 
Dr. Billy Morgan, is a general surgeon at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
who evaluated Krystal Ballard at the request of Dr. Tisha Fujii, who was the primary treating 
physician of Krystal Ballard at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. Dr. Morgan issued a 
report that covered his evaluation of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 and the report states in 
pertinent part "she now has what appears to be a probable fat emboli syndrome with significant 
ARDS, massive hypoxemia, unresponsive to ventilator modes from a surgical standpoint." His 
report goes on to say in part in regard to the chest x-ray from Elmore Medical Center "findings 
possibly a similar fat emboli syndrome." 
His Report also states in regard to the buttocks of Krystal Ballard, "The patient's 
buttocks show 2 wounds, 1 on the posterior superior iliac crest on each side with no crepitance to 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 24 
002009
the subcutaneous tissue. No evidence of redness or inflammation and no drainage from the 
insertion sites for the fat transplants." Defendants' Exhibit U. On July 25, 2010, chest x-rays of 
Krystal Ballard were taken at Elmore Medical Center and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center and interpreted by radiologists Dr. Stemmler and Dr. Schaff. They issued radiology reports 
for their respective interpretations of the chest x-rays, Defendants' Exhibits Wand X. Exhibits U, 
W and X are identified in the Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane. Their repmts collectively provide 
that similar findings may be seen in setting of fat embolism and findings may represent fat 
embolism. 
The subject records, put in evidence by the Plaintiff, demonstrate that no pertinent 
or persistent infections existed which is the testimony of Dr. Stiller that resulted in the mistrial 
Order of the District Judge. At the time of the subject testimony of Dr. Stiller, the entries in the 
subject records had not yet been explained by witnesses although the records themselves that 
contained the entries of doctors of no evidence of infection in Krystal Ballard were in evidence at 
the doing of the Plaintiff. See also the Affidavit of Dr. Stiller. The foregoing litany of events and 
facts, give context to the testimony of Dr. Stiller that in fairness the Court may not have been aware 
of when the mistrial was declared. 
Plaintiffs counsel has blatantly inflamed and exaggerated the nature of the 
testimony and the events at issue solely hoping to unfairly influence the Court and further their 
quest for sanctions. Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 47(u), Plaintiff can point to no 
"deliberate misconduct" by the Defense which resulted in the granting of the mistrial. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff cites to no case authority to support such an award of sanctions against a 
party in response to a mistrial whether applying Rule 37(e) or Rule 47(u). For these reasons, the 
Defense requests the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions in its entirety. 
DATED this gth day of February, 2014. 
E JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jerem ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Terrence S. Jones, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the 5th or ?111 day of February, 2014, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
· indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid '\ 
Scott McKay [ ] Hand Delivered 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2772 [X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
2855 Cranbe1Ty Square [ ] Overnight Mail 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 [X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 [X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NQ,,------,~-t-?--
AM..---~L 90j : 
FEB f O 201~ 
CHAJSTOP.HeA D RIC 
~Y. CHRISTINE swe~' Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
· TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 




Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, moves this Court to strike Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanction filed on the afternoon of Friday, 
February 7, 2014 pursuant to Rules 7(b)(l) and IO(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Fourth Judicial District Local Rule 8.1. This Memorandum, like Defendants' first 
Memorandum filed without leave of Court on February 5, 2014, violates the pleading 
requirements of the foregoing Rules. 
More specifically, Defendants on February 5, 2014 filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions which was 36 pages long, excluding the certificate of service 
page. This Memorandum exceeded by 11 pages the 25 page limit set forth in Fourth Judicial 
District Local Rule 8.1. Rather than obtaining leave of court prior to filing this overlength 
Memorandum, Defendants instead filed a contemporaneous Motion for Leave to File Over 
Length Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions presumably assuming the Court 
would allow nunc pro tune their overlength filing. 1 
0? February 7, 2014, the parties were informed by the Court that the Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to File Over Length Brief was denied. (See Letter dated February 7, 2014, 
from attorney Jeremiah Quane to the Court attached hereto as Exhibit "A.") In response, 
Defendants' filed the same Memorandum later that day which they asserted had now been 
"reformatted ... in conformance with Rule IO(a)(l)." (Id) According to defense counsel, 
"[w]ith these formatting changes only, our Memorandum now falls within the 25 page limit of 
1 Plaintiff filed his motion for sanctions on December 6, 2013, leaving Defendants two months 
in which to obtain leave to file an overlength brief and file their responsive pleading. Rather 
than requesting leave during this period, Defendants waited until the very last day to file their 
responsive pleadings so as to leave Plaintiff's counsel with only the minimum amount of time to 
respond to their lengthy, overlength filing. 
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local Rule 8.1." (Id). 
, Defendants' second Memorandum is not in conformity with I.R.C.P. lO(a)(l) which 
governs the form of pleadings and requires that the body of such memoranda "be typed with 
double line spacing or one-and-one half (1 Yz) line spacing with pica standard typing of not more 
than 10 letters to the inch." A double spaced document using Times New Roman 12 text, which 
Defendants state they used, will generally have 23 lines of text per page. Defendants' second 
Memorandum has 32 lines of text per page and it is clear to even the naked eyed that it is not 
double spaced. It is further clear that the text of Defendants memoranda far exceeds the pica 
standard of 10 letters to an inch to the extent Defendants used line spacing of one and one-half 
(1 Yz).2 
Accordingly, Defendants' second Memorandum should be stricken. Defendants, in 
rysponse to the Court's ruling, have simply crammed together, without regard to the pagination 
and formatting requirements set forth in our local rules and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
their prior overlength Memorandum, which was rejected by the Court. In so doing, Defendants 
continue to flout the rules applicable to them and the rulings of this Court. 
Plaintiff does not seek oral argument on this motion. 
2 Defendants' second Memorandum also is untimely pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(E)- "[a]ny 
responsive briefs shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the parties, at 
least seven (7) days prior to the hearing." · 
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Dated this 10th day of February, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By =ev~ce; 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by delivering the same to the following by hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
~ 
ScottMcKay ~ 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEV.IN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 . 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite. 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
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1. I am an attorney, duly licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia, and a 
partner with the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP in Morgantown, West Virginia. I am 
admitted pro hac vice in this case, and I am lead counsel for Plaintiff Charles Ballard. 
2. A true and accurate copy of the Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings held 
in the above case on November 14, 2013, is attached hereto at Exhibit A. 
This ends my declaration. 
I declare un~er penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho, that the 
foregoing is true and co1Tect to the best of my knowledge, infom1ation and belief. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 101h day of February, 2014, I served a hue and con-ect copy of 
the foregoing Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad in Support of Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Sanctions by hand delivering the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Junes 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
~~ 
Scott McKay 
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anaesthesia and the practices that he uses and how 
he does a procedure when it involves the heart, 
things that are completely irrelevant to this 
case. And it's true, they did accommodate 
Dr. Sorensen, but that was only because he spent 
two hours talking to Dr. Sorensen --
THE COURT: I know. I think that -- I agree 
with you that jury time is not being used well at . 
all. The examinations tend to cumulative. They 
tend to be wandering all over the place. And they 
tend not to be beneficial. 
And there was some relevance in it, 
which is getting a little idea of perhaps what an 
anesthesiologist might do, so I think that was 
fair. But, yes, I have concerns as well that jury 
time is being used very poorly and there is 
substantial and unnecessary repetition, but I 
don't see how that relates to whether a witness 
should be called out of order. 
And I think sometimes -- my experience 
has been that sometimes when attorneys have been 
in situations for a considerable period of time, 
they find it a bit aggravating and have a tendency 
to "kitchen sink" objections. And I don't know 
that that is beneficial. The focus right now 
Page 2 
1 Boise, Idaho 
2 November 14, 2013 
3 
4 THE COURT: I understand you have something 
5 to talce up; please proceed. 
6 MR. JONES: Your Honor, on the_ defense side 
7 for our case this morning we have an out-of-town 
8 witness with a scheduling issue, kind of like 
9 Dr. Sorensen, and we would like to call him this 
10 morning first thing. 
11 THE COURT: Who is that? 
12 MR. JONES: Dr. Stiller, Jeffery Stiller. 
13 THE COURT: And did you advise counsel that 
14 he would be one of your witnesses today? 
15 · MR. JONES: Yes, ma'am. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Comments? 
17 MR. McKAY: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: Briefly. 
19 MR. McKAY: Yes, thankyou, Your Honor. 
20 I hope I have earned the reputation 
21 over. the years of being reasonable and 
22 accommodating reasonable requests from opposing 
23 counsel. This is not reasonable. Counsel chose 
24 to spend all day yesterday with Dr. Kerr on direct 
25 examination examining him on things like his 
Page 4 
1 is -- I agree with you, things have not moved 
2 anywhere close, anywhere close to a desirable 
3 pace. 
4 And I will be emphasizing to the jury 
5 the need to give fair treatment to the case and to 
6 remember their functions as judges of the facts 
7 because I would hate to think that using their 
B time poorly was deliberate. 
9 MR. HADDAD: So I understand Your Honor, and 
10 maybe at the risk of sounding self-serving here, 
11 you gave us two weeks to try the case. We've done 
12 everything we can to present our case in a way 
13 that it can be tried in two weeks. 
14 THE COURT: And you are going to talk to me 
15 about how this affects Dr. Stiller. because you 
16 will, of course, not give in to the temptation to 
1 7 the "kitchen sink" because you are frustrated? 
18 MR. HADDAD: I understand the Court's 
19 comments and I'll sit down now. 
20 THE COURT: I'll allow this witness to be 
21 called out of order. 
22 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, can we take up one 
23 other thing? 
24 THE COURT: One other thing. 
25 MR. HADDAD: And just so that we don't get 
1 (Pages 1 to 4) 
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1 -into a situation where we have to try to raise an 1 their presentation on his direct examination would 
2 issue that might be better served outside the 2 be improper because there's been no 
3 presence of the jury, there's some CT scans that 3 cross-examination availability on that. 
4 Mr. Jones had raised the issue of using some of 4 THE COURT: Okay. I think that is a serious 
5 those CT scans of Ms. Ballard in Dr. 5 issue. What is your response? 
6 Sti_Uer's presentation of evidence. 6: MR. JONES: Your Honor, the radiology reP-ort 
7 Those CTs were not presented as part of 7 of the CT that interprets the very images that are 
8 the materials that Dr. Stiller had at the time of 8 simply represented by the films themselves, have 
9 his deposition. In fact, the plaintiffs -- rm 9 been in their possession the whole time. 
10 sorry -- th~ defendants did not get those until 10 THE COURT: Wasn't that witness asked what 
11 they subpoenaed those from St. Al's, I believe, 11 he relied on in his deposition? 
12 the end of October. 12 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Oh, so this was something that 13 THE COURT: And did he rely specifically on 
14 was not previously used and not previously 14 these CT scans? 
15 disclosed? Was it was disclosed as a potential .. 15 MR. JONES: He relied on the St. Al's 
16 exhibit? 16 records, which include the report of the CT scan. 
17 MR. HADDAD: As an exhibit, and they had 17 All this is is the image itself The CT scan 
18 identified the radiologist that read them, and 18 report--
19 that may be appropriate under some circumstances. 19 THE COURT: Okay. rm sustaining the 
20 But with this witness, he didn't have the benefit 20 · objection. 
21 of those, didn't have them with him, didn't 21 I think that -- frankly, I'm perturbed 
22 comment on them. In fact, they didn't get the 22 by the pattern in this case of pulling out 
23 X-rays or CTs until sometime at the end of 23 exhibits and items that haven't previously been 
24 October. ' 24 disclosed and then try to end run around the fact 
25 So to use those with Dr. Stiller in 25 that when a person at a deposition is asked what's . 
Page 7 Page 8 
1 their opinion, what's it based on, and they 1 morning, Your Honor. 
2 respond in a certain way, then I see no reason to 2 THE COURT: Counsel, I have confidence that 
3 allow information to slip in later that they did 3 you will make every effort, so I'll look forward 
4 not rely on when they formed their opinion and 4 to it. 
5 related their opinion a very brief time ago. 5 MR. JONES: Thank you. 
6 I don't think that is fair or 6 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's bring in 
7 reasonable. And rm not going to permit it. 7 our jury. 
8 MR. JONES: So I'm clear, Your Honor. He is '· 8 (Jury enters courtroom.) 
9 certainly capable, then, of talking about the 9 THE COURT: Well, the members of the jury 
10 reports which he reviewed and replied upon. 10 are present. We'll be taking a witness out of 
.. 11 - .· THE COURT:-He carrtalk aboureverything he - · 11-" order again for scheduling reasons:-Normally, 
12 reviewed and testified about in his deposition, 12 you'll -- this doesn't happen on a regular basis, 
13 and I hope he will and I hope the jury find it 13 but it does tend to happen from time to time when 
14 informative. 14 we have physician witnesses because the parties 
15 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 are balancing their professional responsibilities. 
16 And also, with respect to the two in 16 And so it is sometimes necessary to call a witness 
17 limine issues, there will be an offer of proof in 17 out of order. 
18 about the middle of this witness that will need to 18 Also, I do have some concerns that our 
19 be made. Perhaps, we can take it up during a 19 pace is off the pace that I anticipated the trial 
20 break. 20 to be. And I think the most important thing --
21 THE COURT: That's a very good idea. 21 absolute most important thing is that a case be 
22 MR. JONES: I'm just letting the Court know. 22 decided fairly and impartially and based on the 
. 23 THE COURT: All right. I'm very concerned 23 evidence received in court and the jury's wise and 
24 that we are not using our jury time well. 24 independent evaluation of that evidence. 
25 MR. JONES: I'll try to move quickly this 25 And I know that feeling pressured by 
2 (Pages 5 to 8) 
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1 · your personal schedule can sometimes get in the 
2 way. Although, I have faith that you all know the 
3 case is important to everybody and you will give 
4 it your best consideration. 
5 But to help me and to help the parties, 
6 I'd like you to write down and put down any 
7 schedule issues you have and write it down and 
8 pass to the bailiff to pass it along to me. 
9 Because we will do what we canto make it possible 
10 for you to do the best job that you can. And so 
11 if there are things that we can do and adjustments 
12 we can make, we'll do so. 
13 Counsel assures me today that he will 
14 be presenting an efficient presentation to you, 
15 but I need to know where you are. As a general 
16 rule, within the first couple of days of the 
1 7 trial, I have a pretty good estimate on how we are 
18 proceeding and let's just say that I have now 
19 developed concerns about our schedule.· And I need 
2 0 to know what your concerns are. 
21 So if you'd just write it down, give it 
22 to the bailiff and we'll do what we can to make it 
23 work for everybody. Because absolutely the most 
24 important thing in any trial is that the case be 
25 decided fairly and impartially by jurors who don't 
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1 I'm a general and cosmetic surgeon. 
2 Q. Where do you reside? 
3 A. In Spokane, Washington. 
4 Q. Where do you practice? 
5 A. In Moscow, Idaho; Pullman, Washington; 
6 and Colfax, Washington. 
· 7 Q. Are you are a ·retained expert in this 
8 case for the defense; are you not? 
9 A. lam. 
10 Q. And the court clerk is getting Exhibit 
11 G, which is -Defense Exhibit G, which is an 
12 admitted exhibit of your CV. 
13 While she is getting that, if you could 
14 tell the jury a little bit about your background 
15 training and education? 
16 A. Absolutely. So I did medical school at 
17 the University of Minnesota from '92 to '96. And 
18 then a general surgical residency at Graduate 
19 Hospital in Philadelphia, which is part of the 
20 University of Pennsylvania system when I started. 
21 After I finished my residency training, 
22 I then entered the Air Force and was stationed at 
23 Mountain Home Air Force base -- was stationed 
24 there as a general surgeon and became chief of the 



























feel unduly pressured or harassed by life. So if 
we can make adjustments to our schedule to make 
things work better for you, we will. 
Please call your witness. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. Defense 
calls Dr. Stiller. 
Madam Clerk, this witness will need a 
few exhibits and I'll tell what you they are so we 
can have those. Exhibit G. And I can get started 
with the witness while you get started with that, 
if you want to write these down. G, H, I, J, K, 
L,M,N,O. 
GEOFFREY DAVID STILLER, 
having been sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Good morning. 
A. Good morning. 
Q. Please introduce yourself to the jury. 
A. I'm Geoffrey David Stiller. 
Q. And what is your occupation? 
A. Can you hear me well enough? Okay. 
Page 12 
1 four years there as a general surgeon. 
2 When I completed my four years in the 
3 Air Force, I moved up to Moscow/Pullman area and . 
4 started a general surgical practice called Palouse 
5 Surgeons. After practicing for three years, I 
6 finally got to do what I wanted to do which was go 
7 off and do some training in cosmetic surgery. And 
8 I did a fellowship in cosmetic surgery in Seattle. 
9 After that, I practiced for about a 
10 year and a half in North Carolina and made my back 
11 to Spokane. Practiced there for two years. And 
12 then finally came back to my original practice in 
13 Moscow and Pullman. And I'm now practicing there. 
1~ Q. And just to kind of summarize that. 
15 How many years of medical school, residency, 
16 fellowship, how many years was your training 
17 total? 
18 A. Four years in medical school, five 
19 years in residency, one year in fellowship, so a 
20 total of ten. 
21 Q. And you've currently been practicing in 
22 the Moscow area for the last how many years? 
23 A. About a year and a half, almost two 
24 years now. 
25 Q. Now, in looking at Exhibit G, it 
3 (Pages 9 to 12) 
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1 ·indicates you were in the Air Force. You said 
2 that briefly. When you were stationed at Mountain 
3 Home Air Force here south of Boise, tell the jury 
4 a little bit about what you did there. 
5 A. Sure. I was a staff general surgeon. 
6 There were two ofus stationed there and at times 
7 three ofus stationed there: We would take care 
8 of all of the dependents of the Air Force as well 
9 as the Air Force members, as well as retirees. 
10 Even to the point where I would come 
11 and practice occasionally up here at the V.A. and 
12 do my larger cases, my thoracic cases, vascular 
13 cases. 
14 Q. And let's talk about that a little bit. 
15 With your background in general surgery, can you 
16 give the jury kind of a brief flavor of the types 
1 7 of surgeries that you perform in general surgery. 
18 A. Sure. General surgery a lot right now 
19 is minimally invasive, so your small incisions 
20 taking out gallbladders, doing colon cancer 
21 surgeries that way. I will even take out parts of 
22 a liver or the spleen through small incisions. 
23 I also do trauma surgery. Occasionally 
24 we'll have to do some vascular surgery if it's 
25 from trauma. I try to stay away from that as much 
Page 15 
1 practice, you said you started doing after you 
2 completed your tour of obligation to the Air 
3 Force, correct? 
4 A. A couple of years afterwards. I spent 
5 my four yours in the military and my goal was 
6 always to do cosmetics. But I had a few kids and 
7 a family to take care of, so I had to earn enough 
8 money to go back to a resident's salary, so I did 
9 that. 
10 · Q. Can you tell us a little bit -- tell 
11 the jury a little bit about the nature of your 
12 cosmetic practice currently. 
13 A. Sure. So I'm considered by my practice 
14 50 percent general, 50 percent cosmetic. 
15 Now, my cosmetic practice really 
16 entails from head to toe, so I do liposuction. 
1 7 I'll do fat grafting. I will do tummy tucks. I 
18 will do complete body lifts. I'll do facelifts, 
19 rhinoplasties, breast reductions, and I do some 
20 cancer reconstruction for breast cancer. 
21 Q. Now, also in your CV, Exhibit G, I see 
22 there is a reference to faculty appointments. 
2 3 A. Correct. 
24 Q. Could you describe that to the jury. 
25 A. So in here I have Affiliate Faculty at 
Page 14 
1 as possible now because it has now become 
2 specialized. We do thoracic surgery, so ifI have 
3 somebody with a lung injury, I'll take care of 
4 that. Or a lung cancer, I can take out the lung 
5 cancer as well. 
6 Other than that, biopsies of the skin, 
7 a wide array of anything that, basically, can come 
8 in that is not an orthopaedic we handle in general 
9 surgery. 
10 Q. Do you have hospital privileges 
11 currently? 
12 A. Ida. 
13 Q. Where? 
14 A. At Griffin Medical School in Moscow, 
15 Idaho. I have Pullman Regional Hospital in 
16 Pullman, Washington. And then at Whitman Health 
17 and Medical Center in Colfax, Washington. 
18 Q. Colfax? 
19 A. Colfax, correct. 
20 Q. So the catchment area for your patients 
21 is that whole Palouse area up there? 
22 A. It really is. It's from Spokane down 
23 to about Boise. We will get patients coming from 
24 three or four hours away. 
25 Q. Now, with respect to your cosmetic 
Page 16 
1 the University of Washington Medical School WW AMJ. 
2 program. The University of Washington, how it 
3 functions is it talces students from Wyoming, 
4 Washington, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho. And they 
5 will all go for a number of years at U-Dub in 
6 Seattle, but their first year, they stay in the 
7 state where they are at. 
8 So if they are an Idaho student, there 
9 will be a program here in Boise where physicians 
10 will teach them. The same thing happens in 
11 Moscow, Idaho. So I have medical students with me 
12 every week that I'm teaching them surgery as well 
13 as clinical medicine. 
14 As far as the Faculty of the National 
15 Society of Cosmetic Physicians, that is a national 
16 program or group that I do lectures and I'll do 
1 7 training of different physicians for. 
18 Q. And I see in your CV you have a 
19 reference to a number of presentations. Do you 
20 provide physicians with presentations on cosmetic 
21 surgery issues? 
22 A. I do. 
23 Q. And could you discuss briefly with the 
24 jury what that entails and the topics that you 
25 cover. 
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1 A. Sure. So at national conferences, so 
2 there will be people from all over the world 
3 coming to these conferences. I'll lecture on 
4 different aspects of medicine. 
5 You can see -- well, I assume you will 
6 have a copy of all of these -- but you will see 
7 the case presentations. But just recently in 
8 September, I lectured there and I did a lecture of 
9 art of beauty, a lecture on like 
10 lipo-abdominoplasties, breast augmentation and 
11 techniques, and as well as circumferential body 
12 lifts. 
13 Q. Have you provided lectures to 
· 14 physicians on the topic of fat transfers? 
15 A. Many times, to be specific, Brazilian 
16 butt. 
1 7 Q. And tell the jury a little bit about 
18 who your audience is and what your training 
19 involves. 
20 A. So during the lectures or during a 
21 training course? 
22 Q. Both. 
23 A. Both, okay. So for the lectures it 
2 4 · will be for nurses and doctors that are interested 
25 in cosmetic surgery. It can be the staff of 
Page 19 
1 and fat transfers? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And about how many years have you been 
4 involved in providing that sort of training? 
5 A. About 4 or 5 years. When I was in my 
6 fellowship, we also did trainings and there were 
7 international students coming and we would always 
8 have physicians coming in during training and 
9 spending the week with us. 
10 So I guess I can add that up to five 
11 years then. 
12 Q. With respect to the types of physicians 
13 that attend these training classes, whether the 
14 seminars are at big conferences or the ones that 
15 are coming directly to your practice to shadow 
16 with you, can you tell the jury the types of 
1 7 specialists those physicians are, generally. 
18 A. I've trained anywhere from family 
19 practice docs to cardiologists to plastic 
20 surgeons, so it can be a wide array of someone 
21 wanting to get into the cosmetic aspect of 
22 medicine. 
23 Q. And, in fact, with respect to the 
24 plastic surgeons that you've trained, do you have 
25 an understanding as to why they are coming to you 
Page 18 
1 physicians as well. I start from a basic approach 
2 of how to evaluate a patient all th~ way to what 
3 the goals are to even in my presentations I show a 
4 video of a procedure. 
5 So it gives the doctors the opportunity 
6 to see if this is something they are going to 
7 augment their practice with. Or if it's a 
8 physician, it gives them the opportunity to say, 
9 "Hey, I do it this way," and we can have a 
10 discussion regarding the procedure itself 
11 When I do courses, I do them in Idaho, 
12 so they are not hands-on courses. But it's 
13 clinical physicians coming in and they will spend 
14 between one and five days with me going through 
15 different cases. And what I do with that is I ask 
16 them, "Okay, what kind of procedures do you want 
1 7 to see that you are interested in?" And I will 
18 have my schedule filled up with that. 
19 And we'll have a course curriculum on 
2 O what we are going over starting again from the 
21 complete basics to advanced procedures, and then 
22 they get to watch me do procedures. 
23 Q. Now, these trainings courses that you 
24 are referring to, have you been involved directly 
25 in training physicians on the topic of liposuction 
Page 20 
1 as cosmetic surgeon for training on those topics? 
2 A. Well, one of them -- a lot of the 
3 plastic surgeons are coming in for more advanced 
4 training or using lasers, which if they went and 
5 did their residency more than ten years ago, laser 
6 hypologist, which is ultrasound guided by 
7 hypologist wasn't around. 
8 So if they have later training, they 
9 have to be trained some way to how to do it, and 
1 O so they will come to somebody like myself and do 
11 that. However, a lot of plastic surgeons -- I do 
12 all outpatient surgery so when I talk about 
13 circumferential body lift, which is a tummy tuck 
14 all the way around as an outpatient, most plastic 
15 surgeons have never done anything like that so 
16 they will come and spend time with me. 
17 Q. Do the training of the surgeons -- or 
18 excuse me -- the training of the physicians that 
19 you have performed in the last five years, do they 
20 include as some of the specialities 
21 anesthesiologists? 
22 A. Wouldn't be unheard of. I don't recall 
23 an anesthesiologist training with me, but it 
24 wouldn't out of the realm of possibility. 
25 Q. Looking at your CV again, doctor, I see 
5 (Pages 17 to 20) 
Tucker & Associates, 605 W. Fort St., Boise, ID 83702 (208) 345-3704 
002025
Ballard v. Kerr 11/14/2013 
Page 21 
1 a reference to some publications. Could you talk 
2 to the jury just briefly about what you have 
3 published in what capacity. 
4 A. Sure. So when I was in residency, in 
5 surgery residency, I did -- we did a paper on 
6 alternative approaches to antegrade 
7 catheter-directed thrombolysis in a case of 
8 phlegmasia cerulean dolens -- I apologize. It is 
9 a mouth full. 
10 MR. JONES: I have the spelling, ma'am court 
._ll.-reporter .• ------·--·-·----·----·· - ·-· ---- -· 
12 THE WI1NESS: And this is actually before 
13 catheter-directed thrombolysis. Now, 
14 catheter-directed thrombolysis, which is basically 
15 when·sorrieone has a blood clot, you will slide a 
16 catheter up through a vessel to that blood clot 
1 7 and directly infuse a clot buster, EPA or 
18 (inaudible) or (inaudible). 
19 When I was in residency, we were one of 
20 the first people to try it on a patient who had 
21 blood clots in her leg so no blood flow was coming 
22 out of the leg, and the leg was basically dying. 
23 So we did the catheter-directed thrombolysis with 
24 that and had good success. And that was the 
25 beginning stages of starting to do those. 
Page 23 
1 radiation oncologist radiate them and then put 
2 them all back together. So they didn't have to 
3 have any postoperative radiation or chemotherapy 
4 and fourtd the success rate. So, again, that is 
5 why we published that. 
6 The third one I published after my 
7 fellowship is a unique method of body contouring 
8 after massive weight loss. Now, this journal, 
9 again, is talking about doing circumferential body 
10 lifts, which I've mentioned a couple of times, as 
11 an outpatient with no drains. And we presented 26 
12 patients and the outcomes of those 26 patients. 
13 BY MR. JONES: 
14 Q. So that particular article, the last 
15 one you referred to was published in the American 
16 Journal of Cosmetic Surgery? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Is that a peer reviewed journal? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And can you describe for the jury what 
21 "peer review" means. 
22 A. So a peer review journal -- when you 
23 look at multiple different aspects of journals, 
24 you can just publish -- you can write a letter to 
25 · a magazine and it's a publication. 
Page 22 
1 The next was neoadjuvant chemotherapy 
2 and radical resection of the intraoperative -
3 THE COURT: You need to slow down just a 
4 tad. 
5 MR. JONES: A little fast again, sorry, Your 
6 Honor. · 
7 THE WI1NESS: I apologize. I'm from the 
8 east coast. 
9 THE COURT: You need to slow down for our 
10 court reporter. 
- 11 .. THE WI1NESS: I've seen smoke coming out of-
12 her ears. 
13 Neoadjuvant chemotherapy and radical 
14 resection of the intraoperative. So basically at 
15 my institution, I was working with our surgical 
16 oncologist and we would have people that would 
17 have cancers at the base of the esophagus, 
18 beginning of the stomach. 
19 And as part of the operation, what we 
20 would do is instead of just going in and resecting 
21 it, we would start them first with chemotherapy to 
22 try and reouce their tumor side, their tumor 
23 burden. And then during surgery we would do 
24 interoperative radiation, so we actually operate 
25 on them, take out their tumor, and then have a 
Page 24 
1 Now, what a peer review journal means 
2 - is that there are multiple other people that are 
3 in your specialty reviewing the journal to see 
4 what efficacy it has in medicine. And so if it 
5 passes the, I guess, the test, it gets published. 
6 Q. And in this instance with respect to 
7 that last one that was published in the American 
8 Journal of Cosmetic Surgery, it passed peer review 
9 and was selected for publication? 
1 O A. It did. And, again, that was one of 
11 the reasons I was able to present that at that 
12 last conference. 
13 Q. And what year was that one published? 
14 ·A. In 2011. 
15 Q. In what states are you licensed, 
16 doctor? 
1 7 A. Currently I'm a licensed in Idaho and 
18 · in Washington. 
19 Q. And what are your board certifications? 
2 O A. I'm board certified by the American 
21 Board of Surgery. I'm board certified by the 
22 American Board of Cosmetic Surgery. 
23 Q. When did you obtain the certification 
24 for cosmetic surgery? · 
25 A. I believe it was 201 I. 
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1 Q. All right. Thank you for sharing your 1 Q. Now, with respect to your cosmetic 
2 CV with the jury. 2 · practice, you indicated that that is focused in 
3 You indicated that you are currently 3 Moscow, correct? 
4 about 50 percent between cosmetic and general 4 A. Right. 
5 surgery, correct? 5 Q. And where specifically? Describe the 
6 A. At least that's what my contract says. 6 facility where you are practicing your cosmetic 
7 Q. Tell the jury a little bit about what 7 surgery. 
8 is the nature of your current practice in terms of 8 A. So we have -- I practice my cosmetic 
' 
9 where you worked, the various locations, just 9 surgery in multiple different places, but my 
10 briefly. 10 office base setting, there's four doctors -- four 
11 A. Sure. So I have a practice in Moscow, 11 surgeons in our group and one GI doctor in our 
12 Pullman, and Colfax. We have two offices, one in 12 group. So we have an office, multiple rooms. And 
13 Pullman and one in Moscow. My cosmetic practice 13 I have four operating rooms in the back that are 
14 is solely in Moscow. However, I will do some 14 office-based suites for surgery. 
15 surgical procedures ifl'm doing a tummy tuck at 15 Then I also do operations at each of 
16 the same time they are doing a hysterectomy, I'll 16 the four hospitals, and we also have a surgery 
17 do that ih Pullman if it's being done robotically 17 that is owned by one of the hospitals that I will 
18 at their hospital. 18 do cases at as well. 
19 Now, according to my contract, it says 19 Q. Do you perform liposuction and fat 
20 50/50. That being said, about 95 percent of my 20 transfer grafting procedures in your office-based 
21 time is spent cosmetically. The 50/50 comes down 21 practice? 
22 to the fact that I take calls for general surgery, 22 A. Almost exclusively. 
23 meaning that 25 percent of the time. So every 23 Q. Do you combine those procedures 
24 Monday night I'm on call and one weekend a month 24 sometimes? 
25 I'm on call, just for general surgery. 25 A. Well, you always have to do some 
Page 27 Page 28 
1 liposuction to get the fat to harvest, so yes. 1 them to stay for a week. And then I still have 
2 Q. All right. Now, with respect to the 2 friends back there that I will arrange for them to 
3 area of Moscow, is it pretty common for you to 3 follow up with if there's any concerns. 
4 have patients to come see you that are, say, 
,. 
4 Now, the nice thing about cosmetics, is 
5 greater than 45 minutes to an hour away from your 5 a lot of-- a lot of what we do is visual. So if 
6 office? 6 they are having concerns, a lot times they can 
7 A. I have patients still coming in from 7 pick up the phone. I can talk with them. I can 
8 North Carolina that I operated on there or I 8 have them text me a picture, and we can talk about 
9 operated on there that fly into Moscow for me to 9 what is going on from that circumstance. 
10 operate on them. 10 Q. Do you in your cosmetic practice, 
11 Q. Can you describe to the jury, just 11 specifically, with procedures like liposuction and 
12 briefly, the challenge it faces or it poses to you 12 fat transfer, employ the use of prophylactic 
13 as a physician having patients that are located 13 antibiotics? 
14 remotely from you. 14 A. All of my patients are actually given 
15 A. It's very challenging in the fact that, 15 Keflex in the morning, the night before. They are 
16 one, you can't just say, "Come on into my office. 16 given Cephalexin the morning of and are continued 
17 I want to see you." You have to be respective of 17 on an 8-day course ofKeflex or if they are 
18 their distance, especially if they are coming from 18 allergic, then I use something different. 
19 multiple hours away. So it does make it a little 19 Q. But for the jury's benefit, Keflex and 
20 bit more challenging. And, oftentimes, I will 20 Cephalexin are what? 
21 have patients to stay for a night at least in the 21 A. They are both sefalasporin? 
22 hotel close by so I can see them the next day if 22 Q. An antibiotic? 
23 they are from a further distance. 23 A. Yes. 
24 When I have patients fly in from 24 Q. And can you explain to the jury why 
25 North Carolina, oftentimes I tell them that I want 25 that is part of your procedure. 
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1 A. It's really what we are trying to do is 
2 prophylactically treat an infection. Now, when we 
3 do any type of surgical procedure in the hospital, 
4 if I'm doing a hernia repair, I give them a dose 
5 of antibiotics. 
6 Q. And again, that is prophylactically 
7 treating them for infection? 
8 A. In cosmetics it's very common and just 
9 about everybody I talk to, and everybody in my 
10 training, recommend using some antibiotics 
11 afterwards. 
12 · Is there any science behind it? I 
13 don't rightfully know, but that's what we do in 
14 cosmetics.· 
15 Q. When you were in the Air Force and you 
16 indicated you were a healthcare provider out at 
1 7 Mountain Home Air Force base, when you were 
18 treating members of the military, were there any 
19 requirements associated with how you would treat 
2 O someone from the military in terms of, say, if 
21 they needed a surgical procedure, would they have 
22 to come see you if you were doing the surgery and 
23 would that impact their status in any way as an 
24 active duty person? 
25 MR. HADDAD: Objection relevance, 
Page 31 
1 the hospital, I'll see that patient, but -- so 
2 every Monday I'll do it. Otherwise, one weekend a 
3 month I take calls and see hospitalized patients 
4 at that point in time as well. 
5 Q. Are you aware, given your status in 
. 6 Idaho as a cosmetic physician who performs 
7 surgical procedures in your office, are you aware 
8 of any requirement in order to perform and provide 
9 that care to your patients of any certification or 
10 license of any kind that you need in order to be 
11 able to perform, for example, liposuction and fat 
12 transfers in your office? 
13 A. I believe the only license you would be 
14 required would be your medical license. 
15 Q. Do you believe it's safe for you to 
16 perform ~osmetic procedures, like liposuction and 
1 7 fat transfer, in an office-based setting as 
18 opposed to an hospital? 
19 A. Absolutely. 
20 MR. HADDAD: Objection, Your Honor. Overly 
21 broad, relevance. 
22 THE COURT: It is a broad question, but I 
23 think it's relevant so the objection is overruled. 
24 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. I think it's 
25 safe. I do it daily. 
Page 30 
1 Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Sustained. 
3 BY MR. JONES: 
4 Q. To your knowledge as a physician that 
5 was involved in the Air Force, when a patient 
6 would - an airman, for example, would seek to 
7 undergo a surgical procedure, was that something 
8 that you would be required to see the patient for 
9 and to sign-off on in any way? 
10 MR. HADDAD: Objection. Relevance, 
11 Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Sustained. 
13 BY MR. JONES: 
14 Q. Now, I want to come back to your 
15 practice a little bit, doctor, with respect to 
16 seeing patients in the hospital, how much of your 
1 7 time are you spending -- since you've indicated 
18 about 95 percent cosmetic and 5 percent general, 
19 how much of your time are you actually seeing 
20 patients in a hospital as opposed to within your 
21 clinic setting? 
22 A. I only see patients in the hospital 
23 when I'm on-call. So every Monday I will do 
24 rounds for whatever patients we have in the 
25 hospital. Obviously, if I'm doing an operation in 
Page 32 
1 BY MR. JONES: 
2 Q. Okay. Now, you weren't here for an 
3 expert that testified for the plaintiff, a 
4 Dr. Sorensen who has testified in this case. 
5 He was asked questions regarding the 
.. 6 use of general anesthetic for liposuction. Do you 
7 use general anesthetic for your liposuction 
8 procedures? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. And can you explain to the jury why you 
11 don't. 
12 MR. HADDAD: Objection. Relevance, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the 
15 objection. What the relevance is not what he does 
16 in a different community, but what he does -
1 7 whether he's familiar with the applicable standard 
18 of care as it existed in this area at the time and 
19 place that this occurred and then how it relates. 
20 So I think it would be helpful --
21 MR. JONES: I'll tie it up, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: -- to tie it up now. · 
23 MR. JONES: I'll circle around to that, · 
24 Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Well, if you want to go 
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1 directly, that would be useful, too. 
2 BY MR. JONES: 
3 Q. Let me ask you this, doctor. As a 
4 result of your work in this case, have you engaged 
5 in any discussions with any physicians from Boise 
6 who practice cosmetic surgery here in Boise in the 
7 year2010? 
8 A. !have. 
9 Q. Who did you speak with? 
10 A. Dr. O'Neil. 
11 Q. Who do you understand Dr. O'Neil to be? 
12 A. I believe he is a family doc who 
13 actually practiced here who did cosmetic 
14 procedures here during that time frame. He is now 
15 in California. 
16 Q. Okay. Did you know Dr. O'Neil before 
17 this case? 
18 A. I did not. 
19 Q. Were you asked to call him in order to 
20 discuss standard of practice issues for Boise? 
21 A. lwas. 
22 Q. Did you do so? 
23 A. I did. 
24 . Q. And can you share with the jury some of 
'25 the information you learned based on your 
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1 We briefly discussed some aspects of 
2 cleaning and sterilization, but we didn't go 
3 into - during our conversation, we didn't go into 
4 that. But since then, we have discussed it more 
5 thoroughly. 
6 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, may we approach 
7 because that is new opinion, new testimony as to 
8 the foundation for his opinions. That was not 
9 disclosed to us. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's excuse 
11 the jury briefly and have you all stretch. Please 
12 don't start talking about the case and don't 
13 express or form an opinion, and I will see you 
14 shortly. 
15 (Jury Leaves.) 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Proceed. 
1 7 MR. HADDAD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 In the deposition of Dr. Stiller that 
19 took place July 19th of this year, he was asked 
20 about how he availed himself of knowledge of the 
21 standard of care in Idaho, specifically Boise. 
22 He said he spoke with Dr. O'Neil. I 
23 asked him on how many occasions. And he said, 
24 "Once." And now it appears he's had subsequent 
25 calls that we were not made aware of and have not 
Page 34 
1 conversation with Dr. O'Neil? 
2 A. Regarding what aspects? 
3 Q. Well, for example, did your discussion 
4 with Dr. O'Neil focus on a specific time frame? 
5 A. It did. It was during 2010. 
6 Q. Did it focus on a specific type of 
7 practice? 
8 A. A non-surgical based cosmetic practice. 
9 · Q. Did your discussion with Dr. O'Neil 
1 O involve the facts of this case? 
11 A. It did. 
12 Q. And did you discuss with Dr. O'Neil 
13 issues relating to the performance of liposuction 
14 and fat transfer? 
15 A. We did. 
16 Q. And can you describe to the jury what 
1 7 you talked about in general regarding those 
18 topics. 
19 A. We talked about what kind of procedures 
2 O he was performing and people like him were 
21 performing, the other physicians in the area, 
22 whether they did it at surgery centers, in their 
23 office, what they felt comfortable with. And as 
24 far as that is concerned, what kind of anesthetics 
2 5 they used. 
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1 had a chance to delve into on cross-examination. 
2 MR: JONES: May I respond, Your Honor? 
3 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
4 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I struggle with this 
5 continued reference to depositions. When Rule 
6 26(b) specifically states that the way in which an 
7 expert's opinions may be learned is based not only 
8 on deposition, but on interrogatory responses. 
9 And in this particular case, 
10 interrogatory responses which predated 
11 Dr. Stiller's deposition go into nauseating detail 
12 on the nature and discussion that he had to learn 
13 about the standard of healthcare practice in 
14 Boise, Idaho, in 2010. And that he would be 
15 coming here today to testify fully on that topic. 
16 THE COURT: I see. And you answered, no 
1 7 doubt, in general terms about how he familiarized 
18 himself with the standard of care in Boise during 
19 that time period. 
20 MR. JONES: In more than general terms, 
21 Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Well, let me see your response. 
23 MR. JONES: Well, it's about 15 pages for 
2 4 Dr. Stiller's portion and --
25 THE COURT: And I would be delighted to see 
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1 ·it. 
2 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, just for your 
3 attention -- and I think the Court has hit the 
4 nail on the head -- they said Dr. Stiller will 
5 testify how he became aware of the standard in 
6 care. In that very generality. 
7 That's why when I deposed him, I said, 
8 "How did you become aware?" 
9 "I spoke with Dr. O'Neil." 
10 How many times? 
11 "Once." 
12 So I was given a very vague disclosure. 
13 I asked him in his deposition to find out what, in 
14 fact, those opinions would be based on. I was 
15 told he spoke with Dr. O'Neil one time. 
16 MR. JONES: I have the disclosure. I would 
1 7 be happy to provide it to the Court, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Yes, please. 
19 MR. JONES: May I approach? 
20 THECOURT: Yes. 
21 MR. JONES: It starts on this page, 
22 Your Honor, and --
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MR. JONES: There are a number of references 
25 throughout. 
Page 39 
1 think he asked -- I think it was a question on how 
2 many occasions did he speak with Dr. O'Neil. I 
3 thought that's what prompted the objection. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 THE REPORTER: Okay. Let me just recheck. 
6 MR. JONES: I don't remember asking that 
7 question, but... 
8 THE COURT: Well, it is proper for him to 
9 discuss generally what he talked about in terms of 
10 as I indicated, you know, the procedures -- what 
11 the general practice was, what the procedures were 
12 with respect to performing liposuction and fat 
13 transfer. An it's appropriate that he discussed 
14 those general topic areas and familiarize himself 
15 with the standard ofcare in this area. 
· 16 MR. HADDAD: I thought he said that he had 
1 7 spoken -- he had called him on more than one 
18 occasion. That is really what prompted this 
19 because when I spoke -- and just to give the Court 
20 a heads up -- first of all, when I deposed him, he 
21 brought his file. There is a letter dated May 17, 
22 2010 -- 2013, I'm sorry -- from Mr. Quane to him 
23 saying, "Call Dr. O'Neil. He will tell you what 
24 the standard of care is." 
25 In July, I deposed him and he said he 
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1 And I have some additional points after 
2 you've had a chance to look at that, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Let me give this back 
4 counsel. 
5 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 May I further my argument, Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: Not right yet. 
8 What appears to me from reading the 
9 interrogatories is that the interrogatory, that is 
10 not all that unusual, contains simply the general 
11 statement that the witness has familiarized 
12 himself with the appropriate standard of care. I 
13 noted that the responses were filed on May 31st, 
14 and it's my understanding that the deposition was 
·· 15 in July. 
16 MR. HADDAD: That's correct, Your Honor. 
1 7 THE COURT: And then he discussed his 
18 familiarity with the standard of care. 
19 And if the court reporter could give me 
20 the specific question once again that prompted our 
21 objection, that would be helpful. 
22 (Last question was read by the reporter.) 
23 THE COURT: All right. I think that is a 
24 proper question. 
25 MR. HADDAD: I apologize, Your Honor. I 
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1 spoke to him once. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. HADDAD: And just for the Court's 
4 edification, he said he did not ask Dr. O'Neil 
5 what cleaners he used. He didn't ask Dr. O'Neil 
6 disinfectants he used. 
7 THE COURT: You can bring that up in your 
8 cross-examination, counsel. 
9 MR. HADDAD: Well, the problem is, if he's 
10 spoken -- if after the deposition all of a s_udden 
11 he goes out and now he learns it, I can't cross 
12 examine him on later learned evidence. That is 
13 the prejudice and that is the case law because; 
14 quite frankly, after taking Dr. Stiller's 
15 deposition, I anticipated this is exactly what was 
16 going to transpire. 
1 7 I was going to depose him, ask him all 
18 the relevant questions. "What did you know? What 
19 did you talk about to avail yourself of the 
20 standard of care?" And then I was going to come 
21 into court and he was going to use after-acquired 
22 information to expand upon what he said he knew at 
23 the time of his deposition. And I would have no 
24 chance of cross examine him, except to say you 
25 didn't tell me that in July. That is meaningless 
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1 ifhe says, "I spoke with Dr. O'Neil." 
2 The prejudice is compounded by the 
3 fact, Your Honor, that Dr. O'Neil -- if the Court 
4 remembers, the Court granted a motion in limine to 
5 keep out his board of medicine issues. 
6 If you read the 2008 order, because 
7 that's when Dr. O'Neil applied for licensure was 
8 late 2007, and the disciplinary action came about 
9 in 2008, Dr. O'Neil was not permitted under that 
10 restriction to do fat transfers. 
11 So if, in fact, he said, "I spoke to 
12 Dr. O'Neil about his practice of doing fat 
13 transfers in 2010," I should be entitled to cross 
14 examine him saying, "Well, did you know the Board 
15 of Medicine in Idaho restricted his license such 
16 that he could not do those?" Because that goes to 
1 7 the credibility and honesty of the person he has 
18 spoken with. 
19 THE COURT: Well, that is an unusual 
20 situation. 
21 MR. JONES: Your Honor, ifl may, I haven't 
22 had a chance to respond to any of that, ifl 
23 could. 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 
25 MR. JONES: First of all, ifl had written 
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1 Number one, this is foundational information. 
2 These don't relate to his opinions. He hasn't 
3 added new opinions as a result of having an 
4 additional phone call with Dr. O'Neil. 
5 THE COURT: So he hasn't added new opinions 
6 as a result --
7 MR. JONES: He hasn't added new opinions. 
8 This was simply -- he was asked, "Did you know or 
9 did you talk to Dr. O'Neil about this issue 
10 involving what happened in Boise, or this issue?" 
11 It's not that he didn't already have a basic 
12 understanding of what the local standard of 
13 practice is. And that is set forth in his 
14 deposition quite clearly. And I can read sections 
15 out of it for the Court if the Court would like. · 
16 The issue is when he asked him the 
17 question, for example, "Do you know if Dr. O'Neil 
18 used spore counts?" And he didn't know the answer 
19 to that question. So he called and talked to 
20 Dr. O'Neil again. "Do you use spore counts?" 
21 Why? Not because it will change his opinions that 
22 he is going to render in this case, but in order 
23 to address the question that Mr. Haddad wanted to 
24 say, which was you don't even know ifhe takes 
25 spore counts. He can say he knows he didn't take 
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1 Mr. Haddad a letter and said, "Dr. Stiller has 
2 called and the questions that you asked him about 
3 in his deposition, he has since followed up to see 
4 if there was additional information that he could 
5 obtain," the Ramos versus Dixon --1 believe --
6 and a couple of other med-mal decisions, 
7 specifically on this issue of people who are at 
8 trial and have failed to qualify their expert 
9 witness have been given breaks in the trial to go 
10 out and place a phone call to try and learn about 
11 the standard of practice. There hasn't been an 
12 issue that has been unfair for the opposing party 
13 to not be able to depose that person about 
14 whatever it was that they talked about. 
15 In this instance, they've know that 
16 Dr. O'Neil was involved all along. They never 
1 7 sought to take his deposition. If they wanted to 
18 question or challenge his veracity or his 
19 knowledge, they certainly-
20 THE COURT: I don't think that is 
21 particularly relevant. Talk to me about the 
22 specific issue whether it's violative of any rule 
23 to allow your witness to supplement his prior 
24 testimony in some more major way. 
25 MR. JONES: Well, two issues there. 
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1 spore counts. 
2 The basis for which he seeks to cross 
3 examine him on, is the same basis he has now and 
4 would have had even ifhe had taken a second 
5 deposition of Dr. Stiller. Nothing has changed. 
6 So for him to claim that he is somehow unfairly 
7 prejudiced because Dr. Stiller had a second 
8 conversation after his deposition to address some 
9 of the concerns that were advanced by saying, 
10 "Well, you didn't ask Dr. O'Neil this specific 
11 question" is not improper. 
12 MR. HADDAD: It is absolutely improper 
13 because he's -- the whole issue is me being able 
14 to cross examine him on how he availed himself of 
15 knowledge about what the local standard of care is 
16 with respect to cleaning, disinfecting, and 
1 7 sterilizing medical equipment. 
18 Ifhe says, "I did that" -- and quite 
19 frankly, and I think Dr. Stiller will tell you 
20 this, he in March of2012 -- 2010, I'm sorry-- he 
21 was still in North Carolina, not in this area. He 
22 had not been to this area since 2007 when he was 
23 in Washington doing his fellowship training. 
24 He goes back to Washington in 2010 and 
25 practices in Spokane. He didn't even come to 
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1 Idaho until 2012. So he wouldn't even have, based 
2 on his own knowledge, known what's going on in 
3 Boise, even arguably, until he came --
4 THE COURT: All right. So he is not himself 
5 familiar with the general practice in Boise on 
6 2010. . 
7 MR. JONES: Your Honor, for example, on page 
8 70 in his deposition, he was asked: 
9 "QUESTION: When you were talking to 
10 him" - meaning Dr. O'Neil - I'm on page 70, line 
11 17 -- "did you ask him how he was trained both in 
12 and through medical school, residency, and in 
13 cosmetic procedures? 
14 "ANSWER: No. I asked him about the 
· 15 standard of practice in Boise at that point in 
16 time." 
1 7 And now there's a number of other 
18 discussions about him where he said he talked to 
19 Dr. O'Neil about sterilization. And if the Court 
20 would like, I can try to provide an exhaustive 
21 list of exactly what was discussed, but the issue 
22 is whether or not Dr. Stiller can lay a foundation 
23 that he has actual knowledge of the standard of 
24 healthcare practice in Boise in 2010 applicable to 
25 Dr. Kerr. 
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1 would have to avail himself of the standard of 
2 care of 2010, in July, in Boise, with respect to 
3 what is the appropriate method of cleaning, 
4 disinfecting, and sterilization. And that's why I 
5 asked him specifically, "What did you ask to avail 
6 yourself of the information on those issues that 
7 are the issues that are directly relevant to the 
8 plaintifl's case." You said he never asked. 
9 Now they want to come back and say, 
10 "Oh, that's irrelevant to him being able to go 
11 back and supplement what is a complete derth of 
12 basis of knowledge with respect to the standard of 
13 care on those key issues and now they have him go 
14 back without. 
15 And, quite frankly, again, I've looked 
16 in the issue (inaudible) and (inaudible) says, if 
1 7 you are going to supplement, you have to 
18 reasonably supplement. If he is going to go back 
19 and say, "I am now aware of the standard of care 
20 with regarding with cleaning, disinfec.ting, and 
21 sterilization, then he should have let me know 
22 that. 
23 This is akin, quite frankly, 
24 Your Honor, as to what happened with Dr. Garrison. 
25 And if you remember, at his deposition was the 
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1 Now, if plaintiff wants to challenge 
2 that by virtue of cross-examination on the 
3 questions and the depth of the discussion that he 
4 had, it wouldn't matter ifhe had talked 
5 Dr. O'Neil 12 times or ifhe talked to him 5 
6 minutes ago before he came in here. 
7 He can still challenge the basis and 
8 suggest to the jury if he wants, "Well, you didn't 
9 ask Dr. O'Neil this question or that question." 
10 The fact that he hadn't asked him every question 
11 under the sun when he had his deposition taken, 
12 doesn't mean he didn't have an adequate foundation 
13 to be able to testify. 
14 All I'm trying to do by having him have 
15 an additional· discussion with Dr. O'Neil is 
16 prepare him to oppose some of these questions that 
1 7 Hr. Haddad is going to try to beat on him with on 
18 cross-examination. 
19 MR. HADDAD: The whole issue in this case, 
20 despite the defense presentation of examination, 
21 has been: Was the standard of care met in Boise, 
22 Idaho, in July of2010 with respect to the 
23 cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilization of the 
24 equipment. 
25 So that for this witness, Dr. Stiller 
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1 first time in September that he knew he had an 
2 opinion about fat embolysis. And he admitted that 
3 wasn't part of his disclosure. 
4 At that point, quite frankly, Your 
5 Honor, we were prepared and did file a motion in 
6 limine. Defense counsel ultimately allowed us to 
7 re-depose Dr. Garrison on that issue. And, 
8 therefore, I did not raise the issue of what was a 
9 very late disclosure, but nonetheless, the 
10 opportunity to cure that by a second deposition so 
11 I could ask those questions and be adequately 
12 prepared to cross examine Dr. Garrison on that. 
13 That's how big boys play. This is 
14 trial by ambush, quite frankly, Your Honor. 
15 MR. JONES: Page 77, Your Honor --
16 THE COURT: All right. I don't really need 
1 7 any -- I have questions specifically. 
18 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
19 26(e) requires the responses be supplemented. It 
2 O is particularly required under 26 ( e )( 1 b) that the 
21 identity of person expected to be called as an 
22 expert witness, the subject matter in which the 
23 person is expected to testify, and the substance 
24 of the person's testimony is specific subject to 
25 duty to supplement. 
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1 A party under Idaho Rule of Civil 
2 Procedure 26(e)(2) has a duty to seasonably 
3 supplement. Under subsection b, "If the party 
4 knows that the response, though correct when made, 
5 is made no longer true and the circumstances are 
6 such that a failure to amend the response is in 
7 substance a knowing concealment." 
8 And so it seems to me that there's no 
9 question. It's always -- it has been a very long 
10 time in this case, a critical issue about how the 
11 equipment used in the procedure was sterilized and 
12 maintained and used. And that is a central issue 
13 in this case. 
14 The focus of expert testimony at a 
15 trial of this type is whether the practitioner 
16 negligently failed to meet the applicable standard 
17 of healthcare of the community in which the care 
18 was provided as the standard existed at the time 
19 and place of the alleged negligence. 
2 O So it is the central issue in the case 
21 that certain conduct did not meet the standard of 
22 care for a practitioner of that type in this area 
23 in 2010. That's the central issue. And it is a 
24 central issue in a medical malpractice case that 
25 all experts be familiar with the local standard of 
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1 whether then counsel's obligation would be to 
2 supplement that response because that is so 
3 particularly material. 
4 MR. HADDAD: I know the Court's thinking, 
5 Your Honor. Can I say one more thing very 
6 briefly? 
7 We had prepared a motion in limine on 
8 this very subject matter. And even after receipt 
9 of that, we were never provided with anything that 
1 O would give us a clue that he had availed himself 
11 of additional information. 
12 MR. JONES: Counsel, I disagree with that 
13 representation --
14 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to let you have 
15 a response now, so go right ahead. 
16 MR. JONES: I disagree that there was 
1 7 something in the motion of limine that 
18 specifically raised the concern about whether or 
19 not Dr. Stiller or any of the defense experts had 
20 had further discussions with Dr. O'Neil. And I 
21 would love to see plaintiffs counsel point to 
22 somewhere in his brief where he could say--
23 THE COURT: Wait. Wait. 
24 MR. HADDAD: I apologize. I didn't mean to 
2 5 say that. I just mean to say the issue of what 
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1 care. 
2 So I find that I do have some concerns 
3 about two things. I have some concern about the 
4 fact that the expert engaged in additional inquiry 
5 into the standard of care after his deposition 
6 which was not disclosed to counsel by way of 
7 supplementation. 
8 And I must say, I do have some concern 
9 about some of the issues being raised with respect 
10 to whether the source of this information was a 
11 person who was himself adequately familiar with 
12 the standard of care for the procedure at the time 
13 and place the care was rendered. 
14 It is not, in my experience, terribly 
15 uncommon for a deposition to flag issues that a 
16 party feels then should be addressed more fully by 
1 7 their expert. I don't think that is unusual, so I 
18 don't see anything incorrect in and of itself for 
19 Dr. Stiller to have, after a deposition, sought to 
20 clarify with the person he was relying on to 
21 provide standard of care information, additional 
22 information that the deposition raised questions 
23 about. That doesn't seem to me to be improper or. 
24 unusual. 
25 The problem I do have, though, is 
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1 was said at the deposition of Dr. Stiller with 
2 respect to his lack of knowledge about the 
3 cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilization. 
4 Because I asked specifically, "Do you know what 
5 cleaner? Do you know what disinfectant? Do you 
6 know ifhe takes spore counts?" He said, "No. 
7 No. No." 
8 I raised that as a failure to avail 
9 himself of sufficient knowledge on the court 
10 issues of the motion in limine. That's what I 
11 meant. I apologize if counsel misunderstood my 
12 statement. 
13 MR. JONES: And to the suggestion that 
14 Dr. Stiller had no information at the time of his 
15 deposition, there are a few key passages we can 
16 point to in the deposition. 
17 Page 77. 
18 "QUESTION: All right. Let me ask you 
19 this. You talked about alcohol, Hibiclens and, 
20 obviously, you couldn't have much discussion about 
21 the appropriateness of some unknown cleaner, 
22 correct? 
23 "Correct. 
24 "QUESTION. All right. 
25 "Well, we talked also about autoclave, 
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1 ·the steam autoclave and the fact that he did use a 
2 chemical marker." 
3 And then going to page 75. 
4 ''Now, when you say you discussed the 
5 sterilization and the adequacy of the 
6 sterilization as described, are you talking about, 
7 as Dr. Kerr described in his deposition? 
8 "Yes." 
9 THE COURT: Wait a minute. You talking 
10 about Dr. Kerr's practices? 
11 The issue that is before me right now 
12 . is whether this expert familiarized himself with 
13 the applicable standard of care from his other 
14 expert. Now, of course -- and, as I looked at the 
15 plaintiffs motion in limine which was filed· 
16 before the Court October 22, 2013, at page 21 of 
1 7 that brief filed by the plaintiffs, specific 
18 concerns are raised with respect to whether 
19 Dr. Stiller had had a sufficient conversation with 
20 Dr. O'Neil to familiarize himself for the standard 
21 of practice for cosmetic surgeons in Boise in 
22 2010. That ts a·specific issue that's raised and 
23 it's flagged on October 22nd. 
24 Now, I am concerned about the lack of 
25 further supplementation. Let me -- so you talked 
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1 And the only way to test that is by 
2 chemical markers, which is again, what I had said -
3 beforehand ~egarding --
4 THE COURT: And you had said thr1t at your 
5 deposition. 
6 THE WITNESS: Exactly. 
7 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, I would just point 
8 to his deposition. He doesn't know and didn't ask 
9 what disinfectants were used. Doesn't know and 
10 didn't ask if he even uses an autoclave. That is 
11 on page 71 of his deposition. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Now, wait a minute. Does 
13 Dr. O'Neil use an autoclave? 
14 MR. HADDAD: He didn't even bother to ask 
15 and there was no discussion about an autoclave 
16 even being used by Dr. O'Neil. 
1 7 THE WITNESS: Ma'am, could I answer that? 
18 THE COURT: Yes, please do. 
19 THE WITNESS: The only way to sterilize 
20 something is by an autoclave, so it's a redundant 
21 question. 
22 MR. HADDAD: Doesn't know and doesn't ask if 
23 he used biological markers. I mean, if he doesn't 
24 know, that is the point. If you are asking the 
25 only person that's been flagged as being the guy 
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1 with Dr. O'Neil after your deposition and asked 
2 about some things that the deposition had raised. 
3 THE WI1NESS: (Witness shakes head). 
4 THE COURT: So how many times did you talk 
5 to him? 
6 THE WI1NESS: One more time. 
7 THE COURT: Just one more time. And when 
8 did you talk to him? 
9 THE WI1NESS: Last night. 
10 THE COURT: Well, that makes that tricky for 
11 supplementation. Can you just kind of fill us in 
12 a little bit. 
13 THE WI1NESS: Sure. Specifically we were 
14 . trying to address, okay, the sterilization that 
15 was done, his chemical cleaning apparatus, whether 
16 he was using Hibiclens, what he was doing this 
1 7 for, what he had talked to other people in the 
18 area that he was doing; okay. 
19 Again, his opinion was, and I agreed 
20 with that, Hibiclens and alcohol used to clean an 
21 instrument and then using a cleaner afterwards is 
22 fine. But the most important part is 
23 sterilization with an autoclave. That's· what 
24 kills the bacteria that the cleaning and 
25 disinfecting don't. 
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1 you're supposed to go to and you don't even bother 
2 to find out if he is the one doing the 
3 autoclaving, how he does it, whether it's steam or 
4 some other type, whether he takes spore counts, 
5 how am I to know? And now he has a conversation 
6 last night with -- and quite frankly, I have 
7 serious concerns that Dr. O'Neil was never here. 
8 THE COURT: Well, would you be able to 
9 render your opinion without discussing what came 
10 of last night? 
11 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. My opinion hasn't 
12 change. 
13 THE COURT: All right, then. I think that 
14 · probably cuts to the chase. We'll just skip last 
15 night's discussion because his opinion hasn't 
16 changed. I think he can explain his reasons for 
1 7 his opinion without any discussion last night. 
18 And I think that would address the problem that is 
19 created. 
20 Because I do think-- it isn't uncommon 
21 for people after depositions to double check with 
22 people to see about this or that issue that may 
23 have come up, as long as it's reasonably 
24 supplemented. I think the best thing to do is 
25 just to stick with what he did at the deposition. 
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1 If it didn't change your opinion, we 
2 are probably spending way too much time on this. 
3 The jury needs to understand the basic issues in 
4 the case a,nd my goal in the case is to make sure 
5 that the jury fairly and completely has adequate 
6 information, that both sides have had a fair time 
7 to explore it. 
8 So ifwe stick with what he has already 
9 disclosed since he said it doesn't change the 
10 opinion, then I think that will be sufficient. 
11 MR. HADDAD: Ifl ask the questions, 
12 obviously, what I asked in deposition and got the 
13 answers I got, am I somehow going to be opening 
14 the door to some conversation he had last night? 
15 I mean, that's my concern is all of a 
16 sudden, well, you didn't know if Dr. O'Neil even 
1 7 used an autoclave, do you? Oh, yeah I do because 
18 I talked to him. And then it opens that door for 
19 that whole -
20 THE COURT: Well, I assume he is familiar 
21 with what Dr. Kerr did. And Dr. Kerr said he used 
22 an autoclave. 
23 MR. HADDAD: I'm talking about Dr. O'Neil. 
24 THE COURT: Yes, I know. But I don't think 
25 that - I therefore think that this is an 
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1 reconsideration as well as make an offer of proof. 
2 Dr. O'Neil applied for licensure in the 
3 state ofldaho in late of 2007. Because of some 
4 misrepresentations on his application, it became 
5 the subject of a disciplinary action. He had been 
6 disciplined once before and his license revoked 
7 once before in the state ofldaho. 
8 When he came in 2008, he entered into 
9 an agreed order that limited his practice to 
10 chemical peels and liposuction. It also said, 
11 very interesting, Your Honor, that if Dr. O'Neil 
12 intends to come to practice in Idaho, he is to let 
13 the Board of Medicine know by way of written 
14 letter. He was not practicing in at least 2008 --
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. HADDAD: So I want to get into the 
1 7 issues of obviously that I think that sets a 
18 tenure that is much different --
19 . THE COURT: Okay. Stop. Stop. Stop. 
20 Board of Medicine restriction is he can only do 
21 liposuction? 
22 MR. HADDAD: And chemical peels. 
23 THE COURT: Liposuction and chemical peels. 
24 The fact that he may not be able to do the fat 
25 transfers does not necessarily mean that he is not 
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1 appropriate area for him to discuss as long as he 
2 limits himself to his prior opinion and the basis 
3 forthat. 
4 And at this point, we'll ask the 
5 witness not to discuss anything that was discussed 
6 last night, not to go into that, not to reference 
7 it. But I think we are consuming a good deal of 
8 time on something that perhaps doesn't warrant 
9 this level of concern. 
10 I don't think you are necessarily 
11 opening the door for it, but I would recommend 
12 that -- I mean, this witness has just said that he 
13 hasn't changed his opinion since he gave his 
14 deposition. And at the time of his deposition, he 
15 had talked to Dr. O'Neil one time. · 
16 We know that he will have reviewed 
1 7 Dr. Kerr's records, and he will know from 
18 Dr. Kerr's records for himself that he used an 
19 autoclave. And certainly, this witness has the 
20 expertise to talk about what the desired results 
21 would be for that process. 
22 MR. HADDAD: Obviously, it raises the issue 
23 again, Your Honor, of Dr. O'Neil, and I want to 
24 make an offer of proof at this time. So we are 
25 . here on the motion oflimine for both the Court's 
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1 familiar with the local standard of practice in 
2 Boise. 
3 And it seems to me that you can get 
4 into the fact that he himself does not -- that 
5 Dr. O'Neil - was the witness aware that 
6 Dr. O'Neil did not do fat transfers without 
7 getting to other areas that we've previously 
8 addressed. Of course, the question is would that 
9 make any difference in your opinion. 
10 THE WITNESS: If you look at the expert 
11 witness, he doesn't do -- for the defendant, he 
12 doesn't do fat grafting either. 
13 MR. JONES: You mean the plaintiff. 
14 THE WITNESS: The plaintiff. I'm sorry. 
15 MR. HADDAD: Of course, if you heard the 
16 testimony you would know that he practiced 
1 7 alongside his partner --
18 THE WITNESS: But he didn't do it--
19 THE COURT: Don't. Don't. Don't. Don't. 
20 Don't. 
21 MR. JONES: lfl may just respond --
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. JONES: -- to the coloring of 
24 Dr. O'Neil. The suggestion that he made a 
25 misrepresentation, there was an extensive amount 
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1 ·of information that was provided in our briefing 
2 about his license application and how there was a 
Utah company that was hired to complete the 

























THE COURT: Right. And that's why we are 
not going to go into all of those collateral 
matters. It is sufficient that Dr. O'Neil does 
not do fat transfers. 
And that is a fair question and I'll 
allow him to ask ifhe knows if Dr. O'Neil does 
not do fat transfers and the answer to that is no 
Dr. O'Neil does not do fat transfers. And then we 
move on because that still doesn't mean that he 
wouldn't be aware of the standard of practice in 
the area, even though he doesn't do it. 
Because I do think that the fact that 
it is pretty clear from the testimony that the 
doctors can be aware of the standard of care with 
respect to the procedures that they don't 
necessarily do. And I think we are consuming too 
much time on this. 
So, no. I don't want him to talk about 
what he talked about last night. And, certainly, 
he can respond to the question, "Does Dr. O'Neil 
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1 . your conversation prior to, say, June of this year 
2 with Dr. O'Neil. 
3 A. Our conversation really -- what I 
4 wanted to know is whether the standard of practice 
5 was met with what Dr. Kerr had done, so we had 
6 discussed liposuction and the aspects of 
7 liposuction and discussed the way that Dr. Kerr 
8 had done his sterilization and whether it was 
9 within what was considered the standard of 
10 practice in the Boise at that. 
11 Q. As a result of your discussion with Dr. 
12 O'Neil on those topics, do you believe you have 
13 actual knowledge of the standard of practice 
14 applicable to Dr. Kerr regarding the cleaning, 
15 disinfecting, and sterilizing of reusable surgical 
16 equipment in Boise in 2010? 
1 7 A. I'm sorry. Could you repeat that one 
18 more time? 
19 Q. I'm sorry. There's a lot there. A lot 
20 of it is just to comply with lots of things. 
21 Do you believe that as a result of your 
22 discussion with Dr. O'Neil regarding the topics of 
23 cle'aning, disinfecting, and sterilizing of 
24 reusable medical equipment that you actually have 



























do fat transfers?" "No, he doesn't." 
MR. JONES: Well, he didn't whether he was 
in Idaho, but he does them. I mean, when he had 
his conversation with -
THE COURT: Well, yeah, that he did not 
perform fat transfers in 2010 himself is a fair 
question. And it doesn't implicate all of these 
collateral matters that we would have to get into 
if we were going to have to be totally stirred off 
track into a discussion about Dr. O'Neil's issue. 
So I think we can deal with this 
cleanly. And since we've been dealing with this 
for a while, let's take a five-minute break and 
we'll resume. 
(Short break taken.) 
THE COURT: All right. Please proceed. 
MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. Before the break, Dr. Stiller, we had 
been discussing your conversation that you had had 
with Dr. O'Neil. Do you recall where we were at? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Basically, my question that 
I'm wanting you to answer to the jury is to 
discuss with them what you'learned as a result of 
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1 applicable to Dr. Kerr in Boise in 2010 on that 
2 issue? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. With respect to your own practice, 
5 doctor, your own office-based practice, are you 
6 certified -- is your facility certified in any 
7 way? 
8 A. It is not. 
9 Q. Now, I want to circle back for a minute 
10 to this discussion that you had with Dr. O'Neil. 
11 Did your discussion with Dr. O'Neil prior to June 
12 of 2003 include discussing whether or not his 
13 facility or facilities for cosmetic surgeons in 
14 Boise in 2010 were board certified? 
15 A. His -- Dr. O'Neil's was not, and he 
16 felt that the other non-plastic surgeon cosmetic 
1 7 physicians were not certified. 
18 Q. Did you have an occasion during that 
19 discussion to discuss with Dr. O'Neil, in addition 
2 O to the fact that the facility itself, the surgical 
21 facility, didn't have any requirements to be 
22 certified, whether the staff involved in cleaning, 
23 disinfecting, and sterilizing reusable surgical 
24 equipment were required to have any special 
25 certifications, licenses, designations? 
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1 A. I do not believe there is any 
2 certifications, licenses, or designations for a 
3 person who sterilizes equipment. 
4 Q. During your discussion with Dr. O'Neil, 
5 the time period we've focused on prior to June of 
6 2013, did you have a discussion regarding the care 
7 and treatment that was provided by Dr. Kerr to 
8 Krystal Ballard? 
9 A. One more time. I'm sorry. I lost you 
10 there. 
11 Q. Sure. I'm putting my preface -- all of 
12 my questions will be relating to the discussion 
13 that you shared with the jury with Dr. O'Neil 
14 prior to June of 2013. 
15 Did you have a discussion with him as 
16 part of your conversation about the care and 
17 treatment Dr. Kerr provided to Krystal Ballard in 
18 this case? 
19 A. We did. That was the focus of our 
20 conversation. 
21 Q. And if you could provide the jury, to 
22 the extent you haven't, with information about 
23 what you discussed. 
2 4 A. We discussed, first of all, the 
25 surgical procedures, what other non-plastic 
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1 BY MR. JONES: 
2 Q. All right. As a result of your 
3 conversation with Dr. O'Neil, did you learn of 
4 there being any significant differences between 
5 how things were done in Boise in 2010 and how you 
6 were doing things in your own cosmetic practice in 
7 2010? 
8 MR. HADDAD: Objection. Relevance to his 
9 practice, Your Honor, because he was not in this 
10 area in 2010. 
11 THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase your 
12 question. 
13 BY MR. JONES: 
14 Q. Dr. Stiller, as a result of your 
15 conversation with Dr. O'Neil, did you learn 
16 anything about the standard of practice in 2010 
1 7 that was different from how you were conducting 
18 your own practice at that time? 
19 MR. HADDAD: Same objection. 
20 THE COURT: Overruled. 
21 THE WITNESS: No. It is very similar to the 
22 way I practice. 
23 BY MR. JONES: 
24 Q. For example, do you know if Dr. O'Neil 
2 5 himself cleans his own instruments as a result of 
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1 cosmetic surgeons were doing, what kind of 
2 liposuction were they performing, whether it was 
3 laser liposuction, traditional liposuction, 
4 whether it was done under anesthesia or not, 
5 whether it was done just solely with the tumescent 
6 anesthesia. 
7 And it got more specifically involved 
8 in the case regarding the rendering of care that 
9 Dr. Kerr had performed as far as follow up 
10 whether, you know, it was necessary to do blood 
11 work post procedure or not. And we discussed 
12 those issues as well. And regarding the case 
13 itself, what he had thought as far as his --
14 Dr. Kerr's handling of this patient. 
15 Q. Now, as a result of your discussion, 
16 did you confirm that Dr. O'Neil was familiar with 
1 7 the standard of practice in Boise for cosmetic 
18 surgeons in 2010 regarding the performance of both 
19 liposuction and fat transfer procedures? 
20 MR. HADDAD: Objection; foundation. 
21 THE COURT: Overruled. 
22 MR. JONES: You may answer. 
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. Did I confirm that he 
24 had a knowledge of fat transfer as well as 
25 liposuction, yes. 
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1 your discussion with him, the conversation that 
2 you had with him? 
3 A. I don't know if we actually discussed 
4 whether he cleaned his own instruments. 
5 Q. Do you know whether or not he has a 
6 separate room, a standalone room that he uses to 
7 perform the -- or for his employees or himself to 
8 perform the cleaning, disinfecting, and 
9 sterilizing of his reusable medical equipment? 
10 A. He did not do the cleaning and 
11 sterilizing in the operating room. So, yes, it 
12 was in a separate room. 
13 Q. Okay. Do you know ifhe had --for 
14 example, if there was more than one sink, a 
15 dedicated sink that was used specifically for the 
16 purpose of one aspect, or more than one aspect, of 
1 7 the cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing of 
18 reusable medical equipment? 
19 A. He had a sink that he did it in. I 
2 O don't know if it was specifically just for that. 
21 Q. Now, you were asked in your deposition 
22 about the issue of spore counts. Do you remember 
23 you were taken -- a deposition was taken by Mr. 
24 Haddad. What is your understanding given your 
25 position in a cosmetic surgical practice that you 
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1 ·have in Moscow; do you take spore counts? 
2 A. I don't personally, but my tech does. 
3 Q. Do you have an understanding as to what 
4 spore counts do as it relates to bacteria? 
5 A. From what I understand, it's a 
6 biological marker so you are trying to see if 
7 there is any bacteria or spores left behind after 
8 you've done a sterilization process. 
9 Q. What is a spore? 
10 A. Basically, I define it like an egg, 
11 something that can grow into a bacterium. 
12 Q. Do you know whether or not a spore 
13 count will tell you if your autoclave is killing 
14 gram negative bacteria? 
15 A. Gram negatives don't cause spores. 
16 Q. Explain your answer. 
1 7 A. Spores are caused by gram positive 
18 bacteria, not gram negatives. 
19 Q. So to the extent there's been criticism 
20 advanced in this case by Dr. Sorensen that 
21 Dr. !<.err was not taking spore counts, do you have 
22 an opinion as to whether or not if Dr. Kerr had 
23 been taking spore counts, there would have been 
24 any identification of any gram negative bacteria; 
25 do you have an opinion? 
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1 cosmetic surgeon like Dr. Kerr practicing in Boise 
2 in 2010? 
3 A. I do. 
4 Q. And are you prepared to offer opinions 
5 to the jury today in this case based on your 
6 knowledge of this standard and your review of the 
7 case? 
8 A. I will. 
9 Q. All right. Now, I asked you to review 
10 some records and depositions in this case; did I 
11 not? 
12 A. You did. 
13 Q. And can you share with the jury, and to 
14 the extent you can recall, the items that you were 
15 asked to review. 
16 A. Sure. I was asked to review the 
17 depositions of Dr. Kerr, Mrs. Kerr, their daughter 
18 Brianna, Ms. Berg. I was asked to review the 
19 medical records from Elmore County, the ambulance 
20 transfer, the lifeflight records, St. Alphonsus' 
21 records, as well as the autopsy records. And I 
22 was given the -- part of the testimony of 
23 Dr. Sorensen from yesterday. 
24 Q. Did you also have the opportunity--
25 when you said "autopsy record," you mean the 
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1 A. Absolutely. 
2 Q. What is your opinion? 
3 A. My opinion is that gram negative rods 
4 or gram negatives do not give spores. Your spore 
5 count won't be elevated, changed, or anything, 
6 whether he checked it or not. They don't develop 
7 spores. 
8 Q. So regardless of whether Dr. Kerr or 
9 his facility had been keeping spore counts, it 
10 would not have had any bearing on his ability or 
11 inability to identify the presence of a gram 
12 negative bacteria; is that correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. Based on your answer a moment ago that 
15 you didn't learn anything new about the way things 
16 were done in Boise, is it a true statements that 
1 7 the opinions you are rendering here today are your 
18 opinions? 
19 A. They are. 
20 Q. As a result of your background, 
21 training, and experience in cosmetic surgery, 
22 including your discussion with Dr. O'Neil and your 
23 review of the medical records and the depositions 
2 4 in this case, do you believe you have actual 
25 knowledge of the standards of practice for a 
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1 coroner's records? 
2 A. Correct, I'm sorry. Yes. 
3 Q. Did you also have the opportunity to 
4 review any of the Air Force medical records? 
5 A. I looked at a part of the medical 
6 records of Ms. Ballard from the Air Force. 
7 Q. All right. And the portion of 
8 Dr. Sorensen's testimony was a portion of his 
9 cross-examination that was given in this trial, 
10 correct? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. All right. Now, I asked you to come to 
13 this court and discuss and explain to the jury the 
14 facts of the case, the standards of practice 
15 involving cosmetic surgery, and the cause of death 
16 of this patient; correct? 
1 7 A. Correct. 
18 Q. All right. I left out Dr. Kerr's 
19 records, Silk Touch records. 
20 A. Oh, yes. I did look at the Silk Touch 
21 records as well. 
22 Q. Now, I've agreed to reimburse you for 
23 your time spent away from your practice of 
24 medicine. You have a full-time practice in Moscow 
25 as you've shared, right? 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. You have staff and requirements to pay 
3 for your employees and your building and overhead, 
4 correct? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. All right. I've agreed to reimburse 
7 you for traveling and coming down here to Boise to 
8 testify and be involved in this case; have I not? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. And I'm reimbursing you at the rate of 
11 $5,000 for your time today to be away, to travel, 
12 and to be here today, correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. All right. Now, the opinions that you 
15 hold and that you are prepared to render today, do 
16 you hold those opinions to a reasonable degree of 
1 7 medical certainty? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. If at any point I ask you a question or 
20 you provide us an opinion that is not so based on 
21 reasonable certainty, would you please let me 
22 know? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 MR. JONES: Could the witness be handed 
25 those other exhibits, please? 
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1 as a weekly basis, I'll be doing three to ten, it 
2 depends.· 
3 As far as fat grafting, I would say 
4 really about 20 to 50 a year I will do some aspect 
5 of fat grafting, although, that is starting to 
6 increase with doing breast reconstruction because 
. 7 fat grafting for breast reconstruction is actually 
8 increasing. 
9 Q. Now, with respect to the fat grafting, 
1 O is fat transfers to the buttocks something that 
11 you do in your practice? 
12 A. It is, yes. 
13 Q. Okay. The other types of cosmetic 
14 procedures that you do, for example, are you 
15 involved ~n Botox or fillers and things like that? 
16 A. lam. 
1 7 Q. What else do you do in your practice, 
18 your strictly cosmetic practice? 
19 A. My strictly cosmetics, so for 
20 non-invasive, we are starting up a laser program. 
21 So I'll do laser hair removal as well as lesions 
22 on the face, blood vessels. 
23 As far as injectables, I do Botox, 
24 (inaudible), which is a different type botulism, 
25 toxin, (inaudible) -- (inaudible) -- sorry --
Page 74 
1 1HE COURT: Except I'm going to require that 
2 Exhibit 5, instead ofH be used. There is not 
3 sense in having duplicate Dr. Kerr records, so go 
4 ahead. 
5 MR. JONES: Just while that is being done, 
6 Your Honor, obviously, that wasn't going to be 
7 shown to the jury but there are differences. 
8 1HE COURT: Right. Please proceed. 
9 BY MR. JONES: 
10 Q. Now, let's talk just a little bit 
11 before we get into your opinions, Dr. Stiller, 
12 about your own experience performing cosmetic 
13 . surgery. 
14 Can you kind of describe for the jury a 
15 little bit about the frequency and volume of the 
16 type of procedure in this case, a liposuction, 
1 7 that was done and fat transfers, just kind of 
18 describe that and explain your experience to the 
19 jury. 
2 0 A. As far as liposuction is concerned, I 
21 do a lot of liposuctions because any time I do an 
22 aspect of a breast lift, a liposuction, some 
23 aspect ofit, obviously, with liposuction, all 
2 4 different parts of the body -- and any time I do a 
25 tummy tuck, I do liposuction as well -- so as far 
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1 which are fillers to pump up the face. However, 
2 almost every patient I have with a filler, I will 
3 actually transfer them into doing fat into their 
4 face because it's a longer lasting volumizer. 
5 Then starting from the head to toe, I 
6 do brow lifts, so I will do an incision across the 
7 forehead or just endoscopic. With the brow, I do 
8 blepharoplasties; facelifts; rhinoplasties; 
9 otoplasties, which are ears. 
10 I do transgenders, so I will do 
11 feminization to the face, tracheal shavings. I 
12 do -- as far as breasts, I do breast augmentation, 
13 breast reduction, gynecomastia with liposuction 
14 versus just excisions. Arms, liposuction of the 
15 arms. Liposuction just about everywhere. Tummy 
16 tucks. I'll do thigh lifts, butt lifts, back 
1 7 lifts. So if somebody has loose skin, we can 
18 pretty much lift it someplace. 
19 Q. Let's talk about the types of patients 
20 that you have. Are all of the patients that you 
21 see on your cosmetic practice, are they just 
22 trying to fight the effects of time or are they 
23 there for other reasons? 
24 A. Well, everybody does it for different 
25 reasons. The majority of the reasons -- well, I 
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1 ·guess, everybody does it for different reasons. 
2 You will have patients that just have a 
3 crink in their nose and never liked it or they 
4 don't want to look like their mom anymore, so we 
5 do it from that standpoint. 
6 And certainly, ageing is a process, but 
7 you look at the age range where we do cosmetic 
8 surgery. The youngest person I've done an 
9 operation on was 16 years old where I did a breast 
10 reduction versus the oldest person has been 86 and 
11 I did a facelift on her, so it's a wide range for 
12 different reasons. 
13 Q. Your cosmetic patients include trauma 
14 victims? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Cancer victims? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Do--
19 A. Well, I should say that they may have 
2 0 had cancer, but they are not seeing me for that 
21 cosmetic reason typically. I consider that part 
22 ofmy general surgical practice. 
23 Q. Is there an art to what you do as a 
24 cosmetic surgeon? 
25 A. It's all art. 
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1 A. That, as well as working in the 
2 hospital, we have to do medical reviews on charts 
3 all the time. 
4 · Q. All right. So this isn't the first 
5 instance where you've been asked to look at 
6 somebody's records and discuss the care? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. All right. Now, on that topic, have 
9 you ever testified before in a court in any 
10 fashion? 
· 11 A. I have not, no. ·· · · 
12 Q. Have I ever asked you to review a case 
13 for myself or my office ever before? 
14 A. Justthis one. 
15 Q. Now, with respect to Dr. Kerr's 
16 records, which you were handed Exhibit 5, and I'll 
1 7 ask you to have those records handy so we can 
18 discuss a little bit of the care. 
19 Have you got Exhibit 5 handy? 
20 °A. Yes. 
21 Q. Now, anytime you need to refer to those 
22 exhibits that you've been provided with to address 
23 some ofmy questions, they've been admitted 
24 exhibits and feel free to do so. 
25 Now, you are aware in this ·case, 
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1 Q. Describe to the jury what you mean by 
2 that. 
3 A. It's art in a lot of different ways in 
4 just the way you deal with a patient trying to 
5 understand what they are trying to really achieve. 
6 Because most people can say, "I don't like this," 
7 but they don't know what it is they don't like. 
8 So just the art of trying to get a patient to 
9 relate to you what they want. 
1 O When you get into the surgical 
11 procedure, especially with liposuction, the goal 
12 of liposuction isn't taking away the fat. It's 
13 sculpting the body. It is all art. 
14 And then when you get into the fat 
15 grafting aspect ofit, trying to change the 
16 buttock in a different way, it depends on the 
1 7 individual. You talk about African American 
18 woman, they will want it differently than a 
19 Hispanic or Caucasian woman. They all want it 
2 O differently and it's all an artistic approach on 
21 how to reach that. 
22 Q. Now, with respect to your practice and 
23 the types of patients that you treat, do you have 
24 occasion to review medical records from other 



























doctor, that the patient first presented on 
July 13, 2010? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And she was there for a pre-op 
evaluation and discussion? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. Based on your review of the 
records of that encounter with Silk Touch and the 
staff and folks there, did you see any evidence or 
indication that the patient had a health concern 
of any kind? 
A. She doesn't mark any and none is noted. 
Q. Is there anything that indicates she 
was sick or infected at that time? 
A. There was not. 
Q. All right. Now, have you Exhibit O in 
front of you, which the jury has seen those 
photographs yesterday, the preoperative 
photographs were taken of Krystal Ballard. 
Do you see anything in those 
photographs, and I believe there are 21 of them, 
anything in those photographs that would in any 
way disqualify or raise a red flag of concern for 
doing a liposuction or fat transfer procedure on 
Krystal Ballard? 
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1 A. I apologize. I will look at these real 
2 quickly. The only ones I had were photocopies. 
3 Q. Okay. So, these are the color ones. 
4 And while you are doing that, doctor, why don't 
5 you explain --
6 THE COURT: Wait until he can answer his 
7 question. 
8 THE WITNESS: No. She actually looks like a 
9 great candidate for both liposuction and fat 
10 grafting. 
11 BY MR. JONES: 
12 Q. And what I was going to ask you, what 
13 are you looking at when you are looking at those 
14 pictures? 
15 A. Sure. So when you are looking at it, 
16 and specifically, when rm looking at the abdomen, 
1 7 what rm looking for is whether there's any 
18 stretch marks or if there's any scarring that 
19 might be going across -- having had a previous 
20 appendectomy or abdominal operation to make it a 
21 little more challenging as far as that is 
22 concerned. Looking at the areas of adiposity and 
23 what she is trying to achieve as far as her fast . 
24 grafting. rm looking at all of those 
25 possibilities. Now, when I look at somebody that 
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1 Q. All right. Do you have -- I would like 
2 you to tum to that page in the record, if you 
3 could. And what I'm interested in sharing with 
4 the jury is based on your view of these records. 
5 . Do you see anything in the records, 
6 including in that the deposition testimony that 
7 you've reviewed and considered for Dr. Kerr and 
8 his staff, which at that point in time as of the 
9 date of surgery, would raise any red flags or 
10 concern about Krystal Ballard undergoing this 
11 liposuction fat transfer? 
12 A. No. As far as her candidacy in the 
13 procedure itself, it looks like everything went 
14 just as you would expect.. 
15 Q. Now, with respect to your knowledge of 
16 the standard of practice in Boise, an issue has 
1 7 been raised in this case regarding the taking of a 
18 complete blood count or additional laboratory work 
19 prior to a patient, like Krystal Ballard, 
20 undergoing liposuction. 
21 And I would like you -- first of all, 
22 do you have an opinion on whether or not any 
23 preoperative testing of any kind was required by 
24 the standard of practice on Krystal Ballard? 
25 A . . No. And _.:. 
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1 has darker skin, I'm always more apt to say they 
2 are a great candidate for liposuction if they 
3 don't have any significant loose skin because 
4 their skin bounces back so much better than a 
5 Caucasian individual does. 
6 Q. So in your experience, you have seen a 
7 difference in the quality of the outcome depending 
8 on the race of the patient? 
9 A. Oh, absolutely. Somebody that is 
10 Caucasian, I may not offer liposuction to. I 
11 would rather do a tummy tuck than do liposuction 
12 because of the quality of their skin. 
13 Q. And was it your opinion in looking at 
14 those that the patient was what, as far as 
15 qualified or not qualified? 
16 A. She was phenomenal and would be a great 
17 candidate for liposuction and fat transfer. 
18 Q. Now, again, keeping in mind Dr. Kerr's 
19 records, when the patient came in, you understand 
20 the procedure was done later in July? 
21 A. Yes. · · 
22 Q. Do you know what day it was? 
23 A. I believe it was the 23rd. 
24 Q. 21st. 
25 A. 21. I'm sony. 
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1 Q. I asked you if you have an opinion. 
2 A. Yes, I have an opinion. 
3 Q. All right. And what is your opinion? 
4 A. My opinion is that as far as the 
5 standard of practice with people doing that, 
6 again, discussing that with Dr. O'Neil, a CBC, I 
7 don't think is necessary or any urinalysis 
8 beforehand. 
9 Now in my own clinical practice, I will 
10 judge on -- depending on how much fat I'm going to 
11 · be taking out on whether I will actually take 
12 out -- whether I will do a blood count beforehand 
13 on somebody who is a low volume, which is what she 
14 is. I wouldn't check the blood count. 
15 As far as a urinalysis, the only reason 
16 to do that is was she symptomatic. And she never 
1 7 expressed any symptoms of a urinary tract 
18 infection. So I wouldn't do that as a standard 
19 practice. I don't do it for my hernia repairs. 
2 O Q. Now, just to make sure that the jury 
21 understands, describe for them what a complete 
22 blood count is and what that infonnation gives you 
23 as a physician. 
24 A. When you looking at a complete blood 
25 count, you are looking at your white blood cells, 
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1 your hematocrit, which is a measure of what the 
2 hemoglobin is. It's three times normal 
3 hemoglobin, and your platelet count. 
4 And it will give you a bunch of other 
5 information regarding what size are the cells to 
6 tell you whether you have any iron deficiency 
7 anemia or they have something else going on. So 
8 in a young individual, really the pertinency of it 
9 is really low because you are not worried about 
10 them having a GI bleed anywhere else or having 
11 anemia for an unknown reason, especially in a 
12 healthy individual. 
13 . Q. Now, do you - as part of your practice 
14 in Idaho, do you routinely perform whether it's 
15 complete blood counts, urinalysis, a blood 
16 culture, a urine culture, anything like that on a 
1 7 patient such as Krystal Ballard? 
18 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, I would just object 
19 to relevancy. We have not make a claim that a 
20 preoperative CBC urinalysis condition exists. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. so·why are we discussing 
22 this, Counsel. 
23 MR. JONES: It was an issue that was raised 
24 by Dr. Sorensen as I understand his testimony --



























Q. And is that somebody that -- are they a 
physician or a physician's assistant, or what is 
their background? 
A. No. It's a surgical scrub. Whenever 
we do operations, we surgeons need someone to hold 
our hands. That is what a surgical scrub does. 
Basically, they are the people who pass 
us instruments. They prep the patient to make 
sure everything is ready for us in the operating 
room. And then at the end of the procedure, they 
are the ones who cleans everything. · .· · -
In a hospital, we will send it to a 
central supply or central area and you will have 
somebody who all they will do is clean 
instruments. And in a office-based setting or 
surgery center, your surgical scrubs will be the 
one who clean the instruments and put it them in 
the autoclave for you. 
Q. I want to talk about a little bit more 
in depth about this procedure used by Dr. Kerr at 
his office for cleaning, disinfecting, and 
sterilizing the equipment, the reusable medical 
equipment that would be used in, for example, 
liposuction, such as was done on Krystal Ballard. 




















































give a little leeway. Let's finish on the key 
issues, that would be great. 
MR. JONES: This will be the last question. 
THE WITNESS: So on a patient like Krystal 
Ballard, no. 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q. And we'll move on, Doctor. 
What is your understanding in this case 
as to how Dr. Kerr cleaned, disinfected, and 
sterilized his reusable medical equipment? 
A. As far as cleaning and disinfecting, he 
used Hibiclens and an alcohol solution. And for 
the cleaning aspect, he used some type of 
enzymatic cleaner after that. And then he put it 
in a steam autoclave to autoc18.Ve it. ·· -
Q. And is enzymatic cleaner, is that 
synonymous to you as a detergent? 
A. Basically that's what it is. 
Q. Is that similar to how you clean 
equipment? 
A. I don't clean equipment. It's similar 
to how my staff does it for me. 
Q. And who do you have that cleans your 
equipment at your office-based practice? 
A. My surgical scrub. 
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understanding of what is happening at each of 
these stages, the cleaning, disinfecting, and 
sterilization. 
A. Sure. So you can kind of look at it a 
couple of different ways. I'll attribute it to 
kind of washing your dishes; okay. 
You eat your dinner. You get your 
dish. You run it over water. You run water over 
it. That is your cleaning. Your disinfecting 
would be like taking the soap and putting a scrub 
brush on it and brushing it. That is your 
disinfecting. 
So you are looking at taking away the 
gross contamination and then scrubbing it further 
would be the disinfecting aspect where you are 
trying to get more of the process out, more of 
whatever is left behind out. And then you are 
going to put it in the dishwasher, your 
sterilizer, which is going to then further.clean 
it. 
The sterilizer, the dishwasher is 
really the one that really cleans it. 
Q. Now, describe to the jury, they've 
heard a little bit about there term Hibiclens. 
Briefly, what is Hibiclens? 
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1 A. It's basically !1 soap product, an 
2 antibacterial soap. 
3 Q. So based on your testimony, the process 
4 is remove gross debris, try to clean off the 
5 equipment; but it's the third process that is the 
6 key process? 
7 A. The sterilization, correct. 
8 Q. Okay. Is there any magic solution, to 
9 your knowledge, that is required to either clean 
10 or disinfect reusable medical equipment? 
11 A. I wish there were, but no there isn't. 
12 Q. What is the goal you are trying to 
13 achieve prior to placing your reusable medical 
14 equipment into a autoclave? 
15 A. Is taking away gross contamination. 
16 Q; Now, another issue that -- my memory 
1 7 is -- was raised during Dr. Sorenson's testimony 
18 on direct during the plaintiffs case, had to do 
19 with the existence or lack of existence of written 
20 policies or procedures regarding the cleaning, 
21 disinfecting, and sterilization of reusable 
22 medical equipment. 
23 Do you yourself at your practice in 
24 Moscow, Idaho, your office~based surgical 
25 practice, do you have any such written policies or 
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1 this case regarding an autoclave, and I would like 
2 you to give the jury based on your understanding, 
3 a brief discussion and description of an 
4 autoclave. 
5 A. So an autoclave, there are multiple 
6 different types. And the main type and what 
7 really is mostly used in facility, especially in 
8 office-based surgery center is steam autoclave. 
9 So it's using water rather than gas; 
1 O okay. And what you are doing is you are putting 
11 your instruments in there and you're and heating 
12 it and pressuring it to a certain temperature and 
13 pressure that will kill bacteria. 
14 And if it maintains at that pressure 
15 for 15 minutes, all the bacteria will be gone. 
16 And that's the whole point is to kill the bacteria 
1 7 or fry them. 
18 Q. Do you use an autoclave in your 
19 office-based practice? 
20 A. Ido. 
21 Q. All right. What - you used the term 
22 "fry." What is your understanding-when you use 
23 that term you say it kills everything that's on 
2 4 the instrument? 
25 A. That's the whole point. 
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1 procedures? 
2 A. We do not at this time. 
3 Q. Does the absence of written policies or 
4 procedures concerning the cleaning, disinfecting, 
5 and sterilization of reusable medical equipment 
6 impact the ability of your staff to clean the 
7 equipment? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. What is your understanding as to the 
1 O basis for having it in writing? 
11 A. The only reason I would put it in 
12 writing is ifl was going for standardization or 
13 getting certification for my operative procedure, 
14 in on my office-based procedure room. 
15 Q. So in other words, if you wanted to 
16 certify your facility as a surgical center? 
17 A. Correct or office-based surgery. 
18 Q. There is it a requirement that you have 
19 these written policies? 
20 A. Basically that's what certification is. 
21 It's a requirement for policies. 
22 Q. It doesn't mean that you don't have one 
23 in terms of what the staff do? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Now, there's been some discussion in 
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1 Q. All right. It doesn't segregate as to 
2 what it kills and what it doesn't. The idea is to 
3 kill everything? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. Do you use a chemical indicator with 
6 your autoclave? 
7 A. I do. 
8 Q. What is the purpose of using a chemical 
9 indicator? 
1 O A. So the chemical indicator is to tell 
11 you that it's reached the temperature that is 
12 appropriate for sterilization. 
13 Q. Does the presence of the indicator help 
14 to tell you whether or not the autoclave is 
15 working properly? 
16 A. It tells you that you have reached 
1 7 adequate temperature, so yes. 
18 Q. Now, the autoclaves that exists, do 
19 they just have -- for example, are you aware of 
2 O the type of autoclave that Dr. Kerr has? 
21 A. I'm aware that it's a steam autoclave, 
22 correct. 
23 Q. Now, in your experience with 
24 autoclaves, do you just have a start button or 
25 will it tell you whether it's run a cycle or do 
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1 · ·you know? 
2 A. In all honesty, I've never started an 
3 autoclave mysel£ 
4 Q. Okay. Fair enough. With respect to 
5 these chemical indicators, you indicated that they 
6 help to tell you whether or not three things have 
7 happened. It's time, temperature, and pressure. 
8 A. Well as far as pressure, pressure is 
9 going to - depending on the pressure, it's going 
10 to depend on how hot the temperature has to. get. 
11 So you change the temperature --you cha11ge the 
12 pressure, it's going to change the temperature you 
13 have to good to. 
14 As far as the chemical indicators and 
15 what they indicate is only that it has reached 
16 temperature. That's all it indicates. It doesn't 
1 7 tell you time. It doesn't tell you pressure. 
18 But, then again, pressure is going to be related 
19 to temperature. 
20 Q. All right. In Dr. Sorenson's testimony 
21 cross-examination before this jury, he was asked 
22 this question. This is on page 14 of his 
23 cross-examination. 
24 "QUESTION: Is there any temperature 
25 degree that you are safe in concluding will kill a 
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1 you have an opinion? 
2 A. If there was -
3 Q. Do you have an opinion? 
4 A. Do I have an opinion, yes. 
5 Q. What is your opinion? 
6 A. My opinion is if there was some 
7 indication to say his autoclave was broken, he 
8 should have somebody come fix it. If there is no 
9 indication that it's broken, there is no need to 
10 check. 
· 11 Q. -In your own practice you indicate you 
12 don't clean your instruments in Moscow, correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. In your discussion with Dr. O'Neil, in 
15 your knowledge and experience as a cosmetic 
16 surgeon, in your opinion, does the standard of 
1 7 healthcare practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in 
18 Boise in 2010 require that he personally be the 
19 one handing the cleaning, disinfecting, and 
20 sterilization of his reusable medical equipment? 
21 A. No. I don't believe it requires him to 
22 do it. 
23 Q. Did the standard of practice require 
24 Dr. Kerr to have any of his employees certified in 
25 any fashion in order for them to be able to clean, 
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1 bacteria? 
2 "ANSWER: I don't think that number is 
3 available." 
4 Q. Do you agree with Dr. Sorensen? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Can you explain to the jury why? 
7 A. Because depending on your pressure, if 
8 you are at a pressure of 26, usually it's between 
9 26 PSI and 30. At 26 PSI, you have to be at a 
10 temperature of 121 celsius. At 30 PSI, you have 
11 to be at 130 degree celsius. 
12 So actually, it's well documented on 
13 what pressure you have to be at. That's why the 
14 chemical indicators are made. 
15 Q. So if you achieve that pressure and 
16 that temperature, you have achieved sterility? 
17 A. As long as it lasts 15 minutes. 
18 Q. Another issue that Dr. Sorensen raised 
19. had to do with whether or not Dr. Kerr needed to 
20 have a third party come in and handle checking up 
21 on his autoclave or servicing his autoclave. 
22 Do you have an opinion in this case as 
23 to whether or not the standard of practice 
24 required Dr. Kerr to have some third party 
25 involved in that fashion with his autoclave? Do 
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1 sterilize, and disinfect his reusable medical 
2 equipment? 
3 A. I don't believe there is any 
4 certification for that. 
5 Q. Now, you likened cleaning, 
6 disinfecting, and sterilization to the use of the 
7 dishwasher at home. When you were in the military 
8 in the Air Force, did you have to perform 
9 sterilization in a field setting? 
10 A. When I was at Mountain Home, I was on 
11 the -- I was deployable, which means -- and it was 
12 right after 9/11, so obviously, they geared us all 
13 up to ship. And Mountain Home at the point in 
14 time was a base where the whole base could up and 
15 move and you would have a whole fighting team 
16 because we had the bombers and everything. So as 
1 7 the surgeon, yeah. They sent me to all kinds of 
18 training to do that. 
19 I had to do something called C4, which 
20 is combat, casualty, and something training. And 
21 during that we had to set up a tent and we had to 
22 set up an autoclave as well. Did I run the 
23 autoclave myself? Did I do the cleaning? No. 
24 Again, I had scrub techs there, but I was in the 
25 process of - I was with the process of setting up 
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1 the operating room and having that all available 1 with his disclosure, which predated --
2 for us while. 2 THE COURT: Which I've read. 
3 We were there it was actually the same 3 11:R. JONES: -- a deposition. 
4 equipment we would deploy with. 4 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to 
5 Q. And this was out in a field setting, 5 allow him to respond to the question. The 
6 not inside a building somewhere? 6 objection is overruled. 
7 A. It was in a tent. 7 BY 11:R. JONES: 
8 Q. And you were able to reach sterility? 8 Q. I'd asked you if you had occasion to 
9 A. As best as we can in a tent, yes. 9 see that document. 
10 Q. During Dr. Kerr's examination by the 10 A. I have. 
11 plaintiff, he was asked about a manual that exists 11 11:R. JONES: All right. And I don't remember 
12 for the V aser machine? 12 which exhibit that was of yours, counsel. 
13 A. Okay. 13 Could I have the overhead? If the 
14 Q. A sound surgical technology manual. 14 witness could be handed Exhibit 48. 
15 Have you had an opportunity chance to see that 15 BY 11:R. JONES: 
16 manual? 16 Q. Now, there were two sections that were 
17 A. I have. 17 discussed with Dr. Kerr. One had to do with the 
18 11:R. HADDAD: Your Honor, this was not 18 fragmentation hand piece and the other had to do 
19 provided to him prior to his deposition. We've 19 with the Vaser System Ventex Control Users guide. 
20 had no supplementation on any opinions regarding 20 And for ease of use so you don't have 
21 the significance or lack of significance of the 21 to dig through there and find it, I'm going to put 
22 V aser manual. It was produced in discovery by the 22 them up on the overhead. One is page 8 of 14. . 
23 defendants long ago. It was available. They 23 And ifl remember the instructions the judge gave 
24 didn't provide it to him. 24 me, ifl zoom in, it will get better. And it 
25 11:R. JONES: Your Honor, this is consistent 25 does. 
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1 The other page that talks about 1 practice applicable to Dr. Kerr in Boise in 2010, 
2 cleaning and sterilization, you've seen both guys; 2 was he required to clean, disinfect, and sterilize 
3 haven't you? 3 his reusable surgical equipment as is discussed on 
4 A. I have. 4 this overhead document? 
5 Q. All right. Now, the representation was . 5 A. Well, he did on the second portion, not 
6 made in questioning of Dr. Kerr that this manual 6 the first portion. And that being said, we've 
7 in that second, I guess, it would be the third 7 already discussed there is no magical wash, so he 
8 paragraph in the first sentence as well up at the 8 did follow within the standard of care. 
9 top where it says, "This section described 9 Q. Okay. 
10 cleaning procedures and sterilization procedures 10 A. Or standard of practice, excuse me. 
11 and must be used to ensure clean system." Do you 11 Q. Thank you. That's all I have for that 
12 see that? 12 document. 
13 A. I do. 13 Now, during the surgery -- get us back 
14 Q. And then you go down to the fourth 14 to our time line here on July 21, 2010. I want you 
15 paragraph where it says, "Follow the cleaning 15 to assume that Dr. Kerr utilized reusable medical 
1~ procedures and guidelines recommended by your 16 equipment during the liposuction and fat transfer 
17 institution. The following are guidelines that 17 which had been cleaned, disinfected, and 
18 may be used in conjunction with your institution's 18 sterilized as he described in his deposition as 
19 procedures and guidelines." Did I read that 19 we've discussed here today. All right? 
20 correctly? 20 A. Okay. 
21 A; I believe so. 21. Q. All right. Now, with that assumption, 
22 Q. All right. Now, my question to you 22 you are aware of the autopsy findings in this case 
23 regarding these two documents, which are 23 that observe the presence of gram negative 
24 identical, is simply this: Based on your · 24 bacteria; are you not? 
25 understan_ding of the standard of healthcare 25 A. lam. 
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1 Q. All right. And the jury already has 
2 some idea of gram negative bacteria, but just so 
3 they know you know, can you just in a nutshell 
4 tell us what gram negative bacteria are. 
5 A. So again we talk about two different 
6 types of staining for bacteria, negative and 
7 positive. Gram negative bacteria are a class of 
8 organisms that can be both aerobic and anaerobic. 
9 Anaerobic means can't use -- it will die in the 
1 O presence of oxygen. Aerobic means it has to _have 
11 oxygen. 
12 So when you talk about a gram negative 
13 rod, it could be E coli or bacteroides or it could 
14 be pseudomonas so that is basically what you talk 
15 about with gram negatives. 
16 Q. So there are different types? 
1 7 A. There are. 
18 Q. All right. Is there a more common type 
19 of gram negative bacteria that you are aware of? 
20 A. The most common types, at least on 
21 humans, in humans would be E coli's and 
22 bacteroides. 
23 Q. And the jury has heard that they live 
2 4 in the h:ttestinal track. · 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 of contaminated reusable surgical instruments from 
2 Dr. Kerr's office being used on Krystal Ballard. 
3 You are aware of that? 
4 A. lam. 
5 Q. All right. Do you have an opinion in 
6 this case whether or not the gram negative 
7 bacteria found on Krystal Ballard came from 
8 contaminated reusable medical instruments by 
9 Dr. Kerr? 
10 A. I do have an opinion. 
-11- · ·· -- ··Q:-what 1s your opm1on? -- --· - · ·· 
12 A. That that is incorrect. 
13 Q. What is your opinion based on? 
14 A. In order -- well, there's multiple 
15 different ways of looking at it. 
16 As far as the process of sterilization, 
1 7 we know that a chemical marker was done so we've 
18 reached sterilization as far as the temperature is 
19 . concerned. As long as the machine basically said 
2 0 that it was adequate time, all the autoclave · · 
21 machines will have a register on it saying whether 
22 it has reached adequate time or not. So by that 
23 definition, it's been sterilized; okay.· , 
24 Spore counts don't matter. It's a gram 




1 Q. All right. Are bacteria capable, in 
2 your opinion, Doctor, from being killed or 
3 eliminated from reusable surgical equipment? 
4 A. That's the whole point of 
5 sterilization, yes. 
6 Q. Is that the whole point of the 
7 autoclave? 
8 A. That is the whole point of the 
9 autoclave. 
10 Q. All right. And I have this question 
11 for you, Doctor: Is the presence of gram negative 
12 bacteria being found at the autopsy of 
13 Krystal Ballard at her buttock, is that proof to 
14 you that Dr. Kerr did ·anything wrong? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Explain your answer, please. 
1 7 A. Gram negative rods or gram negative 
18 bacteria can come at any point in time. It's in 
19 your stool. If she wiped herself in the wrong way 
20 and put her hand on her buttock, it can go into 
21 the wound. So it isn't directly applicable to the 
22 surgical therapy. 
23 Q. Now, Dr. Sorensen has rendered the 
24 opinion that he believes the patient became 
25 infected with gram negative bacteria as a result 
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1 liposuction and removing all of that tissue, and . 
2 then injecting it back in, as far as it being done 
3 sterilely, a gram negative rod coming from the 
4 colon to the uria or from one of his equipment, I 
5 don't see how it can happen. 
6 G Let alone the fact of that no pertinent ~ 
7 r persistent infections in the office. There is · 
8 o history of the fact that --
9 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained, and we'll address it. 
11 . MR. HADDAD: Thank you. --
12 THE COURT: All right. We'll break for the 
13 noon recess. Please remember my usual reminder 
14 and I will see you at I :30. 
15 (Jury Leaves.) 
16 THE COURT: Is there some reason why you did 
1 7 not tell your witness about the order in limine? 
18 THE WITNESS: He did; I apologize. 
19 THE COURT: Well, that may not be 
20 sufficient. 
21 MR. HADDAD: Well, Your Honor, at this time 
22 we are obligated, based upon the discussion with 
23 the Court earlier and the clear mandate by this 
24 Court on this very issue, not on other issues, 
25 this very issue, that if the issue of persistent 
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1 ·history of infections or lack of infections came 
2 into this trial, that the Court would grant a 
3 mistrial and award attorneys' fees, costs, and 
4 expenses to the party that had violated that 
5 order. This is a clear violation of that order. 
6 Based upon the activities in this 
7 trial, I am suspect as to the serendipity of that 
8 statement being made in the presence of this jury 
9 by this witness, but we move for a mistrial at 
1 O this point in time, Your Honor, and ask you to -
11 enforce your admonition to these parties as you 
12 made earlier and on numerous occasions. 
13 MR. JONES: Your Honor, first of all, I did 
14 make that discussion on more than one occasion 
15 with this particular witness. So to the extent it 
16 came out, I'll take responsibility for it; he's my 
1 7 witness. But the discussion was had and was had 
18 more than once. 
19 I would like to see exactly what the 
2 0 witness said, so I can better comment on it to the 
21 judge on the issue of grounds for a mistrial. I 
22 do know that when this judge - when Your Honor 
23 talked about this initially, the issue ofcosts 
24 and attorney fees and granting a mistrial was in 
25 response to bringing up the issue of whether the 
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1 the first day of the trial. And I specifically 
2 reviewed the testimony relating to the absence of 
3 other infections. 
4 I discussed in general terms the 
5 general rule that the absence of other accidents 
6 is not generally admissible to prove the absence 
7 of negligence in a particular case. There are 
8 exceptions, and those exceptions require a 
9 foundation of a significant nature to establish 
10 why the evidence would be relevant and admissible 
11 in a particular case. 
12 As our discussion on that issue 
13 continued, I was advised by plaintiff's counsel 
14 that they had not been provided the underlying 
15 data that went into the summary that there had, in 
16 fact; been no other infections. The failure to 
1 7 provide the data, which would support the 
18 conclusion, then played directly into my decision 
19 to grant the order in limine with respect to the 
20 absence of other infections as being not 
21 permissible and to direct counsel not to address 
22 that unless we had a discussion outside the 
23 presence of the jury and a foundation was laid. 
24 But it was particularly of concern to 
25 me that the u~derlying records had not been 
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1 patient was going to remarry. 
2 Now, I know there was subsequent 
3 discussions about the issue of other infections, 
4 and I don't believe what this witness just 
5 testified to and what he said --
6 THE COURT: I said there was not to be any 
7 reference to any·other infections. 
8 I don't see I have any choice but to 
9 grant a mistrial. And I will address the costs 
10 and attorney fees later, but it seems to me that 
11 this was something I addressed specifically. I 
12 said take it up outside the presence of the jury. 
13 This is a serious violation of the , 
14 Court's prior order, and I don't see the Court has 
.15 any choice but to grant counsel's request for a 
16 mistrial. 
1 7 MR. KERR: Your Honor, can I --
18 MR. JONES: No. No. 
19 THE COURT: We'll recess. I'll see you all 
20 at 1:30. 
21 (Court recessed, lunch break.) 
22 (Proceedings had outside the presence of the 
23 jury.) 
24 THE COURT: I have reviewed extensively all 
25 of the orders and arguments in limine that we had 
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1 provided to the plaintiffs so that the plaintiffs 
2 could independently verify whether that was a 
3 conclusion which could be drawn from the records. 
4 So there were a number of -- there were a number 
5 of problems that were flagged that were discussed 
6 by counsel on the first day of trial. 
7 And at approximately 2:40 in the 
8 afternoon on the first day of trial, I said I'm 
9 granting an order in limine and I will not allow 
10 evidence of absence of other infections. And I 
11 expressly outlined the normal procedure to follow 
12 when counsel wants that revisited, which is draw 
13 my attention outside the presence of the jury and 
14 we would discuss it. But it was particularly 
15 critical because of the failure to disclose the 
16 underlying data. 
1 7 I am therefore declaring a mistrial in 
18 this case, and I will award expert witness's cost 
19 to be paid to the plaintiff prior to the retrial. 
20 And I will ask counsel that you take a 
21 look at your calendars and see when you would next 
22 be available. I know you will have to meet with 
23 various witnesses and consult with them so we can 
24 have -- so that we can proceed. 
25 MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, are you only 
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1 ·awarding expert witness costs? 
2 THE COURT: I'm awarding expert witness 
3 fees. I'm reserving the issue on attorney fees. 
4 I'm not denying it. I said that it was something 
5 that I would consider if my orders in limine were 
6 violated, and I will consider it. I just, at the 
7 very outset, I think at a minimum, the plaintiff's 
8 experts -- because we have to retry this -- that 
9 is a fair cost. 
10 MR. HADDAD: I'm going to let Mr. McKay 
11 speak to other issues, but I would ask, at least 
12 at this juncture understanding the Court's holding 
13 a ruling on attorney's fees, that we likewise be 
14 reimbursed other ancillary costs associated. 
15 Meaning, obviously, Mr. Ballard had to travel 
16 here. I did with my paralegal. We have stayed in 
1 7 a hotel. Those kind of costs as well. 
18 THE COURT: I think you can submit all 
19 appropriate costs. I'm not denying them. I'm 
2 O only reserving them so you can submit those. 
21 MR.McKAY: Your Honor, could !just be 
22 heard on the issue of a mistrial? Frankly, we 
23 find ourselves in an untenable position here. On 
24 the one hand we've been grossly prejudiced by 



























MR. McKAY: If I could just be heard 
briefly, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Sure. I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
MR. McKAY: He's active duty in the United 
States Air Force. He is stationed in Florida. 
You heard testimony about him being deployed 
overseas. He has no control over that. He is 
entitled to justice here. And delaying this --
delaying this, delays justice. And it's wrong 
what they did. It's a pattern that we've seen 
throughout this trial. 
And giving him a new trial at some 
undetermined date in the future, which permits 
them to recalibrate, to have the advantage of 
having seen our case, to provide us, I assume, 
with the data that they wouldn't otherwise provide 
us, to having a do-over at a time when the 
evidence has come in, it's not fair. 
And I think that there are -- I think 
there are other sanctions available to this Court. 
This Court can strike their defenses and order 
that this case go to the jury on damages. I think 
that would be an appropriate sanction given the 
conduct that occurred here and the conduct that 
has occurred throughout this trial. 
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1 clearly not to be offered during this trial. 
2 On the other hand, a mistrial benefits 
3 these defendants --
4 THE COURT: Well, that's why I tried to --
5 by the award of costs, tried to avoid as much as I 
6 can with. that and minimize that because I do think 
7 that's one of the terrible consequences. 
8 MR. McKAY: I understand. And it benefits 
9 these lawyers and -- but there's other 
10 consequences besides just the costs. 
11 THE COURT: I know, counsel, and I will tell 
12 you, that this is something I rarely do. And I 
13 don't want to do it, but I don't think there's any 
14 way around it. 
15 This is a grossly prejudicial issue to 
16 raise particularly when the underlying data has 
' 1 7 not been disclosed to the other side. It's simply 
18 a bell that can't be unrung. 
19 And I will consider any other 
20 additional requests you have, but I think that 
21 it's so tainting to a jury that it really can't --
22 this is the only sensible way to address it. 
23 MR. McKAY: But Charles Ballard, he is 
24 active duty --
25 THE COURT: I know and I --
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1 I heard counsel say he didn't mean for 
2 it to happen, but that witness was two sentences 
3 into describing what happened before we had to 
4 stand up and stop him. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I agree with you, counsel. 
6 And it's -- I mean, I definitely agree with you 
7 that it's terribly unfair to be in this situation. 
8 And I -- that is one of the reasons why I think 
9 it's imperative that the plaintiff's costs for 
10 experts and attorney's fees and incidental costs 
11 be paid prior to the next proceeding. 
12 But the reason I'm granting a mistriai 
13 is because I think it's so unfairly damaging to 
14 your case that it's just something that I can't 
15 remedy with an instruction. And I think it could 
16 potentially pollute your suggested remedy, which 
1 7 · is not a remedy I considered, I admit. 
18 I think there would be circumstances 
19 where maybe that would be reasonable. But I think 
20 there are things that can so pollute a case, and I 
21 think this is one of them. That's why I felt so 
22 strongly about it on the first day of trial. 
23 There are things that when they pollute a case, 
24 they pollute the entire part of the case. 
25 So I won't bar you from addressing 
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1 anything else additional that you want to consider 
2 by way of sanctions, but I am going to declare a 
3 mistrial. And I will -- your case will have the 
4 absolute priority on my calendar. You will have 
5 priority over any proceeding. I will do 
6 everything possible to minimize the harm to 
7 Sergeant Ballard. · 
8 MR. McKAY: Thank you, Your Honor, and I'll 
9 just make the Court. aware that we will also be 
10 moving that these lawyers be disqualified from 
11 representing these defendants. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. We'll address all of 
13 that. 
14 MR.McKAY: They should not benefit from a 
15 new trial. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I won't bar you from 
1 7 anywhere you want to take this discussion. 
18 MR. McKAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's bring 
2 0 the jury back and we'll excuse them. 
21 (Jury enters the courtroom.) 
22 THE COURT: Well, ladies an.cl gentlemen of 
23 the jury, I deeply regret informing you that I 
24 have declared a mistrial in this case. Prior to 
25 trial, a number of motions come before the court, 
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1 hundred percent, came through on your duty. We 
2 really appreciate it. I know you've made 
3 sacrifices to be here. There were many other 
4 obligations that were calling out to you and you 
5 all put them aside to be what your community asked 
6 you to be, the judges of the facts. 
7 And so on behalf of myself and the 
8 other judges, I want to thank you for your service 
9 in this case because we a hundred percent count on 
10 jurors making the sacrifice that you made and we 
11 deeply appreciate it. And I want to thank you for 
12 your service in this case. You may talk about the 
13 case if you choose to do so. I would recommend 
14 you might consider not talking about the case, but 
15 you may talk about it with friends and family if 
16 you choose to do so. You are released from your 
1 7 obligation not to discuss the case any further. 
18 Now that--you know, there were times 
19 in this trial where things didn't move very 
20 crisply. I'm sorry about that. It happens; 
21 trials vary. But I will say you all worked hard. 
22 You all paid attention. You all did a fine job. 
2 3 Thank you for your service. You are excused from 
2 4 service in this case. 
25 (Proceedings concluded at 1 :46 p.m.) 
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1 and those motions address matters what either side 
2 feels would be so potentially problematic that 
3 they should not be brought up in a trial. 
4 And a court makes certain rulings 
5 called orders in limine. And those orders in 
6 limine are designed to address major problem areas 
7 and major issues that should not be touched upon 
8 at all. For example -- well, I won't give you an 
9 example, but just to say, they are major and 
10 important and critical issues. 
11 And the Court in this case -- I, in 
12 this case, issued a clear ruling with respect to 
13 the certain information. And that ruling was 
14 violated, and I am forced to declare a mistrial in 
15 this case. 
16 So I want to thank you for your 
1 7 service. I want you to know it's very rare that 
18 this occurs. We don't bring you here to torment 
19 you, even though sometimes it might feel that way. 
20 We don't take you from your other jobs, we don't 
21 spend all this time, money, and effort to present 
22 a case to you to have it blow up. 
23 So, in any event, I want to thank you 
24 all for your service. I really appreciate you 
25 being here and being available to serve. You, a 
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5 I, Roxanne K. Patchell, Court Reporter, 
6 County of Ada, State ofldaho, hereby certify: 
7 That I am the reporter who transcribed 
8 the proceedings had in the above-entitled action 
9 in machine shorthand and thereafter the same was 
10 reduced into typewriting under my direct 
11 supervision; and 
12 That the foregoing transcript contains a 
13 full, true, and accurate record of the proceedings 
14 had in the above and foregoing cause, which was 
15 heard at Boise, Idaho. 
16 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
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REPORTER' s. CERTIFICATE 
I, Roxanne K. Patchell, a Notary Public 
in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the 
witness named in the foregoing deposition was by 
me duly sworn to·testify the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth; 
That said deposition was taken down by 
me in shorthand at the time and place therein 
named and theieafter reduced into typewriting 
under my direction, and that the foregoing 
tra~script contains a full, true, and verbatim 
record of the said deposition. 
I further certify that I have no 
interest in the ~vent of the action. 
WITNESS my hand 81:d and seal this day of 
f;,brtA.~r . , 2 O 1/ . 
NOTARY PUBLIC J. 
residing at 
My commission expires 9/08/2017 
CSR No. 733 
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Mr. Quane's intentfonal, inflammatory, and unfair tactic to violate the statute and 
confuse and unfairly prejudice the jury should not be tolerated. It must be 
controlled by the swift and firm application of Idaho Code § 10-111., which 
requires a mistrial and leaves no discretion to the trial court judge. A new trial is 
required pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l) because this 
"irregularity in the preceedings" prevented the Robertsons "from having a fair 
trial." 
In addition, since the Plaintiffs have been required to try the case to completion 
and incur tremendous expenses and costs, the court should award costs and 
attorney's fees against defendant pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). The intentional violation of Idaho Code § 10-111 
was an unreasonable bad faith defense of this case and justifies an award of 
attorney's fees both at the trial level and on this appeal. 
Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 643, 769 P.2d 505, 520 (1987) (Bistline, J., concuning 
specially) ( emphasis in original). 
Rarely is counsel mentioned by name, by our appellate courts. In the above case, 
handling defense counsel is mentioned nearly 50 times, not counting references to the transcript, 
and his trial tactics resoundingly criticized. And yet in response to the instant Plaintiffs motion 
for sanctions which followed this Court's declaration of mistrial and misconduct by the 
Defendants, defense counsel has the audacity to claim the real motivation :behind Plaintiff's 
motion is his effectiveness as a trial lawyer and that among the many trials he has handled, he 
has "never had any that ended or terminated by a mistrial." Defendants Second "Reformatted" 
Memorandum, p. 13.1 
Plaintiff seeks the sanctions set fort11 in his motion for one simple reason: Defendants and 
their counsel caused a mistrial by violating the Court's rulings which significantly prejudices 
1 Plaintiff has conte_mporaneously filed a motion to strike this reformatted memorandum which is 
not in conformity with the pleading requirements set forth in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Local Rules and thus like Defendants' initial overlength memorandum, is similarly 
overlength. 
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SSgt. Charles Ballard. This mistrial generated tremendous expense and waste of the Court and 
Plaintiffs resources. The Defendants' actions delay SSgt. Ballard's ability to obtain justice for 
the death of his spouse, Krystal Ballard, and will require him to once again undergo the 
excruciating pain and sorrow associated with describing this loss - which the Court witnessed. 
Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions because Defendant's caused the mistrial. This Court 
has already stated that such monetary sanctions are appropriate: 
THE COURT: Well, I agree with you, counsel. And it's -- I mean, I 
definitely agree with you that it's terribly unfair to be in this situation. And I --
that is one of the reasons why I think it's imperative that the plaintiffs costs for 
experts and attorney's fees and incidental costs be paid prior to the next 
proceeding. 
Transcript of Proceedings from November, 14, 2013, p. 112.2 
Plaintiff also seeks through his sanction motion the removal of defense counsel from this 
case. In short, these lawyers have forfeited the right to appear before this Coutt on this case. 
Plaintiff's motion and supporting memorandum detail the factual and legal basis for all the relief 
sought by Plaintiff through his sanction motion including the removal of defense counsel. 
In response to Plaintiffs motion, Defendants assign blame to everyone but themselves 
including this Court. They assert the case would have ended in mistrial anyway because of jury 
scheduling issues. Thus, they presumably believe the Court and Plaintiff conspired to use Dr. 
Stiller's testimony as subterfuge for the real reason for the mistrial. They incredulously deny 
that any prejudicial violation of this Court's pretrial rnlings occurred and take no responsibility 
for their conduct and actions at trial. For the reasons stated herein and in Plaintiffs previously 
2 The transcript from the proceedings on November 14, 2013 is submitted herewith as Exhibit A 
to the contemporaneously filed Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad. 
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filed motion and supporting pleadings, all relief sought by Plaintiff through this motion should 
be granted.3 
a. Defendants oppose sanctions thrQugh a distorted attempt at revisionist history and 
blame everyone but themselves for the mistrial in this case. · 
By their memorandum, Defendants blame the Jury Commissioner, Plaintiff, and this 
Court for the mistrial in this case. Defendants deny that a violation of the Court's in limine 
rulings occu1Ted. Defendants deny any and all responsibility for the mistrial in this matter and 
quite incredibly, cast themselves as victims of the Court's ruling. 
Defendants blame this Court for purportedly failing to allow argument prior to granting a 
mistrial, although Defendants had every opportunity to argue their position, but elected not to do 
so - and as pointed out in Plaintiff's opening memorandum, lead counsel even turned his back on 
this Court as the Court addressed the parties. Defendants blame the Court for failing to offer a 
curative instruction which they never requested (and, thus, for failing to bring more attention to 
their prejudicial testimony). They blan1e the Court for granting a mistrial arguing Dr. Stiller 
didn't really say what he said - or that the jury was not sophisticated enough to understand the 
import of what ~e said. They dismiss the significance of their own misconduct arguing a mistrial 
would have occmred anyway b~cause of juror scheduling issues which they presumably don't 
believe the Court could have resolved.4 They blame the Jury Commissioner for failing to ensure 
3 Defendants present no opposition to the additional relief requested by Plaintiffs motion -- full 
enforcement of sanctions previously imposed for their discovery violation and enforcement of 
existing discovery and disclosure deadlines, and accordingly, such relief also should be ordered. 
4 It is hard to know whether Defendants really believe that a couple jurors' expression of 
concerns over scheduling could not be overcome by this experienced Co·urt after two weeks of 
trial other than by the grant of a mistrial. While this belief might explain their dilatory trial 
tactics, it seems incredible to think that these issues could not be resolved just at they are 
resolved in every other multi week trial. 
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a panel of sufficient number. They blame Pl~intiffs counsel claiming they purportedly failed to 
consult with Mr. Ballard prior to ·seeking a mistrial. They blame SSgt. Ballard for having "three 
different law firms" represent him.5 They even blame the process of aging claiming Mr. Quane 
had his back turned to the Court because of hearing loss and having the sniffles. These 
arguments are as irrelevant as they are inaccurate. 
The only questions presented by Plaintiffs motion is whether a violation occurred, and 
who should bear the cost of the mistrial in this case. The answers to those questions are as 
abundantly clear today as they were the moment Dr. Stiller tendered the offending testimony -
which this Court immediately recognized. 
Defendants cannot now credibly claim that "[t]he [d]efense did not violate any of the 
Orders issued by the Couit on the Motions in Limine." (Defs' Mem. at 8.6) The witness offered 
an apology to the Court in the wake of Mr. Haddad's objection. (Exhibit A to Declaration of 
Counsel, Partial Tr. Of Proceedings 104:18, Nov. 14, 2013.) And defense counsel, Mr. Jones, 
stated that, "to the extent it came out, I'll take responsibility for it; he's my witness" (Id. at 
105:15-17.) Now Defendants incredibly argue Dr. Stiller presented no offending testimony -
notwithstanding what everyone in Court including this Couit, the parties, the lawyers and the 
jury otherwise understood. 
Consider, for example, the linguistic gymnastics offered by Defendants in their 
trausformative interpretation of Dr. Stiller's testimony. Defendants argue that when Dr. Sti!Jer 
testified that he based his opinions on "the fact ... that [there were] no pertinent or persistent 
5 Plaintiff has been represented throughout these proceedings by two law fim1s: Bailey & 
Glasser, LLP and local counsel, Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP. 
6 Th1:01.1ghout this reply, Plaintiff cites to the "reformatted" version of Defendants' memorandum. 
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infections in the office[,]" Plaintiff employed "sheer speculation" in jumping to the conclusion 
that a violation of the Court's in limine ruling had occtmed arguing that "an equally plausible 
interpretation ... was the fact the patient herself had never presented with evidence of infection 
during her office visits and/or subsequent discussions with Dr. Kerr." (Defs.' Mem. at 7.) 
Though this "equally plausible" interpretation is completely at odds with a plain-meaning 
interpretation of the testimony at issue, which contains no cognizable reference to Mrs. Ballard 
whatsoever, and though everyone in the coUI1roo~ with knowledge of the Court's pretrial ruling 
immediately recognized the impropriety of the testimony including Defendants, their lawyers 
and Dr. Stiller himself, Defendants' counsel accuses Plaintiff's counsel of "inflated and half-
trnth statements." (Defs.' Mem. at 8.) 
This Court was repeat~dly clear on this point, that the issue should not have been 
UJ.1ilaterally raised without fm1her discussion outside the jury's presence. Defendants violated 
this ruling as already found by the Com1. Their "ordinary dictionary definitions [for] the words 
pertinent and persistent[,]" all the while ignoring the witness' reference to "in the office" and the 
lack of any such office history, is unpersuasive. The witness's apology to the Court's inquiry 
about the Order in Limine on this precise point, and everyone's immediate understanding of this 
testimony, leaves no room for the revisionist interpretation now argued by Defendants. 
b. Sanctions are warranted under IRCP 37(e) as well as IRCP 47(u). 
Defendants quite w1derstandably given their conduct in this case wish to limit the 
analysis of this motion to a parsing of Dr. Stiller's testimony and to characterize the other 
improper pretrial and trial tactics cited in Plaintiffs initial memorandum as "collateral issues." 
(See Defs.' Mem. at 8.) According to the defense, "Plaintiff's counsel made it perfectly clear 
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that the only reason he was seeking a mistrial was based on one narrow issue of other patient 
infections, but yet now in support of sanctions Plaintiff is advancing the entire kitchen sink 
argument." (Defs.' Mem. at 13.) , 
· Defendants' attempt to mischaracterize the instant analysis is unavailing. First, the Court 
on several prior occasions raised the specter of a mistrial should the Court's pretrial rulings be 
violated. Numerous objections were .raised, and sustained, due to defense counsel's conduct 
including following violation of the Court's rulings. And while the Court finally declared a 
mistrial in response to Dr. Stiller's obvious violation of the Court's pretrial ruling related to other 
infections, the issue of sanctions need not be confined to the specific conduct triggering a 
mistrial. Defense counsel's repeated disregard for the rules and for this Court's rulings, both 
before and during trial, is absolutely relevant. Thus, sanctions are appropriate in this case under 
both IRCP 37(e) for failure to comply with the Couit's order as well as IRCP 47(u) for deliberate 
misconduct by a party or attorney. 
Under the analysis provide9 in the Adams and Ashby cases, an analysis acknowledged by 
the pruties, "delay resulting from intentional conduct" is one of three aggravating factors, only 
one of which need be satisfied. Adams v. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 39, 57 P.3d at 505, 508 (Ct. App. 
2002) (quoting Ashby v. W. Council, Lumber Prod. & Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686-87, 
791 P.2d 434, 436-37 (1990)). Clearly, the conduct defense counsel characterizes as "collateral" 
is wholly.relevant in this context. Moreover, Defer.i.dants' assertion that "there is no pattern of 
delay in this case" is erroneous. Plaintiff encourages the Court to refer to his initial 
memorandum of law, which sets forth numerous exam_ples of defense counsel's intentional and 
improper tactics in the context of discovery, pretrial, and trial. Plaintiffs satisfaction of the 
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Ashby factors is clear. 
And while Rule 47(u) appears to limit the Court's consideration of sanctions to 
"deliberate misconduct of a party or attorney," Defendants offer no reason to believe that this 
Court cannot consider trial conduct separate and apart from that which ultimately caused the 
mistrial in determining whether the offending conduct was, in fact, deliberate. Surely defense 
counsel's trial tactics throughout the trial proceedings is illuminative on this issue, and should be 
considered. 
In any event, there can be no dispute that Defendants violated this Court's order in limine 
and thus all monetary sanctions sought by Plaintiff including attorney's fe~s, costs and expenses 
are recoverable under the clear language ofIRCP 37(e). 
c. The Court should exercise its discretion and remove defense counsel from this case. 
With regard to Plaintiffs request for disqualification of defense counsel, Defendants' 
attempt to distinguish the cases cited by Plaintiff misses the mark for three reasons. First, the 
Crown and Weaver holdings both specifically acknowledge that "[t]he decision to grant or to 
deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial court." Crown v. Hawkins 
Co., ltd, i28 Idaho 114, 122, 910 P.2d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Weaver v. Millard, 120 
ldah~ 692,696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct.App.1991)). Accordingly, such a ruling would be wholly 
appropriate so long as it is the product of the proper exercise of that discretion. Secondly, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in Crown affirmed the trial court's denial of the Growers' motion to 
disqualify Nungester's counsel due to the prejudice that Nungester would have suffered upon the 
r 
disqualification of his counsel in such close proximity to trial. Crown, 128 Idaho at 122, 910 
P.2d at 794. Here, Defendants stand to suffer no such prejudice and have known since Plaintiff 
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raised this issue in Court on November 14, 2013 that Plaintiff would seek the removal pf defense 
counsel. (Tr. 113, 11. 8-11) ("Thank you, Your Honor, and I'll just make the Court aware that we 
will also be moving that these lawyers be disqualified from representing these defendants.''). 
Lastly, in Weaver, the trial court's order denying disqualiffoation was based, in large part, on the 
fact that the moving party waited over a year to file the subject motion. Weaver v. Millard, 120 
Idaho 692, 698, 8l9 P.2d 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1991). Again, that is simply not the case here. 
Plaintiff promptly filed his motion for sanctions and took the first hearing date offered by the 
Court when scheduling this motion for hearing. 
d. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs motion, his accompanying memorandum of law, and 
the instant reply, this Court should grant Plaintiffs motion and award Plaintiff all requested 
sanctions and other relief sought through his motion. 
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Quane Jones McColl, PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Jeremiah A. Quane jaq@quanelow.com 
VIA EMAIL 
Honorable Judge Deborah A Bail 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
February 7, 2014 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Dear Judge Bail: 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Our File No. 1107 /25-938 
US Bonk Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise. ID 83701 
(208) 780-3939 Telephone 
(208) 780-3930 Facsimile 
www.quanelaw.com 
In view of having been informed today that the Court denied our Motion for 
Leave to File and Overlength Brief, we have reformatted our brief in conformance with 
Rule 1 O(a)(1 ). We also confirmed today with the Ada County Court Clerk's office that the 
use of Times New Roman 12 point font is acceptable and appropriate. With these 
formatting changes only, our Memorandum now falls within the 25 page limit of local Rule 
8.1. Please note we could have submitted our brief originally in this format, but for the 
convenience and ease of reading for the Court and counsel we had used the expanded 
format and therefore sought the longer page limit. 
JAQ/cf 
Enclosure 
Cc/encl: Scott McKay/David Nevin 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
EXHIBIT-A-. 
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Judge Bail 021214 Tara Villi . _ I Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
01 :47:18 PM I jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Mo/Sanctions 
··~;: ~: ;.;~ -·:·~ ·l·i:~e Haddad"°and . .JI. ~:1:e~::eof ··the···Plaintiff ······························································································································································ 
! Scott McKay 1 
I I 
02:08:26 PM j Jeremiah Quane 1!; on behalf of the Defendant 
I and Terry Jones 
I i 
02:08:28 PM jG. Haddad jArgues Motion for Sanctions 
-~~:i~:~~ -:~-! i~i::~ad ----------!~=~nt~:0:::::::::::::0~::::::es-costs---including· 
I I expert witness. Travel costs for counsel during that time. 
l I Travel costs for the Plaintiff. Jury fees to be paid to Ada 
! I County. Denies the Request to dismiss all defenses. Denies 
I i the Motion for DQ of opposing counsel. 
! I 
03:05:32 PM Judge I will give counsel a couple of days to check on availability of jury 
······················································· 1l. ........................................................................... .\. ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
I trial in Aoril. 
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Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, hereby submits this Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to the Court's order in open court on February 12, 2014, 
whereby the Court considered Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, For Full Enforcement of 
Sanctions Previously Imposed and for Enforcement of Existing Discovery and Disclosure 
Deadlines. The Court has awarded Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiff his costs 
including expert witness costs and attorney fees associated with the jury trial in the above matter 
that ended in a mistrial declared by the Co.urt on November 14, 2013. 1 
The foregoing monetary award is consistent with the Court's ruling at the time it declared 
this mistrial and as noted by the Court, these fees and costs must be paid by Defendants prior to 
the retrial of this case: 
THE COURT: Well, I agree with you, counsel. And it's -- I mean, I 
definitely agree with you that it's terribly unfair to be in this situation. And I --
that is one of the reasons why I think it's imperative that the plaintiff's costs 
for experts and attorney's fees and incidental costs be paid prior to the next 
proceeding. 
Transcript of Proceedings from November, 14, 2013, p. 112, lines 5-11 (emphasis 
added).2 
This Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs is supported by a contemporaneously 
filed Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad attesting to the amounts sought herein as well as the 
Declaration of J. Charles Hepworth attesting to the reasonableness of the professional rates 
underlying the attorney fee amounts. Based on the foregoing, the Court should order 
Defendants to pay Plaintiff prior to beginning the retrial in this matter the following: 
1 The Court also ordered that Defendants reimburse Ada County for the jury costs and fees paid 
by Ada County in connection with this trial. 
2 The transcript from the proceedings on November 14, 2013 was previously submitted as 
Exhibit "A" to the Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad filed February 10, 2014. 
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A. Attorney Fees Associated with Mistrial: $151,090.50 
1. Attorney fees pretrial commencing on the date of counsel's arrival in Boise on 
October 30, 2013, to prepare for trial beginning on November 5, 2013: $48,373.00 (Bailey & 
Glasser, LLP - $30,467.00; Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP -$17,906.00). 
2. Attorney fees during trial, November 5, 2013 to November 14, 2013: $70,566.50 
(Bailey & Glasser, LLP - $46,479.00; Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP - $24,087.50). 
3. Attorney fees following mistrial associated with mistrial and litigating motion for 
sanctions: $32,151.00 (Bailey & Glasser, LLP -$19,202.50; Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, 
LLP - $12,948.50). 
B. Trial Costs and Expert Witness Fees Associated with Mistrial: $55,051.96 . . 
1. Costs for Plaintiff SSgt. Charles Ballard consisting of travel from Florida where he is 
stationed to Boise, lodging and meals associated with trial: $4,324.54. 
I ...__, 
2. Other trial costs incurred by Plaintiff including expert's travel to Boise, lodging and 
testimony at trial; travel from West Virginia to Boise, lodging and meals for Bailey & Glasser 
attorney Greg Haddad and trial paralegal Farrah Caruthers, trial technician for evidence and 
exhibit presentation software, costs for service of trial subpoenas, costs of trial witness fees and 
other itemized and reasonable trial costs: $50,727.42 (Bailey & Glasser, LLP - $48,673.41; 
Nevin, B~njamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP - $2,054.01). 
C. Total Attorney Fees and Costs Associated with Mistrial: $206,142.46 
\ 
~ D. Attorney Fees Held in Abeyance for Earlier Discovery Sanctions Imposed by the 
Court: $5,651.36 
The Court earlier imposed partial sanctions against Defendants' counsel as a result of 
Defendants' refusal to answer discovery and invited Plaintiff to seek full reimbursement for 
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attorney fees incurred as a result of this violation at a later time. (See Court's Order filed October 
11, 2012 imposing sanctions against Defendants' counsel in the amount of $1,500 and permitting 
Plaintiff to later seek reimbursement for full fees incurred in bringing motion to compel). 
Plaintiffs motion for sanctions following the mistrial seeks reimbursement of the remaining 
attorney fees held in abeyance by this Court. The Court did not address this aspect of Plaintiffs 
motion at the hearing on February 12, 2014. Plaintiff now seeks imposition of full attorney fees 
for this discovery violation. 
E. Total Attorney Fees and Costs Associated with Mistrial and Attorney Fees Held 
in Abeyance for Earlier Discovery Sanctions Imposed by Court: $211,793.82 
The above attorney fees and costs are reasonable and the result of the mistrial declared in 
this case as well as the Defendants' earlier refusal to answer discovery as required. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that attorney fees and costs totaling $ be awarded in full to him and 
against Defendants and Defendants be required to pay this amount prior to the retrial of the 
above matter. 
Dated this 18th day of February, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By~~£' 
_/_., ~ P. Gregory Haddad 
r - James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by maili~g the same to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floo!, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
g-;,e~· 
ScottMcKay ~
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:--.-il!Sia.~----'"FiiF1L7:reo;---4h~,,,~'./r,---
----P.M. L.Y...L._ 
FEB 18 2014 
CHRISTOPHER o 
By CHRISTINE ·s~;~· Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, . 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
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Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DECLARATION OF P. GREGORY 
HADDAD IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 





I, P. Gregory Haddad, as the attorney for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, subscribed hereto by 
authority duly given, after being duly sworn, upon his oath, state and allege the following. 
1. I am duly licensed to practice law in the State of West Virginia, and I am a partner 
with the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP in Morgantown, West Virginia. I am admitted pro 
hac vice in this case, and I am lead counsel for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard. Together with the law 
firm of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, I have prosecuted this case, and I was present 
throughout the trial of this matter, which began on November 5, 2013, and which ended upon the 
declaration of mistrial on November 14, 2013. Bailey & Glasser, LLP, is based in Charleston, 
West Virginia, and now employs over forty lawyers practicing from nine offices, including 
offices in Birmingham, Alabama, Boston, Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., and Springfield, 
Illinois. Our lawyers practice in state and federal courts across the country and routinely 
represent clients in complex litigation and trial. I have tried over seventy cases, and I have 
represented plaintiffs and defendants in complex personal injury and professional liability 
matters, including medical malpractice and wrongful death cases, in state and federal courts, both 
in West Virginia and around the country. 
2. Scott McKay and the law firm of Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, have 
been instrumental and necessary to the preparation of this case, as well as its presentation at 
trial. Upon information and b~lief, Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, was founded more 
than thirty years ago. Mr. McKay has handled cases throughout the country, and regularly 
appears in both state and federal court. Mr. McKay and his firm have an "AV" rating from 
Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating available from this lawyer rating service. Mr. McKay 
graduated magna cum laude from the Gonzaga University School of Law in 1990 and, aside 
from clerking at the Idaho Supreme Court, he has been engaged continuously in the private 
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practice of law. Along with his "AV" rating from the Martindale-Hubbell lawyer rating service, 
Mr. McKay has been selected by his peers each year since 2003 for listing in "The Best Lawyers 
in America." He has been listed in Mountain States Super Lawyers Magazine, which describes 
itself as featuring the top five percent of lawyers in Nevada, Utah, Montana, Idaho, and 
Wyoming. 
3. My senior paralegal, Farrah L. Caruthers, arrived in Boise, Idaho, to prepare for 
trial on October 30, 2013. I arrived in Boise, Idaho, to prepare for trial on October 31, 2013. For 
purposes of this Declaration, October 30, 2013, is considered the date counsel arrived in Boise, 
Idaho, to prepare for trial. 
4. Bailey & Glasser, LLP's pretrial fees commencing on the date of lead counsel's 
arrival in Boise on October 30, 2013, to November 4, 2013, total $30,467.00. 
5. Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP's pretrial fees commencing on the date 
oflead counsel's arrival in Boise on October 30, 2013, to November 4, 2013, total $17,906.00. 
6. Bailey & Glasser, LLP's fees during trial, from November 5, 2013, to November 
14, 2013, total $46,479.00. 
7. Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP's fees during trial, from November 5, 
2013, to November 14, 2013, total $24,087.50. 
8. Bailey & Glasser, LLP's fees since the mistrial and associated with Plaintiffs 
motion for sanctions total $19,202.50. 
9. Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP's fees since the mistrial and associated 
with Plaintiffs motion for sanctions total $12,948.50. 
10. Attached hereto at Exhibit A is Bailey & Glasser, LLP's fee and cost detail for 
the time period October 30, 2013, to February 17, 2014. As reflected in this fee and cost detail, 
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legal work and costs that need not be duplicated as a result of the mistrial have been stricken 
from the computations set forth herein. So, too, have non-trial related costs and expenses. The 
undersigned redacted time entry narratives to protect attorney-client confidentiality and attorney 
work product information. 
11. Attached hereto at Exhibit B is Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP's fee 
and cost detail for the time period October 30, 2013, to February 17, 2014, consistent with the 
above paragraph. 
12. The hourly rates associated with the above stated fees are reasonable and 
consistent with that of other law firms and lawyers handling cases of this nature in this area. 
Attached hereto at Exhibit C is the Declaration J. Charles Hepworth, an attorney practicing in 
Boise, Idaho, who attests to the reasonableness of Plaintiff's counsel's hourly rates. 
13. Bailey & Glasser, LLP has incurred $48,673.41 in costs and expenses associated 
with the trial that ended in a mistrial in this case and pursuing a motion for sanctions. Included 
in this amount are the costs associated with the presentation of expert witness testimony at the 
trial in this case. 
14. Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP incurred $2,054.01 in costs and 
expenses related to trial and in pursuit of an Order granting sanctions against Defendants. 
15. Attached hereto at Exhibit D is an invoice from National Travel, which details 
airfare costs incurred by Bailey & Glasser, LLP for the undersigned's air travel to and from 
Boise, Idaho, in conjunction with the undersigned's appearance before this Court on Plaintiff's 
motion for sanctions. As this cost was paid with Bailey & Glasser, LLP's credit card, and as this 
cost will .appear on Bailey & Glasser LLP's March 2014 credit card statement, same has not yet 
been posted to Mr. Ballard's file. 
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16. Plaintiff, Charles Ballard incurred $864.11 in rental car and gasoline costs, 
$1,130.90 in airfare and baggage costs, $1,598.95 for lodging, and $730.58 for meals in 
attending trial. Accordingly, Mr. Ballard incurred a total of $4,324.54 in costs and expenses to 
participate in the trial of this matter. 
17. By Order dated October 11, 2012, this Court granted sanctions to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $1,500.00 for Defendants' failure to comply with their discovery obligations. 
Furthermore, the Court permitted Plaintiff to later seek full reimbursement for the remaining fees 
and costs associated with Plaintiffs motion to compel. In accordance with this Court's Order of 
October 11, 2012, Plaintiff now requests that defense counsel be ordered to pay $5,651.36, 
which represents the difference between the sanctions imposed by the Court in October 2012, 
and the total fees and expenses associated with Plaintiffs pursuit of an order compelling 
Defendants to comply with well-established discovery obligations. (See Aff. of Counsel, Sept. 
14, 2012 (setting forth $7,151.36 in reasonable fees and expenses).) 
18. The fees and costs detailed above total $211,793.82. Plaintiff seeks full 
reimbursement of this total in conjunction with the mistrial caused by Defendants, as well as in 
relation to Defendants' discovery sanction. 
19. Plaintiff provides the attached attorney fees and cost details without waiving his 
attorney-client privilege or the protections afforded pursuant to the work product doctrine. 
20. Plaintiff, through his counsel, endeavored to keep the aforementioned fees and 
expenses reasonable by engaging paralegals to perform work; by engaging a paralegal, as 
opposed to an associate or ano!her partner, to accompany lead counsel at trial; and by planning 
Plaintiffs order of proof at trial so as to minimize the unnecessary expenditure of resources, 
particularly as applied to expert witnesses. 
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This ends my declaration. 
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the Jaw of the State of Id$o, that the 
;forego1ngfa t;rqe ~d con;ec_t to,th~ b~$tof my kn.owledge, infonnation and b_elfof. 
Dated this 18th day of February, 2014 .... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 181h day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
~~ 
Scott McKay 




.. ,,.... ...... 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
209 Capitol Street 
Chflfleston, West Virginia.25301 
(304) 345:- 6555. 
February 18, 2014 
Charles Ballard 
1.89.1 Myrick Road 
Tailahassee, FL 32303· 
Jn Reference To: Estate of Crystal Ballard 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
10/30/2013 PLC Travel to Boise, Idaho for trial prep with 
. co-counsel and trial; continue trial prep, 
includi_ng numerous emails from/to 
attorneys, staff, co-counsel; review 
pleadings; continue working on Index for 
tria.1 documents; prepa~e letter to ~oui:t 
reporter; telephone call to court reporter; 
meetings with co-counsel. 
PGH Prepare for trial. 
RDS Continued Trial Preparation With Attention 
to Trial Boxes. 
RDS __ Regarding 
BJM 
10/31/2013 FLC Continue preparing for trial, including 
numerous emails from/to attorneys, 
co-counsel, staff; meetings with attorney and 
co-counsel; continue preparing index for trial 
d'irector documents; review and revise 
pleadings; review pleading filed by opposing 
cdunsel; telephone calls and emails to/from 
experts and fact witnesses. 
PGH Prepare for trial; travel to Boise. 
Invoice# 0 
Client # .BAL LOO I 
Matter# I 003362 
Billing through 02/17/2.014 
12.40 .hrs 1,5.50.09 
8.70 lws 2.827.50 
1.40 hrs· l 3'3.00 
0.20 hrs 19.00 
- -
11.60 hrs ·J,450.00 

























BALLOOl Ballard, Chru:les Invoice#- 0 Page 2 
PGH Prepare for trial--outlines, literature to be 9.60 hrs 3.,120.00. 





















FLC Continue triaJ prep, Including IJUinerous 10.00 hi's 1,250.00 
.I 
'I 
emails from/to attorney, co•CQuh·sel al'ld 
staff; continue working on index for trial 
director, including begin preparing separate 
lists fo_r our exhibits and defense exhibits; 
meet with IT personnel re: trial director; go 
to courthouse re: preparing for trial; 
telephone calls and emails to/from fact 
witnesses and experts. 
PGH Prepare for trial--witness exilm!I; 10.40 hrs 3,380.00 
meeting/discussions with-- - -
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J'l/02/2013 FL.C Continue trial prep; including emails from/to 10.00 'hrs 1,250 .. 00 
attorney and co-c_ounsel; continue w9rking 
on exhibits and documents on trial director; 
prepare,page-lines for Garrisori Vol II and 
Lundeby; cr¢ate vid~o clips for Garrison VQI 
lI on td~l direct~r, and e~it same; prepare file 
materfals; discussions with attorney and 
co-counsel. 





l l./03/2Q.13 T~J.,C .. Continue· trial prep, including :emails from/to · J 1.90 hrs 1,487.~0 l l 
. attorney and co-9.ounsel; em~ils Md I 
teiephqrte calls fr9mito Life Flight att9rney; i 
continu!' preparing exhibits and documents l 
in:tri~l director; .meetjngs: with att<:>rney and :1 
co~counse.l{ prep!,tr.e. a:nd i'e¥ise: tlepositiQli ii 
clips; meeting with counsel and client re: -~ I 
jury selection; prepare pl's-exhioit' I I 
, noteQooks. 
PGH Prepare for trial--witness examinations. 9.70 hrs 3,152.50 i 
1111 - - I ·f ,1 i ., 
• ~ ' '!
• - -
1 ]/04/2013 FLC Continue trial prep, including final 11.90 hrs J,487.50 
preparations with ttial director, exhibits, 
documents; preparing for Kerr; meetings 
with attorneys; meet with Pat re: trial 
director; emails from/to attorney and 
co-counsel. 
PGH Prepare for trial--jury selection, opening. 9.80 hrs 3,185.00 
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11 ,, ,. 
,! 
; 
11/05/201:3 FLC Attend. trial; 1neet with ·ilttoroey -and 10.40 .hrs J,~.00.00 " ,i 
eo-counsel; review defense exhib.its; review ; 
file;: additional preparations for trial. 
PGH Prepare for trial da1; 1attend trial day~ prepare 11.SO :hrs 3,737.50 
foi:"tQlnorrow trial day, 
KWB Re~ear~h 1.00 hrs '300',00 I ··1 
with ·Trirtl. I 
i 'f 
RDS Receipt and Rev.ie:w of Affidavit" or' Ser.vice 0.1.0 _hi:s 9;sp 
11 
u 
For·Subpoena ofElniqre:Me.dioal Center. 
RDS Receipt an~ Review of Affidavit of Service 0.10 hrs 9.50 
,,, ,, 
·J 
For Subpoena To Life Flight. 'S 
'I 
11/06/2.013 FLC Attend ·trial; ri1ce.t wifh to 11.6.0 :hrs 1,450,00 . t ; 
prepatc ;.review and -redact ., 
records to admit as an exhibit. •I 
PGH Pre-pare for trial day; attend trial; pr_epi!J:e for 12.20 hrs 3,965.00 
·i 
! tomorrow tJial dl;!.y, I 
,I 
1111 - - I I •1 t 
r.f 
l 1/07/20'13. FLC Attend trial; rneet with attprney, co-counsel .10.10 hrs 1,26~,?0 
and .. to prepare for Friday's testimonies. 
PGH Prepare for trial day; attend trial; prepare for j 1.49 hr~ 3;_705.00 
tomorrow trial day. 
I 1/08/.ZOI3 fLC Attend trial; meetings with attorney, 9.00 hrs 1,125.00 
co-counsel, witnesses; emails from/to 
co-counsel. 
PGH Prepare for trial day; attend trial. I 0.20 hrs 3,3.15.00 
1.1/09/2013 FLC Num.erous e111ails from/to attome s, 1.l O hrs 137.50 
co-counsel and staff; review 
and 
otluir documents; r:eview invoices. from 
expert. 
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11/10/2013 FLC Em11ils from/to attorney and co-counsel; 6.20 hrs ·775.00 
prepai·e for this w.eek's witnesses at trial; 
review 
; p1'epare addition.al exhi9.its; I-
aqgi_tional preparation of witnes.s' files. 
U/H/2.013 FLC- Contjnue tri~I prep~ratio11s, in·cJuding: ·9. lO lirs 1,137.50 
meetings with attorney'and co-c0tm~el, 
prepare additional exhibits, review file for 
lnfonnation, add'itional preparations for 
witness files. 
'.POI{ Prepru:e·f9r trial day; attend ~,r,f~I; pr~pare for 11.40 hi'.$' 3,705 .. 00 
tomorrow trial day. 
l?OH Prepare for trial preseniati0n for tomorrow. 9.00 hrs· 2·,925.00 
Preparations for. trial; attend trial; me!;:ting 9.50 hrs :t,18750 
'.j 
11/12/2013 ,FLC i wlth attorneys to prepare fofl.1pcoming .l 
wit.ness~s~ 
d 
roll J.:>repar~ fqr 1d!!l day ; ~ttend tri~f; prepare for 1'1.QO hrs. 3,575.00 J 
tomorrow trial day. 1 
·J 
P~. .Research ; call 0,50 h·rs 112.50 I 





rt/13/2013 FLC Preparations for .trial; att~nd trial; meetings .9.90 hrs ,,in.so 
with att9rneys and preparations for witnesses 
tomorrow. 
PGH Prepare for trial dayi attend trial; prepare for 12.00 hrs ~.900.QO 
tomorrow trial da_y . 
• - 11111 - - -
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11/14/2013 FLC :Preparations for trial; attend trial; meeting 8..SO hrs 1;062.50 
with. attorney, c.o-co1,1nsel and clicm~ re: 
- prepare file t_o be ~tored and •i 
materials. to· be. shipped to Charleston. 
PGJl Prepare for trial day: attend trial; mistrial 8.50 ·hrs 2,762.50 }i 
granted. 
PMK Research re waiver of mistrial. 0.70 hrs 157.50 I 




1 ws12p13 ELG Travel from Boise, Idaho to Winfield, WV. 
.r 
8.20 hrs 1,_025.00 
.P.I:lH Return. to Morgantown: t9 j3Qise afler 8.0Q ht'$ 2,609.00 
mistrial. 
BjM Conferred with Local Counsel Via 2'.00 hrs 450.00 
Telephone Re: Motion for Sanctions and 
AdlJlissibility of Evidence Pe$ining to 
income taxes; Reviewed· Invoices and Other \ 
File Materials for Documentary Support of ! 
' Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions;· Emailed RS ·i 
Re.: Billing fof Pretrial Preparati_on and Trial i in Conjunction with Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions. l 
11/18/2013 -- .. _,,. ,. . FLC Nwnerol,l~ erni)ils from/to attorneys, 2.00 .hrs 250.00 
co-counsel, staff, client; telephone calls 
from/to attorney; review file and prepare 
documents re: expenses for defendants to 
reimburse; telephone calls re: charges made. 
BJM Conferred with PGH Re: Mistrial and 6.60 hrs 1,4-85.00 
Motion for Sanctions; Researched Idaho 
Code, Rules, and Case Law in Conjunction 
with Plaintiff~ Motion,for Sanctions; 
Reviewed Invoices and Researched B&G's 
Trial Related Fees and Costs in Conjunction 
with Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions; 
Conferred with FC and Rebekah Parsons Via 
Email and Telephone Re: Trial Related Fees 
and Costs, All in Conjunction with Plaintiff's 
Motion for Sanctions; Drafted Plaintiff's 
Motion for Sanctions; Drafted Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Sanctions. 
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11/19/2013 PLC :Emails from/to co-counsel, attorney and 1.60 hrs 225.00 
staff; review motion for sanctions and email 
attorney and accounting re:. same; meet with 
accounting re: motion for sanctions; email 
. ancLtelephone calf to client re: same. 
BJM Conferred with ,PGH Re: Motion for 4.00 hrs 900.00 
Sanctions; Conferred with Rebekah Parsons 
Re: CompiJatiO:n.t>f'l'rial R,elated Fees and 
} 
Cost I11formation: Draft~d Plaintiffls Motjon 
for Sanctions; Emailed PGH and Loca] 
r 
Counsel.Rei Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions. 
'l 2/Q2/2.013 ·BJM Rev.iewed'PGH Revisions for Plaintiff's 0.30 hrs 67.50· 
Motion for Sanct,io'ns; Conferred with Local 
Counsel Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Sancti'ons. 
.12/03/2013 FLC. Emails from/to attorney; review revised 0.20 hrs 25.QO 
motion '(or,sanctions. ,, 
' 
BJM Revised Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions 4.20 hrs 945,00 ,: 
Pursuant to· PGI! Revisions; Reviewed Trial ·1 
I 
Related Cost Spreadsheet Provided by ' T 
~~beka.h Pnrsqp.s; Conferred with. J:,ocal : 
Counsel Via Email Re: Revised Motion for 
Sanctions. 
12/04/2013 FLC Emails from/to attorney and staff; review 0.5.0 hrs, 62.50 
'! 
4 
numerous documents fr9m trial. : 
'i 
12/05/2013 FLC Several' emails from attorneys and 0.30 hrs 37.50 i ·i 
co-counsel; review motion. for sanctions, . 
memorandum and declaration in support. ? . 
I! 
BJM Reviewed and Revised Plaintiff's Motion for 1.50 hrs .;337.$0 ,! 
Sanctions; Revised Memorandum of Law 
and Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Sanctions; Conferred w'ith PGH and 
Local Counsel Via Motion for Sanctions, 
Memorandum and Affidavit in Support 
Thereof; Reviewed Draft Motion for 
Sanctions, Draft Memorandum of Law, and 
Draft Declaration of Counsel Submitted by 
Local Counsel for Review. 
12/06/2013 FLC . Emails from/to staff, attorney and 0.30 hrs 37.50 
co-counsel; review memorandum in support 
of motion for sanctions. 
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:SJM Conferred with PGH and LocaJ Counsel Re: 4.00 hrs 900..00 
Drl:\ft Motion for S1mctions an4 
Accqmpanying Memorandum of Law an9 . . 
Declaration of Counsel Submitted by Local 
C01,msel; Reviewed and Revised. 'Draft 
].yloticm for Sanction~ ~d S~pp,o.r:ting 
Memorand11m of Law and Declaratlon•of 
Cou~~ei"; Rcv·iewed lnvof~e,for Service ;f 
Trial Subpoenas; Conferred with FC. Via 
Email Re: Invoice ilridThnb:'ig of Detailed 
·Fees ~n~ OP.sts Related tQ Plaintiffs Motion 
for Sanctions. - • - - t .. - • - 11111 - • - 1111 'i ~. 
'l 
.! 
12/17/2,013 F_LC Em.ail to e>eperl. 0.] 0c hrs 12.50 l 
12/20/2013 FLC Emails fromito attorneys; emails'to ail 0.70 hrs 87.50 
experts re: mistrial/retaining theidile; emails 
from/to exp_ert and accounting; en:uiils re: 
defense experts that need paid; review file 
j 
for invoices. i ·• 
Ji/z3l2013 F.tc Em~ils from/to attorney and co-couns:el~ 0.30. hrs 37.50 
calen_dar hearing on h1otion for sancti"ons and 
holds for travel to and from Idaho; revi~w 
response to motion for sanctions. 
12/26/2013 FLC Email from co-counsel; review notice of 0.10 ,hrs 12.so 
hearing; revise calendar entry, 
12/30/2013 FLC Emails from/to client and 0.20 hrs 25.00 
attorneys/co-counsel. 
12/31/20.13 FLC Emails from/to co-counsel an_d attorney. 0.JO hrs '12.50 
Ql/02/20)4 ·r,1,c, Emails from attorney; review invoices from O.IQ hrs _12,?f) 
expert. 
01/08/2014 • - 1111 
01/14/2014 FLC Prepare letter to-enclosing - 0.60 hrs 75.00 
Ill; prepare Fed Ex to be sent. 
01/15/2014 FLC Emails to/from- nnd his office re: 0.10 hrs 12.50 -
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OI/17/2Q14 11111 - • 
-·· - 1111 j 01/22/2014 Ftc Emails from/to co-cou:nsel and attorney. 0.10 hrs 12.50 . ' 
Q(/29/20)4 PGH Call with co counsel re resetting trial !_lnd l.09 hrs 32.s~oo 
work that needs done fa advance. 
·ov2W2014· F.LC EmaiJs from/to sblff and attorney. o.ro hrs. n .. so I 
;I 
11111 - • ~, ;, 'l 
01/2912014 FLC Several emails fr.om/to attorney, co-counsel 0.50 hrs 62.50 
'l 
•J 
and accounting; telephone calls to/from Dr. 
Nichols' office re: available trial d!ites. I 
Ql/31/2014 FLC Telephone call"to Dr. Nichols' office; email 0.10 hrs 12.SO 
I 
i 
to atto"rney and co~counsel re: same. 
i 02/03/2014 FLC En~ai!~ fro~/t9 co-counsel an,d atjoi:neyi 0.20 hrs 25,00 
telephone call to ·nr.'Nlch<ils' office:. · ./ 'i 
' .02/04/20J4 fLC Emails from/to co~c.ounsel and attorney; 0:50 ·hrs 62.SO l t 
r~view t.t;ial tra,:isci:ipt from 1 t(I_4/13. . 1 .. 
.02/0S/20i4 FLC ' Emails from/to co-co\lnsel and attorneys; 0.70. hrs 87.50 ' ' f
review opposition to.motion for sanctions; I 
' calendar reply. i ' I, 
,BJM Conferred with Local Counsel Re: 1.00 hrs 225 .. 00 l t 
Defendants' Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion.for 
Sanctions; Reviewed Defendants' 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions; Reviewed 
Case ofRobertson v. Richards in 
Conjunction with Plaintiffs Reply to 
Defendants' .Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Sanctions. 
02/06/2014 FLC Emails from/to attorneys and co-counsel. 0.20 hrs 25.00 
02/07/2014 FLC Several emails from attorneys and 0.10 hrs 12.50 
co-counsel; review email lo client. 
BJM Reviewed Defendants' Response in 1.00 hrs 225.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Sanctions; Outlined Reply lo Defendants' 
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
f9r Sanctions. 
002087
BALLOOI Ballard> Charles Invoice# 0 Page IO 
02/09/2014 BJM Researched and Drafted Plaintiffs Reply to s.oo .hrs 1,12~.oo 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs. Moticm for. San~tions. 
02/i0/2014 FLC: Several emafls from/to co-counsel, staff and 0.20 Ju~ 25.00 
attorneys; ·review letter and revised memo in 
i 
opposition to motion for sanctions;- I 
i: 
BJM Researched, Drafted, and, Revised Plaintiff's 7.00 hrs· 1.,575':00 I, 
'Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for ,! 
SE1nctions; Conferred with POH Rei Same; 
! ~ 
Conferred with Local Couns~l Via 
Telephone and Email Re: Same; Assembled 
Filings Related to Plaintiff's Motion for I 
Sanctions for PGH; Drafted Decl~ration of I 
PGf.l in Support of Plaintiffs·Reply to 
'I 
' 
Oefendants! .Memorandum in Opposition to i 
.Plaj.qtiffs Motion for SancJions. l ,i 
~hJ'.S, " ·oii1 i{20 t.4 .Ft.C $ev.~ral emails from/t9 ,qo-couns~I; s!}:veral ~ !J 
attejnpts I 8 \00,00 ·! incluaing 
research re: 
revie)v bri9f~·fll_ed yesterday ·re: m9tjo,n for •! 
sanctions; return cnll from client;·rev1cw ! 






PGI-I Travel to Boise for hearing on motion for 8.00 hrs 2~600.00· 
sanctions. 
02/12/2014 • - 11111 
PGH Prepare for hearing on motion for sanctions. 6.50 hrs 2,J 12.50 
PGH Attend hearing on motion for sanctions. ·1.20 hl's 390.00 
02/13/2014 FLC Numerous emails from/to staff, attorneys and 0.40 hrs ·so.oo 
co-counsel (discussions re: submitting fees 
and expenses to Court); review bill for costs 
and expenses. 
PGH Retum to Morgantown from hearing on 8.80 hrs 2,860.00 
motion for sanctions. 
002088
BALLOOl Ballard, Charles lilvoice# 0 
BJM Revfewed Pre-Bill for Trial Related Fees and 1.00 hr$ 
Expenses to be Paid by Defense. as Sanction; 
Conferre.d with PGI-1, .FG,.and Local Col!ns¢J 
Via. Email Re: Fees and Bx:penses to be 
Detailed in Submission to Court and 
Affidavit to·be Prepared for Submission to 
Coulj. 
02/iM20.14 FLC $everaJ emaiis from/to accounting, ·staff, 0.30 "hrs 
attorney.s and co-counsel; telephone call to 
c!lent. 
B)M Gohferr~d ·with Local Couns~l and PGH Re: I.SO brs 
CompiJ.ation of Fees 1,md' Costs for 
Submission to Court;. Conferred with Sheryl 
Tucker Re: Fees and Costs Detail} Reviewed 
Fees and Costs -Deta.il for Trial. R.~lated·Fees 
and Costs to be Submitted to Court. 
02/17/2014 FLC Emails from/to attotneys and co-courisel; 0.30 hr$ 
teJephone calls and emai,1.to client-. 
BJM CQnferred with Rebc;ikah Par~ons and Sheryl 2.80 hrs 
Tucker Re: Pre-Bill for Sanctions 
Suf>inission; Reviewed Fees and Costs 
Details; Reviewed: Draft Memorandum. i.n 
Support of Attorney Fees and Costs; 
Conferred with PG:f:I; FC, arid Local Counsel 
Via Email Re: Fees and CQsts and 
Declaration of PGH in S\lppon of 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs; 
Conferred with Rebekah Parsons Via 
Telephone and PGH in PersoJJ Re: Void.ing 
Uncashed / Und~posited Witness 
Appearance Fee Checks. 




11/04/2013 Dr. Keith B. Armitage; Expert Services. 
11/05/2013 FedEx; Shipment to Tri County Process Serving on 10/24/13. 
11/05/2013 Tri-County Process Serving; Service of Subpoena. 
I 1/05/2013 Tri-County Process Serving; Service of Subpoena. 
11/05/2013 Tri-County Process Serving; Service of Subpoena. 
l l/05/2013 



















BALLOOl Ballard, Charles , Jnvoicell 0 Page 12, 
11/06/2013 -11/06/20]3 Trl~County. Process Serv'lng!, Service of Process. 103.00 
11/08/2013 Airfare for Farrah Caruthers on l 0/30/13. 505.89 
111oa12013 Airfare :for Greg Hnddl!d <;m 10/31/13. 590.83 
11/0.8/2013 Lodging for Farrah Carufl1ers on l 0/20/13. 137.34 t 
11/08/2Ql3 .Lodging for 10/30/131 2',9:S.8t34 E 
' 11/10/2013 - " 11/12/2013 • [ 11/13/2013 --- -l 1J13/z'013 - .. i 11/~3/201-3 FedB~; ShiP.mept to Scott McJ(ay op 10/30/13. 17.8.18 } '• 1 
11(131:2013 FeqEx; Shipm~nt to Scott:McKay, on I Q/30/13. 65.94 
11/13"4013 FedEx; Shipment to Scott M()Kay o,t 10/30/13, 55,33 
11/13/1013 - - l j l 1/13/20f3 FedEx; Shipment to Farrah·Caruthers on 10/:Jl/13. 13.43 '1 .! 
t l/13/2013 FedEx; Shipment to Farrah Caruthers on 10/31:/I:t 26.60 
.'/ 
l 1/13/20i3 FedEx; Shipm~mts 't9 D; Presh~r on 10/29713. 553.86 'i 
1J/13/20l) ~atz ConsultiiJg GrQup; Pro(esslqnal Seryic~s for Ocit~ber 2Ql.3~ 2,217.52 
:, 
' t 





11/14/2013 Dr. Keith B. Armitage; Professional Ser.vices. 540.00 J , ., •, ,, 




l 1/]4/2013 - ' '{ l ll.14/2013 - ' j 11/l5/2013 • ll/18/2013 • 11/19/2013 P. Gregory Haddad; Meals and Travel Fees for 10/31 /J 3-11 /8/13. 583..28 
ll/19/20)3 P. Gregory Haddad; Meals for ll/12/13-11/15/13. 315.59 
11/19/2013 P. Gl'egory J:Iaddad; Travel, Lodging, and Meals for I 0/24/13-10/25/13. 685.75 
J 1/19/2013 P. Gregory Haddad; Meals for J0/31/13-11/10/13. 387.69 
11/19/2013 M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.; Trial Presentation Support. 3,541.25 · 
11/19/2013 • I 1/20/2013 FarJ"ah Cal'Uthers; Meals and Baggage Fees fur 10/30/13-11/2/13. 176.02 
11/20/2013 Farrah Caruthers; Meals and Postage for I 1/12/13-11/15/13. 12 l.08 
11/20/2013 Farrah Caruthers; Meals for J 0/31/13-11/S/J 3. 304.04 
11/20/2013 Farrah Caruthers; Meals for l l/7/13-11/12/13. 89.57 
11/20/2013 P. Gregory Haddad; Copies. 1,314.00 
12/03/2013 • 12/04/2013 P. Gregory Haddad; Travel for J0/2l/13-10/26/13. 547.48 
12/05/2013 Legal Research for November 2013. 466.76 
002090
BALLOOl B.allard, Charles 
12/05/2013 FedEx;· Shipment to Greg Haddad on 11/15/13. 
12/06/2013 Airfare for Fan·ah Caruthers on 11/15/13. 
12/06/2013 Airfare for Greg Haddad on 11/15/13. 
12/06/2013 Lodging. 
Invoice# 0 
12/06/2013 Rental Car fofGreg Haddad. and .Farrah Caruthers in Boise. 
12/06/2013 Rental Car for Greg Haddad on 11/15/13. 
12/06/2013 Photocopies·( 61 x.15) 
12/09/2013 Tri-County .Process Serving; Service of Process. 
01/08/2014 The GEC Gr9up; Professional Services for November 2013. 
01/27/2014 . ,. - -








02/17/2014 .P. Gregor/Haddad; Travel, Jyle'als, and Lodging for 2/11/14-2/.13/14. 
02/17/2014 Tncker & Associates; Ti:anscripts. 
02/17/2014 Photocopies.( 65x.15) 
TotaJ Additional Charges 
BILLING SUMMARY 
Total This Bill 
Total balance now due 
TIMEKEEPER SUMMARY 
Brian J. McAllister Associate 
Cris I. Bombard Associate 
Farrah L. Caruthers Paralegal 
Kerrie W. Boyle. Partner 
Patrick D. Clark Legal Assistant 
Philip Greg Haddad Partner 


















207.90 ' ' 
6,296.50 ' . i • i 14-.5& t - i 'i ,, • l I . .. ' r f - I ! - 'i - ,1 • •, 749.91 :t 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles 11126 
Mr. Charles Ballard 
Phone 2 
Phone 4 
By billing value on each slip 
By billing value on each slip 
Exempt 
2/17/2014 
11/19/2012 Amount $375.00 





Task Markup % __ D_N_B_T_i_m_e __ D_N_B_A_m_t ___ _ 
10/30/2013 SM 275.00 6.70 
64485 preparation 
Trial preparation; various telephone conversations and office conferences 
regarding trial preparation; telephone conversation and communications 
with client; review email (various); prepare email (various); telephone 
conversation with co-counsel; evening trial preparation 
10/30/2013 DP 95.00 3.50 
64490 legal assist. 
Various trial tasks including research regarding jury selection, witness 
and exhibit lists, proofread and finalize response to defendants' 
. mi~representation, trial director 
10/31/2013 SM 275.00 6.50 
64497 preparation 
Trial preparation; work on witness and exhibit lists; telephone 
conversation with expert; telephone conversation with witness; telephone 
conversation with client; conference with co-counsel and team; trial 
preparation 
10/31/2013 DP 95.00 6.20 
64499 legal assist. 
Various trial tasks including witnesses, exhibits, depositions; office 
conference with team 
11/1/2013 SM 275.00 12.40 
64544 preparation . 
Early morning· travel to Mountain Home for witness meeting; return travel 
to Boise; trial preparation - day and evening; conferences with co-counsel 
and staff; review courtroom arrangement and technology; review and 
prepare email (various); review briefing; legal research regarding trial 
issues 
11/1/2013 DP 95.00 6.80 
64550 legal assist. 
Various trial related tasks including jury research, exhibits, meeting at 
courtroom · 
11/2/2013 SM . 275.00 7.50 
64549 preparation 











NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 









case expert; review and prepare various email; legal research regarding 
evidentiary issues and instruction; tasks regarding jury (Saturday) 
11/2/2013 DP 95.00 7.70 
64551 legal assist. 
Various trial related tasks including jury research, jury list and exhibits 
11/3/2013 DP 95.00 6.20 
64558 legal assist. 
Various trial related tasks including jury research, jury list and exhibits; 
office conference regarding jurors 
11/3/2013 SM 275.00 8.60 
64859 preparation 
Trial preparation; conferences with co-counsel and staff regarding same; 
work on jury selection issues; prepare for limine argument; drafting of 
outline for use at trial; evening trial preparation (Sunday) 
11/4/2013 DP 95.00 6.40 
64575 legal assist. 
Various trial related tasks including jury, exhibits and witnesses 
11/4/2013 SM 275.00 10.70 
64624 preparation 
Trial Preparation; prepare for day 1 of trial including jury selection, 
argument of limine issues and potential witness examination; work on 
exhibits; conferences with co-counsel and staff; visit courtroom and 
address logistical issues; evening trial preparation 
11/5/2013 SM 275.00 9.70 
64625 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial Day 1; evening trial preparation for 
Day2 
11/6/2013 DP. 95.00 1.60 
64589 legal assist. 
Trial support including exhibit organization and witness contact 
11/6/2013 DP 95.00 5.90 
64592 legal assist. 
Trial support including exhibit organization, witness contact; assist in jury 
selection 
11/6/2013 SM 275.00 11.40 
64626 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial Day 2; evening nighttime trial 


























NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 





Rate Hours Amount 
DNB Amt ------- Markup% __ D_N_B_T_i_m_e 10 . ..,,..80..,..----:-=--:---11/7/2013 SM 275.00 2,970.00 
64627 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial Day 3; evening-night trial 
preparation for Day 4 
11/8/2013 SM 275.00 8.10 
64628 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial Day 4- tasks following day's trial to 
prepare for following week 
11/10/2013 SM 275.00 
64629 preparation 
Trial Preparation (Sunday) 
11/11/2013 SM 275.00 
64630 preparation 
Trial Preparation for Day 5 and week 2 of trial; conferences with 
co-counsel to prepare for same; evening trial preparation 
9.30 
8.30 
11/12/2013 SM 275.00 10.70 
64663 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial Day 5; prepare comments to draft 
jury instructions; evening trial preparation 
11/13/2013 SM 275.00 11.40 
64664 preparation 
Trial preparation; attend Day 6 of trial;; trial preparation (evening) 
11/14/2013 SM 275.00 5.30 
64860 preparation 
Morning trial preparation; attend trial - Day 7, mistrial declared; various 
post trial tasks and conferences following mistrial 
11/15/2013 SM 275.00 2.30 
64861 preparation 
Tasks to address mistrial and prepare for post trial briefing on sanctions -
retrial; telephone conversations (various) with case witnesses and 
contacts regarding mistrial 
12/4/2013 RF 185.00 2.20 
64899 research 
Telephone conversation with Scott McKay regarding sanctions research; 
legal research regarding disqualification of counsel as sanction; drafting 
regarding same 
12/4/2013 SM 275.00 2.60 
64942 preparation 
Research and drafting of sanctions motion; review and prepare case 


























NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 











12/5/2013 SM 275.00 5.50 
64943 preparation 
Research and drafting of sanctions motion, memorandum and supporting 
pleadings; review and preparation of case email (various) regarding same 
12/6/2013 SM 275.00 2.70 
64946 preparation 
Further review and drafting of memorandum in support of motion for 
sanctions and supporting pleadings; telephone conversations with 
, co-counsel regarding same; conferences with staff to coordinate same; 
tasks regarding same 
12/23/2013 DP 95.00 0.10 
65045 legal assist. 
Draft notice of hearing 
12/23/2013 SM 275.00 0.30 
65667 preparation 
Review objection to sanction motion; revise notice regarding sanction 
motion and trial setting 
2/5/2014 SM 275.00 3.50 
65600 preparation 
Review of defendants' opposition to motion for sanctions and related 
materials; legal research and tasks regarding same; prepare and review 
em.ail (various) regarding same 
2/6/2014 SM 275.00 2.90 
65647 preparation 
Further review of defendants' opposition to sanction motion and research 
regarding same; research and inquiry regarding defense representations 
opposing sanctions; tasks regarding same; various email regarding 
sanction motion and response 
2/7/2014 SM 275.00 2.40 
65654 preparation 
Prepare and review email regarding pending sanction motion and trial 
reset; tasks regarding same; telephone conversation with co-counsel 
regarding same; conference with assistant regarding defendants' 
overlength brief and court's denial of same; prepare email regarding 
same; review defendants' letter and "reformatted brief'; legal research 
regarding same; further case email regarding briefing; tasks regarding 
same 
2/9/2014 SM 275.00 1.30 
65656 preparation 
























NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 











2/10/2014 DP 95.00 2.30 
65623 legal assist. 
Proofread and finalize motion to strike, reply memo in support of sanction 
motion and declaration; filing and service 
2/10/2014 SM 275.00 5.70 
65657 preparation 
Legal research and drafting of reply memorandum in support of motion 
for sanctions; telephone conversations with co-counsel (various) 
regarding same; conferences with legal assistant regarding sanction reply 
and related tasks; finalize brief and supporting pleadings; coordinate filing 
and service 
2/11/2014 SM 275.00 4.30 
65658 preparation 
Conference with assistant regarding task to address filling and pending 
motions regarding sanctions; review and revise pleading regarding same; 
conferences with co-counsel to prepare regarding sanction hearing; 
review of pleadings and research regarding same 
2/12/2014 SM 275.00 3.80 
65659 preparation 
Morning conference with co-counsel to prepare for hearing on sanction 
motion; review of pleadings and prepare for hearing; attend hearing on 
sanction motion; post hearing conferences with co-counsel and tasks 
2/13/2014 DP 95.00 0.80 
65642 legal assist. 
Format affidavit of counsel regarding sanction motion; prepare 
documents regarding sanctions 
2/13/2014 SM 275.00 3.10 
65660 preparation 
Research and outline of issues regarding court's ruling on sanction 
motion and fee petition; review and prepare email regarding same; 
drafting of pleadings to support same 
2/14/2014 SM 275.00 1.60 
65661 preparation 
Revise pleadings in support of fee petition; prepare email regarding 
same; review and reply to case email; review correspondence regarding 
new trial dates; email and tasks to address new trial date· 
2/17/2014 SM 275.00 2.50 
65662 preparation 
Research and drafting of memorandum of fees and costs; review and 
prepare email regarding same; outline declaration and submission 
























NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles:Mr. Charles Ballard (continued) 
Amount 
TOTAL Billable Fees 231.60 
Date Professional Price Quantity 
ID ExQense MarkuQ % 
10/31/2013 SM 0.15 1293.000 
64383 $copy charges 
In-house copies (limine motion, affidavit, exhibits and Jls} 
10/31/2013 SM 0.565 86.799 
64407 $misc costs 
Mileage Boise to Mountain Home 
10/31/2013 SM 0.15 1354.000 
64465 $copy charges 
In-house copies (Trial) 
10/31/2013 SM 35.90 1.000 
64498 $misc costs 
Witness fee for trial witness 
10/31/2013 SM 0.15 130.000 
64554 $copy charges 
In-house copies (trial} 
11/1/2013 SM 0.15 95.000 
64556 $copy charges 
In-house copies (trial) 
11/2/2013 SM 0.15 54.000 
64557 $copy charges 
In-house copies (Trial) 
11/3/2013 SM 31.27 1.000 
64552 $meals 
Lunch for trial counsel/client 
11/3/2013 SM 0.15 1650.000 
64555 $copy charges 
In house copies (Trial) 
11/3/2013 SM 0.15 1350.000 
65641 $copy charges 
In house copies (Trial) 
11/4/2013 SM 0.15 997.000 
6457 4 $copy charges 



















NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles:Mr. Charles Ballard (continued) 
Price Quantity 
Page 8 
Amount 1 Date 
ID ---------
Professional 
Expense Markup o/o ___________ __, _____ _ 
11/4/2013 SM 
64576 $copy costs 
In house copies (Tri~I) 
11/5/2013 SM 
64587 $meals 
· Lunch (Trial) 
11/6/2013 SM 
64586 $copy costs 














64652 $copy charges 
In house copies (Trial) 
11/11/2013 SM 
64620 $copy charges 
In-house copies (Trial) 
11/11/2013 SM 
64653 $copy charges 





64683 $copy charges 

















2488.000 373.20 Billable 
1.000 25.42 Billable 
196.000 29.40 Billable 
1.000 32.22 Billable 
1.000 61.13 Billable 
1.000 85.99 Billable 
1.000 31.00 Billable 
328.000 49.20 Billable 
492.000 73.80 Billable 
546.000 81.90 Billable 
1.000 19.71 Billable 
104.000 15.60 Billable 




NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
Pre-bill Worksheet 
Ballard, Charles:Mr. 'charles Ballard (continued) 
Date Professional Price Quantity 
Page 9 
Amount 1 
_ ID~~~~ Expense Markup% ________________ _ 
1/14/2014 SM 
65281 $misc costs 
PACER (Trial) 
TOTAL Billable Costs 
Fees Bill Arrangement: Slips · 
By billing value on each slip. 
Total of billable time slips 
Total of Fees (Time Charges) 
Costs Bill Arrangement: Slips 
By billing value on each slip. 
Total of billable expense slips 
Total of Costs (Expense Charges) 
Total new charges 
12.30 
Calculation of Fees and Costs 











David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DECLARATION OF 
J. CHARLES HEPWORTH 
DECLARATION OF J. CHARLES HEPWORTH-Page 1 
002103
1. I am an attorney, duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and the senior 
partner with the law firm of Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd., in Boise. I make the statements 
contained in this declaration based on my own personal observations and knowledge. 
2. I graduated from Stanford University with a degree in English in 1978 and obtained 
my law degree from the University of California, Hastings College of Law in 1981. Since that 
time, I have actively been engaged in the private practice of law and for over thirty years, have 
been practicing in Idaho. 
3. My law firm and my practice are devoted to representing individuals and surviving 
family members in claims for personal injury and wrongful death including medical malpractice. 
I have tried to verdict many such cases including a $6.15 million verdict that I helped obtain in 
2006 for the family of a 28-year-old woman who died as a result of a medical error, and a $7.55 
million verdict that I helped obtain against St. Luke's Hospital in a wrongful death case in 2001. 
4. I am listed in The Best Lawyers in America and was rated one of the top 75 lawyers in 
all fields by the Mountain States Super Lawyers for 2009. I have an "AV" rating from the 
Martindale Hubbell lawyer rating service. I am a member of the American Association for 
Justice, a fellow with the American College of Trial Lawyers and a long standing member of the 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association. 
5. I am familiar with hourly rates charged by the lawyers and legal professionals at my 
law firm as well as other law firms in this area. It is my opinion that a billing rate for attorney P. 
Gregory Haddad of $325/hr. and for attorney Scott McKay of $275/hr., the attorneys who 
handled the first trial in the above matter, is eminently reasonable and consistent with billing 
rates in the Boise area for attorneys of similar experience, skill and reputation. I further believe 
that billing rates for experienced paralegal support of up to $125/hr. and for experienced 
DECLARATION OF J. CHARLES HEPWORTH- Page 2 
002104
associate attorneys of up to $225/hr. is likewise reasonable for experienced paralegals and 
associates assisting on cases of this nature in the Boise area. 
This ends my declaration. 
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED This Dated this 14th day of February, 2014. 
J. Charles Hepworth 






information ·»technology » service 
I -----·---·--··-· ·---··-· .. ·-·-.. - .................................... . 
, HADDAD/PHILIP BALLARD 
j GREGORY Booking locator: TMLOPY 
Fare: $452.00 
~ .. _,_,._ • .,.,,.u,,,..~•,•"'"'~ •'j 
24-Jan-2014 11:12 am l 
Page 1 of 2 j 
I I THANK YOU. TRACI w I; ..... --. -- ... -- ...... ~---·Ai, ........ _ .. Dei'ia A0ir Lin.es . .. ............ ........ . ................... ·- ....... Flight#. "97 4.... .. ..... '"'class:'. u 
·, .:::V From: Pittsburgh PA, USA To: Minneapolis St Pl MN, USA 
..... -----1 
I 
, 11-Feb-2014 Meal: REFRESH AT COST Seats: Seat08C 
j 08:55am Equip: Airbus Jet Status: 
i Tuesday Depart: 11-Feb-2014 Tuesday 08:55am Stops: 
I Arrival: 11-Feb-2014 Tuesday 10:23am 
I Depart 




j Delta Air Lines locator: HQ2YYN i~----·-··---· :~right_ D~:l::::n:in:s hour(s) .. _ and _28 minutes .. Flight# __ 869 _____ ·--··-·"'c"fu's·~~- ·u·--···-·· ----·-·-i 
From: Minneapolis St Pl MN, USA To: Boise ID, USA J 
Feb-2014 Meal: REFRESHATCOST Seats: Seat:15F I 
35am Equip: Airbus Jet Status: Confirmed i 
sday Depart: 11-Feb-2014 Tuesday 11 :35am Stops: O 
Arrival: 11-Feb-2014 Tuesday 01:41pm 
Depart - MSP TERMINAL 1 
Arrive -
Delta Air Lines locator: HQ2YYN 
Flight Duration: 3 hour(s) and 6 minutes 
I I~,; 1 Hotel Interstate Hotels And Resorts Hotel 43 981 Grove Street, Boise ID US 83702 , 
11-Feb-2014 Phone: 1-208-3424622 
1Tuesday Number of Rooms: 1 
I Confirmation: 14937SB011149 Check Out: 13-Feb-2014 Thursday 
., BK59591ARR11FEB CXL:O<L BY 1600 HOTEL TIME ON 11FEB14-FEE 1 NIGHT-
RESERVATION IS GUARANTEED FOR LATE ARRIVAL. 





*DIRECTIONS TO HOTEL* 
..... _!_3.QI_:_B~_~e .. ft:i r.p_or:!=. 3. _!)Ii. NE 1- ... -· .... -· ·- -
·1511 I 13-Feb-2014 
J07:10am 
:Thursday 
Air United Airlines Flight# 
To: 
1412 Class: T 
! 





, .. -- -......... ·-· 
, 15-Mar-2014 
I S~!U~d-~¥ • - - - -
From: Boise ID, USA 
Meal: None 
Equip: Boeing 737-800 Jet 
Depart: 13-Feb-2014 Thursday 
Arrival: 13-Feb-2014 Thursday 
United Airlines locator: CMYlSM 
07:10am 
08:59am 
Flight Duration: 1 hour(s) and 49 minutes 
Uniied Airlines . 
- ~ ·H-Air 
From: Denver CO, USA 
Meal: FOOD TO PURCHASE 
Equip: Airbus Jet 
Depart: 13-Feb-2014 Thursday 09:56am 
Arrival: 13-Feb-2014 Thursday 02:53pm 
United Airlines locator: CMYlSM 
Flight Duration: 2 hour(s) and 57 minutes 
Pittsburgh PA, USA 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A 
AND LASER CENTER and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA LASER and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-04792 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 
TRIAL SETTING 
AND ORDER GOVERNING 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
This case is set for Jury Trial to commence on Tuesday, April 8, 2014 at 09:30 A.M., and 
continue for three (3) weeks. No trial proceedings will be lteld on Mondays because it is tlte Court's 
criminal calendar day. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED: 
1. All pretrial motions, with the exception of Motions in Limine, shall be heard and 
completed at least twenty-eight (28) days before the trial date. A Judge's copy of all motions and 
memoranda in support tl,ereof slwuld be filed directly wit/z c/zambers. *Motions in Limine must be 
filed not later titan two (2) weeks prior to trial. No Motions filed after t/zat time will be considered. 
Motions in Limine slta/l be lteard on tlte morning of trial, unless otlterwise sclteduled by tlte Court. 
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2. Not later than fourteen (14) days before the trial date, counsel for all parties to the action 
shall hold a conference for exchange of information and discussion of matters specified by I.R.C.P. 
16(a) and 16(b). 
3. Not later than seven (7) days before trial: (a) each attorney shall certify to the Court, in 
writing, that such Exchange of Information Conference has taken place and furnish with such 
certification a list of the names of persons disclosed as possible witnesses pursuant to Rule 16(a)(4), 
and a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered in evidence, reciting which exhibits counsel 
have agreed may be received in evidence without objection and those to which no objection will be 
made on grounds other than irrelevancy or immateriality; or (b) in lieu thereof, all counsel may join in 
submitting a written stipulation in conformance with Rule 16(b ). 
4. Any objection to the date of this trial must be made by any party within fifteen (15) days 
from the date of this notice. 
5. All exhibit lists must be submitted to the Court five (5) days prior to trial. 
6. All requested jury instructions must be submitted to the Court, BOTH hard copy AND 
emailed to lsimsdouglas@adaweb.net (in Word format) fourteen (14) days prior to trial. 
7. This Order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified for good 
cause shown to prevent manifest injustice. 
8. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of this Order, which may 
include assignment of the trial date to another case. 
9. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an 
alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case if the assigned judge is 
unavailable. The following is a list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G. D. Carey 
Hon. Gregory M. Culet 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Justice Gerald Schroeder 
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Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr. 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Hon. Ronald Wilpur 
Hon. W.H. Woodland 
All Sitting Fourth District Judges 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 
40(d)(l), each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for disqualification without cause as to 
any alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after service of this notice. 
DATED the 21st day of February, 2014. 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING // JT 3/4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thed)tJ:' day of February, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
DAVID NEVIN 
SCOTT S MCKAY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
POST OFFICE BOX 2772 
BOISE ID 83701-2772 
JEREMIAH A QUANE 
TERRENCE S. JONES 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
POST OFFICE BOX 1576 
BOISE ID 83701-1576 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING // JT 
,:,.. .. 
' ' . .
4/4 
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2014/02/24 13:42:24 2 /9 
· ORIGH\JAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF · ·· 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE Of lDAHO, IN ANO · · 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA : . 
NO. _F,t. ·-g,,! ~ · , 
A.M.-----:-. , . · , · · 
CHntSTOPHER D .. ·RICH, Clerk 




Case No: CY.OC ,1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an 1daho. limited 
Hability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba S1LK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTIONS TO-PLAINTIFF'S·.. ·. . . . . . · .. '.-. '~ 
MEMORANDUM OF AU.ORN~·. 
FEES AND COSTS . . . 
The following constitute the objections of the Defe~d~nts to t~e ·Plaintiff's 
Memorandum of attorney fees and costs. The Plaintiff's Memmandun'l cites five · 
categories of fees and costs, labeled A through E, each of which is objected to by the 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATIORNEY FEES ANO.=COSTS - · 1 . ·. . . ·. . .. 
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... ·.· ·: .. 
. .·.· .. 
:. ·!: ... · .: . · .. 
Defendants, in their totality and in certain portions and aspects. 
It is the position of the Defendants that an award is confined-to the p.J_aintiff's · 
. . . 
costs for his experts who testified at trial, 3 in number, attorney fe~·s for the trlai itself arid . 
incidental costs for the trial. Attorney time spent preparing for trial is not-intl~d~.d _a~{ti~~-- ·. 
spent in addition to the time ln Court for trial is not included, nor· is the payment to Ada· 
. . 
County for_ Jury costs and fees for the trial authorized by rule 47(u),·l.R.C.P. ltis pro~ibited·. . · 
by Rule 48(a), I.R.C.P. In the opinion of undersigned, the services of par~legals·and iegal . 
. . 
assist for trial are not recoverable, not reasonably required or necess·aty and ·nqt withi_n-. ...:. 
t • • ••• • 
the scope of the award to be entered by the Court. The fees· and. costs. f9r s~riti~es:. 
rendered after November 14, 2013 are not recoverabte and not within the s·cop~_oqh~ · :.·.·: 
. . ·. . 
award to be en~ered by the Court. 
At trial, the Plaintiff called 5 live witnesses and -one witness· __ by <h.er· .· . ' 
. . . 
deposition and its video. The medical records were adm(tted· by _agreeiTie!lt of ~ouns~f. .. ·:: 
. . .· . . 
. ' 
The Plaintiff called 3 expert witnesses, Dr. Kerr and the-Plaintiff.1-he· piajntlff rest~tj his · ... ·. : . ·. 
. . . •'• .. ·. . 
case-i~-chiefon November 12, 2013. The Defendant~ called· Dr. Ke;rand:Oc·S°tffler:1ri.· :·_.·: . . . . -.: ........ . 
their case-in-chief and neither were cross-examined by Plairitiff's,counse1. T~e frial:~lsfd · : : 
included jury selection, opening statements, Court hearings on .several. Mptions·· ano . ·. 
. : . •' . 
matters, and the matter of one juror not returning for trial. The Def~nd.ants dit;i oot"hav_e 'a 
. ~ ... · :. . 
paralegal or legal assistant at trial or technician for operating equi"pment'showing exhibit~, 
none of which was reasonably necessary or required. 
Defendants object as follows to the categories specified in t_he Plaintiff'~. 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Category A.1. Not recoverable. 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTtFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES ANO COSTS - . : 
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. . : .: .. : 
.. ·. .... . . · .. •,, 
•I•,• 
Category A.2. Excessive time, attorney duplication, improper att_orney 
hourly rates, lack of proof. that the time of all persons was rieces.sary, reason a.bl~- and 
required. 
Category A.3. Not recoverable. 
Category 8.1. Not recoverable. 
Category B.2. Other than the expert witness .fees of Ors. S~r.~n~en and. 
Nichols and Economist Hoffman, there is only traver expen~e of Dr. Nichols .. ·rrayel 
expense of Mr. Haddad and paralegal Farrah Caruthers and tests qf trial technician·not . . . . . 
recoverable. Costs of trial subpoenas, trial witness fees and oth~r·itemi.zed .trial' costs rio_t · 
. . . 
.... 
. . 
recoverable. The Declaration of Mr. Haddad under the heading Additional Charg~s d~¢s: . , 
not de.scribe or identify the need or reasons for the it~ms listed and Dr·Arniitagefdid .nor 
. 
testify at the trial. 
Category D. Not recoverable. Has nothing to do with ... tlje ·mistrial. Defen;se : : .. .. 
. : . . . :' .. . . :· ..... . 
counsel did not violate any discovery order or refusal to an~we~-di~66very~ one~ the:Courf-. . : . '.: .. 
·.. . . . . . . . . . · .. 
• • a:· 
overruled objections to Plaintiff's interrogatories. Answers to the· if!.~errogafo~i~ .~ere . . 
promptly filed and served and payment made to Plaintiff's. attorn~Y. ~s ::c:,rder~d.· _by J.he.: ·. ·. ·. ·. 
. . . . . : . . . . -
District Judge. 
Category E. Objections noted above are applica~le. 
The Affidavit of Jeremiah A. Quane i~ filed and served with these 
objections. It is relied upon in the instances where applicable to these objections:. : · 
The Defendants and their counsel urge the Court t~ consider the following. 
factors in determining the amount of attorney fees: 
1. The time and labor reasonably requ'ired and necessary as oppos~d 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.-· 
3 ::.. · ..: . 
. . :· 
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.... ·.·: : : .. · .. . : ..... . ·. · ... · .. . 
.. . . : .·· .. · ... 
· .. : .· =· •.•.•. : . • · .. : 
to time entries simply made in time records. 
2. The novelty and difficulty of the issues, le~al an·d factu~l .. of t~·e ca$e .. : · · ·. · . 
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal servic;es ,properly antt. th_e·.·· .. : . . . . . . ,.... . · ... · 
experience and ability of the Plaintiffs attorneys in the field of law-for medical. ~alpr~ctic~.. . .. 
4. The prevailing changes in the Boise area for like work. 
5. Whether the fees of Plaintiffs counsel are fixed or _conting~_nt. 
6. The time limitations imposed under the circumstances of -~he ~se. .· 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2014. 
JONES McCOLL, PLLC . · 
B --1--+---~~----.::::;=:.---'-----· 
Jer iah A. Quane,. Of the Firm·· 
Attorneys torp~f~ndanfs .. 
. . 
. . ·. 
. .. ·· 
•' 
: . .. 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNtY FEES AND·COSTS -. . . · 4 . . . .. . . .. ... 
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., I ' _. 
... : . •' ... : .· 
:. ,: . ... ; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 241h day of Februa.ry1.2.0.14, .I s.erv~d.~ true.. .. ·. 
and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S:.MI;MORANDUM: .. bF ·, 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS by delivering the same to each of the.following.; :~Y .the. : .· . · 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: · ·: ·. ·· · · · · 
.. • . . .. 
· David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
. Boise, idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
· P. Gregory .Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
[ J U.S .. Mail, pqstage· pr.epaid ·. -
[ ] Hand Delivered· 
[ ] ave.might r0ail 
[X] Facsimiie (208) 345~8274 
[ ] U.S . .fvlait,.p.o~tage prepai<,J 
[ ] Hand Delivered· ·. 
{ J Overnight Mail . 
[X] Facsimile .(304:) .594-970~ 
. . 
[ l U.S. fy1.~il, post?ge prep~id 
[ J Hand· Deliver~d . 
.. 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone {205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ l overnlghf M~l'· · . . . ... . . 
[X] F?csimil~::(~95} 7~3-489.ff .· .... ·. 
.... 
. , . . . . . . . . .. . . 
. ·.·· 
.. . .. . . . 
: . . ~. ; . . ::. ......... :· .. ·. 
: .. · 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES.ANO CO$TS -· · · . 
5 . . . . . .. · ... 
. . 
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v,,a\.:ia\JAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulev.ard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ·1N AND 





FEB 2 4 2014 
?HA/STOPHER o: A/CH Clerk 




Case No.· CV·OC 1204792·· 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER ·CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
;6~~As~1;~6~:~~1~~N~~t~s~· .· . =·'' · 
MEMORANDUrvh)F'.ATTORNEY · .. ·· .": ·. · ·. 
FEES AND .COSTS '. ... ·. . . . · .. 
,. 
,,• 
Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn .upon. oath, depose.s· and 
says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJECTIONS .TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1 . 
. . ... ":·' 
. ·.· ... · .·.·.: ' :· . . ·· 
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... · . . . . .. . ": . . • .. 
.... .. 
1. I am the attorney of record for Defendants· in the .above capt.i~ned · 
action, and the following statements are made of my own p·ersorial kr.i_o\Afl~dge·~nct:·.a.re,. 
·.· . .. . . 
true and correct. 
..... ···: . 
2. I have handled numerous civil tort cases- thal !.nv?lved yaryi.D9, \~~al.. · >· · · .... · 
; ...... · ... 
. . . 
issues. Of these civil tort cases, many were medical malpractice cas~_s. 1 have.handled · ·: · · 
and/or tried civil tort and medical malpractice cases in all but 8 of the 44 counties in the . · 
. ',. . 
. . 
State of Idaho and the Federal District Courts of Idaho and Montana.· Of these cases, a . · . · . . . . . . . . ~ . . 
great number of them were in the District Court of Ada County. 
. .. ···: .. 
.. ... 
3. Based on my experience, I am familiar with arid have knowledgeLo(:: : · ·. ·. 
• • • • = •• 
the attorney fee hourly rates customarily and usually charged by attorneys -in ¢ivil t9rt a~d 
medical malpractice cases that include cases in the Dis1rict Court of .Ada·. County ·and·.its . ·. · · 
', .. 
. . . 
surrounding counties. I have acquired this knowledge by. means of.di!:>Clissing hourly.· · · . ·· .. · . . . ,. . ·.. . 
rates with attorneys, reviewing billing· statem~nts of attorneys· and claim~ i!J.ssert~d-' by_\ ... ·. · 
' . . . . ......... : - . . . ·. 
. : . : .. . 
attorneys in connection with litigated cases and decisions. of c_ou.rts f~~ t~e .a~S~f!s.rn~n~:Pf ... · .......... · ... . 
. . . . .. ·· ... ·. .. : . ... . .... . 
attorney fees. I have testified as an expert witness in the District Court ~f Aqa G·o~nty:~ri\ :·.:' :::\_. ·· . 
. ,' .. · . , ... -:: .. ·. . 
the subject of reasonable and customary attorney fee hourly rates ~nc;l ~~S~r¥.~d ·.other: .: · -.. ·' . · .. . .. : 
·: . . . . . . ·. . : . .. . . . 
attorneys doing the same. ln these cases, the presiding juqgc;=: ··accept~-~. me·: as.·~ .. · .. 
. . . . .·: . 
·: ~= . 
qualified expert witness. . .... :::: .. >:·. : . :· .. 
4. 1 am qualified to render the opinions stated in.thiifAffi_dayit .. · · · · .. ' . .'. 
. . . 
5. The customary, usual and accepted hourly rate~· for attorneys iryt~e. 
Fourth and other Judicial Districts of the State of idaho in civif tort and f!lalprac(ice.~s~s 
is in the range of $150 to $190, and $190 is the outer or highest rate. 
6. In my opinion, these are the ranges for the ass~~me.nt' of -atto~ney 
. . : . . . 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJECTtONS TO. P(AINT!f:'F'S· 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2 . . . . . .. . 
..... .. . . ~ .. . •. · . 
. ·:. · .. .. ·: . · .. 
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. : · .. . . · .
,• ·· .. :·.: •,: . ... : ,: . "' . . . . . 
fees in connection with the Plaintiff's pending motion. 
7. My experience and acquired knowledge· set fo~h abov~. coy~rs, 
.. 
applies and relates to the attorney time necessary and reason~bly. required.to pertorrrj" the: ·; :·. : :· . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . : . . ... 
legal services for"the issues involved in this case and I believe-th~t J. am:'qbalifi$~ tq.ren~~~-- :·· ·.."_··.,:· : 
. . .. •, . . . . . . . : . . .· . 
an opinion on the time that is customarily and reasonably necessary a~d required'. of .. ··_, · 
Plaintiff's attorney to conduct the trial of this case. 
8. The trial of this case started November · 5, . 201.3, and· erided .·: . . . . . .~ ... 
' . 
November 14, 2013, a total of slightly over 6 % days. The actual:~im·e spent in tri~_l .is: as. 
fotlows for the trial days: 
November 5, 2013 
November 6, 2013 
November 7, 2013 
November 8, 2013 
November 12, 2013 
November 13, 2013 









· 45.4 hours 
.. . ,• 
.. · .. ... . . . · ... . 
. .:·· : .... . 
9. According to the declaration of Mr. Haddad; Jh~· following tifr!e. is ... · · 
. . · .... ·· ......... · .. · ..... ·· .. 
stated to be as follows for himself and Mr. McKay for the trial ·d?l~es: ... ._,: · · .-  
. . ·. ,· .. 
Mr. Haddad 
November 5, 2013 
November 6, 2013 
November 7, 2013 
November 8, 2013 
November 12, 2013 
November 13, 2013 
November 14, 2013 
.... 










0 :. oN: O 
... . .. 
• ...... . 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJECTIONS TO: ... P.lAINTfFF'S ·. :· 
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. . ..... 
.: • ... 
. . · . . ... : . . . . . 
Mr. McKay 
November 5, 2013 
November 6, 2013 
November 7, 2013 
November 8, 2013 
November 12, 2013 
November 13, 2013 








. ,• . ': .·· :· 
Total 68.4 hours 
·10. According to the time records of Nevin, BehJamin, McKay and . ·· 
:- ·. 
Bartlett, Exhibit B to the Declaration of Mr. Haddad and the time rec(?rds_. of ~ail~y_.ahd · . · ... · . . . . . . . . .. ·. 
Glasser, Exhibit A to the Declaration of Mr. Haddad, the descriptibn of servic::~s}or e~clJ _: · .·.- · .· 
. . . . . . . 
trial day for both Mr. McKay and Mr. Haddad are very similar a_nd ·constita.te: in:the opfr1ion :. · ··: .:- -: · · 
. . . . . . . . ·.· · .. : . . . . 
of undersigned, the unnecessary duplication· of services of orie to the·o.th~r. .. . · · ·_, .. : . · . . .. . . . 
11. The Declaration of Mr. Haddad, page 2; states th~·t he h~s tried o~_e"r.-· ... 
. . .. · . 
seventy cases, but his declaration does not state the ~umbers· of cases t~ied. A~st1ry:i(ng · ... · .. 
. . ~ ... 
the number ·of cases tried ls about 70 or close to 70, undersigne9 has trfed .175 cjvil ·C~$e{. · .. :. ·. :_ -:. 
in Idaho compared to the alleged 70 or so cases tried by Mr. ~~~~-~d· •. ··n6~~·-i·~i::iq~h·~· i. ·:·· · .. 
except this case. 
12. The Declaration of Mr:Haddad does notdescribe·_ormentjo·n·th.elriaf;·.: :· . : 
experience of Mr. McKay in medical malpractice cases. . · :." 
13. The Declaration of Mr. Haddad, page 4, :.paragrap_h ·12· .. 'st~t~s-. "the: .. · .:· '. 
hourly rates associated with the above stated fees are reasona~fe ;and .coilsJ~te~t'w_ith.' 
that of other law firms and lawyers handling cases of this nature in .this area." The: 
! . . . 
Declaration then refers to the Declaration of attorney Charles ~ej:>worth. The ab?Ve 
quoted statement of Mr. Haddad lacks foundation and the factual' basis-for it, and. is. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJl;CTIONS ··T9 .PLAINT!FF.'S. 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -4 .. 
•,' . : ....... . 
.. :. . ·.' .:.. : .. . .. ,, ,: •, 
~ •' ' . 
. : : 
:,, 
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· ..... 
. : ·. ·:: _:·_ ·: .-.··;": .. 
·.:.:. 
tantamount to pure speculation and conjecture. 
14. In the opinion of undersigned, he has hanc:tled ?nd tri~d many more· 
. . ·. . . .. ,• . ·: . 
medical malpractice cases than attorney Charles Hepworth and ·he_.dis~tg~~e.s.wJt'h ·j~~-: .·. · ·-.-:.· · ·.·. 
·. . .· . ~ . .. . ·. ·. . . 
attorney fee rates specified in the Declaration of Mr. Hepworth and:h~--~is~g"ree~·w1t6 t~·e · ·· 
. . . ·:· . . . :· .. 
attorney fee rates specified in the Declaration of Mr. Haddad. 
15. The Complaint in this case was filed. March: 16; 2012: .The .·· . . . . . . . . . .... 
Declaration of Mr. Haddad contains the time records of Bailey.an9:GJasser. and.Nevin-,· .. 
. . . . .. ·.·.· .. ·:: 
', :· 
• ','•1 
Benjamin, McKay and Bartlett that reflect the attorney time regist~t~d .f9r both tvh-. ·H~ddatj ·:' ·: .·. ·.: :_.. 
. . ,• .. ·.. . . . . . . . . :•' .. 
and Mr. McKay for the following dates: 
. · ... 
dates: 
Mr. Haddad 
October 30, 2013 
October 31, 2013 
November 1, 2013 
November 2, 2013 
November 3, 2013 







::: . . . 
. - . . 
: .. · ..... ·.· .. 
.··. . . ... 
. . . . . . :. . ~ . · ... 
,:· ·: .. ··· .. •: . 
... . ,, : .... 
. ..... · .. 
-·.· . : . 
.I • : • • 
. ·. · ..... . 
:· . ... 
•,. 
. . . 
· .. · .... '_·· .: ·., 
. . . ·. ,· 
. . ·· ': .. : ... 
.· ··. 
.. . : . · .... · .... : ·· ..... : 
... ·- ·.: . ... . 
Mr. McKay 
October-30, 2013 
·October 31, 2013 
November 1, 2013 
November 2, 2013 
November3, 2013 







. ·· .. · .... ·. . ... 
. .. . :· ... 
. . . . . . 
. · .. ·:-.· . ', : .. 
The same time records reflect the time r~gistered.for-others:_qn the··foliowing· . 
Bailey and Glasser 
October 30, 2013 (FLC (paralegal)) 12.4 hours 
(RDS (paralegal)) 1;6 hours 
October 31, 2013 (FLC) 11.6 hours· 
. ~ . 
.: .· .. 
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November 1, 2013 (FLC) 10.0 hours 
November 2, 2013 (FLC) 10.0 hours . 
November 3, 2013 (FLC) 11.0 hours 
November 4, 2013 (FLC) 11.9 hours 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay and Bartlett 
October 30, 2013 (DP (Jegal assist)) 3.5 hours. 
October 31, 2013 (DP) 6.2 hours 
November 1, 2013 (DP) 6.8 hours . 
November 2, 2013 (DP) 7.7 hours. 
November 3, 2013 (DP) 8.6 hours 
November 4, 2013 (DP) 6.4 hours 
.... •. :. •' ... 
.. ·.. •, .. 
.. . . . ,,•; .. 
... 
.. 
. ; : 
' . 
. . •'•, : 
. .:• .. 
... ·., 
·.·· .. 
.. . . . .. 
-: . ,• : 







The time entries themselves noted above, do . not in .the·. opiniqn. of .... : . \. '. 
undersigned establish that the services were reasonaJly ~eces~-~~:.a~~·:r~~~irn~::.·~ri~ .. ·::. '_:···.··:·_. > 
. ' : . : . . : . . . . . ·: . 
.. 
customary nor dot.hey show that the services of each person ·are npfth.e ~~plic~.fion ·of th~·:·._:: · .·· .. _ .... · .. :. ·. ·: 
. .. .... ·. : .. \ : .. . . . ::.,. · ... . : .. ··. . . ·. : 
services of others. · .. · ·. >: -'.':-,'.:· · · ..- .. :· .. ::· ... , 
. Taking into acco~nt the fact that both ·Jaw fit:ms .forthe:P.l~;-htiff\~~f~~~~'.·i .·:.: -;<·=/ =:: ··.:-: 
: . •. . . . . ·:· .... ,: :··.. ·.= . . ·• . . 
working on this case since the Compl~int was.filed March 16;.io1?:an~·be.for~,:ii~t~~ .. ·. · .. · f .. -· · 
,.; . 
opinion of undersigned that the time reflected in the time reco~ds is \~xcessive,·. ··not .. .::" .. ::.·... . . : 
required, not customary. and not reasonably. necessa~, notwi~~:~~~~·~i~~:: .th~ .-P~~-iiion · .. :· .:.-.:":. ;. : ·.' : 
- ····. : .. . :• . . ... . 
taken by the Defendants that services performed before-th~ triatstarted'o~-N~yemb~r··~~·-:-- ·:.· ... >·_.· .. .. 
. . . · ............. · ...... :· .. . 
2013 are not recoverable or the s~bject of the Court Order for fee~· ancJ·cos'ts -'ba·sed ·o.~·th~ :_.:_. _· ·.·: · .. 
. . . . . . :' · ..... · 
mistrial. 
16. The time records for both Mr. Haddad and fVlr.-. McKay for. the:, trial 
. . .·. .. . . : ... _ .. ·: .. : . 
dates do ~ot describe or identify the type and nature ot the s~rvice~ rendered: They.-~r~ . . . . ', ,' . 
both similar in descriptions that basically say prepare for trial, c!ttend trial E:ind ·prepar;~°'.~or 
trial the next day. It is the opinion of undersigned that there is no showing py the. Pf~iriti.ff qr. 
' . 
.... 
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,•:. 
documentation that the services for Mr. Haddad and Mr,· McKay are reasohably . . . . .. . 
necessary, required and customary, which is the standard: the C01:J.rt s~ould app.ly, · · ..... · .· 
. . . . . . . . -~ . 









Trialtime 6.1 hours. Recorded tirlie·1s·t2.2 hours, \eaving·6~1 ·: 
hours. 
Trial time 6.1 hours. Recorded .time is·.11 A hours, le:ay1ryg ~-~ .:-'. 
hours. · . ·. · · · '. · .· ·. · .·· ····. · 
..... • = • .. ·. 
Trial time is 6.5 hours. Recorded.tim~ is 12:.0 hours, .. le~ving ·,.. · . · 
5.5 hours. · · · · · · . . · · ' · ·: 
. . . . . 
Trial time is 6.5 hours. Recorded ·time··1.s ... 1_1.4 · hours,. -l~avfr,g · 
4.9 hours. · · .: '· · · ·. . . ·. · :··· ·. : ·. 
.. ·.·· 
·. ,'• 
17. The Declaration of Charles Hepworth stat~s in· p~:rt ~billihg ~at~ f~·r . ; : . '. ·. '. 
: . . .··= :.: • . . . . •.··• . ·.. . . . ·. . . .: • 
attorney P. Gregory Haddad of $325/hour and for attorney ~cott.Md(~y of $~75/~o"u·~,--:~is<. · : .. · .. .- : . ·. 
: . . . . ·. . ·. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . .. ·.. . . . . .. : ~ 
consistent with billing rates in the Boise area for attorneys ·of similar experien9E;? 1 s~ill ar:id. · .-.· .. -: · . . . . . . . . :, ~ . . . 
. . . . 
reputation." The Declaration of Mr. Haddad does not identify or: .ctiis9r1b~fthe:exp~ri~nce; .. · .. :· ..... 
. . . . . . . . 
· .. ··: .•. 
skill and reput~tio·n of Mr. McKay on the handling and trial o(m·edical. ·malpra~tice cas¢~; . _':- , . ·:: . 
' ,•,.: • •, • I' ••," •• ,• • • •: • •.'. • ,•' •' • •• ' 
The Declaration of Mr. Haddad does not identify or ·describe ·~i.$ experience, skUJ an.d. · . · 
. . . . . . ~ 
reputation in the handling and trial of medical malpractic~ · ~·ases, -although it. ·~tat~s . 
generally that he has represented Plaintiffs and Defendants _in cqmplex _per$O'l~I. i!lJury. 
and professional liability matters, including medical malpractic~ and. -wrqngf1,1I, deat~ · 
cases, in state and federal courts, both in West Virginia a~d · aroyt:,d .,he. co.uritrY:·.-T.l:lese · 
. . .. 
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matters stated for Mr. McKay and Mr. Haddad are vague, non·sp~dfic ._and ·1ackin,Q jn'. 
particulars that bear upon their experience with and knowledg~ ·ofth~ rnedica_1 ·~;~- l~1;fa.L ·· .-:. i . .... · · · · .. : 
: . . : .. . . . ·. . . . . ~- . . . . :: . . . ; 
issues involved in medical malpractice cases so a.s to 1:tllaw the ·C6urt·tq.·deter.m·i.rnfa.hd. :-: ._.-. ;_.:_· ·._ ·. 
gauge their experience, skill and reputation as ·stated in the De~_la.ratio-~-·-.o/~/ 8~:~WQ~~i-/·: · __ :-.; ·.· -~ ···: 
. . : :·· .. ·. .. ', ,, ·. ·::: . ;' . . .. : .· ·.; 
1t is the opinion ot undersigned that the attorney tat~s:t~r M_r. ·Had~g9 ·arid:.-.:;·_·.-_ -· ·.· · ·: 
. . ~- . . . .· . . 
Mr. McKay as stated by Mr. Hepworth are not consistent with t~e billiOg r:at_e~ _in th~ B·9is~. ·._. .. ·: · 
. . : : : . . : .... : · .. : :" ·:-
area for attorneys of simflar experience, skill and reputation. 
. .. :·. .. . . . 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. · · · . · I - : . ::. -~: · t: ·: ·:·. -.. ·j 
. :··. 
... ·.· .. ··.·: 
• I • • ~ .. 
:. :• : . .. : 
. ·. •: . . A . . -. •, 
/\lJJ. -~· . '•. :-
JerJfiA.~- '' 
: .. ··· 
. . . . .... 
. . · ... :- :.·:: .·: 
...... 
. . . . :,. . .. •.. . .. · ... . .. .. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me tlii~.i4th :~.~Y--~f..f.ebr.~_a_ry;:~914.:_i· .- ·._ .. ·. 
. . . . . .. : :·:. ··. : 
. . . 
. . . . 
·.~ A~:> : \:,:• .. ····<· 
. Notary Public for Jda!,o.·, ... : : -:·, · ._ .·. : , . · .. ,._< · · -. ·:. : 
Residing ·at Boise, Idaho·,. , ·· ... ·. ·. : : ··: .--:. :_· .. _. .. · _· : 
Commission expi°res·o~/01'!2018.-.. : · . .- .. : ·: .·. _:.-. · ·. :_-._; . 
. . :. :: : . :. . . . . •,. . . 
. . . .: ... ' :·.: ,• :-: . . : ·. ~: .. ·. :·/· ·. : 
. . . . : .. 
N • o '• o ' 
. ... 
. ·: . ·· ... •, ·· .. : . . ·• 
: ··: 
. : :- .... 
. ... ·.· · .. 
·· ... ·:. :_. '._. .. ·._\ :,:: ·. •,. 
,'. 
. . .. . . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
: ... . . . 
. •, ... ·. :· ·.·:· 
.. .. 
.. ··.:,:. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day·of Febr,uary"; .201.4·; I setved. i:1.true · · 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A: OUf\f'.'JE ... fOR.: ·. ·. ... . . 
OBJECTJONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY. ~fES-:ANP .~OST.?·.·. · .· -.: .. ·. · · :< · 
by delivering the same to each of the following, ·by the m·ethod .ir;idic~tect· b~low,. · .. ·.. ... . .. 
addressed as follows: · · · · : · · · ... : . ·_- ..... · ·e. · 
· David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ldah9 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James 8. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, ~labama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 





u.s:; Mai"I, P~$t~_ge.p~~pa.id .. 
Hand·'Delivered · · 
Ove~nigtit.Ma'if.: . · , ...... ·. 
F atsimile (208}'-345.:827 4. · .. · . . . •, . . 
. ·. ·. 
.. • .. · 
·. :· . 
. : · .. : 
.. : ·.· 
:· ··. 
r 1 .. u ..s:M~i1, ~9stafie.prepa1d:·. ·. · .. ,-· . . : :: .. : . 
[ ] Hand Del_ive.red .·· . ,. ··. : ·.. ·. :. · · .:. 
[ 1 Overnig~t Maj!' . ·: · ... \ · :_.-._· :_:. : ... : · . ·. ; 
{XJ Facsimil~ (304).59:4.~$7Q9. : · .\: ... ' .. : ·. · . . 
I 1 Etha1f· ..... ... ·: ·. ..'. . · .. ·:. · ·· · ·.. ., · ·· · 
. : . ' . . ·.. . .... ·· . . . : ... . . : ',•, 
1' • • • • •• • : • . . . '• . ~ .. 
[ ] U.$.·Mail,.'po~tage:preb~id .. :.-.-::·. :._.'. . •,. 
[ J Ha~_d:·qelivered· ... · :_:·.':.·. '_:··:· . :: .. ·. 
[ l. Ov~r.nighHv~E!i.1: .... ·. : . . .. . · .. · .- .' ... : 
{X]. Fa~sii:J,ile·(405)7.3~-4896 · .. ' .. -'. :· =. · · 
[ l ·t;:mail ~ . . . · ...-: .. . . . : ... · .. ; :. . . : . :: 
: . .. . . ··:/ .:: : ... 
~-Quan~···· _·-·· ' •.••::'.···: ·-·:.·••-
• 
0000
' O :- O O 
00 
O: ; ,"•, ', O O oM O O O O O .~··: l O o O : O O O : 
=.... . . ;= . · .. • .· 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE FOR OBJEQTIO~s·. T¢: PLAINT,iFF'.~ .. : ·: .· ·. ·· 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 9 · . : . . . ·· ... ·. ··_.... · 
. · .... : . . .. ·::·· ... ,• 
•, : . . . 
. . ... .. 
. . . .. . . 
002125
2014/02/24 13:42:24 7 /9 
.. . . . . .· . :r~o ...... ·~ ...... ·_· . -·~·--~ .. ~· ._ .. ..,__ ____ ;._ 
. ·. · . · ·. ,FILED. . '? , · . ,r-
A.M. · ·. · .. . M .~ .f -=> · 
FEB.- 2 4 2014 . · ' . ' Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
CHFlfSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk" 
By l~T~INA THIESSEN. 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF . 
THE FOURTH JUDICfAL DISTRICT .. · . 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND. . 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, .LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER,. and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED.SPA, LASER AND UPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC··1?04792 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
DEPUTY ·• · 
. : .. 
. : ·:: ·;· ·.·.. . . ·.· ... . . .. 
. ·.· . 
.... 
'\ . : . 
. ! . . . . . 
.. ,• .... 
. .. • . 
...... 
·. ·. ·· .. 
.. . . . 
.. :• ... 
.. '• .· . ·.·. . . ..... . 
· ....... . 
',. 
. . 
. . .. : . ~ 
: ... ·· .. : 
TO: . THE ABOVE ENTITLED PARTIES/PLAlNTIFFS and th~ir attqm_eys: · . .. . . . . 
of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Wednesday, the.1ih:day ·of ·. . . . .. 
March, 2013, at 2:00 p.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel_.can-be:~ea~d, .. : 
·. ,•' 
.. ,, . . . . ... · -
,', : .. ·:. NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 •,: 




2014/02/24 13:42:24 8 /9 
...... . .• 
. . ·: ... ~ . . . . .. : . . 
before the Honorable Deborah A. Bail, at the Ada County Cou~hquse, Bqise, ldah~; t_he"· . 
undersigned will call up for hearing before the Court Defendants' Objectior:is to .Ptair:itiff's. · .. 
. . ~ ... 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2014. 
QUANE JON~S McCOLL, Pl.LC · 
. •' .. 
. · . 
·.· .... 
. .. 
. . .. . . 
•, ·.. : ...... 
NOTICE OF HEARING-.2 . ·. - . .. ... . . . . . . : .~ . . . . ... . ... 
·.: 
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·. ···;./·;· .: .. ( ·, ..... ,' 
·. ·:··: ·,:·. ·. . ·. . ! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of February, 2.0 .. 1.4;.1 _s~rved a-true: .. ·. :: . 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by de_ljveridg t~e' sam~·.to: .. e~cfr· .. ·: · ... 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follow~: :· · .. · · . : · · ·. :- ··: ... ·. · . .-.: · 
. . . . . : . . : ~ . 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
·P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
1 Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
· BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
: Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 





. . . .·. 
U.S. ·fy1~jl,_.p9stage. pt~p~Jc( .. .'· . ..:. :._- ... <· · ·. . . . 
Hana Delivetad. .... . 
·overnight ·Mail · · . . 
Facsimiie .(2Q8.) ~45·-827,4 . . ~ . . .... 
E.. • • 
: ·· ... 
[ ] U.S. M~il, .po~Jage pre·pa_id:.· : · ... '· · ·.· ·. · . · : 
[ J HancfDelivered . , . . · · . . . . . · . : 
[ ] Overnight Mail- . . .. . .. . ' 
IX] faGSimife (~04) 59.4-9709. : __ :_ ..... , .. :·. 
·.· : •, · .. •, .... 
. .. 
... · 
. . . .... 
r . 1 ·u .. s . .-M~11_;:postage prep~ia. ::-... : · _: ... ;·, ·.:. · . · 
[ 'J Ha_rfd P~!ivered,".::._. ·· · · : .. <·. _::'.· . . :: .· , . . . , 
. [ j . .OvernigH(Maii ... : · · · ·.: . . : ... / .. · .. -.. . ···.:·. :· · . ·. . · · 
[X] .Facs.imil.e"(205). 733-4896' :, ·.-: ·-.-.... :_.·_-_:.: .· ·. . , 
• • • • • , • • • • I 
..... ·:·- . 
,, 
... · ...... :;: :•-\ : ..- .... 
. ~ : . . : .. : . ·:: 
.· ~··. .· .... ···.··>··· 
. . .. :·. . : : ·.. ,· ··." .. · .. . . .:·. b'·· .· ... ~ . ·. . . ... . . 
\-OeremlahA:1tnme .. :- :·· ·:. · .... · · ... : · . .' ':--. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ·. . . <· : ..-:"· .. ·': -·. . . . :. 
•': 
: ·: ~ : :· .: . . .. . . 
• • •• •: • '. •: • ...... •• I 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
0 (Y\onbY\ . &JC] 
• FILED b11 I A.M. P.M .. ___ _ 
FEB 2 7 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




··FEB 2··a 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
B)'.J'A~~EAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MOTION FOR FIRST 
DISQUALIFICATION OF THE 
HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL 
COME NOW the Defendants, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
40(d)(1), 40(d)(1)(A), 40(d)(1)(B) and 40(d)(1)(F) and respectfully move this Court for its 
order, without cause, for the disqualification of the Honorable Deborah Bail. This is the 
MOTION FOR FIRST DISQUALIFICATION OF THE HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL - 1 
_A} ,...,., I\ ,,. ' '~ ,,.1 
002129
. ; .. 
first and only Motion for Disqualification without cause of the Honorable Deborah Bail by 
the Defendants and is not made to hinder, delay or obstruct the Administration of Justice. 
On February 21, 2014, Judge Bail signed and entered her Amended Notice of Trial 
Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings that was served by mail on the 
attorneys for the Plaintiff and Defendants February 21, 2014 as certified by Deputy Court 
Clerk Linda Sims-Douglas and received by counsel for the Defendants February 25, 
2014. A trial of this case has been held starting November 5, 2013 in which the Plaintiff 
completed his case-in-chief and rested on November 12, 2013 and the Defendants then 
proceeded with their case-in-chief that ended November 14, 2013 when the Court 
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for a mistrial. The Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order 
Governing Further Proceedings of Judge Deborah Bail setting this case for jury trial to 
commence April 8, 2014 is a complete new trial from the previous trial that was held. This 
Motion is timely filed after service of the written Notice or Order of Judge Deborah Bail 
setting the action for trial and is filed before the commencement of the new trial before the 
Honorable Deborah Bail. 
The trial scheduled April 8, 2014 per the written Amended Notice of Trial 
Setting dated February 21, 2014 will be a complete trial, irrespective of the events of the 
trial held previously and the provisions of Rules 40(d)(1 ), 40(d)(1 )(A) and 40(d)(1 )(B) are 
applicable. Per Rule 40(d)(1 )(A), the Motion for Disqualification, if timely, shall be granted. 
As respects the trial scheduled April 8, 2014, there has been no status conference, 
pre-trial conference, contested proceeding before Judge Deborah Bail. The Amended 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated February 21, 
2014 specifies and denotes the issues, matters and events to be undertaken and 
MOTION FOR FIRST DISQUALIFICATION OF THE HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL - 2 
002130
completed before the trial is scheduled to start April 8, 2014. This Order has no bearing on 
or relationship to anything that transpired in the trial previously conducted and the 
consequences of the Order of the Judge granting a mistrial. The trial scheduled April 8, 
2014 is a totally new and different trial than the trial previously conducted. 
This matter is not made on the basis of cause for the disqualification of the 
Honorable Deborah Bail. 
DATED this 2yth day of February, 2014. 
NES McCOLL, PLLC 
By--===---+1--~~-----l~==---=::::-~~~ 
Jeremi A. Quane, Of the 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MOTION FOR FIRST DISQUALIFICATION OF THE HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2?1h day of February, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR FIRST DISQUALIFICATION OF THE 
HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL by delivering the same to each of the following, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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Judge Bail 031214 Tara Viii\.. I Susan Gambee Courtroom508 
I CVOC 12-4 792 Ballard v Kerr Objection to Fees and Costs 
............................................................ .. ......... _ .......................... 1 ....................... ,-......................................................................................................................................................................... _ ...... ,, __ ,., ........................... .. 
02:05:54 PM i Judge I Calls case 
02:05:58 PM! Jeremiah I on behalf of the Plaintiff 
iOuane 1 
02:06:00 PM I Scott McKay I on behalf of the Defendant 
02:06:0 J. Quane !Argues Objection to Fees and Costs 
.. 02:22:4 s: .... McKaY .................. JArgues .. in .. opposition .. to .. Objection ... to .. Fees .. and ... costs .................................. . 
02:22:45 PM Judge Orders $64,324.54 with respects to travel costs and other 
I costs to be paid by March 21 @ noon. Will address attorney 
1 fees at a later date. 
02:26:03 PM IS. McKay uests sanctions from the first hearing 
···································-··· .. ··············,····.......................... . ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................  




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
jaq@quanelaw.com 
tsj@quanelaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF,JDAHO, IN·AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CHARLES BALLARD, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, DAVID Z. NEVIN, SCOTT MCKAY, NEVIN, BENJAMIN, 
MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP, P.O. BOX 2772, BOISE, IDAHO 83701, P. GREGORY 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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HADDAD, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 2855 CRANBERRY SQUARE, MORGANTOWN, 
WEST VIRGINIA 26508, JAMES B. PERRINE, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 3000 
RIVERCHASE GALLERIA, SUITE 905, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35244, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; and Silk Touch Laser, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, dba Silk Touch Med Spa and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and 
Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipa of Boise, appeal against the 
above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following orders of the 
District Court, both of which were verbally rendered from the bench by the District Judge 
without written orders: 
a. Order of the District Court for the award of witness costs, 
expert witness fees, travel expenses and costs of the Plaintiff, travel 
expenses and attorney fees of Plaintiffs' attorney and jury fees of 
Ada County against Appellants as a result of the mistrial ordered by 
the District Court on November 14, 2013, entered in the 
above-entitled action on February 12, 2014, honorable Judge 
Deborah A. Bail presiding. 
b. Order of the District Court for the award of expenses and 
costs against Appellants in the sum of $64,324.54 that must be paid 
by noon, March 21, 2014, Mountain Daylight Time as a result of the 
mistrial ordered by the District Court on November 14, 2013, entered 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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in the above entitled action on March 12, 2014, Honorable Judge 
Deborah A. Bail presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and 
the Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11, (a)(1), I.AR. and the following: 
a. The Orders appealed from are final Orders and enforceable 
and not dependent on or subject to the District Court Order 
scheduling the case for trial April 8, 2014 for three weeks, excluding 
each Monday, entered February 21, 2014 and the results or outcome 
of the scheduled trial. The appealed orders are in effect despite 
anything to do with the trial or court ordered preparations for the trial 
and the time period to appeal the Orders is not extended by reason 
of the scheduled trial. 
b. By virtue of the Order of the District Court of March 12, 2014 
for the award of expenses and costs against Appellants in the sum of 
$64,324.54 that must be paid by March 21, 2014 constitutes 
significant detriment to Appellants and the only viable remedy for 
relief from the Order is this Appeal. 
c. The trial is scheduled April 8, 2014 through April 25, 2014 (3 
weeks) and appeals from the Court Orders of February 12, 2014 and 
March 12, 2014 will be untimely if the appeal is taken after April 25, 
2014 or the conclusion of the trial. 
d. The Orders appealed from involve legal issues and questions 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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of first impression in this state in regard to the application, effect and 
interpretation of Rule 47(u), I.R.C.P. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants 
then intend to assert in the appeal are as follows: 
a. Did the District Court error in its Order of March 12, 2014 
awarding costs and expenses for Respondent against Appellants 
that must be paid by March 21, 2014 in the sum of $64,324.54. 
b. Whether the provisions of Rule 37(e), I.R.C.P., for the 
assessment of attorney fees, costs or expenses against a party or 
the party's attorney control, or apply to the violation of a Court Order 
on a Motion in Limine entered during trial. 
c. Whether the provisions of Rule 47(u) for the payment of 
expenses and attorney fees is the controlling basis and authority for 
an Order of the District Court for payment of expenses and attorney 
fees. 
d. Whether the District Court erred by failing to make a 
determination that an occurrence at trial prevented a fair trial for the 
Respondent in ordering a mistrial on November 14, 2013 that 
resulted in the Orders of the District Court of February 12, 2014 and 
March 12, 2014 for the award of costs, expenses and attorney fees 
against the Appellants. 
e. Whether the District Court erred by failing to make a 
determination that the mistrial was caused by the deliberate 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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misconduct of the Appellants and their attorneys that resulted in the 
orders of the District Court of February 12, 2014 and March 12, 2014 
for the award of costs, expenses and attorney fees against 
Appellants. 
f. After the jury was impaneled on November 5, 2013, the 
District Court granted Respondent's Motion in Limine to exclude 
evidence pertaining to the lack of post-surgical infections of other 
patients of Appellants. Whether the testimony of Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
on November 14, 2013 constituted a violation of this Order of the 
District Court on the Respondent's Motion in Limine that justified a 
mistrial that resulted in the Orders of the District Court of February 
12, 2014 and March 12, 2014 for awards of costs, expenses and 
attorney fees. 
g. Whether the District Court erred in its Order of February 12, 
2014 for payment of jury fees of Ada County by Appellants. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
Reporter's transcripts have been requested. 
The appellants request the preparation of the following 
reporter's transcripts in hard copy format for: 
(1) Portions of the November 5, 2013 trial transcript; 
(2) Entire November 14, 2013 trial transcript; 
(3) Entire February 12, 2014 hearing transcript; and 
(4) Entire March 12, 2014 hearing transcript. 
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6. The Clerk's standard record is limited to the following as authorized 
by Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. 3/16/12, Complaint filed; 
b. 4/16/12, Answer of Defendants; 
c. Notice of Appeal; 
d. Table of Contents and Index; 
The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the 
Clerk's records in addition to those specified above for the standard 
Clerk's record: 
a. 10/22/13, Plaintiff's Consolidated Motions in Limine; 
b. 10/29/13, Memorandum in Oppos\tion to Plaintiff's Motions in 
Limine; 
c. 10/29/13, Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motions in Limine; 
d. 2/5/14, Affidavit of Terrence S Jones; 
e. 2/5/14, Affidavit of Dr. Geoffrey D Stiller; 
f. 2/18/14, Declaration of P. Gregory Haddad In Support Of 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs; and 
g. 2/21/14, Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further 
Proceedings. 
7. The Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court - None. 
8. I certify: 
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(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at 
the address set out below: 
(1) Tiffany Fisher, Boise, Idaho; 
(2) Roxanne Patchell, Boise, Idaho; and 
(3) Susan Gambee, Boise, Idaho. 
(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees 
for preparation of the reporter's transcripts. 
(c) The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
(d) The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 201h day of March, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by delivering the same to each of 
the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
AM ·--~ ... ·-···!l~~-~-.=2 NO.  1 
Scott McKay (ISB #~-3,09) smckay@nbmlaw.com ___ -·-·- .. __ _ MAR· 2 5 2014 NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP . . . 
303 W. Bannock CHRISTOPHER P. RICH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B_. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF 
RELIANCE ON PREVIOUSLY 
FILED CONSOLIDATED 
MOTIONS IN LIM/NE AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MOTIONS IN LIM/NE 
ORIGINAL-
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Idaho Code-§ 9-102,' Idaho Rule-ofEvideiic£ I03(c), and the Court's Ainended Notice of Trial 
Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings of February 21, 2014, and hereby gives notice 
of his reliance on Plaintiffs Consolidated Motions in Limine, which Plaintiff filed on October 
22, 2013. Plaintiff incorporates by reference this prior filing as if it was fully set forth herein. 
For the Court's convenience, the matters previously addressed by Plaintiffs Consolidated 
Motions in Limine, and ruled upon by the Court, include the following: 
I. The Possibility that Charles Ballard Might Remarry or Enter Into Another 
Relationship; 
IL Krystal Ballard's Purported Noncompliance; 
III. The Absence of Infection in Other Silk Touch Patients to Prove Compliance with 
the Standard of Care as to Krystal Ballard; 
IV. Life Insurance and Other Collateral Sources; 
V. Dr. Charles Garrison's Untimely Opinion Regarding Fat Embolism and All 
Undisclosed Expert Opinions; 
· VI. Defense Experts Who Failed to Properly Familiarize Themselves as to the 
Applicable Standard of Practice; 
VIL Dr. Kerr's Co~unication with Krystal Ballard's Aunt; 
VIII. Dr. Lundeby's Testimony as to Krystal Ballard's Cause of Death; 
IX. Evidence, Argument, and Special Verdict Pertaining to Third Party Liability; 
_ X. Testimony of Dr. Kerr Regarding a Medical Malpractice Action Involving 
Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Sorenson; 
XI. Speaking Objections, Unswom Testimony of Counsel, and References to the 
2 
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Parties' Motion Practice While in the Jury's Presence; 
. - . -~-- ·-··---·-- XII: -- Ad Hominiim Arguments and Remarks; 
XIII. Settlement Negotiations; 
XIV. Expert Testimony That Invades the Province of the Jury; and 
XV. Cumulative Expert Testimony. 
Additionally, Plaintiff moves for a further order in limine regarding the following 
matters: 
XVI. Dr. Gregory Laurence's Recent Guilty Plea to a Federal Felony Offense is 
Admissible, as are the Underlying Facts Contained Within His Plea Agreement, Which Dr. 
Laurence Now Admits Are True; and 
XVII. Defendants Should be Precluded from Eliciting Responses From Witnesses or 
Jurors That Vouch for the Credibility of One of Their Retained Experts. 
As for the evidence Plaintiff seeks to preclude, the order(s) in limine should forbid 
Defendants, Defendants' counsel, and Defendants' witnesses at trial from causing or permitting 
the jury to hear, read, or otherwise become aware of the foregoing matters in any way, whether 
through the testimony of its witnesses, in cross-examination of Plaintiff's witnesses, in colloquy 
or argument, or in any other manner, and whether in the case-in-chief, rebuttal, or surrebuttal. 
A memorandum in support of these motions follows. An Affidavit of Counsel, to which 




- -· ~ .. -~ - - "' .... . .. 
XVI. DR. GREGORY LAURENCE'S RECENT GUILTY PLEA TO A FEDERAL 
FELONY OFFENSE IS ADMISSIBLE, AS ARE THE UNDERLYING FACTS 
CONTAINED WITHIN ms PLEA AGREEMENT, WHICH DR. LAURENCE 
NOW ADMITS ARE TRUE. 
Defendants retained Dr. Gregory Laurence and intend to call him as an expert witness on 
the standard of care. To buttress his testimony and credibility, Defendants are likely to elicit 
testimony highlighting Dr. Laurence's "various publications, honors and university appointments 
as set forth in his curriculum vitae," among other qualifications. (See Exhibit N to Aff. of 
Counsel in Support of Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.'s Mots. in Limine, Oct. 29, 2013 (Defs.' Ans. to Pl.'s 
Third Set of Discovery 42).) 
In light of such a jury presentation, and by operation of Idaho Rules of Evidence 608 and 
609, Plaintiff should be allowed to demonstrate that Dr. Laurence pleaded guilty to a federal 
felony offense, one which originates from his medical practice, and one which certainly calls into 
question his character for truthfulness, his fitness to practice medicine, and his qualifications to 
render standard of care opinions in this case. Moreover, because Dr. Laurence now faces the 
very real possibility of prolonged imprisonment, substantial fines, restitution, and the loss of his 
license to practice medicine, Plaintiff should be free to inquire as to whether these significant 
financial consequences bear on the issue of Dr. Laurence's motives and/or biases in this case. 
a. On February 6, 2014, Dr. Laurence Pleaded Guilty to a Federal Felony 
Offense Arising Out of His Medical Practice. 
On May 8, 2013, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District 
of Colorado returned a six count indictment charging Dr. Laurence and two co-defendants with 
various felony offenses ranging from Conspiracy to Defraud the United States to Corruptly 
Endeavoring to Obstruct or Impede the Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws. (See 
4 
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Exhibit A, Indictment, United States v. Eva Melissa Sugar, Jerry Lynn Roberts and Gregory 
Nath~n La~r;~~~~ . u .-s:· Di;tri~t c~~. D-i~trict ~f-Coi~rado;· Cri~i~~ ca;~ N~~-i 3·::-c;-00-i 93:.=:::::::-_---
JLK.) The government charged Dr. Laurence with this latter crime, as well as Obstruction of 
Justice. (Id. at Counts 5 and 6.) Recently, Dr. Laurence "[ entered a plea of] guilty to the 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), Corruptly Endeavoring to Impede the Due Administration of 
the Internal Revenue Laws, [as] charged in Count 5 of the Indictment." (Exhibit B, Plea 
Agreement 1, Feb. 6, 2014; Exhibit C, Change in Plea Minutes 1, Feb. 6, 2014.) By the 
agreement, the parties stipulate that, under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), the government has the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) "the defendant acted with the purpose to obstruct or 
impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Laws;" 2) "the defendant's acts had a 
reasonable tendency to obstruct or impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws;" 
3) "the defendant acted knowingly;" and 4) "the defendant acted corruptly, that is, with the 
purpose to obtain an unlawful benefit for himself or someone else." (Plea Agreement at 5-6 
(citing Fed. Crim. Jury Instr., 7th Cir 7212[1]).) 
By his signed, sworn guilty plea, Dr. Laurence admits to the following conduct: 
• "[Dr. Laurence] practiced medicine through two entities in which he was the sole 
physician, Germantown Family Care and Obstetrics, LP and Germantown 
Aesthetics, LP." (Plea Agreement at 7.) 
• "Beginning in approximately June, 2002, and continuing through at least the end 
of 2007, Dr. Laurence used the services of ... an attorney ... as well as others 
associated with a group known as Financial Fortress Associates ... to take steps 
to disguise his true income from the IRS and to support the false business and 
personal tax returns he filed during the relevant period." (Id.) 
• "Dr. Laurence paid [the attorney] for the use of various unincorporated business 
organizations ("UBOs") .... " (Id.) 
• "Dr. Laurence also paid [the attorney] to set up bank accounts for the UBOs at 
two different banks and to list sham trusts as deposit<?rs for the bank accounts." 
(Id. at 8.) 
• "Dr. Laurence and [the attorney] opened the bank accounts for the UBOs using 
the UBO EINs in part so that Dr. Laurence's social security number would not be 
associated with the bank accounts." (Id.) 
5 
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• "Dr. Laurence paid [the attorney] to conduct bank transactions for the UBOs on 
his behalf." (Id) ____ ,,_. __ _ . _ --··. -----··· _ -------·- -----·------------ ·--- ---~-------··-· 
• "Dr. Laurence took steps which purported to transfer own.ership of the ·shruni·tists·-- - . - . -·-· . ... . 
of assets that he or his medical practices owned, such as his personal residence, 
his cars, the buildings where he conducted his practices, and the equipment used 
in those practices." (Id) 
• "[Dr. Laurence] issued checks from his professional corporation to the fictitious 
trust entities for expenses such as rents and equipment leases. These checks were 
deposited into various UBO accounts. Dr. Laurence then treated these payments 
as legitimate deductions for business expenses to reduce the apparent profit 
generated by Germantown Family, thereby reducing its taxable income." (Id at 
8-9.) 
• "Dr. Laurence also avoided payroll taxes for Germantown Family and 
Germantown Aesthetics by stopping his previous practices of withholding and 
paying over payroll taxes and issuing his employees Forms W-2 each year. 
Instead, Dr. Laurence caused his employees to be paid their wages and other 
incentives, without any withholdings and as purported independent contractors, 
through [a UBO.]" (Id at 9.) 
• "Between January 1, 2003, and April, 2007, Dr. Laurence deposited over $1.7 
million into [ a UBO account] from his practices. He did not report the 
employees' receipt of those wages to the IRS in any form, but he did claim his 
payments as deductions for labor on Germantown Family's returns." (Id) 
• "Dr. Laurence caused the preparation and filing of federal tax returns for 
Germantown Family for tax years 2002 through 2007, which reported these false 
deductions and substantially under-reported the total compensation he received. 
During the same period, Dr. Laurence did not file any returns or other documents 
which would have allowed the IRS to determine that Germantown Aesthetics 
even existed." (Id.) 
• "Dr. Laurence also caused the preparation and filing of false individual federal 
income tax returns for tax years 2002 through 2007, which tracked the corporate 
returns by substantially under-reporting the total compensation he received from 
his medical practices." (Id.) 
• "Dr. Laurence used the funds in the UBO account to pay personal expenses, such 
as vehicles, his home mortgage, and tuition for his children's schools." (Id.) 
• "During the time period at issue ... neither [the attorney] nor Dr. Laurence filed 
Forms 1065 for the UBOs or federal tax returns for any of the fictitious entities. 
Dr. Laurence was aware that he had a duty to file tax returns which contained 
accurate information and that the IRS was relying on the information in his 
corporate and personal returns when computing taxes due and owing. The total 
tax loss from Dr. Laurence's conduct was between approximately $195,000 and 
approximately $300,000." (Id. at 10.) -
The Plea Agreement continues to describe how Dr. Laurence "took a number of steps to 
obstruct [the ensuing grand jury] investigation," and furthermore, how Dr. Laurence defied a 
6 
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court order compelling the production of materials requested in grand jury subpoenas. (Id. at 10-
·----" - --t- . -- .......... _ ,. ______ ..... _._____ ---~----·- .. -· ----. - . 
11.) In fact, "[o]n January 23, 2009,-the Court issued an order finding Dr~ Laurence in.contempt. 
of its ... order to compel." (Id. at 11.) The Court imposed fines upon Dr. Laurence for his 
contemptuous behavior. (Id.) 
Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, "[Dr. Laurence] agrees to pay restitution . . . in the 
amount of all taxes, interest, and penalties due and owing since 2003 .... " (Id. at 1.) In 
addition to restitution, Dr. Laurence faces an estimated eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months in 
prison, fines estimated between four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) and six hundred thousand 
dollars ($600,000.00), and one year of supervised release. (Id. at 12-13.) The parties, including 
Dr. Laurence, signed and filed the Plea Agreement on February 6, 2014. (Id. at 1, 14.) That 
same day, Senior District Judge John L. Kane accepted Dr. Laurence's plea and set sentencing 
for September 4, 2014. (Change in Plea Minutes at 1-2.) 
Germantown Aesthetics, as identified in the Plea Agreement, is the entity used by Dr. 
Laurence to practice cosmetic medicine. Defendants note as much in their expert disclosure, by 
which they list: "Gregory Laurence, M.D., Germantown Aesthetics." (See Defs.' Ans. to Pl.'s 
Third Set of Discovery 37, July 22, 2013.) Dr. Laurence describes himself in his curriculum 
vitae as the Medical Director of Germantown Aesthetics. Similarly, Defendants' disclosure touts 
Dr. Laurence's obstetrical experience, and his curriculum vitae likewise lists a long association 
with Germantown Family Care and Obstetrics, the other medical practice described within the 
Plea Agreement. 
There is no indication, based upon a review of readily and publicly-available licensure 
information from the Idaho or Tennessee Boards of Medicine, that Dr. Laurence reported any 
information pertaining to his plea in Colorado. (Exhibit D, Tennessee Department of Health 
7 
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Practitioner Profile Data; State of Idaho Board of Medicine Public Record Information Detail; 
-· ·-- ·-·---··-- --·--~ .. ~-----------·---·-··------- __,,._, - ·---- . --
Utah Division of oc·cupatioiial and Professional Licensing Informatio·n.) . 
b. Evidence of Dr. Laurence's Plea, the Criminal Conduct Serving as the Basis 
for That Plea, and the Consequences of that Plea, is Admissible Under Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. 
By their previous motion in limine on this topic, Defendants sought to preclude evidence 
of the government's charges against Dr. Laurence, arguing that because "[n]o trial date, plea or 
conviction of any kind has been entered against Dr. Laurence ... any reference to Dr. Laurence's 
jndictment at the trial would be unfairly prejudicial, irrelevant and arguably raise an appeal 
issue." (Defs.'s Mem. in Support of Mots. in Limine 8, Oct. 21, 2013.) Defendants also argued 
that evidence of Dr. Laurence's indictment is inadmissible under IRE 609 as "Dr. Laurence's 
indictment ... is not a conviction of any kind." (Id at 8-9.) This Court ultimately agreed. 
Circumstances today, however, are vastly different. When the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado accepted Dr. Laurence's guilty plea on February 6, 2014, any 
potential prejudice previously existing evaporated, and evidence pertaining to the guilty plea 
became admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 provides as follows: 
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the fact that 
the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the felony shall be 
admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if 
the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of 
the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to 
the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If the 
evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the 
conviction, is admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or 
proceeding, the party shall have the option to present evidence of the nature of the 
conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be 
admissible. 
In this case; there is no question that Dr. Laurence pleaded guilty to a federal felony 





participated m a sophisticated, corrupt, criminal scheme designed to mislead the Internal 
- --·-·- ... --Revenue Sehi;~:-~d -~o~seqh;i{tiy, t~ ;~~id paying pe;s~~al ~d ·c~qJO;~t~ t~e~ -owed:· This 
conduct, which took place over the course of years, stems directly from the very same medical 
practices Dr. Laurence operated in gathering the experience Defendants tout in attempting to 
qualify Dr. Laurence as an expert in this case. 
Moreover, there is no question that the probative value of this evidence greatly outweighs 
any prejudicial effect that might befall Defendants. As mentioned below, Dr. Laurence serves in 
this case ·as a repetitive standard of care expert. Defendants have the option of calling Dr. 
Laurence, or not calling Dr. Laurence. Because Defendants enjoy such a choice, cries of 
weighty prejudice should be disregarded. If Defendants choose to put Dr. Laurence on the stand, 
Defendants will have, by necessity, decided that any purported prejudice is outweighed by other 
factors. In that case, Defendants will have, in essence, performed the Rule 609 balancing test for 
the Court, and Plaintiff must be allowed to confront Dr. Laurence in accordance with Rule 609's 
full operation. 
The Rules of Evidence also provide that "[ s ]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." I.R.E. 608(b). "They 
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning ... the character of the witness for 
' 
truthfulness or untruthfulness .... " Id. 
And "[ a ]lthough the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not specifically address impeachment of 
witnesses by evidence of bias, the right to do so is unquestionable." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial 
Handbook 342 (2d ed. 2005). The reason for this is simple: "Proof of bias is almost always 
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·- R ---·-- ---- -
~ -- ~ ---~ 
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been 
-:-~~titl~c{t~ ·as;ess all e~ide~~~- ~hich· ;ight- be; -;;·-th~ ·ac~~~cy ~i truth ~i a--~ibl~;;i--~ -~ - - · 
testimony." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
US. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469 (1984)) (emphasis added). For this reason, 
because "[i]t would not be unusual for a medical expert to have a bias in favor of the party who 
is paying his expert witness fee . . . cross-examination as to who is paying for the expert is 
almost always allowed when the expert is testifying." Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, l 09 Idaho 
920, 925, 712 P.2d 621, 626 (1985). 
Ultimately, the scope of cross-examination rests in the Court's discretion. Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986); State v. Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795, 711 P.2d 741 
(Ct.App.1985). That being said, "[o]ur system of dispute resolution permits and encourages 
challenges to the credentials and opinions of an opponent's experts." Harmston v. Agro-W., Inc., 
111 Idaho 814, 820, 727 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159, 
438 P.2d 904 (1968) and State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255,232 P.2d 669 (1951)). 
A recent Idaho Court of Appeals opinion discusses the distinction between IRE 609 and 
608(b) and the broad discretion of a trial judge to permit evidence of a witness's character for 
truthfulness under I.R.E. 608(b) -- which discretion should be exercised in this case to permit 
evidence of Dr. Laurence's untruthful character. In State v. Bergerud, the trial court precluded 
the defendant from impeaching a witness on cross-examination based upon that witness's 
conviction of a misdemeanor for lying to police. 155 Idaho 705, 316 P.3d 117 (Ct. App. 2013). 
The trial court held that such impeachment was not permissible under IRE 608 and 609, which 
the trial court held applies only to felonies. 155 Idaho at---, 316 P.3d at 122. On appeal, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not separately considering the 
10 
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admissibility of such evidence under IRE 608(b) and acknowledged the discretion of a trial judge 
to permit such evidence. Id. 
As noted by the Court in Bergerud, "although Rule 608(b) prohibits extrinsic evidence of 
a witness's past conduct to attack credibility, it expressly allows cross-examination of the 
witness concerning instances of the witness's conduct if it is probative of the witness's 
truthfulness." Id (italics and footnote omitted) (citing State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 
P.2d 872, 880 (1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38, 752 P.2d 632,640 (Ct.App.1988)). With 
respect to whether the misdemeanor conduct was relevant, the Court further held that "[m]aking 
a false statement to a law enforcement officer, like perjury, is an act that is intimately connected 
to credibility. In fact, it is itself a crime." 155 Idaho at---, 316 P.3d at 124 (citing I.C. § 18-
705). "It not only indicates a willingness to be dishonest when it serves one's own interest, but a 
willingness to defy authority and break the law when doing so." Id. 
The conduct admitted by Dr. Laurence in the subject Plea Agreement is far more 
egregious than the conduct at issue in Bergerud. That conduct certainly reveals Dr. Laurence's 
willingness to be dishonest when it serves his interests, as it demonstrates Dr. Laurence's 
willingness to defy authority and break the law. After all, Dr. Laurence pleaded guilty to 1) 
acting with the purpose to obstruct or impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue 
Laws; 2) performing acts that had a reasonable tendency to obstruct or impede the due 
administration of the Internal Revenue laws; 3) doing so knowingly; and 4) acting corruptly, that 
is, with the purpose to obtain an unlawful benefit for himself or someone else. Of additional, and 
considerable, significance is the fact that Dr. Laurence's criminal conduct stems directly from 
the medical practices upon which he relies in providing qualified expert testimony in this case. 
Furthermore, the conduct described in Dr. Laurence's Plea Agreement demonstrates his 
11 
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contempt and disdain for the legal process in refusing to comply with the District Court's order 
.. - - .. - -· . . . --- .......... ,_...,.. __ --~------------·-· - - -- ~---·-- ----- -~- ·-
that he· produce· grand jury materials directed at his medical and co·smetic medicine practice: If 
Dr. Laurence refused to honor subpoenas and court orders specifically directed at him and his 
medical practices, how can it be assumed that he complied with the legal requirements associated 
with rendering testimony in this case, including the requirement that he adequately familiarize 
himself_with the local standard of care? Again, Dr. Laurence's admitted conduct.demonstrates a 
willingness to defy authority and break the law, particularly when it serves his own self-interest. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff should be permitted to inquire of Dr. Laurence regarding this contempt of 
the legal process, which is probative of his character for truthfulness under IRE 608(b ). 
Additionally, Dr. Laurence's character for untruthfulness exists through his medical 
licensure, including in Idaho, where he is now licensed. Dr. Laurence testified at his deposition 
that he had not informed any of the three states where he is licensed, including Idaho, of his 
pending felony charges. (Laurence Dep. 168: 17 - 169:9, Oct. 2, 2013.) In Idaho, a physician is 
required to report not only a felony conviction but the "commission of any act constituting a 
felony." Idaho Code§ 54-1814(1) (licensed physician required to report conviction of a felony); 
Idaho Code § 54-1814(21) (licensed physician required to report commission of an act 
constituting a felony or crime of moral turpitude). In addition, a physician in Idaho, upon 
renewal of his medical license, is required to report, among other matters, whether they have 
been "charged with or convicted of a felony .... " (See Exhibit O to Aff. of Counsel in Support of 
Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mots. in Limine, Oct. 29, 2013 (State of Idaho, Board of Medicine, 
Physician and Surgeon License Renewal Application Form).) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it appears Dr. Laurence never reported his Indictment to 
the appropriate regulatory boards. It also appears that, to date, Dr. Laurence has likewise failed 
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to advise these boards of his guilty plea. This information is probative of his character for 
- .. ' . ------ --·-------------- --- ··-· ·- . ..,_ 
truthfulness, and thus, it is admissible.' Independerifof this·analysis, however, once Dr. Laurence 
entered his guilty plea, application of Rules 608 and 609 renders the subject evidence admissible 
in any event. 
Dr. Laurence is a redundant defense expert on the issue of standard of care. Defendants 
have identified two other physicians they intend to call to address the standard of care, one from 
Idaho, and another from Spokane who also maintains a practice in Coeur d'Alene. The notion 
that Defendants will suffer prejudice by Plaintiffs cross-examination of Dr. Laurence is 
unavailing. It is Defendants who failed to adequately vet this expert, and who were surprised 
when they learned for the first time of Dr. Laurence's indictment at deposition. Plaintiff should 
neither be faulted, nor disadvantaged, simply because Defendants were unaware of Dr. 
Laurence's criminal issues, or because Dr. Laurence chose to conceal the subject information 
from defense counsel. In fact, it is Mr. Ballard who will be unfairly prejudiced unless he is 
allowed a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine this expert -- a process our system of justice 
both permits and encourages. 
c. The Significant Consequences and Penalties Facing Dr. Laurence Are 
Admissible. 
With his guilty plea, Dr. Laurence faces the very real potential of years of imprisonment, 
significant fines, and a weighty restitution obligation. Dr. Laurence also faces dramatic penalties 
with regard to his medical licensures in Tennessee, Idaho, and Utah. See Tennessee Code§ 63-
6-214(a)(I0) (grounds for medical license revocation include conviction of a felony); Idaho Code 
§ 54-1814(1) (same). Committing acts constituting a felony is likewise grounds for discipline 
and a physician is required to report such conduct. Idaho Code § 54-1814(21 ). 
The foregoing, looming consequences and termination of his income stream provide Dr. 
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Laurence with a strong motive to work with Defendants and express a favorable opinion that will 
.. -- ~e;~it"-Iif;<laiti~naC1ucrati~::.-bii,~rt\vit~J;s··~~~k.-- As-;uch,- tii-~~~ ~harges and ;yri~ci ~r 
consequences are probative and admissible to show motive. IRE 404(b) (evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible to show motive). In addition, such evidence is 
admissible to show bias on the part of Dr. Laurence. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91, 856 P.2d 
872, 881 (1993) ("[T]he bias, prejudice, or motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented 
in a trial is always material and relevant to effective cross-examination."); see also Cosgrove By 
and Through Winfree v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 476-77, 788 P.2d 
1293, 1299-1300 (1989) (discussing impeachment of expert by evidence of amount earned 
testifying in court). 
d. · Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, evidence of Dr. Laurence's federal felony guilty plea, the 
potential consequences of that plea, and the admitted facts underlying that plea, should be 
admitted. 
XVII. DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ELICITING RESPONSES 
FROM WITNESSES OR JURORS THAT VOUCH FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF 
ONE OF THEIR RETAINED EXPERTS. 
During the first trial of this matter, Defendants' counsel inquired of a prospective juror 
and Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Sorenson, about Defendant's retained expert, Dr. Thomas Coffman. 1 
Defendants asked questions of this juror and of Dr. Sorenson, with the intention of bolstering the 
credibility of Dr. Coffman. Such questioning, and such testimony, must be precluded moving 
forward, as any such testimony invades the province of the jury. 
"[ A ]n expert witness may provide an opinion '[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
1 Defendants retained Dr. Coffman, an infectious disease specialist, who presently charges $1,500.00 per 
hour for testimony in this case. 
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
- ·~ -·--·--····~---..... ·-·------· .._.. . - ' -~ - ·• 
- · fact in issue."' Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013) (quoting Idaho R. 
Evid. 702). "Therefore, after the court qualifies a witness as an expert, it "must determine 
whether· such expert opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence." 
Id (citing State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,246, 192 P.3d 1065, 1070 (2008)). "Pursuant to I.R.E. 
704, an expert's testimony is not inadmissible merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided in the case; however, ' [ e ]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the 
average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal 
experience is inadmissible."' Id (quoting State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66, 253 P.3d 727, 740 
(2011)).-"[E]vidence is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 702 if it vouches for the credibility of 
another witness." Id (citing State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003)). 
l;Jone of the jurors, lay witnesses, or experts in this case should be offering testimony 
designed to bolster an expert witness's credibility in the eyes of the jury. Members of the jury 
will be well-qualified, based upon common sense and normal experience, to make 
determinations of expert witness credibility. Accordingly, counsel should be precluded from 
eliciting, and experts should be precluded from offering, testimony that vouches for, or otherwise 
bolsters, the credibility of any other witness. 
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Dated this 25th day of March, 2014. 
-
Respectfully Submitted, 
IN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i hereby certify that on the 25th day of March, 2014, I served~ tru~ ~d-corre~t;~py-~f·----
the foregoing Plaintiff's Notice of Reliance on Previously Filed Consolidated Motions in 
Limine and Supplemental Motions in Limine by delivering the same to the following via U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
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Ufft.i.~!#. .. ~~ ~tt.~~h~.4:.h..er.¢~9,~~'/o.)'itjy;r..s: 
·4., A-'We and: accufat&-c=cr · ·: of'Dr'. nre ... d .... : Laurerice;s 1iricfthtirierit 'iri the Uilit~~i": ... . . .. . .... .. . . . ····· ...... PY. ... .. ..... . .... ~ .. !IY ........... . . .... . . ....... . . .................................. . 
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IN THEUNITED STATES DiSTRICT COURT 
. '"i=oR Tt·nib1STRICT OF co'ti>RAP:o. 
Criminal Case No~. 13-c:r·-oo.-.J.:93 JLK 
UNfff=Q.STA't'E~ O.F AMi:RICA, 
v .. 
. . . . . 
1 .. EVA .M~L,.ISSA SLJ<;;AR,. 
:2: JER.RY. L YNt•i ROBERTS and 
.: : ·.: ... ·:. . :· .. . . . ... . . . ' ..... .. 
·3. GREGORY NATHAN LAURENCE 
Defendants. 
The G'rand jury charges: 
.1~,.i'bi<irl\ilE'i~Jt: 




1 f if:~f c~ :§ 1 s'o'i 
.COUNT~1.; 
EVA ME[ISSSA ·suGAR 
(18 U.S.C. § 371 • Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) 
,.THE CONSPIRACY., 
1. From on or about sometime in 1999, the exact date being unknown to the 
Grand Jury, and contin.uing through on or about April 2008, in the State and District of 
Colorado, defendant SUGAR did unlawfully, voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly 
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.other indi.v.i.c:l4al.~ !;>oth ~now11 ~nd !-m.knq\/Vn. to tb.e G.ranc:1. ¥1_ryJ9 geff.cll!d. ~~~ IJn_it~ct 
:~~~-t~_s: f(?r ~~~ pyrpq_~~- q(il!IP,E?¥ng;, \m.P#\~)n9_,. o~~~~~_di~_g; ~-~,tj, ~~f~f'~i~~r fti{l_a}Vf~{ 
:Government iundiomnifoe internafkevenu·e ·sen.dee ("iRS;;) ofthe'°freasury 
·oepartment in the ascertainmentcomputation,.,assessmerit; and collection:of the. 
revenue, nc1meiy income, employm.eni,.,anc(other fe'deraltaxe~i . . .: . ... :: 
At various:trmes re"leva·nt to .. this=.lndictinent 
2: J'.L' waif a resident of Geier ia\~ho' o .. erated Financial Fortress: ........................... 9 ............... P ................................. .. 
:A.s~_¢,~ic:1teisi·:qr ·ct va..ri~Jig:n c/th:c:1.t -~~r,ni:3 ·ch.:~r.¢.!D.?.fl~t' ,if:f.A~l.,· ;~_rj; ·c;,r~~b(?i:1trCl.~'tb~f 
promoted a·nd· 'advised]t~f cHernfa ori: stheme·s, fo avokflhe. payment offncome .and other: 
. . . . : 
:tederaf:taxes, 
3.. P~f$n.danU:VA MElJSSASU.GAR., ~.1$o.i.<n.Pwn,as·.M$Hs.~~.s.u~:c.ir;) :w.~ts,~' 
·resident of'Aurora 'CoI6rado ·and,was .. self-'em · 10 ·ed as·a"n aHorne ... s· ·edalizin · in tax 
................... , ......... 1.... .... . ..... .P .. Y ...................... ._Y. P ............ 9 .. . 
. and q~h,er.Jegal. rjiatt~rs iri. Deii\ie:t, .GC?k>'r~qo'. su_<;3AR.w.or.ke_gWi.th FfA ¢!re.tits Jg 
. .. . 
.~xec::ute the· ~ch.~r:n.~s .FFA prpmot~d.:: 
4. rii'I.D.B. wa? a re~iderit of Florida: a·nd worked as a promoter for. FFA. 
















MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY. 
6. The conspiracy was carried out using the following manner and means, 
which created interdependency among the conspirators: 
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a. J.L and M.D.B;_.wittn:ithers,· operated FFA· F.FA promoted:Pure. 
Trust cirgan1zat1ons t'.Pfb~) and :••prfvate b~mkin~~-uslng SQ7Calied Bankfng 
Uninc:orporate.cfi3'uslhess:or~~nJz@6n$ ~"B(JBQ;;),ii'~.V~ti,c!es'tq '66hce~I bT1sh1ess·anc1: 
personi;!l, income a'r:1c;f a!s"sefdwnership.'a'r1'd; there~x·, :to avoid payiri9., ihcorhe, 
·ernpl9yrrierjt\ .a'r1d 9.th(ff f~:qet~IJ.~?C$.$J<tt!:ie.· 1.R$. :FFA ~e.!d: ~~r.rt.i!'.l§.rs)1:~-~ \Vorksh_op~: 
·around the· counr ·to ... romotedts schemes ,'Which iri'dividt.i'als ... aid' t6'atte.rid.- SUGAR .. . . . .. ..... ry ... P ......... ,•. .. ..... ..... I .............. •. ••• • •• . P. . ... . . .... . . .. . . . .... . 
occasionally attencfed. ~n.d siJ.C?.k~: ~.t .i=EA ~~:?-ii.!1$.1"$: )\(those-~~rn,nars,. fi= A's pror:note.rs, 
expla'ined the schemes ·anciprovided referra'fs::fo thei'r co;.conspirators, includi~~ 
·s·uGAf(.wtio·char~ed'.'fees to.execu'te:the:schemes.:for'FFA:dients .. 
b.~- A$ p~rtiort~~ F:.fi(~9.fi~m$.~; $.Q{~AR:9.t ¢tnijt$ e#~1:>!ishe:a:,9;Je,c;i( 
·rn:o.r~ voTnGQfp.P:riit~ct;$.u~,n.~:$'.~::O~~ij'iiiz~t.iQr.i,(~t:r.ua.o;~)ilo:r'ia~·¢h.:¢.11~int.·~nq appl.!ec:t.fot 
an: IRS.:jssQeq Emp!qye¢ .l.O$i'.ltific~tion=.NPr:n.P.$((".!;1.N"tfqr .th9.s~J)J~.O$.' .l;:~:(;tl WBO. wgs 
narhed as·a "maria· ·ement;i corr!' an·. ·i':eL'.~)(M'an::r ement": 'i=or each us6 SUGAR· ..... ,.· .. ·.· ... ::. . . ,., ... 9 .,.·.·,., ,, , ....... P, .... Y,.,,., .. ,, .,,,,·, ... ·::::,,·.9 ... ,.· ,:: .... , ... , .. ,. .· .. ::· .. , ..... ,.· 
ppened ~:si?.~r~~pqn#ipg 'ban:~·:c;1ccopnHotaF·;sUsci with the same name·as 'the'UBd. 
The .bank account for each BUBO. was set up fo accept deposits by at least:one named 
fictitious. entity, yvhich th~ co.-Gonspirators ~er:i\3r~Hy .described ciS a "tr~st» Qr PTO. FFA 
conspirators, inclµding·J.D., set up these'·frus'ts forthe fFA clients. 
C. FFA clients used the fictitious trust entities as companies "doing 
business as" the management company for which the BUBO bank account was 
' . 
established. The entities, however, existed in name only. Generally, the FFA client 
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. entiti~$.:divert.ing th¢. incor:n~J9. t.h~ .BL!BQ l;!a11k::accQ!Jnt~n:9_ th~rel:>y ·un.qer~tatiQ.g_ tt,e: 
:~,us·i~ess
1
s'·g~~~~ _repe:i"pt_$,<bt (2)_ n;iad:~ payrn~n.t~;.tq Cir)~( Ph~~- ljpti~iR.4.~. e~~i~i~~ and 
4~~w¢t:ed tber p~ym·$n.fa·Ej_s ~xpen~e$ for.the .FFA ·di~nts iegitima'te "busi~ess, :theteby; 
decreasing the bush,ess;siii,come . 
.d, S{lGAR and-fhe FFAdienHhen .. caµsed funds:from the BU.SQ\ 
-~cc::6'4ht fo b~_(i)._paid.dired_ifback to the Fi=Ac;nent; (~f ~'~e~·to _i:>~fffie FFA d,en_ts·· 
}>'ersorial expenses, (~): used for personal_p.urcha:ses; such'·as:totcars or.'vacatioti: 
:1:(o_ri,ie_*; 'q:((4) trah~f¢.rred ·9.ffsho"r_e or: tq a ~~r~_h'61-l~:e.Lb~:hK~~-~ µp toid!$9~f.~e. ~h.¢, 
:ownershi"' · and source· ot'the funds; .. .. ......... "" .. p ... . .. . ..... . . . .. .. 
e, A.n_¢'th.¢t:varia~lon of' FF.A's. progrart,dnvolve.d :p'iadng. assets;'itito tHe 
inames·:ofthe·"frditious entities-'ffiaf used·fhe'.Bankaccounflo conceafthe:proceecls of 
:the· sale ·of those· as~els, As noted_,_: <;:onspirators frequentlt estaolishe.d .the: emtitie$ ai:; 
i'frl.i"sts ,~,:wfth·one.·ofthe' --·rorrioters ·such as J.L or M:D;B: hamed·as·truste"e. When'the ... ' ........... " . ..IJ. ..... I. . . ... , ........ , ..... . . " .. " ......... . 
·FFA client sold the assets· the bu· ·er:"would issiie a·check"fo the·tri.ist· which-then .. '""... .... . .. . . . . . .. . ,. . y. . . . .... "... .. ... " .. ' . . . . . " 
c:f~po_sited_ the- ch~qk'into'the_ BIJBO bar:,k account.· Ttie FF A.client would t~_er:i use th~ 
_f~rid~ ~,s d"iscus_sed)n subparagraph 6(d) above. 
. . . . . . 
f. SUGAR provided various services to her clients, which as· 
described, included establishing UBOs, applying for EINs for the UBOs, and opening 
associated BUBO bank accounts that her clients used to conceal assets and income 
and to avoid paying taxes to the IRS. SUGAR generally was the trustee for the UBOs 
and had signatory authority for the bank accounts. If her client also wanted signatory 
4 
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: ~9tbgr.ity fgr jhe .s.Q~q _9ank: ~~coun_t?, S..L.i~AR wq_u,ld: list .th.e::~lient as an. 
:."admfn1sfraHve ass1stan~;~: iirvfonafjing °t)irect9:r,{9~ SOQl~' ofo,~t 9ffi9e~ ~.r ~i.npi~_y~;~ e>fj~~-
:ncHt1ous trust ent'tty or "t..is6ii3Ds6. 
g. Often·, however,. to. prevent' the clients ·name from assoc:iaticm with, . .. ,. ... ~ 
. .... . ........ ........ . . """d ........... ·········· .. . ... . . .. . . . . . 
. th~ .13..V.l?..O _aq;9t,1nt; $.VG.AR:.gfl · th~:.cli~nt WoiJI<;!' .idemtJ~ .a .third._P'f.31'.ty '-: $LI.ch· as, a: family, 
:member; .~$ tne '.ijc,imini~tr~uve··a_s&J§t~nf..of'.otner'.fiosftioii fddfie Jictitious trust erWty or' 
:.u.eo1euso~ That person ·would be. given··signatory ai.ithorityfol"the ·suso: bank 
;~;~,qqu:~.~- .T.h.~se)ry~lvi~:uals::~x~r~isecJ n.o·:aut.~6rity;qr gon.ttC?.! <?Y~.r:th~JJ.13.Q/13!-/,BQ/th.~ 
·fidiHbus trust'enti!Y; .. or'the'a·s$ets'thereof.- ·so thaf'fhe :couid ·use ttie::susd bank .. .. . . .. ... . ...... ...... ... .. . ... .. . .......... 'I .......... •, ... . . . . .... .. . . ..... .. 
, .account without Involvement.by, the fhfrd parfy,,.$0GAi{and: her.drenfa,'had, sigrtature· 
J\famps'.created.for ffiese,fodi'v1duais,. 
h'. 'Witli ·the: .. BUBQ b_arj.K_ .. a¢~o4.iit~"$$t~.b..lfahed; $.UGAR them 
conducted trarisactiomffother'clieii'ts·usih· .. :those accounts. incllidin· Jor exam ·1e-. · ............... , ........... : .......... . 9 ............... ... , ......... .. 9 ......... .P, .. , 
.subparagraph 6(d);· endorsing c~ecks for d~pc;isrf; ~n~·\Y,_itli9r~yving ga~h: 
i. SUGAR char_ged her clfents fees for'. her services, including annua·i 
marntenance fees and fees on a per-service basis, such as for signing checks or 
authorizing a wire transfer. 
j. The FFA client and owner of the UBO/BUBO would not file federal 
tax returns for the UBO/BUBO or the fictitious entities, despite legal filing requirements. 
Indeed, because the UBOs did not file federal income tax returns and all of the bank 
5 
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. ac9ount_s ~stab!.i.~h€;l4for: th~(~QBP.~: we~e nqr1-int'?_re.s~-be_aring .~c_cbyil_ts·; _the i R.S ~la·~ 
·unaware of the use ~utd:op·eration of the BUBO: accounts and.eritiffes., c>h'iy the: i"Efq~est 
.and·recelpf of the· .. Ei~fw91}ld 1hd1Gafe to'the G'overoment that ·the\H!:i"6is0s.o ·ever 
~~isled., 
,OVERTACTS]N::FUR"fHERANCE:oE:XHE:coNSPIRACY..; 
... : ::-::. .. -'"'"'::·-----------......... -........ -:.:_-.~.::.:.:.~:.:---~:-.-· .. .:.:~.. :-.::.· =-· .. ~·.: ..... -=--,• .. :::::-- -- _,_..; ,, 
.folloW.iog QV¢.tt:~_qt$. were :GPmrnittec;1.:in the District of .Color~do ~n·c;1 e_1$e'Nhere;.: 
O:· n·,·o·r1a·'b' ·o·u· t. :'N-·o·v· e· m'be··r··.2··'3' '-::1·-:s·,,s· ·s··' s·u·· G. ·A·.,,R.· ·a · ,·1·1e·d·'·t·o: ·t.h'··e· .. 1'R'''·s·' ~o··r·:· -~> ·:::, .. :• :.: ::: .... ·: ... : :.::·:.· .... ··: ... :·c: .... > ••• ·: .. , I •. ·• ·: ':. : .... pp .. " ............ !.' .. . 
-EfNs.in ttie names·ofStreainside'Mat1a9emen( Northslde Mana_gemen( Ma_ple Leaf 
._Mc;1n~g_emenf,,:Oxfo,:o:M~1.1ag~menf,,'.C~i;cac:fe,.Man~gement,.:M~nagernent:l.111liinited;, 
:Ea~tsJde!Mahii$,~frient!!:and·Avoh::M~na$erne.rit 
b. . ·.ohor:::a.b:outot1.February sj' 200.r,.,suGAR _opened.a' bank':accouht .. . .. 
at-corn··a~sBa:nk/fotrnerl ··:kn.ow,tas FirsTier-Balik, in.the n·ame of streamside ............ P.. . .............................. y ....... .. ... ..... .. . ... . . . .. .. . . . ........ ... . . ... . . . ...... . 
J\/i:~~~_ge_n:1.~_ryJ,,_y;;ff~>§PG.f\'.ft~.rt~ -~"6~ER_T~'$ t~:~n)n.ip_or ~on as -~ig·n.~tories:· 
C; On or.about August -1 s; 2002, at-the request of lier clfent,,°L.:.S.; 
SUGAR wrote out and signed a .check from a Bank of Denver account for Garnet 
Manc1gemerit to Bex~_r'techn9iogies in the amount of $21,000. 
d. Oh or about September 23, 2002, SUGAR sent an e-mail to her 
client, Gregory L?1Urence, instructing hin, that SUGAR alone must sign all endorsements 
on checks deposited into and all checks written from Laurence's BUBO bank accounts, 
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·on ·or about ·rvfarctf25; .io64, SUGAR transferred 'tfie. b'ank account 
. . . 
'.for' Triumptdvianageme.nt from Uberty :s·avings Bank to 'ton.,pass ~anl<:: 
f.: On or,about between ·Jurie:16,:·20b~i ah.d:·J.uhe.23,..2006; SUGAR 
'si ·, ri'ed 504 blank checks tor' Best 'fo'r-Hearin.. Limited: Partnerstii ... 'arf uBo:·she: . . J;L . .. .... .. .. .. .. ... . ..... ... .. . . ... .... . ... 9 . ... .. .. .. .... .. .... p, . .. ... ........ .. 
g. On .or about May, 14,.2.0.07;' SUGAR ~t,Jthoriz~~ the wJr.~ .trar:i$fer .9,f, 
; ~?J.~.,!5QQ..froni, th.~ ¢.o.m p~~:~·· ~a~k-~.ccp:~.h.t:f~_r'Aq~·~.rlus J0~n.~g~n,~ri(f pr; her ctfenf J: K. 
h; 9~ ot'~~out-.Ma{2s,: 2·001 .: SUGAFl caused, $1· ,_0§1\34B:4a''fo ·be·: 
:wired, from. i'forths'ide tvfanagemerits.:C:ompass. E~nk ·~i:;counf tqiS.Y.r.~ty, T/tle .. A.g1?11qyJ9.f 
~ . . . . . ..... . 
!her:client J:S':'s: purchase. dfa vacation home, 
i, ·orLot aoout:July' 5',: 2oo·t SUGAR ttansfetred =$200 ftor:n: aestJor 
He:ar.ing·.u.r.nit¢~·~ compass @~n,k::acco.un_t fo.h~r:i?'4'ri ba~k ~c.9.o~n~.~.f P~Yr.n~nt:fp_r 
)e,iyic~s reQ9e,red ihJ~lation. t<?. that ~ri\ify for..°iJ.er ~fi~nt.E\~.:· 
j. Qn· or about .January 15, 2008, SUGAR deposited or caused to be 
deposited into her personal account a Postal Money Order for $451 from Reef 
Management. 
k. On or about November 7, 2007, SUGAR wrote and cashed seven 
checks from the BUBO accounts at Compass Bank for her client Gregory Laurence. 
I. On or about April 24, 2008, SUGAR cashed a negotiable 
instrument for $13,776 from the Compass Bank account for Palm Tree Management. 
7 
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COUNT2:_ 
-: - - - =--- - - - -- -· ----: -·. ,E.YA M.EL_l,S_SA-S,µ~A,R _AND·J_~_RRY: ROBEtrr~:: -·-: - - -
(26 u.s.c~-§7_212(a) and-18 U.S.C. § 2:;:corrupt Endeavor to:Obstrucfor: Impede-, 
: Due-A.dmi.nistr.~tioil qf th~ _1!1teri\~l. R~v,~_~t;i~ ~J~W~)~n.~:f'.itjisjlf~~~-A~e~!-~g) 
~, The{Grahd:Jii -- realle --es-a-nd inco' --orates_ .. ala --i'c'I" li .. threeftiereih:. --- - ---- --· - ry --- - _g -- --- ·- - - -- ---- _rp _____ -· ·---- p ______ g -_p ___ ----------- --= __________ • 
~, At -~I! tim~s r~ievant _tp _th 13: ind_(c:_t~_erit, ~6.E.(i;Rf.$, W-~$ ~- resrderif of 
}=_19.~i~~,: R96$.F.{ts -~C?rk~_4, f~r Re>b~rts: Enterprises,_ a farn1ly-ownec:1 fundra"isfn~ 
·- -
business. 
-fO; Efoginniilg on or about November:2~;'1"999_,=and,contin-u_in~::throu!;J.hoii or: 
_about A ril -2ooa frHne State a'nd District. of Colorado -and_ elseWhefre -ttie=defendants' p - - . :! - - ----- - - . - --------- ----- ---------- ---- -.. -- -------- --------------· ·------ -- ----------------- --
'SQGAR ark{ ROBEt{fS, afdin~):1ri~)ip~_tting''.ij;il¢njjth~f:d;!itf¢,Qf,fi:ipUy e'o.g~~~9{Hl 
· -obstrucUfnd int edefthe_.dueradministration -dfthe i-nternai Revenuedaws,-b _-the= ---------- _______ , ___ ,_, _____ ,_p __ ·: =------- ----=--=--=---:-:: , _______ ,, ______ , _____ ,_,,_ --- --=-=-- ______ ,,_,,_:::_,: :--::_:-:,:_::-::-::::--:c:_-:;_; _,,-Y_,_;_;;: 
:f.9.llg~i11g !'D:~!=lri,~;_:cimong dJ~~rs.~ 
~i. ROBERTS paid-SOGARfo-set up UBOs\·associated BUBO bank-
_accounts, and nominee fictitious trust accounts_ q~ d_~pqsjtor~ for the Jfaok /;iccouhts. 
-Specifically, SUGAR established Streamside:Man~gern~t\t,_T~i_µmph' M~-oag~rnent, and_: .. . . : 
_Universal Management, each with an associated bank cH:Got,mt;:ind_~everal associated 
fictitious trust entities. 
b. SUGAR and ROBERTS identified other individuals, including-
ROBERTS'S family members, as "ma-nagers," "administrative assistants," or other 
positions for the various management companies and trust entities. These individuals 
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accounts..: fq.r examRl~;v~ne_r:,:.~UG.AR: ~_ritj)~QBE.RTS. first 9pe_n_~cnh,~ ~u_i3Cfban.k 
accounts, ROBERTS: caused fijs·: then minor Sbri 'to "be iden"fified as "ttie Adml"nistr'at1ve 
)\s.s.isfanftor th~ t1dltlous.:trus"t-erjt1ties:assoQ1~ted-w.\tfr ead, management company,_ 
.RotfERT!{'S-son al~fo had-si~_natory authonty. .. atvarious times for.each of.the three. 
·man"ii ··errierif com·· aiiies. iROBERTS- used his- s·o"ii:fo cash ·cnecks=arawri from the . .. ~-- ........ P ... ..... .... . ........ ...... ... .... .... :· ..................... . 
a uso__b~nk 'accoi..int~. 
G... $UC3AR arn;I .RQSE.RTS ~c;1Used :signature stamp~ to: be -cre·ateq for: 
.. ·. : . ·. : . ::·. .. .. .. : .:····. : . : .. :: . . . ·. ·:.'" . . · .. : 
· thefthird~p!:;lrty .$ignatoties on the:_su.so, b.:ank· a.ccounts and ai.Jthotizeo- fai'csJmile .. · .............. •., ................ ' .................. ' .. ' ..... .... .................... . ................... . 
sigii~tutes for,those individuals: 
d.. · .$.O~AR-also- io~ntined b~rseJf: c;1s the)'Man.agin.g t>frector:" for th~: 
JiGtffi:OU$:foJst .entifi~s .wifti '$lg'hatofy -autHor.1.tV:f.<ih:eacH of.tiie,·aus0:ti.ari1<:accourHs •. 
:SUGAR and the: third pattie·s,.wete: tl:i$.onlyJnotv.idua1s·.with_"signatory ·authority forthe, . ·. .. : .. 
. ~~N<::~c~o.i:fr:1.t~;.RQB.~_R_T§· ultiiJ~.are_lY,~crt.1tfql_l~d.;' 
e. .~.9~_$:~T$. .~s.~~ th.~ ·fict(Ho:u~)r.y.st enti~ie$ ,,ir:id m.a.n?Jgement 
companies,.along with S"OGAR's services; to dfa9uise income paid to him by Roberts· 
.Entetprises: 
f. ROBERTS use~ the funds.in the BUBO.bank accounts to pay for 
personal expenses,· such as credit card payments, mortgage payments, utility and 
telephone bills, and'for cash. 
g. During the time period at issue, from November 1999 through April 
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,.?POO (hfq_i.Jgl] ~QQ7;, (!if n.~ither 80B~RtS· nqr $U_GAR flied. FO.rrl)? 1·0_<;,S_fqr Str~9msicfe 
iManagemen(TrrLfmpfr'Managemeh( or 'On,versaf rvi'anagem~nt; and'.(.(ii) ROBERT$ 
:and .. sLiGAl{didnoHHedederaftax returns tor any ohhe.fictitious eritiffes. 
The .for~soin_ij_Was in .violation of Title 26! United State. Code.~ Section. 7212(~)... 
,COUNT~3~ 
·Ev A ivlEIJSsA:s'LiGAR 
(2&: u;sJ:~ f 12·Q·3 . .::·,=ai1.:fre tQ Fil~- r~x Rettfrn) 
11.: . P_u:ring· thEfc}alendar year 2007, defendant SUG.AR, who wa:s a resid.ent of 
,A~_rp_ra:; ,G,o.k>r~_tj'~h w~~ -~,~if-·ef!lployed):1$,: ~:n at~orn,ey:_ih o'.~11~~ri: 991_or.a·~o .. Qyr!ng· tiiat 
,year/ SUGAR'earhed iifcome. in. exc.es.~ of ~a/$.9.,; ~h.(~h !.ry·~q,(rl_e_te,qy\r.ei~·th.?.t. ~,U.G..AR: 
f1le:a:Jederaflncornefax return: on· or before. Aprif.-i'$',_'2bda,Jo any_proper offic.er oftlie, 
_:JnternaLRevenueiService" :betenclarifSUGAR~,weir'knowir'.!,~;anc:J beiievi'n9.a11 of the 
Joregoih1J, ·kn9Win~1y:t~IJea:.to:fi!e,anyfet:~rn .. <iH tha.t. i.hci;)m~ .. 
The:fore .... oin· · was· in violation of 2s. United. states Code·: section 1203 . .. .... .... 9 ...... 9 ... ...... ....... . .. .......... .... .. .... .. ............ .. 
,COUNT:4, 
JERRY ROBERTS. 
(18 LJ.~:c.·§ 1_~6:J. ~ CJf?str.tJC.tio'n. of Justice).· 
12'. Beginning on or ab~ut May 2,. 2008, and continuing thereafter up to and' 
including on or abput July 22, 2008, in the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, 
RO~ERTS corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede the due 
administration of justice, in that, after contact by Internal Revenue Service criminal 
investigators and the service of Grand Jury subpoenas relating to Streamside 
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:ROBE.RTS ~9mm.itteid)he fq.liowfrig. acti3; 
·a. ROBERTS's·iQ~edia·nd s·e·nt.~t p~}J$~~)9 b~ .. ~~.~ft~·~h·.~. °-~ 111.ot~ 
sp~dal Agents· of the: 1ks1 a letter-that sfate.d i,cbiiiiPUA~ic·E. HEREWITl-(fs. 
MANDATORY.!' The Jetter enclosed a/Public: s·ervice .Q·uestionnaire/ which 
...................................................... ······ If···························· ............... . 
·ctern~md~q th~ Spec,~I.A9.ent'.s"J:>eJ$Qf1.aUnf P.r.ma.tiP)J,. T ·e.;:qoef$tion):t~ir~ st~te~ tll~t 
faihire· to apvj~e R0$1;RT$. before{r~lei3$i.riµ: inrQrmi!itio.n::fogzifdJ~g'him'Jd anf#ers:o:fr 
ma:y subject. the Special Agents to tJvil or:ctimihal.:attion .. 
, b.: R6s:ERTS·sr ·n·ec:i':and sentor:"caused toJ:ie sent tcfone:otmore: ............. 9 ........... .................. ························· ....... ·········· .. . ........ . 
IRS s· · eciai A ·ents a,"Notice bf Defaulr·,c:ja,ml'n ... the. s'· edal A ·enf'hacUa'iled· t6 P 9. .:. . . , : .. . ..... : .... 9. : .... : .... lJ .... : ......... 9 ...... : .................. . 
.c.o~plete the ,~P.u·bnc Service Questionnaire~'andi as.sertlr:ig., amo~g rithedb1ngsdhat 
_that fa"llure to:respond w"fil result: in,:the,Spec,aI Ag_ent's: ~greemenlfo}Commerdal .. ... . .. 
Dishonor~. that~a Default'! be: entered' a ainstfhe'.S "eciafA ... erit ·and to':"bein· ··,a • • I . . . .•.... . . . g ............ P .. ....... ~. ··.' ............ .... Q .. 
· artici ·antin Fraud." The lettet also asserted:"thaffailure."ofa f6rei .:n a·· e"nt to: rriall a: P .. P . . . . ........................... : ........ ······ ......... ....... 9 ... 9 . ............ . 
certified· co . ,·of a "Forei n A ·ents' Re· "istrati6i1 Stateirie"rie:With .. hotb' identificatioh' to ... . . . .. PY, .. 9 . ... 9 .......... .. 9 .. ... .. . .. .. ... . . . . ........ P.... . ... ... ... . . ....... . 
ROBERTS "may resulf i.!'.1 a clarrn .. n9fti?. e;><c;~e.d.:Ori~ rvi'iil19_i1 po_l!c:1rs:" · 
· c. ROBERTS signed an "Affidavif of P.ubifo Notic_e·P.'and recorded or 
caused to be recorded with ttie Polk County. Clerk of the Court documents including 
(i) copies of the "Public Service Questionnaire" and "Notice of Default" mentioned in 
subparagraphs 12(a) and (b), and (ii) "Disclosure Statements" for IRS Special Agents 
stating that failure to complete a "Public Servant's Questionnaire" and provide "verified 
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enterecl .9ga)nst yo1,1 .f.qr,:T~9· Hunqreci. Thousar:iqs °[s(c] p9ff~r an.cf 110 ~ent[lJSD]/' 
d, °F~OBERTS' mailecfor caused fo be mailed to one· otmore· fR·s: 
: Speda·i A!;l.ent~dfre, recorded. documents identiffecfln S!Jbparagraph · 1.2(c). 
The fore9oin~;i,,was.' in violation of:fifie:1 a,. United States· Co.c:IE:, .S.ectioh 1503~ . 
. CO.UNI'.5:,. 
EVA MELis·sA'SUGARAND ~GREGORY LAUREN.CE 
· (2~ .. 0,.S,,¢./§'7..~J~(~nfrj~f1'a. Q;$~C:,.,§ 2- Cp.rrµpt Ehdeavor' to Obstriict'O:r. lfupijd~( 
.. ·oue Administration ofthe Internal ·Revenue Laws and· Aiding and:Abetting)' 
·13,. tne·:G.rand Jury re~il'=.~es an~ incorpori:lte$ paragr~phthreerb.~'rein~ 
14. Afan tim.es televanfto..fni3: indictment, G"regory LAURENcE·was a.'resident 
'of Teiiriiis·see: l.AURENCE\iii~is 'iidoctof.who'o· · erated two businesses. Germa'iit0Wr1 .... ········ .................. ··································· .................... P ............................. ····' ...................... . 
A~MO:~ti.i:$\' t:.PT.G.A1T~n.~t~~irn:i~htoW.h:: F cfrrjily: Ca'r.e'~ :QP:$te.tt1c*, :'.LP ',~·G.FGQ.~); 
·1,_~\ :~~Q!D.~/PJf9/\:9(~.bq,~J)~nµ~.fy 4;:,?.9o'?r'~n~: sC?:·Qtiru1r1~phrbl!_Qh .oh ·or 
·about 6ctober2boa',)n,'the'sfafe .and '.'r5isfriclofca1orado and· elsewhere,.:·the ·~ 
defendants SUGAR and LAURENCE;: ·aidi~g and abetting each other, did corruptly: 
·endeavo(tq 9~$fruc(~)i.q .impede ft,~ due. aaniinistratioii ofthe Internal. R.eveiiue laWs 
.. 
by' the followirig"means,. :ainong 'others:. 
. . 
a.. lAURENC!:: paid SUGAR to set up UBOs, a.ssociated BUBO.bank 
accounts, ;3nd ·nom)n!:l~ ficJitious trust acco_unts as depositors for the bank account~; 
Specifically, SUGAR established Jasper Management, Amethyst Management, 
Capricorn Management, Diamond Management, Emerald Management, Moonstone 
Management, Pearl Management, __ Sagittarius Management,· and Sapphire 
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b: LAURENCE·caused his wife fo be identified'as "Ass·isfant: 
Adnilnisfrafor:" with signatory au·thorlty forthe JasperiManagement,:Emerald . . . . .. . .. . . 
Manageriient,JVloonsto.n~ Man·.aQ~rn~nt1 and Pea'r,i'Maii~.ij'efo~·nt b~.'nk ~.cco_uhtS:w.ith: 
:autncfrity. to use,:a:tacsimile sig_~ature. ·SU.GAR iden'trfied her~elfas ·the "Mari'a~in$ 
;pJr~_ct9(:tor theJictitio.~.s.: tr~·~t. ~ntitie$·:wJtb sig~:~to'iY ~.Y.t.h:¢tity fqr;ea.~.h.:9n!:J¢ ~V.!3.9 
.l;>a),.k a_ccounts: 
. . .. .·· .... . . .... . ... 
C. Sl)C3AR and. LAW.RENCE'S wife,:we_i'e to~ onfy jri_di'litjua..l~ wlt.b 
siQnafory authori~~" for the bank accounts.°LAURENCt uitimately: controlled: .. 
LAUR.ENCE himself was noi named in any position· tor tiie, numerous entities suGAtt 
:~n..4 -~.W.R.!;N.C_!;; ~~fap!J~ne.9:: 
~t ·.S.U.GA.R: ~iii'd JAQR!=NC~,¢$i:i.~~g ;§/~h~:tute:'. ~t~.mg:~. ti:>. .. 1;>¢ .. ¢.r.ei~tgq 
:f P:t::lAURENC.~.'.$},,,ti.fe: and ~~thoriz~qJq~im.i!~ ~igr,~.tw~.s: fqnl'JE(3 f.3.Ve.O b~.n.l(c:!¢!;:Ql!IJ\$ 
'fo.r ~hi~.h $iher ~a~ sign_9-tory a_uth_o:~tYi 
e. .LA°LiREN.cE: caused G·i=co'to·'issoe. checks:payable to the. fictitious· 
trust er:1tities associated with his BU Bo· bank accounts to make a portion of GFCO's 
business income appear as legitimat~ deductions. and Gosts of goods s·old, theri3by· . ·. 
reducing GFCO's taxable income. LAURENC~ :also· caused the GFCO p1:1rtrier~hip 
federal income tax returns prepared for calendar years 2002 through 2007 to report 
those sums as deductions. 
f. LAURENCE used the management companies, fictitious trust 
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.file .federal income tax returns. for GA for calendar years·.2002 throu9.h 2007. 
g. LAURENCE-used tiditloµsJf\lst ~ntify .D.yrictmi.i:{Healtti C~re 
'st~'ffinf arid:Ja.spefr Man~$.S:meht, al6ng':with.$U.GAR's.:s'efvic~s,'.to pay hirfofo!f a'r1·a 
.employees.of GA and GFC.O. as·''.independent contractors"· and. to.avoi~f1:>"aying fedetal; 
·em· lo .. mehttaxes':. LAURENCE/did riotissuefthosEfefrrf· lo .. ·ees·IRS.Fomis 1099 . ..... P ... Y ............ ....................................................... , ..... .. P .. Y...... . ....... . 
h: Laurehcerused ihe fonds 111 the/sUsci'bank accounts.tt> a fcir ............................ ,... . ...... ... .... .. . p y ..... 
:it~rris indu·c:fing _e_xp_enses· ~s.sodat~d with h'is:'businesses, school tu'ition for.his chiidren,_, 
.cars;: and. credit card.payments.-
i.. buri~Q .ttie tline _pen.od a_t fa~!Je!: from·Jg_nua~· 2002 'fhfou~~ Aprii 
:2ooa 'neitheYSUGAR ·nor- LAU'RENCE:tiletf F·ormsA d65Jcff th·e uso man a .. e·ment: .... , ............................................................................................................. .... 9 ..... . .. 
:cam .. ·an ies: 6f.-federar ta'j(reti.frhs fof:an· .. : oftheJictifious. ·entities'l . ...... . P .. ................................ ................. Y ................................................. . 
COUNT~6~ 
~R-EGORYt'.AORE.Nc'E 
(18 U.S.C. § .1503 .... Obstrli'ctioi1 of Justic·e) .. . . ' .. ....... .. . . .. ' .. . 
16·. Beginnihg ~n· o_r abci~t .. fYlarc~.'s, 2_0q8, arid C(_)~ti~uing there.after' Up to_ antj. 
inc)uding on or about January 22,· 2009, in the State and District of Colorado and 
elsewhere, LAURENCE corruptly endeavored fo influence, obstruct, and impede the 
due administration of justice, in that, after contact by Internal Revenue Service criminal 
investigators and the service of Grand Jury subpoenas relating to GA and GFCO, 
LAURENCE committed the following acts. 
a. LAURl=: NCE signed and sent or caused to be sent to one or more 
14 
002177
Case 1:13-cr-00193-JLK Document 2 Filed 05/08/13 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 16 
)R$ Sp_ecial f.\gent~; t_hrough t~.e United States. At_torney'.s Office, dqcum.~nts_ includirig: 
:(1) "P"ubiic $'erv,tntis Q~estionnaire~"--~eques_ti~g the Spef!.al_ Agents tp·prpvi~~:)5-er§~>Q~i 
'information; and··(2} ···otsdosure 'statements;! asserting tha"t fai1ure'fr,:·re$pond"to the 
.questionnaire and failure to answer qµestions in. the statement: will result:ih the .. $pecial: .. .. . .. . . 
-A.~~tJtst'.~~f~e.'fri~:ii.f _fo· ".¢.p'rrihie~cia! Oi~hciiiort thJ~t. '.-';;1.'I)~f~_µltb.e.e.n:te.rect ~9.,ifosf yo_q-for 
Twq H~riqr~d-Thou$~nds [sic] oo!la'i [u.so1;,,· at\c.fto' ".oefrig·a participant frf'FraucL"· 
p, .LAURENCE signed ~ind serit or caused. tc>" be:serit:to.'onefofm·ore, 
1B$ $p~c.1a_if.\g~_nt_s a, "!"Joti_ce · of [)efa_ul~ .c1_nd. Dis~<?lib(~f_a L!3~f~I_.P_Liblic· ~_ery:a_rit 
buesffonhaf re·:~ 
·c. ·LAU:RENC·e.-faiied to: comply wHH Orders.lo'.Comp.el produdlon:of 
'the-'.subpoenaed re.cords.'l~sued 6x,ttie Uriited'.States'bistdct:Courfforihe bfofrfot of 
Cohjrado on Nov'E;!b.11;>$( 1T~flq b'e¢ijfnpgr:"8:; 2008·. 
The·fore .... oiii.: Waifln'Violatk>n ·of Title :1 a un·ited State·s Code, ·sectioh 1503. . .. ...... 9 ...... 9. .. ... . . .. .. ... . . . . . , .. ... . . . .. . . .. .. ........ . 
ATRLJE BILL 
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Matthew Kirsch 
'Anria K:· Edgar . . .. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES. D!STRIC.T _COURT 
.t=08 TttE .. PJ~T~•ct C>F _tQ.~9RAP9' 
.Grimfiial,.~ase::N~'. ~-;3-cr-9Q1. 93_-J_t:.K~.9.3 · 
tiNVreb'"st A t·Es:t>.F AME.RiCA, 
Plaintiff;:, 
V; 
GREGOR'l NATHAN LAi.JRENC.E; -- .. ' ........ ·. . . . . . ... . .... . .. 
. :c. - ...._ __ , __ ..... - ) •• - ,,C.-,_,,• •M ' ... , __ ,._, -
Th~'-Unite~. $.t~_tf3~ .9T .Ame:r:i¢.~. PYc ~~~r ~~_r9u~t.( M~.t~h~vi: r ~i~~h)ir.~ 
:Anna'· K:l;dga'r I f..s~i~J~nf lJnited · ~tate¢)\ttotiJ:e:Ys f9r-tl1~ .. P.!~trict c/¢0.!'.6_r_a~9.· ~.nf ~e: 
·oefehdafit,. Gregbry Nath~nJ~aLirence,· p~rs·orjaliy -~lid by _co~.D~~I,' VV,. _Hi~ktnan Ewing,: 
;.:! 
}r. (~,e.r~~y ~~~(!'ii~ t~eJo.lloy,Ang Pieia_ Agr.~~merit and· Statement of Facts Reievant to .. 
·$¢.~teiid°ng pursliant.to D.C.COLO.LCrR 11. { 
I. PLEA AGREEMENT. 
-,': 
. . 
The defendant agrees to plead guilty to the violation of 26 U.S.C._§ 7212(a), 
Corruptly Endeavoring to Impede the Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, 
charged in Count 5 of the Indictment. 
The __ defendant agrees to pay restitution to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
in the amount of all taxes, interest, and penalties due and owing since 2003, including 
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~eterniin~d ~Y th..~ ¢9µrt_ ~t ~'?nten~in_g. The defendant agrees this· restitµtion c1rriolint .. . . 
r~~Y.it~ irptn·h1~·~onduct as descdbed in .Count 5, as'\v.ell.~~ .anY/elev~rifconduct __ a~: 
tj¢t¢rrtiined 'by- the ·court aflhe·'iJme Qf sente.i')ciiig. ·rlie., d~feii~~-ijfaqr~e.s .. tn.:~t he\viH 
sign any iR·s--forms deemed neces~ary, bY: t_helRS.to enable. theJRS·.tom~ke an., 
1mniecHafo.ass~s~rri'ent ofJhij __ t~x: ari'~ ifit¢r.est _that. h~;_agr~es;_t~:,~t~Y.;:~§;:r~-~~!tµ~i9Q'. j~e;, 
d~fehd~n(agfeEis)foffo file)i11y·c1~irn' tor refufl~ oft~x~_s _or 1n.t~r¢~t;r~pres·en~~d: by any 
amount of restitution· paid p_ursuant to 1his: agi'eemelit. 
The QC?Y.'?.~.m~.n.t .~9!.~e~, t.~~J J~e ~ef~,ndant;s restituHon:.amount: should be 
r¢du~~~:~y th~ ~~-~ynt__c?.{~~y payments aiready made qy-t11~rc1.M~nc1~nt qn his 
_quf#ai]ding· fax oblig_afions from conciYGl. r~l-~Y?nftq tbJ.f pl~_~J:,~ftjteJtiiit t~it1~(9.f.' 
sentendna;: 
';J .. ,. ........... .. 
The:defehd~nt ~.!J°re~s thatt1othiri~ ir{thi~ agr~e,rn:~.n.t:.$.h~JI IJr:nit the-lR~ i!1 iJs· 
lawful ~x~min~tio'i1, cfeterminatiqil,"a~s:ess_nie_nt, ·o.r colfoJrt,on·:~>(~ny t~xes, p~n~ltie~· or· ... .. . ........ ..... .. . ... .... ... . .. . .., ' 
interest due from· the defei,d~lit_ f9rt~~ .tim~ p~ri¢_tf~o~~_fe~·:byJtiis a9:reement or any' 
other time p~riod, and. he c:Jgr~es that tt1is agreement; or any Judgmen~ •. order, release; 
or s~_tisfaction issued in connection with this agreement, wili'noi_sat_isfy, ~ettle,_·or 
compromise the defendant's obligation to pay the balance of ·any reiTiairiin~ Givil 
liabilities, including tax, additional tax, additions to tax. interest, and penalties, owed to 
the IRS for the time period covered by this agreement or any other time period. The 
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Provided the defendant does··nothing {nqe>n$i$te1Jt.with ac~p~ing re~ponsibility 
betweeri'the· date:-of hi~fplea and the: d~te :of ~entehcfr1g,·' ihe government Will ... . . ...... '. .. . .... ... .. . . . . . ........ .. ......... . ... , .. :. 
teco'mrnend ~hat t6e ~~f.e.r:id.~_n't. r¢9~iy~; ~=~-~ maximum· reduction for acceptance of 
re~pq11si~iii1Y.~. 
: -the· g~fendanfa~i'ees "tb: cooperate fuflyi honestly;: without. r~sery~tioi\ an~ 
affirmativeiy with ·theiUnited Sfates Atforney's_ Office for.: the(Districf of Colorado· (the 
"government") and with any ofher-fe.deral,.statE(or local gqvemmehtal department or: 
. .. .. .. : . . 
agency des\9.nated·by· th~::Goy$r~menf(''~.e:S_ignat~d -~gerj¢y") r~_latirig t_c;> __ aryy _rTl_att~t 
b.e_ing_ iriv~·s.tiga'ted bfthe(g'qv~rnm.~rit:9r: ~'_ij_esign.~tijtj :agency ab_out)vhich the 
:··· .. . . .. . 
defendant may possess kr.,.owle99¢; inform~tiQD/.<?r m~t(?d~is~ 
. The· def endant:agtees that:his:.conifou.ir:i9i¢C>PP.er.~t,on :with the government: .... ..... .. ................... ..... ..... ... ... . ........................... ...................... . 
descdbed: ahovEtirtdudes; but is· noi"Hmfted'.foj.-th.eHollowhi. : ............................ , .................. : .. Jt 
a; compietely,and .trutliftiily_disciosing .. ~1.1':irif~m:n~t,on ·and m~t~rials in his 
_possession fo t~e govemme.nt'th:afthe.iioverrime6tqr i~~: designated. ag·ency'.rnay, 
retju_e-~t; 
b. Affirmatively' and immediately' providing to the governmenbmy information· 
' ,. .. .. . . . . . ' . ' .. 
arid materials t_hat comes to the'defen~ant's atten~ion that may be relevant to any_ 
governmental investigation; 
c. Assembling, organizing, and providing, in a responsive and prompt fashion, all 
information and materials in his possession, custody, or control as may be 
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d.. Providin9 information .and materials and testifyi.ti$ as feq:ue':sted ~¥ the 
go\i~rn'o,ijnt; ir:i'cl.tidinii:"~wqrn test/n,c:friy bef9re"~ gfand.jljfy'o:t ii,:'al'.)yjijtjic:i_13J 
.: :: ·. ' :.· 
p"roqe~ii:i·g ·~hd interviews .with Jh~ ·99vernrr1enfa.n.:d:'d$.$igrjatijd ):1~ieri¢,~s. 
The $.6vernmefnt:.agrees: that any. information. and: te$timotiY glV~_n, ·by,_the: 
d~.f~nd.~nt put~iJ~:D.U9Jh.i~·c1gr~:effl~i"n~_~i1))C?.t. ~~. l:Js~~,:~9-~,ih~t,bi~r;e(tfa~r ~fr~fqtiy ;9:~ 
Jndifectiy;. !n arY: crii:n'1na1 c$s~ ~xcept ior prosecution~ tor perJy_ry~ 'rfiaKi~~: a i~.i~~:r 
~t~tem~ot;~r qbs~itic.t!CJfl. ofjlJ_~#~.i or for, impeachment: Information and:'testimonywilf 
n.qt b,~· u~!;!d aQainstthe· defendant; pursuant to. Section: 1 s·f 8 ofthe,Senfoncin_Q·: 
Guidelines· .. Any 'information-and testimony relating to th~ def~_nd~rit'~ .invoJv.ern~rifJii 
crim~~ QfViPi~.D.~~; ~~j;t~f!n~d. i.n.J~: l.t$!.G!; ij_ 1 $;)$:_e~~luq~g J(tj_aj' ift.!$.:~~_t$¢.1'.ri~h( 
Thifdefendiint 'a .. ·rees':that if- the· .. overnni'enf 6arfshow:thathe lied::«:>fattenr ted .................................. ~ ....................... 9 ...................................................................... P ...... .. 
:tcfrtiislead th:~·gqy~mrner.,t:p.r J.~·v·{~nfq_rc:;~me..ni _authoriti~~/qr i(h~_tj9~_~}19~J1;1if1).0he.. ·· · 
terms o_f -~r ~o:~s -~-~~};~ortiple~~ ~i{go_pp~t~tioji ·µ.ri,~er.thi?· ~fJ'i'e~~~~(~b13.~· -~DY· 
informatio"ri"ot)estimony:\~b.id,· he ·has. given in connection with this· case can· be' used in, ... ... .... ....... ....... . .. .. . .. . ..... . 
any _prosecution against him, notwithstanding.the provisions above.- If the government 
alleges such conduct; it will have the burden of establishing the alieged .. cqnduct ~l ij. 
separate hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Provided that the defendant continues to fully and truthfully cooperate With the 
government as described above, as determined in the government's sole discretion, the 
gov~mment agrees that it will consider_filing, before or at the time of the defendant's 
sentencing, a motion for downward departure, pursuant to Section 5K1 .1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(e). The parties 
-4-
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agi'$e:arid.tmderstahd thattheJi6verhnient:is not yet in ~f position fo detennfne whetbet 
such'a m'otion would be:·a· · "ro riate. Re· ·ardles·s·ofwhether.the· overnment files a . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . PP... P ... . .. . .. 9 .... .. . .. . .. . ...... . . ..... 9. , . . . .. .. .. .. .. 
sectiori SK1:.1 motioh· it if rees to "fnake knoWn' to the court the·natu"re."anc{extent·oi.the· .. ... . . .... . . .. ' .9 . .. ..... .. ... ... ...... .... ..... .. .. . . . ........ .. .. ...... . 
The· ovehimeht ftJrther :a····rees-'to consici'~rwhetiieta ·sentence beiow the . ·::.:·9 .... ·.: .. ·. ··· ........ :.:.·.,, .. ,.9 ..... :., ... : ... : .... ·:::· .. ::.·: :::::.:·::: .... : ... :::: .. :.:·:· .. ::.::.:: , 
s1atut9ry.maxfmum wouicfbe reasohabie:-under:·appifoabie iaw and ·whetherfo 
recommend such a sentence, includi~~:l: a varianf.sentence·to account "tor the· 
defendant's ·civil GOntempt p~natti.~s '.jmpo~~ctduf.i~$, th~ irive'sti9i1t_iQ~,°C>f tt,h,jriatte"r" ... T~e :· 
ctef~n·~arjt_ ls}riie:ta recommend .to' th~ se'iitehe1i'@'coiirt:w.hate~erJ1e b~u~ves' i~:thi 
appropriate·sentence: .. 
Additic>'nair·; . .the ·overnhi"ent if rtfe·s .ftfmov~uo.·d'lsmiss'·countJi ot.tfre.:fndictm·e:i;t ........................ Y ........ 9 ........................... 9 .......... ....................................................................................... .. 
aflne thii.e'ofs·entendn · ·; ···················· ........ ... 9. 
this agre¢ment is.subm.i#ed to the,°Courffodts·.considera"tion pursuant. to Rt.He 
1:f(p).(1).(A) and ·Jsj_ oflhe:·Federal Ruie.s of.'Crimi'naf r·i-<?cedure.-
1.· ,- ELEMENT$ OF THE OFFENSE($) 
"· -- ·--::- •• .-.-;,-..--,---:-,.:---•• A. • • • • • ~ • ' • • • ••• 
"in orde~ to be convi~ted.. of a v_iolatior'l"pf ?~· y.s.¢. f7212(a),- tti~ following 
elements would have to be proven by the govemmenf b~yond·a reasonable doubt: 
First: the defendant acted with the purpose to obstruct or impede the due 
administration of the Internal Revenue laws, which includes the Internal Revenue 
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se·conct'..thefdefendahl'$: ac;t$ h~~ .a reaspn~bie t~mt.e11cy: ~<?·.~!>~fruct or impede 
t~e. d!:J~ ·c1gQ1iDI~~f~tio.11.'c;,f .t~e ,~w~.m.~i R~\ieiiu~.:,aw~;- .' 
Ttii@: th~f~~f~D4~~t::a~t~(im~wi~·gty; and 
i foyrt_h:'(h~ defendarif acted·corruptly,.:that is, wi"th the.purpos·e·to.obtairi an 
uril~wftif ~·~nefit. forhimseifor st,meone else. 
Fed .. cfim. Jury.instr./ifNcii:·t2i"~('~J. 
11.•: s·TATUTORY.·PENALTI~~'., 
The maximum., sliif~t.ofy}~~nijlfy f9f:;~ :ViolatiQ(l of ~~, U ~.s;c~ §.}21:2(a)Js; as 
foll~w~.=' ncitmck~ \h~.ai~(fm'ohths·.of 1mptisonm~·n~.:~: fl!i~ 9.t-nqt..m9t~ tnan. :th~ .9t$..~~~(9.f 
$25"0,000~00 or:.twice.the.···airfor.loss·ftomJhe;:offense;,:or b9th;.:r1<>f.rn9.t~ f~~ri 1 :··.·ear 6t ................................................ 9 ................................................... ···-- .. .................................. .... X 
su····ervised release\if $f oct6o:·s··· ed~i:asses$tn~nffeEffcosts: of prosecution; :pius ... P .................. .. ········ ..... , ....................... .P ............. ·········· ........ ... ...... .. ... ... . ... . 
r.~st,~l,Jjiqn:as b,~ .. tj.~f~m,Jn.~~ib.Y t~~.'q~~~:· ·1(probation or supervised r~lease, is .. 
irnpqsed, ·a.vioiatron of any condition .of probation or supervised. r~1e·~~$ n:i!3Y.f~sliit' irfa.1 . '. . . . .... . : 
'Ill, :iCOLLATERALCONSEQUENCES 
;:::= -- - --- ........ ' 
·th~ C,OD'/f~~i(?l'l. rili3y.:f~rt~e_rcause. the fr>SS of Certain civil rights, including·, bµfnot. 
limited to,. the right fo .possess a firearm, vote, hold elected office, and sit on a jury. 
IV. STIPULATION OF. FACTS 
The parties agree that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea that the 
defendant will. tender pursuant to this plea agreement. That basis is set forth below. 
Because the Court must, as part-of its sentencing methodology, compute the advisory 
guideline range for the offense of conviction, consider relevant conduct, and consider 
-6-
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" 
tfi~ other factqt$ set fort.Ii i.O. 18 .U .. S.C. § 3553,:'additional fa~tsJna.y;b~ inclyqed.b~IOV,,'. 
w~.lch a~~ p·~rtin,e~t .. to' th.o~ef cq~:~id¢.r.~tior1.s)1~~. :cor.tput~ii.op~/T.e> t~e ~xt~pt the, p~,r.tjes: 
di~agr~eial:19.Jit th:e. fa.tji{~etJor.th ~~1ow;: t~ef~tipuiatlo.n.·~f.Ya.9~s. id.er,t(~~~ wh(t.h ta~.~)~r~, 
~n.Pw.n tq· p~:Jn dispute·,~tjh~ .tJm~ o.t.:Jh~ .~X.~c.q~i9rro.nhe .Pl~c1 agreement 
., fiiis stipui~tloo ... ot.~.Gt~·cio~s:nof~:i'redude .. either party trom hereafter presenting' ... . .. . ... ... . . . ..... ......... ..... . . . . . .. 
~h~· ¢~µit:i!*'a;~ditioi;ial f~dt~wtiich'do·nof contradict fads fo which .tlie parfies have.1 
stipulatecf and which are. relevant to'the Court's guideiine computatiori's; fo other . .1'81 
UJs::c} ~, 3553]actors·, ,odo: the 'Court's pver~ll .. sente.nqing ~eci~ior.i .. 
th~ p~frtJ~~ ·.a~fee· th.afthe cJ.i:itefor(wliich reiev.~nt'ciiridµcfb¢g~n'wa·s:Jn::~.µ!ie;1 
2002., 
The pa'rties .. a .. te:enhatthe:= .. ·overnmen,ii evidenc~wo.uia b~::.~.~dQii'Pw~~ ..................... .. 9 ..................... 9 .......................... ....................... · ................................ . 
Atali· reieva·nfi1ii1es·; Defendant: Gte· .. o .... : Nathan· Laurence. was:-a' resident:of ... ,. .. .......... ......... . ...................... ~: ,ry, .. ... .... .. . . .. 
.•. 
C3~rni~i1to.W.~;, Tetmes.s~e: H·e. p ractr~ed. medicine ·through two .entities in which.-he w~~ 
the· soie physician, Germantown Family tare and Obstetrics; LP and :Germantown: 
•• 1. • • • •• •• 
Aesthetics; LP: Beginning in approxim·at~ly June, 2002,'.and continuing through at least, 
the end'pf'2007., br: Lauren'ce used thti·seivices of Melfssa Sug.ar, ~h :attorney in' 
Denver,· Colorado, as well as others associated with· a group known as Financial 
Fortress Associates, among other things, to take steps to disguise his true income from 
the IRS and to support the false business and personal tax returns he filed during the 
relevant period. 
Dr. Laurence paid Sugar for the use of various unincorporated business 
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Amethyst Mana!;)ement,; Moonstone Mana~~ment, P~arl Mana~ement,. Diamond. 
Management·,. Em~rald. Mari'ci·~:~rri¢rjt, .Sapphi~~ . .MEi~.age.iii~rit,· a~9:.$agitt~friu:s: 
M1:!11agefrn~hf.: .s.i:iQaf ~~d r,re.vic>usly Gt~atecfthes·e: V.BQs ·~.n.d· h~9Jippi1~~ ;to" th¢'.!~~ t9t, 
:Ef11ploye~ ldentifrcatioi:-i Numbers,.("EINs.T) .fpr:.tb.~ LJ.13.Q~:. Pr; 1;~.1.ff.e.o~~:,~.,~P. P.~.(~ .. $.Lig~(· 
tos~t.ii' ... bank acco'tihts for the· us6s,at. two·ctiff~rent banklrand fo: lisf sham·frusts as· . .. ..... ... . .. p. .... .. ·,: .. .. . ... . ······. .. .... . ................. · ....................... :.: ... :··.: ::.:: .. ::::... . .... :·.:: . ::: · ..... · : .. 
d$pq_s~t<>r~ fqr'Jhe, l>an~ ~ccoi;ints.: The$e lru~~~. ,n.9i~q~)Synamfc Heaith:care'-Staffiri~~: 
R.eli~nt-.Prc,,perty M.an.~gemen($.ervfc~~; ·Professional Properly:Managemenf Services! 
$µp~r(or'.consulting ·services,. Physician 'Marketing:·servlces,_.Ffrst auafity·Medical 
•. l . ... ". .... . ..• ". \,, .. 
Equipment and"supply; Midsoutli Aufo Leait"ng'.;- Mid.southJ-lqm~,$o!µ~i6.n._s; arid Ass:et-
Mana emenf Services.= 'Dr .. laureifoe ahd . .su····ar.:o .. ·eiied the'bahlflicco1Irits.fot th.a., .,9..... . ... ·········- ............................... ~_ ..... P .......................................................... . 
oaos usiry~-:tneJJao:.~tN~Jn p~tt:i:~q io:~.t Pr:,.:6~\it¢.n¢.e.'$. .. s:o¢J~1:.$~.¢.µrjty::~9rri~~r:W.i?.9.i~J 
not.be ·as·s:ociated with ·th~. bank: gGCQVn.t~. 
~LJga:r h~.a sole ~ign/~~oi'Y ~~~h,or,ity ·9y~_r m~~y: 9f the LJ~q :~~~~: ~-~co~~ts:, 
~s~~bli$fi~c(fo.t'Dr:·L.ci"U.r.e.~~-: o~,:0~~!3-~ accounts,· Dr;: Laurence's wife· was·icJ.entme.d tc;>.: 
the baf"!k as an ."Assistant Adminisfrator" forthe UBO andQraoted signatory c;1uthorify, 
althou_~h she rarely lf ever e~erciseq thafauthdrity, Instead,· t>r: .. Laui'~rice .Pafd .. St.iga_r t_o. 
. conduct bank transactions for ttie uaos .. on .his behalf·. 
Dr. Laurence took steps ·which purported to transfer ownership to the sham 
trusts of assets that he or his medical practices owned, such as his personal residence, 
his cars, the buildings where he conducted his practices, and the equipment .used in 
those practices. He issued checks from his professional corporation to the fictitious 
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deposited=i'ntp various v..ao.a~oµ_rits,: Or. L~uten¢e t~en. treate~ the~e payments as, 
legJ~ilji_ate tje:~·u~iiq11s /9(bq~\~.~~,~,:~~-P~.~-~=~=~· ~C?=.r~,q_uc~ the ·apparent profit generated' bY 
Ge®.~~~ow~:)=afliiiy.; th.ereby reducing· it~ taxabie · income. 
At FFA;s st1ggest1on_; br: La1Jr.enc~ .. a.l$Q.~voic:J~d._payr9ll t~xeifci'r.,C3~{m~:ntqW0: 
·Family-and Germantown Aesthetics:t,y,.$toppingi hi.s''pr~vi.q'u~' p'r~¢tici.?$ qfwltb!i9.ldiiig, 
ancf paying over. payroll ta~e..s ~n~J~·s~iirl$ 'his .empioyees· F.orrn~ .W-2 each'y~·~r,: 
.tnst~~d~. Dr\ l.?ur¢iic~ .~i;iµse.,;tNs .e~p-!qy¢~~:JO.· ~.e. P.a.i~, th.,e.ir wages .a~d ~.t.~~.I" 
irl.c.~fitives·, w.ithq~l ~ny.;withhpl~Hp~s .an~ .. as'.pllrp¢rted., ir:i~~P.~n.dent ~c;_ntr.a.~tt)~:~ ibt():~gh 
Jasper M.:Jn.~geaj~nt,; afjtwee.:o)c3rj_u·~:& · 1 ;_ 2QO~; and: Ap~f;=-:2q_o7 ,: Dr. La~r~n¢$. 
dep~siieif QVe( $.1)(mi)ijqn int9.'ft,~ ·J.~.sp_¢t,accolitit'fr.orrd1is pracHces. :He did''.nof report .................... ,· ........ .. .......... ........ ...... ........... .. . .. .: 
~h.~:~ajpi_<:>Y.~,~.S:: r~;~~)p( qf {h.9s~. w~.9.~S ·to' ilie :IRS'. in· any, ·form:; but he did claiin 'ti'is·. 
p~yments, as .d.eductionsJor labor. on :Germantown: F.amil_y's.'r~tums·.\. 
·or. Laurerfoe.ciiused the ... re .. ·a'fatioii iirid friln .. oHederattax·returiisfcfr: . .. . . ... . .. .. ....... p .. P.. ... ..... .. ....... g . . . .. ...... . . ..... .. 
;, .. :·:· 
Germ~n.towff F~'rhU_y fcfrJa.x ·y~~rs. 4QQZJhf9J,i~t, :iOO?; .. Which r13p9r.t¢ciJ~e.se· fal.$.~' 
deductions and suo.stantially l!iicler:.;..rep9rte:ci. th~ fetal ~omp~risation he received. 
During the ~a.me j:)~riod, :Dr: ·Layrenc~;:~i~ .flO~; fi_ie ,any_ r~tUfr:1S or ·other documents wh.ich 
would ·have aliowed the· iRS to de.tehliirie U1at Germantown Aesthetics even existed. 
Dr. Laurence also caused the preparation and filing of false individual federal 
inco.me tax returns for tax years 2002 through 2007, which tracked the corporate returns 
by substantially under-reporting the total compensation he received from his medical 
practices. Dr. Laurence used the funds in the UBO account to pay for personal 
expenses, such as vehicles, his home mortgage, and tuition for his children's schools. 
-9-
~· ' : 
002189
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P.uring tl:ie Um~ P$f!Qd.'~t i$$.V~,' fr~rrr j.~n~;,,2.9.0~i t~_r9ug~-AP.aJ;, ~008;, ~~itb~.r 
s'tigat no.r :Or; Laore:r:ice .rii'~cii f c;rm$ j .o.a$; tor {h$ .u:a:b.s. or :rederaftafc:returns, tot. any-or ... . ........... ···;· .... .......... .. .. ... .. .. . .. ... .... .. . ........... ... .. .... . . .. 
ihe:f!ciitl~U.s ~n.tlti$~i ¢..ri i-:a.µ~~~~e ~a~ ;awar!3 lhai he:'i-,ad a· duty'to ·riie tax returns· which: 
~oi:it~iD~~-~.~cur_~·~e:·information and that the: U~s:was·relying. on the'.informatfon in his. 
~orj:>'orate and' person~il refoms:whencomputing: taxes due: and:owing.:' The· total taxJ6s's:: .. ... .. ·: . . .. :. 
from Dt. Laurenc,is:·conduct was between approx1mate.iy: $1°95~ 0.00 .an~·. apiiibx!rrfr~tel{ 
$.300,000. 
Dr: Laurence' learned'of the:=-·overnment's irriiesti ·auon,ofthe'a·cuvit .. des·cnbed .. . ........... ······ ···~····· .... ................... 9 ...... ··········· .... y ············ . 
above' in Februi ... 2008 :wh·en'IRS:a·"·e:i'rits served hfrn·with" "rand/u .. sub. oenaii:f6r . . . ....... .. .. JY, ....... , ................. g.. .. ... .... .. ... .. ........... 9 ........ J.JY .... P ... .............. , 
r$.c9rd~ r.ei~,~~: t~t G.~r:m~.nt.qw,r'~~r.n1Jy. ·f,lt,g G.¢.rm.~H.fown. A.~~ffie.tfo~·., ·or-: Laurence· 'fhen 
~~~k;.~)JMrn~:~r rl ~~~p~)p 9tj,~irl:!Pf thaflnves'i!~t~ifon· .. 
(: 
F'ot'example,:·on· March 5li2008,,.or.l.aurence·sig_ned: and, sent:a documen.Ua: fhif 
<lrand· J.ury· ~ncl:osJng.:~PlJ:b!ic: Servan(Qi.Je$t{oiiria.ir~s\"' w.fii~h· cJ~n.,arjdec;f ttiifp¢rsqrj$'1' 
iriformaHon ·bfl RS;:Spedal ~~,ents. ·n;~· qu~$tloifo.~Jre· :st~t~ct that faihiredO:: ~d.visij D.r: 
Laurence before releasing information regarding hirn to:~ny pe~orfm~y·$ubject,th~. 
Special Agehts to· civiror criminal action. Dr.· Laurence· also enclosed "Discio.sure . . .... .. . ... .. . . .. . . .. . ' 
Statem~nts'i dire~te~ to' IJ~S Special Age~ts, whi~h stated that the agen.ts' failure to . . . 
respond to the Public Servant Questionnaires would result in a $400,000 default 
judgment being entered against the agents. 
Dr. Laurence was subsequently served with orders to compel the production of 
. -
the material requested In the grand jury subpoenas. He responded to those orders by, 
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that the Deputy.United States Marshals who.·had served:the o~ders were g_uilty of 
criminal trespass. 
·on:.J·anu~uy:-23, 2009; this· Courflsiuecf~n ofcf£¥r tfrid1tj9. P.i/l~_urence in 
contempt of ifa_ptevious order tq ·d~r:ne·e.1.:.oo·M~rch:43~ ~009.lhtf court.found that Dt: 
Laurence: had · · reviousJ · 'tfr ed; his c·ontem .. ta'fid. im .. osed fines ·ot $45,ooo ·each ·on-. . .. ... . . .... . . . ... p . .'I p.. g .. . .. .. . .. .. . ... p ................ P...... .. .. . . ... .. ........ ·: .. .. ........ . 
Gennaiitown· Fam ii · Germantown Aesthetics· .. an~ibr; Latire·n·ce · but sus· ended· ............ . . .. y, . . ................ ·' ............................. , ...... P .... . 
$40,0.QQ·_pf. each. qf tbos~ Jines.-. 
V., · .. S.ENTENCING COMP.UT AfiON: AND 3553·Abvi·seMENT. 
.. . .~. - - .... --· - .. -··· .. -----· ---- - -- ~· . .. - . ,_.,,_ .... ,-- ---···-·.,-... ,. . ., - .--- ... - - -..... -.--1 
ThEfparties·tindersfand. that the· iritp6s!t!bn:'of~. ~~ril~ri~ in ttJl~.m~f;ter- i~ 
, .. ·ovemed ·b 18 U.S.C:. §·:3553/:lifdeteiiiiihin·g tbe;particolar:s$ntence,to:.b$ ir:n · os.ecl. 9 ................... ,Y .................................................................................................................... P ....... .. 
~ 
the:.court!Js.:re· u·ired: to.'consid~r ·seveift'adors~,'bne, ofthosedactors,hr.tiie·:se.nt~:n:6'.in ·, ................................. q ...................................................................................................................................... 9. 
rn.ng~·~9mp_y_te_tj f;>y the ¢0.u_ftJJfld.~_r, acfyi~91y g~1~e,iln~s, ,ssued:by·,~a Onited States, 
$eritencin~. Comm.ission. ·ji,.order'to aid the Court in this: regard{the parties·.setfortfr 
i:,~ioy., ftieJr. estlrna.te of the ~dv,sory gliJde.!tn~ .r.~oge .. ~li~.d fq°r by tlief l)i')if~cl $t~tes 
Seritencir;,g Guicieline~. To the extent th~t the·pa·rties dis~i'~ree· about the guideline· 
¢9mput*ions, the recitation below identlfies the matters .. which: are in dispute. 
A Tfle appropriate Guideline is §2T1 .. 1. The ba.se offense level is the lev~I. from· 
§2T 4.1 (Tax Table), either 16, corresponding to a tax loss of approximately 
$195,000, or 18, corresponding to a tax loss greater than $200,000. The 
defendant reserves the right to argue that the applicable guideline is §2T1 .9, with 
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Ek TnerEf i$: a 4-(~vel. i.n:Crease. b~:cau.$e tne· offense involved sophisticat~d means; 
.1~ •. '§~TtH~).<~>; t11.tj ~ef~~-~~.n.f,r~s~r:v~.s *~e. :righ.t to ~tiaiit3nge, ~tie ~ppncabrnty.: 
·oHhis ert'hanceme~tc 
C: .. ,. 'There are no victiin-relafed:or. role-irH>ffense adjustments. There is a 2-level 
focteas.eJor obstruction:of:Justice •. Id: ~3CJJ. 
b~.. The, adJ~sted·;offenseJevel is between ta: and ·22~ 
E~ Pursuant'fci§3E1 .:1 (a) arid (b), the defendant shou.ld receive the full three-level: 
·;-~di:i~figrffqr: ~cc~pta):ic~. o( resµij·n.sibiJity. The. resulting offen·s,flev.el. w.olllcf be 
,:• ·.: .. .·· 
~~~~~tfy~;; :t~~-:~i,i~lh~t:~Hit.~ry ~~t~gqry-.i~:J~Jtj{na.\~,y ·~e.~~hl)'im:!d:· b,dh~. Cgyrt., 
the, inform·afioii known·fo ~h~ ~arties,-'howeverr shows ttiafthe defendant does. 
not appear to have any prior criminal history . .Ac.cordingly, the .defendant'$ 
cnmlnar hfafor{cate$ory is':estimafed .to. be Categc>'rY' !. 
G,. Assuming the tentative 'crinihial history facts· above are accurate, the. career 
offE~nder/criminaJ liyelihobd/arr)'led career crimina.1 adjustments _qo not apply. 
H, The"guidelirie range resulting from the e·stimated offense ievels above; and_ the 
tentative criminal history category above, is 18 to 24 months at a level 15 and 30-
36 months at a level 19. However, in order to be as accurate as possible, with 
the criminal history category undetermined at this time, the estimated offense 
level could conceivably result in a range from 18 months (bottom of Category I, 
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L · Pursuant to guideline §5E1 .2,- assuming the estimated offense level atfove·is 
accurate, the fine range_ for thiifoffe·ose _we>ul~ be betweE:,in $4,QOO'to·a~:'irn:.ic:fas: . .. 
appr6xim~te1y_ $4.0q:ooo :~t a. level 1_s; _9r $6;000 to as'. m'uc~ as. ~ppfoximately: 
$600,000: at'a level :19, pit.is applicabl.e interest.arid 'p'eiialtietk 
,.J'.. pµr$1J~i~t'..t<? §~.D.1_:2;: if,the: ~o.u:ct:Jmpos:e~_;a. t~ITTl:.~f ·$.\i'P.~t'i~~d:_r¢1_¢~~~dh~U~r~:i 
$J:ian be· 1 yi:!ar;· 
~; 8~stitu(ic;,r(Wiii't>e._tjetermined _by_the Cou~ at the ,ir.n.~ .9f s_e11t~fiq1rig~ 
T.~!3 :partie~ und~~tflnd ·that ~ithougf, the· couifwiii: considedhe parties'.·estfrnate.-, 
,. the·:court must make its··own determination.ofthe,Quideiine ran~e...:'lh.di:>l~_g so/the · 
(fo.Yrt:.is. _n_q( tmun~:P.Y.tli~,posit!QD Qf~·o_y paity; 
NP e$tirn~t~.o.y· th~P~r.ti.~~.:r~tii:j~ding. thEfg'i.~,d~Ho$:'.r.$.n.g~f Pt~.~,t}~~~j~_ith¢fp$ttY: 
:: ·:.: •. • ·:.: '1 .• · ::. .• .: • 
frO:mJ:1~~in:9.Jh~ .. cowtt, Withi.n.th~ Pve.r~ll Gom~~_ct9f:thefg~_ide.li.ne!?.;Jo oe.·p:~rt.fforr.t.th9ot 
tat'.lgefat ~e.l'.Jt~n.cir.ig_ ~)~at Pc.i!1Y b~li~ve,s th~t.a_·~~par,tu.re i~ ~P~Sffi~liy ~':ljhqri+~4 ~Y. 
th.~ gyi~~-line:~(or th~t. th_e_re ·~x.ists· ~n. agg~vating or ~itiga.!_i,~g ~ircu.'!.ls~ati<?,e·.~-~ a}fo~ip_r: 
to·? d~gree; not adequatefy_:taken into consideration by the United States Sentencing. 
co~mission ln formulatir:ig_the advisory guidelines.:similarl~. no estfinate.by'the parties. 
regarding the guideline range. precludes either party.from asking the Court to vary 
enti~ely from the advisory guidelines and to impose a non-guideline sentence based on 
other 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors. 
VI. ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
This document states the parties' entire agreement. There are no other promises, 
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·!. 
i: 
~f Pt~~s o'~ ltripHec( h:i ~nt_erh,g t.~:fs_:.~gr~_E;m~r:itf n~Jtn..~t th~·99.vernt0~Dt:.nqr:_t~-~ .. .. 
'i 
, 
:·::.·.:::::.:::: ·.·.·.·. ! 
'.-,b~e·· .... · ~:.:..,z·· ~,i., ,Jt'• ·g·. c,c::n . .;: ·~ .. ..~, l.r· ~:-,.,.,, . 
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IN T.HE UNITED STATE$ D1SJ".Rl9T COURT 
·FoRtHE DISTRICT: OF COLORADO 
$eni.or Judge Jp_hn L:kan.~ 
bate: Februa · 6 2014 .. . .... !)' '. . . . 
=·--=--- . ~-=-----==·· ·:.:.-.. · .- .. •,·::-~··, ' ·-··-:.-.- -·-· - ~- ... -
'tFarties;~ 
... - ----- ___. .. 
UNIT~O .STATES OF .AM!;RICA, 
P)a/.~_tif( 
v:-
GREGORY NATHAN LAWF{ENC.E,: 
: :· . 
Courtroom Def' ut : Berni uefAbiakam ............... · .. P .. Y ...... q ..... ,. · ........ 
·Court Reporter:,MaryGeorQe 
Arm? K.,· ~dg~r.; 
WrlliarrrH. Ewing·, ·Jtl,t; 
Court calls· case. Counsel preserit. Defe'rida.nt present oii boiid. 
P~fer,dant:_syJqrn ahd _ciriswer~ _q·uest_io~s,asked_ by' the_ Go'urt 
EXHU31TS: Cd'urt E_xhibit 1 - Piea_Agreement~ court ~xhibit?:- Staterheht by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty. 
Defendant ~dyised of the maximum penalties. 
Defendant's right to trial to jury and other constitutional rights are explained. 
Defendant is re-arraigned. 
Defendant pleads guilty to Count Five of the Indictment. 
The Court accepts the plea of guilty. 
ORDERED: Probation department shall conduct a presentence investigation.and 
submit a presentence report as required by Fed.R.Crim.P.32. 
-~ 
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13-cr-00193-JI.K-3 
Change of Plea:: 
February 6,.2014: 
O~DER.E.D:,: .$et1tem_c.!ng J~ ~.et fo.r. ~eptember 4~·2014 af 10:00 a.m .. 
°bRbE.RE°b:. Boncfls cdNT"iNUED .. 
4:24"p.rn·. "cfourfin rec~ss. 
:Hearing· conch.ide~t 















Tennessee Department of Health: Licensure Verification 
J. 1 U.VL.ltlVJJ\.tl .J. .1. VJ.JJ\.,, vcu.a · · 
Page 1 of 3. 
Practitioner Profjle Data 
f.his info.rmat.iol'}. ~S. provided by the li(;ensee a$ requ_ired by la:w.i 
Print1)(lfe.3/24!2014 · · 
.• J • •• • • • ·: ' •• •• • :· : • 
While.'seaicJ:.iiP:g foi,-.iriformation ·on a:·particul.ar health car~ P!9fessfo~~l;·.c.~n~~ef~)~<?:u.14 qi(~w~e t1:i.~t.tjJ,et~Are; 
s~yerai. fog_~tj9ns ~vaii~bi~ tq aid.them yvith thefr.r.es.e!if~h~ (Licensure V,eiification (ind.ex;bt.111)~:Abuse ~egi~_B'Y:: 
, (i AbuseReg!S'try/index.htinl), ·Monthly Disdplinary Actions, {/Boards/discipliriafy.htm} @'d Recently Suspended: 
~LiceiisesJ::hie: fo Failure to.Pay. Child.:Sup)Yofl. (/Do~oad_s~~~~pe~_~e<l.~ice~se~:B_~t.>.2~ Links fo -various Internet sites. 
~e .~v~fab1e.from the Df?partment of Health Website hom.t:, p~~~- (http://st~~~:.tn.-us(.11:~~1.th/);and'from the:~ealth, 
.$~~~!~~-·0~4~.~~Hsi~e..(~~~r9.stiiid~x.htm);, .. · -
LAURENCE, GREGORY NAtHAN 
.PRACTICE ADDRESS: GERMANTOWN SURGICAL SERVICES~ PA 
7475 POJ;>LAR'PIKE 
GERMANTOWN';:TN,38138 
:.iLA~9U.A.G~~:: (Othedhah E_ngl,ish) Non!) Reporle:ci' 
·S'Q;P.ERYI~m9. J.>HX~J(JA~_:: ~:~m.e)i~p()rt~~ 












.~'.f J\ '.1'.E.f: 
'COUNTRY' 
DALLASTX ... ' .. ····· 
·DATEOif 
: Q.Ml?. l!A.T:~,O:N, 
OTHER EDUCATION ANffTRAINING 
:ci1Y 

















AMERICAN BOARD OF FAMILY PRACTICE 





ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR UNIV OF TN 
STAFF PRIVILEGES 
This practitioner currently holds staff privileges at the following hospitals 
CITY/STATE 
MEMPHIS TN 
http://bealth.statc.tn. us/Licensure/Practitioner.aspx?ProfessionCode= 1 606&amp;LicenseN um ber=2501 7 &a... 3/24/2014 
l 











MEMPHIS TN . .. . . 
Tbis practidoner curreJ}tly participates in the following TennCare plans' 






None Reported Nohe Reported, 
lIBSIGNAlJQNS IN .LlElT.OF n.BNilNAl:JQN' 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
-----· Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com __ .... 
·-··--·-- ... -·- NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IIQ~~-~~~~~~~ 
AM ____ r-,Lu.~;.;i;:- UJ 
MAR 2 5 201-'i 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clar 
By STACEY LAFFEFiTY k 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF 
RELIANCE ON PREVIOUSLY 
FILED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
ORIGINAL 
002204
Pursuant to the Court's Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further 
Proc~edirigs fil~d F~b~~ 21, 2014, Piaintiff Charles Ballard, tfu.o;gh hi;-att~~;ys~ h~;~by ... __ ";·.:=··-=-:·:-::-=: 
gives notice of his reliance on Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
filed October 22, 2013. Plaintiff incorporates by reference this prior filing, as if it was fully set 
forth herein, and requests that the Court instruct the jury and utilize the special verdict form as 
set forth in his previous filing 
Dated this 25th day of March, 2014. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- ------- -------------- --·--- ' - - -· - ~' >-\--------- .. -------..----·- ... - .... ----•+·--·-·--. 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of March, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Notice of Reliance on Previously Filed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form by delivering the same by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL, PLLC 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 






MAR 2 6 2014 
Ada County C!el'k 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
~11lt AM_ ~ - -----
MAR 2 6 2014 
CHRISToPHt:R 0 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PLLC, and move this Court, pursuant to Rules 103, 104, 401, 402, 403, 
701 and 803 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and Rules 16 and 47(i) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure for Orders in Limine as to the following issues: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1 
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1) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, that Defendant Dr. Kerr or 
any of the defense witnesses, including Dr. Kelly O'Neil, have ever had any complaints 
filed against them or proceedings or orders of any kind before any state licensing entity in 
any jurisdiction that they have ever been licensed in. 
2) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that Dr. Kerr or any 
of the defense witnesses, including Kelly O'Neil have ever been previously sued for 
malpractice or settled a malpractice claim in any jurisdiction. 
3) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, that Dr. Laurence has been 
the subject of any criminal indictments or grand jury proceedings in any jurisdiction. 
4) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that any of the 
Defendants have liability insurance, the availability of insurance or the issue of insurance 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2 
002208
.. 
in any way at all. 
5) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the fact that any of the 
Defendants or any of the defense witnesses have ever been previously represented by 
Jeremiah Quane or any of the attorneys with the firm Quane Jones McColl, PLLC. 
6) For an Order in limine prohibiting Plaintiffs, their counsel or any of the 
Plaintiffs' witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during 
either voir dire, Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or 
closing statements or by way of offering any evidence at trial, the effect of this or any 
medical malpractice case on the cost of health care or the implementation of the 
affordable care act also known as "Obamacare." 
This Motion in Limine is based upon the Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motions in Limine filed contemporaneously herewith, in addition to the court 
record, files, and pleadings otherwise on file in this action. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 2014. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By___:::::~-l!---=-__..::.....:::::==------
Jere iah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attdrneys for Defendants 
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~ •• .I .... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
:11Jt ~ , ___ _ 
MAR 2 6 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
This is a medical malpractice case set for trial before this court on 
November 5, 2013. Pending before the court are the defense motions in limine. While 
most of the six defense motions in limine are self-explanatory, below is additional 
authority for consideration by the court in support of the defense motions. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1 
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1. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Any Mention Of Liability 
Insurance. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or reports relating to the issue of Defendants' liability insurance. 
Rule 402 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) prohibits a party from 
introducing any evidence that is not relevant. According to I.R.E. 401, relevant evidence 
"means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probably or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." The disputed facts and issues in this matter relate to 
Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice. The Defendants' possession of liability 
insurance is not likely to make the existence of any fact needed for the determination of 
this claim more or less probable. Therefore, evidence of Defendants' insurance is not 
relevant to this case and Plaintiff should be barred from introducing it at trial. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that information regarding liability 
insurance is relevant, under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this case, any 
potential probative value of evidence regarding the Defendants' insurance coverage is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Plaintiff can prove his claim for 
malpractice without a necessary reference to the Defendants' liability insurance. The 
prejudicial effect of an unnecessary reference to liability insurance, however, is 
substantial. Evidence of a party's insurance coverage is likely to be misused by the jury. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2 
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Under I.RE. 411, "[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against 
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or 
otherwise wrongfully." The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
explained that Rule 411 is based on "the feeling that knowledge of the presence or 
absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds." 
Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory committee's note (1972). Although evidence of liability 
insurance may be admissible for a limited purpose, none of the limited applications are 
appropriate for the case at bar. See I.R.E. 411. The mention of liability insurance will 
only put in the minds of the jury that Defendants are insured. See Lehmkuhl v. 
Bowland, 114 Idaho 503, 508; 757 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Ct. App. 1998) (review denied) 
(Idaho Rule of Evidence 411 may be utilized to assure that issues of liability based upon 
insurance are not introduced). Such an inference will unfairly and unnecessarily prejudice 
the jury to conclude that it will not be the Defendants' own personal money that would pay 
any potential verdict. 
The decision whether to allow inquiries relating to insurance during voir dire 
is a matter within the trial court's discretion. See Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 907, 
120 P .3d 289, 295 (Ct. App. 2005). However, "[t]he fact that this practice is not forbidden 
by Idaho law does not mean that a trial court must allow it. " Id. (citing Kozlowski v. 
Rush, 121 Idaho 825,831,828 P.2d 854,860 (1992)). Here, there is no indication that 
allowing Plaintiff's counsel to make statements regarding liability insurance during voir 
dire will contribute to a purported aim of ferreting out juror bias. Any reference to liability 
insurance during voir dire will be highly prejudicial in that it will signal to the jury that the 
Defendants are insured. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3 
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an order prohibiting 
Plaintiff from discussing, in any way, the issue of Defendants' liability insurance. 
2. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Discussing The Issue Of 
Whether Any Defendant or Defense Expert Has Been Sued For 
Malpractice Or Has Any Prior Board Or Licensing Matters. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or reports relating to whether any Defendant or defense expert has been sued 
for malpractice or has been the subject of any prior administrative licensing matter. 
Information regarding any such issue is irrelevant and would be unfairly prejudicial to the 
Defendants. 
Per I.R.E. 401, information regarding an expert's previous lawsuit history 
would be irrelevant and therefore under I.R.E. 402, inadmissible. The disputed facts and 
issues in this matter relate to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice. Whether any 
of the defendants or defense experts have ever been sued for medical malpractice or 
have been involved in any board proceeding has no tendency to make the existence of 
facts related to Plaintiff's allegations of malpractice more or less probable. Therefore, 
information regarding previous lawsuits of any defense expert is irrelevant and is not 
admissible. 
Even if this Court were to find information regarding any of the defense 
expert's medical malpractice lawsuits or prior board proceedings to somehow be 
relevant, its probative value is grossly outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 4 
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Defendants and should be excluded under I.R.E 403. "It is well established that a trial 
court has considerable discretion to exclude evidence for reasons ... that the evidence is 
confusing, and could [be] interpreted in many different ways." Burgess v. Salmon 
River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565 574, 903 P.3d 730, 739 (1994). Any mention that 
a Defendant or defense expert has been sued or has been the subject of a prior board 
matter is unfairly prejudicial because such information could be interpreted by the jury in 
myriad ways which are not applicable to the case at bar. The raising of such a collateral 
issue by Plaintiffs' counsel will result in a protracted mini-trial on such issues which will 
only serve to confuse and distract the jury from the actual limited malpractice issues 
before them. 
Attached to the affidavit of counsel in support of the Defendants' motions in 
Limine are the reported decisions from a number of other jurisdictions wherein the issue 
of using prior disciplinary matters and/or prior malpractice claims for impeachment 
purposes was held improper, see Noble v. Lansche, 735 S.W. 2d (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding evidence that medical malpractice Plaintiff's expert witness physician had 
voluntarily surrendered his license to dispense narcotics was inadmissible 
impeachment); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831,835 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (error for trial court 
to allow defense counsel to cross examine plaintiff's expert witness with questions 
concerning past disciplinary proceedings since such questions are an improper attack on 
the witness' credibility); Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W. 2d 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 
(trial court abused discretion in allowing cross examination of medical expert regarding 
prior claims of malpractice as it is not probative of his truthfulness or competency and 
knowledge - such allegations of malpractice are analogous to unproven charges of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 5 
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criminal activity); Stickney v. Wesley Medical Center, 768 P.2d 253 (Kan. 1989) 
(affirming in part on grounds that plaintiff sought to improperly impeach defense medical 
expert with extrinsic evidence involving an unrelated lawsuit); Manhardt v. Tamton, 832 
So.2d 129 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002) (Plaintiff entitled to new trial, in part, after defense counsel 
improperly questioned plaintiff expert about prior lawsuits); Morrow v. Stivers, 836 
S.W.2d 464 (Kent. Ct. App. (1992) (trial court properly precluded counsel from asking 
plaintiff medical expert on cross examination whether he had his license to practice 
medicine suspended for five years due to passing hepatitis to several patients, citing 
general rule that a witness cannot be cross examined on a collateral matter which is 
irrelevant to the issue at hand); Hathcock v. Wood, 815 So.2d 502 (Ala. 2001 )(affirming 
district court's refusal to allow counsel from asking plaintiff medical expert on cross 
examination as to the probationary status of his professional license, citing that under 
Rule 608(b), the only kind of evidence that may be presented as to an expert's character 
for truthfulness is evidence regarding the expert's general reputation in the community for 
untruthfulness or opinion testimony from another competent witness). 
Although no such reported decisions exist on this narrow topic in Idaho, the 
majority of these case authorities have adopted rules of evidence which are identical or 
nearly identical to those in Idaho. These decisions aptly demonstrate the improper 
nature of cross examination questions which seek to delve into an experts past lawsuits 
and board matters. Such allegations are analogous to unproven accusations which may 
not be used for impeachment purposes. The attempt at impeachment using such 
evidence does not address the expert's skill, knowledge, or qualifications as an expert 
medical witness; instead, its calculated effect is to simply cast a pall of disparagement 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 6 
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over the doctor's testimony by reason of irrelevant misconduct. For these reasons, such 
evidence should be excluded at the trial. 
In Idaho, medical malpractice actions are governed by Idaho Code § 
6-1012. In this case, Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Kerr is judged relative to his compliance 
with the standard of health care practice applicable to a physician engaged in the medical 
specialty of cosmetic surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2010. Any discussions of any other suits 
involving any other case or expert, would involve injecting into the trial collateral issues, a 
different standard of health care practice and a different time for which no expert 
testimony has been disclosed. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an 
order prohibiting Plaintiff from presenting evidence or testimony regarding any Defendant 
or defense expert's prior medical malpractice lawsuits, claims and/or licensing matters of 
any kind. 
3. Plaintiff Should Be Prohibited From Presenting Evidence, Or 
Discussing In Any Way, Defense Expert Gregory Laurence, 
M.D.'S Yet To Be Resolved Indictment By A Federal Grand Jury. 
Defendants move to prohibit Plaintiff Charles Ballard, his counsel, or any of 
his witnesses from in any way, directly or indirectly, mentioning to the jury, during either 
voir dire, Plaintiff's case in chief, cross-examination or rebuttal, or opening or closing 
statements, introducing evidence, submitting jury instructions, mentioning, or offering 
testimony or documents of any kind relating to the issue of Dr. Gregory Laurence's federal 
grand jury indictment. 
Dr. Gregory Laurence is a defense standard of practice expert from 
Tennessee. At his October 2013 deposition, Dr. Laurence was questioned by Plaintiff's 
counsel regarding a federal grand jury indictment filed against him and others which was 
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filed in Colorado for alleged violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2- Corrupt 
Endeavor to Obstruct or Impede Due Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws and 
Aiding and Abetting) and for alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Obstruction of 
Justice). The indictment was handed down in May 2013 and this matter is still simply at 
the indictment phase. No trial date, plea or conviction of any kind has been entered 
against Dr. Laurence. The defense contends that to allow any reference to Dr. 
Laurence's indictment at the trial would be unfairly prejudicial, irrelevant and arguably 
raise an appeal issue. 
Under I.RE. 401, information regarding a defense expert's grand jury 
indictment is irrelevant and under I.R.E 402, is not admissible. The disputed facts and 
issues in this matter relate to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice involving the 
death of Krystal Ballard. Whether Dr. Laurence, who is acting as a defense expert, has 
been indicted by a federal grand jury on an unrelated contested tax issue is an entirely 
collateral issue which has absolutely no tendency to make the existence of facts related 
to Plaintiff's allegations of medical malpractice more or less probable. Therefore, 
information regarding his indictment is irrelevant and not admissible. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that information regarding Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment to be somehow relevant, its probative value is grossly 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendants. As a result, it should be 
excluded under I.R.E 403. More to the point, I.RE. 608(b) prohibits the admission of 
extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior misconduct to impeach a witness's credibility. 
While there is an exception under I.RE. 609 for impeachment by evidence of conviction 
of a crime, that exception does not apply to Dr. Laurence's indictment which is not a 
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conviction of any kind. Rule 609(a) states: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,, evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the 
nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior 
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant 
to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party 
offering the witness. 
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which I.R.E. 609 
was modeled after, "the following do not qualify as convictions, i.e., are inadmissible 
[under Rule 609]: an indictment, an arrest, acts that may be criminal but have not been 
prosecuted .... " Frazier v. /MED Corp., 2003 WL 1984366, *3 (Del. Super. Ct. April 25, 
2003) (citing 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence§ 
609.03, at 609-13 to 609-14 (citations omitted) (Joseph M. McClaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) 
(internal quotations omitted). In the instant case, extrinsic evidence regarding Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment is inadmissible because not been convicted of a felony. 
If allowed into evidence, Dr. Laurence would be unfairly impeached by the 
jury without him ever being able to defend himself. It would open up an entirely irrelevant 
issue which would consume court time and force the defense to interrupt the trial in order 
to present a mini-trial on the collateral issue of why Dr. Laurence is not guilty of tax 
evasion. Finally, use of the indictment would not even be relevant for impeachment 
purposes because Dr. Laurence did not deny its existence, but rather he truthfully 
admitted in his deposition all about the indictment before opposing counsel elected to 
produce the indictment. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an order prohibiting 
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I • 
Plaintiff from presenting any evidence or testimony regarding defense expert Dr. 
Laurence's grand jury indictment. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By_--+-H......+--w-ol-,J<.-----===------
Jere a A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attar eys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No." CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS'PROPOSEDJURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
COME NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PPLC, respectfully request the following jury instruction Nos. 1 through 28 
and Special Verdict Form. 
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DATED this 25th day of March, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
B~~ 
JereMiah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM by delivering the same to each of the following, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 2 
002223
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law 
that applies to this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set 
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so 
doing, you must follow these instructions. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one or disregarding others. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital 
to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in 
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered 
and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court 
is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I may sustain an objection to a 
question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an offered exhibit without 
receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question called for testimony that was 
not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, 
I may instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you 







was inadmissible only after it had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider this testimony or exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, 
none of my rulings are intended by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence 
in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but 
they are not themselves evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the 
evidence, then you should disregard it. However, there are two exceptions to this rule: 
(1) An admission of fact by one attorney is binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of 
fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the 
course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the 
interest, bias or prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and 







opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts about which he testified; the 
contradiction, if any, of a witness's testimony by other evidence; any statements made 
by the witness at other times that are inconsistent with his present testimony; any 
evidence regarding a witness's general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any 
felony conviction of a witness. 
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the 
circumstances under which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit 









INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each 
party to the suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in 
any way with the parties, their attorneys, agents or witnesses. You are likewise not to 
discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether 
within or without the courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself 
to contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. 
In the event that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your 
decision, you will report it to me promptly. You are not even to discuss the case among 
yourselves until you retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case, 
and you are not to form or express any opinion on the case until you have heard all of 
the testimony and have had the benefit of my instructions as to the law which applies to 
the case. You should not go to the place where any alleged event occurred unless the 














INSTRUCTION NO. 3 




INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
I remind you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you are not to discuss 
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the 









INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use 
the expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, 
considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof 
in the case, without resorting to inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that 
indirectly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, 
by means of proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof 









INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 







IDJI 124. (Modified.) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved 
in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled to neither more nor less 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by an interrogatory and 
an answer to the interrogatory. An interrogatory is a written question from one party 
and answered by another during the course of a case. This evidence is entitled to the 
same consideration you would give had the witness been asked the interrogatory and 
then answered it from the witness stand. 
You will only have the interrogatory and the answer read to you in court. 
Although there is a record of the interrogatory and answer to the interrogatory, this 






I.R.E. 801 (d)(2) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not 
consider it for any other purpose. 







IDJI 127. (Modified.) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by 
a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that at the time and place of the 
incident in question Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care was provided as such 
standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was functioning. 
In addition, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the failure of 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 






The Defendants have no burden of proof on any issue in the case. 
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Individual providers of health care, such as Dr. Brian Kerr in this case, 
shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account their training, experience, and fields 






Idaho Code§ 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The standard of health care practice means the care typically provided 
under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider in the 






Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 
(2003); McDaniel v. Inland and Northwest 
Renal Care Group Idaho, LLC, 159 P.3d 856 
(2007), 144 Idaho 219 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice and 
professional learning, skill and care required of Dr. Brian Kerr only from the testimony of 
those persons, including Dr. Brian Kerr, who have testified as expert witnesses as to 










The quality or appropriateness of the standard of health care practice is 
not for you to decide. 
You must apply the standard of health care practice that you determine to 
be applicable and you must not consider or decide whether that standard of health care 






Based on I.C. § 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are not permitted to assume or conclude that the standard of health 






Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32 (2007), 
I.C. § 6-1012. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that 
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital where the medical 






Idaho Code§ 6-1012 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not 






IDJI 230; Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 
P.2d 1122 (1989); Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 
Idaho 591,595,818 P.2d 295,299 (1991). 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 









INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
You are instructed, in considering the issue of damages, that a physician 
is not liable for any pre-existing injury, disease, condition or disability which is not the 
natural and proximate result of the actions of the physician. In other words, you cannot 
award damages to the Plaintiff if the damage resulted from the natural progress of any 
injury, disease, condition or disability which is attributable to causes other than the 










INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
You may not include as damages any amount that you might add for the 
purpose of punishing the Defendants or to make an example of them for the public 
good or to prevent other incidents. Such damages would be punitive and they are not 






BAJI 14.61 (6th ed.) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
An award of damages is not subject to any income taxes, and you should 









INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, 






BAJI 1.00 (6th ed.). (Modified) 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by chance. Thus, 
if you determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover, you must not arrive at the 
amount of damages to be awarded by agreeing in advance to take the independent 
estimate of each juror of the amount to be awarded and then to average such estimates 









INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have 
told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to 
determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you; 
and then you will retire to the jury room for deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations 
are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic 
expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to 
change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph 
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your 
individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do 









INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreperson, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Use only the one conforming to your conclusions and return the other unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill it out, if 
necessary, and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your Foreperson alone will 
sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing 
will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict(s), you will notify 









INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at 
least three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered 
judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges -- judges of the facts. Your sole 









INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict form to use in returning 
your verdict. I will read the Verdict Form to you now: 
We, the Jury, answer the Special Verdict form as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to 
the class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES NO ------ ----
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 







Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
Non-Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
Now that you have been chosen as jurors for this trial, you are required to 
decide this case based solely on the evidence and the exhibits that you see and hear in 
this courtroom. "The case" includes anything you see or hear in the courtroom, or on 
any case questionnaire you completed, anything said by the lawyers, the Judge, Court 
staff, and everyone else in the courtroom. At the end of the case, I will give you 
instructions about the law that you must apply, and you will be asked to use that law, 
together with the evidence you have heard, to reach a verdict. In order for your verdict 
to be fair, you must not be exposed to any other information about the case, the law, or 
any of the issues involved in this trial during the course of your jury duty. This is very 
important, and so I am taking the time to give you some very detailed explanations 
about what you should do and not do during your time as jurors. 
First, you must not try to get information from any source other than what 
you see and hear in this courtroom. This means you may not speak to anyone, 
including your family or friends. You may not do any research about the case with any 
electronic device. You may not use any printed or electronic sources to get information 
about this case or the issues involved. This includes the internet, reference books or 
dictionaries, newspapers, magazines, television, radio, computers, Blackberries, 







any personal medical research or investigation, including visiting any of the places 
involved in this case, using Internet maps or Google, talking to any possible witnesses, 
or creating your own demonstrations or reenactments of the events which are the 
subject of this case. 
Second, you must not communicate with anyone about this case or your 
jury service, and you must not allow anyone to communicate with you. In particular, you 
may not communicate about the case via emails, text messages, tweets, biogs, chat 
rooms, comments or other postings, Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, or any other 
websites. This applies to communicating with your fellow jurors until I give you the case 
for deliberation, and it applies to communicating with everyone else including your 
family members, your employer, and the people involved in the trial, although you may 
notify your family and your employer that you have been seated as a juror in the case. 
But, if you are asked or approached in any way about your jury service or anything 
about this case, you must respond that you have been ordered not to discuss the 
matter and to report the contact to the court. 
The court recognizes that these rules and restrictions may affect activities 
that you would consider to be normal and harmless, and I assure you that I am very 
much aware that I am asking you to refrain from activities that may be very common 
and very important in your daily lives. However, the law requires these restrictions to 
ensure the parties have a fair trial based on the evidence that each party has had an 







outside source, that information might be inaccurate or incomplete, or for some other 
reason not applicable to this case, and the parties would not have a chance to explain 
or contradict that information because they wouldn't know about it. That's why it is so 
important that you base your verdict only on information you receive in this courtroom. 
Some of you may have heard about trials where the jurors are not 
permitted to go home at night, or were sequestered for the entire length of the trial. For 
a variety of reasons, this is something we rarely do. It is far more of an imposition on 
your lives than the court wishes to make. However, it was effective in keeping jurors 
away from information that might affect the fairness of the trial-that was the entire 
purpose. 
You must not engage in any activity, or be exposed to any information, 
that might unfairly affect the outcome of this case. Any juror who violates these 
restrictions I have explained to you jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a 
mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start over. As you can 
imagine, a mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the parties, the court 
and the taxpayers. If any juror is exposed to any outside information, or has any 
difficulty whatsoever in following these instructions, please notify the court immediately. 
If any juror becomes aware that one of your fellow jurors has done 
something that violates these instructions, you are obligated to report that to the court 
as well. If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either directly or indirectly, or 







restrictions must remain in effect throughout this trial. Once the trial is over, you may 
resume your normal activities. At that point, you will be free to read or research 
anything you wish. After the trial, you will be able to speak-or choose not to speak-
about the trial to anyone you wish. You may write, or post, or tweet about the case if 
you choose to do so. The only limitation is that you must wait until after the verdict, 








INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
Jury Instruction regarding Courtroom Conduct 
While court is in session, jurors are not permitted to use electronic devices 
unless specifically authorized by the court. This includes sending or receiving phone 
calls, voice mails, text messages, tweets, or accessing the internet. No electronic 
device may be used to record, photograph or film any of the court proceedings. When 
you arrive at the courthouse in the morning, you will be asked to give any electronic 
devices to the court officer. These devices will be returned to you at the end of the court 
day. You will be provided with a telephone number in the courtroom that your family 
may use to contact you in the event of an emergency. Any emergency message will be 








INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
Jury Instruction regarding Jury Deliberations 
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any 
information to anyone by any means about this case. You many not use any electronic 
device or media, such as the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry 
or computer, the internet, any internet service, any text or instant messaging service, 
any internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, Linkedln, 
YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to 









These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law 
that applies to this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set 
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so 
doing, you must follow these instructions. You must consider them as a whole, not 
picking out one or disregarding others. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital 
to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in 
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered 
and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court 
is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I may sustain an objection to a 
question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an offered exhibit without 
receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question called for testimony that was 
not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, 
I may instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you 
dismiss it from your minds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence 
was inadmissible only after it had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, 
you may not consider this testimony or exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, 
none of my rulings are intended by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence 
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in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but 
they are not themselves evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the 
evidence, then you should disregard it. However, there are two exceptions to this rule: 
(1) An admission of fact by one attorney is binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of 
fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the 
course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your 
everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you should 
apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the 
interest, bias or prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and 
appearance of the witness and the manner in which he gives his testimony; the 
opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts about which he testified; the 
contradiction, if any, of a witness's testimony by other evidence; any statements made 
by the witness at other times that are inconsistent with his present testimony; any 
evidence regarding a witness's general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any 
felony conviction of a witness. 
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In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the 
circumstances under which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit 




As you can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each 
party to the suit is entitled to your full and fair consideration. You are not to associate in 
any way with the parties, their attorneys, agents or witnesses. You are likewise not to 
discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with you, whether 
within or without the courthouse, during the course of the trial; and you are not yourself 
to contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding of the case. 
In the event that anyone attempts to discuss the case with you or to influence your 
decision, you will report it to me promptly. You are not even to discuss the case among 
yourselves until you retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case, 
and you are not to form or express any opinion on the case until you have heard all of 
the testimony and have had the benefit of my instructions as to the law which applies to 
the case. You should not go to the place where any alleged event occurred unless the 








I remind you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that you are not to discuss 
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the 




When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use 
the expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, 
considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the 




Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof 
in the case, without resorting to inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that 
indirectly proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, 
by means of proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof 




A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 





A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved 
in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled to neither more nor less 
consideration than you would give the same testimony had the witness testified here. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by an interrogatory and 
an answer to the interrogatory. An interrogatory is a written question from one party 
and answered by another during the course of a case. This evidence is entitled to the 
same consideration you would give had the witness been asked the interrogatory and 
then answered it from the witness stand. 
You will only have the interrogatory and the answer read to you in court. 
Although there is a record of the interrogatory and answer to the interrogatory, this 




Whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not 
consider it for any other purpose. 




INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by 
a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that at the time and place of the 
incident in question Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care was provided as such 
standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was functioning. 
In addition, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the failure of 
Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 
caused the injuries of the Plaintiff. 
The Defendants have no burden of proof on any issue in the case. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Individual providers of health care, such as Dr. Brian Kerr in this case, 
shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account their training, experience, and fields 
of medical specialization. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The standard of health care practice means the care typically provided 
under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care provider in the 




You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice and 
professional learning, skill and care required of Dr. Brian Kerr only from the testimony of 
those persons, including Dr. Brian Kerr, who have testified as expert witnesses as to 




The quality or appropriateness of the standard of health care practice is 
not for you to decide. 
You must apply the standard of health care practice that you determine to 
be applicable and you must not consider or decide whether that standard of health care 




You are not permitted to assume or conclude that the standard of health 




As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that 
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital where the medical 




When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not 




In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 




You are instructed, in considering the issue of damages, that a physician 
is not liable for any pre-existing injury, disease, condition or disability which is not the 
natural and proximate result of the actions of the physician. In other words, you cannot 
award damages to the Plaintiff if the damage resulted from the natural progress of any 
injury, disease, condition or disability which is attributable to causes other than the 
actions of the physician. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
You may not include as damages any amount that you might add for the 
purpose of punishing the Defendants or to make an example of them for the public 
good or to prevent other incidents. Such damages would be punitive and they are not 




An award of damages is not subject to any income taxes, and you should 




You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, 




The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by chance. Thus, 
if you determine that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover, you must not arrive at the 
amount of damages to be awarded by agreeing in advance to take the independent 
estimate of each juror of the amount to be awarded and then to average such estimates 
to set the amount of your award. 
002285
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have 
told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to 
determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you; 
and then you will retire to the jury room for deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations 
are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic 
expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to 
change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph 
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your 
individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do 




On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreperson, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Use only the one conforming to your conclusions and return the other unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill it out, if 
necessary, and have it signed. If your verdict is unanimous, your Foreperson alone will 
sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing 
will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict(s), you will notify 




Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at 
least three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered 
judgment of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your 
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if 
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges -- judges of the facts. Your sole 




In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict form to use in returning 
your verdict. I will read the Verdict Form to you now: 
We, the Jury, answer the Special Verdict form as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to 
the class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES NO ------ ----
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff for 
Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 




Now that you have been chosen as jurors for this trial, you are required to 
decide this case based solely on the evidence and the exhibits that you see and hear in 
this courtroom. "The case" includes anything you see or hear in the courtroom, or on 
any case questionnaire you completed, anything said by the lawyers, the Judge, Court 
staff, and everyone else in the courtroom. At the end of the case, I will give you 
instructions about the law that you must apply, and you will be asked to use that law, 
together with the evidence you have heard, to reach a verdict. In order for your verdict 
to be fair, you must not be exposed to any other information about the case, the law, or 
any of the issues involved in this trial during the course of your jury duty. This is very 
important, and so I am taking the time to give you some very detailed explanations 
about what you should do and not do during your time as jurors. 
First, you must not try to get information from any source other than what 
you see and hear in this courtroom. This means you may not speak to anyone, 
including your family or friends. You may not do any research about the case with any 
electronic device. You may not use any printed or electronic sources to get information 
about this case or the issues involved. This includes the internet, reference books or 
dictionaries, newspapers, magazines, television, radio, computers, Blackberries, 
iPhones, iPads, Smartphones, PDAs, or any other electronic device. You may not do 
any personal medical research or investigation, including visiting any of the places 
involved in this case, using Internet maps or Google, talking to any possible witnesses, 
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or creating your own demonstrations or reenactments of the events which are the 
subject of this case. 
Second, you must not communicate with anyone about this case or your 
jury service, and you must not allow anyone to communicate with you. In particular, you 
may not communicate about the case via emails, text messages, tweets, biogs, chat 
rooms, comments or other postings, Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, or any other 
websites. This applies to communicating with your fellow jurors until I give you the case 
for deliberation, and it applies to communicating with everyone else including your 
family members, your employer, and the people involved in the trial, although you may 
notify your family and your employer that you have been seated as a juror in the case. 
But, if you are asked or approached in any way about your jury service or anything 
about this case, you must respond that you have been ordered not to discuss the 
matter and to report the contact to the court. 
The court recognizes that these rules and restrictions may affect activities 
that you would consider to be normal and harmless, and I assure you that I am very 
much aware that I am asking you to refrain from activities that may be very common 
and very important in your daily lives. However, the law requires these restrictions to 
ensure the parties have a fair trial based on the evidence that each party has had an 
opportunity to address. If one or more of you were to get additional information from an 
outside source, that information might be inaccurate or incomplete, or for some other 
reason not applicable to this case, and the parties would not have a chance to explain 
or contradict that information because they wouldn't know about it. That's why it is so 
important that you base your verdict only on information you receive in this courtroom. 
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Some of you may have heard about trials where the jurors are not 
permitted to go home at night, or were sequestered for the entire length of the trial. For 
a variety of reasons, this is something we rarely do. It is far more of an imposition on 
your lives than the court wishes to make. However, it was effective in keeping jurors 
away from information that might affect the fairness of the trial-that was the entire 
purpose. 
You must not engage in any activity, or be exposed to any information, 
that might unfairly affect the outcome of this case. Any juror who violates these 
restrictions I have explained to you jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a 
mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start over. As you can 
imagine, a mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the parties, the court 
and the taxpayers. If any juror is exposed to any outside information, or has any 
difficulty whatsoever in following these instructions, please notify the court immediately. 
If any juror becomes aware that one of your fellow jurors has done 
something that violates these instructions, you are obligated to report that to the court 
as well. If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either directly or indirectly, or 
sends you any information about the case, please report this promptly as well. These 
restrictions must remain in effect throughout this trial. Once the trial is over, you may 
resume your normal activities. At that point, you will be free to read or research 
anything you wish. After the trial, you will be able to speak-or choose not to speak-
about the trial to anyone you wish. You may write, or post, or tweet about the case if 
you choose to do so. The only limitation is that you must wait until after the verdict, 




Jury Instruction regarding Courtroom Conduct 
While court is in session, jurors are not permitted to use electronic devices 
unless specifically authorized by the court. This includes sending or receiving phone 
calls, voice mails, text messages, tweets, or accessing the internet. No electronic 
device may be used to record, photograph or film any of the court proceedings. When 
you arrive at the courthouse in the morning, you will be asked to give any electronic 
devices to the court officer. These devices will be returned to you at the end of the court 
day. You will be provided with a telephone number in the courtroom that your family 
may use to contact you in the event of an emergency. Any emergency message will be 
received by the court staff and communicated to you at the appropriate time. 
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DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
l~STRUCTION NO. __ 
Jury Instruction regarding Jury Deliberations 
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any 
information to anyone by any means about this case. You many not use any electronic 
device or media, such as the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry 
or computer, the internet, any internet service, any text or instant messaging service, 
any internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, Linkedln, 
YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to 
conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. 
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' ,· - . 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury, answer the Special Verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care was 
provided, as such standard existed at the time such care was provided, with respect to the 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 1 
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class of health care provider to which Dr. Brian Kerr belonged and in which he was 
functioning, and did such failure proximately cause the death of Krystal Ballard? 
ANSWER: YES ____ _ NO __ _ 
If you answered the above question "No," then simply sign the verdict form 
and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question "Yes," 
please answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the total amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs? 
Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
Non-Economic damages: $ _______________ _ 
DATED this __ day of _______ , 2014. 
Foreperson 
SPECIAL VERDICT - 2 
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SPECIAL VERDICT - 3 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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MAR 2 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS'EMERGENCY 
MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL OF 
APRIL 8, 2014 
Defendants respectfully move the Court for its order.vacating the scheduled 
trial of this case April 8, 2014 on the grounds that Defendant Brian Kerr was injured in a 
bike accident and is unable to attend the scheduled trial because of his injuries. The 
Affidavit of his treating physician, Dr. Britani Hill is attached. 
DEFENDANTS' EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL OF APRIL 8, 2014 - 1 
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DATED this 28th day of March, 2014. 
( k 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
~ iah A. Quane, Of the Fi 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE 
TRIAL OF APRIL 8, 2014 by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
~Bne 
DEFENDANTS' EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL OF APRIL 8, 2014-2 
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2014-03-28 14: 17 Wells Farg :1nk, NA 2089397462 > : Law P 2/4 
2014/03/28 12:11 :21 
Jeremiah A. Qunnc. ISB No. 977 
1'Cl'l'e.ilce S. Jones, lS.ij No. 58 l l 
QUANE !ONES McCOT..,T., PT.LC 
US Ba.nk Plaza 
l O 1 South Capitol 'Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780·3939 
Facsimile: (208) 780-3930 
Auomcys for DcfcndQnts 
4 /7 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
'J'HH l;C>URTH JUDICIAL DlS'l'RJCT 
OF 'I'HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR mE COUNTY OF ADA 
NO. A.~~-==:::FiiFll.f:lj~b~ffl~~---P.M_-__ _ 
MAR 2 8 2014 · ... 
CHRISTOPHER O RI 




Case No, CV OC 12047.92 
vs. 
BR.IAN CALDER KP.RR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK 'l'OUCil 
LASER. LLP. an Idaho limited liability 
_partnership, dba. Sll,K '!'OUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/o.r SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA. LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Adn ) 
AFF10AVIT OF DR.·BRITANl HILL 
Britanl Hill, M.D., having been first duly swom upon oath. d~poscs and says: 
l. n1c information and event~ recited herdn is based upon your AffiMt~s 
..) 
personal knowledge and experience, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. l3IUT ANI HILL .. l 
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2, I a.ma physicjan licensed by the ldaho State Board of Medi(.'ine and I have 
medical staff privileges at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. 
3. I am th~ al.tending physician for Brian Kerr> I admitted Brian Kett to Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Cenl~r on March 20, 2014 as a rcsull of injuries that w~rc, upon 
infonnation and belief. suffered by him in a bicycle accident on March 19, 2014, 
4, Initially, Mt. Kerr was admitted to the Intensive Ca.re;: Unit. He rcmain~d· 
under my care fo1· the duration of his hospitalization and was discharged on.March 27, 2014. 
S. Mr. Kerr is continuing to receive care for his injuries, inclucl~~g the 
administration of narct'>tic drogs. 
G. I have boon informed that Mr. Kerr is o. ])efendunt in a law·suit> and that a 
thrccwwcek trinl is scheduled to begin on April 8, 2014. Based on Mr. Kerr'8 i!)juries, his· 
continuing rncdicnl troatmcnt a.nd rnedica1.ions he lS to.king, l believe he Will hove difficulty in 
attending o.nd participating in the trial proe!:eding8. 
P 3/4 
7, l consider Brian KcIT not to bt medical stablo and he j5 impaired ·SO as to· . · 
prevent him attending his t.dnl. 
FURTHER your Affiunt ~aith not. 
Tu,dcrw,~-
BRITANI HILL, M.D. · . . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Ir day of Mlirch, 20 i 4. 
(SEAL) 
NO~~· 
Residing at_ .IW,. [~ 
Commission expires · 
AFF'IDA VIT OF DR. BlUTANI UfLL - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28111 day of March, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRIT ANI HILL by delivering the same to 
each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 









U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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· Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
MAR 2 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
SHORTENING TIME 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PLLC, and hereby move this Court for its order shortening the time for 
hearing said Defendants' Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial of April 8, 2014 to April 2, 
MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 1 
002303
· 2014 at 2:30 p.m., at the same time as the telephonic status conference that is scheduled. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that the Trial is 
set for April 8, 2014; therefore, Defendants' Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial of April 8, 
2014 will need to be heard by the Court prior to that date. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons stated in the 
Affidavit of Dr. Britani Hill, and documents and pleadings on file herein. 
DATED this 281h day of March, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 2 
Jere iah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
002304
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 281h day of March, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed 
as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
\tleremiah A.Quane 
002305
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. . : ·.·. ·. ·:. : . . . . . :, . . 
APR O 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk ' . 
By KAT.RINA THIESSEN 
DEPUTY Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, tN A~o· 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC-'1~04792 
vs. 
. . . 
CERTIFICATION -OF DEFENSE. · · .· 
COUNSEL P.ER THE.AMENDED .. · 
: : 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND . 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH ·LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho Hmited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND UPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GOVE~NING FPRTHEFf. ·. ; .· . . .. · : 
PROCEEDINGS.DATE,D F~bruary-21·; .... · . . · 
2014 . 
Undersigned counsel for the Defendants hereby certifie~. that the Co.art 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMEND~O}~OTICE OF.TRIAL· 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS'D'ATED·Fehru~ry,21,.·· .-
2014-1 . . . . .. .. , ... 
. .. . . 
. . .. 
~ . 
002306
2014/04/0111:06:09 4 /11 
. . . :: :-.. -:.: · .. ~·.:. . . . . . . 
·.. . . 
,", -· ··. ,• 
ordered exchange of information conference with counsel for the. Plaintiff was ~d~ducted,. · . 
. . .. 
by means of the exchange of written correspondence as -ordered. ~.Y the. Qourt 14._ days_ · :. ·:. 
before the trial date. This Certification is made to comply with the·court-Or.de(of Fe~ruc:iry_,. ·. · · : .. : 
. ·: . . . ·. . . . . . . ... .. . : . 
21, 2014 and is subject to the trial of this case on April 8, 2014 bei~g v~~at~d:·· .· .: · . ... :. · 
Persons disclosed as possible witnesses for the Defend~nts 




Dr. Thomas Coffman 
Dr. Charles Garrison 
Dr. Gregory Laurence 
Dr. Alan Frankie 
Dr. John Lundeby 
Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
Stephanie Miller 
Dr. Karl Olson 
Dr. Matthew Campbell 
Dr. Glen Graben 
Dr. Billy Morgan 
Dr. Howard Schaff 
Dr. Bertram Stemmler 
: .. 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED.NOTICE :OF TRIAL.· .. 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED··Febr~ary:21;::.· ·.,.. . 
2014-2 · :. _..·. ·.,-··· ,·_.. · ... - :• 
. . . . . 
. . ·: ·: ... 
002307




Dr. Tisha Fujii 
Charles Ballard 
, .. .. 
:, : 
Descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be ·offered. in evidence by. 
the Defendants 
1. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr; 




Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison; 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman; 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. f rankle; 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby; 
7. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller. 
8. Medical records of Dr. 'Kerr and Silk Touch Laser' .. 
.··.,: . 
• 1' •• 
·. . .. ·.· .. 
9. · Records of Elmore Medical Center for treatme~~ of:K~stal ~allar.d. · ·. · .... :'_._-: 
. :·. .. . . . 
• • • • 1 
. . ! 
10. Records of Elmore Ambulance Service:. for :qu~ and· t~eatrrien(of · .. :.' ,·. · =. 
Krystal Ballard. .. , .... 
11. Records of Life Flight for care and t~eattnent qf Krystal ~~Jlard. 
12. Records of St. Atphonsus Regional Medical .Center for yefa~ent of · · .. 
Krystal Ballard. 
13. Records of Ada County Coroner. 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL· 
SETIING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED Feo~uary 21, · · 
2014-3 . ·. '•'. . . . . . ,· 
........ 
002308
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14. Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard. 
... ,,• ... . .. . . . ..... · . 
\ ...... ·· . . : . . .. . . . . . . . 
. . . . ,· 
·.· . . . 
15. 21 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken by'Ot. KerrfO_rhis.op~r~~ive_· .. ' .:·· · ... 
... · : 
procedure. •. . .. 
•• :· l• • 
16. 43 photographs of Krystal Ballard taken_.at a0\bP~Y·-. 
. . . ·. . .. 
17. 6 photographs of Susan Kerr that depi~t th~ positions of Krystal 
Ballard for the operative procedure of Dr. Kerr. 
.. 
18. Photographs of brain and kidney tissue fri;im ·the .~utopsy ?f _Kry~\al . ·. · ·'.:: 
Ballard prepared by Dr. Garrison that show the presence of fat ernboli. 
19. Autopsy tissue slides. 
20. 4 photographs of _Krystal Ballard that ._depict the_ -.en~ry .~ites :t~y . . . . . . 
markings f~r liposuction· and fat transfer. 
21.. Report of Dr. Morgan. 
22. CT study of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010, :_ 
. . 
23. Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest x-ray of Kry~tal B~lia~cf of -J~ly 25, 
. ... : . ·. · .. 
2010. 
: . . . 
24. Report of Dr. Schaff for chest x-ray -of Kryst~i :-l~~lllard of Juiy ·25, . . . . . ·. · 
.·· . . . . . ·.. . 
2010. 
:··. 
25. Visible glass container that shows the quantify _of fl~id measured "fr1 _-: ·. ·. ·. 
milliliters or the equivalent in cubic centimeters. 
. . 
26. Medical devices, equipment, supplies, pa:ck~ged r:nateri~I? al!tocl;3ve · 
and instruments used by Dr. Kerr for his procedures with photogr~phs ofth~ sarne. · 
. . 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE. AMENDED NOTICE.Ct= TRJAL 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNtNG FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED February 21', -
2014 - 4 . . . . . :. . · ... 
: . . . ·: .. . ·. · . 
. ·.· .. · .... 
. . .. 
. ··. 
002309
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.... 
! .· . 
' 
27. Compilation of data and database for opera.ti~eq:ir:oc~dure~: of Or: ·. '. ... :. 
Kerr by date, procedure and patient's first name from Decenjber of. 2007 tQrO\.)g°h'. ·. ·:-: .... · .. · 
December 23, 2010, with .Krystal Ballard identified on July 21,. i.ci~O-,and the:n~-~b-~r ~;:···.·.: ·. :"-< _:._ · .. -! 
. . . .. : . . .. · .. : . . :· ; 
. . . . 
liposuction procedures, consisting· of a total of 338 procedures. . ... ·. 
. . 
28. Documents, records, material, data and ~alen1ars .produce_9 ~ith. . · _.- . · 
Defendants responses to Ptaintiffs flrst Requests for Production qf Docl!rnent~ dated· · · · . · .. · · 
' . . . . . .... 
June 29, 2012. 
29. For illustrative purposes, the following medical artist illustration·~: ·.. . . . . 
. . 
a. 18 depicting liposuction of anatomy wjth ~nq without the 
. . . •, . . .. ':. 
cannula. 
. : : 
··.· ... _.:. ·:.· 
b. 1 depicting anatomy for fat transf~~ in. th.e bila.te.ra(quttock~.:- .. :- ·, :·: :: ·. 




1 depicting various tissue layers. 
1 depicting the content of the abdpm~n·. 
1 depicting the urinary system. 
.. 
. . . .. 
. . . 
-.... 
.· .. ·. 
.. 
f. 1 depicting gram negative and Qf?ltrl ·p0_$_i~jve.:b~cteria o·r. ro_ds."··.. · .. :. ·. : ... : · .. 
Brochure of detergent. 
Container of detergent. 
. . ··.·. . : . . . . .... · .. · .. : 
. ... 
. . 
·.· :·. ·.·: _ ..... •:, 
· .. . . .. 
30. 
31. 
32. Chronological record of medical care of Mountain horn~: Ai_~:F·6~c~· ·,. :. :.: :-;". 
Base f<?r Krystal Ballard. dated July 23, 2010. 
33. Medical records of United States ·Air Fo.rce. ·id~ntifled .. a~:· ·i-4( · .... ··. 
produced at the deposition of the Plaintiff. 
Exhibits counsel have agreed may be received in· evidence without· 
. . 
~~~l~~~~lg~~;E~~i~::N~ii~~~~::: ;R~~~~~:G~b1~~~~~~~!i~~.:··. · ... 
2014 - 5 ···. · · · ... . . . 
.. . . · 
' .. · .... 
002310
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.. : 
: . .... 
. objection: 
.. . ,' . 
: ... :·· .. 
Defense exhibits to which this section applies are n·utnb~r$ ·1 thrQ~gh· 1.-6,: ·· . · :_ .· .... · : . 
. . . ·.. . .. ,, ,· .. 
19, 21, 22, 23 and 24. 
·. '• .:·· . ' . ·: 
=·. ·. 
. " .. 
The rest of defense exhibits are objected to by the .. ~).~·intiff bn, all-gro_~·rid_s:::_·· . 
allowed by law. 
. : .:·. 
Plaintiffs exhibits to which this section applies ~re riumbers.1, 2, 3, 4, ·.~'. 6', ... · . 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24 and 25. 
'• . 
The rest of Plaintiff's exhibits are objected to byt)1e def~nse on.all g_rou_nds .. ·· :·· 
• • I : : ,'• • 
allowed by law except that no objections will be asserted to the fo_llowing_exhjbit~_'q,n the .. ·: ·· .. 
. . . ·. .· 
·basis of authenticity-numbers 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
The Plaintiff disclosed the following exhibits ·at the ·e:xc~-~~~e·:_of i:nfo·r~~t\~n= : .. 
conference that undersigned counsel has numbered 1 through 3"(. 
. .. . 
1. Medical records - charts for Silk Touch, Elmore Amb·u.lance, Efrnore' . .. . ··. . _. 
' . ' .· _: .: : ·":·. / · ... :: : .: ' .... _·: ':,_.· .. · .· ·.,: .. . · ·: .. ·.· .. 
Medical Center, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ada County.:Coron~r.-including . . ·· ··. . . ... ·. · .... · ... ·:_. . . . .. . . · .. 
Autopsy Report; 
2. Cell phone record of Silk Touch; 
.: . : 
. '. 
,, 
: ....... .: .· :_: 
. ·.·· .. ·· . . : . 
3. Curriculum Vitaes of Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Niche>IS,. ·or.: Armitage.:ancf . .- . :· . : ·:··. · 
. ·. .. .. . .. •' . ·. : . . . . .· ·. 
Cornelius Hofman; .. , .. : ..... . 
4. Funeral placard; 
5. Funeral placard; 
6. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
7. Photo of Charles and Krystal; 
.· . . : 
CERTIFICATION Of DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AME.NDED .NOTICE OF ·TRIAL. 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCE~DJNGS.OATED·Februa·ry:21, .· :.- :· . 
2014 - 6 . . . : . . 
002311
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Photo of Krystal tubing; 
Marriage License; 
Death Certificate; 
12. Tillman Funeral Home.invoice; 
13. Artistic Flowers invoice; 
14. Memorial program; 
15. Bill from St. Alphonsus; 
16. Bill from Elmore Medical Center; 
17. Bill from Rost ~uneral Home; 
18. Bill from ~ifeflight; 
. . '• 
· ... 
. ~ . . 
. . . ·. ~: . . ... 





. . . ·. 
. .··· .. 
·: .. . ... : 
.. · .: 
. : ·:· 
. · .. ··· · .. ·. ··: .. 
·· ... · . 
. . ;· .... 
.··: 
. · .. . .. 
. : ·: 
19. Mem.orand um - Extension of Enlistment for . .P¢S (El~~ndbrf};· = .. · . . . . : . :· 
. . . . . . .. ·. : . . · 
20. USAF Records Certification; 
21. Line of Duty Detern:iination; 
22. 
23. 
Awards and Decorations info; 
Air Force Achievement Medal; 
24. Air Force Commendation Medal; 
25. DJMS LES~ Krystal; 
26. DJMS LES - Charles; 
·.· . ...... · . 
... 
..... 
.•: :· . . ·· . 
. .. . .. .. 
. . . . . . ........ : . 
.. ' . 1,_.. :-... . . ·.. . 
. . . -~ . ... : 
: ·.. . . .. 
. ··: ,• 
.. . . . ~ 
27. Letter from Major Thomas Brown to Charles e~pressin·g ~ymp;:1thi('.ls; 
28. Statement of Service; 
29. Enlisted Performance Review 2010; 
. . 
CERTIFICATJON OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE .AMEN[)ED.NOTICE OF:TRIAL.- .. · ·. · ·. 
SETIING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEED.iNGS" DATED.February 21· ,· ·; . . ··.. :· '· : 
2014 - 7 . . . · .. · · . · · .. 
.. . . 
,, .... 
002312
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30. EPR 2009; 
31. EPR 2008; 
32. EPR 2007; 
33. Reenlistment Eligibility Annex; 
34. Air University CCAF Transcript; 
35. BSU Transcript; 
36. Embry-Riddle Transcript; and 
37. University of Maryland Transcript. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2014. 
. . . . ~ . . 
... 
.. ·. . . : :: 
. . . . . . . 
.... 
.. : .:. .. 
~.. : 
.: . .. ·: . .. :· .· 
.. . . : 
. ... . . . . 
... :-
. : .: .: .. ·. . . :· •' .·.' .. 
. . 
•• 1'· 
. .. . ·.: .. ·· ...... 
. ;,,, ·:. : .... ·.· 
. : ': .· .·.: .: .. · ... .. ,.: .... : .. ·. ·.· 
. ... . ... 
. · ..... .. 
.· .. · ... · 
,• .. · . 
QUANE JONES·McCOLL, PLl-C _:.··_. _"... . . . .. · ... 
. . : . . . . . . . -: . . . . : ,,:· . . 
•' : .. : .. ·· . ... 
• • : l • . . -.... . . • .... :/. :;· . . ·. . . -:~ •, . 
. : ·· ....... ·· 
. . · .. . . :-_: : .. 
:· . . 
. . . .. . 
·. : .··· .. , .. : 
. , ,• .... 
. · ... :· 
•, : . :- : . . •,. 
. : . . . . . . . . . . ~ .. . . . ~- ... ·:.: . : .~ . . . . . . . 
. ·. . ... .. . ' .. 
. . . . .... · . . . .. , ~. . 
:· · .. ' : .... 
I '• • 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMEN·O~D N_Cffl~E.t)F:·jR~AL ·· . 
SETTING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DATED Febru·ary 21; · · · : 
2014 - 8 •. ·... . . . 
. . .. : .... . : . 
. . . · ..... ·· .. ·: . . 
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. .. :· . .... 
·· .• · .= . 
. · . .-:· .. ·. ·. 
•• • •• . t. . ... :· 
··: ·. . .. . :·. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE _. _ 
". " .. ~ . . . ~ .· ..... . 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that o~ this 1st day of April, -201-4; r"se~etf i-tn.ie -a:-nd - -- -_ -- ---_ -
correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATION OF DEFEN_SE-COUNSEL PER -THE:- __ - -.--__ -_ '- _ -
AMENDED NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND ORDER.--_-_(3QVERNING., fU.RTHER · .. · :-_: . · · 
PROCEEDINGS DATED February 21, 2014 by delivering )he. _sanie_. to· ~acQ. o(the_._ .. :- : :- '.-.. :_ -. 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: . ·. · .. : · ·: : _ _._-- _>.- -_ .-
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Ma_it··posta·ge prepaid. 
[ ] Han9 D~Hvered · -.- -. . . .. 
[ ] Overnight Mail . . ... ·'. · -:-_ - . · . : ·. ·. -. 
[X] F~csimile (208)'. 345-~274· · . .-,- :· .... _ 
. . . .. .. . . 
. . . . ·. ·: . 
.·: ... 
. .... 
• • • A • : : • • 
. ··: ... .' . 
[ J U.S. M~i:po~tage prepaid.;.·_:·< -. :_·.·._ .. ·-· / 
[ J Hand Delivered.·. -· .:. · :- · . .- · .. :.-.: : · · · · 
[ ] Overnight Mail .. :·:- .. -:._·_:.;._ .... ·· .. ::__ · .... 
[X] Facsi~ilf ~3~~) _594,.9769.: · .. _·: :..'·, ·. · · :-
..... ... : . " 
[ ] U.S. M~if; p6:;;tage prepa.if.': _·_. : ·_·. ·. :_ . - : 
[ . ] 1-!a.rid. Del\vered __ :· .· ·: · · ·:-:. · .. : . .--'.- · . . . · .. . ·_:-
( l Overriight'IV]ail:· ·. -· :·:·. · .. ·· ---:.-.· : .. · . 
[X] Fa~i(nile (205) i~3-4.89$.-~--: · · ·. : . : · .... 
. ,. : ... ·:·. · ... :· .-.:- .=·.· ... ·.· ·. · .. 
.-": . ,• 
-~ ... · . . . ~ 
. ·--.. 
. :·.·· . .. 
. : .. . ·. . . . . . . . " : 
f ":. • :.. • 
;,, 
,,• . 
. . . . . 
CERTIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PER THE AMENDED N'OTiCE>o'F· r°RIAL ·: .: . 
SETIING AND ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDiNGS .. !)ATED F~bruary 21',: -.. ·, 
2014 - 9 . .. - · · · . 
. ·. :: "• . .. :· .. 
. ;. . . 
. ·:- ... 
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... 
David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP _ 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. ----F_.-ILE_~. /zP?1 
A.M. /-
APR O 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK T:OUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS'EMERGENCY 
MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL 
OR\ G_\ NAL 
002315
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, and hereby 
responds to Defendants' Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial. 
,The circumstances necessitating Defendants' Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial are 
certainly unfortunate. While a civil defendant enjoys no constitutional right to be present at trial, 
Plaintiff is willing to consider accommodating Defendants' request to continue the trial so long 
as any such continuance is not for an unreasonably long period of time. 
Initially, it is hardly clear from the Affidavit of Britani Hill, M.D., filed in support of the 
emergency motion, that the Defendant Brian Kerr, MD is unable to participate as necessary in 
the upcoming trial. On the one hand, Dr. Hill opines that she "believe[s] he will have difficulty 
in attending and participating in the trial proceedings." (Paragraph 6) Dr. Hill concludes: "I 
consider Brian Kerr not to be medical stable [sic] and he is impaired so as to prevent him attend 
his trial. [sic]" (Paragraph 7). Difficulty in attending trial does not equate to inability to attend 
trial. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff is not unsympathetic to Dr. Kerr's injuries and medical 
condition. Nor does Plaintiff wish to be subjected to a claim by defendants at trial or on appeal 
that Dr. Kerr was in fact unable to attend trial, or should he attend that he was otherwise limited 
by his medical condition. 
With these considerations in mind, Plaintiff is willing to discuss the options available, if 
any, for an alternative trial date, and Plaintiff will be prepared to advise the Court of his position 
when this topic is addressed at the hearing scheduled for April 2, 2014. 




P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLEIT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
002317
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Emergency Motion to Vacate Trial by 
facsimile to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
-'§:» ;ff /l,/7-7')---/ 
Scott McKay (_/ 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
No. ___ Fii:eiO-~b:,,,C:I-
A.M. ____ F1L~~-tfl11 = 
APR O f 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES ' 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL 




Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, provides this certification concerning the 
parties' exchange of information conference as described in the Court's Amended Notice of Trial 
< 
Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings of February 21, 2014. 
On October 22, 2013, the parties conferred for the purpose of exchanging pretrial 
information in advance of the first trial in this matter. By letter dated March 20, 2014 and 
emailed to defense counsel on that same date, plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel that 
their position regarding trial exhibits remained the same and ~hat we assumed defendants' 
position was likewise the same, but if not or if defense counsel felt a second pretrial conference 
was necessary, plaintiffs counsel was prepared to hold another pretrial conference at a mutually 
convenient time. (See Exhibit A, Email from B. McAllister to J. Quane Attaching Letter from P. 
Gregory Haddad to J. Quane.) Through this same letter, plaintiffs counsel again inquired of 
defendants' interest in exploring settlement as dictated by I.R.C.P. 16. Defendants did not 
respond to the foregoing letter. 
Accordingly, plaintiff submits the foregoing regarding the matters described in Rule 16: 
a. Plaintiffs Exhibits to be Received Into Evidence Without Objection 
During the aforementioned conference of October 22, 2013, the parties agreed that the 
following exhibits would be received in evidence without objection. An asterisk"*" notes the 
exhibits that were offered and admitted into evidence during the November 2013 trial of this 
matter that ended in a mistrial: 
Funeral Placards for Krystal Ballard (2) * 
Photos of Charles & Krystal (2) * 
Framed Photos of Charles & Krystal * 






Marriage License * 
Death Certificate * 
Silk Touch Medical Records (redacted to reflect Court's limine ruling)* 
Elmore Ambulance Medical Records * 
Elmore Medical Center Medical Records * 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Medical Records * 
Ada County Coroner Records, Including Autopsy Report, Photos, and Tissue Slides * 
Curricula Vitaes for Testifying Expert Witnesses * 
CT Scans of Krystal Ballard * 
b. Exhibits to Which No Agreement was Reached 
During the aforementioned conference of October 22, 2013, defense counsel stated an 
objection to the following exhibits "on all grounds" or alternatively no agreement was reached in 
advance of the November 2013 trial. An asterisk "*" notes the exhibits that were offered and 
admitted into evidence during the November 2013 trial of this matter that ended in a mistrial: 
Tillman Funeral Home Invoice * 
Artistic Flowers Invoice * 
Memorial Program for Krystal Ballarµ * 
Bill from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center * 
Bill from Elmore Medical Center * 
Bill from Rost Funeral Home * 
Bill from Lifeflight * 
Memorandum - Extension of Enlistment for PCS (Elmendorf) 
USAF Records Certification * 
3 
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Line of Duty Determination * 
Awards & Decorations Info * 
Air Force Achievement Medal * 
Air Force Commendation Medal* 
DJMS LES -Krystal* (will redact to exclude insurance information) 
DJMS LES - Charles * (will redact to exclude insurance information) 
L~tter from Major Thomas Brown to Charles Ballard following .Krystal's death* 
Statement of Service * 
Enlisted Performance Review 2010 * 
Enlisted Performance Review 2009 * 
Enlisted Performance Review 2008 * 
Enlisted Performance Review 2007 * 
Reenlistment Eligibility Annex for Krystal* 
Air University CCAF Transcript 
BSU Transcript 
Embry-Riddle Transcript 
University of Maryland Transcript 
Charts and Tables Generated and/or Employed by Plaintiff's Expert Economist, 
Cornelius Hofman * 
Sound Surgical Technologies the VASER System VentX Suction Handpiece User's 
Guide* 
Cell Phone Records of Dr. Kerr and Susan Kerr·* 




Tissue Slides (Garrison) * 
Autopsy Photos * 
Photos of Tissue Slides from Autopsy (Nichols)* 
c. Demonstrative Exhibits, Surgical Equipment and Devices, and Photos of Surgical 
Equipment and Devices 
Both parties at the November 2013 trial identified certain surgical equipment, supplies, 
devices, and photos of same although no agreement was reached concerning admissibility. The 
Court denied admissibility of a jug of detergent and a brochure concerning detergent which had 
not been identified or produced by defendants in discovery. 
d. Possible Witnesses for Plaintiff , 
On October 22, 2013, the parties agreed they would separately provide a list of possible 
trial witnesses. The following is plaintiffs list of possible trial witnesses. 
Charles Ballard 
Brian Kerr, M.D. 
Susan Kerr 
Donna Berg 
Briana Kerr Dumas 
Karl Olson, M.D. 
Matthew Campbell, M.D. 
Edward Jong Wook Kim, M.D. 
Howard Schaff, M.D. 
Erwin Sonnenberg 
Glen Groben, M.D. 
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Dean Sorensen, M.D. 
Keith Armitage, M.D. 
George Nichols, M.D 
Bertram Stemmler, M.D. 





Jonelle Cadiz Buchanan (by Video Deposition) 
Cornelius Hofman, GEC Group 
Custodians of Records for Elmore Medical Center, Elmore Ambulance, Life Flight, 
SARMC, USAF 
e. Offer of Mediation 
Defendants have declined plaintiffs offer to engage in mediation and have not responded 
to plaintiffs invitation to discuss settlement. 
6 
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Dated this 1st day of April, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Pretrial Exchange of Information Certification by deliv~ring the same to 
the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
8 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~~·----F-IL'~.~. bf7J7 
APR O 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
· Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 
AND RESPONSE TO 




COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by and through his attorneys, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 9-102, Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(c), and the Court's Amended Notice of Trial 
Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings of February 21, 2014, and hereby opposes and 
responds to Defendants' Motions in Limine. Plaintiff incorporates by reference his prior 
Responses to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed October 29, 2013, as if that filing was fully 
set forth herein. 
Plaintiff relies on his October 29, 2013, filing because Defendants' current Motions in 
Limine, including the legal reasoning presented by memorandum in support of those motions, are 
substantively identical to Defendants' previous filings, even insofar as Defendants include the 
same trial date of November 5, 2013. (Compare Mem. in Supp. OfDefs.' Mots. in Limine, Oct. 
21, 2013, with Mem. in Supp. Of Defs.' Mots. in Limine, March 25, 2014.) Contrary to 
Defendants' recent filing, however, circumstances involving defense expert, Dr. Gregory 
Laurence, are quite different today than they were in October. 
No longer does Dr. Laurence face mere allegations. On February 6, 2014, Dr. Laurence 
entered a guilty plea to the federal felony offense of Corruptly Endeavoring to Impede the Due 
Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws. (See Exhibit B to Aff. of [Pl.' s] Counsel, March 
25, 2014 (Plea Agreement).) At that time, Dr. Laurence admitted to committing the criminal acts 
serving as the factual basis for that plea. (Id) 
By Plaintiffs response of October 29, 2013, Plaintiff presented the following arguments: 
I. Defendants' First and Second Motions in Limine Should be Denied Because 
Plaintiff Should be Permitted to Put on Evidence of Dr. O'Neil's Competence to Serve as the 




II. Defendants' Third Motion in Li mine [ as to the Admissibility of Evidence 
Pertaining to the Criminal Proceedings Pending Against Dr. Laurence] Should be Denied; 
III. Defendants' Fourth Motion in Limine Should be Denied to the Degree Dr. Kerr 
Opens the Door for Cross-Examination on the Issue of Liability Insurance; 
IV. Defendants' Fifth Motion in Limine [to Preclude Evidence That Defendants or 
Defendants' Witnesses Have Been Previously Represented by Defense Counsel] Should be 
Denied to the Degree it Seeks to Preclude Proper Cross-Examination of Defendants' Expert 
Witnesses; and 
V. · Defendants' Sixth Motion in Limine Regarding Obamacare is Unopposed. 
On account of Dr. Gregory Laurence's guilty plea, Plaintiff now responds to Defendants' 
Third Motion in Limine by reference to his sixteenth motion in limine, which Plaintiff 
incorporates as if it was fully set forth herein. By that motion in limine, Plaintiff argues that Dr. 
Gregory Laurence's recent guilty plea to a federal felony offense is admissible, as are the 
underlying facts contained within his plea agreement, which Dr. Laurence now admits are true. 
(See Pl.'s Not. of Reliance on Previously Filed Cons?lidated Mots. in Limine and Supp. Mots. in 
Limine 4-14, March 25, 2014.) For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs sixteenth motion in limine, 
Defendants' Third Motion in Limine should be denied. 
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Dated this 1st day of April, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~ By __________ _ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Opposition and Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine by 
delivering the same to the following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 





David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. FILED V{'r/1 
A.M·----..r .. M .. ___ _ 
APR O 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 




AFFIDAVIT OF P. GREGORY HADDAD 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA, TO WIT: 
I, P. Gregory Haddad, as the attorney for Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, subscribed hereto by 
authority duly given, after being duly sworn, upon his oath, state and allege the following. 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff in this litigation. 
2. On this date, Plaintiff filed his Pretrial Exchange of Information Certification. 
3. A true and accurate copy of the exhibit referenced within Plaintiffs Pretrial 
Exchange oflnformation Certification is attached hereto as follows. 
4. A true and accurate copy of Brian McAlli~ter's March 20, 2014, email to Mr. 
Quane attaching P. Gregory Haddad's letter to Mr. Quane of the same date is attached hereto at 
Exhibit A. 
And further affiant saith not. 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; 
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA, to-wit: 
Gfn!kulU 
P. Gregory Haddad 
. Taken, subscribed and sworn to before me this 151 day of April, 2014. 
My Commission expires: _ _.Q.....,.k(~~,...,_, ...... l"""h--i,...,.?l=' ..::a();;.... ~--'} ___ _ 
. I iJr1¥; !J: ~a?~ 
• 
• 0¢FICIAL SEAL 
DOROTHY A,. SOMMERS. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA 
525 Tyrono Road 
QWn. Wt/ 26508 . ~ C:: E~a Dae 1e.z~21 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
· I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of Counsel by delivering the same to the following by facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 








Brian J. McAllister [bmcallister@baileyglasser.com] 




Philip G. Haddad; Scott McKay; Debi Presher; Farrah Caruthers; Brian J. McAllister 
{Ballard, Charles}{Matter No.[10-03362)} 
Attachments: 693116.pdf 
Mr. Quane and Ms. Ferris -
Attached please find a letter from Greg Haddad. 
Thank you. 
Brian J. McAllister:: Lawyer 
2855 Cranberry Square :: Morgantown WV 26508 
Office 304.594.0087 :: Fax 304.594.9709 
BAIIBY&GLASSERu.P 
This message and any attached documents contain infonnation from the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended 
recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this infonnation. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-mail then 
delete this message. 
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure - To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we infonn you than any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including 
any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) promoting, marketing, 




BAILEY &G LASSERu.P 
VIA EMAIL ONLY 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
PO Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
Dear Mr. Quane: 
March 20, 2014 
Lawyers 
Internet www.baileyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cmnbc1ry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Pursuant to the Amended Notice of Trial Setting filed on February 21, 2014, the parties are 
directed t<? hold a conference for exchange of information and discussion of matters specified by 
IRCP 16(a) and 16(b) not later than fourteen (14) days prior to trial. We previously conducted such 
a conference on October 22, 2013, at your office. 
Our position regarding your trial exhibits remains the same, and we assume your position 
regarding our exhibits is likewise the same. Thus, unless you now have a different position, or 
unless you contemplate different trial exhibits, it does not appear that a second conference is 
necessary. If you feel that there is a need for such a conference, we can make ourselves available at 
a mutually convenient time next week to conduct the conference telephonically. 
Rule 16 also requires us to discuss settlement. At your invitation, we previously provided 
you with a settlement demand by letter dated June 10, 2013. You did not respond to this 
demand. You now have the benefit of having observed the presentation of plaintiff's claims at 
trial. We believe the presentation of those claims would have resulted in a substantial jury verdict 
against your °clients absent the mistrial. With that said, we also recognize that every case has risk, 
and we are willing to take that risk into consideration in the context of a settlement. If your clients 
are interested in exploring settlement of ~his case, I invite you to present a reasonable counter-offer, 
to which we will promptly respond after discussing with SSgt Ballard. 
I look forward to hearing from you concerning the above matters. 
PGH/bjm: 
cc: Scott McKay, Esq. (via email) 
Sincerely, 
. Isl P. Gregory Haddad 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 





BRIAN CALDER KERR and SILK TOUCH 
LAS~R, 
Defendants. 
TIME .SET FOR: Telephonic Status Conference 
Case No. CVOC12-4792 
Greg Haddad and Scott McKay on behalf of the Plaintiff 
Jeremiah Quane on behalf of the Defendants 
Quane argues Motion to Vacate Jury Trial 
Haddad has no objection to the Motion to Vacate Jury Trial if the co,ntinuance is brief 
The Court vacates the Jury Trial set for April 8th. Re-sets the Jury Trial for September 16 
@ 9:30 am. Defense has until tomorrow to contact witnesses. 
002337
:.q~.:iq:::~~:·. ·- ;;. 
. APR O 8 201~ 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VILLEREAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DEPUTY 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter has been re-set for jury trial on: 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-04792 
NOTICE OF RE-SETTING TRIAL 
September 16, 2014 @ 9:30 a.m. and continue for three (3) weeks . 
..,.. All discovery has been completed . 
..,.. All trial exhibits have been identified. 
' ........... . . ,, ,, 
~•'' i\1H iUI) ,,,~ 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~'~~ •••••••• i'Q ~-~ 
Clerk of the District Co{fta ••• •• ••./'< \ 
~ $ _,, I 0~ 1UE ST~te\ ~ ; 
(j~ -~· i OP· I~ : • l:11:1.
By: ~DAHO I~ I 
Deputy Court Cler\~ •. l 'I : .-...,•. •• 4,,:, 
,,,. . t· ••••••••• ~" ~ .. ,, 1~ c::,.::i~ ~· 
,,,,, 'lJ POR AD~ c; ,,,,, ,,,,,,. ....... 
002338
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 81h day of April, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
SCOTT MCKAY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBOX2772 
BOISE ID 83701 
GREG HADDAD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2855 CRANBERRY SQ 
MORGANTOWN WV 26508 
JAMES PERRINE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3000 RIVERCHASE GALLERIA STE 905 
BIRMINGHAM AL 35244 
JEREMIAH QUANE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1576 
BOISE ID 83701 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
002339
jDavid Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
'Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com . 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, AL 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO·---~~-~--• f:ILE:D ~J. A.M., ____ l'.M __ -, ____ _ 
AUG O G 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By PATRICK McLAUGHLIN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 





PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that, effective immediately, the address for the undersigned 
Plaintiffs counsel will be as follows: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone and facsimile numbers will remain unchanged. Please amend your contact 
information accordingly. 
Dated this 61h day of August, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By~-~ 
p-zY. Gregory Haddad 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
002341
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Change of Address by delivering the same to the following via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
002342
2014/09/11 16:23:32 4 /9 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SEP 11 2014 
CHRISTOPHeA 0. AIOH, Clerk 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF ON USE OF DEPOSITIONS 
AT TRIAL 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide when a deposition may be used 
at trial. See I.R.C.P. 32(a). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 32(a) .provi~e~ when a 
deposition may be used at trial as follows: 
BRIEF ON USE OF DEPOSITIONS AT TRIAL - 1 
002343
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At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an 
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far 
as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used 
against any party who was present or 'represented at the 
taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, 
in accordance with any.of the following provisions: 
( 1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose 
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a 
witness, or for any other purpose permitted by the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time 
of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing 
agent, or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to 
testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership 
or association or governmental agency which is a party may 
be used by an adverse party for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may 
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that 
the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a greater 
distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is 
out of the state of Idaho, unless it appears that the absence of 
the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; 
or (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of 
age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party 
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the 
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon 
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances 
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with 
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of 
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be 
used. 
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by 
a party, an adverse party may require the party to introduce 
any other part which ought in fairness to be considered with 
the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other 
parts. 
I.R.C.P. 32(a). 
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In determining whether a deposition may be used at trial, the distinction 
between parties and non-parties is important. Only two sections of I.R.C.P. 32(a) apply to 
a non-party witness's deposition. See I.R.C.P. 32(a). I.R.C.P. 32(a)(1) allows any _party to 
use any deposition at trial to impeach the testimony of a deponent as a witness. See 
I.R.C.P. 32(a)(1). I.R.C.P. 32{a)(3) permits the deposition of a party or a non-party 
witness for any purpose if and only if the court finds that the deponent is dead, that the 
deponent is greater than 100 miles away from the place of trial, ·that the deponent is 
unable to testify due to age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment, or that "exceptional 
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard 
to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow 
the deposition to be used." See I.R.C.P. 32(a)(3). 
In the present case, since Dr. Coffman is not on the stand testifying, his 
deposition testimony cannot be read and used to impeach him.-See I.R.C.P. 32(a)(1). 
Rule 32(a)(1) does not allow one witness to be impeached by the deposition testimony of 
another witness. Id. Dr. Coffman's deposition testimony cannot be used to impeach 
anyone but Dr. Coffman. Id. Therefore, I.R.C.P. 32(a)(1} does not apply and Dr. 
Coffman's deposition cannot be read for the purpose of impeachment during Dr. Kerr's 
testimony. 
When a deposition is sought to be introduced during the testi.mo~y of 
someone other than the d~ponent himself, as is being done here, the deposition can be 
used for any purpose under the very limited circumstances enumerated in I.R.C.P. 
32(a)(3). See I.R.C.P. 32(a)(3). 
BRIEF ON USE OF DEPOSITIONS AT TRIAL - 3 
002345
,· 
2014/09/11 16:23:32 7 /9 
In the present case, Dr. Thomas Coffman is a non-party witness; therefore, 
1.R.C.P. 32(a)(3) applies and limits the use of his deposition at trial. See I.R.C.P. 32(a)(3). 
None of the limited circumstances enumerated in Rule 32(a)(3) are present however. Dr. 
Coffman is alive and well, and he is in Idaho. Moreover, he 1s within 100 miles from the 
. . 
Ada County Courthouse, as he is in Boise. Dr. Coffman is not in prison or of an age that 
affects his ability to testify. No exceptional circumstances exist in this case warranting the 
. reading of Dr. Coffman's deposition during the Defendant Dr. Kerr's testimony. 
The purpose of I.R.C.P. 32(a)(3) is to prevent the need for a continuance of 
the trial due to the witness's unavailability. See Alabama Power co: v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 
484, 488, 306 So. 2d 236, 239 (1975) ("As we perceive· it, the very purpose of [Rule 
32(a)(3)] is to prevent the need for a continuance."). In the present matter, Dr. Coffman is 
not unavailable due to any of the enumerated reasons in I.R.C.P. 32(a)(3). Not only are 
none of the enumerated reasons present here, there is also no need to prevent the 
. . 
continuance of the trial. There is no danger of the trial continuing if Dr. Coffman's 
deposition is not read during Dr. Kerr's testimony. If the deposition of Dr. Coffman is 
permitted to be used during the presentation of the testimony of Dr. Kerr by Plaintiffs 
counsel, it will be tantamount to the admission of testimony that is inadmissible arid a 
complete departure from the limitations of Rule 32(a) that govern the use of depositions at 
trial. 
The Defendant respectfully submits that I.R.C.P. 32(a) is mandatory in 
nature. This rule prohibits the reading of Dr. Coffman's deposition. during Dr. Kerr's 
testimony because none of the very limited circumstances in Rule 32(a)(3) exists. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff should be prohibited from reading any portion of Dr.· Coffman's 
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deposition during Dr. Kerr's testimony. 
DATED this Jl day of September, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
BRIEF ON USE OF DEPOSITIONS AT TRIAL- 5 
Jere 1ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lL_ day of September, 2014, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF ON USE OF DEPOSITIONS AT TRIAL by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, address~d 
as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594'-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overr:iight Mail 
[X] Facsimile {304) 594.a9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, ·postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
~uane 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AM "f'llLl/ta = 
5iP 11 20f4 
SHA1ST9PHGR g, RiGH OlorJt 




Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK.TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF FILING 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
Please find, attached, Defendants' Exhibit List. 
NOTICE OF FILING - 1 ORIGIJNlAL 
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DATED this 111h day of September, 2014. 
NES McCOLL, PLLC 
NOTICE OF FILING- 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of.September, 2014, I served ·a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF FILING - 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail,· postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (3q4) 594-970~ 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail . 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page 1 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Kerr 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Laurence 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Garrison 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Coffman 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Frankie 
C 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Lundeby 
Curriculum vitae of Dr. Stiller 
Medical records of Dr. Kerr and Silk 
Touch Laser 
Records of Elmore Medical Center 
for treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of Elmore Ambulance 
Service for care and treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of Life Flight for care and 
treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Records of St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center for treatment of 
Krystal Ballard 
Records of Ada County Coroner 
Autopsy Report for Krystal Ballard 
21 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page 2 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
43 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
taken at autopsy 
4 Photographs of Susan Kerr that 
depict the positions of Krystal 
. Ballard for the operative procedure 
of Dr. Kerr 
46 Photographs of brain and kidney 
tissue from the autopsy of Krystal 
Ballard .prepared by Dr. Garrison 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page 3 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Autopsy tissue slides 
I 
4 Photographs of Krystal Ballard 
that depict the entry sites by 
markings for liposuction and fat 
transfer 
Report of Dr. Morgan 
CT study of Krystal Ballard of July 
25, 201 O (44 films) 
Report of Dr. Stemmler for chest 
x-ray of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 
2010 
Report of Dr. Schaff for chest x-ray 
of Krystal Ballard of July 25, 2010 
Visible glass container that shows 
the quantity of fluid measured in 
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DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS 
Page4 
Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. 
Ada County Case No. CV QC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
Various medical devices, 
equipment, supplies, packaged 
material, autoclave and surgical 
instruments used by Dr. Kerr for the 
liposuction and fat transfer 
procedure with illustrative 
photographs of the same 
Compilation of operative 
procedures of Dr. Kerr from 
December of 2007 through 
December 23, 2010, with Krystal 
Ballard identified on July 21, 2010 
with the total number of liposuction 
procedures, consisting of 338. 
Documents, records, material, data 
and calendars produced with 
Defendants response to Plaintiff's 
First Requests for Production of 




















Ballard v. Kerr, eta/. . 
Ada County Case No. CV QC 1204792 
DESCRIPTION OFFERED 
18 Medical illustrations depicting 
liposuction of anatomy with and 
without cannula of Krystal Ballard 
Medical illustrations depicting 
anatomy for fat transfer in the 
bilateral buttocks of Krystal .Ballard 
Medical illustrations depicting 
various tissue layers 
Medical illustrations depicting the 
content of the abdomen 
Medical illustrations depicting the 
urinary system 
Medical illustrations depicting gram 
negative and gram positive bacteria 
or rods 
Brochure for detergent 
Container of detergent 
Chronological record of medical 
care of Mountain Home Air Force 
Base for Krystal Ballard dated July 
23,2010 
Medical records of United States Air 
Force identified as 1-44 produced at 




Judge Bail 091614 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
08:41 :24 AM j I CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 1 
.. 09: 06 :.50 .. AM .1. =~~~~:,~ .................. _.I.Greg_ Haddad & Scott .. McKay ......................................................... _ ..______ ................................... _ 
09:07:08 AM Defendant's I Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
~ A ~~~~~eys----,~:;•u;~e not-present ____ _ 
09:34:09 AM IS. McKay eves to exclude witnesses 
09:34:22 AM I Judge itnesses are excluded except parties and party 
resentatives 
09:34:49 AM IS. McKay eves to exclude mention of the prior trial 
_ ........... --.................................................... 1 
09:35:07 AM I Judge may be mentioned as a prior proceeding 
09:35:55 AM I J. Quane I Responds 
09:36:35 AM! S. McKay I Moves to allow jurors to ask questions 
09:38:48 AM I Judge !will allow jurors to ask questions 
09:39:00 AM j J. Quane I objects to juror questions 
09:44:39 AM S. McKay I objects to Defendant's exhibits II and JJ 
09:45:39 AM I J. Quane I Responds 
09:45:49 AM I Judge I Will not allow it now but if it becomes relevant it will be 
.......................... - ....................... 1 ............... _ .......................................... - .... ta ken .. up .. outside .. the _presence .. of. the jury __ ._ .......................... - .... _ ........ .. 
09:48:35 AM I Judge I instructs counsel 
09:56:26 AM! J. Quane I comments .. 1.0:00:39 .................................................................... Tcourt .. recesses· ... -.......................... -............................................................................................................... - ... -..... .. 
.. 1.o:'01·:·04· AM I ........ Tcourt resumes ....................................................... -....... -.......................................................................................... --.. --.. .. 
·T0: .. fE3fJi:tiif i' ............................................................... Ttti_e ... prasi:i·ectfve .. }iiry-·pa.nens ... pres·enr ....................................................................... -.. ·-·--.. .. 
_ ~ ~; ~ ~ ;;~ ~~ !·~~:!e .... -................................. 1,~::;~~!~/he prospective jury. panel ............................................................................................... .. 
· 1·0:'16:28. AM. erk ............................. -.......... lswears .. in .. the .. prospective jury panel ...........................................................................................  
10:22:44 AM I Judge !Voir dires the prospective jury panel 
10:35:03 AM I Clerk I Draws twenty-six names 
10:43:03 AM I I Juror# 179 is excused by the Court with cause 
10:49:48 AM I I Juror# 163 is excused by the Court with cause 
............ --------·-····-.. ·---................................ . 
11 :00:24 AM j I Juror# 107 is excused by the Court with cause 
... 1 .. 1 .. :.9..~ .. : .. ~ . ..9 .... ~.~ . .l .. -........... -...... ____ , ____ , ..... _,_, JUE~-~ ... ! ... ~ .. ~.~ .... ~.! ... :.~.~~.~.:.~ .... ~Y.. .. ~.~~.-~.~.~.~-~.~~·~·-~-~U~!._, __ .. ___ ............... .. 
11 :04:56 AM I Juror# 119 is excused by the Court with cause 
11 :09:00 AM IS. McKay Voir dires the prospective jury panel 
1°'1.:27:·o4 .. AMT" ...................................... --................ ·Juror·#.87 is·excused.by"the .. ·court·with ... cause ................ _ ........ -.. - ...... .. 
· 1: 1 :28 ::oo:: AM L::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~:~:=~~~JJuror # :·125 is:: excused· by~the: .. court: with:::cause :::::::::~:::::::::~~:~:==-~:~· 
• i-i·::i:~~-;~r S.:McKay:~~i~~:e:•~J]i:~~~:~:~~~tC~~~~;~hc~~~:e =--= 
~~;~~:-~~ -~~., ...................................................................... g~~~ .. ~:~~::: .................................... -........................ -........................................................................................................ .. 
9/16/2014 Courtroom510 
002357
~- .. . !f. 
Judge Bail 091614 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
12:16:17 PM! jthe prospective jury panel is present 
T2·:Ttr·1··~f i=>·rv1TI···au·ane···· .. ····-·-·--··1Yioir dTres··the .. iiro.si:>ecfive··1ii"iy .. p.a·ner····-··········-··············-··---····-.. ·······················--·---··· 
01 :01 :52 PM j J. Quane I passes the panel with cause 
··~·~ · :·~~ ;~;·· ~~ ·l·Judge .................. ___ ··-! :=~~:=1·:::r:~:~:~;i:::~~~ ptory ··challenges····----············· .. ··························· 
01 :26:23 PM! Judge I Seats the trial jury 
··~·~. ~ ~ ~· ~·~~ ~~ ·!·~~~~: -----·----·-··l·!:~~~~s~:~.~~~~~~ .. the. jury········-···········-·-.. ·-··················································-···················· 
-~~:~i :~~::~ i=--=~~=l~~~~:~~;::ent====::~=~~::== ---
03:01 :34 PM I Clerk I Swears in the trial jury 
. ~~~~:~:~···:~.·,t~d~=ddad·························I ~::~~n~r:!:!::1ury. instructions .................................................................................................  
--~~:~~:~~ :~-,~~~:~~:d ~~~=~~~~·::::~:ed _________  
··o~E4.f:.4if i=>·rv1Tcr··Haaaa,r-··-·-·--··TobJecHon···:··re"i"eviin·ce············································ .. ·······················································-······-·····················-·-···---· 
04:41 :51 PM j Judge I Objection is sustained 
··~~;.~:::~···~~·l·~:·-~:~~:~ -···············l·~i~~~~::~··objection·········································-···················-.............................................................. _ ................ . 
05: 13:44 PM j Judge I admonishes the jury 
05:14:12 PMI jCourt recesses 
9/16/2014 Courtroom51 O 
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Judge Bail 091714 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
08:45: 11 AM I I CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 2 
08:45:36 AM I Plaintiff's attorney Scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
........................................................ 1. ···--·-·--····················--············--········ .. ···················· .. ························· .. ··························································--.. ································· .. ·············· 
08:46:47 AM! Defendant's Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
·----··-·······-··················· i. attorney·························---·--·-·········································-········----·---··············----·-·······················································································-················ .. ·····--·-··········-· 
09:34:36 AM I Judge Calls case 
09: 34 :41 AM I .!~.~_).~-~·-!~-~?.!.£~:.~~~--·-·-··-·-··-·································-··-··································· ...........................................................  
09:34:51 AM ,S. McKay counsel agree to exchange the following day witnesses by 6 
········-·······-····--·········-····-··-····································--·-................................. ,.Pm······························-···--··--····-··-·················--·--··--------.. ······-........................................................................................................ . 
09:36:58 AM IS. McKay I Exhibits# 1, 5, Sa, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 & 21 
, I are identified and moves to admit 
09:38:50 AM I Judge I Exhibits# 1, 5, Sa, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 & 21 
are admitted 
09:40:07 AM IS. McKay objects to reference to Defendant's exhibit - call from Krystal to 
.............................................. _ ........... 1 ·-········-···------···-·-·····--· .Air_ Force .................................................................................... -................................................. -................................................................  
09:41 :27 AM I Judge that exhibit can't be referenced at all 
··o"~r~n··:·~i-s)~rv1-j··············---·-···········-········-········-···Tff,e-rury .. is····n·ow ... preiienf ................... -.. ·-·-.. -------···-.......................... ___ ..... -......................................................  
09:42:08 AM j G. Haddad I Calls Dean Sorensen, sworn, direct examination 
.. ~ ~ '.·~; '.·;; .. ~~ ·\·~ ~::ne ·············-··············· ... I O~~=~::~~ ~sl:~:~~~~~ndation ................................ -.......................................... -.. ·--·····#··-······· ........ . 
10:07:38 AM j J. Quane ection - non-responsive 
10:07:40 AM I Judge erruled -······-·--·-................................................................................................................................................... - ......................... . 
10:20:27 AM I J. Quane Objection - form of the question 
10:20:33 AM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
10:21 :57 AM i G. Haddad I Moves to publish Deposition of Brian Kerr 
10:23: 11 A I Deposition of Brian Kerr is published ·· 1 0 :·31 :·5 8 .. A.... . ............................ - ...................... _ .......... f adm on is hes .. the .. j u ry -·····-·········· ......................................................................................................................................... .. 
·Tcf:"3·f·cis··A ..................... -........................ _ ......................... Tcou·ri"rec·e·ss·es················ .. ····-· .... -----·-·····-··········-······· ......................... -............................................................................................ .. 
10:53:02 A j Court resumes 
10:53:12AM jthejuryispresent 
10:53: 14 AM G. Haddad continues direct examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
............................................ . .............. ----·-·····································+---
10:54:08 AM G. Haddad Moves to publish answers to interrogatories 
10:54:22 AM J. Quane !Objection - not disclosed 
10:54:35 AM. Judge Objection is overruled 
10:55:02 AM { Answers to interrogatories is published ··~·~;.;;;~~ .. ~~·l·~~~u:.~.: ....................................... ~~1:~!:~~ ·~s~;~:~~:d?..~.~·~·~·~·~·~?..~ .......................................................... -......................................................... . 
.. ~· ~ ;.;:; ~·~·· ~~ .,.j ~~u:ne ..................................... ~~1:~!:~~·· ~s c;~:~~:d conclusion ............................................................................................... -............. - .... .. 
.. 1 ..1 · :' 1·4: 1· 8 .. AM rJ .···auane ....................................... Objection .............. ·-··········--·-·-..................... _ .............................................................................................................. - ........... - ... . 
··~ ~ ;~6;!~··~~j-j~~gu:ne ..................................... ·~~1:~!:~~ .~s :i:~~r~!~: ................ _ .......... - ..............................................................................................................................  
·· 11 :·20 :49 .. AM lJudge ............................................... ·objection···is ··overruled·································· .. ···-.. ·---.................................................................................................. -.......... . 
9/17/2014 Courtroom510 
002359
Judge Bail 091714 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
11 :22: 15 AM I J. Quane I Cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
11 :29:44 AM I G. Haddad Objection - speculation . ~{;~;~~ .. :~I·~~~~:·--.. -·----·--- .... ~:~~~i~~!:·~~:tj~~ed .... ·-··-··-·-·-·---···--............. --............................ _._ .. _______ ._ ...................................... .. 
11 :59:22 AM I I Court recesses 
01 :31 :58 PM I I Court resumes oT:3·:fcj':f'p'rviT ........................................................... ____ .. ,ftiie"Jury .. is ... pr1ii'seriT·-·-·--.......... _ .. ,_ ................................................................................................ _._ .. _ ... _____ .... , ..........  
01 :32: 15 PM I J. Quane I continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
.. 02:·05:'oi.PM I J .... Quane ···-·--·-rwould ... like.to .. make .. an .. offer of proof re: .. ·website ... photo .............. _ ....................... .. 
02: 07: 1 o ··PM I Judge ...... _ ... __ , ......................... Texcuses .. the ·jury .......................... ___ .. ________ .. -.... --.. - .....................................................................................................  
02:07: 11 PM I J. Quane I Makes an offer of proof 
·02:07:25 ... PM.jJudge ......................................... __ Twill not.allow .. the .. photo.to .. be .. shown .. to-the .. jury ............ -...................... . 
. 02: 0 7: 41 .... p M · 1 ....................................... - ............... -.Tcou rt recesses ............................................................................................................ -........................................................ _. __ .. ,. ............ l 
··~~;-;-~-;:~ .;~ ................. ---......... -........ r ~~~:~e:u;::ent ............................. - ......... -· _ .......... --................ -......................................................................................  
02:31 :54 pri]f I J. Quane I continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
.. 03 :05: 1.i.PM'f G .... Haddad···--.. --....... , Objection·_ .. relevance .. and .. outside .. the .. scope ............................. ___ .. ___ .. ________ .. ____ . 
03:05:22 PM I J. Quane I Responds 
03:07:03 PM I Judge Objection is sustained 
03:07:26 PM j G. Haddad Objection - foundation 
-~;:~~:~;-:~ I ~ud~:ddad--]~~=~:~~-'.· ,~~:~~:-----------------------
03: 15:58 PM I Judge ····· >bjection is sustained 
.. 03: 1·6:4 7 ... PM 'JG· .... Haddad )bjection ................................................................................................. - .......... -...... ______ ....... -....... --................................. . 
03:17:03 PMjJudge excuses the jury 
.. 03: 18: 13 · PM·j·J .... Quane ..................................... f makes .. an ... offer ·of ·proof ........... ---·--· .. --.. --.......... - ... -....................................................................................... .. 
· 03 :22:2?° .. PMT~r .. ·J·a-nes .............................. _ ......fcamme-nts ______ .......................................................................................... _._ ........................................................................ _._ ... _. __ .. 
03:23:52 PM Judge I Objection is sustained ··03·:·24·:··1··tri5·rv1.. ..._ ........... ___ fcouit ... re·cess·,is ................................................................................................. _ .. _ ... _._ ................ _ .......................................... _. __ ... _ ....  
.. 03 :·3 7 :·04 ... PM 1.-.................... --·---·--·---·-f court .. resumes .......................................... - .................. _ .......... -............. _. ___ ......................................... .. 
.. 0 3: 3 7 :· 1· 2 ·PM· 1 ........ - .. - ....... - ......... - ...... _ ........... ______ Tthe· jury .. is .. present"' ................... _____ .. ___ ........................ _ ................................................................................................... .. 
03:37:20 PM I J. Quane I continues cross-examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
·-o3·:·4g:·cm·· .. P·M·1· ...................................... -............ __ .. _.I Movesta-pui>Tish-'depasffi·o·n ... af··the ... wiiness ... = .. fie~in·-s·o·rens-eri ............. .. 
.. 03 :45 :' 1· i.PM I G·. Haddad _ .. __ TObjection .. _ .. relevance ................................. _________ .. ____ .............................................................................................. .. 
03:4 7:20 PM j Judge j Allows the deposition of Dean Sorensen to be published ........... .. 
04:05:39 PM j G. Haddad I Objection - based on Court's ruling ............... . 
04:07:21 PM jJudge j Inquires of the witness 
04:20: 1 O PM I G. Haddad j Re-direct examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
04:20:55 PMjJ. Quane jObjection 
04:20:58 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
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04:21 :·21 PM j J. Quane I Objection - lack of foundation ··o~r2·r:·2·3···i::i"fvfFiuc1ge .......................... _ ........ -.. Tofije6t,an-i-s-ove·rruie,r· ........................................................... -......................... _. ___ ............... -····--··· .. ·---···-··· 
04:21 :38 PM I J. Quane I Objection - leading 
"04: i 1·:47 ... PM· 1 Judge ........... ·---·----·--·"[ Objection···is ... overru led ........................................... ,---·······------·······-····--·-································-··--········ 
04:21:58 P J. Quane jObjection - lack of foundation 
........................................... ···············---·-----·····-·---·-T····-··-·-............................................................................................................... --················· .. ······-··········-············································ .. ···········--······· .. ······ 
04:22:00 P Judge I Objection is overruled 
"04 :22 :· 1· 3·· P J ."·auane ·····--·-.. ·-robjection·· _·· beyond·· the·· scope"""-··--·······-······················-················"························""·················""···· 
04:22:20 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
04:22:29 PM I J. Quane I Objection - beyond the scope 
04:22:46 PM I Judge I re-phrase question .. ............................. ··············-····-·-·····························-··"···· ............ T ............................................................................................ _ ............ ,-·---·············--....................................................................................................... . 
04:23: 19 PM I J. Quane I Objection - relevance and beyond the scope 
04:23:32 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled ·04·:2s:·2·1·· i=>"rJiTI··oii~i"n·e·-·································j··c55Jecffo·n··=··Taci<oHounciati"an············-·········· .......................................................................... _ ........................ .. 
04:25:22 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
04:27:36 PM I J. Quane Objection - redundant 
04:27:50 PM jJudge Objection is overruled 
•Eiiiii~:~~!·~~g::-==!i~~;:~~:;:b:::~:!~e:soope =:====== 
··o4·:Ir·o·3 ... i:i.rvffI···auane·---·····--·-robJectl'a·n··=···n·c;-n=responsTve············· ......... -............................... _ ... --·····················---·-········ ..................  
··04 :·3 7 :·o 9 ··p M · 1 Judge ·-··-------········-·Tobjection···is ··overruled .................................. --············································-·-.. ···················-····················· .... -.............. . 
04:41 :20 PM I · questions are handed to the Court 
··04: 43: 2s·· PM ·j···········--·- ··-·-·-··----········· r ····-··-.... ··-···--··-·······-·-............................................... . 
04:48:36 PM j Judge uires of the witness - Dean Sorensen ................. - ................................................... . 
04:53:25 PM J J. Quane I Re-cross examination of the witness - Dean Sorensen 
··~:: ~ ~: ~~ ·· ~ ~ ·G udge ····-··-············· .. ·-········· I· :~:~:i=~~= · jt~; jury ...... ·-·····-···-----·-···--··-···············--·--······································ .. ··························-......... -.. . 
04:58:58 PM I Judge I instructs counsel regarding jury questions 
05:02:57 PM I J. Quane I ~~:~b~\s ~o~~fir~~~~d:fs:i~k;dt~;~~~f~!:ied - makes.an 
o·s·:·01·:·0·4 .. i:i.KATJ"uag·e·· .. ··························-·· .. ·-········rrt1e···exfu6i"fs··wi-if··n·on:ie .. admifrea·············· .................................................................................... ___ . ___ ..  
05:07: 18 PM j I Court recesses 
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Time Speaker Note 
9:07:09 AM l lCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 3 
9:07:30 AM f Plaintiff's jscott McKay & Greg Haddad 
lattorney i 
9:07:42 AM f Defendant's[Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
/attorney i 
9:21:15 AM fJudge [Calls case 
9:21 :21 AM f [the jury is not present 
9:21 :23 AM js. McKay jExhibit # 2 previously marked is identified 
9:21 :37 AM js. McKay jMoves to admit Exhibit# 2 
.... 9:21 .. :43_AM_jJ ... Quane ........ ..iNo .. objection ................................................................................................................................................................  
9:21 :45 AM !Judge !Exhibit# 2 is admitted 
9:22:21 AM !s. McKay !Argues previous filed Motion in Limine 
9:26:15 AM jJudge jThe ruling on the previous Motion in Limine stands 
9:30:37 AM jJ. Quane jcomments regarding testimony of witnesses not discussing 
i i previous trial 
9:34:48 AM f [ Court recesses 
9:37:09 AM f tcourt resumes 
9:37:13AM i ithejuryispresent ............ .. 
9:37:24 AM iG. Haddad fcalls George Nichols, sworn, direct examination 
9:56:01 AM L. Quane !objection 
9:56:04 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
9:57:17 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - non-disclosure 
9:57:29 AM ,G. Haddad 'Responds 
9:57:46 AM f Judge f Objection is overruled 
10:30:16 AM jJ. Quane jObjection - improper use of a deposition 
10:30:21 AM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
10:37: 18 AM j jadmonishes the jury 
10:37:21 AM! !Court recesses 
10:54:14 AM i !court resumes 
10:54:21 AM i ithe jury is present · ·· · ..... 
10:54:49 AM jG. Haddad jcontinues direct examination of the witness - George Nichols 
11 :11 :07 AM L. Quane f Cross-examination of the witness - George Nichols 
......................................................................................... ! ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
11 :50:49 AM !Judge 1admonishes the jury 
11 :50:52 AM l !Court recesses ................................................ + ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
1 :46: 16 PM ! !Court resumes 
................................................ ~ ........................................ ! ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
1 :46:28 PM ! !the jury is present 
1 :46:43 PM 1J. Quane [ continues cross-examination of the witness - George Nichols 
: I 
i i 
2:46:55 PM JG. Haddad !Objection 
i i : : 
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2:47:15 PM !Judge !Objection is overruled 
3:14:40 PM j jadmonishes the jury 
3: 14:43 PM i !court recesses 
3:29:53 PM i icourt resumes 
3:30:07 PM i ithe jury is present 
3:30: 12 PM iJ. Quane icontinues cross-examination of the witness - George Nichols 
i ; 
3:35:44 PM f G. Haddad [Re-direct examination of the witness - George Nichols 
: : 
3:36:36 PM 1J. Quane !objection - mis-statement 
3:36:39 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
3:37:52 PM jJ. Quane !objection 
3:37:55 PM f Judge jobjection is overruled 
3:41 :24 PM jJ. Quane !objection - leading 
3:41 :31 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:50:08 PM jJ. Quane jObjection - foundation 
3:50:10 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:54:20 PM jJ. Quane jRe-cross examination of the witness - George Nichols 
: : 
3:57:'14 PM f Judge !excuses the witness - George Nichols 
3:58:20 PM jG. Haddad [Video Deposition of Janelle Buchanan 
E ~ 
4:34:48 PM f lside-bar 
4:37:28 PM f G. Haddad ivideo Deposition of Janelle Buchanan 
: : 
5:02:18 PM {Judge !admonishes the jury 
5:02:24 PM f !court recesses 
: : 
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Time Speaker Note 
8:36:24 AM I !CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 4 
8:37:53 AM jPlaintiffs !scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
[attorney / 
8:38:00 AM f Defendant's JJeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
[attorney I .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
9:29:12 AM !Judge !Calls case 
9:29: 16 AM i !the jury is not present 
9:29:25 AM js. McKay f provides the Court a transcript of cross-examination of the 
I !witness - Jonelle Buchanan 
9:30:39 AM f Judge fwill not allow that line of questioning in cross-examination of 
I !the witness - Jonelle Buchanan .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
9:32:21 AM lJudge !instructs counsel regarding side remarks. They are not to be 
[ [made. 
9:33:01 AM f Judge f There was an objection to a question of the witness Jonelle 
[ \ Buchanan. That objection was overruled. 
9:34:42 AM I f the jury is present 
9:34:49 AM jG. Haddad jVideo Deposition of Jonelle Buchanan continued 
9:36:18 AM jJ. Quane jReads questions and answers from cross-examination of the 
1 /witness - Jonelle Buchanan 
9:54:05 AM tG. Haddad tcalls Brian Kerr, sworn, direct examination 
10:03:08 AM iJ. Quane f objection - relevance 
10:03: 13 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:04:49 AM lJ. Quane \Objection 
10:04:52 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:05:33 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - relevance 
10:05:35 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
·10:08:04 AM jJ. Quane !objection - form of the question 
10:08:13 AMlJudge jRe-phrase the question 
10:10:43 AM jJ. Quane !objection 
10:10:50 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
10: 18:54 AM jJ. Quane jobjection 
10:18:59 AM jJudge lobjection is overruled 
10:28:49 AM f J. Quane jobjection - argumentative 
10:28:54 AM jJudge jRe-phrase the question 
10:33:43 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - form of the question 
10:33:46 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:35: 14 AM j G. Haddad I Exhibit# 48 previously marked is identified 
10:35:28 AM /G. Haddad /Moves to admit Exhibit# 48 
10:35:42 AM iJ. Quane iNo objection 
10:35:45 AM jJudge jExhibit # 48 is admitted 
10:35:51 AM lJudge f admonishes the jury 
10:35:54 AM i lcourt recesses 
10:57:41 AM i icourt resumes 
: : 
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10:57:46 AM ! /the jury is present 
10:58:03 AM iG. Haddad icontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
~ i 
11 :03:44 AM !J. Quane Jobjection 
11 :03:53 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11 :06:56 AM /J. Quane )Objection 
11:07:10 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11: 10:50 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - repetitious 
11:10:52 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11 :11 :21 AM jJ. Quane jObjection - repetitious 
11: 11 :24 AM f Judge f objection is sustained 
11 :15:58 AM jJ. Quane jobjection 
11 :16:00 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
11: 16:31 AM jJ. Quane jObjection - lack of foundation 
11: 16:44 AM jJudge j Objection is overruled 
11: 19: 19 AM j G. Haddad j moves to publish CDC guidelines 
11 :20:32 AM jJudge jrhe guidelines may be read but not published or admitted 
11 :25:24 AM JJ. Quane 1cross-examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
11 :28:03 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
11 :28:06 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11 :28:44 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
11 :28:46 AM jJudge lobjection is overruled 
11 :30:37 AM lG. Haddad iobjection - leading and foundation 
11 :30:48 AM iJudge tobjection is sustained 
11 :32: 16 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
11 :32:19 AM )Judge )Objection is overruled 
11 :35:51 AM j jjury questions are handed to the Court 
11 :39:34 AM f Judge f Inquires of the witness - Brian Kerr . 
11 :47:15 AM f G. Haddad f Re-direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
11 :52:07 AM jJudge jexcuses the witness 
11 :52:14 AM j !admonishes the jury 
_1_1_:52:_1_7_AMJ ....... · ................................ Jcourt_recesses .................................................................................................................................................... .. 
1 :31 :42 PM 1 !Court resumes 
.. 1 :31°':46 PM t .... hhe.jury .. is .. present"'..... ......... ...... ....... ............. .. ............. . 
1 :31 :51 PM f G. Haddad f Calls Glen Graben, sworn, direct examination 
1:36:19 PM fJ. Quane !Objection - leading 
1 :36:23 PM fJudge f Objection is sustained 
2:01 :38 PM f J. Quane f Objection - leading 
2:01 :41 PM f Judge f Objection is overruled 
2:07:31 PM lJ. Quane lobjection - leading 
I : 
2:07:32 PM iJudge !Objection is overruled 
: I 
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2:12:17 PM jJ. Quane !Objection - leading 
2:12:20 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
2:15:51 PM iJ. Quane fcross-examination of the witness - Glen Graben 
2:18:01 PM tG. Haddad iRe-direct examination of the witness - Glen Graben 
2: 18:39 PM iJ. Quane iobjection - asked and answered 
2:18:41 PM jJudge fobjection is overruled 
2:18:57 PM j jjury questions are handed to the Court 
2:19:11 PM j lside-bar 
2:22:24 PM f Judge j1nquires of the witness - Glen Graben 
2:26:00 PM jJudge jexcuses the witness - Glen Groben 
2:26: 1 O PM \S. McKay i Exhibits# 29,30,32,31,33,34,37,38,39,40,41,42,43 
l l previously marked are identified, moves to admit 
2:27:21 PM fJ. Quane fobjects to Exhibits# 29,31,32,33,34,37,38,39,40,41,42 and 
I 143 - relevance 
................................................ ,i .......................................... ,i. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
2:28:07 PM jS. McKay !Responds 
2:28:41 PM jJ. Quane jResponds 
2:29:37 PM fJudge iExhibits # 29-34, 37-43 are admitted 
2:30:59 PM iJudge iadmonishes the jury 
2:31 :03 PM i icourt recesses 
2:44:48 PM i icourt resumes 
2:44:52 PM j jthe jury is present 
2:44:54 PM is. McKay icalls Vincent Brooks, sworn, direct examination 
2:49:28 PM fJ. Quane iobjection - relevance 
2:49:35 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
2:52:22 PM f J. Quane jobjection - leading 
2:52:24 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
3:32:43 PM iJ. Quane lcross-examination of the witness - Vincent Brooks 
3:37:55 PM i ijury questions are handed to the Court 
3:38:58 PM j jside-bar 
3:40:21 PM f Judge j1nquires of the witness - Vincent Brooks 
3:41 :29 PM jJudge jexcuses the witness - Vincent Brooks 
.... 3:41.:4.1 ... PM ... jJudge .................... Jadmonishes .. the.jury .................................................................................................................................... .. 
3:42:46 PM ! jCourt recesses 
9/19/2014 3 of3 
002366
Judge Bail 092314 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
8:24: 18 AM ! ! CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 5 
8:24:41 AM jPlaintiffs f scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
!attorney l 
8:25:04 AM !Defendant's fJeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
!attorney ! 
9:19:48 AM f {Calls case 
9: 19:54 AM l · ithe jury is not present 
9: 19:56 AM js. McKay jcounsel stipulated to swap out a better quality copy of Exhibit 
1 15 
9:20:44 AM f s. McKay f counsel stipulate to admit Exhibit# 4, previously marked and 
! ! identified 
9:20:56 AM fJudge f Exhibit# 4 is admitted 
9:21 :01 AM is. McKay lExhibit # 35 previously marked is identified, moves to admit 
~ I 
9:22:35 AM f J. Quane lArgues objection to the admission of Exhibit# 35 
9:25:24 AM js. McKay jHands the Court a bench brief 
9:28:49 AM f Judge jwon't allow any inquiry to taxes and social security 
9:28:59 AM jJudge f Exhibit# 35 is admitted 
9:29:25 AM lJ. Quane lcontinues argument in opposition of the admission of exhibit 
! l#35 
9:30:38 AM f Judge f objection is overruled 
9:31 :39 AM f jcourt recesses 
9:38:53 AM i icourt resumes ............. . 
9:38:58 AM i ithe jury is present .................. . 
9:39:42 AM js. McKay jcalls Cornelius Hofman, sworn, direct examination 
9:41 :50 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - leading 
9:41 :52 AM f Judge jobjection is sustained 
9:42:09 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - leading 
9:42:22 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
10:00:04 AM f s. McKay jExhibit # 51 b previously marked is identified 
:~:~;:;~. ~~ 1~ .. ~i:n•:-1~~~:~i:~~:~~~::~;1.#. 51.b --------- --- - - -
10:02:32 AM !Judge !Objection is overruled 
10:02:33 AM iJudge i Exhibit# 51 b is admitted 
10:06:02 AM f S. McKay !Exhibit# 51c previously marked is identified 
10:06:44 AM js. McKay 1Moves to admit Exhibit# 51 c 
10:07:17 AMIJ. Quane !Objection - speculation 
I I 
10:07:29 AM lJudge lObjection is overruled 
10:07:34 AM f Judge iExhibit # 51 c is admitted 
10:07:53 AM jJudge f admonishes the jury 
.. 1.0:08.:.1 .. J .. AM.!.. ...................................... Jcourt.recesses ................................................................................................................................................... ... 
10:40:36 AM! !Court resumes 
: : 
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10:40:43 AM ! !the jury is present 
10:40:51 AM is. McKay icontinues direct examination of the witness - Cornelius 
! !Hofman 
10:42:34 AM !J. Quane !objection - leading 
10:42:37 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
10:43:38 AM f s. McKay f Exhibit# 51d previously marked is identified 
; ~:::::1·~~·1~·.~~:::-1~:;e;i:~ admit .Exhibit_#.51 d _ _ _ _ _ ________ _ 
10:44:46 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:44:49 AM iJudge iExhibit # 51d is admitted 
10:49: 18 AM ts. McKay t Exhibit# 51 k previously marked is identified , 
10:50:05 AM js. McKay jMoves to admit Exhibit# 51 k 
10:50:08 AM jJ. Quane jObjection 
10:50:11 AM !Judge !Objection is overruled 
10:50:14 AM jJudge jExhibit # 51k is admitted 
10:53:26 AM js. McKay f Exhiblt # 51 m previously marked is identified 
10:54:18 AM js. McKay jMoves to admit Exhibit# 51m 
10:54:23 AM jJ. Quane !Objection 
10:54:25 AM f Judge f Objection is overruled 
10:54:27 AM iJudge iExhibit # 51 mis admitted 
10:55:01 AM is. McKay iExhibits # 511 & 51n previously marked are identified .; ~:;:::~ ·~~ 1~ .. ~~:na:-1~:j:~i:~admit .. Exhibits. #S1.1 .. & .. s1.n ___________ _ 
10:56:17 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:56:20 AM iJudge iExhibits # 511 & 51n are admitted 
11 :02:11 AM ts. McKay iExhibit # 51a previously marked is identified 
11 :02:37 AM js. McKay jMoves to admit Exhibit# 51a 
11 :02:38 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - foundation 
11 :02:45 AM f s. McKay f Responds 
11 :04:41 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
.. ~.~.;~:;~:·:~.i~~~gu:ne···········1~:~!~:i:n5-11::~~~mitted······················································································································· 
11 :09:22 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11: 12:28 AM iJ. Quane icross-examination of the witness - Cornelius Hofman 
i i 
! i 
11 :24:53 AM ls. McKay lObjection - asked and answered 
11 :24:55 AM f Judge jobjection is sustained 
11 :28: 16 AM js. McKay lobjection - relevance 
11 :28:54 AM lJudge f Re-phrase the question 
I I 
11 :32:06 AM Js. McKay f Objection - asked and answered 
11 :32:08 AM jJudge f Objection is overruled 
11 :50:01 AM rs. McKay jObjection - asked and answered 
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11 :50:03 AM jJudge !Objection is overruled 
11 :51 :42 AM 1s. McKay fObjection - asked and answered 
11 :51 :44 AM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
12:05:32 PM \S. McKay I Re-direct examination of the witness - Cornelius Hofman 
! ~ 
12: 10:23 PM f f jury questions are handed to the Court 
12:10:54PM1 iside-bar ......... . 
12: 13:26 PM iJudge i Inquires of the witness - Cornelius Hofman 
12:15:13 PMjJudge jadmonishesthejury 
12:15:16 PM j jcourt recesses 
1 :50:34 PM j 1court resumes 
1 :50:42 PM ! )the jury is not present 
1 :50:47 PM jJ. Quane jwould like to read deposition of next witness - Charles 
I \Ballard ................................................ , .......................................... ; ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
1 :52:58 PM :G. Haddad :Responds 
1 :56:05 PM jJudge iwould allow portions of the deposition to be read 
1 :57:29 PM 1J. Quane jArgues regarding testimony of neighbor 
1 :59:26 PM jJudge !will not allow it at this point but will re-visit the issue later 
2:00:55 PM ls. McKay lResponds 
2:04:04 PM ! )the jury is present 
2:04:21 PM js. McKay jcalls Charles Ballard, sworn, direct examination 
2:41 :56 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - leading 
2:41 :57 PM jJudge !objection is sustained 
2:56:56 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - leading 
2:56:59 PM !Judge !Objection is sustained 
3:13:21 PM fs. McKay jExhibits # 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 & 28 previously marked are 
! ! identified 
3:15:08 PM lJ. Quane lobjection - hearsay 
3:15:11 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3: 15:40 PM jJ. Quane JObjection - hearsay & lack of foundation 
3:15:50 PM !Judge fObjection is overruled 
3:16:25 PM fJ. Quane jObjection - lack of foundation & hearsay 
3: 16:35 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
3:17:04 PM !J. Quane iObjection - hearsay & lack of foundation 
I I 
3:17:06 PM JJudge JObjection is overruled .......................................................................................... ,; .. , .................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
3: 17:37 PM !J. Quane !Objection - hearsay & lack of foundation 
3: 17:39 PM lJudge jobjection is overruled ................................................ ; .......................................... .;. .......................................................................................................................................................................................................  
3: 18:04 PM !J. Quane jObjection - hearsay & lack of foundation 
3:18:06 PM jJudge fObjection is overruled 
3:18:12 PM ls. McKay !Moves to admit Exhibits# 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 & 28 
: I 
3:18:28 PM JJ. Quane JObjection - hearsay 
3: 18:39 PM jJudge jadmonishes the jury 
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3:19:55 PM 1 )Court recesses 
3:39:02 PM t !court resumes 
3:39: 13 PM ! !the jury is not present 
··· ;:;::! ~ -:~ -i~---~~::-]~;e:~:~•- -- ---- ---------- --- -- -
3:40:35 PM is. McKay iHands the Court Certificate of Authetication 
3:41 :04 PM !Judge iobjection is overruled 
3:41: 15 PM iJudge i Exhibits # 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 & 28 are admitted 
3:44: 13 PM i ithe jury is present · · ·· ............. · · 
3:44:34 PM js. McKay jcontinues direct examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
3:46:05 PM lJ. Quane tobjection - narrative 
3:46:07 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
3:56:42 PM iJ. Quane icross-examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
4:09:22 PM ! !Deposition of Charles Ballard is published 
4:10:02 PM js. McKay jobjection - assumes facts 
4:10:05 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:13:52 PM fs. McKay fObjection - assumes facts 
4: 13:58 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:18:01 PM js. McKay jObjection - assumes facts 
4:18:06 PM lJudge Jobjection is overruled 
4:30:38 PM js. McKay Jobjection 
4:31 :42 PM iJudge fwould like more of the transcript read now 
4:39:41 PM js. McKay jobjection - asked and answered 
4:39:47 PM jJudge !Objection is sustained 
4:54:36 PM js. McKay jobjection - relevance 
4:54:40 PM jJudge f Objection is sustained 
4:54:55 PM jJudge !admonishes the jury 
4:55:06 PM i icourt recesses 
: : 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




, BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LA.SER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF 
RE TAXES 
1. Defendants should be forbidden from arguing about the tax consequences of the 
jury's award or suggesting to the jury that Mr. Ballard's lost financial support from 
Krystal Ballard be reduced to account for taxation. 
Idaho Code § 5-311 defines the recoverable damages in an action for wrongful death. It 
provides that the heirs of the decedent may recover such damages "as under all the circumstances 
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of the case may be just." Consistent with this, the applicable model jury instruction regarding 
wrongful death damages, IDJI 9.05, provides that "the jury must determine the amount of money 
that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be 
proximately caused by defendant's negligence." With respect to financial support, this 
instruction provides for recovery of this as follows: 
The plaintiffs loss of financial support from the decedent, and the present cash value of 
financial support the decedent would have provided to the plaintiff in the future, but for 
the decedent's death, taking into account the plaintiffs life expectancy, the decedent's 
age and normal life expectancy, the decedent's earning capacity, habits, disposition and 
any other circumstances shown by the evidence. 
IDJI 9.05 
Neither the instruction, nor the statute, makes any reference to taxes, and the "just" and 
"fair" language requires that no such reference be advanced. To allow otherwise impermissibly 
penalizes a plaintiff whether their award be non taxable or taxable. More specifically, in the 
event the IRS determined that the award should not be taxed, a defendant should not have the 
benefit of jury imposed reduction to account for its non taxability. On the other hand, if a 
component of the award is taxable, a defendant should likewise not be permitted to argue a jury 
should reduce the award to account for taxes as doing so would amount to a plaintiff being taxed 
twice - first by the jury in reducing the award and later by the IRS upon the assessment of an 
additional tax. Neither is just or fair and neither should be permitted. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized as much in finding the trial court properly 
barred cross examination of the plaintiffs economic expert concerning taxation and affirming 
the award of damages in a personal injury case: 
Defendants assert that the trial court should not have (1) allowed the economic expert to 
testify that any damage award was subject to income taxes, (2) denied defendants cross-
examination of the economic expert, and (3) failed to cure the testimony of the economic 
expert by giving a proper instruction to the jury. We disagree. 




We first note that we do not address defendants' challenge to the testimony of the 
economic expert concerning taxation of any damage awards. Defendants did not object at 
the time of the economic expert's testimony to the question posed about taxes or to his 
answer. Even in their briefs on appeal, they make no argument and cite no authority for 
their contention that it was improper for the trial court to allow the economic expert to 
testify regarding taxes. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966,970 (1996) 
(concluding that "[a] party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument 
is lacking"). 
We turn then to defendants' contention that the trial court should have allowed them to 
cross-examine the economic expert concerning taxation of any damage award. In State v. 
Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 736 P.2d 1314 (1987), the Court pointed out that "[t]he control of 
cross-examination of a witness is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and 
absent a showing of prejudice, a limitation of cross-examination imposed by a trial judge 
will not be overturned on appeal." Id. at 867, 736 P.2d at 1321. Without reaching the 
question of any prejudice there may have been to defendants, we conclude that the 
instructions the trial court gave the jury concerning the taxability of a damage award 
cured any error there may have been. Barry v. Arrow Transp. Co., 83 Idaho 41, 47,358 \ 
P .2d 1041, 1045 (1960). The trial court gave the jury three different instructions 
concerning taxation of damage awards, all of which instructed the jury to disregard tax 
consequences. We conclude that collectively these instructions cured any problem 
created by the economic expert's testimony concerning taxation. 
Concerning the trial court's refusal to give defendants' requested IDJI 937 instruction, we 
exercise free review. Hookv. B.C. Inv., Inc., 125 Idaho 453,455, 872 P.2d 716, 718 
(1'994). We review a trial court's decision refusing to give a proposed jury instruction "to 
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the 
issues and the applicable law." Lankfordv. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 126 Idaho 187,189,879 
P.2d 1120, 1122 (1994). "If the Court finds that the instructions adequately present the 
issues and state the applicable law, the Court will not reverse the trial court." Id. "The 
giving of an erroneous jury instruction does not generally justify granting of a new trial 
unless the appellant can establish that he or she was prejudiced thereby, and that the error 
affected the jury's conclusion.!' Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,260, 805 P.2d 452, 
466 (1991). 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard tax consequences in 
rendering any damage award. Even though the trial court's instruction did not take the 
extra step contained in [former] IDJI 937 of telling the jury that any personal injury 
award was not subject to income taxes, the effect of the instructions the trial court gave 
was to direct the jury not to consider the taxation of any damage award. We presume the 
jury followed this instruction. 
Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,382, 973 P.2d 148, 153 (1999). 
Accordingly, the defendants in the present case should be forbidden from arguing about 
3 - PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF RE TAXES 
002373
the tax consequences of the jury's award or arguing or suggesting to the jury that Charles 
Ballard's lost financial support from Kyrstal Ballard be reduced to account for taxation. 
~"" 
DATED this d.l day of September, 2014. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By~-~-a-v-id_Z_._N_e_v_~~~~~-~~~~--~~ 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
P"' 
I hereby certify that on September d~ 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane. 
Terrance JQnes 
QUANE JONES McCOLL PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH _ 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF 
RE ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL 
BILLS 
The evidence presented during plaintiff's case in chief establishes that on Wednesday, 
July 21, 2010, Defendant Dr. Brian Kerr performed a cosmetic surgical procedure on Krystal 
Ballard. · Plaintiff has established through the testimony of medical experts called during 
plaintiff's case that Dr. Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 
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concerning the cleaning, disinfecting and sterilizing of reusable medical equipment used on Mrs. 
Ballard during this surgical procedure and as a consequence, she was infected and died 
approximately 4 days after Dr. Kerr's surgical procedure. 
Following Dr. Kerr's procedure and at approximately 2 am on the morning of Sunday, 
July 25, 2010, paramedics were summoned to Mrs. Ballard's home in Mountain Home. Mrs. 
Ballard was transported by paramedics to the Elmore County Medical Center where she was 
admitted. Later that morning, Life Flight was called by Elmore Medical Center medical staff 
and Mrs. Ballard was transported that morning by air ambulance to Saint Alphonsus Medical 
Center in Boise where she was admitted at 7 :20 am. Mrs. Ballard died approximately 17 hours 
later with the time of her death pronounced at 12:38 am on July 26, 2010. 
Mrs. Ballard survived for less than 24 hours after Elmore County paramedics were called 
to her home. The medical records describing the care and treatment of Mrs. Ballard during this 
period were admitted at trial by agreement of the parties. More specifically, the parties agreed to 
the admission of the following medical records which have been admitted: Elmore Ambulance 
(plaintiffs exhibit 6); Elmore Medical Center (plaintiffs exhibit 7) and Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center (plaintiffs exhibit 8). The medical experts that have testified to date 
including Dean Sorensen, M.D., George Nichols, M.D. and Glen Groben, M.D., have addressed 
the medical treatment Mrs. Ballard received following her admission at Elmore Medical Center 
up to the time of her death at Saint Alphonsus. 
During the trial, Mrs. Ballard's husband, Plaintiff Charles Ballard identified the medical 
bills he received in connection with the above described care and treatment of his wife. These 
medical bills are comprised of the bills for Elmore Medical Center (plaintiffs exhibit 26), Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (plaintiffs exhibit 25) and Life Flight (plaintiffs exhibit 
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28). Defendants acknowledge that each of the foregoing medical bills are authentic - and 
indeed plaintiff produced certificates of authenticity for each medical record and bill from the 
custodian of records for each provider. Defendants further acknowledge that Krystal Ballard 
received medical care and treatment from each of these providers which are described in the 
corresponding medical records admitted by agreement of the parties. Nevertheless, defendants 
argue that the Court should not admit these three medical bills because plaintiff has not 
adequately established that the medical care established in each bill was reasonable and 
necessary. The Court admitted the foregoing three medical bills over the objection of 
defendants subject to a motion to strike these exhibits pending citation to relevant authority 
concerning the admissibility of the bills. 
The Court properly admitted each of the three medical bill exhibits. 
1. The Court Properly Admitted the Medical Bills Related to the Emergency Medical 
Treatment of Krystal Ballard 
Each of the medical bills at issue were identified by Charles Ballard as relating to the care 
and treatment of his wife, Krystal. This care and treatment closely followed the surgical 
treatment performed by Dr. Kerr and the bills mirror the medical treatment described in the 
medical bills which defendants agreed should be admitted in evidence. The medical bills cover a 
period ofless than 24 hours and reflect the futile efforts of the providers to save Mrs. Ballard's 
life. Defendants agree that each of these medical bills is authentic. 
In Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681,686, 39 P.3d 621,626 (2001), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed the admission of summaries of medical bills and the attached records 
in a personal injury trial where the defendant objected to introduction of these summaries of 
medical bills and records offered by the plaintiff. The admission of the records in that case was 
based on the plaintiffs testimony relating to the medical expense summary that he had prepared 
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and the defense argued that, since only the plaintiff had testified, the summaries were admitted 
without foundation showing the treatment was reasonably related to the accident and that the 
amounts of the bills were reasonable for the services provided. Id 
In rejecting the argument of the defense, the Supreme Court held "[o]rdinarily, testimony 
by the patient or by the physician or the health care provider on the amounts charged or paid for 
medical services is sufficient evidence of the reasonable value of the services in the absence of 
some showing to the contrary." Id (emphasis added). The Court noted that where the record 
reveals direct testimony that the injuries and resulting medical expense incurred after the incident 
were proximately caused by the injuries received in the incident, there is no error in the 
admission of the medical bill and treatment summaries. Id 
Similarly, in In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277,280, 192 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Ct. App. 2008), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals considered a challenge to the admission of medical bills at a restitution 
hearing offered by the victim of a battery committed by a juvenile. Counsel for the juvenile and 
his guardian objected to admission of the bill arguing there was insufficient foundation that the 
services rendered were reasonable, medically necessary, and "linked" to Doe's actions. Id The 
magistrate refused admission of the bills which was affirmed by the district court. 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals first noted the broad discretion of the trial court 
concerning the admission of evidence and that its judgment concerning this admission will be 
reversed only upon an abuse of discretion. Id. at 281, 192 P. 3d. at 1105, citing State v. Howard, 
135 Idaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74, 
829 P.2d 861, 863-64 (1992). Notwithstanding, the Court discussed the holding by the Supreme 
Court in Van Brunt and held the magistrate court erred in refusing admission of various medical 
bills testified to by C.L., the crime victim. These bills, which the Court ruled should have been 
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admitted; included bills from Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ada County 
Paramedics, Gem State Radiology, Southwest Idaho Ear, Nose and Throat and Idaho Emergency 
Physicians. By way of example, the Court provided the following explanation for the admission 
of two of these medical bills: 
Exhibit 2, the bill from St. Alphonsus Regional medical Center for $4,741.30, 
also should have been admitted as there was sufficient evidence presented tying it 
to the attack. Not only did C.L. testify that he had been taken to St. Alphonsus and 
was treated there after being battered, but the bill itself identifies C.L. as the 
patient and lists the date of the services provided as the same date the attack 
occurred. Importantly, the bill also provides a descriptive breakdown of services 
provided to C.L., allowing the inference that these are treatments that would 
logically be provided to a victim who had been struck in the face. 
The court also erred in excluding Exhibit 3, the bill from Ada County Paramedics 
for $766.44. That C.L. received these services as a result of the crime was 
supported by C.L.'s testimony that he was taken from the scene to St. Alphonsus 
in an ambulance. Additionally, the bill lists the date of the trip as the same date 
the attack occurred, indicates that C.L. was the person transported,· and notes that 
he was taken from the scene of the crime (9140 Emerald St.) to St. Alphonsus 
(1055 N. Curtis). The bill also provides a descriptive breakdown of services 
provided and the amounts charged for each. This information in concert with 
C.L.'s testimony provided adequate foundation for its admission. 
Id, 146 Idaho at 282, 192 P.3d at 1106. 
In the present case, the medical bills all refer to Krystal Ballard and correlate to the 
medical services provided to Mrs. Ballard that are described in the corresponding admitted 
medical records. The dates of service reflected in these bills correlate to the treatment of Mrs. 
Ballard reflected in these medical records. These services occurred over a period of less than 24 
hours and closely followed the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Kerr. Plaintiff has presented 
expert medical testimony which directly links the medical treatment reflected in these medical 
records (which in turn are reflected in the medical bills) to this surgical procedure and to the 
death of Mrs. Ballard. Further, this expert testimony describes how the treatment by the medical 
providers was rendered in an attempt to save Mrs. Ballard's life-which ultimately proved 
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unsuccessful. Mr. Ballard identified each bill as relating to the treatment of his spouse following 
the call to the Elmore paramedics. 
Defendants have made no "showing to the contrary" concerning the reasonableness of the 
services reflected in the medical bills. In fact, defendants acknowledge the authenticity of these 
medical bills and agreed to the admission of the medical records which correspond directly to the 
services described in the medical bills. 
In sum, plaintiff provided an adequate foundation for the admission of each medical bill 
and the Court properly admitted each medical bill exhibit. 
• ,l't,--,. 
DATED this ;J'-/ day of September, 2014. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By_~--~-=----~~ 
David Z. Nevin ~
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 'J4, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrance Jones 
QUANE JONES McCOLL PLLC 
Scott McKay 
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Judge Bail 092414 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
8:11 :00 AM j jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 6 
8:11 :1 O AM jPlaintiff's jscott McKay & Greg Haddad 
!attorney l 
8: 11 :21 AM }Defendant's f Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
/attorney l 
9:25:52 AM l [Calls case 
9:25:57 AM j jthe jury is not present 
9:27:11 AM jJ. Quane jcomments re: depositions 
9:27:14 AM i icourt recesses ...................... · ................................................................................. .. 
9:35:08 AM i icourt resumes 
9:35: 13 AM f ithe jury is present ............................................. · · ·· .................................................................................................. .. 
9:35:24 AM iJ. Quane [continues cross-examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
i i 
10:05:01 AM ts. McKay [Objection - vague 
10:05:07 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:16:58 AMfs. McKay !objection 
10:16:59 AM js. McKay jwithdraws the objection 
10:17:22 AM !S. McKay !Re-direct examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
10:27:15 AMf !jury questions are handed to the Court ....... . .......... . 
10:27:57 AM i iside-bar · .................................................. ··· ...................................................................................................... .. 
10:30:25 AM iJudge !inquires of the witness - Charles Ballard ... · 
10:32:26 AM iJ. Quane !Re-cross examination of the witness - Charles Ballard 
10:33:45 AM is. McKay !objection - mis-characterization 
10:34:04 AM iJ. Quane [Responds 
10:34:39 AM iJudge iexcuses the witness - Charles Ballard 
10:34:51 AM f Judge I admonishes the jury 
10:35:00 AM i icourt recesses 
10:59:31 AM i icourt resumes 
10:59:36 AM i ithe jury is not present ... · 
10:59:49 AM js. McKay iwm be calling one more witness 
11 :00:46 AM j jthe jury is present 
11 :01: 18 AM js. McKay jcalls Susan Kerr, sworn, direct examination 
11 :03: 16 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - leading 
11 :03:18 AM jJudge [Objection is overruled ................................................ , ............................................... , .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
11 :09:43 AM !J. Quane !Cross-examination of the witness - Susan Kerr 
11: 14: 12 AM js. McKay [Objection - beyond the scope 
11 :14:14 AMfJudge [Objection is overruled 
................................................ J. .............................................. ,r ... , ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
11 :15:29 AM IS. McKay !Re-direct examination of the witness - Susan Kerr .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
11: 17:50 AM I ljury questions are handed to the Court 
.. 1·1·:·1·a:'oo·AM J ................. !side-bar ...... ......... ...................................................... ..................... . ....... .. 
11 :18:42 AM !Judge ilnquires of the witness - Susan Kerr 
: I 
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11 : 19: 18 AM I Judge I excuses the witness - Susan Kerr 
11·:·1·9:26.AM is. McKay ·······tThe .. Plaintiff.rests·································································································································································· 
11: 19:41 AM jJ. Quane icalls Brian Kerr, previously sworn, direct examination 
11 :33:02 AM jJ. Quane !Exhibit# A previously marked is identified 
11 :33:07 AM !J. Quane iMoves to admit Exhibit# A ········· ···················· 
11:33:10 AM iG. Haddad !No objection 
11 :33:13 AM jJudge !Exhibit# A is admitted 
12:00:19 PM \Judge [admonishes the jury 
12:00:25 PM i !court recesses 
1 :34:26 PM i !court resumes 
1 :34:30 PM j lthe jury is not present 
1 :34:36 PM ]G. Haddad !comments regarding motion in limine 
1 :38:44 PM j jthe jury is present 
1 :38:47 PM jJ. Quane jcontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
1:46:13 PM JG. Haddad \Objection 
1 :46: 16 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
2:05:36 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - foundation 
2:05:41 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
2:33:47 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - non-disclosure 
2:33:56 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
2:55:44 PM f Judge jadmonishes the jury 
2:55:53 PM i !court recesses 
3: 16:02 PM j jcourt resumes 
3:16:05 PM I jthe jury is present 
3:17:41 PM !J. Quane !continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
3:35:55 PM jG. Haddad !objection - asked and answered 
3:35:57 PM \Judge \Objection is sustained 
3:48:59 PM r jside-bar 
4:04:21 PM r jadmonishes the jury 
... 4.:04:24 .. PM ... i ............................................... icourt.recesses ........................................................................................................................................................................  
4:15:35 PM \ \Court resumes 
4:15:39 PM j jthejury is present 
4:15:48 PM JJ. Quane jcontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
4:25:40 PM \J. Quane \Exhibits# 01-021 previously marked are identified 
4:26:03 PM jJ. Quane jMoves to admit Exhibits# 01-021 
4:26:07 PM jG. Haddad jNo objection 
4:26:10 PM jJudge jExhibits # 01-021 are admitted 
5:00:09 PM f Judge f admonishes the jury 
5:00:12 PM l jCourt recesses 
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Judge Bail 092514 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 . 
Time Speaker Note 
8:59:04 AM i iCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 7 
8:59:48 AM f Plaintiffs jscott McKay & Greg Haddad 
!attorney i 
8:59:55 AM lDefendant's lJeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
!attorney i .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
9:21 :06 AM /Judge /Calls case 
9:21 :06 AM i !the jury is not present 
9:21: 18 AM jT. Jones jArgues for admission of Exhibits # KK for impeachment 
I /purposes 
9:23:02 AM lJudge f The exhibit is not going to be admitted. It is not 
i i impeachment or relevant 
9:26:44 AM {T. Jones Jcounsel stipulate to Exhibits# K & T 
9:26:57 AM jJudge f Exhibits# K & Tare admitted 
9:32:09 AM jT. Jones f Argues for redactions to be shown to the jury from Exhibit# 
................................................ l ............. ' ........................... 15 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. .. 
9:34:33 AM \G. Haddad \Responds 
. 9:43:31 AM !Judge iwill allow testimony by Briana re: medical instructions given 
i ~ 
9:50:44 AM f lthe jury is present 
9:51 :29 AM h. Jones icalls Briana Dumas, sworn, direct examination 
10:00:04 AM h. Jones iExhibits # 214, 220-225 & 252 previously marked is 
l I identified 
................................................ ,0. .......................................... ,0. ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
10:00:45 AM IT. Jones /Moves to admit Exhibits# 214, 220-225 & 252 
10:00:50 AM is. McKay fNo.objection ········ .............. ················· ....................................... . 
10:00:53 AM f Judge jExhibits # 214, 220-225 & 252 are admitted 
10: 12:52 AM js. McKay jobjection - lack of foundation 
10:12:54 AM jJudge fobjection is sustained 
10:27:41 AM js. McKay jobjection - relevance 
10:27:47 AM jJudge Jobjection is sustained 
10:30:00 AM f s. McKay !Cross-examination of the witness - Briana Dumas 
10:34:53 AM jT. Jones jObjection - argumentative 
10:34:58 AM jJudge ,, Jobjection is overruled 
10:40:46 AM f Judge f admonishes the jury 
10:40:50 AM i fcourt recesses 
11 :03:43 AM i icourt resumes 
11 :03:47 AM j jthe jury is present 
11 :03:50 AM is. McKay icontinues cross-examination of the witness - Briana Dumas 
~ i 
11 :09:43 AM JT. Jones f objection - argumentative 
11 :09:45 AM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
11: 11 :06 AM jT. Jones !Objection - repetitious 
11: 11: 19 AM jJudge f Objection is sustained 
11 :15:54 AM j JDeposition of Briana Dumas is published 
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11: 19: 15 AM jT. Jones !Objection - beyond the scope 
11: 19: 18 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11 :20:48 AM fr. Jones jRe-direct examination of the witness - Briana Dumas 
11 :29:37 AM j jjury questions are handed to the Court 
11 :29:42 AM i iside-bar 
11 :32:37 AM iJudge i Inquires of the witness - Briana Dumas 
11 :33:40 AM j jcourt recesses 
1 :56:40 PM i jcourt resumes 
1 :56:46 PM j jthe jury is present 
1 :57:07 PM jJudge jlnquires of the witness - Briana Dumas 
2:03:40 PM 1T. Jones !Re-direct examination of the witness - Briana Dumas 
2:04:34 PM is. McKay 1Re-cross examination of the witness - Briana Dumas 
i i 
2:06:03 PM Jr. Jones Iobjection - asked and answered 
2:06:05 PM f Judge f Objection is overruled 
2:06:43 PM jr. Jones jobjection - legal question 
2:06:53 PM )udge !Objection is overruled 
2:10:28 PM fJudge jexcuses the witness - Briana Dumas 
2:10:51 PM jT. Jones jcalls Geoffrey Stiller, sworn, direct examination 
2:12:14 PM ir. Jones !Exhibit# G previously marked is identified 
2:12:31 PM ir. Jones tMoves to admit Exhibit# G 
2:12:36 PM is. McKay iNo objection 
{:~:~ ~ -=~ -l~udi:ddad-1~:~:i:n ~:::::;~::-- ---- -- ------- -
2:40:21 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:42:13 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - relevance • 
2:42:22 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
-~::~:~~-=~ -l!ud~:::::-1~:;;:~~ ~=:~::fr:u,e --------- -----·-- -
2:50:12 PM j jJury is excused 
2:50:39 PM jr. Jones jmakes an offer of proof 
2:52:54 PM f G. Haddad !Responds 
2:59:05 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
3:01 :24 PM 1 !the jury is present 
3:01 :26 PM jr. Jones jcontinues direct examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
3:20:34 PM 1G. Haddad tobjection - foundation 
3:20:41 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:28:01 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - foundation 
3:28:03 PM !Judge f Objection is overruled 
3:32:10 PM jJudge jadmonishes the jury 
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3:32:15 PM I )Court recesses 
3:46:46 PM i icourt resumes 
3:46:52 PM i hhe jury is present 
3:46:55 PM iT. Jones icontinues direct examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
: : 
3:48:29 PM lG. Haddad lobjection -
3:49:12 PM fJudge f Re-phrase the question 
3:52:07 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - beyond the scope 
3:52:31 PM j jside-bar 
3:57:05 PM 1Judge !Re-phrase the question 
4:02:55 PM fG. Haddad jobjection - compound 
4:02:58 PM jJudge f Objection is overruled 
4:08:32 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - foundation 
4:08:36 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
4:28:40 PM fG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
4:28:42 PM f Judge jObjection is overruled 
4:29:45 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - relevance 
4:29:53 PM jT. Jones !Responds 
4:30:12 PM jJudge f Objection is sustained 
4:30:40 PM fG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
4:30:43 PM !Judge jobjection is overruled 
4:31 :16 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
4:31 :21 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:33:00 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - argumentative 
4:33:06 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:34:02 PM 1G. Haddad jObjection - argumentative & leading 
4:34:11 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:34:43 PM jG. Haddad f Objection 
4:34:46 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
4:36:09 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - speculative 
4:36:24 PM jJudge !objection is sustained 
4:37:28 PM f G. Haddad /Objection - leading, asked and answered 
4:37:30 PM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
4:37:48 PM iG. Haddad icross-examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
4:38:22 PM i f oeposition of Geoffrey Stiller is published 
4:46:55 PM iT. Jones iobjection 
4:46:59 PM f Judge jObjection is overruled 
4:57:39 PM jT. Jones jobjection - over broad 
4:57:46 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
4:58: 19 PM jJudge jadmonishes the jury 
4:58:49 PM j jcourt recesses 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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A.M CA I :'.?1? Fl.ED ...l ~ ,P.M----
SEP 2 5 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
. By TARA VILLEREAL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS' BENCH MEMO RE: 
THE INTRODUCTION OF AIR 
FORCE MEDICAL RECORDS OF 
KRYSTAL BALLARD FOR 
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES 
Defendants seek to introduce a July 23, 2010 Air Force medical clinic 
record for Krystal Ballard to be used for the purpose of impeachment. Plaintiff contends 
DEFENDANTS' BENCH MEMO RE: THE INTRODUCTION OF AIR FORCE MEDICAL 
RECORDS OF KRYSTAL BALLARD FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES -1 
002388
that this record should not be used because it was not included as an exhibit in 
Defendants' Exhibit List at the last trial. This is not a valid objection, however, as the 
document is admissible for purposes of impeachment. Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 16(h), the defense is not required to disclose impeachment exhibits. 
The Defendants intend to use this Air Force record to impeach Mrs. Ballard 
based on the inconsistency of her statements made in a number of hours to Air Force 
health care provider Kristina K. Swartz versus what she told Dr. Kerr on July 23, 2010 just 
hours later. The Air Force medical record dated July 23, 2010, a copy of which is 
attached hereto, reflects that Mrs. Ballard told Kristina K. Swartz that she was in pain in 
her back as a result of having slid down the stairs the previous night for which she took an 
old prescription of Norco. No mention is made of her having had the prior surgical 
procedure with Dr. Kerr which is something that would have been included in the record 
had it been disclosed by Mrs. Ballard. Hours later on the same date, however, Mrs. 
Ballard told a different story completely to Dr. Kerr, and she said that she was having pain 
in her buttocks with no mention of having fallen down any stairs. 
In this wrongful death action, the inconsistent statements of Mrs. Ballard are 
proper to raise to the jury to consider. 
A. The Defense is Entitled to Introduce Mrs. Ballard's Air Force 
Medical Record For Impeachment Purposes. 
The Defense is entitled to introduce the Air Force medical record of Mrs. 
Ballard for impeachment purposes. The Plaintiff in this case, Charles Ballard, stands in 
the shoes of Krystal Ballard and may not recover in this case unless Krystal Ballard could 
have recovered had she sued the Defendants herself. The Plaintiff is subject to all of the 
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defenses of the Defendants to claims and suits of Krystal Ballard as if she had sued the 
Defendants, and the Plaintiff is subject to the Rules of Evidence that would apply if Krystal 
Ballard had sued the Defendants. For this reason, the inconsistent statements of Krystal 
Ballard can be used for impeachment purposes when offered into evidence by the 
Defense, regardless that Krystal Ballard made those statements. The credibility of Mrs. 
Ballard should in all fairness be subject to impeachment since the Plaintiff stands in her 
shoes. 
Defendants are entitled to impeach Krystal Ballard with her obviously 
inconsistent statements. The jury is entitled to know that Mrs. Ballard told the Air Force 
health care provider that she was in pain in her back not her buttocks and that it was 
because she slid down the stairs, not from the surgical procedure. The jury is entitled to 
know that within about two hours of her statement to the Air Force Medical Clinic, Mrs. 
Ballard told Dr. Kerr something completely different. The jury should be entitled to make 
its own observations and come to its own conclusions with respect to Mrs. Ballard's 
truthfulness and credibility. A jury could infer that since the two aforementioned 
statements are inconsistent, that Krystal Ballard's other statements to Dr. Kerr and others 
are untruthful. 
8. The Inconsistent Statements of Mrs. Ballard are Imputed to 
Plaintiff Charles Ballard in this Wrongful Death Action. 
The Defense submits that Idaho law supports that the inconsistent 
statements of Mrs. Ballard are imputed to Plaintiff Charles Ballard. A decedent's 
negligence in a wrongful death action is imputed to the plaintiff due to the derivative 
nature of a wrongful death action. See Woodburn v. Manco, 137 Idaho 502, 506, 50 
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P.3d 997, 1001 (2002) (stating that the negligence of a decedent is imputed to a plaintiff in 
a wrongful death action). By this same reasoning, a decedent's inconsistent statements 
would also be admissible to impeach the actions of the decedent in a wrongful death 
action. 
C. I.R.E. 806 Also Supports that the Defense Should be Allowed to 
Introduce the Medical Record for Impeachment Purposes. 
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 806 provides as follows: 
When a hearsay statement, 1 or a statement defined in Rule 
801 (d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the 
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked 
may be supported, by any evidence which would be 
admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a 
witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the 
declarant at any time, inconsistent with declarant's hearsay 
statement, is not subject to any requirement that declarant 
may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If 
the party against whom a hearsay statement has been 
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled 
to examine the declarant on the statement as if under 
cross-examination. 
I.RE. 806 (emphasis added). 
It is apparent that I.R.E. 806 contemplates the use of impeachment 
evidence in order to call into question the hearsay statements of non-testifying 
declarants. See State v. Hernandez, 191 Ariz. 553, 557, 959 P.2d 810, 814 (Ct. App. 
1998) (finding that Arizona Rule of Evidence 806, which is similar to I.R.E. 806, "clearly 
contemplates use of impeachment evidence to discredit hearsay statements by 
1 This refers to all hearsay statements regardless whether those hearsay 
statements could be introduced at trial because they fall within one of the hearsay 
exceptions. A statement that falls within a hearsay exception is still considered hearsay, 
and the hearsay exceptions contained within the rules of evidence do not alter the fact 
that these statements are still hearsay statements. 
DEFENDANTS' BENCH MEMO RE: THE INTRODUCTION OF AIR FORCE MEDICAL 
RECORDS OF KRYSTAL BALLARD FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES -4 
002391
non-testifying declarants .... "). The language of I.RE. 806 indicates that the credibility of 
an unavailable hearsay declarant can be attacked, and this is evident by the language in 
I.R.E. 806 which states that any evidence that would be admissible if declarant had 
testified as a witness is admissible to support the impeachment of that declarant. 
In the present case, Mrs. Ballard's medical records, including statements 
she made to various health care providers, have been admitted into evidence because 
they fall within one or more hearsay exceptions. Particularly, Defendant Dr. Kerr's records 
pertaining to his care and treatment of Mrs. Ballard have been admitted. These records, 
which have been admitted by stipulation, also fall within several hearsay exceptions. For 
example, the hearsay exception contained within I.R.E. 803(4) allows statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment to be admitted. See I.RE. 803(4). Further, the medical 
records also fall within the business records exception. See I.RE. 803(6); United States 
v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that medical records from a hospital 
visit fall within the business records exception, and statements made to a doctor fall within 
the statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment exception). These 
two exceptions apply to allow the introduction of Dr. Kerr's medical records containing 
statements of Mrs. Ballard. 
Since the hearsay statements of Mrs. Ballard to Defendant Dr. Kerr have 
been admitted, impeachment evidence of Mrs. Ballard's statements to the Air Force 
health care provider should also be admitted, pursuant to I.RE. 806. See I.R.E. 806. 
Defendants submit that they are entitled to impeach Mrs. Ballard's statements by any 
means that would have been permissible had Mrs. Ballard been present and testified. 
See I.RE. 806; State v. Hernandez, 191 Ariz. 553, 557, 959 P.2d 810, 814 (Ct. App. 
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1998) (quoting State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 501, 924 P.2d 497, 505 (App.1996) 
("Rule 806 'specifically permits impeachment of a hearsay statement made by an absent 
declarant by any means which would have been permissible had the declarant been 
present and testified."'). Since pursuant to I.R.E. 613(b) the Defense could have 
introduced the Air Force medical record had Mrs. Ballard testified at trial, it follows that the 
Defense should be able to introduce the record in Mrs. Ballard's absence pursuant to 
I.RE. 806. 
Further, there is no question that the statement contained within the Air 
Force medical record regarding the fall down the stairs is attributable to Mrs. Ballard. 
Although Kristina Swartz will not be testifying at trial, the Court can reasonably infer from 
the face of the Air Force record that Mrs. Ballard was the actual source of the statements 
at issue. It is clear from the record that Mrs. Ballard is the only source of the information, 
as there is no indication that anyone else attended the appointment with her. The record 
is clear, and there is no ambiguity presented in the record that would indicate that anyone 
other than Mrs. Ballard made the statement. 
The Defense respectfully submits that it should be allowed to introduce the 
Air Force medical record to impeach Mrs. Ballard because I.R.E. 806 supports admitting 
the Air Force record regardless that Mrs. Ballard will not be testifying at trial. Had Mrs. 
Ballard testified at trial, I.R.E. 613(b) would have supported the introduction of the Air 
Force record, as I.RE. 613(b) allows the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement when the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the 
inconsistent statement. See I.R.E. 613(b). Since I.RE. 613(b) would have supported the 
admission of the record had Mrs. Ballard testified at trial, it follows that I.RE. 806 supports 
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the admission of the Air Force medical record. 
D. Impeachment Exhibits Are Not Required to Be Disclosed. 
Defendants submit that they are not required to disclose impeachment 
evidence under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
16(h) provides as follows: 
In the event no final pre-trial conference is held, the court 
may enter an order directing the parties to file with the court 
and serve on all opposing counsel, or upon parties not 
represented by counsel, a list of all exhibits to be offered at 
trial and a list of the names and addresses of all witnesses 
which such party may call to testify at the trial, except for 
impeachment witnesses and exhibits. Any exhibits or 
witnesses discovered after such disclosure shall immediately 
be disclosed to the court and opposing counsel by filing and 
service stating the date upon which the same was 
discovered. Failure to comply with this rule may be grounds 
for excluding an exhibit from admission into evidence or for 
excluding a witness from testifying in the trial of the action. 
Provided the court, for good cause shown and in order to 
prevent injustice may permit additional exhibits to be used or 
additional witnesses to testify at the trial. 
I.R.C.P. 16(h) (emphasis added). 
Since impeachment evidence is not required to be disclosed, Defendants 
respectfully submit that they should be allowed to introduce Mrs. Ballard's July 23, 2010 
Air Force medical record for impeachment purposes. Moreover, the Air Force medical 
records that Defendants seek to admit were produced by Plaintiff more than a year ago in 
discovery. Furthermore, these records were referred to by Dr. Stiller at the first trial last 
November. As a result, there is no unfair surprise, and Plaintiff is well aware of both the 
existence and the contents of the record. 
Therefore, Defendants request that this Court allow the use of the July 23, 
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2010 Air Force medical record for impeachment purposes. The jury is entitled to know 
about Mrs. Ballard's inconsistent statements so it can make its own observations and 
conclusions regarding her veracity and because there is no unfair surprise to Plaintiff. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE O~~~VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisfth day of September, 2014, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' BENCH MEMO RE: THE 
INTRODUCTION OF AIR FORCE MEDICAL RECORDS OF KRYSTAL BALLARD FOR 
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES by delivering the same to each of the following, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-827 4 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] FacsimilE;l (205) 733-4896 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280), dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309), smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
NO. 
A.M.q, {) 5 ~ ----
SEP 2i6 2014 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad, ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VIUEAEAL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK,TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILKTOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
CURATIVE JURY INSTRUCTION TO 
ADDRESS DEFENDANTS' 
VIOLATION OF PRETRIAL RULING 
Prior to the trial in this matter, this Court instructed the parties that no mention of the 
previous trial in November 2013 should occur in front of the jury. The Court further ruled that to 
the extent it was necessary to refer to witness testimony from this prior trial, the parties could 
prefer to a "prior proceeding" or prior testimony without referring to a "trial." Notwithstanding 
1 - PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR CURATIVE JURY INSTRUCTION TO ADDRESS 
DEFENDANTS' VIOLATION OF PRETRIAL RULING 
ORIGINAL 
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the Court's ruling in this regard, defense witness Briana (Kerr) Dumas referred to this prior trial 
during her testimony before the jury on September 25, 2014. This testimony prejudices Mr. 
Ballard as the jury may now speculate about why there was a prior trial, why there is now a 
second trial and question the validity of his claims. The Court recognized as much in its very 
clear directive that no mention of this prior trial be made. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court give the following curative jury instruction 
to address this violation of the Court's ruling: 
You have heard reference during this trial to a prior proceeding in 
November 2013. Yesterday, a witness for the defendants testified that this prior 
proceeding was a prior trial in this case. I had instructed the parties before the 
start of this trial that no mention of this prior trial should be made because I was 
afraid that a reference to a prior trial would influence your decision in this case. 
My instruction was not followed by this defense witness. 
I am now compelled to inform you that a trial in the case now before you 
began in November of 2013, but it was not completed or submitted to the prior 
jury. It was not completed because a defense witness in that trial failed to abide 
by a pretrial ruling from this court. This violation prejudiced Mr. Ballard to such 
a degree that I declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial. 
The fact that this earlier trial was not completed should not play a part in 
your deliberations or consideration of the evidence in this case. 
r,.,,-, 
DATED this d (, day of September, 2014. 
Respectfully submitted, 




BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September~, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served upon the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrance Jones 
QUANE JONES McCOLL PLLC 
Scott McKay 
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Judge Bail 092614 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
08:38:48 AM i j CVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 8 ............................................................ 
08:40:37 AM intiff's I Scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
rne I ............................................................ , .. ~.:.,., .. ::-.. ; ........... .Y ..................................................................................... -.......................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
ndant's ! Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
................................... ,f .. ::-.:.,.;· .. ;;;.; .. ;n .. ,eY .................................... 1 .............................................. - ..........................................................................................................................................................................................  
09:37:42 A Judge I Calls case 
-~~:;~:ri~-~~ IG ... Haddad··--i::~:~~~: -~~~:::xamination · of the ·witness·_ ·Geoffrey·-
i iStiller 
09:41 :49 AM IT. Jones ! Objection - foundation 
09:41 :53 AM I Judge Objection is overruled 
:iii~iiii:~~·IIu~}l:;::=-1~~j:~~i;[:lf f t~~;;;;~:::·~~.:~t::elfare =:::: 
09:58:35 AM iT. Jones , bjection - relevance & foundation 
09:58:46 AM j G. Haddad j asks questions to lay foundation 
··~·~'.·~~'.·~~ .. ~~.! T .... J;:es ................................ I·~~~;~~; wi11···not .. be··published .......................................................................................................................  
... fcf .. fcf·4'j'")i:fvi", T. Jones j Objection - mis-characterzation 
1O:10:55 AM j Judge j Objection is sustained 
10:12:47 AM!T. Jones jObjection - relevance 
··~· ~'.· ~·;;·;1 .. ~~·l·~~~~~es .................................. !.~~1:~::~~·· ~s a~~:~~~~ .. answered ............................................................................................................  
.. 1. 0 :.1. 3 :.56 .. AM _j_J udge . Objection ... is .. overruled .......................................................................................................................................................  
10: 14:37 AM IT. Jones I Objection - argumentative 
}~:.i~::~:;~J~:1~:es -- -.~~J:::~~::::::::::::::::=::=====::::: 
10:28:56 AM iT. Jones i Objection - compound 
.. 1. 0 :.28:.58 .. AM.i.Judge ............................................ : jection ... is ... sustained .................................................................................................................................................... .. 
.. 1. O :.34 :.52 .. AM .1.T · ... Jones.................................. .!.?.~ ... : ... ~E~.~ .. ~.~.~.!.~.~.!Y.~ ......................................................................................................................................  
10:34:54 AM i Judge 
10:46:35 AM j Judge dmonTshes'The .. }ury ............................................................................................................................  
.. 1.0:46:.38 .. AM.i ....................................................................... i.court .. recesses ................................................................................................................................................................................. .. 
11 :07:34 AM rt resumes ............................................................ .. ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
11 :07:41 AM: the jury is present 
11 :07:44 AM j G. Haddad I continues cross-examination of the witness - Geoffrey 
\ iStiller 
: j: li~iii!: ~~II1i~:: =:::::::[ i~~;i~~:: ·:::::~::.answered=••=•=•••==•=~:::::::=::::::::= 
9/26/2014 Courtroom51 O 
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11 :24:22 AM i T. Jones I Objection 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
11 :24:2 , I Jury is excused 
-i i ::5:04 AM !_;~~;:es ------i~?~F:~~:~;~ained ________________________________________  
..................................... . ...................... -.................................... .. ............................................................................................................................................................... , .... -.............................................. . 
11 :36:29 AM curt resumes 
11 :36:38 AM! the jury is present 
11 :36:41 AM j G. Haddad I continues cross-examination of the witness - Geoffrey 
........................................................... ! ...................................................................... !.Stiller ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1 
11 :40:21 AM i T. Jones i Re-direct examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
i i 
11 :45:59 AM! G. Haddad i Objection - leading 
··~··}\·t~·[·~}··~~·· G. i:ddad·························l·~~1:~::~~···~s a~::~u~~~···answered·············································································································· 
.Tf:·4·tf34""")i:fvf1 e tion is sustainea······················································································································································· 
··:rf:·4·i:··r7···Ai\if G. Haddad I Objection - beyond the scope························································································································· 
11 :47:36 AM i Judge j Objection is overruled 
-i-i-::i:~~-;~.!!ud~:::::--!-~;;~;;e_i1::~~:stion ___________ _ 
.. 1 ..1.:49:.08 .. AM.: Judge·························-···-·········j·Objection ... is .. sustained························································································································································ 
11 :49:30 AM . Haddad I Objection - leading 
11 :49:32 AM i Judge i Objection is sustained 
11 :49:40 AM j G. Haddad , Objection - asked and answered ···································································································· 
.. ~ .. ~.;:;;:~ .. ~~·i·~~di:ddad·························l·~:~:~::~~···~sl:~;~~~ned·················-································································································································ 
-i-i-:~::!~-;~.!-~::~:ddad __________ ,.~~;:;:~~-~: b:~~:~~e-scope----------------------------
11 :5 · ; G. Haddad j Objection - leading 
11 :54:27 A Judge j Objection is overruled 
11 :55:33 G. Haddad i Objection - overly broad 
.. j).:~~:~~--;~i-~~~:ddad _l_~~J:;:~~-i:f~~:~~i~~-------·-----· 
11 :59:58 AM j G. Haddad ion - leading 
12: 00: 00 PM i Judge ..... ,.,·o······n·······,is·········o· .. · ·v····e·······r···r···u·····1, .. e····d···,· ························································································································································ 
··························································+························································ ············-···························-····················"·················· ........... . 
12:00:49 PM I jury questions are handed to the Court 
· ···r~i":·od··:·s"s"···PiVi··t··································································lstae=ba·r······························· ...............................................................................................................................................................................  
··1·2:·1·2:49···PM·l·Judge·········································T1nquires···ofthe··witness··_··Geoffrey··stiller················································································ 
··1·2:·20:·01····p ·········T:··Jones·······-·····················TRe-direct··exam'ination··of.the··witness·-··Geoffrey··stiller························ 
...................................... . .................................................................. ..1. .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
12:21 :05 PM G. Haddad J Objection - leading and beyond the scope 
···1°2":·:i"r:··rr··is-rvf puag·e·· .. ·········································,··ohJecHa·n···1s···overr.u"ie,r······························· .. ································ .. ·············································································· 
9/26/2014 Courtroom510 
002403
Judge Bail 092614 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
12:21 :26 PM I G. Haddad I Objection - beyond the scope 
12:21:36 PMjJudge iobjection is sustained 
12:21 :44 PM i G. Haddad e-cross examination of the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
.......................................................... ..!. ........................................................................ ; .....  
12:25:03 PM' Judge cuses the witness - Geoffrey Stiller 
.................................... ...................................... . ......................................................................................... - ........................................................................................................................................... . 
12:25:1 Judge , admonishes the jury 
..................................... • ............................ -, .......... = .................................................................................................................................................... - .......................................................................................... . 
12:25: 17 PM! I Court recesses 
··~~;.~~;·~o P ·································-····················-············l·~~~~~e~u:~~resent ....................................................................................................................................................... .. 
02:00:07 P McKay jArgues to strike the testimony of Goffrey Stiller 
02:12:05 P T. Jones jArgues in opposition to striking the testimony of Geoffrey 
......................................... - .......................... 1. Sti I le r .................................................................................................................. -.................. -............................................................................... . 
02:31 :54 Judge will not strike the testimony of Geoffrey Stiller 
........................... .................................................................... . .................................................................................................................................................................................................. -............................................ . 
02:45:55 PM Court recesses 
: .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
02:50:16 PMI !Court resumes 
-~~:;~:!:-:~ IT_-Jones--l~:1/~Ja~np~~~~:~y,· sworn, -direct examination _________ ................................... , 
-~~:~::!i-~~-:;u~E:ad---i-~~~:~r::J~~:::~e-admission_of-Exhib~-#-F _ 
03:05:09 PM dge jObjection is sustained 
!!it!~~-i-~ud~:::::----i ~~:;:~~--'.•~:~:~~~~e-·scope ----------------
03: 18:42 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
··~;;:;;·~~·· PM i ~~d~:dd.ad ......................... !.~~1:~!:~~···~s s~;;~~:~n ...................................................................................................................................................  
.. 03:46:.59 ... PM.i.G· ... Haddad················ ... bjection .. -... relevance ......................................................................................................................................................... .. 
03:47:02 PM I Judge bjection is sustained ............................................................ ·......................................... .. ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
03:50:4 ad bjection - foundation 
03:50:5 i asks questions to lay foundation 
03:52: 17 P · admonishes the jury 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
03:52:21 PM 1Court recesses 
04:07:29 PM I j·court resumes ............................. ........................ · ...................... . ....................... . 
· ~:;~;:!!-:~ i T.-Jones--i ::~:~~~:-;~::~~ct-examination-of the ~tness---John· 
............................................................ 1 ....................................................................... i. LundebY ............. _ ............................................... -..........................................................................................................................................  
.. 9.~.:.9..~ .. : .. 1 .. !. .... !:.~ .. 1..9..: .... ~.~.~.~ad 1 ..~?..~J.~.~!!.~.~ ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................  
04:09:23 PM Judge Objection is overruled 
04: 18:56 PM l G. Haddad I Objection 




Judge Bail 092614 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
04:25:00 PM I Judge I Objection is overruled 
.. 04:28:.07 ... P.MJG ..... Haddad mination of the witness - John Lundeby 
04:34:37 PM I ition of John Lundeby is published 
04 :4o :21 PM i Judge Y .. iestim·,,-riii ... rega·raTn·g ... fra'ri.sc·rrpts ... ofb'r: .... Grob'iiri.i .. . 
............................................................ 1 ........................................................................................ imonY .........................................................................................................................................................................................................  
04:46:27 PM! T. Jones I Objection - foundation 
04:46:30 PM I Judge Objection is overruled 
-~::;~-:;~-:~ 1~~~:;·· ------,~~i:::~~-;.f~~:~,:\~~---------------------
. ~~ii~!!~ :M 'If!~:: ::::::::::=ii~l~;:~~: li~;~~f  ==:~:=:~::::::::::=::::::::::::::::::= 
.. ~·l·~·~·[·J6 PM i.Judge ............................................ 1.~!~~~::::s:se .. jury ................................................ - .........................................................................................................  
............................................................ ; ....................................................................... J .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
05:11 :21 PM I !Court resumes 
~;....;....;..~---'--'"'""-' 1 
05:11 :28 PM i !the jury is present 
.. 05 :.1 .. 1 ·:·3·1 .... P MJG ...... Hadd~d ........................ J~~~~~~~s .. cross-examination .. of .the. witness ... -.. Jo·h·n ......................................  
05: 12:56 PM T. Jones irect examination of the witness - John Lundeby 
05:13:09 PM G. Haddad tion -foundation 
................................. 
.. 9..?. .. : ..! .. 9-.. : .. ! .. ~ ..... ~-~.i e I Objection is overruled 
05:14:09 PM Judge I excuses the witness - John Lundeby .. ~;;·~·::·;; ... :~·! Judge ............................................ 1.~!:~~::::s~hse .. jury ........................ -...................................................................................................................................  
.. 05:.1.8:.02 ... PM.! ....................................................................... i.court .. resumes .................................................................... -............................................................................................................  
05:18:06 PMi jthejury is not present 
05: 18: 15 PM j S. McKay · Argues for a curative jury instruction 
··~;;-~-::;~ ... :~ ·1·~_-.. ~~:na: ··66~·~·:·~{~ ... ~:.~.~E~.! .. ~.~ ... ~.?..~.~.~.:.~.'..~ .... ~.~.~ .. ~.:.~.!.~ .......................................................................  
05:20:53 PM j Judge comments regarding courisefi·s .. ·c·o·m·m·enis ....................................................................... . 





Judge Bail 093014 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
8:32:37 AM i jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 9 
8:33:00 AM jPlaintiff's lscott McKay & Greg Haddad 
/attorney i 
8:33:06 AM iDefendant's iJeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
!attorney i 
9:35:22 AM iJudge icalls case 
9:35:30 AM 1 jthe jury is present 
9:35:40 AM iJ. Quane lcalls Thomas Coffman, sworn, direct examination 
9:42:24 AM iJ. Quane tExhibit # D previously marked is identified, moves .. to.admit" ....... 
: ' i i 
9:42:26 AM f G. Haddad iNo objection 
9:42:29 AM 1Judge jExhibit #Dis admitted 
9:58:45 AM fG. Haddad jobjection - leading & foundation 
9:58:47 AM fJudge jobjection is sustained 
9:59:05 AM f G. Haddad jObjection - leading & foundation 
9:59:07 AM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
10:00:23 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading & un-disclosed opinion 
10:00:43 AM f Judge jJury is excused 
10:02: 11 AM jJ. Quane j Hands the Court the deposition of the witness - Thomas 
I !Coffman 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,o. .......................................... J, ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
10:07:55 AM !Judge !Re-phrase the question 
10:08:35 AM j jthe jury is present 
10:09:06 AM jJudge 1 Inquires of the witness - Thomas Coffman 
10:09:56 AM f J. Quane lcontinues direct examination of the witness - Thomas 
I !Coffman 
................................................ J .......................................... ,i ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
10: 11 :25 AM !G. Haddad !Objection - leading 
10:11 :34 AM !Judge JObjection is overruled 
-~·~:·~}!!· ~~.1~~d::ddad _l~~:::~~ .;;~;;~~:~"-- _ _ _ _ _ _ ________ _ 
10:15:51 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading & speculation 
10:16:01 AMfJudge jobjection is sustained 
10:16:38 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading & asked and answered 
10:17:20 AMJJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:19:31 AM IG, Haddad !Cross-examination of the witness -Thomas Coffman 
' : i i 
.. 1.o:_1.9:46_AMJJ._.auane ........... Jobjection ....................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
10:19:49 AM !Judge IObjection is overruled 
10:21:27 AMJJ. Quane fObjection -
10:21 :33 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
10:21 :54 AM f f Deposition of the witness is published - Thomas Coffman 
' ' ................................................ l .......................................... l ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
10:23:41 AM 1J. Quane !Objection - beyond the scope 
10:23:51 AMiJudge lobjection is overruled 
' I 
9/30/2014 1 of 4 
002406
Judge Bail 093014 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
10:27:30 AM jJ. Quane !Objection - misstates the testimony 
10:27:33 AM jJudge f Objection is overruled 
10:27:56 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - misstates the testimony 
10:27:58 AM jJudge lobjection is overruled 
10:28:54 AM jJ. Quane !Objection - beyond the scope 
10:28:56 AM !Judge f Objection is overruled 
10:29:47 AM jJ. Quane jobjection 
10:29:50 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
10:31 :55 AM f J. Quane f Objection - relevance 
10:31 :58 AM jJudge f Objection is overruled 
10:34:11 AM jJ. Quane !Objection - beyond the scope . 
10:34:12 AM jJudge 1objection is overruled 
10:35:33 AM jJ. Quane !objection - beyond the scope 
10:35:36 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
10:36:35 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - relevance & beyond the scope 
10:36:48 AM jJudge !Objection is overruled 
10:38:18 AMfJ. Quane jobjection - relevance 
10:38:25 AM !Judge !Objection is sustained 
10:39:03 AM jJ. Quane jObjection - relevance & beyond the scope 
10:41 :08 AM 1Judge jobjection is sustained 
10:41 :28 AM f J. Quane !Objection - asked and answered 
10:41 :30 AM fJudge jObjection is overruled 
10:47:25 AM jJ. Quane f Objectior, - relevance & beyond the scope 
10:47:28 AM jJudge f objection is overruled 
10:49:56 AM !J. Quane !Re-direct examination of the witness - Thomas Coffman 
i ! 
10:50:14 AMiG. Haddad lobjection - leading 
10:50:16 AM jJudge !Objection is overruled 
10:51 :41 AM jG. Haddad f objection 
10:51 :43 AM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
10:52:56 AM i fjury questions are handed to the Court 
10:53:05 AM i iside-bar 
10:59:00 AM iJudge i1nquires of the witness - Thomas Coffman 
11 :05:50 AM iG. Haddad iRe-cross examination of the witness - Thomas Coffman 
I I 
i i .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
11 :07:28 AM !J. Quane !Objection - relevance 
11 :07:30 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
11 :09:40 AM jJ. Quane jobjection - relevance 
11 :09:44 AM lJudge JObjection is sustained 
........................................................................................... 1 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
11 :09:57 AM !Judge 1excuses the witness -Thomas Coffman 
_1 _1 :_1_0_:0 __ 6 __ A __ M.,,,.,,jJudge ladmonishes the jury . 
11: 10: 11 AM I Jcourt recesses 
I ' 
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11 :30:03 AM! !Court resumes 
11:30:10 AM f f the jury is present 
11 :30: 13 AM iJ. Quane icalls Brian Kerr, previously sworn, direct examination 
~ i 
11 :37:25 AM f J. Quane 1Exhibits # Q1-Q4 previously marked are identified for 
! . !demonstrative purposes only 
11 :38:03 AM fG. 'Haddad Ino objection to demonstrative purposes only 
11 :38:05 AM iJudge iExhibits # Q1-Q4 are not admitted but may be used for 
! )demonstrative purposes only 
12:02:46 PM fJudge fadmonishes the jury 
12:02:54 PM f icourt recesses 
1 :39:50 PM i f court resumes 
1 :39:50 PM j lthe jury is present · 
1 :39:50 PM iJ. Quane icontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
~ ! 
1 :40:56 PM IJ. Quane tExhibit # Z16, Z35 & Z36 previously marked are identified for 
! !demonstrative purposes only 
1:42:12 PM fG. Haddad fno objection to demonstrative purposes only 
1 :42:14 PM iJudge iExhibits # Z35 & Z36 are not admitted but may be used for 
! !demonstrative purposes only . 
2:07:45 PM 1G. Haddad 10bjection - relevance 
2:07:47 PM !Judge !Objection is sustained 
2:18:33 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
2:18:34 PM jJudge fobjection is overruled 
2:46:53 PM jJudge f admonishes the jury 
2:46:58 PM i f court recesses 
3:00:28 PM f icourt resumes 
3:00:33 PM i fthe jury is present 
3:00:42 PM lJ. Quane lcontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
: i 
3:14:48 PM f f side-bar 
3:19:03 PM iJudge iJury is excused 
3:20:27 PM iJudge iwm allow the witness to review his notes to refresh his 
! ! recollection 
• 
3:44:53 PM 1 fthe jury is present 
3:45: 19 PM iJ. Quane icontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
3:48:20 PM f G. Haddad f objection - leading 
3:48:22 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:50:12 PM fG. Haddad Jobjection - compound & leading 
3:50:19 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
3:50:49 PM jG. Haddad jObjection - leading 
3:50:51 PM fJudge f Objection is overruled 
3:54: 19 PM j G. Haddad j Objection - matter of law 
9/30/2014 3 of4 
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! • 
Judge Bail 093014 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee 
3:54:22 PM !Judge !Objection is sustained 
4:04:02 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - improper use of deposition 
4:04:15 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
4:05:46 PM jG. Haddad jobjection 
4:05:49 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:07:31 PM f G. Haddad f Objection - leading 
4:07:34 PM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
4:07:43 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading and foundation 
4:07:50 PM f Judge jRe-phrase question 
4:08:50 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
4:08:52 PM f Judge f Objection is overruled 
4:10:20 PM jG. Haddad jObjection 
4:10:25 PM jJudge f Objection is overruled 
4:11 :39 PM jG. Haddad jobjection 
4:11 :45 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
4: 13:00 PM lG. Haddad lobjection - misrepresentation of testimony 
4: 13:02 PM jJudge f Objection is sustained 
4:14:02 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
4:14:04 PM jJudge f Objection is sustained 
4:15:30 PM jG. Haddad lobjection - waiver issue 
4:15:34 PM fJudge !Objection is overruled 
4: 19:33 PM f G. Haddad jObjection - speculation 
4:19:45 PM jJudge jRe-phrase question 
4:31 :24 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - hearsay 
4:31 :26 PM f Judge jobjection is sustained 
4:32:49 PM fG. Haddad fobjection - hearsay & leading 
4:33:01 PM jJudge jRe-phrase question 
4:40:32 PM jG. Haddad jObjection - relevance 
4:40:35 PM fJudge f Objection is overruled 
4:48:40 PM jG. Haddad jObjection - leading 
4:48:42 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
4:48:48 PM jJudge jadmonishes the jury 
4:48:55 PM j jJury is excused 
4:50:08 PM fr. Jones f Exhibit# Z52 should have been identified as Z43 
4:51:14 PM jr. Jones icomments re: order & revised order 
4:54:15 PM jJudge !instructs counsel 
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RECORDING/TRANSCRIBING AND USE 
OF UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS 
The prior order is withdrawn BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 























SEP 3 0 2014 
CHAISTQPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VILLEREAL 
DEPUTY 
On September 26, 2014, late in the afternoon session in this trial, defendants' counsel, 
Terrence Jones, attempted to place before the jury in this case an unofficial transcript of the 
testimony of Dr. Groben, a witness who had testified in the first week of the trial for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Jones represented to the court and the jury that it was a transcript of Dr. Groben's trial 
testimony. Plaintiff's counsel made a timely objection which was sustained since it was not 
proper to show the purported transcript in any event. The court's official reporter almost 
immediately advised the court that she had not been asked to prepare Dr. Groben's full trial 
testimony and had not prepared any official transcript of Dr. Groben's trial testimony. She later 
advised the court that she had given a small portion of unedited, rough notes to counsel but 
cautioned counsel that it was not an official transcript and could not be used in that fashion. 
It is a fundamental duty of every court to preserve the integrity of all trials and trial 
records. There are strict rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court which govern the 
Order Re: Unauthorized Recording/Unauthorized Transcripts 1 
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qualifications and training of district court reporters. The Supreme Court's rules are designed to 
ensure the integrity of the record. Court reporters are sworn officers of the court who are bound 
by their oath to honestly and accurately prepare transcripts of court proceedings and make a 
verbatim record of all oral communications. A court reporter certified in accordance with ICAR 
21 is required to report all civil trials. Standards of accuracy are required for official transcripts. 
ICAR 27 (e) provides: 
(e) Use of official transcripts of district court proceedings. In all cases where a 
party desires to place in evidence a transcript or partial transcript of a district court 
proceeding, or disclose the contents of a transcript during the examination of a witness, 
the transcript must be an official transcript as provided in subsection ( d) of this rule. 
In order to ensure that the record is accurate and meets the requirements of Idaho law: 
1. No document purporting to be a trial transcript of this trial 
or the previous trial which ended in a mistrial as a result of the 
defense violation of an order in limine may be shown in any manner 
whatsoever in open court without first advising the court of the 
intention to do so and the legitimate legal basis for doing so outside 
the presence of the jury with sufficient time for the court to confirm 
that it is indeed an official transcript. 
2. No counsel may engage in any recording of these 
proceedings by any device whatsoever for the recording or 
transmission of sounds or images from this trial. No electronic 
device capable of recording or transmitting sounds or images shall 
be activated while the electronic device is in the courtroom. 
3. The bailiff will be directed to confiscate any devices used in 
violation of this Order and they will not be returned until the jury 
Order Re: Unauthorized Recording/Unauthorized Transcripts 2 
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. ' 
has rendered its verdict. The bailiff is authorized to inspect for 
recording devices being used in violation of this Order. 
It is so ordered. 
District Judge 
Order Re: Unauthorized Recording/Unauthorized Transcripts 3 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
OCT O 1 ,1201~ 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VILLEREAL 
oePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR~ M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
, liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURY . 
INSTRUCTIONS RE DEATH 
CERTIFICATE AND THE 
ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE 
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Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, requests that the Court use the appended 
instruction regarding a certificate of death and proximate cause in addition to the instructions 
previously submitted by Plaintiff. The proposed instructions are based upon the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 56, 454 P.2d 951, 953 (1969) (death 
certificate) and Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, et al., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 
(2001) (proximate cause). Both instructions are accurate statements of the law and will assist the 
jury in deciding this case. 
SI-
Dated this_/_ day of October, 2014. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~ 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~f-
l hereby certify that on the _I _ day of October, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Request for Supplemental Jury Instructions by hand delivering the 
same to the following by hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 




PLAINTIFF'S JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The facts stated in a certificate of death are presumed to be true unless proven otherwise. 








PLAINTIFF'S WRY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The element of proximate cause can be established through a chain of circumstances from 
which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable. 







Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES Mc~OLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
::·~:a:z:-~::WO&kliP-
OCT O 1 ~2014 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VIUEREAL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: Ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
OFFER OF PROOF RE: RECORDS 
OF DR. KERR'S EXPERIENCE 
PERFORMING LIPOSUCTION 
Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF RE: 
RECORDS OF DR. KERR'S EXPERIENCE PERFORMING LIPOSUCTION - 1 
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says: 
1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, and the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2). The court has ruled that the defense may not utilize defense trial 
Exhibit AA, a copy of which is attached hereto and labeled as Exhibit AA. This document 
does not refer to infections or complications or lack thereof, but rather simply lists 
Defendant Dr. Kerr's other liposuction procedures up through 2010. Plaintiff's objected 
to the use of this exhibit or any reference being made to the absence of other patient 
infections on the ground that the medical records for all of these patients were not timely 
produced to Plaintiff's counsel. While the court has ruled on this issue, the defense was 
not allowed the opportunity to make a record in this trial opposing the Plaintiff's 
contentions. The following is offered for that purpose. 
3). That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of 
excerpts of Dr. Thomas Coffman's deposition which was taken by the Plaintiff on August 
20, 2013. At his deposition on pages 40-41, Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Haddad, refers to, 
having received the document which comprises exhibit AA, Dr. Kerr's patient list which 
contains the first names for patients undergoing 388 other liposuction procedures Dr. Kerr 
had performed including Krystal Ballard. 
4). That on September 16, 2013, Dr. Kerr supplemented his discovery 
response to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20 in which the patient list was again referred to 
and Susie Kerr is identified as the person who will testify about it. A true and correct copy 
of this discovery supplementation is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF RE: 
RECORDS OF DR. KERR'S EXPERIENCE PERFORMING LIPOSUCTION - 2 
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5). That on September 26, 2013, counsel for Dr. Kerr wrote to Mr. 
Haddad stating that Plaintiff's counsel's Susie Kerr's request to conduct a second 
deposition of Susie Kerr was made less than 60 days prior to trial and outside the time 
frame provided for in the Court's scheduling order and that the Defense would not 
voluntarily agree to produce her for a second time on that basis. A true and correct copy 
of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
6). That on Friday, September 27, 2013, Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Haddad, 
issued a notice of deposition duces tecum for Susie Kerr for her to sit for a second 
deposition on Tuesday, October 2, 2013 at noon. A true and correct copy of that 
document is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
7). That on Tuesday, October 1, 2013, counsel for Dr. Kerr sent an email 
to Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Haddad, confirming that Susie Kerr will not be produced the 
following day because the notice of deposition was untimely and based on defense 
counsel's letter of September 26. Plaintiff was informed that if he still sought to further 
depose Susie Kerr that he would need to seek court involvement. A true and correct 
copy of that document is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
8). Nothing further was done to address this issue by Plaintiff's counsel 
who then waited until the trial in November 2013, to instead represent to the court that the 
Defense had been properly requested, but had failed to produce the materials related to 
other patient medical records. The defense disputes that the medical records of other 
patients were ever properly or timely requested in discovery by Plaintiff's counsel and that 
the attached documents establish this fact which the defense has now tried on multiple 
occasions to share with the court despite rulings that information regarding other patient 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF RE: 
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infections will not be admitted at this trial. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2014. 
(SEAL) 
· , . CORINA FERRIS 
· STATE OF fDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF RE: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of October, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delive d 
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Last Name First Name Date ofTx procedures 
Kerr Susan Kerr 12.11.2007 abdomen 
Tiffanv 12.11.07 upper arms, abdomen 
Erica 12.24.07 abdomen, love handles, flank 
M..ike .. / .abdorn_en, _l_qv~ _handles & fla[!k 
~.. . 
' . i 1 •. ' ......... ·-· .. . 
. .. -. 1······ ·-·· -· - ............ l .. . 
• J •• ···-····- ... • • • i ...... . 
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,. 
Last Name First Name Date_ofTx orocedures 
.. .. .. :·.· .. . ... .. . 
Vicki 01.29.08 neck 
Donna 01.31.08 thiqhs 
Julie 02.01.08 full ab. love handles. bra fat 
ruth 02.02.08 lower ab, under bum. outer hips 
Jane 02.08.08 inner & outer thiah. knees 
Matthew 02.08.08 abdomen, flanks -
Nancy 02.11.08 neck, full abdomen & luvs 
Matthew 02.21.08 abdomen, chest 
Kerr Susan 02.25.08 luv handles, flank 
Ruth 02.25.08 luvs, inner thiah 
Jennifer 02.28.08 banana roll, inner & outer thiah -· 
Char 02.29.08 abdomen 
Patty 03.03.08 abdomen 
Pattv 03.03.08 abdomen 
Cheryl 03.04.08 abdomen, flank & loves 
Timothv 03.11.08 abdomen, flanks 
Joni 03.13.08 abdomen, neck 
Mike 04.01.08 abdomen & flank touch up · 
Kristvn 04.03.08 abdomen, flank, inner thiah, tootsie roll, uooer arm 
Simone 04.07.08 abdomen & flank 
Dee 04.09.08 abdomen, flanks 
Cindv 04.11.08 abdomen 
Tauni 04.17.08 inner & outer thiqh, tootsie roll 
Tonva 04.18.08 abdomen, hios, inner thiah 
Dennis 04.19.08 abdomen, flanks, neck -
Myrna 05.08.08 flanks.abdomen -
Cindv 05.13.08 abdomen 
Mollv 05.13.08 abdomen 
" 
Sheila 05.15.08 abdomen, outer lea, flanks, Fat transfer to face 
LeAnn 05.19.08 full ab 
Vicki 05.19.08 flank & bra fat 
Patricia 05.20.08 inner and outer thiah 
Melinda 05.21.08 inner & outer thiahs 
Jennifer 05.21.08 inner & outer thiahs .. 
Debbie 05.22.08 abdomen, flank 
JoAnn 05.22.08 abdomen, chin .. 
Kimber 05.29.09 abdmen & flank 
Kim 06.06.08 abdomen & love handles .. 
Diane 06.26.08 abdomen -
Teresa 07.03.08 abdomen. flanks 
Teresa 07.03.08 abdomen, flanks 
Randae 07.10.08 abdomen, flank, neck 
Paltv 07.11.08 abdomen touch up 
Pally 07.11.08 lower abdomen .. 
Kathv 07.12.08 uooer & lower abdomen .. 
Lisa 07.16.08 abdomen, fllank 
Krissie 07.17.08 abdomen 
Jenny 07.24.08 abdomen, bra & back fat, 
Pam 07.25.08 abdomen, lateral waist 
Steve 07.30.08 abdomen love handles & chest 
Marv Ann 07.30.08 neck 
Nancv 07.31.08 hips 
Lyubov 08.09.08 abdomen 
Jeanette 08.15.08 abdomen, thorax, waist, lat bra fat area 
Nancy 08.19.08 luv handles 
Kendall 09.03.08 arms 
Denis 09.04.08 Breast . ··-···· .... . . . .. : 
Beverly 09.05.08 abs & flank : 
----~-------·-·-·-···· ....... i 
Debbie 09.08.08 abdomen ' 
Eleanor 09.16.08 abdomen, lat waist, flank and lateral bra area 
Jennifer 09.16.08 outer & inner thiah, buttocks 
.. u ~-- -· ................... __ : 
Marion 09.17.08 waist. flank, neck, bra fat i ·-- --- ".... ........ •• •• __ ,, J 
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Jennv 09.19.08 arm, lat waist, nank 
Michelle 09.23.08 abdomen, lateral waist & thiqh 
Jennifer 09.25.08 inner/outer thiqh, knees 
Ernie 09.26.08 luvs, chest 
Kimber 10.02.08 abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
Lisa 10.07.08 outer & inner thiqh, abdomen 
Patty 10.30.08 abdomen flank, waist and bra area, arms, butt 
Kim 11.04.08 abdomen, waist, fat transfer to face 
Katie 11.12.08 inner & outer thiqhs 
Beckv 11.17.08 arms 
linda 12.08.08 full! ab, hios, luv, bra fat 
Erica · 12.27.08 abdomen, luv handles and flanks 
MANDI 12.28.08 abdomen, chin, inner thiqhs, arms 
002425























































1 procedures ·.· :· 
~ .. .. .·.·· .-: ·:· .... .. .. .. .. 
abdomen & neck, fat transfer to face 
abd, luv, bra fat 
abdomen, luv handles, flank 
ankles 
ful abd, chest from hip to armpit 
abd, luvs & flank 
abd 
abd 
full ab, luv, bra fat 
abdomen, outer thiqhs 
inner & outer thioh, 
ankle, thiqh, knee 
outer thiqh 
ab, luv, flank, bra fat 
abdomen, luv handles 
inner & outer thioh 
abd, waist, outer thiqh 
upper arm & lower arms, neck 
abdomen 
full abdomen 
outer, inner thigh, knees 
outer & inner thiqh, knee 
abdomen, full waist and flank 
full abdomen 
abdomen, lat waist & flank, & bra fat 
neck & lower iowels 
lat thigh touch up, fat transfer to outer 
thiqht 
inner & outer thigh, fat transfer to labia & 
face 
outer & inner thigh, flanks, fat transfer to 
face 
ab, luv handles 
abd, outer thiqhs 
chin, neck, arm 
abdomen and flanks 
upper arms, fat transfer to breast 
arms, fat transfer to face 
abdomen, lateral waist 
arm & bra fat 
Fat transfer to face 
outer & inner thiqh 
outer & inner thiqh & knees 
abd, lat waist & thorax 
full abd, luv & flank 
abd touch up, bra fat 
neck 
abdomen & luv handles 
ankles, arms 
neck 
Uooer & lower arms, fat transfer to face 
arm, fat transfer to breasts 
knees, f/t to breast 
inner thii:ih, ft to face and breast 
full ab, flank, bra fat 
abd, luv, bra fat, flank 














. -- ... ·-·-···-·-· .. . . .. ' ---·~ 
........ ···--···· ----- ······· - : 
....... ·- ....... -, .............. / 
... ---· ---· .... -........ . . ... . i 
. . ' ........................ " .• ·= 
··---.................. --······-·--: 
·- ---·· ...... ·---·... .. l 
....... , ..,_ .. ___ ,, .... _,.,,,,_J 
' .... -, ... _ .......... 0 .. - ..... _ ...... ---i 
; 
•-w~•••••" ''""'"" o, • .. , .. ,, .. ,.· ... , t 
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Ed 05.30.09 abd, lateral waist & flank .. 
Marion 06.01.09 lea, thiah, arm, chest wall, f/t to breast 
Tina 06.02.09 outer thiahs, fit to buttocks scar 
Letty 06.02.09 ab, luv, flank, f/t to butt 
abdomen, waist.bra fat, knees and right 
Lisa 06.03.09 upper leQ 
abdomen, lateral waist, inner & outer thigh, 
Shanna 06.13.08 upper lat buttocks, fat transfer to face 
Donna 06.17.09 outer thiqhs 
Tara 06.15.09 neck 
Donna 06.17.09 thiQhS 
Cheryl 06.22.09 full ab, waist & flank -
Chervl 06.24.09 inner thiah, bra fat, fat transfer to breast? 
Anthonv 07.06.09 abdomen, lateral waist 
Michelle 07.07.09 ab & fat transfer to face 
Aaron 07.08.09 breast, neck 
Jackie 07.30.09 full ab, love handles 
Terri 07.31.09 abd, waist, neck flt to breast 
Stacy 08.19.09 full ab, waist ft to face/hands/breast 
Keil 08.27.08 breast, full ab 
Carrie 08.27.09 full ab, flank, inner/outer thiqh 
Glenn 09.03.09 abd, lateral waist & flank 
Teresa 09.04.09 abdomen & waist 
Teresa 09.04.09 abdomen and lateral waist 
Chris 09.08.09 breast 
Phyllis 09.17.09 abd anterior, lower inner thiqh 
Ann 09.21.09 full abd, lat waist & flank 
Maureen 09.22.09 full abd, inner thiah 
Carol 09.23.09 full abdomen 
Jennifer 09.25.08 outer thiahs 
linda 09.25.09 arms 
LaDoena 09.30.09 abd,flank 
LaDoena 09.30.09 abd, flank, bra fat 
aladys 10.01.09 ab,bra fat, fat transfer to breast 
Tarena 10.02.09 abdomen, flank, love handles 
Lori 10.14.09 Lower ab, neck, 
Katie 10.21.09 outer & inner thiah f/t to breast 
Minni 10.22.09 abdomen, flank 
Lisa 11.13.09 love handle, flank, outer thiah 
Brandy 11.16.09 abdomen, flanks 
Helena 11.18.09 ab, love handles, neck 
Jackie 11.19.09 uooer knee, arms -
Marion 11.20.09 ankle, calfs, inner thiQh, axilla, flank, 
ruth 11.23.09 knees, lateral waist 
! Julia 11.24.09 outer & inner thiah, fat transfer to breast -·····-··. .. . ... 
Theresa 11.25.09 abd, lat waist, neck f/t to breast 
- - - - . " . - ~-· -· .. - - ·i 
Ashlev 12.04.09 abdome, lateral waist & flank 
Jim 12.11.09 abd, waist, chest 
............. _....... .. .~ ... ~ 
Travis 12.14.09 neck 
Alvson 12.15.09 abdomen, lat waist & flank 
Becky 12.17.09 ab, luv, inner thioh 
LeaAnn 12.18.09 abd, waist, butt f/t 
Adrienne 12.18.09 outer thiah 
Caiyun 12.21.09 ab, luv, bra fat, 
Janina 12.23.09 abd, waist, neck flt to breast 
John 12.24.09 chest 
Theresa 12.24.09 outer & inner thiah f/t to breast 
~ ......... ·---···--· .. ! 
···------·----- ···-- --. -- --· 
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Last Name First Name Date ofTx orocedures 
Tawnia 1.5.10 ab, flank bra 
Christine 1.8.10 thiqhs, waist 
Brandy 1.14.10 abd, flank, thiQh 
nancy 1.25.10 neck, torso, lateral waist, thorax FAT transfer 
Julie 1.29.10 ab revision, FAT transfer .. 
olivia 2.4.10 abd FAT to lip 
Christine 2.5.10 abd, arms, inner thioh 
Kerr Susan 2.10.10 ab touch uo 
Jennifer 2.10.10 lat outer thiqh 
Linda 2.11.10 flank, FAT 
Steohen 2.17.10 neck ... 
HHaleena 2.18.10 ab ·-
Pamela 2.19.10 ab, flank, FAT face .. 
Linda 2.23.10 abd,flank .. 
Deborah 2.24.10 abd,flank ,. 
Tina 3.1.10 Ab, flank 
Karrie 3.1.10 outer thiqhs 
Janet 3.3.10 thiahs, FAT breast.face, hands 
Letty 3.4.10 abd, arm, FAT bust, butt 
Chris 3.5.10 chest touch UP . 
Jennifer 3.5.10 knees, abdomen, outer thiah .. 
Kelly 03.08.10 abd, lat waist 
Anoie 3.11.10 inner, outer thiah, FAT breast . 
Lisa 3.10.10 outer thiqh, FAT breast -···. -·-"'·"-·· .. .. -.. - ... -· 
Linda 3.10.10 REVision thiqhs . 
Erin 3.12.10 flank, FAT breast . 
Janet 3.16.10 neck, FAT to face . 
Patricia 3.18.10 abd. arms, FAT to butt 
Jessica 3.19.10 abd, waist 
- --· ... ------··-- - _,, __ -·--·-
Michelle 3.22.10 abd, lat waist . 
Dwayne 3.23.10 ab,flank 
' ......... ,·-··-···-----·. --···"·-· ··: 
Geo 3.24.10 abdm flank -
Elsie 3.25.10 abd, flank, FAT face 
Kim 3.25.10 abd 
Ruth 4.5.10 lat thiqh touch up 
•••--••·-·-••m•• •••• •-•·•-• • 
Julia 4.6.10 thiohs ' . ----, .. -, .... -....... . .. -,,. _____ . 
Nancie 4.8.10 abd.flank,FAT 
Emily 4.9.10 outer thiah, inner FAT to breast -
Pauline 4.12.10 abd, arms, -
Sandy 4.13.10 abdomen FAT 
Elizabeth 4.14.10 abd, flank, inner thioh 
Sara 4.16.10 arms, FAT breast -__ ,_,. ______ -u -· ·- - . - ·--- ---· 
Joanna 4.16.10 abd, waist No•---·- -n• • • •• • - • --• -• • 
Phyllis 4.19.10 touch up 
. -·· ------- - . --····-··"" . ----- .j 
Jackie 4.21.10 3 areas, touch up, FAT 
Denise 4.30.10 abd, FAT to face 
Sandy 4.13.10 abdomen FAT 
Patty 4.13.10 abd TU, bra, Fat transfer 
Pauline 4.19.10 inner & outer lhiqh 
Tiffany 4.21.10 flanks 
Rebecca 4.22.10 abd 
--·-------··". -- . --- ·----- -. : 
Kathleen 4.30.10 thiohs ------··· ... -·- ____ ,, ________ _ 
Deborah 5.2.10 arms 
Jeanie 5.4.10 ab, flank, FAT to breast 
' i 
Marianne 5.6.10 3 areas FAT to butt 
Trina 5.7.10 abd, waist thiqh, FAT BUTI 
·- ·~- ••• • -- --M•M ! 
' ·-- -----·-.. ·------ ------. 
Dianne 5.14.2010 abd, FAT to face ' ·---- --- ---· . - - --··-·· - -· 
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Loretta 5.17.10 abd, flank, bra, FAT 
Rhonda 5.18.2010 Thighs, FAT breast & butt 
Bette 5.18.10 flanks, arms 
Melissa 5.20.10 ab, flank 
Gwen 5.25.10 tat transfer 
Debbie 5.26.10 inner, outer thiah, FAT breast 
Jackie 5.28.10 thiahs, FAT thiahs 
Paula 5.28.10 abd 
Barbara 6.2.10 ab, waist, bra fat 
Marv 6.3.10 abd, thiahs 
Lucy 6.4.10 3 areas(abdomen) FAT to hands 
Megan 6.8.10 abd, flank FAT 
Sheri 6.8.10 neck, iowels 
" 
Valerie 6.9.10 ab.flank .. 
Sally 6.16.10 outer thiah, flank, FAT 
Brianna 6.17.10 knees, thiahs, flank 
Melinda 6.18.10 abdm, flank waist 
Deborah 6.20.10 abd, flank, bra 
Sara 6.21.10 ab, waist, bra fat, 
Pamela 6.22.10 neck, jaw, abd, FAT to face 
Tracy 6.24.10 abdomen, flank -
Brenda 6.25.10 breast, thiah 
Deborah 6.30.10 arms 
Carolyn 7.1.10 abdm flank, FAT to face 
Linda 7.7.10 abd 
Kaye 7.6.10 abd, flank, arms, FAT to breast 
Shawn 7.13.10 neck 
full abdomen, luv handles, flank & fat 
Ballard Krvstal 07.21.10 transfer to butt 
Roxann 07.22.10 abd, lat waist 
BECKY 07.23.10 Abd, flanks, fat transfer breast 
Melinda 7.24.10 arms, FAT to breast -
Christopher 7.26.10 abd,flank,neck 
Barbie 7.27.10 liaw, neck 
Becky 7.28.10 ab, luvs, fat transfer breast 
Jessica 7.29.10 abd, lat, waist, flank, breast 
Melinda 7.30.10 thiahs 
Beverly 8.3.10 neck . 
WAFM 8.4.10 Abd, lat waist, flank 
Mike 8.5.10 abd flank 
Kristen 8.6.10 abd, flank 
Mary 8.13.10 abd, flank 
Becky 8.19.10 thiahs .. 
Dennis 8.19.10 neck -
Bonnie 08.19.10 neck 
Josie 8.25.10 abd, fat transfer breast 
Vicki 08.30.10 upper & lower ab 
Rita 9.01.10 abd, fat transfer 
Orie 09.02.10 ab, flank, fat transfer 
Molly 09.03.10 ab, flanks, 
__ .,._ ........... -...... ---·-· ..... : 
Christine 09.15.10 elbo, inner knee • thiaht 
Jackie 09.15.10 abd, uooer ab, lat waist & back ' ...................................... -, ......... . 
Lee 09.16.10 abd, chest ..... -,- ... --·---···- .................. ! 
Melinda 09.16.10 uaoer, lower abdomen larae ! . ············-···--··----·-··--·-.J 
Melissa 9.20.10 arms 
Ginger 9.21.10 abs, flanks, luvs 
Scott 9.22.10 abd,flank 
Amy 9.23.10 arms, bra 
-- ........ -- -·-----···---1 
-·- . ····· ... -.... -. ·-------i 
Cindy 9.24.10 abd, butt banana roll 
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iDR. KERR DID 
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abd, lat waist, flank 
inner outer thiqh 
lat waist flank, chest, fat transfer to face 
chest, axilla 
chest 
abd, lat waist flank. 
abd, flank, chest, fat transfer to butt, breastt 
lat waist touch up 
. ant ab touch up 
abd, flank 
arm, bre·ast fat transfer 
thiahs, fat transfer breast 
inner, outer thi~hs 
abs.flanks 
abd touch up 
abd, flank, inner, outer, fat to breasts 
abd, breasts, neck 
abd, flank, breast 
lat waist, luv, flank touch up 
arms 
ankle, inner thiqh 
flanks, butt fat 
flanks, fat transfer to hands 
touch up ab 
outer, inner thiah 
abd, flank, ftransfer breast 
ab, waist, fat transfer 
ab, breast fat transfer 
chin, ab 
flanks, fat transfer to butt 
flanks 
abd,flank 
abd, bra fat 
abd,flank 
abd, flank, fat transfer breast 
abd,flank 
waist, breast fat trans 
inner outer thiah 
abd, flanks 
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but do you know any of the solutions that were 
used by Dr. Kerr as part of his cleaning and 
disinfecting the materials? 
A. No. 
Q. You have listed private practice 
infectious disease. I take it the bulk of your 
practice is probably being called in on a consult 
in a hospital setting? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Your private practice, does that 
simply involve follow-up to patients that you 
might have consulted with in the hospital that 
need outpatient assessment and treatment? 
A. Yeah. We do -- we see patients, you 
know, outpatient consults in the office, too, for 
different kinds of things, fevers or swollen 
glands, things like that. And we have a pretty 
big HIV practice that we take care of. 
Q. Now, Doctor, among the materials that 
you brought with you, Mr. Quane kind of explained 
it to me off the record, but I want to explain it, 
make sure I have an understanding on the record. 
There appears to be as part of the packet of 
materials that you brought with you comprising 




























name of patients, dates of treatment, and then the 
procedures performed at Silk Touch. 
understanding? 
Is that your 
A. That lS. 
Q. Do you have an understanding as to how 
these sheets were created? 
A. I believe that the people at Silk Touch 
pulled up the names of -- and procedures of people 
they worked on the last several years and compiled 
them. 
Q. Is there anything else other than 
getting this list that had the patient name, the 
date of treatment, and procedure, is there 
anything else you were given or shown regarding 




There is -- Mr. Quane has it for you. 
He indicated that it might contain certain tabs to 
it, which is the defendants' answers to the third 
set of discovery requests. And you understand 
part of this incorporates anticipated opinions 


















Jeremiah A Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20 
Defendants hereby provide supplemental answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory 
No. 20 as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20 -1 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify each witness known to you to have 
information and relevant materials to the claims presented in this action or to any defense 
asserted thereto, and for each person please give a brief summary of each such witness's 
expected trial testimony. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: In addition 
to the individuals named in the Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20 
dated September 24, 2012, the following: 
1. Dr. Howard Schaff - Expected trial testimony relates to the CT 
examination of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center. 
2. Cody Murphy- Expected trial testimony relates to the events, issues 
and matters described in the records of Elmore Ambulance Service for July 25, 2010. 
3. Wendy Vanderburgh - Expected trial testimony relates to the events, 
issues and matters described in the records of Elmore Ambulance Service for July 25, 
2010. 
4. Dr. Billy Morgan - Expected trial testimony relates to his evaluation 
of Krystal Ballard on July 25, 2010 at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and the 
matters described in his Consultation Report. 
5. Melisa Fellows - Expected trial testimony unknown since defense 
counsel has not spoken with her, although attempted. Charles Ballard mentioned her in 
his second deposition and said he spoke with her about her involvement with Krystal 
Ballard. 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20 - 2 
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6. Susie Kerr - In addition to the matters and testimony in her 
deposition, her expected testimony will relate to records of Silk Touch, records and data 
she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of Krystal Ballard, photos of 
Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures. 
7. Briana Kerr - Expected trial testimony is the testimony in her 
deposition and the events of the procedure performed by Dr. Kerr on Krystal Ballard. 
8. Donna Berg - Expected trial testimony is the testimony in her 
deposition and her interactions with and observations of Krystal Ballard. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2013. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
\s\ By~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORY NO. 20 by delivering the same to each of the following, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
Jeremiah A. Quane 




Quane Jones McColl, PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Jeremiah A. Quane jaq@quanelaw.com 
VIA FACSIMILE (304) 594-9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
September 26, 2013 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 780-3939 Telephone 
(208) 780-3930 Facsimile 
www.quanelaw.com 
The records and data compiled by Susie Kerr regarding infections and 
patients which you erroneously claim was untimely supplemented in my Answer to your 
Interrogatory Number 20 was produced for you at your deposition of Dr. Coffman on 
August 20, 2013. You have had this data for one month before you ever brought up the 
subject of deposing Susie Kerr. If anything, you are the one who is untimely and you 
seem to always cast blame on me for your dilatory conduct. The records and data under 
discussion was prepared shortly before August 20, 2013 for the purpose of being a trial 
exhibit and it did not exist before and therefor it was not available for production or 
reference in supplementation to answers to written discovery. In fact, since it will be 
used only as a trial exhibit, the court Order governing further proceedings does not 
require its identification and disclosure until either 14 days or 7 days before trial. The 
Order also provides that the last day to take discovery depositions shall be n·o later than 
sixty (60) days prior to trial. Your request to depose Susie Kerr (September 20, 2013) 
was not made within the time frame of the Court Order. 
I must have you provide me with legal authority and support for your 
claimed right to depose Susie Kerr. I did you a favor by producing the data at the 
deposition of Dr. Coffman on August 20, 2013. 
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P. Gregory Haddad 
September 26, 2013 
Page 2 
You also contend that Dr. Garrison untimely disclosed his opinion on fat 
emboli at his deposition for the first time. I agree that his opinion was first disclosed at 
his deposition but I do not agree it was untimely. It was formed by Dr. Garrison a few 
days before his deposition and therefor it was not subject to disclosure in his two prior 
expert disclosures or at any time before it was formulated by him. He did not tell me 
about his opinion until the day before the deposition. I am always amazed when lawyers 
take depositions of opposing experts and ask about opinions of the expert not 
previously disclosed. It makes no sense or logic why lawyers want to know of opinions 
of experts that have not been previously disclosed when such undisclosed opinions are 
not admissible in evidence. Why ask? You are the one who caused the new opinion of 
Dr. Garrison on fat embolism to be brought out and as a result, you must now live with 
the opinion. But for you, it would not even exist. The deposition of an opposing expert 
taken after the expert has given a disclosure of opinions constitutes a valid disclosure of 
opinions elicited at the deposition, even if new. You did the same thing at the deposition 
of Dr. Coffman and I objected but you persisted and got an opinion of sorts on an issue 
not previously described in the disclosure of Dr. Coffman. You also went into details 
about fat embolism and the basis for the opinions of Dr. Garrison at the deposition. This 
included references to the chest x-ray at Elmore Medical Center and the report of Dr. 
Morgan, both of which made reference to fat embolism. You now claim that you could 
not adequately prepare for his deposition because you did not have notice of his opinion 
in advance. This is an absurd position because you would not be prepared when you 
brought up the matter of fat embolism which you should not have done, but you did. You 
must live with your contention that you were not prepared and I know of no legal 
authority that gives you the right to take another deposition of Dr. Garrison. You have 
put yourself in an awkward position and if you will provide me legal authority and 
support for taking another deposition of Dr. Garrison I will consider your request. 
Very truly yours, 
/s( 
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D URGENT D FOR REVlF:W 0 PLEASE COMME:-JT O Pl.EASE RTIPL Y 0 PU.;:\SE RECYCtE 
.KOTES/COMME.N rs, 
Attached Notice to Take Video Conference Deposition of Susie Kerr 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:---------------------
This fox and any attachments are :::onfidenrial and may be protected by legal privilege. If you are not the 
ir.tended recipient, be aware that an')' disclosure, copying, distr1butron or use of this fax or any atta:::hmer.t is 
~rohib1ted. If you have ~eceived this fax 1n error, please notify us immediate~· by returning it to the sender 
and destrl.ly this copy. 
inank you for your co-operation. BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP--640371.doc 
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, Sep 1271304:30p Bailey & Glasser, 304 709 p.2 
Lawyers 
Internet wi.,w.baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY &G LASSERm Phone (304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9709 ---------------~ ...... 
Clerk of the District Court 
c/o Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et al. 
285 5 Crnnberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
ghaddad@baiieyglasser.com 
September 27, 2013 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find for filing with the Court the NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF SUSAN KERR in regard to the 
above-referenced matter. Copies have been mailed to counsel of record. Thank you 




Isl P. Gregory Haddad 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
cc: Jeremiah Quane/Terrence Jones (via facsimile) 
Scott McKay, Esq. (via facsimile) 
J. B. Perrine, Esq. {via facsimile) 
650730 
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, Sep,27 13 04:30p. Bailey & Glasser, 
David Nevin ((SB #2280) dnevin@nbrnlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) srnckay@nbrnlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAlvUN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bam10ck 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BArLEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, \VV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
James B. Perrine jbperrine@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
T: (205) 988-9253; F: (205) 733-4896 
Attorneys.for Plaintiff 
304 709 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV OC 1204792 
VS. 
p.3 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
pa1tnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER: and LIPO OF BOISE, 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO 
CONFERENCE DEPOSITIOK DUCES 
TECUM OF SUSAN KERR 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
650653 
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Sep.2713 04:30p Bailey & Glasser, 
To: Susan KeIT 
c/o Jeremiah A. Quane, Esquire 
P.O. Box l 576 
Boise, ID 83701 
304 709 p.4 
Please take notice that the Plaintiff, Char]es Ballard, will, by his counsel, take the video 
conference deposition duces tecum of Susan Kerr, on ·wednesday, October 2, 2013, at 12:00 
p.m., mountain time, at Regus, 950 West Bannock Street, #1100, Boise, Idaho 83702, at which 
place and time you are invited to appear and take part in such deposition as you deem proper. 
The Deponent is requested to bring all of the following: 
1. A copy of all documents and data that comprise or relate to the "records of Silk touch, 
records and data she compiled of Silk Touch for infections, patients, drawings of Krystal Ballard, 
photos of Krystal Ballard and experience in training and cosmetic procedures" as referenced in 
Defendants' Supplemental Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 20 dated September 16, 2013 
concerning Susie Kerr. 
The above deposition vvill be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a ;-.l'otary Public of the State of Idaho, or such other officer authorized by law to 
administer oaths. 
Dated this 27th day of September, 2013. 
NEVfN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for P]aintiff 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM 
650653 
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, .Sep~2713 04:30p Bailey & Glasser, 304 709 p.5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECU:M OF SUSAN KERR by Facsimile upon the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
NOTICE TO TAKE VIDEO CONFERENCE DEPOSITION DUCE£ T~CUM 
650653 
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Tuesday, October 01, 2013 12:45 PM 
Philip G. Haddad; 'smckay@nbmlaw.com' 
Corina Ferris 
RE: Ballard v. Kerr 
I have been out of state on other matters. I see you sent out a notice of depo for Ms. Kerr for tomorrow. In addition to 
your notice being untimely, please be advised she will not be attending. Neither the witness nor Jerry are available in 
addition to which this witness has already been deposed and we object to producing her again. I am covering the depo 
of Dr. Laurence tomorrow while Jerry is out of state on other matters. You will need to take up the issue of obtaining a 
further depo of Ms. Kerr with the court consistent with Jerry's correspondence to you on this issue. I am working on 
getting the file for Dr. Laurence emailed to you later today so you will have it in advance of tomorrow. Please note that 
we also object to the breadth of your depo notice for Dr. Laurence and the limited time we have had to try and 
respond. We will do our best to have the requested information. 
Terry. 
Terrence S. Jones 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 




CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the individual(s) 
named as recipients and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510-2521. It 
may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under applicable law, 
including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you have received this email 
in error, please notify the sender at (208) 780-3939, and delete this message from your computer. Do not deliver, 





Judge Bail 100114 Tara Villereal Susan Gambee Courtroom510 
Time Speaker Note 
0 
8:46:10 AM ! !CVOC12-11264 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 10 
8:47:20 AM lPlaintiff's !scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
! attorney ! · 
8:47:27 AM 1Defendant's [Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
!attorney i 
9:36:34 AM I [Calls case 
9:36:46 AM j [the jury is present 
9:36:55 AM iJ. Quane icontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
9:39:56 AM iG. Haddad !objection - relevance 
9:41 :50 AM )udge [ Objection is sustained 
9:42:46 AM l jside-bar 
9:47:43 AM jG. Haddad f Objection - asked and answered 
9:47:44 AM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
9:48:41 AM JG. Haddad !Objection - improper use of a transcript 
9:48:54 AM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
9:49:22 AM jJudge jJury is excused 
9:50:04 AM jJ. Quane jMakes an offer of proof 
9:52:37 AM JJudge [ Objection is sustained 
10:02:06 AM jJ. Quane !Makes an offer of proof re: prior experience of Dr. Kerr 
10:02:43 AM jJ. Quane f Makes an offer of proof re: redacted material in exhibit# 5 
10:05:57 AM jJudge jcomments re: prior rulings 
10:12:36 AM jG. Haddad jResponds 
10:15:38 AM1J. Quane jResponds 
10:18:36 AM I [Court recesses 
10:37:01 AM i icourt resumes 
10:37:04 AM i [the jury is present 
10:37: 15 AM lJ. Quane I continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
10:39:26 AM iG. Haddad iobjection - based on Court's prior ruling 
10:39:42 AM jJudge [Objection is overruled 
10:52:54 AM jG. Haddad jobjection 
10:52:57 AM 1Judge jobjection is sustained 
10:54:16 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - hearsay 
10:56:24 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
10:56:30 AM jJudge [Objection is overruled 
10:56:44 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
10:56:49 AM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
11 :01 :30 AM lG. Haddad jObjection - asked and answered & cumulative 
11 :01 :40 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
11 :04:29 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
11 :04:36 AM jJudge [Objection is overruled 
11 :31 :27 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - relevance 
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11 :31 :55 AM !Judge !Objection is sustained 
11 :37:54 AM jG. Haddad jObjection 
11 :38:18 AM lJudge [Objection is sustained 
11 :41 :45 AM jG. Haddad (Objection 
11 :41 :47 AM f Judge [Objection is overruled 
11 :45: 15 AM jG. Haddad jobjection - asked and answered 
11 :45: 18 AM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
11 :47:47 AM jG. Haddad jObjection - beyond the scope 
11 :47:54 AM f Judge jadmonishes and excuses the jury 
11 :53:42 AM jG. Haddad (Argues objection - cumulative & non-disclosure 
11 :54:04 AM jJ. Quane jResponds 
11 :57:53 AM )udge !will allow limited responses 
11 :59:58 AM i [court recesses 
1 :37:02 PM i icourt resumes 
1 :37:08 PM f !the jury is present 
1 :37:23 PM 1J. Quane jcontinues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
1 :41 :45 PM f G. Haddad jObjection - relevance 
1 :41 :48 PM f Judge jObjection is sustained 
1 :44:43 PM f G. Haddad jObjection - leading 
1 :44:45 PM )udge I Objection is sustained 
1 :44:49 PM jJudge [The answer is stricken 
1 :46:52 PM !G. Haddad !Objection - relevance 
1 :46:57 PM jJ. Quane [Responds 
1 :47:28 PM f Judge jJury is excused 
1 :47:39 PM jJ. Quane [Makes an offer of proof 
1 :49:24 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
1 :54:12 PM i [the jury is present 
1 :54: 15 PM lJ. Quane I continues direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
1 :54:22 PM iG. Haddad I objection - relevance .... · ............... . 
1 :54:26 PM f Judge [Objection is sustained 
1 :54:48 PM jG. Haddad [Objection - relevance 
1 :54:50 PM jJudge jobjection is sustained 
1 :56:09 PM lG. Haddad [cross-examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
1:58:12 PM jJ. Quane jobjection 
1 :58: 16 PM !Judge !Objection is overruled 
2:06:06 PM j joeposition of Brian Kerr is published - first 
2:13:22 PM jG. Haddad jobjection 
2:13:25 PM jJudge [objection is overruled 
2:20:28 PM jJ. Quane !Objection 
2:20:30 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:20:58 PM jJ. Quane [Objection 
2:21: 13 PM jJ!,Jdge I Objection is overruled 
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2:22:16 PM jJ. Quane !Objection - argumentative 
2:22: 17 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:22:34 PM jJ. Quane !objection - redundant 
2:22:35 PM lJudge !objection is overruled 
2:22:58 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - redundant 
2:23:05 PM f Judge jobjection is sustained 
2:28:09 PM jJ. Quane jobjection 
2:28:14 PM f G. Haddad iasks questions to lay foundation 
2:31 :31 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - relevance 
2:31 :37 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:32:06 PM jJ. Quane jObjection 
2:32:12 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:33:04 PM jJ. Quane f Objection - argumentative 
2:33:07 PM IJudge !Objection is overruled 
2:35:10 PM jJ. Quane !objection - relevance 
2:35:35 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
2:35:41 PM jJ. Quane !objection - relevance 
. 2:35:45 PM fJudge [Objection is overruled 
2:36:08 PM jJ. Quane jObjection - relevance 
2:36: 1 O PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
2:36:25 PM JJ. Quane f Objection - argumentative 
2:36:26 PM \Judge [Objection is overruled 
2:36:56 PM f J. Quane jobjection - argumentative 
2:36:57 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
2:38:43 PM jJ. Quane jObjection - relevance 
2:38:44 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
2:40:20 PM jJ. Quane jObjection - relevance 
2:40:23 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
2:44:01 PM f J. Quane !objection - repetitious 
2:44:10 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
-;::;:~.; -:~ i~~!u:ne __ i~~:::~~-;::~~~!:'~ __ _ _ ______ ----- ____ ._ 
2:47:16 PM f J. Quane jobjection - relevance & asked and answered 
2:47:25 PM f Judge jobjection is overruled ................................................ t ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
2:48:13 PM jJ. Quane !Objection - improper use of a deposition 
................................................ .;. ............................................... J ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
2:48:24 PM !Judge !Objection is overruled ................................................ t ............................................... • .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
2:48:57 PM jJ. Quane I Objection - improper use of a deposition ................................................................................................. , .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
2:49:01 PM !Judge !Objection is overruled 
I I 
2:59:29 PM J !Depos"ition of Brian Kerr is published - second 
3:02:36 PM jJ. Quane !objection 
3:02:46 PM iJudge !Objection is overruled 
.... 3:04:56 PM iJ. Quane [Objection 
I • 
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3:05:02 PM !Judge !Re-phrase question 
3:08:22 PM jJudge [admonishes the jury 
3:08:29 PM f jcourt recesses 
3:37:32 PM j jcourt resumes 
3:37:36 PM f jthe jury is present 
3:37:38 PM iG. Haddad I continues cross-examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
.. 3:38:33 PM tJ. Quane iobjection 
3:38:57 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:43:23 PM jJ. Quane jObjection 
3:43:25 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:47:29 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - relevance 
3:47:30 PM jJudge !objection is overruled 
3:47:53 PM f J. Quane jObjection 
3:47:55 PM jJudge jObjection is overruled 
3:49:51 PM jJ. Quane jobjection - hearsay 
3:49:56 PM f Judge jobjection is overruled 
3:51 :00 PM iJ. Quane !Moves to strike 
3:51 :05 PM iJudge idenies the request 
4:03:27 PM jJ. Quane [Objection - hearsay 
... 4.:04:29 .. PM._.lJudge .......................... [Re-phrase_the .. question .............................. , ............................................................................................................  
4:05:38 PM ! jQuane: Objection - hearsay - Judge:Objection is sustained 
4:05:41 PM tJ. Quane [ Re-direct examination of the witness - Brian Kerr 
4:20:56 PM 1G. Haddad [Objection - argumentative 
4:20:58 PM f Judge jobjection is overruled 
4:24:04 PM jG. Haddad jobjection - leading 
4:24:05 PM jJudge jobjection is overruled 
4:25:04 PM fG. Haddad [Objection 
................................................ · ............................................... r····································· ..................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
4:25:06 PM !Judge jRe-phrase the question 
4:29:54 PM jG. Haddad jObjection - leading 
4:30:00 PM jJudge jObjection is sustained 
4:31 :56 PM jG. Haddad jObjection - leading 
............................................... ,1 .. ,, ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
4:31 :59 PM jJudge I Objection is sustained 
4:32:27 PM jG. Haddad [Objection - relevance 
4:32:54 PM jJudge jRe-phrase the question ................................................ .;. ............................................... ;. .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
4:33:20 PM IG. Haddad !Objection - time-frame 
4:33:36 PM fJudge [Objection is sustained 
4:34:11 PM lG. Hadd~d !Objection - relevance 
4:34:13 PM jJudge [Objection is sustained 
4:37:09 PM f !jury questions are handed to the Court 
4:37:17 PM I 1side-bar 
4:47:47 PM fJudge [Inquires of the witness - Brian Kerr 
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4:56:37 PM !Judge !excuses the witness - Brian Kerr 
4:56:44 PM jJudge jadmonishes the jury 
4:56:52 PM i icourt recesses 
: : 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
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DePUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: Ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRENCE S. 
JONES IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COURT'S ORDER RE: 
UNAUTHORIZED RECORDING AND 
USE OF UNOFFICIAL 
TRANSCRIPTS 
Terrence S. Jones, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
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UNAUTHORIZED RECORDING AND USE OF UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS - 1 
002456
says: 
1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned action, anc;i the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2). That on September 30, 2014 I came to court to commence the 9th 
day of trial in this matter and received from the court an order questioning whether I 
created a document and constructed it to look like a page from a trial transcript of Dr. 
Groben who testified earlier in this case. This order was withdrawn and a revised order 
was issued the afternoon of September 30, 2014, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
3). That during this trial the defense has requested from the court 
reporter, Susan Gambee, copies of transcripts for various witnesses. Following Dr. 
Groben's testimony last week I similarly requested a copy of the cross examination for Dr. 
Groben. 
4). That attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 
email I received from the court reporter, Susan Gambee, along with the one page 
attachment reflecting the cross examination testimony of Dr. Groben. The document at 
issue came directly from the court reporter and was not generated in any way by defense 
counsel. It was not relayed to me that this one page cross examination testimony of Dr. 
Groben was "rough notes." 
5). Had I known the authenticity of this document was ever in question, I 
would have gladly shared that I received it from the official court reporter for this trial who 
has been present each and every day of this trial and who emailed the document to me on 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRENCE S. JONES IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S ORDER RE: 
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September 19th. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2014. 
(SEAL) 
f '.' ·~ORINA FERRIS 
? ~~ ·:-ATE OF IDAHO,. 
. '1 . 
~·J ···oT:\~~y - •-PUBLIC ,., 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of October, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF PROOF by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, ) Case No.: CV OC 2012-04 792 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 





















REVISED ORDER RE: UNAUTHORIZED 
RECORDING/TRANSCRIBING AND USE 
OF UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS 
The prior order is withdrawn 
NO·----=F.:.:.:.-=-~--=-=:---
ru:u 2 ~55 A.M, ____ _. .M _ __
SEP 3 0 2014 
CHRISTQPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VIUEREAL 
DEPUT\' 
On September 26, 2014, late in the afternoon session in this trial, defendants' counsel, 
Terrence Jones, attempted to place before the jury in this case an unofficial transcript of the 
testimony of Dr. Groben, a witness who had testified in the first week of the trial for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Jones represented to the court and the jury that it was a transcript of Dr. Groben's trial 
testimony. Plaintiffs counsel made a timely objection which was sustained since it was not 
proper to show the purported transcript in any event. The court's official reporter almost 
immediately advised the court that she had not been asked to prepare Dr. Groben's full trial 
testimony and.had not prepared any official transcript of Dr. Groben's trial testimony. She later 
adv~sed the court that she had given a small portion of unedited, rough notes to counsel but 
cautioned counsel that it was not an 9fficial transcript and could not be used in that fashion. 
It is a fundamental duty of ev~ry court to preserve the integrity of all trials and trial 
records. There are strict rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court which govern the 




qualifications and training of district court reporters. The Supreme Court's rules are designed to 
ensure the integrity of the record. Court reporters are sworn officers of the court who are bound 
by their oath to honestly and accurately prepare transcripts of court proceedings and make a 
verbatim record of all oral communications. A comt reporter certified in accordance with ICAR 
21 is required to report all civil trials. Standards of accuracy are required for otlicial transcripts. 
ICAR 27 (e) provides: 
(e) Use of official transcripts of district court proceedings. In all cases where a 
paity desires to place in evidence a transcript or partial transcript of a district court 
proceeding, or disclose the contents of a transcript during the examination of a witness, 
the transcript must be an official transcript as provided in subsection ( d) of this rule. 
In order to ensure that the record is accurate and meets the requirements of Idaho law: 
1. No document purporting to be a trial transcript of this trial 
or the previous trial which ended in a mistrial as a result of the 
defense violation of an order in limine may be shown in any manner 
whatsoever in open court without first advising the court of the 
intention to do so and the legitimate legal basis for doing so outside 
the presence of the jury with sufficient time for the court to confirm 
that it is indeed an official transcript. 
2. ~ o counsel may engage in any recording of these 
proceedings by any device whatsoever for the recording or 
transmission of sounds or images from this trial. No electronic 
device capable of recording or transmitting sounds or images shall 
be activated while the electronic device is in the courtroom. 
3. The bailiff will be directed to confiscate any devices used in 
violation of this Order and they will not be returned until the jury 
Order Re: Unauthorized Recording/Unauthorize~ Transcripts 2 
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has rendered its verdict. The bailiff is authorized to inspect for 
recording devices being used in violation of this Order. 
It is so ordered. 
Deborah A. Bail 
District Judge 
Order Re: Unauthorized Recording/Unauthorized Transcripts 3 
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This is gratis ... 
SUSAN GAMBEE <susangg@cableone.net> 
Friday, September 19, 2014 4:29 PM 
Terry Jones 
Dr. Graben Questions on Cross 
QuaneCross9-19-14.PDF 
I'll see what I can get done on Monday ... will do as much as time permits. I have two other transcripts that I 
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Friday, September 19, 2014 
(Jury present.) 
EXAMINATION 







I only have one or two questions, Dr. 
That's good. 
Good? That make you happy? 
Sure. 
Okay. You said just moments ago you 
had no idea how bugs got into the tissue in the 
right buttocks. Correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Okay. When you say that as the 
pathologist conducting the autopsy, are you saying 
that you cannot determine or conclude that the 
bugs got into the right buttocks from instruments 
used by Dr. Kerr? 
A. That's right. 
MR. QUANE: 
THE COURT: 
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Time Speaker Note 
8:30:50 AM i jCVOC12-4792 Ballard v Kerr Jury Trial - Day 11 
9:04:10 AM jPlaintiff's jscott McKay & Greg Haddad 
!attorney i 
.... 9:04:·1·7.AMJ~:~~~~;nt's..!Jeremiah.Quane .. &.Terry .. Jones ............................................................................................... .. 
9:37:01 AM i jCalls case 
9:37:05 AM 1 lthe jury is present 
9:37: 17 AM jJ. Quane jhas a few matters to take up outside of the jury 
9:39:14 AM jJudge jJury is excused 
9:39:52 AM iJ. Quane icomments re: redacted information in exhibit# 5 
9:42:25 AM js. McKay !Responds 
9:43:39 AM /Judge /will not allow the certification to be removed from exhibit# 5 
i ! 
9:44:30 AM tJ. Quane tMakes an offer of proof re: redacted information in exhibit# 
i j35 
.... :;:~:~:-~~ .. ·lJudge ..................... l!:h~~~~s3:r:!1:~:main .. how .. it _ _is ............................................................................................... . 
9:51 :08 AM jJ. Quane jThe Defense rests 
9:51 :18 AM !Judge linstructs the jury re: redacted information in exhibit# 5 
l ! 
9:52:07 AM rs. McKay IRe-calls Charles Ballard, previously sworn, direct 
! !examination 
9:52:46 AM IJudge 1excuses the witness - Charles Ballard 
9:56:59 AM f Judge iadmonishes and excuses the jury for the day 
9:59:16 AM jJudge jinstructs counsel re: jury instructions and closing arguments 
~ i .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
10:04:13 AM i !Court recesses 
1:55:10 PM j jcourt resumes 
1 :55:18 PM jJudge jReviews jury instructions with counsel 
3:24:35 PM i icourt recesses 
: : 
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Case No. CV OC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
TRIAL BRIEF 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Quane Jones McColl, 
PLLC, hereby submit the following Trial Brief: 
I. The IDJI 2d Instructions Do Not Reflect The Law In Idaho And 
Should Not Be Used 
It is well settled that the jury instructions as a whole must properly and 
TRIAL BRIEF -1 
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adequately instruct the jury on the applicable law. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 
P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644,646,945 P.2d 1390, 1392 
(Ct. App.1997). Reversible error occurs where jury instructions mislead the jury or 
prejudice the complaining party. Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 1089. The Court is 
required to provide instructions on all matters of law necessary for the jury's information. 
State v. Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 230, 880 P.2d 257, 260 (Ct. App.1994). The Court 
should not use a jury instruction which misleads the jury or misstates the law. See State 
v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,659, 8 P.3d 652,654 (2000); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 
642, 647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). The defense contends that IDJI 2.10.1 and 
2.10.3 misstate Idaho law and should not be given. 
Idaho Code §_6-1012 provides the exclusive vehicle for Plaintiffs to prove 
standard of health care practice violations of Dr. Kerr. Further, Idaho Code §_ 6-1013 
sets forth the foundation requirements governing the admissibility of expert testimony on 
the standard of health care practice. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
language of these statutes should be strictly followed in instructing juries. In addition, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has given strong guidance as to the foundational requirements for 
admission of expert opinion testimony. under these statutes. Idaho Code § 6-1012 
provides in pertinent part: 
6-1012. Proof of community standard of health care practice 
in malpractice case. -- In any case, claim or action for 
damages due to injury to or death of any person, brought 
against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health 
care, including without limitation, ... on account of the 
provision of or failure to provide health care or on account of 
any matter incidental or related thereto, such claimant or 
plaintiff must. as an essential part of his or her case in chief, 
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a 
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
TRIAL BRIEF -2 
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defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community 
in which such care allegedly was or- should have been 
provided, a·s- such standard existed at the time and place of 
the . alleged negligence of such physician and surgeon, 
hospital or other such health care provider and as such 
standard then and there existed with respect to the class 'of 
health care provider that such defendant then and there 
belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it was 
fu-nctionirig. Such individual providers of health care shall be 
judged in such cases in comparison with similarly trained and 
qualified providers of the same class in the same community, 
taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields 
of medical specialization, if any. If there be rio other like 
provider in the community and the standard of practice is 
therefore indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar 
Idaho communities at said time may be considered. As used 
in this act, the term "community" refers to that geographical 
area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or 
nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have been 
provided. (Emphasis added.) 
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 thus provides the exclusive vehicle for recovery in a wrongful death 
case against a physician and the jury must be instructed based on the language used in 
the statute. 
In addition, Idaho Code§ 6-1013 requires: 
6-1013. Testimony of expert witness on community 
standard. -- The applicable standard of practice and such a 
defendant's failure to meet said standard must be established 
in such cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of one (1) or 
more knowle'dgeable, competent expert witnesses, and such 
expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the 
foundation therefor is first laid, establishing (a) that such an 
opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said 
opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, 
and (c) that such expert witness possesses professional 
knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of 
the applicable said community standard to which his or her 
expert opinion testimony is addressed; provided, this section 
shall not be construed to prohibit or otherwise preclude a 
competent expert witness who resides elsewhere from 
adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and prac-
TRIAL BRIEF -3 
002470
tices of (a particular) such area and thereafter giving opinion 
testim_ony in such a trial. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The case of Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997), 
reiterated the opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court that jury instructions in lawsuits for 
alleged medical malpractice should closely follow the language of Idaho Code§§_ 6-1012 
and 6-1013. There, the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice suit appealed a jury verdict in 
favor of the defendant-physician. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered 
whether the district court had committed error in instructing the jury regarding the 
standard of health care practice. The district court gave the following instruction: 
The Idaho statute governing the proof of community standard 
of health care practice in a malpractice case provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: In any claim for damages against 
any physician such plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or 
her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert 
testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent 
evidence, that such physician then and there negligently 
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice 
of the community in which such care allegedly was or should 
have been provided, as such standard existed at the time and 
place of the alleged negligence of such physician and as such 
standard then and ther~ existed with respect to the class of 
physician that such physician then and there belonged to and 
in which capacity he or she was functioning. 
Such physician shall be judged in such cases in comparison 
with similarly trained and qualified physicians of the same 
class in the same community, taking into account his or her 
training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if 
any. If there be no other like physician in the community and 
the standard of practice is therefore indeterminable, evidence 
of such standard in similar Idaho communities at said time 
may be considered. The term "community" refers to that 
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general 
hospital at or nearest to which such care was provided. 
Id., 130 Idaho at 144-145, 937 P.2d at 1218-1219. The Idaho Supreme Court 
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approvingly noted that this instruction mirrored the language of Idaho Code §_6-1012. 
The Court then stated "that it has consistently upheld instructions based upon §_6-1012" 
as they correctly explain the applicable standard of health care practice to the jury. Id., 
130 Idaho at 145, 937 P.2d at 1219. See also Leazer v. Kiefer, 120 Idaho 902, 905, 
821 P.2d 957, 960 (1991); Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 633, 769 P.2d 505, 
510 (1987) (on rehearing, 1989). The Morris Court noted that the following instructions 
were given in Robertson: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case have the burden 
of proving, by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance 
of all competent evidence, that at the time and place of the 
alleged incident in question, the defendant negligently failed 
to meet the applicable standard of health care practiced in the 
community in which such care allegedly was or should have 
been provided as such standard then existed with respect to 
the class of health care provider to which the defendant 
belonged and in which he was functioning. 
*** 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
An individual provider of health care, such as the defendant in 
this case, shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained 
and qualified providers of the same class in the same 
community, taking into account his or her training, 
experience, and field of specialization. 
Morris v. Thomson, supra, 130 Idaho at 148 n. 2, 937 P.2d at 1222 n. 2. 
Following the Morris case, the Idaho Supreme Court more recently 
interpreted Idaho Code §6-1012 in the case of Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 130, 75 
P .3d 180 (2003), wherein the court noted that "the standard of care is simply the care 
typically provided under similar circumstances by the relevant type of health care 
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provider in the community at the time and place of the alleged negligent act." See also 
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group - Idaho, LLC, 159 P.3d 856 (2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also further confirmed Idaho Code§ 6-1012's definition of the 
term "community" in Ramos v. Dixon, __ Idaho __ , 156 P.3d 533 (2007) by 
affirming summary judgment for the defendant physician where plaintiff's expert failed to 
lay a proper foundation showing that he was familiar with the local Blackfoot community 
standard of health care practice. The Ramos court further stated that "Idaho Code 
§_6-1012 precludes assuming that the standard of care is uniform throughout Idaho." Id. 
at 539. Using the foregoing as the foundational background, the IDJI 2d medical 
malpractice instructions fail to comply with the statutory requirements of Idaho Code § 
6-1012 and 6-1013 and should not be given. The two new pattern instructions to which 
the Defendants object provide as follows: 
IDJI 2.10.1 Standard of care: health care professionals as 
specialists 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a 
patient has a duty to possess and exercise that degree of skill 
and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by other 
health care providers of the same or similar speciality 
practicing in the community in which such care is provided. It 
is further the duty of health care providers to use reasonable 
care and diligence in the exercise of their skill and the 
application of their learning. 
The defendants Name and Name are health care providers 
within the meaning of this instruction. 
IDJI 2.10.3 Charging elements of medical negligence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On the claim of medical negligence against the defendant for 
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failure to meet the standard of care, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That the defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the plaintiff was injured; 
3. That the acts of the defendant which failed to meet the 
applicable standard of care were a proximate cause of the 
injuries of the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
Addressing IDJI 2.10.1 first, it not only fails to track the requirements of 
Idaho's malpractice statutes outlined above, but it goes even further by actually 
purporting to define a new standard of care applicable to the defendant. The pattern 
instruction states that it is the duty of "health care providers to use reasonable care and 
diligence in the exercise of their skill and application of their learning." This is not even a 
requirement specified by Idaho Code § 6-1012. Further, this jury instruction fails to 
specify that Defendant's conduct should be judged in comparison with similarly trained 
and qualified providers of the same class in the same community as the statute requires. 
The pattern instruction creates a legal standard which is totally repugnant to provisions of 
Idaho Code 6-1012. 
Consistent with Idaho Code§ 6-1012, the standard of health care practice 
is defined solely by the expert witnesses who testify at trial. IDJI 2.10.1 fails to state that 
plaintiff has the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of 
evidence that defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice as 
required by the statute. The expert witnesses define the standard applicable to the 
defendant and whether or not that standard was violated consistent with the foundational 
requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1013. This is why the Court should instruct the jury as 
outlined in the Defendants' proposed instructions which parrot Idaho Code. 
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Similarly, IDJI 2.10.3 improperly refers to the phrase "standard of care." 
This term has no application in Idaho and cannot be found in either Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 
or 6-1013. The correct term as outlined in these statutes is "standard of health care 
practice" which is significantly different. The term standard of care will be confusing and 
misleading to the jury because by law the Defendants can only be found liable if the 
experts testify that Dr. Kerr's conduct fell below the standard of practice within the 
community applicable to him. This instruction fails to indicate that the plaintiffs must 
prove that a defendant failed to meet the community standard of health care practice in 
order to find the physician liable. The new IDJI 2d instructions fail to tract the 
requirements of Idaho's malpractice statutes and the case authority interpreting them and 
should not be employed by this Court. 
Defendants, therefore, object to the use of any of the revised Idaho Jury 
Instructions (IDJl2d) and requests the Court to use those instructions proposed by the 
defense which have been tested and approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. Such a 
proposition is consistent with Idaho R. Civ. P. 51 (a)(2) which states, that the Court should 
use the IDJI instructions "unless the judge finds that a different instruction would more 
adequately, accurately or clearly state the law." The defense contends that because the 
new pattern instructions do not adequately and accurately state the requirements of 
Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 that they should not be used and the Defendants' 
instructions should be given instead. 
II. Testimony Properly Admissible to a Party's Case-In-chief 
Cannot be Admitted in Rebuttal 
The general rule is that testimony properly admissible in a party's 
case-in-chief cannot be admitted in rebuttal. Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 
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692 (8th Cir. 1967); Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. McCol/um, 732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 
180 (9th Cir. 1980); LaRo Corp. v. Big D Oil Co., 824 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1987); and 
Gossett v. Weyerhauser Co., 856 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988). The fact that the 
proposed rebuttal testimony is important or necessary to remedy a perceived defect in 
plaintiffs' case-in-chief is no excuse. If the proffered testimony relates to plaintiffs' 
case-in-chief, it is subject to exclusion. Page, supra. 
For instance, in 75 Am.Jur.2d Trials§ 157, the author states: 
As a general rule, the party upon whom the affirmative of an 
issue devolves is bound to give all his evidence in support of 
the issue in the first instance, and will not be permitted to hold 
back part of his evidence confirmatory of his case and then 
offer it on rebuttal. Rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff 
should rebut the testimony brought out by the defendant and 
should consist of nothing which could have been offered in 
chief. 
The trial court's right to exclude rebuttal testimony arises out of the Court's 
inherent power to control the mode and order or proof under Rule 611 (a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. Smith v. Conley, 584 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1978). This Rule reads in 
pertinent part: 
Rule 611. Mode and Order of interrogation and presentation. 
- (a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable 
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and presenting evidence, so as to (1) make the interrogation 
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, 
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
The following discussion of analogous federal case authorities amply 
illustrates that a trial court has broad discretion to exclude rebuttal testimony which 
relates to the subject matter of the party's case-in-chief. For example, in Page v. Bark 
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Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff sought recovery for the wrongful 
death of her son, who was killed in a fire allegedly caused by a limb lifter manufactured by 
the defendant. One of the allegations was that the defendant failed to warn of the danger 
of attempting to repair rather than replace a certain part of the lifter. The defendant 
offered evidence that the person who repaired the part in question on the day before the 
fire had not consulted defendant's repair manual and, therefore, any failure to warn was 
irrelevant. In rebuttal, the plaintiff sought to introduce testimony of the repairman's 
supervisor that the supervisor had read defendant's manual, which contained no such 
warning. The trial court excluded the supervisor's testimony, which was affirmed on 
appeal. The appellate court stated: 
The district judge acknowledged the relevance and impor-
tance of this testimony. However, he declined to permit 
plaintiff's lawyers to remedy what he perceived to be a defect 
in their case-in-chief through rebuttal testimony. The 
conduct of a fair trial is a matter within the trial judge's 
discretion. Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Brothers 
Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 388 (5th Cir. 1980). The judge 
had forewarned all counsel that he intended to be strict in his 
rulings on rebuttal testimony. We find no abuse of discretion 
here. 
673 F.2d at 140. 
Moreover, in Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967), 
the trial court's decision excluding rebuttal testimony was affirmed on appeal. One of the 
issues in Skogen was whether the use of an insecticide caused the severe and 
permanent injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. After the defendants submitted testimony 
regarding the lack of a causal connection, plaintiffs sought to call expert witness Dr. 
Quinby on rebuttal to establish that the symptoms of insecticide poisoning were similar to 
the injuries experienced by the plaintiffs. However, the trial court properly denied such 
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testimony on the grounds that the evidence should have been offered by the plaintiffs 
during their case-in-chief. 
After a defense verdict, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the rebuttal 
testimony should have been permitted. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, stating that the case below was complicated and, therefore, the trial court had 
broad discretion to exclude rebuttal testimony in order to keep the issues clearly 
delineated. In support of this holding, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals writes: 
Normally, parties are expected to present all of their evidence 
in thefr case-in-chief . . . At the time of the rebuttal request, 
we see that this was a complex case, covering many days of 
trial and many witnesses, producing volumes of complex 
scientific and medical exhibits, charts, and other data. In this 
situation, it is most difficult to keep the issues clearly 
delineated. An orderly presentation of evidence is essential. 
Id., 375 F.2d at 705. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also pointed to plaintiff's lack of surprise 
as further support in affirming the lower Court: 
The issues were known to plaintiffs when they presented their 
case-in-chief. In fact, proof that the Skogen boys suffered 
from insect poisoning was a necessary element in their prima 
facie case. Likewise, the defense that the Skogen boys did 
not suffer from insect poisoning was certainly anticipated by 
plaintiffs. They did not demonstrate to the trial court's 
satisfaction, nor have they to ours, why Dr. Quinby was not 
called in plaintiffs' case-in-chief. It is altogether possible that 
plaintiffs kept Dr. Quinby in reserve, hoping to achieve some 
tactical advantage by a dramatic final statement on the issue. 
We think under all of the enumerated circumstances the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in preventing plaintiffs from 
presenting rebuttal testimony. 
Id., 375 F.2d at 706 (emphasis added). 
The rationale behind the exclusion on rebuttal of expert testimony is based 
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on policies of fairness and efficiency in the presentation of evidence. Rebuttal testimony 
is permissible to address an entirely new matter raised in the defense case-in-chief. The 
most obvious example of rebuttal is evidence produced to meet the burden of proof of an 
affirmative defense, on which the defendant has the burden. However, rebuttal is not 
designed to allow the plaintiff to withhold part of his case-in-chief and submit it in rebuttal. 
Parties are expected to present all of their evidence in their cases-in-chief rather than 
holding evidence back under the guise of rebuttal for the purpose of sand-bagging the 
opponent. 
Even when the defense presents unanticipated evidence on completely 
new issues, the trial court nevertheless has the discretion to exclude rebuttal testimony 
on such matters in order to fairly and effectively control the mode and order of proof. For 
instance, rebuttal testimony is subject to exclusion if it is needlessly cumulative, of modest 
impeachment value, confusing, or would unduly delay an already lengthy trial consistent 
with I.RE. 403. See a/so, Goldberg v. National Life Insurance Co. of Vermont, 774 
F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1985); VanDyke v. Coburn Enterprises, Inc., 873 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 
1989); and Skogen, supra. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By ~ /;J'I\,\ .c-
Jere iah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 




INSTRUCTION NO. I 
These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law that applies to 
this case. Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In doing so, you must follow these instructions. 
You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. You will have 
copies of these instructions in the jury room. If you do not understand an instruction, you may 
send a note to me through the bailiff and I will clarify the instruction or explain it more fully. 
You are the judges of the facts. Your decision in this case should be based upon a 
rational and objective assessment of the evidence. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by the rule of law. 
Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings were intended by me to indicate any 
opinion concerning the evidence in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are intended to help you 
in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but they are not themselves 
evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it. 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) An admission of fact by one attorney is 
binding on his or her party; and (2) Stipulations of fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
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and background of you lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you 
believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the 
considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such things as: the interest, bias or 
prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and appearance of the witness and 
the manner in which he or she gives his or her testimony; the opportunity that the witness had to 
observe the facts about which he or she testified; the contradiction, if any, of a witness's 
testimony by other evidence. 
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items ~ the circumstances under 
which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit accurately reflects what it is 
intended to show in the light of the other evidence in the case. 
(_ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2.. 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They are part 




As members of the jury is your duty to decide what the facts are and apply those facts to 
the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented in the 
case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. Sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. Exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
Ce1iain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. Arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they 
say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is intended to help you 
interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the 
way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory; 
2. Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed 
to disregard; and 
3. Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -!f-
The key part of your job as jurors is to decide how credible or believable each witness 
was. This is your job, not mine. It is up to you to decide if a witness's testimony was believable, 
and how much weight you think it deserves. You are free to believe everything that a witness 
said, or only part of it, or none of it at all. But you should act reasonably and carefully in making 
these decisions. 
As you weigh the testimony, you can ask yourselves questions: 
(A) Was the witness able to clearly see or hear the events? Sometimes even an honest 
witness may not have been able to see or hear what was happening, and may make a mistake. 
(B) How good was the witness's memory? 
(C) Was there anything else that may have interfered with the witness's ability to 
perceive or remember the events? 
(D) How did the witness act while testifying? Did the witness appear honest or not? 
(E) Did the witness have any relationship either party or anything to gain or lose from 
the case that might influence the witness's testimony? Did the witness have any bias or prejudice 
for or against either side? 
(F) How believable was the witness's testimony ~ in light of all the other evidence? 
Was the witness's testimony supported or contradicted by other evidence that you found 
believable? If you believe that a witness's testimony was contradicted by other evidence, 
remember that people sometimes forget things, and that even two honest people who witness the 
same event may not describe it exactly the same way. 
These are only some of the things that you may consider in deciding how believable each 
witness was. You may also consider other things that you think shed some light on the witness's 
believability. 
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Use your common sense and your everyday experience in dealing with other people. 
And then decide what testimony you believe, and how much weight you think it deserves. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. For example, if you see it snowing, 
you have direct evidence that it has snowed. If you don't see it snowing but wake up and find 
the ground is covered in snow, then you have circumstantial evidence that it snowed. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for 
such convincing force as it may carry 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 0 
An "agent" is a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act for or in the 
place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the scope of 
the agent's scope of authority. 
There is no dispute in this case that, at all relevant times, Dr. Brian Calder Kerr, Brianna 
., Kerr Dumais and other staff were acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the 
principal, Silk Touch Laser, LLP, which was doing business as Silk Touch Med Spa, Silk Touch 
Med Spa and Laser Center, and Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipo of Boise. Therefore, Silk 
Touch Laser, LLP is responsible for their conduct at all relevant times. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _2 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
On his claim of medical negligence against Dr. Brian Calder Kerr for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Kerr failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these 
instructions; 
2. That the acts of Dr. Kerr, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3-
0n his claim of medical negligence against Silk Touch Laser, LLP for failure to meet the 
standard of care, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That an agent of Silk Touch Laser, LLP, failed to meet the applicable standard of 
care as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the acts of the agent, which failed to meet the applicable standard of care, 
were a proximate cause of the death of Krystal Ballard; 
3. That the plaintiff was injured by the death of Krystal Ballard; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /0 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances 
similar to those shown by the evidence. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. }j__ 
A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty to possess 
and exercise that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by other health 
care providers who are trained and qualified in the same or a similar field of care who practice in 
the same community. It is further the duty of health care providers to use reasonable care and 
diligence in the exercise of their skill and the application of their learning. 
Dr. Brian Kerr and the defendants are health care providers within the meaning of 
this instruction. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ) ~ 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss, or the damage complained of. It is sufficient if 
it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss, or damage. It is not a proximate cause 
if the injury, loss, or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the death regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. [}_ 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that 
matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 r 
If the jury decides Charles Ballard is entitled to recover from the defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Mr. Ballard for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
1. The reasonable cost of Krystal Ballard's funeral. 
2. The reasonable value of necessary medical care and expenses incurred prior to 
Krystal Ballard's death. 
3. The reasonable value to Charles Ballard of the loss of Krystal Ballard's services, 
training, comfort, conjugal relationship, and society and the present cash value of any such loss that 
is reasonably certain to occur in the future, taking into consideration the life expectancy of Mr. 
Ballard, Krystal Ballard's age and normal life expectancy, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
4. Charles Ballard's loss of financial support from Krystal Ballard, and the present cash 
value of financial support Krystal Ballard would have provided to Charles Ballard in the future, but 
for Krystal Ballard's death, taking into account Mr. Ballard's life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's age 
and normal life expectancy, Krystal Ballard's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by tl1e evidence. 
Death is inevitable. Although the law compensates for the untimeliness of a death caused 
by another, no damages are allowed for grief or sorrow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. /) 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damages that may accrue in the 
future, I .mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable 
rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the 
future damages will be incurred. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / fe> 
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a thirty-one year old man is 
46.4 more years. This figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable 
remaining length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this 
country. This data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the 
probable life expectancy of Charles Ballard, including his occupation, health, habits, and other 
activities. 
Krystal Ballard was twenty-seven years old at the time of her death. Her life expectancy 
was 54.5 more years. This figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average 
probable remaining length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death 
in this country. This data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the 
probable life expectancy of Krystal Ballard, including her occupation, health, habits, and other 
activities. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I? 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide. You 
must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. )8 
Willful or reckless misconduct, when used in these instructions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, means more than ordinary negligence. Willful or reckless misconduct 
means intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should 
have known not only that his actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but also 
that his actions involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
002502
~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. jJ_ 
There was a reference to a prior proceeding or trial in November, 2013. This trial was 




INSTRUCTION NO. ]() 
In instructing you on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to whether 
plaintiff is or is not entitled to damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law forbids you to determine any issue in this case by chance. Thus, if you 
determine that a party is entitled to recover, you must not arrive at the amount of damages to be 
awarded by agreeing in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror of the amount to 




I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some 
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few 
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you; and then you will retire to the jury 
room for your deliberations. The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their 
deliberations are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make and 
emphatic expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused; there may be reluctance to 
change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or 
advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views and deliberate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are never to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any 
of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
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. .. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2,,~ 
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one of you as a presiding juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that the 
issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a 
chance to express himself or herself upon each question. Nothing is more important than jurors 
approaching deliberations in a careful, respectful way. Listen to each other. Share your views 
with each other. You and you alone are the judges of the facts. 
An appropriate verdict form is submitted to you with these instructions. A verdict may 
be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine or more of you shall 
have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill out the verdict form, if necessary, and have it signed. 
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreperson alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less that 
the entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
-;;,_r-d-
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) __________ ). 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Did Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care 
in his treatment of Krystal Ballard and if so, was that breach a proximate cause of Krystal 
Ballard's death? 
ANSWER: Yes~ No[_] 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did Silk Touch Laser LLP breach the applicable standard of health care 
for health care· professionals in its treatment of Krystal Ballard and if so, was that breach a 
proximate cause of Krystal Ballard's death? 
ANSWER: Yes [XJ No[_] 
If you answered Questions 1 and 2 "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and 
advise the Bailiff. If you answered either Question 1 or 2 "Yes," continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO. 3: If you answered "yes" to Question No. 1 or 2, were the actions of the 
defendant(s) which breached the standard of care and were the proximate cause of Krystal 
Ballard's death, reckless? 
ANSWER: Yes[)( ] No[_] 
002509
• .. .. . 
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount of economic damages sustained by Plaintiff, 
Charles Ballard? 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION NO. 5: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by Plaintiff, 
Charles Ballard? , 
ANSWER: $ \ 1 d. 5 QI O 00 
Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your 
deliberations. 
td 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~FJAN~~~~')RSEN , 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
JUDGMENT · 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
(a) the Plaintiff Charles Ballard shall recover from the Defendants Brian Calder Kerr, 
M.D., and Silk Touch Laser LLP the sum of Three Million Seven Hundred Ninety Thousand 
Four Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($3,790,436.00); and 
(b) interest shall accrue on the foregoing amount at the applicable statutory rate from this 
date forward until paid i~. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2 
I-JUDGMENT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this f 5-tr) day of October, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
Scott S McKay 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise ID 83701 
Jeremiah A Quane 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1576 
Boise ID 83701 
P Gregory Haddad 
Attorney at Law 
6 Canyon Road Suite 200 
Morgantown WV 26508 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 




Jeremiah A. Quane; ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
jaq@quanelaw.com 
tsj@quanelaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
NO.,---~-
AM FIL~~:q"fit:_ 
OCT 1 6 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN.AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CHARLES BALLARD, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, DAVID Z. NEVIN, SCOTT MCKAY, NEVIN, BENJAMIN, 
MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP, P.O. BOX 2772, BOISE, IDAHO 83701, P. GREGORY 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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HADDAD, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 2855 CRANBERRY SQUARE, MORGANTOWN, 
WEST VIRGINIA 26508, JAMES B. PERRINE, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 3000 
RIVERCHASE GALLERIA, SUITE 905, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35244, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; and Silk Touch Laser, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, dba Silk Touch Med Spa and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and 
Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipa of Boise, appeal against the 
above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the October 15, 2014 
Judgment of the District Judge and from all interlocutory Orders entered prior to the 
Judgment including but not limited to the following Orders of the District Judge, both of 
which were verbally rendered from the bench by the District Judge, without written 
Orders: 
a. Order of the District Court for a mistrial and the award of 
witness costs, expert witness fees, travel expenses and costs of the 
Plaintiff, travel expenses and attorney fees of Plaintiffs' attorney and 
jury fees of Ada County against Appellants as a result of the mistrial 
ordered by the District Court on November 14, 2013, entered in the 
above-entitled action on February 12, 2014, honorable Judge 
Deborah A. Bail presiding. 
b. Order of the District Court for the award of expenses and 
costs against Appellants in the sum of $64,324.54 that must be paid 
by noon, March 21, 2014, Mountain Daylight Time as a result of the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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mistrial ordered by the District Court on November 14, 2013, entered 
in the above entitled action on March 12, 2014, Honorable Judge 
Deborah A. Bail presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and 
the Judgment described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 
11 ( 1 ) , I.A. R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants 
then intend to assert in the appeal are as follows: 
a. Did the District Court error in its Order of March 12, 2014 
awarding costs and expenses for Respondent against Appellants 
that must be paid by March 21, 2014 in the sum of $64,324.54. 
b. Whether the provisions of Rule 37(e), I.R.C.P., for the 
assessment of attorney fees, costs or expenses against a party or 
the party's attorney control, or apply to the violation of a Court Order 
on a Motion in Limine entered during trial. 
c. Whether the provisions of Rule 47(u) for the payment of 
expenses and attorney fees is the controlling basis and authority for 
an Order of the District Court for payment of expenses and attorney 
fees. 
d. Whether the District Court erred by failing to make a 
determination that an occurrence at trial prevented a fair trial for the 
Respondent in ordering a mistrial on November 14, 2013 that 
resulted in the Orders of the District Court of February 12, 2014 and 
March 12, 2014 for the award of costs, expenses and attorney fees 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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I • 
against the Appellants. 
e. Whether the District Court erred by failing to make a 
determination that the mistrial was caused by the deliberate 
misconduct of the Appellants and their attorneys that resulted in the 
orders of the District Court of February 12, 2014 and March 12, 2014 
for the award of costs, expenses and attorney fees against 
Appellants. 
f. After the jury was impaneled on November 5, 2013, the 
District Court granted Respondent's Motion in Limine to exclude 
evidence pertaining to the lack of post-surgical infections of other 
patients of Appellants. Whether the testimony of Dr. Geoffrey Stiller 
on November 14, 2013 constituted a violation of this Order of the 
District Court on the Respondent's Motion in Limine that justified a 
mistrial that resulted in the Orders of the District Court of February 
12, 2014 and March 12, 2014 for awards of costs, expenses and 
attorney fees. 
g. Whether the District Court erred in its Order of February 12, 
2014 for payment of jury fees of Ada County by Appellants. 
h. Error of the District Judge in giving jury instructions 5, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 16 and 18 and special verdict. 
i. Refusal of the District Judge to give all of the Appellants' 
proposed jury instructions and special verdict. 
j. Refusal of the District Judge to admit into evidence 
Appellants' Exhibits AA, H, II and KK. 






k. Refusal of the District Judge to allow proof and testimony of 
the absence of infections and complications with other patient's 
surgically treated by Appellants. 
I. Failure of the District Judge to give a jury instruction that 
embodied the requirements of Idaho Code 6-1012. 
m. Refusal of the district Judge to allow Dr. Kerr to testify on the 
source of gram negative rods found in the right buttocks of Krystal 
Ballard at autopsy. 
n. Refusal of the District court to allow impeachment evidence of 
Plaintiff's expert witness Dr. Sorensen that documented bias on his 
part. 
No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
(a) Reporter's transcripts have been requested. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the following 
reporter's transcripts in hard copy and electronic format for: 
(1) Portions of the November 5, 2013 trial transcript; 
(2) Entire November 14, 2013 trial transcript; 
(3) Entire February 12, 2014 hearing transcript; and 
(4) Entire March 12, 2014 hearing transcript. 
(5) Entire transcript for trial which occurred beginning 
September 16, 2014 and ending October 3, 2014. 
6. The Clerk's entire standard record not just that authorized by Rule 
7. The Appellants request all documents, charts, pictures and exhibits 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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• ' • I ' , 
' . 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at 
the address set out below: 
(1) Tiffany Fisher, Boise, Idaho; 
(2) Roxanne Patchell, Boise, Idaho; and 
(3) Susan Gambee, Boise, Idaho. 
(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees 
for preparation of the reporter's transcripts. 
(c) The requested $100.00 deposit for the preparation of the 
clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 161h day of October, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By_=---h'-----l~~~-::;;;,,"'::,._ ___ _ 
Jere ah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of October, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by delivering the same to each of 
the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (!SB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
·~ 
I 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plain~iff 
OCT Z 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Ctg.ri( 
By KYLE MEREDITH 
oePUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
. CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AS A 
MATTER OF RIGHT, 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS AND 
ADJUSTED PREVIOUS A WARD OF 
SANCTIONS 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his counsel of record, P. Gregory 
Haddad and the law firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP and ·Seo~ McKay of Nevin, Benjamin, 




following the entry of judgment in this matter on October 15, 2014, as well as the Court's 
previous award of sanctions related to the mistrial caused by the Defendants in November 2013. 
STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO AWARD OF COSTS 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, parties are entitled to recover costs if they are 
the "prevailing party." See I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l)(A). In this case, the Plaintiff was the prevailing 
party. The Defendants did not make an offer at any time. Ultimately, the Defendants were 
found negligent, reckless, and judgment was entered for $3,790,436.00. Plaintiff submits that 
there should not be any dispute that he was the prevailing party in this case. The Plaintiff also 
seeks adjustment of the sanction award ordered as a consequence of the mistrial occasioned by 
the Defendants to avoid duplication for application of costs as a matter of right covering the 
same monetary sanction. 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
Pursuant to !daho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)(l)(C), Plaintiff submits the following as 
his costs as a matter of right: 
1. Court Filing Fees - 54(d)(l)(C)(l) 
Filing Fee - $88.00 
Total - $88.00 
2. Service Fees - 54 (d)(l)(C)(l) 
Service of Summons and Complaint and Subpoenas-$2,453.90 
Total - $2,453.90 
3. Expert \Yitness Fees - 54(d)(l)(C)(8) 
George Nichols, M.D. - $2,000.00 
Dean Sorensen, M.D. - $2,000.00 
2 
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GEC Group (Cornelius Hofinan)-$1,960.00 
Totai- $5,960.00 
4. Travel Costs for Witness George Nichols, M.D. - 54(d)(l)(C)(4) 
Total- $567.00 (1890 miles x 30 cents/mile) 
5. Charges for Deposition Reporting/Transcribing- 54(d)(l)(C)(9) and (10) 
M&M Reporting- $459.97 
Associated Reporting & Video - $3,232.65 




M&M Reporting - $840.11 
M&M Reporting-$145.00 
CDA Reporting - $632.25 
M&M Reporting-$332.78 
Bonnie Hamada - $300.00 
CDA Reporting- $719.80 
T &T Reporting - $3 27.40 
Associated Reporting - $818.50 
T &T Reporting - $515 .3 5 
Total - $9,450.01 
6. Costs of Preparation of Trial Exhibits 
M&M Reporting (Cost of collecting records, printing and electronically 
presenting exhibits at trial) - $500.00 
3 
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Summary of Costs as a Matter of Right 
1. Court Filing Fees - $88.00 
2. Service Fees - $2,453.90 
3. Expert Witness Fees-$5,960.00 
4. Travel Costs for Witness George Nichols, M.D. - $567.00 
5. Charges'for Deposition Reporting/Transcribing- $9,450.01 
6. Costs of Preparation of Trial Exhibits -$500.00 
Grand Total-$19,018.91 
*Court reporting fees identified above are for deposition transcripts themselves. It does not take 
into account video services or recording of the depositions which will be set forth as a 
discretionary cost. 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff also 
requests an award of Discretionary Costs on the ground that the following lists of costs were 
necessary, reasonable and exceptional and incurred as a consequence of the retrial of this action 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the Defendants. As the Court is aware, 
this case was not defended as simple medical malpractice action. The Defendants identified 
three standard of care witnesses, all within the same specialty of cosmetic surgery, located both . 
within and outside of the State ofldaho. Defendants did not call one of the experts, Dr. Gregory 
Laurence, yet .a fee for deposition was incurred by Plaintiff for this cumulative expert. Further, 
despite .an autopsy performed by an objective and non-retained pathologist, Dr. Glen Groben, 
Ada County Coroner, whose findings under Idaho law are deemed to be the prima facie cause of 
death, Defendants nonetheless identified a pathologist, Dr. Garrison, who ironically worked part-
4 








time at the Ada County Coroner's office, to rebut the cause of death iden_tified in the autopsy 
report. The deposition of the pathologist occurred on two occasions after it was determined at 
his first deposition that he had additional opinions that had not been supplemented. Defendants 
did not call Dr. Garrison at trial. Further, because of the unique characteristics of the case, the 
Plaintiff was forced to present expert witnesses whose education, training ~d experience went 
far beyond that of a typical expert witness. Dr. Dean Sorensen had the unique experience of 
being an inspector of various cosmetic surgery facilities, which then brought to bear his 
experience of being able to identify the standard of care applicable to the entire Treasure Valley 
area and not simply testifying as to what his individual practice was. Dr. Nichols is a nationally-
recognized expert who has authored a number of different articles, on issues directly relevant to 
the case. Also, this case is exceptional simply by virtue of the fact that the initial case ended in 
a mistrial occasioned by the Defendants' actions at a point in the original trial where Defendants 
had the benefit of hearing all of the Plaintiffs case; a second trial had to be continued due to 
injury to one of the Defendants, and ultimately a retrial which lasted three weeks, although a vast 
majority of trial time was consumed by defense counsel examining witnesses which further 
increased the costs' of Plaintiffs experts, who were forced to undergo many, many hours of 
cross-examination. The Plaintiffs expert charges are in line on an hourly basis for what the 
Defendants' experts charged on an hourly basis, and therefore, were reasonable in cost. It is in 
the interest of justice that these discretionary costs should be awarded, especially in a situation 
where Defendants made no offer and forced Plaintiff to incur extraordinary costs in prosecuting 
the case, despite fairly clear and straightforward issues which should not have been in dispute. 
These costs are significant and justice requires the Plaintiff not be penalized by incurring such 
costs as the prevailing party. 
I 
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The discretionary costs claimed in this matter are as follows: 
A. Expert Witness Costs Above $2,000.00 
George Nichols, M.D. - $10,000.00 
AMFS (Dean Sorensen, M.D.)-$11,812.37 
Total-$21,812.37 
B. Expert witness fees of defense experts 
Gregory Laurence, M.D. - $2,000.00 (Deposition Fee for Cumulative Defense 
expert not called at trial) 
Charles Garrison, M.D. - $1,295.00 (Deposition Fee) 
Total- $3,295.00 
C. The travel costs, lodging and transportation for Plaintiff's counsel and paralegal 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Air Fare- $269.28 
Hotel-$3,857.17 
Farrah Caruthers 
Air Fare -$457.28 · 
Rental Car- $1,217.18 
Hotel- $2,659.80 
Total-$8,460.71 
D. VideoconferencingNideo Deposition Charges 
John Glenn Hall Company-$181.90 
Associated Reporting & Video - $1,168.00 
Bushman Court Reporting - Videographer- $510.00 
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Bushman Court Reporting - Videographer - $250.00 
Bonnie Hamada - Video Deposition - $400.00 
Nuvision Productions - $480.25 
Streski Reporting & Video-Videoconference- $450.00 
ACT Teleconferencing Services with Conference Room Rental- $1,175.00 
Streski Reporting & Video-Videoconference -$175.00 
M&M Court Reporting Services, Inc. - Videographer- $447.00 
Susan Gambee-$120.00 
Total- $5,357.15 
E. Expert Witness Travel Expenses for George Nichols Above $.30 per mile rate 
Airfare- $1,298.20 
Hotel - $3 81.94 
Mea!s-$93.23 
Parking-$39.00 
Total - $1,812.37 minus $567.00 for one-way travel at $.30 per mile as 
part of costs as a matter ofright = $1,245.37 
F. M & M ~ourt Reporting for trial support/electronic display of exhibits 
Total- $5,192.72 ($5,692.72 minus $500 for costs above for trial exhibits) 
G. Preparation of Trial/Hearing Transcripts: 
Tiffany Fisher - $90.00 
Nevi.n Benjamin for reimbursement of trial transcripts - $166.00 
Tiffany Fisher for Trial/Hearing transcripts - $270.00 
Tucker & Associates for Trial/Hearing transcripts - $342.25 
7 




Tucker & Associates for Trial/Hearing Transcripts - $274.00 
Nevin Benjamin for reimbursement of trial/hearing transcripts- $80.50 
Christie Valchich-$442.00 
Total - $1,664.75 
Summary of Discretionary Costs 
A. Expert Witness Costs Above $2,000.00-$21,812.37 
B. Defense Expert Deposition Fees - $3,295.00 
C. Travel Costs - Plaintiff counsel and paralegal airfare, hotel and rental car for trial 
-$8,460.71 
D. VideoconferencingNideo Deposition Charges - $5,357.15 
E. Expert Witness Travel Expenses for George Nichols Above $.30 per mile rate -
$1,245.37 
F. Cost for Electronic Preparation and Display of Exhibits - $5,192.72 
G. Preparation of Trial/Hearing Transcripts - $1,664.75 
Grand Total - $47,028.07 
Cost for Previously-Awarded Sanctions 
The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference Plaintiffs Memorandum of Attorney Fees 
and Costs previously submitted to the Court. 
Because seryice of subpoenas is incorporated into the costs as a matter of right above, the 
costs incurred as a result of the mistrial occasioned by Defendants' conduct should be adjusted 
downward by $551.90, and, therefore, the Bailey & Glasser LLP incurred costs and expenses 
associated with the sanction previously imposed would change from $48,673.41 to $48,121.51. 
While the Court h~s not specifically ruled on the attorney's fees occasioned by the mistrial, 
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Plaintiffs counsel would point out that a mistrial resulted in one month of lost work by the 
undersigned, P. Gregory Haddad, as well as Scott McKay and Farrah Caruthers, the 
undersigned's paralegal. A majority of the legal work of these attorneys and paralegal is hourly, 
not contingent, and therefore, a lost month because of the mistrial has actual and substantial 
impact on Plaintiffs counsel. Further, even if it is a contingency case, it would be unjust to 
cause counsel to lose one month of dedicated time that it could have devoted to either hourly 
work or contingency work occasioned solely and exclusively by the mistrial declared. 
VERIFICATION 
The undersigned, P. Gregory Haddad, hereby verifies and confirms, to the best of my 
personal knowledge and belief, that each of the above listed and described costs are correct, were 
actually incurred by our law firm on behalf of the Plaintiff in this litigation, and that all said costs 
are in compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho .Rules of Civil Procedure and its various subparts. 
As further verification and confirmation of these costs being correct and actually incurred, 
attached as Exhibit A hereto, a copy of a cost ledger generated by our firm in this litigation, 
listing all the costs actually incurred. This is a record of what is kept by our law firm in the 
regular course of business. 
Dated this J3~ay of October, 2014. 
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P: -a·egcfr.y,-Haddad, Attorney for Plaintiff 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
ScottMcKay 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; 
COUNTY OF MONONGALIA, to-wit: 
Taken, subscri~ed and sworn to before me this~~day of October, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r"-' 
I hereby certify that on the d 2 day of October, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AS A MATTER 
OF RIGHT, DISCRETIONARY COSTS AND ADJUSTED PREVIOUS A WARD OF 
SANCTIONS delivering the same to the following via hand delivery: 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Terrence S. Jones, Esq. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P. 0. Box 1578 
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42]W. Franklin Street 
,/ 
P.O. Box 2636. Boise, ID 83701-2636 
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax) 
l-800-234-96 l t 
email courtrcportcrs@m-mseryice:com 
Remit Payment J_ 
. r::::!!0t ·:ti;o~t<ay 
Billed: .211.~;iofa 
Amount Due: .. $669:97 
NORTHERN OFFJCE 
816 E. Shemiun Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d' Alerie, JD. 83814:·4~2 I 
208-765-1700 208:765'-8097 (fax) 
1-800.879~ 1700 
email csrnilb@mntcourt.com 
Remit Payment [ J 
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Associated Reporting & Video, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83702 




P. Gregory Haddad 
Bailey 8c Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranbeny Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Case: Ballard vs. Kerr, M.D., et al. 
Case No: CV OC 1204792 
Dates Taken: 01/30/2013 and 01/31/2013 
Location: Boise, Idaho 
Deponents: Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. (Ol/30?2013) 
30 (b){6) Silk Touch Laser, LLP, and Donna Berg {01/31/2013) 
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR No. 716, RPR, CRR, CBC 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Appearance· 01/30/2013 
Appearance - 01/31/2013 
Transcript - Original+ Realtime - Kerr, M.D. (260 pgs) 
Transcr1pt - Original + Realtime - Silk Touch Laser, LLP (210 pgs) 
Transcript - Original + Realtime - Donna Berg (83 pgs) 
Exhibits (all depos} 57 pgs 
****See page 2"*"',.. 
Federal ID# 82-0436903 
2/13/2013 201300106 












Associated Reporting & Video, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Phone # 108.343.4004 info@assodatedreportinginc.com 
F~ # 208.343.4002 _ .. ~.assoclatedreportingi~c.com 
P. Gregocy·H~dd~d 
Bailey &: Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
- ' . 
Videography services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Appearance - First hour with setup 
Appearance - 5.5 hours 
Video Sync to Transcript 
Original + 1 Video taken at deposition (5 DVDs) 
Shipping and Handling 
State Sales Tax 
•i 
Federal ID# 82-o436903 
2/13/2013 201300106 
-· -· -· -· -· 











BUSHMAN COURT REPORTING 
620 W. Third Street, Suite 302 
P.O. Boi(2734 
utrre ROCK,.AR n20J-2,~ 
Phone:501-372-SUS Fax:501-378-0077 
James B. Perrine 
Balley & Gi;isser, LL?.· 




James B. Perrine 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
201 Monroe Street 
Suite i170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
Remit To: BUSHMAN COURT REPORTING 
620 W. Third Street, Suite 302 
P.O. Box 2734 
UTILE ROCK, AR 72203-2734 
INVOICE 
,, 




















BUSHMAN COURT REPORTING 
6iD W. T}ll((! sireei; Suifed02 
P.O. Bq~f734 
LJTTU;i~OCK, AR 72203-2734 
Phone,:501•312:5115 Fax:501-378-0077 
)ames B.-Perrfne 
~(le~s~ Gla5*r; LLP 
Wi, MOJ)~ Stfeet-' 
Sulte2170 
MontQ.omery, ,Al 36104 
INVOICE 
Tax JD: 71-0687373 Phone: 334-262, 6485 Fax:334-262-0657 
Jall')es B. Perrine 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
201 Monroe'street 
Suite 2170 
Montgomery, AL 36104 
Remit To: BUSHMAN COURT REPORTING 
620 W. Third Street, Suite 302 
P.O. Box 2734 
LITILE ROCK, AR 72203-2734 
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BUSHMAN COL!RT REPORTING 
G20 w. Third Stn!et, Suite 302 
P.O. Box 2734 
Uffif ROCK, AR 72203-2734 
Pheine~501 ~n·Sll5 F~X!,501-378-0077 
James' B. Pemoe 
Balley !l Gta.sser,. JlP 
20U1t>t1rt>e Street 
su1te1110 
Montgoma,y,. AL 36104 
Tax ID: 7Hl~87373 
Jarnes B. Perrine 
Balley & Glasser, LLP 
201 Moriro.e Street 
Suite 2170 
Mor,tgomer.y; AL 3.6104 
Remit To: BUSHMAN COURT REPORTING 
620-W; "1111rd street, Suite 302 
P;O. Box 2734 
I..ITTlE ROCK, AR 72203-2734 
INVOICE 
125499 5/2/2013 69811 
4/2/2013 cvoc:1204792 
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M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
MM FED ID. NO. 82-0298125 "Excellence In Court Reporting Since 1970" 
Billed to: 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Bailey & Glasser LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Job # (3357084) Invoice# 670081 
Case: Ballard v. Kerr 
Witness: Charles Ballard 
Date: 5/23/20131:30:00 PM 
Charges: 
VOLUME II 
Copy of Deposition 
Shipping & Handling 
Billed: 7/11/2013 
Claim# 
$2.50 63 $157.50 
$10.00 · 1 $10.00 
Sub Total $167.50 
Payments $0.00 
Balance Due $167.50 
REBILLING 06/27/2013 
(Return this section with check) 
SOUTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, ID 83701-2636 
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax) 
1-800-234-9611 
email courtreporters@m-mservice.com 










816 E. Sherman Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-4921 
208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax) 
1-800-879-1700 
email csmith@mmcourt.com 






Phone # 208.343.4004 
Fax # 208,343.4002 
Scott McKay, Esq. 
info@associatedreportinginc.com 
www .associatedreportinginc.com 
Nevin, Banjarnin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Post Office Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Case: Ballard vs. Kerr, M.D., et al. 
Case No: CV OC 1204792 
Date Taken: 06/25/2013 
Location: Boise, Idaho 
Deponent Briana Kerr 
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR No. 716, RMR, CRR, CBC 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Appearance 
Transcript - Original 
Exhibits 
State Sales Tax 
Federal ID# 82-0436903 
7/12/2013 














2013/08/0i 10:11 :42 
Quane Jones McColl, Puc 
Attorneys at Law 
Terrence S. Jones lsj@quonetow.com 
August2,2013 
VIA FACSIMILE (304) 594-9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Re.: Ballard v. Kerr .. 
Our File No. 1107 /25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
3 /4 
US Bonk l'IClla 
101 S. Cup!tol Boulevard 
Suilo 1601 . 
P.O. Bo'M 1576 
Bolso, ID 83701 
12081 780-3939 Telephone 
(208) 780-3930 Fuc51mlle 
www.quanolow.com 
Enclosed please find the invoice from Dr. Lundeby for his time spent in 
deposition. Please forward payment for $1100 made payable to John Lundeby, M.0. to 












Jun 23 00· 10:48p Shape 




Pua and payable 011 ree2!pt. 
2013/08/02 10:11 :42 4 /4 
509-444-2an 
Invoice for Professional Services 
P, Lundeby, MD, FACS, FMCS Ta,c 10 to use- 518-64..()589 
John P. Lundeby, MD 
3741 West Fairway Drive 















M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
FED ID. NO. 82-0298125 . . 
. 
"Excellence In Court Reporting Since 1970" . ··w·· ... : _.; . 
BIiied to: Billed: 7/31/2013 
Scott McKay 
Neyin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box2n2 
Boise, ID 83702-2n2 
Job# (7145C2) Invoice# 12503C1 Claim# 
Case: Ballard v. Kerr 
Witness: Geoffrey Stiller, M.D. 
Date: 7/19/2013 9:09:00 AM 
Charges: 
Transcript Fee 0&1 Expert/Technical $4.50 150 $675.00 
Hourly Appearance Fee $40.00 3.5 $140.00 
B&W Exhibits Attached to Transcript $0.25 57 $14.25 
6% sales tax $0.86 1 $0.86 
Shipping & Handling $10.00 1 $10;00 
Vldeography to be invoiced separately $0.00 1 $0.00 
Sub Total $840.11 
Payments $0.00 
Balance Due $840.11 
We accept Visa and MasterCard 
(Return this.section with check) 
SOUTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, ID 83701-2636 
208-34S-961 l 208-345-8800 (fax) 
1-800-234-9611 
email courtreporters@m-mservice.com 










816 E. Sherman Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, JD 83814-4921 
208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax) 
1-800-879-1700 
email csmith@mmcourt.com 
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From: Farrah Caruthers 
Sent 
To: 
Tuesday, August 13, 2013 12:52 PM 
Rebekah Parsons; Roger Shealy 
Subject: FW: Service Fees for Boise, ID area 
Importance: High 
Rebekah, can you issue a check made payable to Tri-County Process Serving LLC in the amount of $363.00? This is for 
the Charles Ballard case. Also, once you do that, can you scan a copy and email it to me so I can send to them? They 
require pre-payment, but they said if I send them a copy of the check that Is going to be mailed, they can go ahead and 
serve the Subpoenas. 
Let me know if you need additional information to· process this request. Thanks! 
Farrah 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal :: Balley & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
From;· trico· [maiito:tri~~@gwestoffice.net;] 
Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 11:55 AM 
To: Farrah caruthers 
Subject: Service Fees for Boise, ID area 
Farrah, 
The itemized service fees for each service are listed below. 
Karl Olson, Mountain Home, ID - $125.00 
Matthew B. Campbell, Meridian, ID - $61.00 
E.J. Kim, Eagle, ID -$61.00 
Erwin L. Sonnenberg, Boise, ID - $58.00 
Glen R. Groben, Boise, ID - $58.00 
'IrianR.S, 
Sfi.annon 'Roes6ery 
· Tri-County Process Servin9 £..CC 
PO 'Box 1224 














Legal Video Services 
603 North Oak Street 




Mr. P. Gregoxy Haddad, Esq. 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
08/08/13 
Rebill: _J_/13 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Videotaped Deposition or John P. Lundeby, MD. 
Remote Recording: 
Travel to Coeur d1 Alene and Return - no charge 
I st hour 
AdditionaJ 2 hours 
3 :Mini DV Tapes 
Complimentary Sealed Original Unedited DVDs I and 2, 
Original Certificate of Video Opemtor ~ Video Event Log 
Complimentary DVD Copy of Original Unedited DVDs land 2, 
Copy of Certificate and Log 
3-hr transfer from Master Mini DV tapes to DVDs and Copying 
4 DVDs/Labeling 
Shipping and handling - Fed Ex 
Total 








A cluuge of one percent per month (twelve pel'Cent per annum) will be made on 1he unpaid 
balance thirty days f'rom 'the statement date. 
Thank you. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian CaJder Kerr, M.D.; Silk Touch Laser, et a1. 
Ada County No. CV OC 1204792 - Trial Date: __ _ 
Taken 07/26/13 By Bonnie Hamada, CLVS 
LVS ID #91-1791629 -See attached W-9 
#13121B59 WV Bailey & Ghmer 400 
002555
\ 
CDA Reporting Court Reporters 
401 Front Avenue, Suite 215 
CoelD' d'Alene, Idaho 83314 
Phono 208-765-3666 Fax 208-676-8903 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Oanberry Square 
Morganmwn, VN 26508 
ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT OF: 
John P. Lundeby, MD 
Hourly 
eTranscr1pt No Charge 
B & W El<hlblts 
FedEx 
We appreciate your business! Thank you! 
. DB 
Tax ID; 80-0157666 
INVOICE 
Invoice Date Job No. 
6045 8/9/2013 1725 
Jc,66ate. ease No ... 
,,, 4 ¥ ,A_, 
- -- ........ ·. 
7 /26/2013 0/ 0C 1204792 
_Case Name 
. CHARLES BAUARD VS. BRIAN KERR, M.D.;SIU< TOUCH 
lASER, L~ ...... 
Payment Te~ . 
Due upon receipt 
:;.', 
.. ' 
1Q9.00 Pages @ 3,95 430.55 
2.75 Hours @ SO.DO 137.50 
o.oo 0.00 
123.00 QI 0.40 49.20' 
15.00 15.00 
TOTAL DUE >>> $632.25:· 
Phone: 304-594-0087 Fax:304-594-9709 
Pleas, rktach bottom porl(on and return with payment. 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAll.EY & GLASSER, U.P 
2855 Oanberry Square 
Morgantown, VN 26508 
Remit To: CDA Reporting Court Reporters 
401 Front Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Job No. : 1725 BUID :1-MAIN 
case No. : CV oc 1204792 
case Name : CHARLES BALLARD vs. BRIAN KERR, M.D.;SIU< 
TOUCH LASER, LlP 
Invoice No, : 6045 Invoice Date .: 8/9/2013 
Total Due : $ 632.25 
PAYMENT Wfflf CREDIT (ARD ii5 • rlE) 
~~~rnwe~: ______________________ _ 
~!Jj~,,.._ ___________ _ 
l:XP, Date: Phone#: 
sunng Address; 
zro; ~.i::,e'..._ ________ _ 












Sunday, August 18, 2013 11:58 PM 
Rebekah Parsons; Roger Shealy 
FW: Ballard v. Kerr; CVOC12-4792 
Rebekah, 
Can you issue a check in the amount of $120.00 made payable to 
Susan G. Gambee 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
And can you mail it to the attention of 
Debi Presher 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Thanks so much I Let me know if you have any questions. 
Farrah 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal :: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
, ' • - " ' ~h ' • • • ' -- --, 
From: Debi Presher [mailto:dpresher@nbmlaw.com] 
Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 10:20 AM 
To: Farrah caruthers 
Subject: Re: Ballard v. Kerr; CVOC12-4792 
Her address will be the same as the clerks office which I think you have. But will you send it to me so that I can swap it 
for the transcript? Thanks. 
Sent from my iPhone 
On Aug 16, 2013, at 8:37 PM, "Farrah Caruthers" <FCarut_hers@baileyglasser.com> wrote: 
Yes, I will need her address to process the request. If you can get that to me Monday morning, I should 
be able to have the check mailed out Monday afternoon. Thanks! 








From: Debi Presher [mailto:dpresher@nbmlaw.com] 
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 5:02 PM 
To: Farrah Caruthers 
Subject: FW: Ballard v. Kerr; CVOC12-4792 
could you have a check written to Susan o. Gambee for $120 and mall it to 
me? I'll get it over to the courthouse and pick up this transcript. Thanks. Debi 
Debi Presher 
Legal Assistant 
Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett LLP 
208.343.1000 
_ .. ~ .. - ' .... --- - ~ ... -: ~ .. ... ·- 1 .... - - -·' 
From: Susan Gambee-[mallto:sga~bee@adaweb.net] 
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 2:37 PM 
To: Debi Presher 
Subject: RE: Ballard v. Kerr; CVOC12-4792 
Debi, good timing! I just finished the transcript .. lt is ready for pickup on the 4th floor in the Transcripts 
Department. That office can be found in the Trial Court Administrator's wing. The cost Is $120, and the 













Friday, August 16, 2013 10:54 AM 
Rebekah Parsons; Roger ,Shealy 
Ballard check request 
~· 




- - ...,._-, ... --.-~·-
From: trrco [mailto:trico@gwestoffice.net] 
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 10:48 AM 
To: Farrah Caruthers 
Subject: RE: Request invoice for pre-payment 
Susan Kerr, Eagle, ID - $61.00 
Donna Berg, Pocatello, ID - $95.00 
Briana Dumas, Rexburg, ID - $130.00 
'Inanfis, 
Sfiannon 'Roes6ery 
Tri-County Process Serving ilC 
PO 'Box 1224 
'Boise, I'D 83701 
pfi: 208-344-4132 
:fax: 208-338-1530 
From: Farrah Caruthers [mailto:FCaruthers@baileyglasser.com] 
Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 10:22 PM 
To: trice (trfco@gwestoffice.net) 
Cc: Farrah Caruthers 
Subject: Request invoice for pre-payment 
Shannon, 
Can you provide me with the Itemized service fees for service of the attached subpoenas? I will send a check for pre-












Friday, August 30, 2013 12:26 PM 
Rebekah Parsons 
invoices 
Thank you for speaking with me today. We have received your check number 42869 in the amount of $363.00 and 
42947 in the amount of $286.00 and we will apply the funds as follows:· 
Check42869 
Invoice 130823 $125.00 
Invoice 130824 $61.00 
Invoice 130825 $61.00 
Invoice 130826 $58.00 
Invoice 130827 $58.00 
Check42947 
Invoice 130993 $61.00 
Invoice 130994 $58.00 
Invoice 130995 $130.00 
Invoice 130823 $37.00 
Invoice 130823 and 130824 had incurred location fees of $45.00 each and the fee for invoice 130994 was less than 
anticipated. Once we apply the fees to the jobs, there will be $8.00 due on invoice 130823 and $45.00 on invoice 
130824. I apologize for any confusion. 
Thanks 
Ted Teninty 
Tri-County Process Serving LLC 
208-344-4132 
PO Box 1224 
Boise ID 83702 
J 
002561
2013/09/04 10:09:33 3 /4 
Quane Jones McColl. me 
Attorneys at Low 
leriencc s. JonP.s lsJ@quanelaW.com 
September 4, 2013 
VIA FACSIMILE (304) 594-9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Re: Ballard v. Ke" 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
US Bank Plozo 
101 s. CopUol Boulevord 
Su!le 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise. ro 83701 • 
(200) 700..3939 Tefephorie 
(2061 780-3930 tocsimlle 
www.quonelaw.c:om 
,. 
Enclosed please find the invoice from Dr. Stifler for his time .,spent in 
deposition. Please foiward payment for $2250.00 made pay~ble to Geoffr~y D. Stiller, ~. 
M.D. to my attention and I will see to it that the fund , . ·delivered to hlrri. Please call 
with any questions. · 
TSJ/cf 
Enclosure 

































y ~· ,, ~ 
2013/09/04 10:09:33 4 /4 
•" • ~ • • I ' ' 
.. ~ .~)?~ v' •• < .,.- :~, ... •• ~ ,• .. .. 
Jobn.S. Vis~er; MD~ FACS - ~r.oc~ fi.. Walk~·DJ>:, FA'.c;18 -0!•-7'~:~ ~¥Mn_·· 
BoatdG~ili.cd.~ . ·tl()Qfl)·<;tru6afSmj.ton Bol!1ll (:lQ.liJi'e<l~\u'g'OOn' •' 
T~.l?- JQncs 
Qua11e Jo~e.c. McColl, PLl ,C 
US Bank P.laza 
101 S Capitol Boulevard 
Suite i-601 
PO Bin~l57.6 
BQiS~, Idaho 8370:I 
R-e~ Ballard:vs. Kerr Invoice 
J~ffrcy 0. Jones, MD· - Geo:fncy Still~") MD 




On July 19, 2013 I was deposed in Mo~ow, Xdaho for 3 hOltrs at s,. rate o.f $750 ru:r liour, 
R.especrtulJy, · 
.. - ,::, 
-~~" . .. /-r··. '\ 
,,,;._,?·· ;'· 
/' -): . :i 
~4-·:·, , ' ' . , ' , / - . ' , 
'oe!) :::.$ill~ MD,"PACS, FAA CS 
1224 Jr£fock"WCAAi Pines Rd 
Spokane, V.f A 99203 
825 SE Bishop Blvd Ste 130 Pullman, Washington 99163 ph (5q9) ~38-0632 f~ (?09) "338-0560 








" . .,, '::•, ·".t!;,~,:•~-: r'Y.:1:" ::_ ~f<l ;> 
' ' 
'.;:§e~Uenc:~.in'Ci>_0ffRe.BJ;~1· . l rt1~~)1~7.Q'! 
; .::; · i/•t.-:tf)1fr''.1''->;,.f~;,->::r\;'t 
(Return this section with check) 
SOUTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, JD. 83701-2636 













816 E. Sherma11 Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-4921 
208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax) 
I-800-879-1700 
email csmiU1@mmcourt.com 




5178 S. Sweetgrass WaJ 
Boise, ldmo 83716 
Ball aid Glasser, LLP 
Attn: P. Gregory Haddid 
2855 Craibeny Square 
Morga,town, WV 26508 
.. p;, :~t~rlv~t;ill~t~ 
DDJv IJ s m 0,MI 
PRODUCTl:ONS 
DI t!U TA~ v I Dl!a e [il:C•li•Xiilil·!U:WA 
13-989 Due on recept 





Flrst hour of video recording 
Additional hours 
Mini DV tape stock 

















Legal Video Services 
603 North Oak Street 




Mr. P. Gregocy Haddad, Esq. 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
09/10/13 
Rebill: / /13 -,.-. 
2855 Cranbeny Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
gbaddad@baileyglasser.com 
304.S94.0087 
Videotaped Deposition of Thomas J. Coffman, MD. 
Digital Video Transcript MPEGl DVD of Original Unedited: 
3-hr transfer from Master DVDs/Sync Transcript with Video/ 
Export to MPEGI 
1 DVD/Labeling 
Shipping and handling- Fed Ex 
Total 
Please return ydlow copy with your remittance to LVS. 
$270.00 
$300.00 
A charge of one percent per month (twelve percent per annum) will be made on the unpaid 
balance thirty days from the statement date. 
Thank you. 
Charles Ballard vs. Brian Calder Kerr, MD.; Silk Touch Laser, et al. 
Ada County No. CV OC 1204792 - Trial Date: ---
Taken 08/20/13 by Christopher R. Ennis 
and Reporter Patricia J. Terry 
Synched by LVS 9/10/13 
LVS ID #91-1791629 




; . . . 
' . 
002566
Streski Reporting & -Video Service 
Job#: 130923VC·M2 
,I I Job Date: 09/23/2013 Invoice a division of MDStreskl, LLC Order Date: 09/23/2013 75 12th Street 
DB Ref.#: Invoice#: 17600 
Wheeling, WV 26003 
Date of Loss: II Inv.Date: 10/01/2013 




- .. - -·. - ',• ' "V - .. ,. .. -~ .. . ' " . .. 
l Bill To: Action: Ballard, Charles 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire vs 
Balley & Glasser, LLP Kerr, MD., Brian Calder 
2855 Cranberry Square 
: Action#: CVOC1204792 Morgantown, WV 26508 
Rep: VC-M 
Cert: 
- .. .. . . . .. a ., - - - ~ .. .. 
· Item Proc;edfng/W{lness _Description . ' - .,, . -- .. .;:_ .. .. -
1. Charles Garrison, MD Video Conference (Aller Hours Rate) 






Comments: - .. .. •<.' - ' -- - ... ... .. ' ' ~ y "n '. 
Sub Total $450.00 
: 
Shipping ............ $0,00 . 
••• Your Referral is our Highest Compliment••• .. --· Tax . N/A · Check Payable to MDStreski, LLC - Visa-Mastercard-Discover 
~$450.00, Total Invoice 
.. Payment 
Federal Tax I.D.: 92-0194603 . I Terms: Net 30 Days @ 1.5% Balance Due 
.Please KEE.P :XHIS PART:t'<U, ,YOWi RECORDS, _ ... 
Pleas a FOLD then !l'BAR !lEil1/ and RETURN THIS PART .,,1th PAYMEN'J.'. 
Bill To: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
.I Invoice I 
De/Iver To: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
2856 Cranberry Square 









Phone: (304) 232-9292 
Job#: 130923VC-M2 
(304) 232-9375 
Streskl Reporting & Video Service 
a division of MDStreskl, LLC 
75 12th Street 
Wheeling, WV 26003 
Fax: 
Job Date: 09/23/2013 
DB Ref.#: 






•• :l!t ~ .: ...... . ••1&-- , __ _ · T &T Reporting 
••• ., ",•:'•:>< 




P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
October 1, 2013 
J:nvoice# 11484 
Balance: $722.40 
Re: Ballard vs. Kerr, MD, et al. 
Garrison, MD, Charles 
on 09/23/13 Billed 09/30/13 
by DiAnn E. Prock/ John Terrill 
Invoicing Information 
.Charge Description. 
·wITNESs:· Charles'Garrison, M.D. 
<<<<<<<<<< Videographer >>>>>>>>>> 
1st Hour Appearance Fee/Setup/Media 
Additional Hours: 1.5 
Cameo Video Conference 
<<<<<<<<<< Court Reporter>>>>>>>>>> 
Appearance Fee 
Original Plus certified Copy 
Create New Original Exhibits 
Exhibits 
Min-U-Script PDF -- Complimentary with order 
S&H to Return Witness's Exhibits via Certified Mai 
Shipping & Handling 
2.00% per month on unpaid balance 
P l e a s e Remit - - - > Total Due: 
Visa - MasterCard - Discover - American Express 
***** EIN 72-1526406 ***** 
Please place invoice number on payment to ensure proper credit 


















Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
Farrah Caruthers 
2855 Cranberry Square 




ACT Teleconferencing, Services 
1526 Cole Boulevard 
Suite 300 
Lakewood CO 80401 
Email: globalcustomerservlce@acttel.com 
Phone: (866) 231-2682 
Fax: (303) 238-0096 
Location: Boise Lead Participant: TBD 
Location: Morgantown Lead Participant: TBD 
Remittance Address: Wire Instructions: 
45-2353678 
Ship To: 
Balley & Glasser, LLP 
Farrah Caruthers 
2855 Cranberry Square 














ACT Teleconferencing Services, Inc 
PO Box 975312 
ABA No: 021000021 
CHASUS33 
Totaf . · ·~·{ 
SWIFT Code: 
Dallas, TX 75397-5312 
Beneficiary : 
Account No: 
Bank Details : 
ACT Teleconferencing Services Inc. 
193539432 
JPMorgan Chase 
1125 17th Street 








., if Associated Reporting & Video, Inc. 
!"Kr~;<I"fl\ ·:" 1618 W. Jefferso~ Street 




2856 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV ~08 
Federal ID# 82-0436903 
-.,.! • J: '.' •';)-*.:1.,;/ . ~ ,,. ~./\( • " 
Case: BaU~:td vs. Ken:,~1Q1.tch 
Case No; t'M' ~C 120-4~ 
Date Tctke,tl} t({JP/20)3 
Lomtien: ·B~t~e; Idaho 
Deponenr. GregoryN~ Laur-e-tl~, M.D. 
Rep.o.rtet: Andt~a J. Wecket'i 'E:l:SR No. 716_, RMR» CRR, CBC 




State Sales Tax 








---:1'.'~---.. ~ T&TReporting ••rrr ---
•. ,!ikli ••m.!l ---••f'.;;1--
Depositions - Videography - Video Conferencing 
P.O. Box 51020 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1020 
208.529.5491 
TO: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esq. 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
October 18, 2013 
Invoice# 11512 
Balance: $835.35 
Re: Ballard vs. Kerr, MD, et al. 
Garrison, MD, Charles (Vol. II) 
on 10/16/13 Billed 10/18/13 
by DiAnn E. Prock/ John Terrill 
Invoicing In£ormation 
Charge Description 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>******* EXPEDITE *******<<<<<<<<<<< 
WITNESS: Charles Garrison, M.D. 
<<<<<<<<<< Videographer >>>>>>>>>> 
1st Hour Appearance Fee/Setup/Media 
Additional Hours: .5 hr 
Cameo - Mobile Video Conferencing 
<<<<<<<<<< Court Reporter>>>>>>>>>> 
Appearance Fee 
Original Plus Certified Copy 
Exhibits 
Min-U-Script PDF -- Complimentary with order 
Shipping & Handling 
FedEx - Video 
Tracking No. 7969 4894 9309 
2.00% per month on unpaid balance 
P 1 e a s e Rem i t - - - > Tota1 Due: 
Visa - MasterCard - Discover - American Express 
***** EIN 72-1526406 ***** 
Please place invoice number on payment to ensure proper credit 














. .. . . ThanlfY,91,1Jot.C~qo~!h9l .· . . . 
TRJ-~OUN:ri:'P~OC,E$l3:.SERVING Lt.C~ 
002572
'fhan,k Yo~ fort:¢hoqsjng; . " 






. . ,:hank YQU for, Ch9.9~{ng 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC! 




EE Associated Reporting & Video, Inc. --_ .. 1618 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83702 




P. Gregory Haddad 
Bailey & Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Case: Ballard vs. Kerr, Silk Touch 
Case No: CV OC 1204792 
Date Taken: 10/2/2013 
Location: Boise, Idaho 
Deponent: Gregory N. Laurence, M.D. 
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR No. 716, RMR, CRR, CBC 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Rebinding and Resealing three (3) Original Transcripts: 
Brian Calder Kerr, M.D. 
Donna Berg 
30 (b)(6) Silk Touch Laser 
State Sales Tax 






-· -· -· 1 eo , .. . l= 








Th,;mk Yqufor Choosing 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS' SERVING LLC! 
DUE ON RECEIPT: $125.00 
002576
. O'ctobeb2s; 2013· 
TRM~OUNU PRO.CEss~sERVING LL:..C. ~' ··, 
A~/ ~~~~1~?:4' .... • 
. ' 
",, Ttfanl<Xi:?l:l'tor Cht>o~il'.l!:J .. 
TRl'-COUNTY PROCESS SERVIN'G'LLCI 
002577
T~a,n~ Y:guJ~r. GbQ'f,>~ii.'lg~ ~ 
TRI-COUffi[Y RROCESS SERVING.tLCI 
' . , , ' 
002578
'Ttf~nkYou for Chqo~;ih.9 . 
TR1,CQUNT'l'PRC)CES$ .'SERVING LLCI 
002579
Case Invoice "Excellence in Court Reporting Since 1970" 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83702-2772 
Ballard v. Kerr CV OC 1204792 
12503C1 7/31/2013 
OE Transcript Fee 0&1 Expert/Technical 
CD2T Hourly Appearance Fee 
EA B&W Exhibits Attached to Transcript 
SalesTax 6% sales tax 
SH Shipping & Handling 
Videography to be invoiced separately 
12525C1 817/2013 
Phone (208) 343-1000 
Fax (208) 345-8274 









Geoffrey Stiller, M.O. 7/19/2013 
V Videographer - 1st hour - Minimum Charge $200.00 1 
V1 Videographer - Additional Hours $95.00 2.5 
V2 Original Video on DVD- 2 disks $0.00 1 
SH Shipping & Handling $10.00 
Amount Paid 
Amount Due 
4664085 2/12/2013 3/11/2013 Charles Ballard 2/1/2013 
C Copy of Deposition $1 .95 214 
R Rough Draft to Mr. Haddad per his request $1.00 210 
EA B&W Exhibits Attached to Transcript $0.25 19 
SR McKay to Obtain Signature 
SalesTax 6% sales tax $37.92 
AmountPaid 
Amount Due 
4939385 9/4/2013 10/4/2013 Dean E. Sorensen, MD, FAGS 8/21/2013 
--------------c Copy of Deposition $1.95 161 
MISC Exhibit Production split w/counsel $508.00 
see attached document 























SalesTax 6% sales tax $18.84 $18.84 
Amount Paid $840.79 
A';'o~nt, ... D_u_e---·~$-0-.0-0-
002580
Ballard v. Kerr CV OC 1204792 
· . mffltl 
SOUTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, ID 83701-2636 
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax) 
1-800-234-9611 
email courtreporters@m-mservice.com 
Remit Payment [ ] 
.~ 
Case Balance $447.50 
NORTHERN OFFICE 
816 E. Sherman Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-4921 
208-765-1800 208-765-8097 (fax) 
1-800-879-1700 
email csmith@mmcourt.com 
Remit Payment [ ] 
002581
Streski Reporting & Video Service 
Morgantown Area, WV 26003 
Job#: 131016VC,M2 
Job Date: 10/16/13 
Order Date: 10/16/13 








Phone: (304) 232-9292 Fax: (304) 232-9375 
BIii To: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Balley & Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Sql!,are 
Morgantown, WV 28608 
• Item ,-P.t<ii:airdfngN1fii_1_a~ .. -... ' .. -. __ . . .. ~. t ... .Qii{cilaiion: . 
. -' 
··comments: 
••• Your Referral Is our Highest Compliment ••• 
·Check Payable to MDStreskl, LLC - Visa-Mastercard-Discover 
Your FIie#: 
Your Client: 
Action: Ballard, Charles 
vs 





" -~. ~ .. -
sub Total '--" .......... $_17_5_.o-io 
• Shipping - )p~q~ . 
. Federal Tax i.o.: ·s2-019460~ ... . J . Te~!-'. Net 30 Days @ (6% . 
Tax i;,;__. _N_IA __ ,_ 
Total Invoice 1"--$~1.:.,;75;.:.;.o~o 
Payment i---$""-_o_.oo~ 
Balance Due $175.00 
BIi/To: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Balley & Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Invoice. 
Streskl Reporting & Video Service 
Morgantown Area, WV 26003 
De/Iver To: 
P. Gregory Haddad, Esquire 
Balley & Glasser, LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
Phone: 1304) 232-9282 
Fax: 1304) 232-9375 




Job Date: 10116113 
DB Ref.#: 
Date of Loss: I I 







M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
MM
'• ' 
FED ID. NO. 82-0298125 . 
"Excellence in Court Reporting Since 1970" . .. . . 
Billed to: 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83702-2772 
Job # (3486784) Invoice # 5049285 
Case: Ballard v. Kerr 
Witness: Trial Presentation Support 
Date: 11/15/2013 11 :OO:OO AM 
Charges: 
Training 10/23/13 (2:00 - 3:30) 
Trial Prep 11/1/13 (10:00-11:30) 
Trial Prep 11/4/13 (1:00- 3:30) 
Setup & Prep 11/5/13 (7:45 11:00) 
Trial 11 /6/13 (8:00 - 5: 15) 
Trial 11 /7 /13 (8:30 - 5:00) 
Trial 11 /8/13 (9:00 - 3:00) 
Trial 11 /12/13 (8:45 - 4: 15) 
Trial 11/13/13 (9:00 - 5:00) 
Trial 11/14/13(9:00-2:15) 
(Return this section with check) 
SOUTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 Boise, ID 83701-2636 
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax) 
1-800-234-9611 
email courtreporters@m-mservice.com 







$75.00 1.5 $112.50 
$65.00 1.5 $97.50 
$65.00 2.5 $162.50 
$65.00 2 $130.00 
$85.00 7.75 $658.75 
$85.00 6.75 $573.75 
$85.00 5 $425.00 
$85.00 6 $510.00 
$85.00 6.5 $552.50 
$85.00 3.75 $318.75 
Sub Total $3,541.25 
Payments $0.00 






816 E. Sherman Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83814-4921 
208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax) 
1-800-879-1700 
email csmith@mmcourt.com 








October 31, 2013 




(108) .33a,;1530 Fax 
Federal Tax ID: 82-0348092 
Attn; > 
~AtL.EY & GLASSER LLP 
,2ij55, CRANBERijY :SQUARE 
MOR'GANiOWN WV 26508 
304-594-0087 Business 





'. ..--~.~~~-,-~~fl~~r:.tr;.. ...... ~y~~tt ;"!~'.l;~~~:~;-=-:-..: 
~efer~n~e ~o.15'tf1i~6'.5,fWh$n · remittfn_g: · 
Charles E3allard vs, Bri;m Cal.der Kerr, M.D. 
Case Number: CV be 12-04792 
Do~umerits: Sub~e>~na Duce~ T~cum; Letter 
Servibe Up6n: Eh'n()re Medicai Center . ,. ~ ,, . . . . . 
Pef$0ric;1l Servic~ tq: Qarol Wilmes, Legal DepiHtment Admlnistrativ~ Ass,istant, on October 29, 2013 at 3:27 PM, 
at: St luke.'s Regional Medical' Center, 190 E. Bannock St., Boise, ID 83702 
by Spencer K. Kent · 
Attempt SeNice at Address qiven $12.5.0 
Advanced Funds (witness fee) $32.91 
Mileage Fee $9.01 
Service Fee $41.0t 
Thank You for Choosing 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC! 
Total: $207.9( 
DUE ON RECEIPT: $207.90 
002584
BAILEY &GLASSERLLP 
, VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Quane Jones McColl, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
February 12, 2014 
Lawyers 
Internet www.baileyglasser.com 
Phone (304) 594-0087 Fax (304) 594-9709 
2855 Cranberry Squnre 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
PO Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr, et aL 
Dear Mr. Quane: 
FC/ 
Please find enclosed the following checks: 
1. A check made payable to Dr. Laurence in the amount of $2,000. 
2. A check made payable to Dr. Coffman in the amount of $3,250. 
3. A check made payable to Dr. Garrison in the. amount of $1,295. 
If you have any questions in this regard, please feel free to contact us. 
Sincerely, 






2013/09/1°7 14:06:26 3 /3 
Quane Jones McColl. PLLc 
Attorneys at Law 
Jeremiah A. Qvone jaq@quonelow.cum 
VIA FACSIMILE (304) 594~9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
September 17, 2013 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad; 
us Bonk rtoza 
101 S, C6pllol Boulevad 
SI/Ile 1601 
P.O • .Box 1576 
Bolse,'ID 83701 1 
!2081 780-3939 Telephone 
[208) 160-39,30 Facsimile 
www.quonelow.com 
,• 
Your deposition of Dr. Coffmann lasted 2 Yz hours at1he rate of $1,500 µ.er 
hour. You owe him $3,250 which you must pay. His depositron was taken ~ugust 20, : 
2013 and you still have not paid him. Send me your check for $3,250 (or my delivery to ·· 
Dr. Coffman. · 




2013/10/1511:15:25 3 /4 
Quane Jones McColl. PLtc 
Attorneys ot Law 
Jcrcniioh A. Quone )oqi>)quonelow.com 
,: 
October 15, 2013 
VIA FACSIMILE (304) 594-9709 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Re: Ballard v. Kerr 
Our File No. 1107/25-938 
Dear Mr. Haddad: 
.. 
US nonk F'fo7o 
IOI S. Copilol Bovlevord 
5ulle 1601 
P.O. Box I.S76 
lloise. II) 63Xl I 
1208) 7&>,3939 Jelophonc 





I have enclosed the invoice of Dr. Laurence for his deposition. By rourt 
order you are only responsible for one half or $2,000.00. Send me your. check payable 
to Dr. Laurence. 
JAQ/cf 
Enclosure 










Gregory N Laurence, MD 
7475 Poplar ?i~.; 




QiJan! J-'l\t.S ~~Coll. PLLC 
? c, 90)'. ,515 
~c1Sa ,c, BJ10, 
Oeuriptlon 
DeP!l~lrt~.Minim.<1m fflQ~ M1Jr·fes1 1()i2J1.~· 
B;tJla~ v ,<arr 
4 /4 
lnv~:ice 
li'lvoic:,.11: ·Kim IIPI 3 
lm'~lctl 04tli: 10/31.2013 
. l)uQ .Data: i0f~!'2()1} 
Projt<;t 
·P .o. Number: 
Rare . · . . ·...... 
. 
,') 
J\n\®l1t· . .. • ,. . . ~ 
l ;O®i»''' 
' · ·, ·v , :.. 
.,. . .. 




-~ .. . 
o-·; • 
f'' , . : •\ • .• 
·· .. "$,4.;~QO· 
' , ' . 
002588
I; 
Tucker & Associates 
Post Office Box 1625 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone:208-345-3704 Fax:208-345-3713 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay Bartlett, LLP 
P.O. Box21n 
Boise, ID 83701 
1 CERTIFIED COPY OFTRANSCRJPT OF: 
Proceedings 11-8-2013 (partial) 
ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT OF: 
Proceedings 11-8-2013 (Partial 33 Pages) 
Now accepting American Express, Discover, Visa and Master cards. 
Tax ID: 820440907 
.· 
INVOICE 
Invoice No. In_volce Date . ' Job No. 




Ballard v. Kerr 
..... Payment Terms.·.~ . 
Due upon rece.lpt :, 
83.00 Pages @ 1.85 153.55 
3.65 - 1_20.45 ~3.00 Pages @ 
$274.00 
Please detach bottom portion and return with payment. 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay Bartlett, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Remit To: Tucker & Associates 
Post Office Box 1625 
Boise, ID 83701 
Invoice No. 121213 
Invoice Date 1 2/4/2014 
Total Due $ 274.00 
Job No. 28088 
BU ID 1-BOISE 
Case No. 








February 28, 2014 
J: N V O I C E 
Susan G. Gambee 
Official Court Reporter, Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 




Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7581: 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, 
LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
CASE. "-~·· --- .. - - . -'·•~---•·-~-.--·• . . . . .. !:CASE_ NO, .... , . -PAGES: . 
CHARLES BALLARD v: __ BRIAN _CALDER KERR, M:D •. , e"i:' al •. ·:tcv O_C 12-47.92 ... 
2-12-14 --- hl!rrari'script-of ProceedingS @$t'.7S .. per,,page· ..-~;;;,-;.;.4-.;., ... ., . ._ _ 
TOTAL 




















I hate to do this to you because I know you a really busy, but is there any way I could get two checks today? This is for 
the upcoming Ballard trial in Idaho. These are checks to the Judge's court reporters to get the trial transcripts from the 
first trial so that our witnesses can review their testimony prior to the second trial. Our co-counsel asked for the checks 
to be sent via Fed Ex today to give to the court reporters. 
1. Christie Valcich 
13333 N. 5th Avenue 
Boise, ID 83714 
SSN
2. Tiffany Fisher 
(getting her info) 
$442.00 
$90.00 
If you will let me know when they are ready, I can come and get them. 
_Again, sorry for the rush request. Thanks II 
Farrah 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal 
209 Capitol Street:: Charleston WV 25301 
Office 304.345.6555 : : Fax 304.342.1110 
This message and any attached documents contain Information from the law firm or Balley & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the 
Intended recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this lnformaUon. II you have received this transmission In error, please notify the sender immediately by reply e-






ThanfYou· for Choosing 
TRl~COUNJY PROCESS SERViNG LLCI 





Thank You for Choosing 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLCI 
::•. ~-
Tot<,11! $58 .. 0.0 
DUE ON RECEIPT: $58.00 
002593
••. ,,g 
.APrll 1 £ 2014 
1/i::1i1:,~:~~tr~~~; "~t:~:i1ti;}:il"c;;t~,;,, . 
,:;J~l; ;,'~ ,:.., ' ·, ~'$' 
Thank You fqr Choosing 
.TRI..COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LI..CI 
002594
March 19, 2014 
'TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LL.C, 
P.0 .. BeiX1224 ,. . 
Bpl$a( IO, ~a701 '' 
(2t}8)' ~44-#t~2 J;Jusiness 
(~O~)M8"15$0.fax 
federal Tl'lX,ID: 82-0348092 
en~flAA aau~rd -V~: .e:tla.n: t1~Jd.e,r!<err, M.P, 
ea•e Numl1et; <:VOt::d'-04:792 
-4\#11~ ~!';~r~.s:qrtH~d,dap 
Qocumc,p,~ r sQ~poana·a.rid;L:;etter 
Howard B. Sc;.haff" M;b. Served by iei;ivlng with Hiillie; Car.tar 
o.n.Mar~-17,·2014 
at-'3,!,47 PM, a~~77 W. Main $ti $qite,603, Bols~,;lb .83702 
by:f<asey.J:i. Vink 
Thank You for Choosing 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLCI 




DUE ON RECEIPT: $58.00 
002595
Thank Yo4 for Qhoqs!ng 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLCI 
i9tal:'$103.00 









KIM I. MADSEN 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
208-287-7583 
kivey@hotmail.com 
August 27, 2014 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MC!q\Y & BARTLETT 




'Boise, Idaho 83701 
,. .., ......... -.... ----TO' .... . ' ~ 1' ... 
;BALLARD VS. KERR, Case No. CVOC-12-4792, transcript of hearing 
13 held November 8, 2013 (Dr. Sorensen) 
14 83 pages @2. oo/page ................................. $166. oo 











I certify that the above account is correct, that the 
services were rendered as stated and the above amount 
is PAID IN FULL 
KIM · .... [11.ABS.EN 












Monday, March 31, 2014 3:57 PM 
Rebekah Parsons 
Joyce A. Andruzis 
Subject: Re:·another check 
Okay, thanks! And I forgot to say this is for Ballard. :) 
On· Mar 31, 2014, at 3:56 PM, "Rebekah Parsons" <RParsons@baileyglasser.com> wrote'.':.' 
I am out tomorrow so I will try to get it ready before EOB today. I just got a super rush request so 
someone may have to get it off my desk tomorrow morning, 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal :: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
Rebekah Parsons:: Accountant:: Bailey & Glasser LLP :: 304.345.6555 
. . . 
From: Farrah caruthers 
Sent: Monday, March 31, 2014 3:53 PM 
To: Rebekah Parsons 
Cc: Joyce A. Andruzis; Farrah Caruthers 
Subject: Fwd: another check 
Rebekah, can you get this check ready by tomorrow and give it to Joyce? 
Joyce, I'll prepare a cover letter and send it to you .. 
Thanks, girls! I 
Farrah 
Begin forwarded message: 
From: Debi Presher <dpresher@nbmlaw.com> 





To: Farrah Caruthers <FCaruthers@baileyglasser.com> 
Subject: another check 
Farrah: The transcript of corv Hoffman's testimony is ready to pick 
up. can you send me a check for $200 made payable to Kim Madsen, 
court reporter? Thank you. Her address Is c/o Ada county 
courthouse, 200 west Front street, Boise, ID 83702. Thanks! Debi 
Debi Presher 
Legat Assistant 
Nevin Benjamin McKay & Bartlett LLP 
208.343.1000 
Farrah Caruthers :: Paralegal 
209 Capitol Street :: Charleston WV 25301 
Office 304.345.6555 :: Fax 304.342.1110 
<imageOOl .jpg> 
This message and any attached documents contain Information from the law firm or Balley & Glasser LLP that may be confidential and/or privileged. If 
you are not the Intended recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this Information. If you have received this transmission In error, please 
notify the sender Immediately by reply e•mall then delete this message. 
2 
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Than~ You for Choosing 
. TRl~COUNTY PROCESS SE=RVING· LLCI 
002601
> ;. PROCESS SE VING L.L.C. 
July:29r2014 
,QJ~~}l1'~$j'6$ 
h~}'':,,- ,}J ,,) },t\,\ 
' 
002602
Juiy ~2·.·fQ14 . 
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. .. Thank· Y94 ror Chgoslng 





TRl,CQYHIY J!BQy~~I ~~,BXltiG L.~Cl 
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Thank You tor Choosing 
JRI-CQ:UN!Y PROCESS Sf;BVi~G ~b,QI 
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Wednesday, August 27, 2014 2:04 PM 
Rebekah Parsons; J. Roger Shealy 
Philip G. Haddad 
Ballard - check request 
·' 
Our co-counsel paid an invoice for us and needs reimbursed. Can you mail a check made payable to Nevin Benjamin 
McKay & Bartlett, LLP In the amount of $166.00? This is for a copy of a trial transcript. I believe you have their Tax ID 
info, but let me know if you need anything else. 
Thanks! 





Bailey & Glasser LLP 
209 Capitol Street 





This message and any attached documents contain Information lrom the law firm or Balley & Glasser LLP that may be conllclentlal and/or privileged. If you are not the 
Intended recipient, you may not read, copy, distribute, or use this inlormatlon. ii you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender Immediately by reply e-











Bailey & Glasser LLP 
T: 304.345.6555 
Lisa Kiser 
Tuesday, September 09, 2014 4:39 PM 
Farrah Caruthers 
FW: 10SEP TO BOISE IDAHO 
UA Flight number 6083 CRW ORD Departs 600 AM (Local Time) FARRAH LYNN 
CARUTHERS_8dl803efale24ae_THQWCCal.ics; UA Flight number 1549 ORD BOI Departs 
945 AM (Local Time) FARRAH LYNN CARUTHERS_8d1803efale24aeTHQWCCa2.ics; 
Rental Car Confirmation Number G2904340223 FARRAH LYNN CARUTHERS_.lcs; Hotel 
Confirmation Number 83164342 FARRAH LYNN CARUTHERS_.ics; THQWCC.txt; 
THQWCC.pdf . 
.. 
From: traciw@nationaltravel.com [mailto:alrs@natlonaltravel.com] 
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 201412:11 PM 
To: Lisa Kiser 
Subject: 10SEP TO BOISE IDAHO 
Created Bn/201412:10 PM EDT 
BAILEY AND GLASSER*99042 
209 CAPITOL STREET 
CHARLESTON WV 25301 
If email attachments are not compatible with your company calendar conflgurallon, click on the links below to add to your calendar. 
Passenger Names 
!CARUTHERS/FARRAH LYNN BALLARD 
Thank You. Traci W 
For a single calendar entry click~ 
Travel Itinerary 
Agency Booking Confirmation Number: THQWCC 
Your travel arrangements and your opinions on our service are important to us. Please take a 
moment to fill our Report Card 
National Travel is open 24 hours/365 days to provide you with toll-free assistance while you travel. 
We appreciate your business. 
1 
002608
ti. UNITED AIRLINES - Flight Number 6083 Confirmation: DM83PY 
Departure: Wed, 09/10/2014 6:00 AM 




Arrival: Wed, 09/10/2014 6:27 AM 
Arrival City: Chicago/OHare, IL (ORD) 
Arrival Tennlnal: 2 
Class of Service: H - Economy 
Fare Basis Code: HM14AFN 
,A - ' 
. ~fatifd'.By EXPRESSJET AIRLINES OBA UNITED EXPRESS ., 
eafAsslgfimenfu:CARUTHERS/FARRAH LYNN -1 oc 
Equipment: ERJ 
Travel Time: 1 hour(s) 27 minute(s) 
Add flight to Calendar 
Baggage Info 
Operating Carrier Baggage Info 
. 'f 
~ UNITED AIRLINES - Flight Number 1549 Confirmation: DM83PY 
Departure: Wed, ciim 0/2014 ·9:45 ·AM 
Departure City: Chlcago/OHare, IL (ORD) 
Departing Terminal: 1 
Status: Confir~~d 
Arrival: Wed, 09/10/201412:19 PM 
Arrival City: Boise, ID (BOI) 
Arrival Terminal: 
Class of Service: H - Economy 
Fare Basis Code: HAA14AFN 
Equipment: 738 
Meal: Food for Purchase 
Travel Time: 3 hour(s) 34 minute(s) 





Hertz Rent A Car , Confirmation: G2904340223 
Pick-up Date: Wed, 09/10/2014 12:19 PM Drop-off Date: Fri, 10/3/2014 12:00 PM 
Pick-up City: Boise, ID 
Car Type: Midsize Car 
Extra Day Rate: 35.70 USD 
Membership Number: XXXXXXX807 
Status:Confirmed 
Cost: 249.99 USO (Weekly) 
Extra Hour Rate: 0.00 USO 
Approximate Total: 1005.00 USO 
Mile Rate Amount: 0.00 USD 
Extra Hour and Mile Rate: 0.00 USO 
Add car to Calendar 
Hotel Confirmation: 83164342 
COURTYARD BOISE DWTN 





Check-In Date: Wed, 09/10/2014 
Location: Boise, ID 
Membership Number: 
Status: MK 
Check-Out Date: Fri, 10/3/2014 
Number of Rooms: 1 
Per ni ht rate ma not Include all taxes and/or additional fees 
2 
Cost per night: O 
Length of stay: 23 nights(s) 





RATE PER NJGHT: $,129.00 U~R 
HOTEL IS GUARANTEED FOR LATE ARRIVAL TO CREDIT CARD 
ifO,AVOID NO-SHOW CHARGES ... CANCEL HOTEL BY 6 PM ON DAY OF ARRIVAL 





Airlines Ticket: 0167408942082 
Invoice Number: 408075001 
: Transaction Fee: 8900613029093 
Your total has been charged to Visa ending in 1948 




For 24 hour enroute assistance please call 800 557 0842 
Ticket is nonrefundable. Fees may apply for change or reissue 
Cancel prior to departure to avoid losing full ticket amount. 
DOCUMENT NUMBER 8900613029093/ BILLED $29.68 
NO FREQUENT FLYER AVAILABLE. 
THIS IS AN ELECTRONIC TICKET TRANSACTION 
XTTaxes 
22.60 
AN ELECTRONIC TICKET CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER CARRIER 
i PLEASE ADVISE NATIONAL TRAVEL IF YOU DO NOT TRAVEL 
FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A REFUND 
' WHEN CHECKING IN FOR YOUR FLIGHTS PLEASE PROVIDE 
THE FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION NUMBER: UA DM83PY 
, YOU MUST P~ESENT POSITlyEmENTIFl(;ATION AT THE CH~CK IN 
Amount: $427.60 
Amount: $29.68 
Total Fare:USD $457.28 , 
Please review your itinerary carefully to verify that names a~e spelled correctly and dates and 
destinations are correct. Notify National Travel immediately with any corrections to avoid airline 
penalties. 
National Travel cannot be held responsible in the event of bankruptcy of airlines or other suppliers. 
Check-In times are 90 minutes prior for domestic flights or 120 minutes for international flights. 
Please present frequent flyer ID at check-in to ensure proper credits. 
Airport Security procedure requires that all travelers obtain a boarding pass from the carrier to clear 
security checkpoints. Travelers should check-in with the carrier at their counter, kiosk, or website to 
obtain their boarding pass. 
Carriage and other services provided by the carrier are subject to conditions of carriage, which are 








Tiffany Fisher, RPR, CSR No. 979 
Court Reporter to Honorable Melissa Moody 
200 West Front Street 




TO: Scott McKay INV. NO. TF14-071 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 
303 West Bannock Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
DUE UPON RECEIPT 
INV. DATE: 09-15-2014 
TAXID: 45-3995517 
BALLARD v. KERR, MD Case No. CVOC-2012-4792 
Testimony of Brian Calder Kerr, MD, held on November 6, 2013, before Honorable Deborah 
Bail, District Court Judge. 
One certified copy 135 pages @ 2.00 $ 270.00 















Tucker & Associates 
Post Office Box 1625 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone:208·345·3704 Fax:208·345·3713 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay Bartlett, UP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
'• .t:,; ;;.·· .,_;.,. 
''1 CE~TIFIE~'CQPY .OF ~SCRIPT Qf:• •, 
~- $ P.roceedngs-11"13·2013. 
' ~ 
~I ~;J': ~ ~~ « t t .I 
' !t''. '....... ·, . .: _,.,'! II( - ."4 ; ,: ·- _:.. 
Pleas~ 111:;lt_YJWY{.etucker,l'tet fpr .vo11r trans_cifpt and exhibit repo~ltQry; 
... .,, .. :1' .... .• 'II ,. ... 
r , • ; ... ~.. ..; ... 
; P.ay you~· 6111 onnne·, :Go tp YJWY{.e'tucker.net and cl~k' iJ~Y l;IER!=,-










Invoice No. Invoice Date Job No. 
121891 9/15/2014 28088 
Job Date Case No, 
1/26/2014 
Ci!S8 N_arrie 
_ Ballard v. Kerr 
Paym_ent T.~rms, 
D_ue upo_n recel~ 
342.2~ '.. 




T ..... • 
' . 
'• 
Please detach bouom portion and return with payment. 
Scott McKay 
Nevin Benjamin McKay Bartlett, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Remit To: Tucker & Associates 
Post Office Box 1625 













Ballard v. Kerr 
002612
. .. 
Commonwealth Medical LegaJ Services, Inc. Invoice 
George R. Nichols, II, M.D. 
6013 Brownsboro Park Blvd., Suite D 
Louisville, KY 40207 
Phone: 502-899-9837 Fax: 502-899-9840 
BILL TO 
Philip G. Haddad -- .-. -
. J311iley & Glasser 
· 2855 Cranbeny Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
l• 
.. . .. 




Airfare to Boise 09/17/2014 
Hotel 
Meals 
Sept 17 - Sept 19 Full Day Trial Fee 
Airport Parking 
Tax I.D. # 61-1315341 
. ,,-, -- . 






.... ~ " . ~ . , ' 














. ' . ' --
HOURS RATE AMOUNT 
.. 
' 1,298.20 1,298.20 381.94 381.94 
93.23 93.23 
















Issue Dato.: 8125/2014 
Reservation ID: TMV12G 
airs@nationaltravel.com 
Thursday, October 09, 2014 2:04 PM 
Rebekah Parsons 
HADDAD/PHILIP GREGOR - TMV12G - -
If you are having trouble reading this emall, please click here. 
~ 
E~changed 11c~~ lnformat(on,• 7,~7,4J~~-1J • ls~'ued ~J,z11i1H,r 
Old Ticket Cost $611,00 I Ponalty $.200.00 
t~an~~\;flO}l F!i~(- 0613181r8.4:' ', ''LI ' ,-; ,: ... / /\;:\ '· , <,, . ,,,~, ,· ) ,, ,r.J,, . . . . . 
NaUonal Travel Service, Inc. 
100 Chase Tower 
Charleston, WV 25301 
r: .. ,:- ~1.f?t),11, ,c;oi'.l\ltiihi 
Bailey.& Glasser 
Laldley Tower Ste 200 
500 lee SI 
Charleston WV 25301 
National Travers Service Fee ls. cjlarged at the time of tlcketlng and is non-refundable. 
This fee Is charged for performing the service of making your reservation and is Independent of the compleilon of trawl. 
Agoncy Information 
NATIONAL TRAVEL 
100 Chase Tower, 707 Virginia SI. E. 
Charleston, WV 25301 
800-557-0842 
This fee Is completely reimbursable by your company or government agency. 
· ·· Thi~ transa.ctlon foo was charged to a Vlaa ·card ending wilh'1948 Total Cost: 
Total cf).ir9os bllled by Nitllonal Travel: · 
National Travel would like your feedback. Please lake a momenl to fill out our Report Card. 
Outlook Calendar • · 
Qlf.!<. here to add your Outlook Calendar 





The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires you, when making a reservation, to provide your full name, date of birth and gender as It Is shown on 
the Identification document that you plan to present at airport security check-points. This Information Is not optional. The purpose of collectlng this information Is to 
allow TSA to perfonn terrorist watch 11st matching that Is currently being done by each airline. Failure to provide the required elements In advance could: (1) inhibit 
your ability to get a boarding pass either at home or at the airport untll the Information has been provided; and, (2) require you to undergo addllional airport 
security screening . 
. : :·1;~ f ~j\i~~ ,. ii~~1t~~t~{1}~ 1~riJ .;;1:(.;.itri1k~d:nf:.1i~~l)t~rr\ ~¥1Jlf \:£Y:tit1e.{tt~i1t~i;;·,~1Jtf.\tfa\,; :~II!f;'1Jrimrr~t t;:{~.l:i}~fi:~1fljf r~r~~~llitj~~~;1*~ta£:\~:if~CT~trtrrl~i d1~r 1 ?i~L~i 
Checked Baggage policies vary by alrtine, destination, frequent flyer status, booking class, bag size and weight. Fees may apply If (1) you plan to check a bag or 
(2) you plan to earl)' sports equipment or an odd-shaped Item or (3) your bag exceeds alrllne weight llmlts. 
For more Information please visit our website at WWW.NATIONAL TRAVEL.COM 
i11f,F?l'.Mf-,f~~~i1II;<~gJ..1~e.ttoo:~MtJfi~j:twAT:lOij'Jj/;l~ffl,,~r,~}3~:&\IJJffi;1;~~'q;t'!PMIG~ti~II1~tl.l~~~oJ(f'llffifi?!rt~~~~"tlH,'?if£t[itt~t 
Airport Security procedure requires that aH travelers obtain a boarding pass from the carrier to clear security checkpoints. Travelers should checkln with the carrier 
at their counter, kiosk, or website to obtain their boarding pass. 
Carriage and other services provided by the carrier are subject to conditions of carriage, which are hereby incorporated by reference. These conditions may be 
obtained from the Issuing carrier. 







First Bag fee 
Baggage Recei'pt 
Issue Date: 10 SEP 2014 CRW ATO 
Qty 
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BAGGAGE FEES Total Fees 
Excess Baggage Terms and conditions: 
USO $125~00 
· All excess bag,age is subject ta space availability. 
- Receipt far payment must be presented at bag check. 
- For refunds or adjustments, see a United representative! 
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Tij~S IS YOUR RECEIPT 
FOR CONDITIONS 'oF 
CONTRACT - SEE 
PASSENGER TICKET AND 
BAGGAGE CHECK 
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The GfC Group 
S555 N Ster ~e Way 
Star, ID 83669 
coryOthegecgroup.eom 
~fill~t::c:~::'':,·:lr.·:· ·.?·~· ~i~l§; 
J.B. Perrine 
eanev J Glasser ••• _ .· ---····· 
Ballard· BALI.AIU) v. kerr 
You cim pay with II cradtcard ordYrocttv from your batik nccount 1iv·cuc1<l119·on 
ttie f'ay Now button when vicwin!i this involcc onllne. If you chooso lo pay with 
o 11ni>er eht:ek, mall ,your tht,;k to rnY. ldoho office. Milke all payments p11yoblo 
to Tho GEC Group lnc, · {82·0417356). P:itit duu omounts Will be .subjccUo · 
Interest t:hargce. al: 1,5% per (nllnlh. lf yuu hn_va eny qucsl[ans 11,bOtJt _thls 
ln~olcc, pll!l\f\C t;,.U me at 312·.B!J.0·620~. Th~nksJor yo.ur b\.!S!r)!lSS, Carn~.111,u 
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~101 - , 
')~ ~ Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Z Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
G QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
NO;--,iilta;-+/-,A4-t¥.J__ u __ --JM:J.-t{V-r: 
~ 
~ US Bank Plaza 
OCT 3 0_2014 
CHA~~ 0. RICH, Clerk 0 101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
,-, P.O. Box 1576 
l,,.-·-"')1 Boise Idaho 83701 
I 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




Case No. CV QC 1204792 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: THE ABOVE ENTITLED PARTIES/PLAINTIFFS and their attorneys 
of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 11"*' day of 
_N_o_"UI\-~---' 2014, at 3:vo l?·'"''" of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
002618
be heard, before the Honorable Deborah A. Bail, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, 
Idaho, the undersigned will call up for hearing before the Court Defendants' Application 
for Stay of Execution or Enforcement of the Judgment Entered October 15, 2014. 
DATED this 301h day of October, 2014. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jere · iah . uane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
002619
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of October, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 




r • .. 
• Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
:.===:.~i=iteb~P.M7c;z~· t,4;:2 9:~: 
OCT 3 O 201% 
CHRISTOPH~A D. RtCH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
jaq@quanelaw.com 
tsj@quanelaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. CV QC 1204792 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF 
EXECUTION OR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED 
OCTOBER 15, 2014 
Defendants move the Court for its immediate Order staying execution on 
the Judgment of October 15, 2014 up to and through the decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court on Defendants' Appeal and for the period of time set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014 - 1 
002621
· 13(15) following the decision of the Supreme Court. This application is supported by the 
attached Original Supersedeas Bond of National Liability and Fire Insurance Company 
and Rule 62(d), I.R.C.P. 
Defendants request the Court to grant the application on an ex parte basis 
within fourteen (14) days of filing this application, 
Otherwise Defendants request a hearing on the application per the 
accompanying notice of hearing. 
The Supersedeas Bond complies with Idaho Law and the requirements of 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(15). 
DATED this 301h day of October, 2014. 
JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
By~-l--1----1--,A+l~====~~~~~ 
Jer iah . uane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED O~TOBER 15, 2014 - 2 
002622
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 301h day of October, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014 by delivering the 
same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James B. Perrine 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
3000 Riverchase Galleria, Suite 905 
Birmingham, Alabama 35244 
Telephone (205) 988-9253 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (205) 733-4896 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014 - 3 
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· Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS' APPEAL TO THE 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
WHEREAS, the National Liability and Fire Insurance Company, Omaha, 
Nebraska, desires to give an undertaking for a stay of execution of the Judgment entered 
October 15, 2014 in favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendants, now, 





THEREFOR, the undersigned surety and Insurance Company, does 
hereby obligate itself, to the Plaintiff Charles Ballard, under said statutory obligations in 
the sum of $3,790,436.00 plus 36% of said amount. National Liability and Fire Insurance 
Company is bound to the full obligation of Idaho Appellate Rule 13, (15), that requires this 
undertaking. National Liability and Fire Insurance Company agrees to pay on behalf of 
the defendants -Appellants, all sums found to be due and owing by the Appellants.by 
reason of the outcome of the appeal within thirty (30) days of the filing of the remittitur 
from the Supreme Court, up to the full amount of the bond or undertaking. 
Executed with our seal this £2!aay of October, 2014. 
NATIONAL LIABILITY AND FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
By:/~~ . 
$11.e,-,,,./ii" 411tf.er-s-~AJ /lHol'h'lJ .. in-h~1 




NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
3024 HARNEY STREET 73LF100070 
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131 
(402) 916-3000 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That this Power-of-Attorney is not valid unless the bond, which this Power-of-Attorney authorizes, has been 
duly executed by the Principal(s) and the Attorney-in-Fact. This Power-of-Attorney specifies THE AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT and THE 
LIABILITY OF THE COMPANY, WHICH SHALL NOT EXCEED: 
FIVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED 
................................................................................................. ,.,u, .. , ...................................................................................................... . 
NINETY-TWO AND 96/100 DOLLARS ($5,154,992.96.00) 
NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMP ANY, a Connecticut corporation, having its principal office in the City of 
Omaha, state ofNebraska, does hereby make, constitute and appoint Everett Anderson 
in the City of ... ~~!:.~ .......................... .' County of .. .1?.9.~Sf.!~.~ .......................... , State of .. ~~!?.E.~~-~.~ .............................. .. 
its true and lawful attorney-in-fact, at ... '?.!'!!~.h~ .............................................. , in the State of ~~!?.E~~-~.<;l; ................................ .. 
to make, execute, seal and deliver for and on its behalf, and as its act and deed, any and all undertakings, bonds, or other such writings 
obligatory in the nature thereof, provided that the liability of the Company as surety on any such bond executed under this authority 
shall not in any event exceed the sum shown above. 
TIDS POWER VOID IF ALTERED OR ERASED 
The ackn~:wledgement and execution of any such document by the said Attorney-In-Fact shall be as binding upon the Company 
as if such bond had been executed and acknowledged by the regularly-elected officers of this Company. 
This Power of Attorney is granted, and is sigued and sealed by original signature, under and by the authority of the following 
Resolution adopted by the Executive Committee, as duly authorized by the Board of Directors ofNATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, at a meeting duly called and held on the 6th day of August, 2014: 
Resolved, That the President, any Vice President or the Secretary, shall have the power and authority to (1) 
appoint Attorneys-in-fact, and to authorize them to execute on behalf of this Company bonds and other 
undertakings and (2) to remove at any time any such Attorney-in-fact and revoke the authority given him." 
In Witness WhereofNATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY has caused its official seal to be hereunder 
affixed, and these presents to be signed by its Senior Vice !?resident this 29th day of October , 2014. 
STATE OF NEBRASKA } ss.: 
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS 
NATIONAL LIABILITY & FIRE INSURANCE COMP ANY 
BY 
(Name) l?hilip M. Wolf t) 
(Title) Senior Vice !?resident 
On this 29th day of October, 2014, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared l?hilip M. Wolf who 
being by hove Power of Attorney as Senior Vice !?resident of said 
NATION . and acknowledged said instrument to be the voluntary.act and deed of 
......... ~L· i .... l.D.ti! .. ~tttWI 
N~blic, Nebraska 
1. THIS POWER DOES NOT AUTHORIZE EXECUTION OF BONDS OF NE EXEAT OR ANY GUARANTEE FOR 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE PAYMENTS OF ALIMONY SUPPORT OR WAGE LAW CLAIMS, OR BONDS FOR 
CRIMINAL APPEARANCE. ' 
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David Nevin (!SB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345~8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
141 0003/0005 
NOVO 4 2014 
f;ll'tfiH&fOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
8y JAMIE MARnN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, LASER, 
and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
> 
NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF NON-






11/04/2014 2:19 PM FAX 30459 - 19 BAILEYGLASSER 141 0004/0005 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Charles Ballard, by counsel, in response to APPLICATION 
FOR STAY OF EXBCUTION OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 
OCTOBER. IS, 2014, filed by the Defendants. In light of the Application and supporting 
documentation supplied therein by the Defendants, the Plaintiff hereby advises the Court that he 
has no opposition to entry of an order staying execution or enforcement of judgment as applied 
for by the Defendants. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
002628
11/04/2014 2: 19 PM FAX 30459 19 BAILEYGLASSER ~ 0005/0005 
.. .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of November. 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
thA fn~Agoing NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF NON-OPPOSITION TO STAY OF EXECUTION OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT by delivering the same to the following via facsimile and 
first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
Terrence Jones 
QUANE. JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard. Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
·p. Gregory Haddad 
002629
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Nv.----:Fr.tLEO~P.M~z;rr: ::::.i3r;;:Q~ A.M,, ___ _. 
NOVO 5 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
. By TARA VILLEREAL 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 
ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014 
Defendants' having filed Application for Stay or Enforcement of the 
Judgment entered October 15, 2014 supported by the Supersedeas Bond of National 
Liability and Fire Insurance Company and the Plaintiff having filed Notice of 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION FOR STAY OR ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENT ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014-1 
002630
non-opposition to the Application,· in which the Plaintiff declares that he has no opposition 
to entry of an Order staying execution or enforcement of judgment as applied for by the 
Defendants, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby ordered and decreed that 
execution or enforcement of the Judgment of October 15, 2014 is stayed up to and 
through the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court on Defendants appeal and for the 
period of time set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 13(15) following the decision of the 
Supreme Court. ~ 
DATEDth!sldayof ND\lembeY-- , 2014. 
Honorable Deborah A. Bail ;,;··=· 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION FOR STAY OR ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENT ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014 - 2 
002631
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
--th 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .i.ff:_ day of Nav:emW. 2014 I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
APPLICATION FOR STAY OR ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT ENTERED OCTOBER 
15, 2014 by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Attorneys for Defendants 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION FOR STAY OR ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENT ENTERED OCTOBER 15, 2014-_3 
002632
David Z. Nevin (ISB#2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO-;--/ili~~'---
AJL i.r~ = 
NOV O 7 2014 j) 
CHRISTOPHER D 
By STEPHAN1e RICH, Cieri< 
DEPUTv VIDAK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHARLES BALLARD, ) 
) 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
Plaintiff Charles Ballard, through his attorneys, hereby gives notice that he will call for 
hearing consideration of his Memorandum of Costs as a Matter of Right, Discretionary Costs and 
Adjusted Previous Award of Sanctions on December 3, 2014 at 2:30 p.m. before the Honorable 
1 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
OR\G\NAL 
002633
Deborah A. Bail. 
I/', 
DATED this 1" day of November, 2014. 
2 • NOTICE OF HEARING 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
By ~~ 
David Z. Nevin ~---
Scott McKay 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
James B. Perrine 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
002634
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l'-
1 hereby certify that on November l- , 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Hearing by facsimile to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
161h Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 




Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO·---~=--------
A.M. ____ FIL~.~ s~ ~ ~ 
NOV 1 0 2014 
CHRl~\TOPHGR. 0. RICH, Clerk 
:J:i• ";. rn·N~\ 11-ilESSEN 
f'1!.P1J't"Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
DISALLOW PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Defendants move the Court to disallow a portion of the Plaintiff's costs as a 
matter of right and the Plaintiff's discretionary costs. 
Costs as a Matter of Right 
Defendants object to item number 2 in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs as 
a Matter of Right entitled Service of Summons and Complaint and Subpoenas in the 
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Amount of $2,453.90, except for the amount paid for service of the petitions of Plaintiff's 
two out-of-state attorneys for admission to practice and the Summons and Complaint in 
the sum of $94.00. 
Rule 54(d)(1 )(c)(2), I.R.C.P., provides "actual fees for service of any 
pleading or document in the action whether served by a public officer or other person." 
The Rule does not specify or refer to service of a subpoena, which it could have recited if 
service of subpoenas was intended as a recoverable cost. In the alternative, the sum of 
$2,453.90, less $94.00, is for service of subpoenas on witnesses for the trial in November 
of 2013, trial scheduled April 8, 2014 and the trial of September 2014. The costs of 
service of subpoenas for the trial of November 2013 were subsumed and included in the 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs of February 18, 2014 and the verbal 
ruling of the Court at the hearing of March 12, 2014 for the award of $64,324.54 to the 
Plaintiff for costs associated with the mistrial. 
Subpoenas were served on witnesses for the trial scheduled April 8, 2014, 
that was vacated on the emergency Motion of the Defendants. An award of costs for the 
postponement of a trial is governed by Rule 54(d)(3), I.R.C.P. It provides in pertinent 
part that the Court in its discretion may impose and tax costs and expenses occasioned 
thereby against the moving party as a condition to such postponement. The Defendant's 
Emergency Motion, Plaintiff's Response to the Motion and the certified original transcript 
of the court reporter, Susan Gambee for the court hearing on the Motion of April 2, 2014 
do not specify or provide as a condition for granting the Motion the imposition of costs and 
expenses against the Defendants. Subpoenas were served by the Plaintiff for the trial of 
September 2014, on Dr. Campbell, Dr. Olson, Dr. Morgan, Dr. Schaff, Dr. Stemmler and 
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Dr. Graben. July Dr. Graben testified. The cost of service of these Subpoenas is $60.000 
for all witnesses except the service on Dr. Olson of $133.00. Since only Dr. Graben 
testified the total for service of subpoenas for the trial of September 2014 is $60.00. In the 
alternative, the total cost of service of subpoenas for the September trial is $433.00, if the 
Court Rules that service of subpoenas is recoverable even though the witnesses served 
did not testify at trial. 
Discretionary Costs 
Defendants object to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs seeking an award for 
discretionary costs. There has been no showing by the Plaintiff that the requested costs 
were necessary and exception costs reasonably incurred and that the interest of justice 
demand that these costs should be assessed against the adverse party. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) sets out that discretionary costs "may be allowed upon 
a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
If costs claimed to be exceptional are of the type commonly incurred in a 
personal injury or wrongful death action, the Supreme Court has affirmed the rejection of 
those costs by the trial court. Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998). 
Plaintiff seeks discretionary costs for their experts, Ors. Nichols and 
Sorensen, stating, without empirical support, that Dr. Sorensen was unique and that "a 
vast majority of the trial was consumed" by the cross-examination of Plaintiff's experts. 
The Court of appeals has held that claims for discretionary fees that are 
claimed as the "testimony of the witness was 'instrumental' and that the witness was 
examined 'at some length by both parties,"' is an insufficient basis for the award for costs 
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which are exceptional and reasonably incurred. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 18 P.3d 
227 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Plaintiff seeks discretionary costs for the depositions of witnesses he 
elected to take, despite these witnesses having disclosures which Defendants 
consistently maintained were the sum total of their opinions. Plaintiff should not be 
awarded these rare and exceptional expenses, as the very nature of Ors. Laurence and 
Garrison's disclosures makes it clear that deposing them would not be necessary. The 
necessity of these at depositions is a requirement under Rule 54(d)(1 )(0). 
Plaintiff seeks discretionary costs for his lawyer and his lawyer's assistant's 
travel, room and board. It was Plaintiff who elected to retain out-of-state counsel. The 
interests of justice are not served by awarding discretionary costs to a party who selects 
counsel from another state. Mr. Haddad knew, when he took this case, that any trial 
would be in Boise and that the travel, room and board costs associated with that trial 
would be a cost of doing that business. 
Plaintiff seeks discretionary costs for videoconferencing and video 
deposition charges, but makes no argument whatsoever that these expenses are 
necessary and exceptional. The Rule draftsman made clear in Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(9), that 
costs for reporting and transcribing could be recovered. There is no law or support for 
the exceptional charge of the video recording or video conferencing of these witnesses, 
which are charges over and above the costs for reporting and transcribing. 
Plaintiff seeks discretionary costs for the exorbitant travel, lodging and meal 
expenses of his expert witness, Dr. Nichols. The rules set out the costs which are to be 
awarded for each expert. There is no exception carved out, nor would the interest of 
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justice be served, to make extraordinary payments to a witness for traveling from out of 
town. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has approved, as the correct interpretation of the 
term "exceptional," a district court's denial of expert witness fees, travel and lodging 
expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys, and administrative costs on the ground that 
the use of such experts and the other expenses were commonly incurred in serious 
personal injury actions. The Fish court made clear that medical experts routinely testify 
in serious personal injury actions which are litigated: "This is the very 'nature' of these 
sorts of cases. Similarly, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and attorneys 
and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the contrary, are common 'in a case 
of this nature." Fish, 131 Idaho at493-94, 960 P.2d at 176-177. 
The Plaintiff put into evidence Exhibits 7 and 8 that contained the reports of 
Ors. Morgan, Stemmler and Schaff. The report of Dr. Morgan stated in part "she now has 
what appears to be a probable fat emboli syndrome." 
The radiology reports of Ors. Stemmler and Schaff for the chest x-rays of 
Krystal Ballard taken at Elmore Medical Center and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center both provided that similar findings may be seen in setting of fat embolism and 
findings may represent fat embolism. It was the Plaintiff who limited the issue on fat 
embolism that would become part of the proof at trial. Plaintiff's expert Dr. Nichols had 
read these reports and records before he testified at the first trial in November of 2013 
and he was fully aware of the proof that Krystal Ballard may have fat embolism. As 
justification for additional expert fees of Dr. Nichols (discretionary costs) and in the 
narrative for discretionary costs it states in part that Dr. Garrison, a defense pathologist 
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was deposed two times after it was determined at his first deposition that he had 
additional opinions that had not been supplemented. Both depositions focused on 
opinions of Dr. Garrison that Krystal Ballard had fat embolism on the basis for the 
opinions. His opinions were in conformity with the reports of Ors. Morgan, Stemmler and 
Schaff that Dr. Nichols had evaluated before the trial in November of 2013. These factors 
and events demonstrate that the claim for additional expert fees of Dr. Nichols were not 
exceptional costs or necessary and reasonably incurred. 
Item A for AMFS (Dean Sorensen, M.D.) of $11,812.37 for discretionary 
costs is absurd and was not necessary or an exceptional cost reasonably incurred. 
Dr. Sorensen testified at the trial about AMFS which he said stood for 
American Medical Forensic Association. This testimony covered and included the 
following subjects: 
1. AMF initially contacted him to review the case and he accepted. 
2. AMF sent him a fee schedule. 
3. AMF established the fees and not Mr. Haddad. 
4. His fees were paid by AMF. 
5. AMF takes a cut or percentage of the fees it is paid by Plaintiff's 
attorney. 
6. AMF is the one that pays Dr. Sorensen. 
7. AMF will pay for his trial testimony. 
There was no proof that the fees charged by AMF and paid by Plaintiff's 
attorney were reasonable and in keeping with the fees ordinarily and customarily charged 
in Boise, Idaho. The engagement of a company by Plaintiff's attorney to locate and hire 
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an expert witness is not a necessary or exceptional cost reasonably incurred that allows 
for an award of discretionary costs. The charges of AMF are not expert witness fees even 
though paid by Plaintiff's attorney. 
The Court had already entered a verbal ruling at the hearing of March 12, 
2014 for an award of costs and expenses of the Plaintiff as a result of the mistrial on 
November 14, 2013. The fact of a mistrial does not create or cause the trial in September 
of 2014 to qualify for discretionary costs. At the trial in November of 2013, the Plaintiff 
called the following witnesses: 
1. Dr. Kerr; 
2. Dr. Sorensen; 
3. Dr. Nichols; 
4. Plaintiff; 
5. Cornelius Hofman; and 
6. Video of Janelle Buchanan. 
Before the trial of November 2013, the Plaintiff had deposed Dr. Kerr, Susie 
Kerr, Briana Dumas, all of the Defendants disclosed and retained expert witnesses and 
Dr. Nichols had reviewed and evaluated the report of the Ada County Coroner and the 
autopsy report of Dr. Graben, and Dr. Sorensen had reviewed all of the medical records of 
the case. At the trial of September 2014, the Plaintiff called the same witnesses that were 
called in the first trial and additional witnesses Dr. Graben, Susie Kerr and Vincent 
Brooks. At the trial in September of 2014, the same exhibits were used by the Plaintiff that 
were used at the first trial. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff, Hofman, Dr. Nichols, Dr. Sorensen and Dr. 
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Kerr, at the September 2014 trial was a repeat of an basically the same as their testimony 
at the first trial. Since their testimony at both trials was basically the same, the mistrial did 
not add anything that would result in their testimony at the second trial to be exceptional 
or necessary. As for Dr. Graben, his testimony basically followed his autopsy report in all 
respects and was essentially a repeat of the autopsy report, that the Plaintiff's experts Dr. 
Nichols and Sorensen were familiar with before and during the first trial. The same is true 
as respects the trial testimony of Susie Kerr whose deposition the Plaintiff had taken 
before the first trial. Using witness Vincent Brooks on the issues of damages was not 
exceptional or necessary that gave rise to discretionary costs. Such witnesses are 
common in personal injury and death cases. 
Allowing discretionary costs for the September 2014 trial would constitute a 
repeat of the verbal cost award of $64,324.54 ordered by the Court at the hearing of 
March 12, 2014, or a doubling up of costs against the Defendants. 
As mentioned several times in this document, there are limitations on the 
right to recover discretionary costs, and the mere fact they were incurred does not qualify 
them as legitimate discretionary costs. In trial all of medical malpractice cases, experts 
are required by the Plaintiff to establish a prima facia case and it is common and ordinary 
for their experts to change professional fees well in excess of the amount allowed as 
costs as a matter of right. It is also a common and usual practice of attorneys in medical 
malpractice cases to take the depositions of an opponents disclosed experts that is 
authorized by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(1)(iii), I.R.C.P. In these matters, Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(4)(c), provides for the payment of the experts fees for the time spent testifying at a 
deposition. These Rules cover and relate to standard and ordinary procedures and are 
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not designed or meant to be exceptional. The combination of these Rules and the 
customary practices and procedures utilized in medical malpractice cases are applicable 
to paragraphs A and B of the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs for discretionary costs and 
should be denied by the Court. 
Paragraph D of the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Discretionary costs, entitled 
videoconferencing/video deposition charges in the amount of $5,357.15. In many medical 
malpractice cases in Idaho, it is not uncommon for a party to take depositions by video 
means. Taking of depositions by video is frequently used and is not an exceptional cost or 
a necessary cost. When Plaintiff's attorney took the video depositions in this case, he was 
exercising an option authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, but taking the 
depositions by this means was not necessary or essential to the presentation of the 
Plaintiff's case. 
The narrative of Plaintiff's attorney in support of the claim for these costs, 
item D, does not give a reason or justification for an award of these costs on a 
discretionary basis. 
When Mr. Haddad initially took this case he knew he would have to travel to 
Boise, Idaho from West Virginia for trial and other pre-trial matters, and that travel costs, 
lodging and transportation would be incurred for himself and his paralegal Farrah 
Caruthers, if he elected to have her attend the trial as an option. The same is true as 
respects the travel expense of Plaintiff's expert Dr. Nichols, in addition to the travel 
expense covered by his travel expense allowed as a matter of right. Plaintiff's attorney 
knew that if Dr. Nichols was retained as an expert and used as a trial witness, the cost of 
his travel from Louisville, Kentucky to Boise would exceed the travel expense authorized 
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as costs as a matter of right. It is obvious the Plaintiff approved these costs and accepted 
them regardless of the outcome of the trial. It was not necessary to have Farrah Caruthers 
attend the trial and in most medical malpractice trials in Idaho, paralegals do not attend 
trials. The defense did not have a paralegal at the trial. The use of a paralegal is an option 
and luxury selected by Mr. Haddad but not necessary or exceptional. The hiring of Dr. 
Nichols from Louisville, Kentucky was also an option and luxury that was not necessary or 
exceptional because there are numerous other pathologists who could have been hired 
that would not have travel expenses like Dr. Nichols. This point is demonstrated by the 
trial testimony of Dr. Graben that basically duplicated the trial testimony of Dr. Nichols. In 
the narrative of Mr. Haddad, he extolls the qualifications and status of Dr. Graben. 
Paragraph F of the claim for discretionary costs is an option that Plaintiff's 
attorney saw fit to employ but it was not necessary or required. It does not equate to an 
exceptional cost. 
The narrative of Mr. Haddad for discretionary costs does not explain, justify 
or support the costs advanced in paragraph F, nor does it support, justify and explain the 
basis for the costs designated in paragraph G. 
The cost of transcripts is not necessary or an exceptional cost, but one that 
is available as an option. The Court has access to the testimony and dialogue contained 
in the transcripts that Plaintiff's attorney can refer to without having possession of the 
transcripts. The use of these transcripts is simply a convenience for Plaintiff's attorney 
and nothing more and their cost does not rise to the level of exceptional and necessary. 
The narrative of Mr. Haddad for an award of discretionary costs is void of 
,. 
specific facts, proof, foundation and justification for discretionary costs, except for the 
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following unsupported conclusory statements. 
1. Costs were necessary, reasonable and exceptional and incurred as 
a consequence of the retrial. 
2. The case was not defended as a simple medical malpractice action. 
3. Because of the unique characteristics of the case, the Plaintiff was 
forced to present expert witnesses whose education, training and experience went far 
beyond that of a typical expert witness. 
4. The case is exceptional simply by virtue of the fact that the initial 
case ended in a mistrial occasioned by the Defendants' actions at a point in the original 
trial where Defendants had the benefit of hearing all of the Plaintiff's case, a second trial 
had to be continued due to injury to one of the Defendants and ultimately a retrial which 
lasted three weeks, although a vast majority of trial time was consumed by Defense 
counsel examining witnesses which further increased the costs of Plaintiff's experts, who 
were forced to undergo many, many hours of cross-examination. 
5. Discretionary costs should be awarded, especially in a situation 
where Defendants made no offer and forced Plaintiff to incur extraordinary costs in 
prosecuting the case, despite fairly clear and straightforward issues which should not 
have been in dispute. 
None of these general and vague statements are supported by proof, 
evidence, events and explanations for awards of discretionary costs. 
Specifically, the trial lasted 12 trial days that included jury selection, 
opening statements, recesses, jury instruction conference and closing arguments that 
was within the time scheduled by the Court. Taking these factors into account, a 12 day 
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malpractice jury trial is not exceptionally long, especially when the Plaintiffs prove and 
want a jury damage award in the range of 3.7 million dollars. In the experience of 
undersigned counsel, medical malpractice trials frequently exceed 12 trial days. 
This case was routine, ordinary and standard medical malpractice case and 
it was defended as a routine medical malpractice action in which undersigned has 
participated many times. The case did not have unique characteristics. It basically 
involved the following: 
1. Whether Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch adequately cleaned, disinfected 
and sterilized the equipment used in the operation on Krystal Ballard. 
2. Whether the gram negative rods found in the right buttock of Krystal 
Ballard were introduced during the operation of Dr. Kerr and if so, whether they resulted in 
the death of Krystal Ballard. 
3. Standard and usual issues of the standard of health care practice for 
Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch and proximate cause. 
The Plaintiff's experts gave testimony that was not unusual and did not go 
far beyond that of a typical expert, taking into account the basic issues of the case. The 
Defense did not put on proof by the testimony of experts that Krystal Ballard had fat 
embolism and the Plaintiff had to rebut the evidence of this because it was contained in 
the records that the Plaintiff put in evidence, in the first place. 
The cross examination of Plaintiff's experts did not take many, many hours. 
There is no proof or support that a lack of an offer by the Defendants would 
have avoided a trial. 
The matters described in paragraph 4 above, constitute conjecture and 
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speculation by Mr. Haddad. They lack proof, justification, and reasons why discretionary 
costs should be awarded. 
In the narrative portion of Plaintiff's Memorandum for discretionary costs, it 
is asserted that Defendants made no offer and forced Plaintiff to incur extraordinary costs 
in prosecuting the case, despite fairly clear and straight forward issues which should not 
have been in dispute. This statement is totally irrelevant to the issue of discretionary costs 
and carries not probative worth for the Court's decision. Since the statement has been 
asserted by counsel for the Plaintiff, the Defendants would like the Court to know that the 
only actual offer of settlement of the Plaintiff was in an amount more than the combined 
jury award for damages, economic and non-economic. 
Furthermore, the statement that Defendants made no offer does not 
establish or prove that an offer by the Defendants, even if made, would have resolved the 
case and not forced the Plaintiff to incur extraordinary costs in prosecuting the case. The 
issue of no offer by the Defendants should also be considered by the Court in light of the 
deposition and trial testimony of the Plaintiffs' only standard of health care practice expert 
Dr. Sorensen, and I quote: 
Q. I guess it's your opinion that gram negative rods were 
injected into the buttocks of Krystal Ballard during Dr. Kerr's 
procedure. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Isn't it true that's just an assumption on your part? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it true that there's no proof by any means of the 
fact that at the time of surgery these gram negative bacteria 
went into her body. Isn't that true? 
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A. Yes. 
There is also the trial testimony of Dr. Graben who performed the autopsy of 
Krystal Ballard, and I quote: 
Q. Okay. You said just moments ago you had no idea how 
bugs got into the tissue in the right buttocks. Correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Okay. When you say that as the pathologist conducting 
the autopsy, are you saying that you cannot determine or 
conclude that the bugs got into the right buttocks from 
instruments used by Dr. Kerr? 
A. That's right. 
Dr. Sorensen testified at trial that the guidelines of the Federal CDC 
(Centers for Disease Control) and the State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
are authoritative and should be followed as a basis for his opinion that Dr. Kerr violated 
the standard of practice that was the cause of death of Krystal Ballard. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff asked Dr. Sorensen questions on these subjects and Dr. Sorensen expressly 
answered the questions, even though Idaho Code 6-1014 prohibits these questions and 
answers and provides that they are not admissible in any proceeding or action concerning 
a determination of liability of a health care practitioner. Both Plaintiff's attorney and Dr. 
Sorensen violated Idaho Code 6-1014. These are examples and reasons why Dr. Kerr 
and Silk Touch believed it was appropriate to go to trial, in addition to the favorable 
opinions and trial testimony of their expert witnesses Ors. Stiller and Lundeby, witness 
Briana Dumas and Dr. Kerr himself. 
All of these factors weigh heavily against an award of discretionary costs to 
the Plaintiff. 
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Rule 37(e), I.R.C.P., only applies to an Order of the Court made pursuant to 
these Rules. The mistrial was ordered on the basis that Dr. Stiller testified on the subject 
of pertinent or persistent infections in the office in violation of the Court Order granting 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine that prohibited proof and testimony on infections, or lack of 
infections, in other patient's treated surgically by Dr. Kerr. There are no Rules of Civil 
Procedure that relate to, cover or embrace Motions in Limine and Orders of the Court on 
Motions in Limine. The term Motions in Limine are not found in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 37(e) only applies to Orders made pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and therefore the basis and reason for the mistrial was not predicated on a 
violation of any Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 47(u) provides for a mistrial if the Court 
determines an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial. The Rule goes on to provide if 
the Court determines that a mistrial was caused by the deliberate misconduct of a party or 
attorney, the Court may require the adverse party or the attorney or both, to pay the 
reasonable expenses including attorney fees incurred by the opposing party resulting 
from such misconduct. Rule 4(u) is the only Rule of Civil Procedure that pertains to a 
mistrial and the sanctions for causing a mistrial. 
When the Court ordered the mistrial, no determination was made that the 
mistrial was caused by the deliberate misconduct of Dr. Kerr, Silk Touch and their counsel 
and there was absolutely no evidence or proof that the mistrial was caused by any 
Defendant and their counsel as required by Rule 47(u). 
At the Court hearing of February 2, 2014 on Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions 
due to the mistrial ordered November 14, 2013, the Court entered a verbal order of 
sanctions for the jury fees to be paid to Ada County by the Defendants. It is the 
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Defendants' position that this sanction is prohibited by the last sentence of Rule 48(a), 
I.R.C.P. that states "the cost of a jury shall not be taxed as costs to any party in any civil 
action." 
Defendants respectfully request the Court to deny in full the Plaintiff's 
Memorandum for Discretionary Costs and the sum of $2,453.90, less the sum of $94.00, 
for costs as a matter of right. 
DATED this 101h day of November, 2014. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jeremi h A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 101h day of November, 2014, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISALLOW 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
V Jeremiah A. Quane 
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David Nevin (ISB #2280) dnevin@nbmlaw.com 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) smckay@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghaddad@baileyglasser.com 
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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OePUTy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISALLOW MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS 
Plaintiff Charles Ballard opposes Defendants' Motion to Disallow Costs. Under the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the "prevailing party" is entitled to recover costs both as a matter of 




Plaintiff was unquestionably the prevailing party as the Defendants were found negligent, 
reckless, and judgment was entered for $3,790,436.00 in Plaintiffs favor. Furthermore, the 
circumstances of the trial, including a mistrial caused by Defendants, led Plaintiff to reasonably 
incur necessary and exceptional costs that Defendants should pay in the interests of justice. On 
October 28, 2014, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Plaintiff filed a verified 
memorandum of costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs and adjusted previous award of 
sanctions in which he set forth all costs he seeks to recover. Through their motion, Defendants 
now oppose certain costs listed by Plaintiff. In opposition to Defendants' motion and in further 
support of their memorandum of costs, Plaintiff states the following: 
I. Costs to Plaintiff as a Matter of Right 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Plaintiff filed a verified memorandum of 
costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs and adjusted previous award of sanctions 
("Memorandum of Costs"). See Pl.'s Mem. of Costs attached as Exhibit 1. In that memorandum, 
Plaintiff set forth the costs he seeks both as a matter of right and at the discretion of the Court for 
costs that were necessary, reasonable and exceptional. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l) entitles Plaintiff to recover certain costs as a 
matter of right, including "[a]ctual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action 
whether served by a public officer or other person." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(2) (emphasis added). 
Defendants make the specious argument that Plaintiff cannot recover the costs for the service of 
subpoenas because subpoenas are not specifically listed as a "document" covered by the rule. 
Yet, the rule itself lists only "pleadings" and otherwise applies to the service of 
"any ... document" without specifying further any other type of document that would be covered. 
Such broad language was clearly meant to encompass all documents that would require "service" 
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in the course of litigation. Other than the summons or complaint, the most common documents 
requiring service in the course of litigation are subpoenas. To exclude them from the rule 
impermissibly renders the words "any document" practically meaningless. See State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 478, 163 P.3d 1183, 1190 (2007) ("In interpreting statutory language, 
all the words of the statute must be given effect if possible, and the statute must be construed as a 
' 
whole.") .. To give effect to the word "document" in the rule, subpoenas must be included and 
Plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to $2,453.90 for the costs he incurred for the service of 
subpoe~as in this case. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to all other costs listed in the 
Memorandum of Costs as a matter of right. See Exhibit 1 at pp. 2-4. 
II. Discretionary Costs 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) provides that "[a]dditional items of cost not 
enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon 
a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should 
in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54. The grant or denial 
of discretionary costs is "committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Zimmerman v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1115, 117 S.Ct. 1245, 137 L.Ed.2d 327 (1997). 
In his Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiff requested an award of discretionary costs on the 
ground that such costs were necessary, reasonable and exceptional and incurred as a consequence 
of the retrial of this action and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against the 
Defendants. Included in Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs were fees for additional expert 
witness fees and travel expenses, both of which may be awarded as discretionary costs: 
Discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) can include travel expenses along 
with other expenses such as photocopying, faxes, postage and long distance 
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telephone calls. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 
P.2d 965, 971 (1993). This Court ... has found that a trial court may assess 
additional expert witness fees under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Turner v. Willis, 116 
Idaho 682, 686, 778 P.2d 804, 808 (1989). 
Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 187, 983 P.2d 
834, 841 · (1999). Defendants cite Fish v. Smith for the proposition that such costs are not 
. 
exceptional in a personal injury case for the purposes of Rule 54(d)(l)(D). Fish v. Smith, 
131 Idaho 492,960 P.2d 175 (1998). Yet, it is clear that the Court in that case simply applied its 
discretion to the facts in that case and the appeals court upheld the lower court's decision, as is 
required by the Rule. Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho at 187 ("[Plaintiff] reads 
Fish as a determination that expert fees and travel costs are not exceptional. This is incorrect. 
Fish merely applied the abuse of discretion standard and concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion."). Applying its discretion to the facts in this case, this Court should uphold 
Plaintiffs request for discretionary costs. 
As stated in the Memorandum of Costs, this case was not defended as a simple medical 
malpractice action. The Defendants identifiea' three standard-of-care witnesses, as well as Dr. 
Kerr himself. All four of these physicians are within the same specialty of cosmetic surgery, and 
are located both within and outside of the State of Idaho. Defendants did not call one of the 
experts, Dr. Gregory.Laurence, yet a fee for Dr. Laurence's deposition was incurred by Plaintiff 
for this cumulative expert. 
Further, despite an autopsy performed by an objective and non-retained pathologist, Dr. 
Glen Groben, Ada County Coroner, whose findings under Idaho law may be deemed to be the 
prima facie cause of death, Defendants nonetheless identified a pathologist, Dr. Garrison to rebut 
the cause of death identified in the autopsy report. The deposition of the pathologist occurred on 
. 
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two occasions after it was determined at his first deposition that he had additional opinions that 
had not been disclosed. Defendants did not call Dr. Garrison at trial. 
Because of the unique characteristics of the case, the Plaintiff was forced to present 
expert witnesses whose education, training and experience went beyond that of a typical expert 
witness. Dr. Dean Sorensen had the unique experience of being an inspector of various cosmetic 
surgery facilities, which brought to bear his experience of being able to identify the standard of 
care applicable to the entire Treasure Valley area. Similarly, Dr. Nichols is a nationally-
recognized expert who has authored a number of different articles, on issues directly relevant to 
the case. 
In addition, the actions of one of the parties can make a case exceptional for the purposes 
of awarding discretionary costs by making the case unnecessarily long or complicated. Puckett v. 
Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169, 158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007). In Puckett, a medical malpractice case, 
the Court upheld the lower court's award of discretionary costs to the Plaintiff, including expert 
fees and travel costs. The award came after two trials, the first having ended in a mistrial. Id. The 
Court found that the costs requested by Plaintiff were exceptional given the "long course of 
litigation and complexity of this case" and that the lower court was not required to evaluate the 
costs requested, item by item, but instead "the district court's findings as to the general character 
of the travel expenses, expert witness fees and other litigation costs were sufficient." Id. 
Accordingly, this case is exceptional simply by virtue of the fact that the initial case 
ended in a mistrial occasioned by the Defendants' actions at a point in the original trial where 
Defendants had the benefit of hearing all of the Plaintiffs case; a second trial had to be 
continued due to injury to one of the Defendants, and ultimately a retrial that lasted three weeks, 
although a vast majority of trial time was consumed by defense counsel examining witnesses, 
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thereby further increasing the costs of Plaintiffs experts. The Plaintiffs expert charges are in 
line on an hourly basis for what the Defendants' experts charged on an hourly basis, and 
therefore, were reasonable in cost. It is in the interest of justice that these discretionary costs 
should b~ awarded, especially in a situation where Defendants made no offer and forced Plaintiff 
to incur extraordinary costs in prosecuting the case, despite fairly clear and straightforward 
issues which should not have been in dispute. Likewise, costs for travel by the attorneys and the 
cost for video depositions are properly included in the overall exceptional litigation costs. 
Finally, Defendants argue without meaningful elaboration that Dr. Sorensen's testimony 
at trial, related to the standard of practice, somehow violated Idaho Code § 6-1014. How this is 
pertinent to the determination of discretionary costs available to the Plaintiff is not clear. What is 
clear is that Idaho Code § 6-1014 is not in any way applicable to Dr. Sorensen's testimony and 
therefore his testimony and the evidence presented at trial did not violate the statute. 
As stated in his Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiff is entitled to $19,018.91 in costs as a 
matter of right. In addition, Plaintiff requests $47,028.07 in discretionary costs on the ground that 
the costs were necessary, reasonable and exceptional and incurred as a consequence of the retrial 
of this action and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the Defendants as stated 
above. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants' Motion to 
Disallow Costs and enter an Order granting the costs requested by Plaintiff in his verified 
memorandum of costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs and adjusted previous award of 
sanctions filed with this court on October 28, 2014. 
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r-
DATED this d ~ day of November, 2014. 
' 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
By:~~ 
#'z-P. Gregory Haddad 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. f"'-
1 hereby certify that on the ;)...'7 day of November, 2014, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS delivering the same to the 
following via facsimile: 
Jeremiah A. Quane, Esq. 
Terrence S. Jones, Esq. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P. 0. Box 1578 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208-780-3930 
Scott McKay 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER, and LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 



















ORDER RE: COSTS AND FEES 
NO----iili&:~~--,. ...... 
AM----iP.M 3 '.LQ 
'FEBO 3 2015 
CHRISTOP~tf:i p. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VILI.EREAL 
OEPuTv 
Krystal Ballard was a previously healthy young Staff Sergeant in the United States Air 
Force who died as a result of contaminated instruments used by Dr. Brian Kerr during a 
liposuction/fat transfer performed at his office at Silk Touch Laser, LLP. The jury concluded 
that Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch were negligent and reckless in the cleaning, disinfecting and 
sterilization of the reusable equipment used in the procedure and awarded damages of 
$3,790,431.00. One of the most critical pjeces of evidence was a slide made by the pathologist 
who performed Krystal's autopsy which showed the deadly infection inside a fat transfer 
injection site, with no tracing of bacteria from the surface of the skin to the infection point. If the 
infection had come from the surface, there would have been signs from the surface of infection. 
There was none. Krystal had nothing else medically wrong with her except the deadly bacteria 
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' ' 
injected during the procedure. The instrument became infected during the procedure. The angle 
of infection matched the angle at which Dr. Kerr injected fat and occurred in an injection site, 
below the skin. The plaintiff prevailed and is entitled to all costs of right and to discretionary 
costs as will be addressed hereafter. 
The defense triggered a mistrial the first time this case went to trial on the first day of the 
defense case, after eight days of testimony, when their witness blatantly disregarded the Court's 
in limine order barring purported evidence of a lack of prior infections. The "evidence" of a lack 
of prior infections came from a review performed by Dr. Kerr's wife, who had no medical 
training or background, of undisclosed records of Silk Touch. The records were never disclosed 
by the defense to the plaintiff in spite of express requests and represented an inadmissible 
"summary" which did not meet any of the requirements of IRE 1006. Considerable time had 
been consumed the first morning of the first trial discussing the problems presented by the 
purported "summary": the lack of disclosure of any of the underlying data allegedly summarized, 
its preparation by an untrained person, lack of clarity about whether the procedures allegedly 
summarized were, in fact, similar, and the lack of any proper foundation for the purported 
evidence of lack of prior infections. While the defense had violated another order in limine 
barring reference to insurance when Mr. Quane engaged in extensive questioning of life 
insurance deductions on Krystal's paycheck, apparently insinuating that, since S.Sgt. Charles 
Ballard had received life insurance proceeds as a result of his wife's death, he was somehow not 
entitled to seek redress from a jury, that violation did not present the serious concerns caused by 
the grave misconduct of the defense witness, Dr. Gregory Stiller. Dr. Stiller, in direct violation 
of the Court's in limine order testified in response to a defense question asking why he held the 
opinion that contaminated instruments were not the cause of S.Sgt. Krystal Ballard's death: 
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" ... Let alone the fact of that no pertinent or persistent infections in the office. There is no 
history of the fact that .... " His answer ended only with the interjection by plaintiffs counsel of 
an objection. Dr. Stiller based his opinion on the excluded "summary" which was excluded 
because it did not meet even the most minimal standards for admissible evidence. While the 
defense, Mr. Quane, engaged in questionable conduct during the trial in violating a different in 
limine order, this violation was such grave misconduct that the Court granted a mistrial and 
indicated that sanctions would be awarded to, as much as possible, alleviate the harm caused by 
the misconduct. There is no credible evidence that there was a prior lack of infection because no 
medically trained person ever reviewed the purported records. The underlying data was never 
disclosed. It is not clear which results from which procedures were reviewed. It was prejudicial 
to imply that there was any legitimate, credible evidence of a lack of prior infections for the same 
procedure. The plaintiff was seriously prejudiced. The defense had a complete preview of the 
entire plaintiffs case. The defense can bill hourly and can recover its expenses regardless of 
outcome-not so the plaintiff. Krystal's husband, SSgt. Charles Ballard, had to come to Boise, 
obtain leave and stay here for two separate trials-a situation which should never have occurred. 
He was, and is, an active duty member of the United States Air Force. 
Mr. Quane is an extremely experienced counsel. He was well aware of the length of time 
spent addressing the motion in limine, its critical importance and the reasons for the court's 
ruling. He has handled expert witnesses for decades. He should have been well aware of the risk 
presented when an expert who has not testified in any previous trial has based previous opinions 
on evidence that has been declared inadmissible and that was fundamentally flawed. The 
triggering of the mistrial was grave misconduct which gave the defense a significant and unfair 
advantage. It is the kind of misconduct which discredits the entire system of justice. The 
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foundational rule of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is that the purpose of all of the rules is 
"to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 
I.R.C.P. l(a). The defense misconduct violated every aspect of the Rule. At the time the mistrial 
was declared, the Court indicated its intention to try to mitigate the unfairness caused by the 
defense deliberate misconduct. The Court ordered that the defense reimburse the plaintiff for the 
expenses which were incurred for the first trial and for attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 47(u) 
but a written Order was not entered for three reasons: first, to give the Court the chance to review 
the matter more fully when the record was more complete and to assess, in colder light, what 
sanctions, beyond costs incurred, should be reasonably assessed; two, how they might be crafted 
to avoid unfairness to either side, and finally, to preclude further delay in the retrial by defense 
interlocutory motions. The second trial had already been continued once because of the 
defendant's bicycle accident. Further delay would have occasioned further unwarranted harm to 
the plaintiff. The kind of conduct engaged in by the defense in this case was so outrageous that 
this Court has simply not seen such a pattern of conduct in over three decades of trying complex 
cases and it seemed like a colder, more measured analysis would be prudent. In the cold light of 
further review, sanctions remain warranted. 
A. Costs of Right. 
The plaintiff prevailed and is entitled to all costs ofright. Under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l), costs 
of right are awarded as follows: 
1. Court filing fees. Filing fees are awarded of $88.00. 
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by a 
public officer or other person. Service fees are awarded of $2,453.90 in accordance with the 
rules. The Rule mandates costs for the service of "any pleading or document."_The defense cites 
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no legal support for its argument rejecting the portion attributable to service of subpoenas. 
Subpoenas are a document for which service is required and is a permissible cost of right. 
3. Travel expenses of witnesses. Travel fees for witnesses computed at the rate provided by 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(4) are awarded in the amount of $567.00. 
4. Costs for Preparation of Trial Exhibits. Costs for preparation of trial exhibits are awarded 
to the plaintiff in the amount of $500.00. 
5. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an 
action. Reasonable expert witness fees, capped at $2,000 per witness, are authorized under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8) and are awarded in the amount of $5,96.00. 
6. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for trial of an 
action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action. The plaintiff is awarded costs 
ofright for depositions of $9,450.01. 
Total Costs of Right Awarded: $19,018.91. 
B. Discretionary Costs. Under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D),additional costs may be awarded by the 
Court, in its sound discretion, "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred" which "should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." In this case, the Court will award all costs associated with the expert testimony offered in 
the first trial because the trial was rendered a nullity as a result of deliberate misconduct by the 
defense and because the interests of justice require that the defense not profit by this misconduct 
any more than can be avoided. Nothing erases the fact that the plaintiff was placed in a position 
of providing a preview of its entire case but the plaintiffs recovery should not be further reduced 
by charges occasioned by the misconduct of the defense which required him to duplicate his 
proof. 
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On the first morning of trial, the Court granted the not uncommon motion in limine 
precluding references to insurance. On his examination purportedly to question the amount of 
damages, Mr. Quane deliberately questioned a witness on Krystal's pay stub which showed 
deductions for life insurance. To preclude a reoccurrence, the Court ordered that those references 
be redacted in the second trial. Although it was a violation of the in limine order, it was one 
which could have been addressed with a cautionary instruction to the jury. 
Trial costs and expert fees for the first trial, less costs of right awarded above, are 
awarded in the amount of $48,121.51. SSgt. Ballard's travel fees and costs from his duty station 
in Florida to attend the first trial, including lodging and meals, are awarded in the amount of 
$4,324. 54 as a discretionary cost since they are reasonable, necessary and exceptional and, in 
the interests of justice, should be awarded to him as a result of the defense misconduct in this 
case. It is prudent and necessary for counsel to obtain transcripts of the prior trial, they are also 
awarded in the.amount of $1,664.75 since they are exceptional costs which should, in the 
interests of justice, be awarded to the plaintiff. 
As to the costs incurred with respect to expert witness fees in the second trial, those are 
not awarded as discretionary costs. The type of discovery counsel had to engage in is typical for 
a medical malpractice case. It is not uncommon to incur deposition costs and expenses in 
connection with a witness who does not testify. The Court has already awarded the maximum 
amount for each expert witness fee as provided for by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(8) as costs of right. 
The additional costs sought do not meet the requirement that they be "exceptional" costs. Travel 
costs connected with the second trial, additional witness fees are customary costs which do not 
fit the requirements for an award of discretionary costs since they will, presumably, be covered 
by the damage award fixed by the jury. 
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This Court has made every effort to allow the costs connected to the first trial to be 
covered as discretionary costs because they were reasonable, necessary and "exceptional" since 
the first trial was rendered worse than a nullity by the defense misconduct. No court could fully 
address the prejudice which may have resulted to the plaintiff by being placed in a position 
where they provided a full preview of their case to the defense. As much as possible however, 
the Court has endeavored to place plaintiff in the position that the plaintiff would have been had 
he been afforded one fair trial. These costs are also properly awarded on the equal ground 
provided by I.R.C.P. 47(u). On both grounds, costs are awarded as provided herein. 
C. Attorney fees. 
The mistrial in this case was triggered as a result of deliberate misconduct which came 
out of the direct violation of an in limine order. Dr. Stiller testified at his deposition about 
conclusions made from the spurious "study." When asked his opinion by the defense, he went 
straight into the area that the Court had barred in limine, after extensive discussion and argument. 
He had been repeatedly warned to stay away from the area. He gave his opinion that there was 
no negligence in the defendants' cleaning, sterilizing and disinfecting of reusable equipment 
used in the fat transfer by referring to the inadmissible "summary": "let alone the fact of that no 
pertinent or persistent infections in the office. There is no history of the fact that-". His answer 
was stopped by the plaintiffs objection. The information he based his opinion on was gathered 
in an unknown fashion by Dr. Kerr's wife who had no medical training--it is not clear if the 
information did relate to the same procedure--the underlying "data" supporting the "summary" 
was never produced for inspection even though requested by the plaintiff. The absence of 
similar accidents always requires a showing of relevance and a significant foundation 
establishing true similarity which was never made in this case. There are important, serious, 
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evidentiary requirements which must be established to permit this type of evidence-none of 
which were shown in this case. The requirements for admission of a summary under IRE 1006 
were never met. The unsupported implication that there had never been prior infections in Dr. 
Kerr's office warranted the mistrial which was granted. 
Under I.R.C.P. 47(u): 
Rule 47(u). Declaration of mistrial Sanctions. 
After trial is commenced, at any time prior to the rendering of a verdict, the court on its 
own motion or upon motion of any party may declare a mistrial if it determines an occurrence 
at trial has prevented a fair trial. If the court determines that a mistrial was caused by the 
deliberate misconduct of a party or attorney, the court may require the adverse party or the 
attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses including attorney fees incurred by the 
opposing party or parties resulting from such misconduct. 
The Court ordered the mistrial and sanctions. Upon further reflection, the Court withdraws the 
order assessing jury fees and costs. 
This was an extremely unusual situation. The defense had engaged in a prior violation of 
an in limine order which the Court intended to address by way of a cautionary instruction but to 
imply, without any solid basis, that there was absence of prior infections was a level of deliberate 
misconduct which necessitated a mistrial. As a result of the mistrial, the defense had a full 
preview of the plaintiffs case. The plaintiff incurred expenses related to a trial which ended 
midway. Plaintiffs counsel expended time for which they would not be fully recompensed even 
if the second trial was fair and did result in a verdict for the plaintiff. It is not uncommon for 
cases to be defended in a way that drives up costs unnecessarily but the deliberate misconduct 
which caused a mistrial in this case was beyond the pale. Having reviewed the plaintiffs 
application for attorney fees, attorney fees are awarded in connection with the first trial in the 
amount of $70, 566.50. 
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Counsel is directed to submit an Amended Judgment reflecting the Court's ruling on 
costs and fees. Counsel's attention is drawn to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a): 
Rule 54(a). Judgments Definition Form. 
Judgment as used in these rules means a separate document entitled Judgment or Decree. 
A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in 
the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not 
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the 
court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. . .. A judgment shall begin 
with the words JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: , and it shall not contain any 
other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment can include any findings of 
fact or conclusions oflaw expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation. 
(emphasis added). 
It is so ordered. 
District Judge 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S. 
PROPOSED SUP.PLEMl=NTAL 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants object to the proposed Supplemental Judgment of the Plaintiff 
on the grounds that the Judgment does not specify or designate the amounts awarded for 
costs of the trial and the fees and costs resulting from the mistrial. 
No objection is asserted to the total amount of ~hese awards of 
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$143,696.21. 
The Order of the Court of February 3, 2015 for costs and fees provides for 
costs as a matter of right of $19,018.91 and award for discretionary costs and attorney 
fees of $124,677.30 as a result of the mistrial. 
The Supplemental Judgment should reflect these separated and distinct 
awards. 
DATED this 1 ith day of February, 2015. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jer iah A. Quane, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D.; SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, d/b/a SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
(Re: Costs and Fees) 
(a) the Plaintiff Charles Ballard shall recover from the Defendants Brian Calder Kerr, 
M.D., and Silk Touch Laser LLP the sum of One Hundred Forty Three Thousand Six Hundred 
and Ninety Six Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($143,696.21); and 
I 
(b) interest shall accrue on the foregoing amount at the applicable statutory rate from this 
date forward until 1 JnifJ:.~> 
J?ATED this U~February, 2015. 
I -SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT (Re: Costs and Fees) 
002675
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: Ballard v. Kerr, Docket No. 42611 
NO. ____ Fii:aj-;~--
A.M. FILED 3 , 
----P.M._ • S""°) 
MAR O 2 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D 
By KELLE WEG:~~· Clerk 
DEPUTY 
Notice is hereby given that on Monday, November 17, 2014, I lodged a 
transcript of 118 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceeding 11/14/2014 Appeal 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
002676
TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 





MARO 2 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D 
By KELLE WEG~~~· Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
X 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 2463 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 
Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains hearing held on: 
2/12/14, 3/12/14, 3/16-10/3/14 
DATE: February 2, 2015 
S~~urt Reporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18 
Registered Merit Reporter 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
(208) 334-2616 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED 
SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
X 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 31 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Boise, Honorable Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains: 
11-05-14 Partial Transcript of 
Proceedings -- Motions in 
Limine 
2014 
Fisher, Official Court Reporter 
Offi 'al Court Reporter to Judge Melissa Moody 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 979 
Registered Professional Reporter 
002678
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42611 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Jury Questions. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 23rd day of March, 2015. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUDGE DEBORAH A. BAIL 
Deputy Clerk: Tara Villereal 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 




BRIAN KERR and SILK TOUCH LASER, 
Defendants. 
Appearances: 
Counsel for Plaintiff: Scott McKay & Greg Haddad 
Counsel for Defendant: Jeremiah Quane & Terry Jones 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-04792 
EXHIBIT LIST 
JURY TRIAL 
~~l~----~~l-~-N~---=~m~~~~T~~: of Dean Sorensen -~-~~=-~=~!~~~---·:-~~~~4~~~--1 
- ..... -- ..... -·-·---,-----------------·---------··--··---- -------------·-··---l 
l. Pltf. _ __[_ ·-·-· 2. _____ Curriculum Vitae of G~e R. Nichols II______ Admitted ··-·-+ 09/18/14 ···--1· 
L~~f: ___ }-····-.i:___ . C~rriculum Vitae of Cornelius A. Hofman___ Admitted _j_QJ{~.fl.!_ __ _ 
! Pltf. 1 5. Medical Record and Chart-Silk Touch Admitted ! 09/17/14 
I~:~~ · !······-- ~~- ··-· ~~~~:a~~~~~;~a~~a~~:rt-Elmore Ambulance ~~~:~~:~ - ! ~~~: ;~~: -·---~ 
1-----·· .. .' -···-·-· -- ------·---------------·-------- . ·----·--·-·-··-·· 
l .. ~l~[._ .. j. ____ ].:..____ _Medical Record and Chart .for-Elmore M~~ Ct~- Admitted . ....;.._09!Jl!J_4 _______ 1 
l..?.}!t __ j __ , ___ J_:.____ Medical_ RecQrd_ and Chart for-St._~ho'!su~ _ Admitted LQ.?.L!_7J.J_1 ______ j 
! __ Pltf. __: ____ 9. _···r Investigative Report -Ada CountyCoroner __ Admitted __ _i 09/17/14 _I 
LPltt:. __ i ____ I o.-=f Funeral Placard of Krystal Ballard ______ Adm!tted '. 09/17/14 ____ ] 
\__Pltt. ___ f_ ....... 11_. -~ Funeral Placard of Krystal Ballard _____ Admitted _l 09/17/14 ___ _.] 
~-!~_1-~f. .. J ....... l.~.:...- -~hotos of Charles and Krystal. Ballard ______ A~~_itted ~: Q.?i 17 / 11 __ .. 1 
; Pltf ..... t.' ___ 13.+V.,OtosofCharlesand Krystal_Ballard _________ Admitted .. ; 09/17/14 _ ~ 
[Pitf. _ 1 ________ 14._~otos of Charles and Krystal Ballard -··--- Admitted . 09/17/14 ___ 1 
}- ~ltf._ .. J . ______ .!..?.:.._J~hoto of Krystal Ballard··-·---------··· Admitted · Q.~!.li.L!. ____ 1 
:.Pl\Li .. -.J.~t M.!l!!i•ge Licens_e --------- A~mitted __ ; 99/17 / 14 ... i 
~-P.~~L.L~ .... JJ.:.... D~~~h Certificate for !(rystal Ballard Admi~~--J._09/.!_?fl.i___j 
;_Pitt:·-·~-- __ 21. ___ PhotosofTissueSlidesfromAutopsy ·--····- Admitted '..09/17/14 ____ ~ 
I Pltf. , 22. I Tillman Funeral Home Invoice Admitted 09/23/14 ! 
i Pltf. ! 23. Artistic Flowers Invoice Admitted 09/23/14 ! 
~~-Pltf. ____ ~~-._=-2s .. ~~]Bill from St. Alphonsus -~=-~-=-=--=:~-=-=~=~~ Admitted--= 09/23/14-~~--j 
! Pltf. 1 26. \ Bill from Elmore Medical Center Admitted : 09/23/14 
L w, ,,. , - I ••., ·--·--·-• ••r-•- -•- ----------·--••••-•••·------·--··----- -- ----.. -·-•-• ••u'" .,.,,.,,_ .. ,., ... ., .,. ! 
: J>It1'. · 27. i Bill from Rost Funeral Home Admitted 09/23/14 · ,. .............. : . ----·· -t---·--···- -- ---·--·-··--·-----·--------··--------· --·--- ............. ---\ 
~_P.!!f: ... -1------~~-=---i . .!E!.! form Lifetlight Admitted _:__09/~-~Q!!.._ _ _/ 
! Pltf.. .. :--··· 29. __ __I_ USAF Records Certification for Kr~tal Ballard Admitted __ , 09/17/14 ____ j 
· _Pltf._ : . 30. _.I.Air Force_Assignment _____________ ····-····--··--·-- . Admitted ___ 09/1_7/J 4 ____ : 
'.Pltf. 31. !LineofDutyDetermination !Admitted ·09/17/14' 
EXHIBIT LIST Page 1 of 3 
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._, ___________________ 
d Decorations Information 
----·· 
chievement Medal ---------· 
ommendation Medal 
:~:::i.--r= ;f-+}~~~:c~ A 
I-::~; -,---- -~h ~~ir~~~ --------------_for Krystal Ballard ___ 
. -----·---n---r-·------·-r---··--
1 PI tf. ___ l_____ 3 7. __ ~-Letter from Major Brown to Ssgt ___ Charles Ballard 
1_Pltf. ___ ! ______ 38._ ±Statement 
: Pltf. ! 39. Enlisted Pe 
i Pltf. 1 40. Enlisted Pe 
of Service 
rformance Review 2010 
rformance Review 2009 
--
,.. --- ----1- ---- ----·---------·--~-------
·r Pltf. __ . ..J_ __ 41_ .... _ Enl!sted Pe 
Pltf. I · 42. En!Isted P 
Pltf. T 43. Re-enlistm 
rformance Review 2008 
erformance Review 2007 ------- ·---------
ent Eligibility Annex ·----· ,- --·- ·+--··-·-.. . 
~_Plt[_ __ l · __ 48. __ Sound~ 
LPltf .. J. __ 5 l_a. __ Present Va 
LPitf. _ .; ... -- _ 51 b.\ Mone1.._ Ea 
i~al Tech-Vaser Sy~~!.11 User's Guide 
Jue of Pecuniary __ Loss Table 1 
rnings Table 2 
~::~;,:--·1 ·- -~ }~~-1 ~~~ ~: 
~ Pltf._~ ____ __51 k. -~uture Mo 
rnings Table 3 
rnings Table 4 .. --- --~------
~Earnings Ta~~J_1 
ney Earnings Table 12 ___ f--Pltf. _( __ . 511~+Future Mo 
! Pltf. ! 51~+ Future Mo 
L~l.tf: T ... ~l.~..:_J Future_~ 
ney Earnin_gDable 13 
ne g_arnings Table 14 
---
Admitted I 09/17/14 
Admitted , 09/17/14 
Admitted 09/17/14 
Admitted . 09/23/14 
Admitted : 09/17/14 -·---·-
Admitted · 09/17/14 
-
Admitted : 09/17/14 
·----·-·--· 
Admitted 09/17/14 '----------------
Admitted · 09/17/14 ----------------·--
Admitted · 09/17/14 
Admitted i 09/17/14 --.----·------· 
Admitted . 09/19/14 ~----
Admitted : 09/23/14 
Admitted , 09/23/14 L----·----,-----
Admitted : 09/23/14 
i----------i-------------
Admitted ; 09/23/ 14 
. ·t . 
Admitted , 09/23/14 -------
Admitted i 09/23/ 14 
-Admitted · 09/23/14 
Admitted : 09/23/14 
--------·--·---
[ }!~----f---~_9~---TJ}ESCRIPTION- ____ _ 
----·---------1 
roef. __ + _____ A. ---- I_ Curriculum Vitae of Brian _K 
: Def. 1 D. Curriculum Vitae of Thomas 
f Def. i F. Curriculum Vitae of John Lu 
i Def. r G. Curriculum Vitae of Geoffre 
LDcf .. f--·-K. __ Records of Life Flight 
: Def. : 0 I. Photo of Krystal Ballard 
i Def. 1 02. Photo of Krystal Ballar--d-
f Def. 1 03. Photo of Krystal Ballard 
ft Def._ l _____ 04. Photo of Krystal Ballard 
Def. I 05. Photo of Krystal Ballard 









LP_~f~ _ _[_ _______ Q1_ ___ . Photo of Krystal Ballard _ 
I Def. ·+---·- 08. ···- Photo of Krystal Ballard 































Admitted 09/24/14 t-Def. I __ 010. Photo of Krystal Ballard __ -·· ··--- ·-----t..Def. -~----011. Photo of M~allard ____ _ -
LP.~f.:.~------Q~--- ~l!oto of Krystal Ballard __ _ -----·------
i Def. , 013. Photo of Krystal Ballard 
I Def. __ j_ _____ 014.___ Photo of Krystal Ballard ___ _ 
[pef: __ J __ _9~--- P~ot~ of Krystal Ballard ···-
--.. --,--·----
·-----·---·-1-f ef .. -+-·-· .. 016. Photo of Krystal Ballard ___ _ ·----·--------
, Def. 1 017. Photo of Krystal Ballard 
--· roer-r··--018. Photo of Krysta!Ballard ----
[):}el~ --··- 0 19. _ Photo of Krystal Ballard ·-···· -·--·------· 
! Def. 1 020. Photo of Krystal Ballard ·--· - -t- ·- ·--- --~-----------------------! Def. 1 • 021. I _Photo of Krystal Ballard -·--------




















,--· --•• ·1 ·--•·-•-•-- •-T•--•-•·----··-----•-••••--•--------
~Q~.(-,-- ___ Q_L:__~to _pf Susan Keri:_ _____________ _ 
·-
, Def. 1 Q2. I Photo of Susan Kerr l. D~T~~t=::~QL_ Photo of Susan Kerr-~----·-
' De~~ Q4. Photo of Susan Kerr 
f"[5ef. _. l-___ T 1. ___ __J_ Photo of Krystal Bafiarcr ·-------
1t_ Def. : ___ . T2. __ .J_Photo of Krystal Ballard 
J)ef. __ T ·---·-T3 .8 Photo of Krystal Ballard 
U.l~f-... l_ __ _I.4.:__ Photo of Krystal Ballar~!_ __ 
Lt;?~L_: ---~}_4. Medical supply or_ device 
~ Q_ef.:..._.+---~!~:. __ Med~cal supply O! dev~ce 
t_Q_~_f_.__~_ :.- .. -~?_O. I ~ed1cal supply or de_y1ce __ -· 
·----
~_Def. __ 4 ___ z2ftMedical_~.lY.9r device __ _ -----·-
; _Def. · i··- ___ Z2~~-i_Medical s~1 or device --·---
~_Def.·--~- ____ 223. frMed~cal S~}>l'_dev~ce ___ _ 
! Def. ___ )._ ___ 224. ___ Medical supply or device_--·-· 
i Def. ! Z25. Medical supply or device 






















Identified i J?.~f:_ i ___ .?:~-~--t- Medical supply or device __ 
[_Def.1 ___ 243. : Medical s~yrdevice ___ _ 
- i----------
Admitted ----·-·-----
























09/17/ L.P.£.f.._j_ ___ ~J-!~_J~reenshot from Website __ - -- ·----· 
Deposition of Dean •Sorensen published - September 17, 2014 
Deposition of Briana Dumas published - September 25, 2014 
Deposition of Thomas Coffman published - September 30, 2014 
Deposition of Brian Kerr published (first) - October 1, 2014 
Deposition of Brian Kerr published (second) - October 1, 2014 
EXHIBIT LIST Page 3 of 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho _limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42611 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JEREMIAH A. QUANE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: MAR O 3 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DAVID Z. NEVIN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,, ........ ,,, 
,,, 1 UDJ 111 
.... , '.\~~ J CJ,1 ,,, 
...... ,C. ~ ••••••••• .( /\',, .. :"' e• •e V -;_ 
$ ~ •• ':,1/\TE ••. V' ~ 
CHRISTOPHER D.ffe_g;Jj. ~ ...._~~ \ e \ 
Clerk of the District~ 0 .. o~" : q: 
:u\ o • : ~ ".:'.i. • \~i,,..~ •• t::: W -;.v.··· •• ~~ .-~~ By lQC'. ,. ......... ~~~ \ ...... . 
Deputy Clerk -.;;;,Mf FO'it ,,,, ........ "''' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
and SILK TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND LASER 
CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA, 
LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42611 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the . 
16th day of October 2014. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
002684
2015/03/1016:14:07 4 /7 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. ~ 
~M. ---·---~~-=--~-: 
MAR 1 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHeR O. FllCH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOl)CH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
NOTICE.OF SUPPLEMENTAL, 
ADDITIONAL AND AUGM~NTE.D . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CHARLES BALLARD, AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, DAVID z. NEVIN, scan MCKAY, NEVIN, BENJAMIN, 
MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP, P.O. BOX ~772, BOISE, IDAHO 83701, P. GREGORY 
HADDAD, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 2855 CRANBERRY SQUARE, MORGANTOWN, 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL AND AUGMENTED ~OTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
I 
i I . 
O'-IGINAL 
002685
2015/03/10 16:14:07 5 /7 
WES"f: VIRGINIA 26508, JAMES B. PERRINE, BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, 3000 
RIVERCHASE GALLERIA, SUITE 905, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35244, AND. THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Brian Calder Kerr, M.D., Silk Touch 
Laser, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; and Silk Touch Laser, LL~, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, dba Silk Touch Med Spa and/or Silk Touch Med Spa and 
Laser Center, and/or Silk Touch Med Spa, Laser and Lipa of_ Boise, appea.1 against the 
above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Supplemental Judgment 
Re Costs and Fees of the District Judge entered by the Clerk February 13, 2015. 
1. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme co·urt and 
the Jµdgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 
11(1), 1.A.R. 
2. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants 
then intend to assert in the appeal are as follows: 
(a) Did the Supplemental Judgment Re Costs and Fees 
constitute error by the District Court. 
3. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
4. No reporter's transcript has been requested. 
5. The Clerk's record contains the Supplemental Judgment Re Costs 
and Fees. 
6. I certify: 
(a) The requested $100.00 deposit for the preparation· of the 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL AND. AUGMENTED _NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
002686
2015/03/10 16:14:07 6 /7 
clerk's record has been paid. 
(b) Service has been made upon all parties required to be serveq 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
(c) The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2015. 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
Jere iah A. Quane, Of the Firm · 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL AND AUGrvlENTED NOTICE Of APPEAL - 3 
I ___ ......... _ .... ___ , 
002687
.. 
2015/03/1016:14:07 7 /7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 101h day of March, 2015, I ~erved a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL, APDITIONAL AND 
AUGMENTED NOTICE OF APPEAL by delivering the same to each of the follovVing,·by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: · 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
.NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mafl, postage prep~id 
[ ] Hand Delivered · 
[ ] Overnight Mail· 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-_8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand o·elivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709 
V Jeremiah A. Quane' 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL AND AUGMENTED NOTICE OF AP.PEAL - 4_·. · 
002688
~11 s /03 /11 16:07:os 4 /6 
. .. 
"FILED.?· A.M. ____ ,P.M_ . .2_.....____,.._ 
MAR f 1 2015 . 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA HOLDEN 
DEPUTY 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTHJUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN-AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case.No. CV 00 1204792 
OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION to 
AUGMENT THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
COMES NOW Defendants by and through their counsel of record, Quane 
Jones McColl, PLLC and hereby moves this Court pursuant to Rules 2B(c), 29 and 3"2-of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules, to have the Clerk's record on appeal augmented in order .to 
include the following additional materials: 




"'"15/03/1116:07:05 5 /6 
1. Copies of all written questions submitted by the jury to Juqge Bail 
during the trial as well as any records showing the Court·~ response · 
to and/or handling of those questions. 
2 .. Copies of all written questions submitted by the .jury to Judge .Bail . . . . 
. . 
during jury deliberations as well as any records showing the Court's 
response to and/or handling of those questions .. 
3. Copy of Defendants' Exhibit H described as medical records of Dr. 
Kerr and Silk Touch Laser consisting of 27 pa.ges. 
4. Copy of Defendants' Exhibit AA described as Compilation of 
operative procedures of Dr. Kerr from. December 2007 through 
December 23, 2010, consisting of'8 pages. 
5. Copy of Defendants' Exhibit II des~ribed as b~ochure for de~ergent, 
consisting of 6 pages. 
6. Copy of Defendants' Exhibit KK descri~ed as record of medical care 
of Mountain Home Air Force Base for Krystal Ballard dated July 2~. 
2010, consisting of 2 pages. 
This request for supplementation is based upon and supported by the ldah_o 
Appellate Rules, and is supported by the Affidavits of Counsel, filed ·contemporan~ously 
herewith. 
DATED THIS 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2015. 
By-:1'-~~~,,,.....::~~~~~___,~ 
Terrence S. Jon , Of the Firm 
Attorneys for D fendants 





"-15/03/11 16:07:05 6 /6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 111h day of March, 2015, I served ·a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL by delivering the same to each of the foilowing, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ I U.S. Mail; postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail . 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepajd 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnlght Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594-9709. 
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ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1(;>01. 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attc;,rneys for Defendants 
f'ILE:IJ·~ 
A.M. ____ ,P.M ..... ~---
MAR 1 1 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cleric 
By KATRINA HOLDEN 
DEPUTY . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
Ss. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE 
IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION . 
AND/OR MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
Jeremiah A. Quane, having been first duly sworn upon oath. deposei:; and 
says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE IN SUPPORT .OF OBJECTION AND/OR.· 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
002692
--,s/03/1116:02:32 s 110 
1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned ac.tion, and t_he following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. · 
2). I was one of the attorneys of record in the trial' cbnducted by Judge 
Bail. 
3). During the trial the jury was allowed to submit written questions to the 
Judge. The jury also submitted at least one written question to the Judge during 
deliberations which is not identified or referred to in the official court transcript. 
4). During multiple side bar conferences· with Judge Bail, she stat.ed to 
me thaUhe juror questions, which were read, rejected or modified and read by the_ Judge·, 
would be part of the record in this case. Upon receipt of the Clerk's record, however, the. 
juror questions are not included and th_erefore the Clerk's record.must be ~upple.mente~. 
5). As the juror questions relate to. several of the issues 0".1 appeal, the 
Clerk's record should be supplemented to include them. 
6). Appellant therefore requests the Clerk's record · on appeal be· 
augmented pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 30 to include all.written questions submitted 
by the jurors in this case. This request is intended to include- those questions submitted· 
by the jury during the trial as well as those questions that were submitted during. jur.y 
deliberations. 
7). In addition, the Judge refused to admit Defense Exhibits H, AA,. II 
and KK all of which were included in the Defense list of exhibits and within the exhibit? 
submitted prior to trial to the Judge and the Judge's clerk. As these exhibits relate 
directly to several of our assignme·nts of err by the District Court as set forth in our Notice 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE IN SUPPO.RT OF OBJECTION AND/OR 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 . . . . 
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of Appeal, Appellant therefore requests the Clerk's record on appeal be augmented 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 30 to include complete copies of ~efense Exhibits H, 
AA, 11 and KK. 
FURTHER your Affiant sayeth naught. 
\~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~da_y of ~arch, 2015. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho . 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
. . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . 
. \\~ . 
· I HEREBY _CERTIFY that on this t£h day of March, 2015, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMI.AH A. QUANE IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTION ftND/OR · MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON. APPEAL. by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method· indicated below, addressed. 
as follows: · 
David Z. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, West Virginia 26508 
· Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand· Delivered · 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X) Facsimile (208) 345-827~ 
[ ] · U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered · 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (304) 594:.9709 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION AND/OR 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 3 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMIAH A. QUANE IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION AND/QR 




... -, s/03/11 16:02:32 4 /10 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Terrence S. Jones, ISB No. 5811 
QUANE JONES McCOLL, PLLC 
US Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 1601 
P.O. Box 1576 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 780-3939 
Facsimile (208) 780-3930 
Attorneys for Defendants 
rlO.---.~HL-;::::ED:-.. .-~~~~ . .-·--
A.M.-· ___ P.M.----
MAR 1 1 2015 · 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA HOLDEN 
. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN.AND . 




BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
Ss. 
Case No. CV OC 1204792 
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER G. KING 
IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION 
AND/OR MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD ON. APPEAL 
Jennifer G. King, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1 ). I am a member of the law firm of Quane Jones McColl, PLLC, 
attorneys of record for Defendants in the above-captioned .action, and the following 
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER G. KING IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION .... 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
002696
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statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
2). On March 10, 2015, I spoke on the telephone with Kelle Wegener, 
the Ada County Deputy Cl.erk who handles appeals. 
3). I asked Ms. Wegener why the written questions the jury submitted to 
the Judge were not included in the recently produced Clerk's record for appeal. Ms. 
Wegener acknowledged that Mr. Quane asked for everything in the record to be included 
on the appeal. 
4). I asked Ms. Wegener to determine whether the written questions 
submitted to the judge by the jury were included Jn the Clerk's file for this case. Ms. 
Wegener informed me that she located the juror's written questions inside an envelope 
within the Court's file. 
5). Ms. Wegener instructed that I submit a request for the Clerk's record 
on appeal to also include the written questions the jury submitted- to the Judge so that they 
may become part of the Clerk's record on appeal. This affidavit is·submitted in supp~rt of. 
the Defendants' accompanying Objection and/or Motion to Augment the Record on 
Appeal for that purpose. 
FURTHER your Affiant sayeth naught. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this.11th day of March, 2015. 
Notary Public for ldah9 
Residing at Boise, Idaho · 
Commission expires 03/01/2018 
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER G. KING IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION-AND/O_R MOTION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE · 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 1h day of March, 2015, I served a tru_e 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER G. KIN.GIN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD . ON APPEAL by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below,·_addresseq 
as follows: 
David Z. Nevin 
S9ott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Gregory Haddad 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
6 Canyon Road, Suite 200 
Morgantown, ·West Virginia 26508 
Telephone (304) 594-0087 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage pre·paid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 345-8274 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] · Hand D~livered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] · Facsimile (304.) ·s94-~709 
AFFIDAVIT OF JENNIFER G. KING IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION AND/ORMOTION 




',I- Scott McKay (ISB#4309) smck.ay@nbmlaw.com 
Robyn Fyffe (ISB#7063) rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
T: (208) 343-1000; F: (208) 345-8274 
P. Gregory Haddad ghad.dad@baileyglasser.com 
1;3AILEY & GLASSER LLP 
2855 Cranberry Square 
Morgantown, WV 26508 
T: (304) 594-0087; F: (304) 594-9709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NQ·--=:-:----;;~~h_ 
A.M._;_-· -.. - ···---flLW,tf?/l~ 
J.M~---:: 
MAR 1 9 201, 
CHAISTOPHeA D Al 
By JAMIE MAR CH, Clark 
D&ury TIN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






BRJAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK ) 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; and SILK TOUCH ) 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability ) 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SPA, ) 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND ) 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH ) 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF BOISE,. ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) __________ ) 
CASE NO. CVOC12-04792 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Ssgt. Charles Ballard, through counsel, offers the following 
response to the Defendant-Appellants' Objection and/or Motion to Augment the Record on 
Appeal filed on March 11, 2015. Specifically, Defendant-Appellants ask the Court to augmen~ 
1 • RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON AP~EAL 
ORIGINAL 
002699
the record with documents related to written questions from jurors listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 
and certain documents described as defense exhibits listed in paragraphs 3 to 6. SSgt. Ballard 
agrees that the records related to juror questions in paragraphs 1 and 2 are properly included in 
the appellate record and has no objection to the Defendant-Appellants' motion with respect to 
those documents. However, as described below, the Defendant-Appellants have not established 
that the other documents can be properly included in the record on appeal and ask that the motion 
as it pertains to paragraphs 3 to 6 be denied on that basis. 
"Any party may request any written document filed or lodged with the district court ... to 
be included in the clerk's ... record." JAR 28( c ). The Defense Exhibits listed in paragraphs 3 to 
6 do not appear on the list of all exhibits identified during trial, whether admitted or not, and the 
Defendant-Appellants' motion does not attach file-stamped copies of the "exhibits" at issue or 
explain when they were filed or lodged with the Court. Accordingly, Defendant-Appellants have 
not established that the documents described in paragraphs 3 to 6 of the motion are properly 
included in the appellate record and the request should be denied on that basis. 
(7--
DATED this_!:!_ day of March, 2015. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 
P. Gregory Haddad 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 • RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL 
002700
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f\,--
I hereby certify that on March 1'1 , 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Respqnse to Defendants' Motion tq Augment Record on Appeal by facsimile to the following: 
Jeremiah A. Quane 
QUANE, JONES, McCOLL 
16th Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IOI S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1601 
P.Q. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0519 
208-780-3930 
~~~ 
Scott McKay (___/ 
3 • RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 





BRIAN CALDER KERR, M.D., SILK 
TOUCH LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, and SILK TOUCH 
LASER, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, dba SILK TOUCH MED SP A 
and/or SILK TOUCH MED SPA AND 
LASER CENTER, and/or SILK TOUCH 
MED SPA, LASER AND LIPO OF 
BOISE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC12-4792 
MAR -2 ·O 2015 
. ~~ 
CHRISTOPHEA.D. RICH, Clerk 
By TARA VILLEREAL 
DEPUTY 
ORDER RE: OBJECTION AND/OR 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant's Objection to the Record is granted in 
part and that the Clerk's record on appeal be augmented to include all written questions submitted 
by the jurors in this case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Objection to the Record be denied in 
part and Defense Exhibits H, AA, II and KK will not be made part of the Clerk's record on appeal. 
These exhijr/f!;;.not identi~ed or offered at trial. 
Dated this '-dayo'fMarch, 2015. 
1 
002702
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this .2.D~ay of March, 2015, I mailed (served) a t~ue and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
JEREMIAH QUANE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1576 
BOISE ID 83701 
SCOTT MCKAY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBOX2772 
BOISE ID 83701 
P GREGORY HADDAD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
6 CANYON RD STE 200 
MORGANTOWN, WV 26508 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
2 
